Sixth meeting

a. When is correction of clerical errors allowed?

 Republic Act (RA) 9048 authorizes the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general to correct a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change the first
name or nickname in the civil register without need of a judicial order.
 RA 9048 allows these corrections: correction of clerical or typographical errors in any
entry in civil registry documents, except corrections involving the change in sex, age,
nationality and status of a person.
 A clerical or typographical error refers to an obvious mistake committed in clerical work,
either in writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as a misspelled name or misspelled place of birth and the
like, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records.

b. Discuss the rule that courts should not give an interpretation that would lead to absurdities.
 Courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdities. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted.
 It is often said that in interpreting a statute a court may have recourse to three "rules" of
interpretation. These are: the "plain meaning" or literal rule, which enjoins that the court
must apply the plain meaning of the words of the statute; the" golden rule," which would
permit a court to depart from the plain meaning when that meaning results in absurdity
or injustice.

1. Discuss People v. Reyes, 236 SCRA 264, G.R. No. 103394, 02 September 1994.

c. Why should construction avoid danger to public interest?

 Where great inconvenience will result, or great public interest will be endangered or
sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a particular construction of the statute, such
construction should be avoided.

d. Why should construction be in favor of right and justice?

 In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of the law, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
 The fact that the statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with respect to a question before
a court will not justify the latter from declining judgment. That one is perceived to tip the
scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation.
  In balancing conflicting situations, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court
believes will best promote the public welfare is its probable operation as a general rule
or principle.

e. What is the Doctrine of necessary implication?

 The doctrine which states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed.

1. Discuss Chua v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 88979, 7 February 1992, 206
SCRA 65

f. What is the principle that grant of power includes all incidental powers?
 Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of one of the performance of the other is also conferred.

1. Discuss Gordon v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-55230, 08 November 1988.

2. Discuss PLDT v. City of Davao, G.R. No. L-23080, 30 October 1965

g. Discuss the axiom that states “what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly?”
 What the law prohibits cannot, in some other way, be legally accomplished.

1. Discuss Tawang Multi Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R No.
166471, 22 March 2011.

h. What is the rule regarding staturory definition?

 The legislative definition controls the meaning of a statutory word, irrespective of any
other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense.

 For the legislature, in adopting a specific definition is deemed to have restricted

the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition.

 When the legislature defines a word, it does not usurp the court‘s function to interpret
the laws but it merely legislates what should form part of the law itself.

 While the definition of terms in a statute must be given all the weight due to
them in the construction of the provision in which they are used, the terms or
phrases being part and parcel of the whole statute must be given effect in
their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and integrated unit, not as a mass
of heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences.

i. What is the rule regarding the construction of words and phrases in a statute?
  Where a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or phrase, should not by
construction, be given a different meaning

1. Discuss Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996.

j. What is generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda?

 What is generally spoken shall be generally understood or general words shall be
understood in a general sense.

1. Discuss Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No.

193459, 15 February 2011.
 DIVISION
[ GR No. 103394, Sep 02, 1994 ]
PEOPLE v. ROBERT REYES Y NAVARRO
DECISION
G.R. No. 103394
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila in
Criminal Case No. 146B-D, finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
I court supported by the evidence:
The information against appellant reads as
follows:
"That on or about the 9th day of January, 1991 in
the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being lawfully authorized to sell, deliver, and
distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and distribute to Pat. Antonio Lumacang, INP,
EPD/MPF, a poseur/buyer in a buy-bust operation,
0.02 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
wrapped in a piece of aluminum foil and 0.05
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride placed
in a maroon colored container with three (3)
pieces of aluminum foil which (sic) is a regulated
drug" (Rollo, p. 3).
On February 8, 1991, appellant pleaded not guilty
to the information (Records, p. 6).
On January 13, 1992, the trial court rendered its
decision convicting the accused of the offense
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused ROBERT REYES
y NAVARRO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment with all its
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and to pay the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be
credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, let the 0.07 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride subject matter
of this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the Government and be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be
disposed of according to law" (Rollo, p. 15).
II
We find the following findings of fact of the trial
"The prosecution presented its case in the
following manner: Based on the information given
by a confidential informant, accused was placed
under surveillance for a week before a 'buy-bust'
operation was decided to be undertaken by the
authorities concerned. On January 9, 1991 at
about 2 p.m., a team composed of Pat. Lumacang,
acting as poseur-buyer, P/Cpl. De Guzman and
Pfc. Pasana was (sic) deployed to Twinville
Subdivision, Marikina to execute the entrapment
of the accused. At about 3 p.m., accused was seen
standing in front of his house at 104 Roses Street,
Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila prompting Pat.
Lumacang to approach him and ask if he had
bato,' the street term for 'shabu.' Accused
answered the inquiry by asking Pat. Lumacang
magkano ba ang kukunin mo?' to which the latter
replied 'piso lang pare' simultaneously handing to
the former a One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bill
with Serial Number, HL 446389 (Exhibit "E") which
had been earlier initialed by Pat. Lumacang. After
receiving the money, accused gave Pat. Lumacang
a piece of foil (Exhibit "C-6") the contents of which
was suspected to be shabu.' Giving the pre-
arranged signal brought out Pfc. Pasana and P/Cpl.
De Guzman from their vantage points and they
assisted Pat. Lumacang in arresting the accused.
After informing the accused of his constitutional
rights, the arresting officers searched the accused
and found three (3) more foils (Exhibits "C-2" to
"C-4") of suspected 'shabu' placed in a plastic
maroon container (Exhibit "C-1"). After the
accused was brought to the police headquarters,
Pat. Lumacang conducted an investigation and the
accused was informed of his right to counsel.
Accused declined and told Pat. Lumacang ayusin
na lang natin sir' but Pat. Lumacang paid no
attention to the invitation. Pat. Lumacang
prepared a statement (Exhibit "F") to explain the
conduct of the operation.
Asserting his innocence, accused Reyes alleged
that he was cleaning his house when three (3)
men suddenly entered and apprehended him.
Held by one (1) of the men, he could only watch
as the two (2) other men searched the premises.
No warrant was shown to him but he was,
nonetheless, taken to the CID on the pretext that
he was being invited thereat for investigation. At
the CID office, accused was asked his name and
address, after which, he was placed in a detention
cell and subsequently charged. In consonance
with accused's theory, witness Ruben Dacanay
said that he was on his way to school when he
noticed an owner-type jeep parked in front of the
accused's house. Being a friend of the accused's
brother, Dacanay looked through the window and
saw accused Reyes being held by a man while two
(2) men were searching the bedroom. Claiming
that the men found nothing, Dacanay also alleged
that he heard the men invite the accused to the
Municipal Hall and as the group left the house,
accused was handcuffed before boarding the jeep.
The recovered specimens, placed in a yellow
envelope (Exhibit "C"), were sent to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Crame, Quezon
City along with a letter request (Exhibit "D"). P/Lt.
Julita T. de Villa conducted the
examination the result of which, as reflected in
the Certification of Laboratory Result (Exhibit "A")
and Chemistry Report Number D-013-91 (Exhibit
"B"), concluded the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride" (Rollo, pp. 44-
46).
Appellant comes to this Court raising the following
assignment of errors:
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING AS
EVIDENCE THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING A SELF-
SERVING PIECE OF EVIDENCE EXHIBIT 'E'.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DELIBERATELY
OVERLOOKING AND FAILING TO CONSIDER
CERTAIN FACTS OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE TO
SHOW THAT EVIDENCE ARE STAGE-MANAGED BY
THE PROSECUTION."
III
Appellant claims that there exists a major
discrepancy in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses with regard to the place where
appellant was arrested.
The testimony of Patrolman Antonio Lumacang
who acted as poseur-buyer is as follows:
"DIRECT EXAM.:
Q Where did the operation takes (sic) place?
A Near their house, sir, at 104 Roces St.,
Nangka, Marikina, MM.
Q Were you able to buy shabu?
A Yes, sir.
Q And from whom?
A Robert Reyes, sir" (TSN, March 8, 1991, p. 3).
On the other hand, Patrolman Antonio Pasana,
another member of the team, testified as follows:
"DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q Where did you conduct this buy-bust
operation?
A At Roces Street, Twinville Subd., Nangka,
Marikina, Metro Manila, sir.
Xxx
Q In what particular place did this transaction
took (sic) place?
A In front of the house of Robert Reyes, sir.
Q Where is that?
A No. 105 Roces Street, Twinsville Subd.,
Nangka, Marikina, Metro Manila, sir" (TSN, April 2,
1991, p. 5).
The testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses
regarding the place where the buy-bust
transaction took place and where appellant was
arrested were consistent with each other. Both
witnesses mentioned that the transaction was
made at Roces St., Barangay Nangka, Marikina,
Metro Manila. While Patrolman Lumacang
mentioned that the transaction was made "near"
the house of appellant, Patrolman Pasana testified
that the same took place "in front" of appellant's
house. To be "in front" of the house is also to be
"near" thereto.
Although there is an inconsistency in the
testimonies with respect to the exact address of
appellant, one witness saying that it was at No.
104 Roces while the other saying that it was at No.
105 Roces, such discrepancy is of minor
importance and does not detract from the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We have held in the case of People v. Doctolero,
193 SCRA 632 (1991), that "inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses which refer to minor details cannot
destroy the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. And where the prosecution witnesses
were able to positively identify the appellants as
the authors of the crime and the testimonies
were, on the whole, consistent on material points,
the contradictions become insignificant."
The inconsistencies pointed out by appellant are
too minor to affect the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, who are all lawmen
presumed to have regularly performed their
duties in the absence of convincing proof to the
contrary (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec.
5[m]; People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA 732 [1992];
People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136 [1990]; People v.
Yap, 185 SCRA 222 [1990]).
What is significant is that the prosecution
witnesses were one in testifying that appellant
was caught in flagrante delicto delivering shabu to
Patrolman Lumacang.
Appellant further asserts that it was an error for
the trial court to admit Exhibit "E", the marked
P100.00 bill, in evidence because it came from
and was in the possession of Patrolman Lumacang
before it was passed on to appellant. The defense
claims that the marked money was a "self-serving
evidence" (Rollo, pp. 34-35).
The admissibility of the marked
money in evidence is governed by Section 1, Rule
130 of the 1989 Rules on Evidence, which
provides that when an object is relevant to the
fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or
viewed by the court. The marked money, being
the consideration paid for the shabu, was relevant
to the fact in issue - the sale of shabu.
The provision under which appellant was charged
(R.A. No. 6425, Art. III, Sec. 15) does
not only penalize the sale but also the delivery of
prohibited drugs. Therefore, even if the marked
money was not admitted as evidence and the
prosecution failed to establish the sale of
dangerous drugs, still appellant could be
convicted for delivering prohibited drugs.
In People v. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 (1990), we
held:
"Suffice it to say that even if the money given to
De la Cruz was not presented in court, the same
would not militate against the People's case. In
fact, there was no need to prove that the marked
money was handed to the appellants in payment
of goods. The crime could have been
consummated by the mere delivery of the
prohibited drugs. What the law proscribes is not
only the act of selling but also, albeit not limited
to, the act of delivering. In the latter case, the act
of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another
personally or otherwise, and by means, with or
without consideration, consummates the offense"
(Underscoring Supplied).
Besides, "(a)s regards the marked money, it is
likewise settled that its absence does not create a
hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution so long
as the prohibited or regulated drug given or
delivered by the appellant was presented before
the court" (People v. Hoble, 211 SCRA 675 [1992]).
Appellant's contention that the trial court failed to
take into consideration certain vital facts to show
that the buy-bust operation was fabricated by the
prosecution, involves an appreciation of the
evidence which we leave to the
court a quo (People v. Tejada, 170 SCRA 497
[1989]).
IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer "the
penalty of life imprisonment with all its accessory
penalties and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) and to pay the costs" pursuant
to Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 as amended by B.P. Blg. 179. The said law,
however, was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.
Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty
imposed for the selling, dispensing, delivering,
transporting or distributing of shabu of less than
200 grams
is prision correccional to reclusion perpetua.
Under Section 14 of R.A. No. 7659, in relation to
Section 17 of the same law, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
on persons who sell, administer, deliver, transport
or distribute shabu when the quantity involved is
200 grams or more of shabu.
We noticed that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No.
7659 as the maximum penalty when the quantity
of shabu involved in the offense is less than 200
grams and at the same time as the minimum
penalty when the quantity of shabu involved is
200 grams or more. To avoid an incongruity in the
application of the law as written, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide
a penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal on
ly when the quantity involved is less than 20
grams. It is the duty of the Court to harmonize
conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole
law (Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court of Appeals,
100 Phil. 850 [1957]). Furthermore, this Court has
the duty to give a statute its logical construction
as to effectuate the intention of the legislature.
The Court should harmonize conflicting provisions
to give effect to the whole law. This is to avoid an
absurd conclusion with regard to the meaning of
the statute (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
Under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which
has suppletory application to special laws, penal
laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the accused. Appellant is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of the penalty
introduced by R. A. No. 7659.
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed
on appellant, we divide the amount of 199 grams
into three to correspond to the three applicable
penalties, namely, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the shabu seized weighs from 134 to 199 grams,
the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If
the shabu seized weighs from 66 to 133 grams,
the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if
the weight of the shabu involved is below 66
grams, the penalty to be imposed
is prision correccional.
Considering that the quantity of shabu confiscated
from appellant was only .07 gram, the penalty
that can be imposed on him
is prision correccional.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
appellant, who is punished under a special law
(People v. Macatando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and
as such law was interpreted in People v. Simon,
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum
penalty that can be imposed on him should be
within the range of arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to TWO (2)
years and FOUR (4) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., (Chairman), on official leave.
EN BANC
[ GR No. 88979, Feb 07, 1992 ]
LYDIA O. CHUA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DECISION
G.R. No. 88979
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and
trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683
was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for
benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well
as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its
benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:
"Sec. 2. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all
appointive officials and employees of the
National Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, as well as the personnel of all local
government units. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of
age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of
the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines including
those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act."
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program,
filed an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead,
she was offered separation benefits equivalent
to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year
of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by
petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded
negative results.[1] Her letter for reconsideration
dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
"With due respect, I think the interpretation of
the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does
not conform with the beneficent purpose of the
law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two
consecutive years of government service in order
to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet
the requirement. Persons who are not entitled
are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to
the budget needed, the law provides that the
Department of Budget and Management will
shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be
allotted to government corporations. Moreover,
personnel of these NIA special projects are
entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves,
compulsory retirement and the like. There is no
reason why we should not be entitled to RA
6683.
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
We regret to inform you that your request
cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1
of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does
not only require an applicant to have two years
of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said
applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status as of
December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A.
6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December
31, 1988, the date of your separation from the
service, is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature, this Commission
shall sustain its original decision.
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this
Court by way of a special civil action
for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the
benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
Her arguments:
"It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section
3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1
requires an applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment
status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic)
of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1,
implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683,
provides that:
'2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No.
6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for
a limited period to perform specific activities or
services with a definite expected output: i.e.
membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines including those of the Philippine
Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC--
INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire
or elect to be separated from the service for
optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No.
1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186,
as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, as
amended, or vice-versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired
voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and
have received the corresponding benefits of that
retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases
punishable by mandatory separation from the
service under existing civil service laws, rules and
regulations; provided that if such officials and
employees apply in writing within the
prescriptive period for the availment of the
benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only
if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their
application accepted and approved by the head
of office concerned.'
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner
does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is
as full time employee of NIA entitled to all the
regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service
Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs
to the Administrative Service. x x x If casuals and
emergency employees were given the benefit of
R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner
who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost
15 years of faithful, continuous service in the
government should be similarly rewarded by the
beneficent (sic) purpose of the law."[4]
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission
reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion
from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683,
because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with
the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA
(the service record was issued by the Watershed
Management and Erosion Control Project
(WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The
project, funded by the World Bank, was
completed as of 31 December 1988, after which
petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career
employee of NIA her position is not included in
its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-
career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient;
on the other hand, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. The most that a
non-career personnel can expect upon the
expiration of his employment is financial
assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to
retire under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's
appointment is permanent, security of tenure is
available only for the term of office (i.e. duration
of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not
really to grant separation or retirement benefits
but reorganization[5] to streamline government
functions. The application of the law must be
made consistent with the purpose for which it
was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of
the law is to reorganize the government, it will
not have any application to special projects such
as the WMECP which exists only for a short and
definite period. This being the nature of special
projects, there is no necessity for
offering its personnel early retirement benefits
just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of
reorganizing the WMECP considering its short
and limited life-span.[6]
5. The law applies only to employees of the
national government, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters
and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the
conflicting interpretations of the parties, the
Court is called upon to define the different
classes of employees in the public sector (i.e.
government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in
Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an
employment regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D. No. 807
(promulgated on 6 October 1975, which
superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 - R.A.
No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 Promulgated on 25 July
1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act
No. 6683) merely includes such class of
employees (regular employees) in its coverage,
unmindful that no such specie is employed in the
public sector.
The appointment status of government
employees in the career service is classified as
follows:
1. permanent - one issued to a person who has
met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof;[7]
2. temporary - In the absence of appropriate
eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary
appointment shall be issued to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That
such temporary appointment shall not exceed
twelve months, but the appointee may be
replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.[8]
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes
the Career Service as:
"(1) Open Career positions for appointment to
which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific,
or highly technical in nature; these include the
faculty and academic staff of state colleges and
universities, and scientific and technical positions
in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service;
namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the
Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career
Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in
the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the
Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do
not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-
skilled, or unskilled."[9]
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is
characterized by:
"x x x (1) entrance on bases other than those of
the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited
to a period specified by law, or which is
coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for
which purpose employment was made."
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or
confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank
who hold their positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and
boards with fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose
employment in the government is in accordance
with a special contract to undertake a specific
work or job requiring special or technical skills
not available in the employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific period, which in
no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his
own responsibility with a minimum of direction
and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel."[10]
There is another type of non-career employee:
"Casual - where and when employment is not
permanent but occasional, unpredictable,
sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza,
102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co.,
96 Phil. 945)"
Consider petitioner's record of service:
"Service with the government commenced on 2
December 1974 designated as a laborer
holding emergency status with the NIA - Upper
Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.[11] From
24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she
was a research aide with temporary status on the
same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31
December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III, R &
R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May
1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper
Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems)
DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA-
W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion
Control Project) retaining the status
of temporary employee. While with this project,
her designation was changed to personnel
assistant on 5 November 1981, starting 9 July
1982, the status became permanent until the
completion of the project on 31 December 1988.
The appointment paper[12] attached to the OSG's
comment lists her status as co-terminus with the
Project."
The employment status of personnel hired under
foreign - assisted projects is considered co-
terminous, that is, they are considered
employees for the duration of the project or until
the completion or cessation of said project (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June
1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and
benefits regular,
temporary,casual and emergency employees
who have rendered at least a total
of two (2) consecutive years of government servi
ce.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987
provides:
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966
dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service
Commission is charged with the function of
determining creditable services for retiring
officers and employees of the national
government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive
Order No. 966 provides that all previous services
by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly
approved appointment to a position in the Civil
Service are considered creditable services, while
Section 6 (a) thereof states that services
rendered
on contractual, emergency or casual status are
non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid
provisions inasmuch as some contractual,
emergency or casual employment are covered by
contracts or appointments duly approved by the
Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that
services rendered on contractual, emergency or
casual status, irrespective of the mode or
manner of payment therefor shall be considered
as creditable for retirement purposes subject to
the following conditions: (underscoring provided)
'1. These services are supported by approved
appointments, official records and/or other
competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned
shall submit the necessary proof of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and
rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity
date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period
prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the
service requirement for retirement."'
What substantial differences exist, if any,
between casual, emergency, seasonal, project,
co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are
tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-
career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC
letter of denial[13] characterized herein
petitioner's employment as co-terminous with
the NIA project which in turn was contractual in
nature. The OSG says petitioner's status is co-
terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991)
characterizes the status of a co-
terminous employee -
"(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a
person whose entrance in the service is
characterized by confidentiality by the
appointing authority or that which is subject to
his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be
further classified into the following:
'a) co-terminous with the project - when the
appointment is co-existent with the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment
was made or subject to the availability of funds
for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority -
when appointment is co-existent with the tenure
of the appointing authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent - when
appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in
that after the resignation, separation or
termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically
abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. 'co-
terminous for a period of 3 years' the
appointment is for a specific period and upon
expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.'
It is stressed, however, that in the last two
classification (c) and (d), what is termed co-
terminous is the position, and not the appointee-
employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of
the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is
limited to a specific period."
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement
Law but the former are not. It will be noted that
Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits
for early retirement
to regular, temporary, casual and emergency em
ployees. But specifically excluded from the
benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued
that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The
legislature would not have made a specific
enumeration in a statute had not the intention
been to restrict its meaning and confine its terms
and benefits to those expressly
mentioned[14] or casus omissus pro omisso haben
dus est - A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.[15] Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a
violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et
al.,[16] comes to mind where, workers belonging
to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously
from one project to another were considered
non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in
four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the
existence of a work pool can be assumed, her
service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
"x x x In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966,
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies
only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the
subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
the classification applies not only to present
conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class."[17]
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early
Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain
respondents' submission that the benefits of said
law are to be denied a class of government
employees who are similarly situated as those
covered by said law. The maxim
of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not
be the applicable maxim in this case but the
doctrine of necessaryimplication which holds
that:
"No statute can be enacted that can provide all
the details involved in its application. There is
always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time
of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation
may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law
develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules
of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is
the doctrine of necessary implication. The
doctrine states that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may
be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including
all such collateral and subsidiary consequences
as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms. Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory
grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege.
This is so because the greater includes the lesser,
expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus."[18]
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman
Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in response to
Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on
coverage of state university employees who are
extended appointments for one (1) year,
renewable for two (2) or three (3) years,[19] he
explained:
"This Bill covers only those who would like to go
on early retirement and voluntary separation. It
is irrespective of the actual status or nature of
the appointment one received, but if he opts to
retire under this, then he is covered."
It will be noted that, presently pending in
Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to
extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law).
Its wording supports the submission that Rep.
Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants, Sec. 3 of said House bill,
on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
"Sec. 3. Coverage. - It will cover all employees of
the national government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, as well as the
personnel of all local government units. The
benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and co
ntractual employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years government service as of the date of
separation. The term 'contractual employees' as
used in this Act does not include experts and
consultants hired by agencies for a limited period
to perform specific activities or services with
definite expected output.
"Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, including those of the PC-INP are
excluded from the coverage of this Act."
(emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or
Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the
bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are
deemed abolished upon early/voluntary
retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion
of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner)
defeat such objective? In their case, upon
termination of the project and separation of the
project personnel from the service, the term of
employment is considered expired, the
office functus officio. Casual, temporary and
contractual personnel serve for shorter periods,
and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years
of continuous service to qualify. This,
incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-
terminous or project employment is inherently
short?lived, temporary and transient, whereas,
retirement presupposes employment for a long
period. Here, violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution becomes glaring
because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and
yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early
Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be
achieved by granting early retirement benefits to
a group of employees (casuals) without plantilla
positions? There would, in such a case, be no
abolition of permanent positions or streamlining
of functions; it would merely be a removal of
excess personnel; but the positions remain, and
future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other
hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the
Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their
application prior to the expiration of their term,
and as long as they comply with CSC regulations
promulgated for such purpose. In this
connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series
of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act
No. 6850,[20] requires, as a condition to qualify
for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of
seven (7) years of government service which
need not be continuous, in the career or non-
career service,
whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractual or co-terminous, including
military and police service, as evaluated and
confirmed by the Civil Service Commission.[21] A
similar regulation should be promulgated for the
inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel who survive the test of
time. This would be in keeping with the coverage
of "all social legislations enacted to promote the
physical and mental well-being of public
servants."[22] After all, co-
terminous personnel are also obligated to the
government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the
denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement
benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is
unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as
petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is
entitled to the benefits of said law. While the
application was filed after expiration of her term,
we can give allowance for the fact that she
originally filed the application on her own
without the assistance of counsel. In the interest
of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not
only for two (2) years - the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen
(15) years in four (4) successive governmental
projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a
favorable disposition of petitioners application
for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No.
6683, in accordance with the pronouncements in
this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
DIVISION
[ GR No. 55230, Nov 08, 1988 ]
RICHARD J. GORDON v. JUDGE REGINO T.
VERIDIANO II AND SPS. EDUARDO AND
ROSALINDA YAMBAO
DECISION
249 Phil. 49
CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is the conflict
between the Food and Drug Administration and
the mayor of Olongapo City over the power to
grant and revoke licenses for the operation of
drug stores in the said city. While conceding that
the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claims
he may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own
power, prevent the operation of drug stores
previously permitted by the former.
There are two drug stores involved in this
dispute, to wit, the San Sebastian Drug Store and
the Olongapo City Drug Store, both owned by
private respondent Rosalinda Yambao.[1] They
are located a few meters from each other in the
same building on Hospital Road, Olongapo
City.[2] They were covered by Mayor's Permits
Nos. 1954 and 1955, respectively, issued for the
year 1980,[3] and licenses to operate issued by
the FDA for the same year.[4]
This case arose when on March 21, 1980, at
about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a joint team
composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics
agents from the Philippine Constabulary
conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug
Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium, 10 mg.
worth P410.00 without a doctor's prescription.[5]
A report on the operation was submitted to the
petitioner, as mayor of Olongapo City, on April 9,
1980.[6] On April 17, 1980, he issued a letter
summarily revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954,
effective April 18, 1980, "for rampant violation of
R.A. 5921, otherwise known as the Pharmacy
Law and R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972."[7] Later, when the petitioner went to
Singapore, Vice-Mayor Alfredo T. de Perio, Jr.
caused the posting of a signboard at the San
Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent
closure.[8]
Acting on the same investigation report of the
"test-buy," and after hearing, FDA Administrator
Arsenio Regala, on April 25, 1980, directed the
closure of the drug store for three days and its
payment of a P100.00 fine for violation of R.A.
No. 3720. He also issued a stern warning to
Yambao against a repetition of the
infraction.[9] On April 29, 1980, the FDA lifted its
closure order after noting that the penalties
imposed had already been discharged and
allowed the drug store to resume operations.[10]
On April 30, 1980, Yambao, through her counsel,
wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking
reconsideration of the revocation of Mayor's
Permit No. 1954.[11] On May 7, 1980, having
received no reply, she and her husband filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a
complaint for mandamus and damages, with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction,
against the petitioner and Vice-Mayor de
Perio.[12]
On the same date, Yambao requested permission
from the FDA to exchange the locations of the
San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo City
Drug Store for reasons of "business
preference."[13] The request was granted.[14] But
when informed of this action, the petitioner, in a
letter to the private respondent dated May 13,
1980, disapproved the transfers and suspended
Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the Olongapo City
Drug Store.[15]
The Yambaos then filed on May 15, 1980, a
supplemental complaint questioning the said
suspension and praying for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of prohibitory injunction.[16] On
the same day, the respondent judge issued an
order directing the maintenance of the status
quo with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store
pending resolution of the issues.[17]
On May 21, 1980, the petitioner wrote the FDA
requesting reconsideration of its order of April
29, 1980, allowing resumption of the operation
of the San Sebastian Drug Store.[18] The request
was denied by the FDA in its reply dated May 27,
1980.[19]
A motion for reconsideration of the status
quo order had earlier been filed on May 19, 1980
by the petitioner. After a joint hearing and an
exchange of memoranda thereon, the
respondent judge issued an order on July 16,
1980,[20] the dispositive portion of which read as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the defendants' motion for
reconsideration of the status quo order dated
May 15, 1980, is hereby DENIED and the letter of
the defendant city mayor dated April 17, 1980,
for the revocation of Mayor's Permit No. 1954
for the San Sebastian Drug Store is declared null
and void.
"Accordingly, a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction is heretofore issued enjoining
defendants from doing acts directed towards the
closure of the San Sebastian Drug Store and the
suspension of the Olongapo City Drug Store both
situated at Hospital Road, Olongapo City.
Further, the signboard posted at San Sebastian
Drug Store by the defendants is ordered
removed in order that the said drug store will
resume its normal business operation.
"The hearing of the main petition for damages is
set on August 14, 1980, at 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon."
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the above-stated order was denied in an order
dated September 4, 1980.[21] The petitioner
thereupon came to this Court in this petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, to challenge the aforesaid orders.
We issued a temporary restraining order against
the respondent judge on October 27,
1980,[22] but lifted it on December 10, 1980, for
failure of the petitioner to file his comment on
the private respondents' motion to lift the said
order and/or for issuance of a counter restraining
order. [23]
First, let us compare the bases of the powers and
functions respectively claimed by the FDA and
the petitioner as mayor of Olongapo City.
The task of drug inspection was originally lodged
with the Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners
pursuant to Act 2762, as amended by Act 4162.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 392 dated
January 1, 1951 (mandating reorganization of
various departments and agencies), this was
assumed by the Department of Health and
exercised through an office in the Bureau of
Health known as the Drug Inspection Section.
This section was empowered "to authorize the
opening of pharmacies, drug stores and
dispensaries, and similar establishments after
inspection by persons authorized by law."
The Food and Drug Administration was created
under R.A No. 3720 (otherwise known as the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), approved on June
22, 1963, and vested with all drug inspection
functions in line with "the policy of the State to
insure safe and good quality supply of food, drug
and cosmetics, and to regulate the production,
sale and traffic of the same to protect the health
of the people." Section 5 of this Act specifically
empowers it:
"(e) to issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of license and spotcheck for compliance
with regulations regarding operation of food,
drug and cosmetic manufacturers and
establishments."
For a more effective exercise of this function, the
Department of Health issued on March 5, 1968,
Administrative Order No. 60, series of 1968,
laying down the requirements for the application
to be filed with the FDA for authorization to
operate or establish a drug establishment. The
order provides that upon approval of the
application, the FDA shall issue to the owner or
administrator of the drug store or similar
establishment a "License to Operate" which
"shall be renewed within the first 3 months of
each year upon payment of the required fees."
This license contains the following reservation:
"However, should during the period of issue, a
violation of any provisions of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act and/or the regulations issued
thereunder be committed, this License shall be
subject to suspension or revocation."
When the drug addiction problem continued to
aggravate, P.D. No. 280 was promulgated on
August 27, 1973, to give more teeth to the
powers of the FDA, thus:
"Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Food and Drug
Administrator is hereby authorized to order the
closure, or suspend or revoke the license of any
drug establishment which after administrative
investigation is found guilty of selling or
dispensing drugs, medicines and other similar
substances in violation of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, and Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
or other laws regulating the sale or dispensation
of drugs, or rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto.
"Sec. 2. The administrative investigation shall
be summary in character. The owner of the drug
store shall be given an opportunity to be heard."
(P.D. 280, emphasis supplied.)
For his part, the petitioner, traces his authority to
the charter of Olongapo City, R.A. No. 4645,
which inter alia empowers the city mayor under
Section 10 thereof:
"k. to grant or refuse municipal licenses to
operate or permits of all classes and to revoke
the same for violation of the conditions upon
which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by
law or city ordinances are being committed
under protection of such licenses or in the
premises in which the business for which the
same have been granted is carried on, or for any
other good reason of general interest."
The charter also provides, in connection with the
powers of the city health officer, that:
"Sec. 6(k). He and his representatives shall have
the power to arrest violators of health laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations and to
recommend the revocation or suspension of the
permits of the different establishments to the City
Mayor for violation of health laws, ordinances,
rules and regulations." (Emphasis supplied.)
An application to establish a drug store in
Olongapo City must be filed with the Office of
the Mayor and must show that the applicant has
complied with the existing ordinances on health
and sanitation, location or zoning, fire or
building, and other local requirements. If the
application is approved, the applicant is granted
what is denominated a "Mayor's Permit"
providing inter alia that it "is valid only at the
place stated above and until (date), unless
sooner revoked for cause."[24]
Courts of justice, when confronted with
apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor
to reconcile the same instead of declaring
outright the invalidity of one as against the
other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise
policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is
possible, bearing in mind that they are equally
the handiwork of the same legislature, and so
give effect to both while at the same time also
according due respect to a coordinate
department of the government. It is this policy
the Court will apply in arriving at the
interpretation of the laws above-cited and the
conclusions that should follow therefrom.
A study of the said laws will show that the
authorization to operate issued by the FDA is a
condition precedent to the grant of a mayor's
permit to the drug store seeking to operate
within the limits of the city. This requirement is
imperative. The power to determine if the
opening of the drug store is conformable to the
national policy and the laws on the regulation of
drug sales belongs to the FDA. Hence, a permit
issued by the mayor to a drug store not
previously cleared with and licensed by the said
agency will be a nullity.
This is not to say, however, that the issuance of
the mayor's permit is mandatory once it is shown
that the FDA has licensed the operation of the
applicant drug store. This is not a necessary
consequence. For while it may appear that the
applicant has complied with the pertinent
national laws and policies, this fact alone will not
signify compliance with the particular conditions
laid down by the local authorities like zoning,
building, health, sanitation, and safety
regulations, and other municipal ordinances
enacted under the general welfare clause. This
compliance still has to be ascertained by the
mayor if the permit is to be issued by his office.
Should he find that the local requirements have
not been observed, the mayor must then, in the
exercise of his own authority under the charter,
refuse to grant the permit sought.
The power to approve a license includes by
implication, even if not expressly granted, the
power to revoke it. By extension, the power to
revoke is limited by the authority to grant the
license, from which it is derived in the first place.
Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its finding
that the applicant drug store has complied with
the requirements of the general laws and the
implementing administrative rules and
regulations, it is only for their violation that the
FDA may revoke the said license. By the same
token, having granted the permit upon his
ascertainment that the conditions thereof as
applied particularly to Olongapo City have been
complied with, it is only for the violation of such
conditions that the mayor may revoke the said
permit.
Conversely, the mayor may not revoke his own
permit on the ground that the compliance with
the conditions laid down and found satisfactory
by the FDA when it issued its license is in his own
view not acceptable. This very same principle
also operates on the FDA. The FDA may not
revoke its license on the ground that the
conditions laid down in the mayor's permit have
been violated notwithstanding that no such
finding has been made by the mayor.
In the present case, the closure of the San
Sebastian Drug Store was ordered by the FDA for
violation of its own conditions, which it certainly
had the primary power to enforce. By revoking
the mayor's permit on the same ground for
which the San Sebastian Drug Store had already
been penalized by the FDA, the mayor was in
effect reversing the decision of the latter on a
matter that came under its jurisdiction. As the
infraction involved the pharmacy and drug laws
which the FDA had the direct responsibility to
execute, the mayor had no authority to interpose
his own findings on the matter and substitute
them for the decision already made by the FDA.
It would have been different if the offense
condoned by the FDA was a violation of, say, a
city ordinance requiring buildings to be provided
with safety devices or equipment, like fire
extinguishers. The city executive may ignore such
condonation and revoke the mayor's permit just
the same. In this situation, he would be acting
properly because the enforcement of the city
ordinance is his own prerogative. In the present
case, however, the condition allegedly violated
related to a national law, not to a matter of
merely local concern, and so came under the
jurisdiction of the FDA.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of
administrative authorities are accorded great
respect because of their acknowledged expertise
in the fields of specialization to which they are
assigned.[25] Even the courts of justice, including
this Court, are concluded by such findings in the
absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion, which is not present in the case at
bar. For all his experience in the enforcement of
city ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the
superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement
of the pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He
should therefore also be prepared, like the
courts of justice themselves, to accept its
decisions on this matter.
The petitioner magnifies the infraction
committed by the San Sebastian Drug Store but
the FDA minimizes it. According to the FDA
Administrator, valium is not even a prohibited
drug, which is why the penalty imposed was only
a 3-day closure of the drug store and a fine of
P100.00.[26] Notably, the criminal charges filed
against the private respondent for the
questioned transaction were dismissed by the
fiscal's office.[27]
It is also worth noting that the San Sebastian
Drug Store was penalized by the FDA only after a
hearing held on April 25, 1980, at which private
respondent Yambao, assisted by her lawyer-
husband, appeared and testified.[28] By contrast,
the revocation of the mayor's permit was
communicated to her in a letter[29] reading
simply as follows:
April 17, 1980
Rosalinda Yambao
c/o San Sebastian Drug Store
Hospital Road, Olongapo City
Madame:
Based on a report submitted by PC Major Virtus
V. Gil, Chief 3 RFO, Dis. B, Task Force 'Bagong
Buhay,' you are rampantly violating the
provisions of Republic Act 5921 otherwise known
as the 'Pharmacy Law.'
Aside from this, there is evidence that you are
dispensing regulated drugs contrary to the
provisions of R.A. 6425 otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
In view of the above, Mayor's Permit No. 1954
heretofore issued in your name for the operation
of a drug store (San Sebastian) at the Annex
Building of the Fil-Am (IYC), along Hospital Road,
this City, is REVOKED effective April 18, 1980.
PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) RICHARD J. GORDON
City Mayor
If only for the violation of due process which is
manifest from this letter, the mayor's arbitrary
action can be annulled.
The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit
for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the
transfer thereof to the site of the San Sebastian
Drug Store as approved by the FDA but without
permission from the petitioner. On this matter,
the Court believes that the final decision rested
with the mayor. The condition violated related
more to the location in Olongapo City of business
establishments in general than to the regulation
of drug stores in particular. It therefore came
under the petitioner's jurisdiction.
The FDA would have the right to disapprove the
site of the drug store only if it would impair the
health or other interests of the customers in
contravention of the national laws or policies, as
where the drug store is located in an unsanitary
site. But the local executive would have reason
to object to the location, even if approved by the
FDA, where it does not conform to, say, a zoning
ordinance intended to promote the comfort and
convenience of the city residents.
The reason given by the petitioner in
disapproving the transfer was violation of
Mayor's Permit No. 1955, which by its terms was
valid only at the place stated therein. In the
letter of May 13, 1980,[30] the private respondent
was clearly informed that for violation of the
condition of Mayor's Permit No. 1955 granting
her the privilege of operating the Olongapo City
Drug Store at No. 1-B Fil-Am Bldg., Hospital Road,
the said permit was "hereby suspended." We
find that that reason was valid enough. The
permit clearly allowed the drug store to operate
in the address given and not elsewhere. No
hearing was necessary because the transfer
without the mayor's permission is not disputed
and was in fact impliedly admitted by the private
respondent.
If the private respondent wanted to transfer her
drug store, what she should have done was to
secure the approval not only of the FDA but also,
and especially, of the mayor. Merely notifying
the petitioner of the change in the location of
her drug stores as allowed by the FDA was not
enough. The FDA had no authority to revoke that
particular condition of the mayor's permits
indicating the sites of the two drug stores as
approved by the mayor in the light of the needs
of the city. Only the mayor could.
We assume that Mayor's Permit No. 1954 could
also have been validly suspended for the same
reason (as the sites of the two drug stores were
exchanged without amendment of their
respective permits) were it not for the fact that
such permit was revoked by the petitioner on the
more serious ground of violation of the
Pharmacy Law and the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.
It is understood, however, that the suspension
should be deemed valid only as long as the two
drug stores have not returned to their original
sites as specified in their respective permits.
Indefinite suspension will amount to a
permanent revocation, which will not be a
commensurate penalty with the degree of the
violation being penalized.
The Court adds that denial of the request for
transfer, if properly made by the private
respondents, may not be validly denied by the
judge in the absence of a clear showing that the
transfer sought will prejudice the residents of the
city. As the two drug stores are only a few
meters from each other, and in the same
building, there would seem to be no reason why
the mere exchange of their locations should not
be permitted. Notably, the location of the two
drug stores had previously been approved in
Mayor's Permits Nos. 1954 and 1955.
Our holding is that the petitioner acted invalidly
in revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after the
FDA had authorized the resumption of
operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store
following the enforcement of the penalties
imposed upon it. However, it was competent for
the petitioner to suspend Mayor's Permit No.
1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo City Drug
Store in violation of the said permit. Such
suspension should nevertheless be effective only
pending the return of the drug store to its
authorized original site or the eventual approval
by the mayor of the requested transfer if found
to be warranted.
The petitioner is to be commended for his zeal in
the promotion of the campaign against drug
addiction, which has sapped the vigor and
blighted the future of many of our people,
especially the youth. The legal presumption is
that he acted in good faith and was motivated
only by his concern for the residents of Olongapo
City when he directed the closure of the first
drug store and the suspension of the permit of
the other drug store. It appears, though, that he
may have overreacted and was for this reason
properly restrained by the respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders of July 6,
1980, and September 4, 1980 are MODIFIED in
the sense that the suspension of Mayor's Permit
No. 1955 shall be considered valid but only until
the San Sebastian Drug Store and the Olongapo
City Drug Store return to their original sites as
specified in the FDA licenses and the mayor's
permits or until the request for transfer, if made
by the private respondents, is approved by the
petitioner. The rest of the said Orders are
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-
Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[ GR No. L-23080, Sep 20, 1965 ]
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE'
COMPANY v. CITY OF DAVAO
DECISION
122 Phil. 478
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. filed
on 23, 1964 this suit for prohibition and
mandamus wnst the City of Davao and the Public
Service Commission. Petitioner seeks to enjoin
Davao City from fullfilling its contract with ITT
Philippines, Inc. for the tallation of Davao City's
telephone system. It further seeks to compel the
Public Service Commission to require that Davao
City first obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity.
The Public Service Commission filed its answer
on July 15, 1964, Davao City on August 11, 1964.
ITT Philippines, Inc. filed a motion to intervene,
which was granted, and an answer in
intervention on August 7, 1964. Petitioner
replied to the answer in intervention on October
15, 1964.
Petitioner twice applied for preliminary
injunction but same was denied.
The record shows that on August 7, 1963 and
December 27, 1963 the Davao City Council
passed Resolutions Nos. 664 and 2015,
respectively, authorizing the establishment and
maintenance of a city-wide telephone system,
owned, maintained and operated by Davao City.
Pursuant thereto Davao City entered into a
contract with ITT Philippines, Inc. on February 26,
1964, under the terms of which ITT Philippines,
Inc. agreed to install and deliver the telephone
system for the consideration of P3,587,000.00. A
down payment of P717,000.00 was paid on May
29, 1964, from which date ITT Philippines, Inc.
was given 18 months, or until November 29,
1966, to deliver the telephone system. Practically
all the materials for the project have arrived and
the process of construction of the aforesaid
telephone system is now well in its advanced
stage-Petitioner maintains that, unless
restrained, the projected installation of a
telephone system for Davao City would result not
only in unlawful expenditure of public funds but
prejudice to the rights of petitioner as prior
owner and operator since 1931 of a city-wide
telephone system in the City of Davao.
Petitioner would therefore rest on two
contentior (1) Davao City has no power to
establish and opera < a telephone system; and
(2) Davao City has first to s
cure a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Public Service Commission.
Davao City's Charter, Commonwealth Act 51, in
Section 14(ee) provides:
"Sec. 14. General powers and duties of the
Council. Except as otherwise provided by law,
and subject to the conditions and limitations
thereof, the City Council shall have the following
Legislative powers:
"(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants, and such others as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge
the powers and duties conferred by this charter;
and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed a two
hundred-peso fine or six months imprisonment,
or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense."
Resolution No. 664 of Davao City's Council stated
as reasons for the establishment of the new
telephone system:
"Whereas, numerous changes in the economic
aspects of the City of Davao during these last ten
(10) years have brought about an urgent
necessity, not only for the improvement of the
present telephone service, but also, the
immediate expansion of facilities in order to
accommodate the ever-increasing demands for
telephone connection by the Davao public;
"Whereas, the National Government,
recognizing these demands and considering the
inability of the Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company to meet these requirements
in places where it has a franchise to operate, has
taken the necessary steps for the establishment
of a nationwide telephone network and that, as a
matter of fact, it has just signed with the
International Telegraph & Telephone Company
of the Philippines a contract for P11,880,000.00
to put up the project;
"Whereas, said project of the National
Government for a nationwide telephone network
includes, among other things, the establishment
of a 1000-line automatic telephone system in
Davao City;
"Whereas, it will be to the advantage of the
people and government of the City of Davao if
the automatic telephone system proposed for
the City of Davao should be owned and operated
by the City Government of Davao, not only
because of its profitable nature, but because of
the need of expanding it to a minimum of 3000
lines which is actually the immediate
requirement in order to satisfy long-standing
requests for telephone connections, and also, in
order that the City can include provisions for the
establishment of microwave telephone system
for the Districts of Calinan, Tugbok, Mintal,
Daliao, Toril, Talomo, Panacan, Tibungco,
Bunawan and Lasang and pave the way for better
control of peace and order and emergencies
arising from the occurrence of fire and
epidemics;"
It is admitted that petitioner's existing telephone
system in Davao City covers only the poblacion.
Its plans for expansion do not appear to include
the 10 districts near the poblacion. While
petitioner hopes to provide 40,000 additional
lines throughout the country by 1969, the
country's need as of May 31, 1964 was already
for 58,000 additional lines (Annex 2 to Answer in
Intervention) .
Petitioner does not question the immediate need
for 3,000 additional lines in Davao City. It has not
supplied and from all that appears in the record
there is no immediate plan to supply such need
adequately. Account must be taken of the fact
within judicial notice that Davao City, with an
area of 942 square miles[1] (1,507.2 square
kilometers), is one of the biggest cities, if not the
biggest city, in the world.[2] It is also the main
port and commercial center of Southern
Mindanao.
Clearly, therefore, Davao City was responding to
t pressing necessity in adopting the resolutions
to establisl a telephone system that can fully
serve and benefit the people in its territory. Such
resolutions, in the light oi the foregoing set-up,
constitute a lawful exercise of Davao City's
power under Section 14 (ee) of its Charte to
legislate for the general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants.
The power of a municipal corporation to
establish and maintain a public utility, not under
a specific and express ! provision of its charter,
but under the general welfare clause therein,
should the same' be deemed conducive to the
health, comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants, has long been recognized in
American jurisprudence.3 The; Supreme Court of
Georgia, in 1918, said in Saunders vs. Mayor of
Arlington, 147 Ga. 581, 94 SE 1022, 1022-24:
"The controlling question in the case is whether
the mayor and council of the town of Arlington,
under the general welfare clause of its charter,
can install and operate an 'ice plant and cold-
storage system, and whether bonds can be
issued and validated for that purpose. * * *
"Express provision is made in the charter for the
erection, installation, and maintenance of a
system of waterworks and an electric light plant
within said town. Acts 1905, p. 608, sec. 2 et seq.
The charter also provides, under the general
welfare clause, that the town may issue bonds, in
addition to the bonds already provided for, etc.,
in a certain amount, whenever the mayor and
board of aldermen 'shall deem it proper and
expedient so to do for the purpose of making any
public improvement or improvements for the
benefit of said town. Does this provision of the
charter authorize the issuance of bonds for, and
the erection and maintenance of, an ice plant
and cold-storage system by the town? It is
suggested that the town of Arlington had express
autority given to it by the legislature to establish
a waterworks and eletric light system, etc., and
that, together with the general authority
conferred of making any other improvements
within said town' (Acts 1913, p. 492 sec. 1),
included the power to establish the ice plant and
cold-storage system. Construing the two
paragraph of the charter together, we are of the
opinion that the legislative intent was to confer
the power to establish and maintain an ice plant
and cold-storage system. * * *
"It was held in Heilbron vs. Cuthbert, 96 Ga. 312,
314, 23 S.E. 206, that under a general welfare
clause which empowered the mayor and council
to 'contract and be contracted with; sue and be
sued; * * * and * * * and do all things for the
benefit of the city, and all things not in violation
of the Constitution and laws of this state,' the
mayor and council could, upon complying with
the requisite constitutional and legal provisions:,
contract a debt for the construction and
maintenance of waterworks and an electric light
plant, and could issue bonds for this purpose. * *
*
"* * * It can hardly be doubted that the
installation of an ice plant and cold-storage
system for the benefit of the citizens of the town
is a public improvement, and one which, would
promote the health and comfort of the citizens
as much as those specifically enumerated in the
act. It would mean the furnishing of pure ice to
its citizens, under sanitary conditions and
(regulations, free from disease germs, etc.; and
the same may be said of the cold-storage system
for the preservation of perishable articles of
food. These things certainly tend to the
preservation of health, convenience, and comfort
of the citizen; and we see no good reason why, in
the exercise of the police power of the state, this
right cannot be and has not been conferred by
the Legislative on the municipality of Arlington
by the grants in its charter. * * *"[4]
Petitioner would, however, argue that Davao
City's telephone system cannot be justified under
general welfare clause provisions because said
telephone system is commercial in nature and
therefore not the proper subject of the exercise
of police power.
Suffice it to state as to this that, firstly, Section
14 (ee) of Davao City's Charter speaks of "the
furtherance of the prosperity" and "the
promotion of the . . . comfort, convenience, and
the general welfare of the City and inhabitants".
If, as stated in Resolution No. 664, the City
Government stands to profit from the- telephone
system, the same is in accordance with, rather
than opposed to, the aforementioned general
welfare clause.
Secondly, an adequate local telephone service is
no longer a mere convenience, but is
indispensable to the social life, business
communications, transactions, law enforcement,
fire alarms, etc., of the City.5 As already
observed, the proposed telephone system in
Davao City would include 10 districts, thereby
enhancing the promotion of peace and order in
said districts as well as facilitating the control of
fire, flood, and other emergencies therein.
After this case was submitted for decision,
Congress enacted the Revised Charter of Davao
City, Republic Act 4354, effective June 19, 1965.
Section 16(aa-I) thereof states:
"Sec. 16. Legislative powers. The City council
shall have the following legislative powers:
"(aa-1) To provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a telephone system, and, subject
to the provisions of the Public Service Act, to fix
the charges for the use of said service."
Arguing on the basis of the above legislation,
intervenor ITT Philippines, Inc. moved to dismiss
this case, for having allegedly become moot. On
the other hand, petitioner opposed said motion
on the ground that the validity of the challenged
Resolutions Nos. 664 and 2015 of the Davao City
Council depends on the existence of Davao City's
authority to establish and maintain a telephone
system as of the time of the passage of said
resolutions, on August 7, 1963 and December 27,
1963, respectively, and not thereafter. Anent this
point, Davao City had the Power and authority to
establish and maintain the telephone system
ordained under said resolutions, as of the s of
their passage, in view of the special facts and
circumstances existing in Davao City which
brought the same within the scope of the general
welfare clause in Davao City's charter, as above
discussed. We therefore find no reason to pass
upon the question of whether Republic Act 4354,
particularly Section 16(aa-l) thereof, had or had
no curative effect on Resolutions Nos. 664 and
2015.
Petitioner would further argue that the Davao
City's entry as another and new telephone
operator in the area covered by petitioner's
franchise would violate its vested rights as prior
operator. We need only point out in this regard
that the law granting petitioner's franchise
expressly provided that the rights thereunder
conferred are not exclusive. Section 14 of Act No-
3436 states:
"Sec. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be
exclusive, and the rights and power to grant any
corporation, association, or person other than
the grantee franchise for the telephone ot
electrical transmission of messages or signals
shall not be impaired or affected by the granting
of this franchise."
A municipal corporation is not prevented from
constructing and operating a competing plant,
although a franchise had been granted a private
company for a similar public utility, provided the
franchise is not exclusive. (McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Ed., Sec. 35.13, Vol. 12, pp.
607-608.)
Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke, in this
instance, the prior operator rule, for the same
requires for its application that the old operator
offers to meet the increase in the demand the
moment it arises and not when another
operator, even a new one, has made the offer to
serve the public needs. [6]
Regarding the issue of whether Davao City has
first to secure a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, the Public Service Act exempts
from said requirement all government entities:
"Section 13. (a) The Commission shall have
jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment,
and their properties, and in the exercise of its
authority, it shall have the necessary powers and
the aid of the public force: Provided, That public
service owned or operated by government
entities or government-owned or controlled
corporations shall be regulated by the
Commission in the same way as privately-owned
public services, but certificates of public
convenience or certificates of pnblic convenience
and necessity shall not be required of such
entities or corporations.
"Section 14. The following are exempted from
the provisions of the preceding section:
"(e) Public service owned or operated by any
instrumentality of the National Government or
by any government-owned or controlled
corporations, except with respect to the fixing of
rates."
It cannot be seriously denied that Davao City is a
Government entity.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby denied,
without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Conception,
Dizon, Makalintal and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
[1]See
Collier's Encyclopedia, 1964 Ed., Vol. 7, p.
737.
[2]
Approximately, London has 700 square miles;
Tokyo, 625 sq. mi.; Brasilia, 400 sq. mi.; and New
York, 321 sq. mi., Cf. Collier's Encyclopedia, 1964
Ed.
[3]
The general welfare caluse in our laws is of
American origin. See Sections 2238, 2625 (jj),
Revised Administrative Code, taken from
Sections 2184, 2611 of old Administrative Code.
[4]
It can be discerned from the above ruling that f
of specific powers in the Charter of a municipal
corporation not preclude exercise of other
powers not so enumerated but plied from the
general welfare clause.
[5]
Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western U. Tel. Co., 96
U.S. 1, 24 h. a. 708; Fink vs. City of Clarendon,
282 S.W. 912.
[6]
Fernando vs. Gallardo, 93 Phil., 708;
Raymundo Trans. Co. Inc. vs. Cerda, 99 Phil., 99;
Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Medina, L- 7329, May 30,
1956; Medina vs. Saulog Transit, Inc., L-7244,J 28,
1956; Estate of F.P. Buan vs. La Mallorca, L-8729,
Feb. 1957; Isidro vs. Ocampo, 105 Phil. 911;
Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. vs. Castelo, 108
Phil., 394.
RESOLUTION
October 30, 1965
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The Philippine Legislature granted Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. a special
franchise to establish and operate a tp'o-phone
system throughout the country. It wisely
provided therein that the rights thereby granted
shall not be exclusive.
Answering the clamor of the inhabitants of
Davao City, Davao City Council provided for a
city-owned and operated telephone
[1]
system. Congress itself thereafter expressly
authorized the establishment of such a
telephone system therein. [2]
The Executive, finding the legislation wisely
taken, approved the same.
The Court, interpreting the broad powers
granted to Davao City Council to legislate for the
general welfare, gave meaning and reality to the
Resolutions and laws abovementioned, in its
decision in this case promulgated September 20,
1965.
Petitioner filed a 53-page motion for
reconsideration of said decision, presenting five
propositions.
The first proposition of movant is that Davao
City's telephone system is proprietary in nature
and, therefore, cannot be undertaken under the
general welfare clause. At the outset it is well to
remember that as stated in Mendoza vs- De
Leon, 33 Phil. 508, 515:
"It often happens that the same agent or agency
has both a governmental and a corporate
character. Such, for instance, are a municipal
water system designed both for protection
against fire (a governmental function) and to
supply water to the inhabitants for profit (a
corporate function) (Omaha Water
Co. vs. Omafia, 12 L.R.A., 736; 77 C.C.A., 267, 147
Fed. 1; Judson vs. Borough of Winsted, 80 Conn.,
384; 15 L.R.A., N.S., 91); a municipal light plant
both for lighting the streets (a governmental
function) and for furnishing light to the
inhabitants at a profit (a corporate function)
(Fisher vs. New Bern, 140 N.C., 506; W Am. St.
Rep., 857)".
The same case recognized that: "The
preservation of the health and peace of its
inhabitants and fire protec tion afforded the
property owner, are governmental functions".
(Ib"d, at 511-512.) Davao City's telephone system
is designed to perform such functions; to secure
and regulate the peace and order situation of
one of the world biggest cities; to safeguard the
health and lives of its inhabitants; to afford
reliable equipment for the fighting and control of
fires, floods and epidemics; to assure these
objectives by providing speedy and direct contact
between Davao City's outlying districts and its
poblacion or seat of government. Such ends are
undoubtedly within the purview of the general
welfare clause.
The facts that in thereby promoting the general
welfare of its inhabitants, the means adopted by
the city would likewise serve the public in a
proprietary manner is no argument that the city
is powerless to adopt said measure. For as
stated, it frequently happens that from the same
act both governmental and corporate functions
arise. An interpretation that would totally limit
the general welfare clause to such governmental
functions only as are without proprietary aspects
would thereby often cripple local governments in
the face of the very evils that said clause
intended them to remedy.
A restrictive view of the general welfare clause is
not favored. The policy of Congress in this regard
has been expressly stated in Section 12 of
Republic Act 2264, the Local Autonomy Act:
"The general welfare clause shall be liberally
interpreted in case doubt so as to give mure
power to losal governments in pro-g ths
economic condition, social welfare and material
progress Z the people in the community."
The view of the movant that the scope of police
power, tiareiore of the general welfare clause,
has been by traditional delineations is not quite
accurate. Police power has not received a full
and complete definition; it is elastic and must be
responsive to various social ions; it is not
confined within the narrow circumscription of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must
follow legal progress of a democratic way of life.
Accordingly, the Court wisely said in
Churchill vs. Rafferty 32 Phil. 580, 603-605:
"In Champer vs. Greencastle (138 Ind., 339), it
was said: 'The police power of the State, so far,
has not received a full and complete definition.' *
**
"In People vs. Brazee ([Mich., 1914], 149 N.W.,
1053), it was said: 'it [the police power] has for
its object the improvement of social and
economic conditions affecting the community at
large and collectively with a view to bring about
"the greatest good of the greatest number."
Courts have consistently and wisely declined to
set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for
the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is
exercised from time to time as varying social
conditions demand correction.'
"Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States
has said in Noble State Bank vs. Haskell (219 U.S.
[1911], 575): 'It may be said in a general way that
the police power extends to all the great public
needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the
public welfare.'
"It was said in Com. vs. Alger (7 Cush., 53, 85),
per Shaw, C.J. that: 'It is much easier to perceive
and realize the existence and sources of this
police power than to mark its boundaries, or to
prescribe limits to its exercise.' * * *"
CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM states:
"* * * The police power of a municipal
corporation must be responsive, in the interest
of common welfare, to the changing conditions
and developing needs of growing communities,
and is not confined within the narrow
circumscription of precedents resting on past
conditions. That which may at one time be
regarded as not with;n such power may, at
another time, by reason of changed conditions,
be recognized as a legitimate exercise for the
exercise of the power. Also, that which may be
regarded as within the police power of one
municipal corporation may not be so regarde as
to another. * * *[3]
Speaking thru Mr. Justice Malcolm, this Court
explicitly said in U.S. vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil 102,
109:
"* * * the general welfare clause, delegates in
statutory the police power to a municipality. As
above stated, this clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its
relation to the particular circumstances of the
case been liberally construed by the courts. Such,
it is well to recall, is the progressive view of
Philippine jurisprudence."
Advancing its second proposition, movant would
find in the specific power of Davao City
to regulate telephone service (Sec. 14 [aa] of its
Charter) an implied denial of power to operate
the same. People vs.Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33, is the
authority relied for this. Said case ruled that
specific power to regulate implies withholding of
power to prohibit. The reason therein given is
that by prohibiting, nothing would be left to
regulate thereby rendering the power to regulate
superfluous and nugatory. It is therefore
different where, as in this case, there is not
suppression or prohibition but, on the contrary,
creation or giving existence to something that
may be regulated. People vs. Esguerra, supra, is
no authority against the latter.
Still movant would press the argument that at
any rate the general welfare clause does not
enlarge, but merely makes effectual, the specific
powers granted. Suffice it to say that in
U.S. vs. Salaveria, supra, at pp. 109-110, we ruled
otherwise:
"The general welfare clause has two branches.
One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon the municipal council by
law. With this class we are not here urectly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is
much more dependent of the specific functions
of the council which are enumerated by law. It
authorizes such ordinances 'as shall seem sssary
and proper to provide for the health and safety,
pro-e prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, j convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, 1 for
the protection of property therein.'"
The general welfare clause suffices in proper
cases to authorize public improvements serving
governmental functions (Saunders vs. Mayor of
Arlington, 147 Ga. 581, 94 SE 1022). Contrary to
movant's view, presence of the words "any
public improvement" in the general welfare
clause is not indispensable for the purpose.
Authorization in the clause, similar to that in
Davao City's Charter, to act for the "safety,
benefit, convenience and advantage" of the city
(Frederick vs. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561) or "to do all
things for the benefit of the city",
(Heilbron vs. Cuthbert, 96 Ga. 312, 23 SE 206)
was found sufficient for the purpose. As to the
case of Hyatt vs. Williams, 148 Cal. 585, 84 P 41,
cited by movant as authoritative, the same did
not involve a general welfare clause.
In its third proposition movant alleges that the
interpretation we followed would rewrite the
general welfare clause in all cities and
municipalities into reservoirs of unlimited
powers, superior even to that of the State under
the Constitution. As to this it must again be
emphasized that our decision was made in light
of the special factual set-up obtaining in this
case. For one thing, the size of Davao City alone
renders its situation unique and apart from our
other cities and municipalities. For another, as
already pointed out the scope of police power
varies according to different conditions and what
is within the police power of the municipal
corporation may not be, so regarded as to
another. No "far-reaching" effects need,
therefore, be feared by movant. Finally, we see
no point in the contention that the State under
the Constitution would have lesser powers than
we bold Davao City to have, for there is no doubt
that under Section 6 of Article XIII of the
Constitution, the State may also, in the interest
of national welfare, establish and operate means
of communications. [4]
Fourth of movant's propositions is that it has
already installed facilities to take care of Davao
City's telephone needs. It is still admitted,
however, that movant's telephone system and its
plan of expansion do not cover the outlying
districts of the city. It cannot therefore be
claimed that movant has provided for the
aforementioned needs or shown an immediate
plan to supply them adequately.
The fifth proposition is that any enabling
provision in Davao City's Charter for the
operation of a telephone system is not enough;
that a special legislative franchise is still required.
Since Congress has recently enacted Republic Act
4354 expressly providing that Davao City has
power to operate and maintain a telephone
system, movant now takes the extreme view that
still another legislation, by way of a special
franchise, is required. ' Such a view would render
the enabling provisions in Davao City's Charter
useless. It should be noted that such enabling
provisions are granted as among the legislative
'powers of the Davao City Council. Accordingly,
there haa been a delegation to said Council of
the legislative power to issue a franchise in favor
of the City.
The Philippine Commission's Act No. 667,
invoked by movant, is an instance of delegation
of power to grant franchise. It provides that any
person authorized to engage in operating a
telephone service has to obtain a franchise from
the municipal council of the municipality through
which its lines will pass. Davao City does not have
to follow the procedure in Act No. 667, for, as
stated, it has been empowered under its charter
to directly grant the franchise to itself. A contrary
view would be absurd: Davao City would have to
file with its City Coun-l an application for a
franchise after said Council had authorized it to
operate the telephone system. Finally, movant
states that the competition between *vao City's
telephone system and its own would be
conomically wasteful. Sometimes, however, it is
good 3r the public service to provide room for a
little com-tition. The fact that movant's own
Charter, Act No. l36, provides in Section 14 that
its right to operate a
telephone system shall not be exclusive and
reserves the power to grant any other
corporation, association or person franchise to
operate a telephone system, shows that public
policy is not always in favor of monopoly in
public utilities. In Benitez vs. Santos, and
Lopez vs. Santos, 107 Phil., 167 this Court had
occasion to remark: "A monopolistic trend with
its concomittant evils can only serve to prejudice
public interest, stifling as it does enthusiasm and
initiative on the part of those eager to learn.
Prior experience, while itself useful, cannot
create a vested right which could endanger the
economy". Republic Act 4354, in effect
authorizing competition in the telephone service
in Davao City, conclusively shows the sense of
Congress that under the prevailing conditions in
Davao City, the same will best inure to the public
welfare therein. The public interest and welfare
should be paramount.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is
denied. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angela, Dizon, Makalintal,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Conception, J., concurs in the result. Motion
denied.
EN BANC
[ GR No. 166471, Mar 22, 2011 ]
 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA
TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
DECISION
661 Phil. 390
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition[1] challenges the 1 October 2004
Judgment[2] and 6 November 2004 Order[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1,
Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case No.
03-CV-1878.
The Facts
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a
cooperative, registered with the Cooperative
Development Authority, and organized to
provide domestic water services in Barangay
Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet.
La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water
utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water
for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes
within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet.
On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National
Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application
for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to
operate and maintain a waterworks system in
Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPC's
application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47
of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is
exclusive. Section 47 states that:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be
granted to any other person or agency for
domestic, industrial or commercial water service
within the district or any portion thereof unless
and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by
resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the
Administration.
In its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002,
the NWRB approved TMPC's application for a
CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision,[4] the NWRB
held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive
since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional
and found that TMPC is legally and financially
qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks
system. NWRB stated that:
With respect to LTWD's opposition, this Board
observes that:
1. It is a substantial reproduction of its
opposition to the application for water permits
previously filed by this same CPC applicant,
under WUC No. 98-17 and 98-62 which was
decided upon by this Board on April 27, 2000.
The issues being raised by Oppositor had been
already resolved when this Board said in
pertinent portions of its decision:
"The authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D.
198 is not Exclusive. While Barangay Tawang is
within their territorial jurisdiction, this does not
mean that all others are excluded in engaging in
such service, especially, if the district is not
capable of supplying water within the area. This
Board has time and again ruled that the
"Exclusive Franchise" provision under P.D. 198
has misled most water districts to believe that it
likewise extends to be [sic] the waters within
their territorial boundaries. Such ideological
adherence collides head on with the
constitutional provision that "ALL WATERS AND
NATURAL RESOURCES BELONG TO THE STATE".
(Sec. 2, Art. XII) and that "No franchise,
certificate or authorization for the operation of
public [sic] shall be exclusive in character".
All the foregoing premises all considered, and
finding that Applicant is legally and financially
qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks
system; that the said operation shall redound to
the benefit of the homeowners/residents of the
subdivision, thereby, promoting public service in
a proper and suitable manner, the instant
application for a Certificate of Public
Convenience is, hereby, GRANTED.[5]
LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18
November 2002 Resolution,[6] the NWRB denied
the motion.
LTWD appealed to the RTC.
The RTC's Ruling
In its 1 October 2004 Judgment, the RTC set aside
the NWRB's 23 July 2002 Resolution and 15
August 2002 Decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC.
The RTC held that Section 47 is valid. The RTC
stated that:
The Constitution uses the term "exclusive in
character". To give effect to this provision, a
reasonable, practical and logical interpretation
should be adopted without disregard to the
ultimate purpose of the Constitution. What is
this ultimate purpose? It is for the state, through
its authorized agencies or instrumentalities, to be
able to keep and maintain ultimate control and
supervision over the operation of public utilities.
Essential part of this control and supervision is
the authority to grant a franchise for the
operation of a public utility to any person or
entity, and to amend or repeal an existing
franchise to serve the requirements of public
interest. Thus, what is repugnant to the
Constitution is a grant of franchise "exclusive in
character" so as to preclude the State itself from
granting a franchise to any other person or entity
than the present grantee when public interest so
requires. In other words, no franchise of
whatever nature can preclude the State, through
its duly authorized agencies or instrumentalities,
from granting franchise to any person or entity,
or to repeal or amend a franchise already
granted. Consequently, the Constitution does not
necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive
on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be
allowed to exercise this present right or privilege
to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the
grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise
against the ultimate authority of the State.[7]
TMPC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 6
November 2004 Order, the RTC denied the
motion. Hence, the present petition.
Issue
TMPC raises as issue that the RTC erred in
holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as
amended, is valid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
What cannot be legally done directly cannot be
done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a
reasonable mind, does not need explanation.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws
would be illusory.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc.,[8] the Court
held that, "What one cannot do directly, he
cannot do indirectly."[9] In Akbayan Citizens
Action Party v. Aquino,[10] quoting Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc.,[11] the Court held that, "This Court has long
and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that
those that cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly."[12] In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[13] the Court held that, "No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to
do directly."[14]
The President, Congress and the Court cannot
create directly franchises for the operation of a
public utility that are exclusive in character. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and
clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that
are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII
of the 1935 Constitution states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or other entities
organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty
per centum of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate or authorization be
exclusive in character or for a longer period than
fifty years. (Empahsis supplied)
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
states that:
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years.
(Emphasis supplied)
Plain words do not require explanation. The
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear --
franchises for the operation of a public utility
cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly
state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be
exclusive in character." There is no exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the
courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court
is to apply the law the way it is worded.
In Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61,[15] the Court
held that:
Basic is the rule of statutory construction
that when the law is clear and unambiguous,
the court is left with no alternative but to apply
the same according to its clear language. As we
have held in the case of Quijano v. Development
Bank of the Philippines:
"x x x We cannot see any room for interpretation
or construction in the clear and unambiguous
language of the above-quoted provision of
law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the
doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is
the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for
only when such literal application is impossible.
No process of interpretation or construction
need be resorted to where a provision of law
peremptorily calls for application. Where a
requirement or condition is made in explicit and
unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the
judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is
obeyed."[16] (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic of the Philippines v. Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc.,[17] the Court held
that, "The Constitution is quite emphatic that the
operation of a public utility shall not be
exclusive."[18] In Pilipino Telephone Corporation v.
National Telecommunications Commission,[19] the
Court held that, "Neither Congress nor the NTC
can grant an exclusive `franchise, certificate, or
any other form of authorization' to operate a
public utility."[20] In National Power Corp. v. Court
of Appeals,[21] the Court held that, "Exclusivity of
any public franchise has not been favored by this
Court such that in most, if not all, grants by the
government to private corporations, the
interpretation of rights, privileges or franchises is
taken against the grantee."[22] In Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v.
National Telecommunications Commission,[23] the
Court held that, "The Constitution mandates that
a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature."[24]
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court
cannot create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. What the President,
Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly
they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President,
Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly
franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water
district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that
are exclusive in character.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created
indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the
LWUA to create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198,
as amended, allows the BOD and the LWUA to
create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character. Section 47 states:
Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall
be granted to any other person or agency for
domestic, industrial or commercial water service
within the district or any portion thereof unless
and except to the extent that the board of
directors of said district consents thereto by
resolution duly adopted, such resolution,
however, shall be subject to review by the
Administration. (Emphasis supplied)
In case of conflict between the Constitution and
a statute, the Constitution always prevails
because the Constitution is the basic law to
which all other laws must conform to. The duty
of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to
declare void all laws that do not conform to it.
In Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board,[25] the Court held that, "It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm
of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void
and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution."[26] In Sabio v. Gordon,[27] the Court
held that, "the Constitution is the highest law of
the land. It is the `basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform.'"[28] In Atty.
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,[29] the
Court held that, "The Constitution is the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional."[30] In Manila Prince Hotel v.
Government Service Insurance System,[31] the
Court held that:
Under the doctrine of constitutional
supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect.
Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and
contract."[32] (Emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions expressly prohibit the creation of
franchises that are exclusive in character. They
uniformly command that "nor shall such
franchise x x x be exclusive in character." This
constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts
no exception. On the other hand, PD No. 198, as
amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to
create franchises that are exclusive in character.
Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be
granted to any other person or agency x x
x unless and except to the extent that the board
of directors consents thereto x x x subject to
review by the Administration." Section 47
creates a glaring exception to the absolute
prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is
patently unconstitutional.
Section 47 gives the BOD and the LWUA the
authority to make an exception to the absolute
prohibition in the Constitution. In short, the BOD
and the LWUA are given the discretion to create
franchises that are exclusive in character. The
BOD and the LWUA are not even legislative
bodies. The BOD is not a regulatory body but
simply a management board of a water district.
Indeed, neither the BOD nor the LWUA can be
granted the power to create any exception to the
absolute prohibition in the Constitution, a power
that Congress itself cannot exercise.
In Metropolitan Cebu Water District v.
Adala,[33] the Court categorically declared Section
47 void. The Court held that:
Nonetheless, while the prohibition in Section 47
of P.D. 198 applies to the issuance of CPCs for
the reasons discussed above, the same
provision must be deemed void ab initio for
being irreconcilable with Article XIV, Section 5
of the 1973 Constitution which was ratified on
January 17, 1973 -- the constitution in force
when P.D. 198 was issued on May 25, 1973.
Thus, Section 5 of Art. XIV of the 1973
Constitution reads:
"SECTION 5. No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor
shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any
such franchise or right be granted except under
the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the
Batasang Pambansa when the public interest so
requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utiltities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in
the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in the capital thereof."
This provision has been substantially reproduced
in Article XII Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution,
including the prohibition against exclusive
franchises.
Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an
"exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is
clearly repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the
1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may
not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in
support of its opposition against respondent's
application for CPC and the subsequent grant
thereof by the NWRB.
WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is
unconstitutional.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The dissenting opinion declares Section 47 valid
and constitutional. In effect, the dissenting
opinion holds that (1) President Marcos can
create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in
character; (2) the BOD can create directly
franchises that are exclusive in character; (3) the
LWUA can create directly franchises that are
exclusive in character; and (4) the Court should
allow the creation of franchises that are exclusive
in character.
Stated differently, the dissenting opinion holds
that (1) President Marcos can violate indirectly
the Constitution; (2) the BOD can violate directly
the Constitution; (3) the LWUA can violate
directly the Constitution; and (4) the Court
should allow the violation of the Constitution.
The dissenting opinion states that the BOD and
the LWUA can create franchises that are
exclusive in character "based on reasonable and
legitimate grounds," and such creation "should
not be construed as a violation of the
constitutional mandate on the non-exclusivity of
a franchise" because it "merely refers to
regulation" which is part of "the government's
inherent right to exercise police power in
regulating public utilities" and that their violation
of the Constitution "would carry with it the legal
presumption that public officers regularly
perform their official functions." The dissenting
opinion states that:
To begin with, a government agency's refusal to
grant a franchise to another entity, based on
reasonable and legitimate grounds, should not
be construed as a violation of the constitutional
mandate on the non-exclusivity of a franchise;
this merely refers to regulation, which the
Constitution does not prohibit. To say that a legal
provision is unconstitutional simply because it
enables a government instrumentality to
determine the propriety of granting a franchise is
contrary to the government's inherent right to
exercise police power in regulating public utilities
for the protection of the public and the utilities
themselves. The refusal of the local water district
or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other
franchises would carry with it the legal
presumption that public officers regularly
perform their official functions.
The dissenting opinion states two "reasonable
and legitimate grounds" for the creation of
exclusive franchise: (1) protection of "the
government's investment,"[35] and (2) avoidance
of "a situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor
and remote areas."[36]
There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground
to violate the Constitution. The Constitution
should never be violated by anyone. Right or
wrong, the President, Congress, the Court, the
BOD and the LWUA have no choice but to follow
the Constitution. Any act, however noble its
intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution.
This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society,[37] the Court held that,
"In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands
of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed."[38] In Sabio,[39] the Court held
that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the
land. It is `the basic and paramount law to
which x x x all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts
with the Constitution.'"[40] In Bengzon v.
Drilon,[41] the Court held that, "the three
branches of government must discharge their
respective functions within the limits of authority
conferred by the Constitution."[42] In Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections,[43] the Court held that,
"The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it
is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to [the Constitution's] commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed."[44]
Police power does not include the power to
violate the Constitution. Police power is the
plenary power vested in Congress to make
laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule
is basic.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,[45] the Court held
that, "Police power is the plenary power vested
in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, not repugnant to the
Constitution."[46] In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v.
Department of Social Welfare and
[47]
Development, the Court held that, police
power "is `the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the constitution.'"[48] In Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin,[49] the Court
held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute
of sovereignty, is the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x
x not repugnant to the Constitution."[50]
There is no question that the effect of Section 47
is the creation of franchises that are exclusive in
character. Section 47 expressly allows the BOD
and the LWUA to create franchises that are
exclusive in character.
The dissenting opinion explains why the BOD and
the LWUA should be allowed to create franchises
that are exclusive in character -- to protect "the
government's investment" and to avoid "a
situation where ruinous competition could
compromise the supply of public utilities in poor
and remote areas." The dissenting opinion
declares that these are "reasonable and
legitimate grounds." The dissenting opinion also
states that, "The refusal of the local water district
or the LWUA to consent to the grant of other
franchises would carry with it the legal
presumption that public officers regularly
perform their official functions."
When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is
void. In Sabio,[51] the Court held that, "A statute
may be declared unconstitutional because it is
not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that
infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose
or effect violates the Constitution or its basic
principles."[52] The effect of Section 47 violates
the Constitution, thus, it is void.
In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v.
Radstock Securities Limited,[53] the Court held
that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the
Constitution."[54] In Bengzon,[55] the Court held
that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the
judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it
decrees."[56] In Mutuc,[57] the Court held that:
The concept of the Constitution as the
fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding
from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of
government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which
occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is [sic]
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience
to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. Congress in the enactment of
statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive
or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the
execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard
what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to
the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary
is called upon to maintain inviolate what is
decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power
of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the
acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic
principle that the Constitution is paramount. It
overrides any governmental measure that fails to
live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.[58]
Sustaining the RTC's ruling would make a
dangerous precedent. It will allow Congress to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly. In order to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition on
franchises that are exclusive in character, all
Congress has to do is to create a law allowing the
BOD and the LWUA to create franchises that are
exclusive in character, as in the present case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
We DECLARE Section 47 of Presidential Decree
No. 198 UNCONSTITUTIONAL. We SET ASIDE the
1 October 2004 Judgment and 6 November 2004
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region
1, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, in Civil Case
No. 03-CV-1878 and REINSTATE the 23 July 2002
Resolution and 15 August 2002 Decision of the
National Water Resources Board.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ GR No. 104988, Jun 18, 1996 ]
MUSTANG LUMBER v. CA
DECISION
327 Phil. 214
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The first and third cases, G.R. No. 104988 and
G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to the
Second and Third Divisions of the Court,
respectively. They were subsequently
consolidated with the second, a case of the
Court en banc.
Petitioner, a domestic corporation with principal
office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street,
Tondo, Manila, and with a lumberyard at Fortune
Street, Fortune Village, Paseo de Blas,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as
a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD) under Certificate of
Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit
as such was to expire on 25 September 1990.
Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were,
during all the time material to these cases, the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Chief of the
Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID)
of the DENR, respectively.
The material operative facts are as follows:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a
huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs
were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the SAID
organized a team of foresters and policemen and
sent it to conduct surveillance at the said
lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team
members saw coming out from the lumberyard
the petitioner's truck, with Plate No. CCK-322,
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver
could not produce the required invoices and
transport documents, the team seized the truck
together with its cargo and impounded them at
the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon
City.[1] The team was not able to gain entry into
the premises because of the refusal of the
owner.[2]
On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a
search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R.
Osorio of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the
team seized on that date from the petitioners
lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of
narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board
feet of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.[3]
On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the
premises of the petitioner 's lumberyard in
Valenzuela and placed under administrative
seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of
311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed
to produce upon demand the corresponding
certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices,
tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the
source of the invoices covering the lumber to
prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.[4]
Parenthetically, it may be stated that under an
administrative seizure the owner retains the
physical possession of the seized articles. Only an
inventory of the articles is taken and signed by
the owner or his representative. The owner is
prohibited from disposing them until further
orders.[5]
On 10 April 1990, counsel for the petitioner sent
a letter to Robles requesting an extension of
fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to produce the
required documents covering the seized articles
because some of them, particularly the
certificate of lumber origin, were allegedly in the
Province of Quirino. Robles denied the motion on
the ground that the documents being required
from the petitioner must accompany the lumber
or forest products placed under seizure.[6]
On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted his
memorandum-report recommending to
Secretary Factoran the following:
1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of
the lumber Dealer's Permit of Mustang
Lumber, Inc. for operating an unregistered
lumberyard and resaw mill and possession
of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie)
without the required documents;
2. Confiscation of the lumber seized at the
Mustang Lumberyard including the truck
with Plate No. CCK-322 and the lumber
loaded herein [sic] now at the DENR
compound in the event its owner fails to
submit documents showing legitimacy of
the source of said lumber within ten days
from date of seizure
3. Filing of criminal charges against Mr. Ri
Chuy Po, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc.
and Mr. Ruiz, or if the circumstances
warrant for illegal possession of narra and
almaciga lumber and shorts if and when
recommendation no. 2 pushes through
4. Confiscation of Trucks with Plate No. CCS-
639 and CDV-458 as well as the lumber
loaded therein for transport lumber using
"recycled" documents.[7]
On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an
order suspending immediately the petitioner's
lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-092590-0469
and directing the petitioner to explain in writing
within fifteen days why its lumber-dealer's
permit should not be cancelled.
On the same date, counsel for the petitioner sent
another letter to Robles informing the latter that
the petitioner had already secured the required
documents and was ready to submit them. None,
however, was submitted.[8]
On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued
another order wherein, after reciting the events
which took place on 1 April and 3 April 1990, he
ordered "CONFISCATED in favor of the
government to be disposed of in accordance with
law" the approximately 311,000 board feet of
lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, shorts, and
sticks found inside the petitioner's lumberyard.[9]
On 11 July 1990, the petitioner filed with the RTC
of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with a prayer for a restraining order or
preliminary injunction against Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A.
Robles. The case (hereinafter, the FIRST CIVIL
CASE) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648
and assigned to Branch 35 o the said court. The
petitioner questioned therein (a) the seizure on 1
April 1990, without any search and seizure order
issued by a judge, of its truck with Plate No. CCK-
322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting
of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes
and dimensions with a total value of P38,000.00;
and (b) the orders of Secretary Factoran of 23
April 1990 for lack of prior notice and hearing
and of 3 May 1990 for violation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution.
On 17 September 1990, in response to reports
that violations of P.D. No. 705 (The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines), as amended,
were committed and acting upon instruction of
Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of
1990, a team of DENR agents went to the
business premises of the petitioner located at
No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, Tondo, Manila. The
team caught the petitioner operating as a lumber
dealer although its lumber-dealer's permit had
already been suspended on 23 April 1990. Since
the gate of the petitioner's lumberyard was
open, the team went inside and saw an owner-
type jeep with a trailer loaded with lumber. Upon
investigation, the team was informed that the
lumber loaded on the trailer was to be delivered
to the petitioner's customer. It also came upon
the sales invoice covering the transaction. The
members of the team then introduced
themselves to the caretaker, one Ms. Chua, who
turned out to be the wife of the petitioner's
president and general manager, Mr. Ri Chuy Po,
who was then out of town. The team's
photographer was able to take photographs of
the stockpiles of lumber including newly cut
ones, fresh dust around sawing or cutting
machineries and equipment, and the transport
vehicles loaded with lumber. The team
thereupon effected a constructive seizure of
approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber
in assorted sizes stockpiled in the premises by
issuing a receipt therefor.[10]
As a consequence of this 17 September 1990
incident, the petitioner filed with the RTC of
Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The case (hereinafter, the SECOND CIVIL CASE)
was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and
assigned to Branch 24 of the said court.
In the meantime, Robles filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against
the petitioner's president and general manager,
Ri Chuy Po, for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After
appropriate preliminary investigation, the
investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, handed
down a resolution[11] whose dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of
lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and for
illegal shipment of almaciga and lauan in
violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 as amended by E.O.
277, series of 1987.
It is further recommended that the 30,000 bd. ft.
of narra shorts, trimmings and slabs covered by
legal documents be released to the rightful
owner, Malupa.[12]
This resolution was approved by Undersecretary
of Justice Silvestre H. Bello, III, who served as
Chairman of the Task Force on Illegal Logging.[13]
On the basis of that resolution, an information
was filed on 5 June 1991 by the DOJ with Branch
172 of the RTC of Valenzuela, charging Ri Chuy Po
with the violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 324-V-91 (hereinafter, the CRIMINAL
CASE). The accusatory portion of the information
reads as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of April 1990, or
prior to or subsequent thereto, within the
premises and vicinity of Mustang Lumber, Inc. in
Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully, have in his
possession truckloads of almaciga and lauan and
approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and
shorts of various species including almaciga and
supa, without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations.[14]
On 7 June 1991, Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila
rendered its decision[15] in the FIRST CIVIL CASE,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment in this case is rendered
as follows:
1. The Order of Respondent Secretary of the
DENR, the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990 ordering
the confiscation in favor of the
Government the approximately 311,000
board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga
lumber, shorts and sticks, found inside and
seized from the lumberyard of the
petitioner at Fortune Drive, Fortune
Village, Paseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Exhibit 10), is
hereby set aside and vacated, and instead
the respondents are required to report
and bring to the Hon. Adriano Osorio,
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court,
NCJR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the said
311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, shorts and sticks, to be
dealt with as directed by law;
2. The respondents are required to initiate
and prosecute the appropriate action
before the proper court regarding the
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted
sizes and dimensions loaded in petitioner's
truck bearing Plate No. CCK-322 which
were seized on April 1, 1990;
3. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued
by the Court on August 2, 1990 shall be
rendered functus oficio upon compliance
by the respondents with paragraphs 1 and
2 of this judgment;
4. Action on the prayer of the petitioner that
the lauan, supa and almaciga lumber,
shorts and sticks mentioned above in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this judgment be
returned to said petitioner, is withheld in
this case until after the proper court has
taken cognizance and determined how
those lumber, shorts and sticks should be
disposed of; and
5. The petitioner is ordered to pay the costs
SO ORDERED.
In resolving the said case, the trial court held that
the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April
1990 of the petitioner's truck, which was moving
out from the petitioner's lumberyard in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded with large
volumes of lumber without covering document
showing the legitimacy of its source or origin did
not offend the constitutional mandate that
search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant. The situation fell under one of the
settled and accepted exceptions where
warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a
search of a moving vehicle.[16] As to the seizure of
a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan
lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the
trial court ruled that the said seizure was a
continuation of that made the previous day and
was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose
validity the petitioner did not even
question.[17] And, although the search warrant
did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and
lauan lumber and shorts, their seizure was valid
because it is settled that the executing officer is
not required to ignore contrabands observed
during the conduct of the search.[18]
The trial court, however, set aside Secretary
Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering the
confiscation of the seized articles in favor of the
Government for the reason that since the articles
were seized pursuant to the search warrant
issued by Executive Judge Osorio they should
have been returned to him in compliance with
the directive in the warrant.
As to the propriety of the 23 April 1990 order of
Secretary Factoran, the trial court ruled that the
same had been rendered moot and academic by
the expiration of the petitioner's lumber-dealer's
permit on 25 September 1990, a fact the
petitioner admitted in its memorandum.
The petitioner forthwith appealed from the
decision in the FIRST CIVIL CASE to the Court of
Appeals, which docketed the appeal as CA-
G.R. SP No. 25510.
On 7 July 1991, accused Ri Chuy Po filed in the
CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quash and/or to
Suspend Proceedings based on the following
grounds: (a) the information does not charge an
offense, for possession of lumber, as opposed
to timber, is not penalized in Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and even
granting arguendo that lumber falls within the
purview of the said section, the same may not be
used in evidence against him for they were taken
by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case
No. 90-53648 of Branch 35 of the RTC of Manila,
the FIRST CIVIL CASE, then pending before the
Court of Appeals, which involves the legality of
the seizure, raises a prejudicial question.[19]
The prosecution opposed the motion alleging
that lumber is included in Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, and possession thereof
without the required legal documents is
penalized therein. It referred to Section 3.2 of
DENR Administrative Order No. 19, series of
1989, for the definitions
of timber and lumber, and then argued that
exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would
defeat the very purpose of the law, i.e., to
minimize, if not halt, illegal logging that has
resulted in the rapid denudation of our forest
resources.[20]
In her order of 16 August 1991 in the CRIMINAL
CASE,[21] respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong granted the motion to quash and
dismissed the case on the ground that
"possession of lumber without the legal
documents required by forest laws and
regulations is not a crime."[22]
Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied in the order of 18 October 1991,[23] the
People filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court in G.R. No. 106424, wherein it contends
that the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion to
quash and in dismissing the case.
On 29 November 1991, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision[24] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 25510 dismissing for lack of merit the
petitioner's appeal from the decision in the FIRST
CIVIL CASE and affirming the trial court's rulings
on the issues raised. As to the claim that the
truck was not carrying contraband articles since
there is no law punishing the possession
of lumber, and that lumber is not timber whose
possession without the required legal documents
is unlawful under P.D. No. 705, as amended, the
Court of Appeals held:
This undue emphasis on lumber or the
commercial nature of the forest product involved
has always been foisted by those who claim to be
engaged in the legitimate business of lumber
dealership. But what is important to consider is
that when appellant was required to present the
valid documents showing its acquisition and
lawful possession of the lumber in question, it
failed to present any despite the period of
extension granted to it.[25]
The petitioner's motion to reconsider the said
decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution of 3 March 1992.[26] Hence, the
petitioner came to this Court by way of a petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 104988, which
was filed on 2 May 1992.[27]
On 24 September 1992, Branch 24 of the RTC of
Manila handed down a decision in the SECOND
CIVIL CASE dismissing the petition
for certiorari and prohibition because (a) the
petitioner did not exhaust administrative
remedies; (b) when the seizure was made on 17
September 1990 the petitioner could not lawfully
sell lumber, as its license was still under
suspension; (c) the seizure was valid under
Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705, as amended; and
(d) the seizure was justified as a warrantless
search and seizure under Section 80 of P.D. No.
705, as amended.
The petitioner appealed from the decision to the
Court of Appeals, which docketed the appeal
as CA-G.R. SP No. 33778.
In its decision[28] of 31 July 1995, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal in CA-
G.R. SP No. 33778 for lack of merit and sustained
the grounds relied upon by the trial court in
dismissing the SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on
the definition of "lumber" by
Webster, viz., "timber or logs, especially after
being prepared for the market," and by the
Random House Dictionary of the English
Language, viz., "wood, esp. when suitable or
adapted for various building purposes," the
respondent Court held that since wood is
included in the definition of forest product in
Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, lumber is necessarily included in
Section 68 under the term forest product.
The Court of Appeals further emphasized that a
forest officer or employee can seize the forest
product involved in a violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 thereof, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775, which provides in
part as follows:
SEC. 80. Arrest, Institution of Criminal Actions.--A
forest officer or employee of the Bureau or any
personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Integrated National Police shall
arrest even without warrant any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any
of the offenses defined in this chapter. He shall
also seize and confiscate, in favor of the
Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense, or the forest products
cut, gathered or taken by the offender in the
process of committing the offense.
Among the offenses punished in the chapter
referred to in said Section 80 are the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products or possession of timber or
other forest products without the required legal
documents.
Its motion to reconsider the decision having been
denied by the Court of Appeals in the resolution
of 6 February 1996, the petitioner filed with this
Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review
on certiorariin G.R. No. 123784.
We shall now resolve these three cases starting
with G.R. 106424 with which the other two were
consolidated.
G.R. No. 106424
The petitioner had moved to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on the
ground that it does not charge an offense.
Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted the
motion reasoning that the subject matter of the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE is LUMBER,
which is neither "timber" nor "other forest
product" under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, and hence, possession thereof without
the required legal documents is not prohibited
and penalized under the said section.
Under paragraph (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, an information may be quashed
on the ground that the facts alleged therein do
not constitute an offense. It has been said that
"the test for the correctness of this ground is the
sufficiency of the averments in the information,
that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of the offense,[29] and matters aliunde will not be
considered." Anent the sufficiency of the
information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court requires, inter alia, that the information
state the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense.
Respondent Ri Chuy Po is charged with the
violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by E.O. No. 277, which provides:
SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting
Timber, or Other Forest Products Without
License.-- Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other
forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the
officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further
proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in
favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipment, implements and tools illegally used
in the area where the timber or forest products
are found.
Punished then in this section are (1)
the cutting, gathering,
collection, or removal of timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned
without any authority; and (b) possession of
timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations.
Indeed, the word lumber does not appear in
Section 68. But conceding ex gratia that this
omission amounts to an exclusion of lumber
from the section's coverage, do the facts averred
in the information in the CRIMINAL CASE validly
charge a violation of the said section?
A cursory reading of the information readily
leads us to an infallible conclusion
that lumber is not solely its subject matter. It is
evident therefrom that what are alleged to be in
the possession of the private respondent,
without the required legal documents, are
truckloads of
1. almaciga and lauan; and
2. approximately 200,000 bd. ft.
of lumber and shorts of various species
including almaciga and supa.
The "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned
in no. (1) are not described as lumber." They
cannot refer to the "lumber" in no. (2) because
they are separated by the words "approximately
200,000 bd. ft." with the conjunction "and," and
not with the preposition "of." They must then be
raw forest products or, more specifically, timbers
under Section 3(q) of P.D. No. 705, as amended,
which reads:
SEC. 3. Definitions.—
(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood,
firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil,
honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest
growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant,
the associated water, fish, game, scenic,
historical, recreational and geological resources
in forest lands.
It follows then that lumber is only one of the
items covered by the information. The public and
the private respondents obviously
miscomprehended the averments in the
information. Accordingly, even if lumber is not
included in Section 68, the other items therein as
noted above fall within the ambit of the said
section, and as to them, the information validly
charges an offense.
Our respected brother, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
suggests in his dissenting opinion that this Court
go beyond the four corners of the information
for enlightenment as to whether the information
exclusively refers to lumber. With the aid of the
pleadings and the annexes thereto, he arrives at
the conclusion that "only lumber has been
envisioned in the indictment."
The majority is unable to subscribe to his view.
First, his proposition violates the rule that only
the facts alleged in the information vis-a-vis the
law violated must be considered in determining
whether an information charges an offense.
Second, the pleadings and annexes he resorted
to are insufficient to justify his conclusion. On the
contrary, the Joint Affidavit of Melencio Jalova,
Jr., and Araman Belleng, which is one of the
annexes he referred to,[30] cannot lead one to
infer that what the team seized was all lumber.
Paragraph 8 thereof expressly states:
8. That when inside the compound, the team
found approximately four (4) truckloads of narra
shorts, trimmings and slabs and a negligible
amount of narra lumber, and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and shorts of various
species including almaciga and supa which are
classified as prohibited wood species. (Italics
supplied)
In the same vein, the dispositive portion of the
resolution[31] of the investigating prosecutor,
which served as the basis for the filing of the
information, does not limit itself to lumber; thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby
recommended that an information be filed
against respondent Ri Chuy Po for illegal
possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting
of almaciga and
supa and for illegal shipment of almaciga and lau
an in violation of Sec. 63 of PD 705 as amended
by E.O. 277, series of 1987. (Italics supplied)
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any
manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is
excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession
thereof without the required legal documents is
not a crime. On the contrary, this Court rules that
such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition
of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant;" which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up,
machine or combination of machine used for the
processing of logs and other forest raw materials
into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, block-
board, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log
or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the
Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or
common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as
"timber or logs after being prepared for the
market."[32] Simply put, lumber is a processed log
or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in
a statute should be given their plain, ordinary,
and common usage meaning.[33] And insofar as
possession of timber without the required legal
documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No.
705, as amended, makes no distinction between
raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubi
lex non distanguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Indisputably, respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-
Capulong of Branch 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion to quash the
information in the CRIMINAL CASE and in
dismissing the said case.
G.R. No. 104988
We find this petition to be without merit. The
petitioner has miserably failed to show that the
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error
in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.
It was duly established that on 1 April 1990, the
petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard
loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of
different sizes and dimensions which were not
accompanied with the required invoices and
transport documents. The seizure of such truck
and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power
vested upon a forest officer or employee by
Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D.
No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE, the search was conducted on a moving
vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully
conducted without a search warrant.
Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
constitutional mandate[34] that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause. The
other exceptions are (1) search as an incident to
a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain
view, (3) customs searches, and (4) consented
warrantless search.[35]
We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4
April 1990 was a continuation of the search on 3
April 1990 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by
Executive Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a
lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at
any time within the said period, and if its object
or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day,
the same may be continued the following day or
days until completed. Thus, when the search
under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it
may be continued under the same warrant the
following day, provided it is still within the ten-
day period.[36]
As to the final plea of the petitioner that the
search was illegal because possession of lumber
without the required legal documents is not
illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended, since lumber is neither specified
therein nor included in the
term forest product, the same hardly merits
further discussion in view of our ruling in G.R.
No. 106424.
G.R. No. 123784
The allegations and arguments set forth in the
petition in this case palpably fail to show prima
facie that a reversible error has been committed
by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision
of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996
in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778. We must, forthwith,
deny it for utter want of merit. There is no need
to require the respondents to comment on the
petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the
petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the trial
court in the SECOND CIVIL CASE. The petitioner
never disputed the fact that its lumber-dealer's
license or permit had been suspended by
Secretary Factoran on 23 April 1990. The
suspension was never lifted, and since the license
had only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990,
the petitioner has absolutely no right to possess,
sell, or otherwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly,
Secretary Factoran or his authorized
representative had the authority to seize the
lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705,
as amended, which provides as follows:
Section 68-A. Administrative Authority of the
Department Head or his Duly Authorized
Representative to Order Confiscation.--In all cases
of violations of this Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned.
...
The petitioner's insistence that possession or sale
of lumber is not penalized must also fail in view
of our disquisition and ruling on the same issue
in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, the issue is totally
irrelevant in the SECOND CIVIL CASE which
involves administrative seizure as a consequence
of the violation of the suspension of the
petitioner's license as lumber dealer.
All told then, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No.
123784 are nothing more than rituals to cover up
blatant violations of the Revised Forestry Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 705), as amended. They
are presumably trifling attempts to block the
serious efforts of the DENR to enforce the
decree, efforts which deserve the commendation
of the public in light of the urgent need to take
firm and decisive action against despoilers of our
forests whose continuous destruction only
ensures to the generations to come, if not the
present, an inheritance of parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. The Government
must not tire in its vigilance to protect the
environment by prosecuting without fear or
favor any person who dares to violate our laws
for the utilization and protection of our forests.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No.

106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for
having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August
1991and 18 October 1991 of respondent Judge
Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional
Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po";
(c) REINSTATING the information in the said
criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent
Judge on her successor to hear and decide the
case with purposeful dispatch; and

2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and

in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error in
the challenged decisions of 29 November
1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL
CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against the petitioner in each of these three

cases.

SO ORDERED.