Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
162777, 31 August 2007 HELD: It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts
FACTS: Francisco I. Chavez stands as a taxpayer and a citizen
asking this Court to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution No.
6520.
Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal
agreements with certain establishments to endorse their
products. On August 18, 2003, he authorized a certain Andrew
So to use his name and image for 96' North, a clothing
company. Petitioner also signed Endorsement Agreements
with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corporation
and another corporation involved in the amusement and video
games business, G-Box. These last two agreements were
entered into on October 14, 2003 and November 10, 2003,
respectively. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards
were set up along the Balintawak Interchange of the North
Expressway. One billboard showed petitioner promoting the
plastic products of Konka International Plastics Manufacturing
Corporation, and the other two showed petitioner endorsing
the clothes of 96' North. One more billboard was set up along
Roxas Boulevard showing petitioner promoting the game and
amusement parlors of G-Box.
On December 30, 2003, however, petitioner filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of Senator under Alyansa ng Pag-
asa, a tripartite alliance of three political parties: PROMDI,
REPORMA, and Aksyon Demokratiko.
On January 6, 2004, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed
herein. On January 21, 2004, petitioner was directed to comply
with the said provision by the COMELEC's Law Department. He
replied, on January 29, 2004, by requesting the COMELEC that
he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed
provision. He sent another letter dated February 23, 2004, this
time asking the COMELEC that he be exempted from the
application of Section 32, considering that the billboards
adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be
construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under
the rules.
The COMELEC answered petitioner's request by issuing
another letter, dated February 27, 2004, wherein it ordered
him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to
cover them from public view pending the approval of his
request. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court
that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted in grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered Chavez to take down the subject
billboards.
1
or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a
private individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and
image assumed partisan political character because the same
indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC
was acting well within its scope of powers when it required
petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards.
If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for
public office whose name and image are used to advertise
commercial products would have more opportunity to make
themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of
other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial
products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to
run for public office within the next few months, could pay
private corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image
even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a
doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature
campaigning: Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political
activity outside campaign period. - It shall be unlawful for any
person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party,
or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
partisan political activity except during the campaign period.
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181614, 11 September 2009 and
25 November 2009
FACTS: Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar
(Andanar) were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during
the 14 May 2007 elections.
On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional
Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a
Petition for Disqualification4 against Penera, as well as the
candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who
belonged to her political party,5 for unlawfully engaging in
election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
commencement of the campaign period.
Andanar claimed that on 29 March 2007 - a day before the
start of the authorized campaign period on 30 March 2007 -
Penera and her partymates went around the different
barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and
requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the
elections.
While SPA No. 07-224 was pending before the COMELEC
Second Division, the 14 May 2007 elections took place and, as
a result thereof, Penera was proclaimed the duly elected
Mayor of Sta. Monica. Penera soon assumed office on 2 July
2002.
On 24 July 2007, the COMELEC Second Division issued its
Resolution in SPA No. 07-224, penned by Commissioner
Nicodemo T. Ferrer (Ferrer), which disqualified Penera from
continuing as a mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, for
engaging in premature campaigning, in violation of Sections 80
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for
Reconsideration14 of the 24 July 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division, maintaining that she did not make
any admission on the factual matters stated in the appealed
resolution. OMELEC en banc denied Penera's Motion for
Reconsideration, disposing thus: WHEREFORE, this
Commission RESOLVES to DENY the instant Motion for
Reconsideration filed by [Penera] for UTTER LACK OF MERIT.
Hence this petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not [Penera] has engaged in an election
campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign
period.
HELD: We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC Second
Division in disqualifying Penera as a mayoralty candidate in Sta.
Monica.
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just
by Andanar's evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that
Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March
2007, participated in a motorcade which passed through the
different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the
public, and threw candies to the onlookers.
More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of
election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely
within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election
Code, on "[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate[.]" A motorcade is a
procession or parade of automobiles or other motor
vehicles.31 The conduct thereof during election periods by the
candidates and their supporters is a fact that need not be
belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The
obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce
the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so
as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names
in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably,
motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose than to
promote the election of a particular candidate or
candidates. As we previously noted, Penera and her
witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two
jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multi-
2
colored balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays
in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved their
hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles,
balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can hardly
persuade us that the motorcade was spontaneous and
unplanned.
For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code,
proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity
outside the campaign period, Penera must be disqualified from
holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, 05 May 2001
FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a
private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics,
politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter
processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results
thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of
general circulation, which features news- worthy items of
information including election surveys.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA.
No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15)
days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of
election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other
pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior
to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two
days before the election day without causing confusion among
the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate
and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election
surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from
explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media
from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues
up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no
reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of
election surveys, which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions
in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the
manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.
It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of
election survey results during the period proscribed by law
bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils"
sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of
expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in
duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and
the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does
not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an

unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression
and the press.

Held: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of

freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize,
the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is
a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3)
the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of
expression.

It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs

respecting matters of public convenience may well support
regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.