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Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris

To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2017) Worldwide deployments
of nuclear weapons, 2017, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73:5, 289-297, DOI:
10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2017
VOL. 73, NO. 5, 289–297
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995
NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK
Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris
ABSTRACT
The authors estimate that as of mid-2017, there are nearly 15,000 nuclear weapons in the world,
located at some 107 sites in 14 countries. Roughly, 9400 of these weapons are in military arsenals;
the remaining weapons are retired and awaiting dismantlement. Nearly 4000 are operationally
available, and some 1800 are on high alert and ready for use on short notice. This article reviews
the locations of nuclear weapons in all nine nuclear-armed states, as well as those of US weapons
deployed outside the United States.
As of mid-2017, we estimate that there are nearly
15,000 nuclear weapons located at some 107 sites in
14 countries. Roughly, 9400 of these weapons are in
military arsenals; the remaining weapons are retired
and awaiting dismantlement. Approximately 4150 are
operationally available, and some 1800 are on high
alert and ready for use on short notice.
By far, the largest concentrations of nuclear weapons
reside in Russia and the United States, which possess
93 percent of the total global inventory (Kristensen and
Norris 2013). In addition to the seven other countries
with nuclear weapon stockpiles (Britain, France, China,
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea), five nonnuc-
lear NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey) host about 150 US nuclear
bombs at six air bases. (For a listing of all the sites
worldwide, see Table 1.1)
Russia
We estimate that Russia stores nuclear weapons at 48
locations, by far the largest number of any nuclear-
armed state. This is a significant reduction from the
100 sites it was using in the late 1990s, 250 in the mid-
1990s, and 500 in 1991.2
There is considerable uncertainty about the number
of Russian nuclear weapons storage sites, for several
reasons. First, the Russian government provides almost
no information about its nuclear warhead storage pro-
gram. Second, Western governments say very little
about what they know.3 Moreover, definitions vary on
what constitutes a “storage site;” some observers count
each fenced storage bunker as a site, even though there
may be several individually fenced bunkers within a
CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org; Robert S. Norris
© 2017 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
KEYWORDS
Belgium; Britain; China;
Germany; France; ICBM;
India; Israel; Italy; North
Korea; missiles; Netherlands;
nuclear weapons; Pakistan;
Russia; SLBM; Turkey; United
States; nuclear weapons
storage
larger storage complex. We count each storage com-
plex as one site.
The Russian government has occasionally made
declarations about its nuclear weapons storage pro-
gram. For example, at the 2010 Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Russia
declared that “the total number of nuclear weapons
storage facilities has been reduced fourfold” since
1991 (Russian Federation 2010a). At the same event,
the Russian delegation distributed a publication stating
that “[a]ll Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons are
concentrated in centralized storage bases exclusively ob
[sic] the national territory” (Russian Federation 2010b).
Moreover, twice a year under the terms of New
START, the Kremlin hands over a detailed list of its
strategic force deployments to the US government.
Unfortunately, the list is secret.4
There is also uncertainty about the status of many
nuclear weapon systems, including what constitute
“nonstrategic” weapons. For example, medium-range
Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers are sometimes described
by Russians as strategic, even though they have a
shorter range than the strategic weapons covered by
New START. Yet, this may imply that Tu-22M3 bases
store some nuclear weapons. There is also uncertainty
about whether some storage facilities associated with
naval attack-submarine bases store nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.
Russian permanent nuclear weapon storage loca-
tions fall into three main categories: operational war-
heads at Strategic Rocket Force, navy, and air force
bases; nonstrategic and reserve or retired warheads at
national-level storage sites; and warheads at assembly
and disassembly factories.5
rnorris@fas.org
290 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS

Table 1. Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017.

Estimated worldwide locations of nuclear weapons 2017
Country Base/location Region Weapon system Remarks
Belgium Kline Brogel AB Limburg B61-3/4 US bombs for delivery by Belgian F-16s of the 10th Fighter
Wing. Weapons in custody of US 701st MUNSS
Subtotal 1
Chinaa 22 Base (Baoji area) Shaanxi Various Central warhead storage site
51 Base (Shenyang area) Liaoning and DF-21/DF-31 SSMs Regional storage site for 806, 810, 816, and 828 Missile Brigades
Shandong
52 Base (Huangshan and Anhui, Jiangxi, DF-15/DF-21 SSMs Regional warhead storage site for 807, 811, 815, 817, 819, and
Tunxi areas) Zhejiang 820 Missile Brigades
53 Base (Kunming and Yunnan, Guangxi DF-21 SSMs Regional warhead storage site for 802, 808, and 821 Missile
Liuzhou areas) Brigades
54 Base (Luoyang area) Henan DF-4, DF-5A/B, DF- Regional warhead storage site for 801, 804, 813, and 827 Missile
26, DF-31A SSMs Brigades
55 Base (Huaihua area) Hunan DF-4, DF-5A/B, DF- Regional warhead storage site for 803, 805, and 814 Missile
31A SSMs Brigades
56 Base (Xining area) Gansu and Qinghai DF-21 and DF-31A Regional storage site for 809, 812, and 823 Missile Brigades
SSMs
Jianggezhuang NSB area Shandong JL-2 SLBMs Possible warhead storage site for JL-2 SLBMs and Jin SSBNsb
Mianyang Sichuan Various Warhead design. CAEP
Pingtung area Sichuan Various Nuclear weapons fabrication. Possible underground storage site
deep in the mountains near Mianyang (Institute of Materials)
Longpo (Yulin) NSB area Hainan JL-2 SLBMs Possible warhead storage site for JL-2 SLBMs on Jin SSBNs
Zitong area Sichuan Various Warhead assembly, disassembly, and dismantlement. Possibly
China’s “Pantex Plant”c
Subtotal 12
France Avord AB Centre TNA, ASMPA ALCM Storage and maintenance site for ASMPA
Centre d’Etudes de Valduc Bourgogne TN75, TNA, TNO Warhead assembly, disassembly, and dismantlement
(Lery, north of Dijon)
Ile Longue NSB Bretagne TN75, TNO For 4 Triomphant-class SSBNs
(replacing
TN75), M51
SLBMs
Istres AB Provence TNA, ASMPA ALCM For Mirage-2000N fighter-bombers. To be replaced with Rafale
K3
Saint-Dizier AB Champagne-Ardenne TNA, ASMPA ALCM For Rafale K3 fighter-bombers. Might also store weapons for
Rafale MK3 on Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier based in
Toulon NB
Saint-Jean, south of Ile Bretagne TN75, TNO Warhead storage site for M51 SLBMs at nearby SSBN base
Longue (replacing TN75)
Subtotal 6
Germany Büchel AB Rheinland-Pfalz B61-3/4 US bombs for delivery by German PA-200 Tornados of the 33rd
Tactical Air Force Squadron. Weapons in custody of US 702nd
MUNSS
Subtotal 1
Indiad Chandighar Plant Punjab Various Possible warhead production
Jodhpur facility Rajasthan Prithvi/Agni SSMs Potential storage facility for Prithvi and/or Agni SSMs and/or
warheads
Unknown Air Force Unknown Bombs For potential use by Jaguar IS at Ambala and Gorakhpur ABs and
storage facilitiese Mirage 2000H at Gwalior AB
Unknown Army storage Unknown Prithvi/Agni SSMs For use by 222nd and 333rd Missile Groups (Prithvi), and 334th
facilitiesf and 335th Missile Groups (Agni)
Unknown Navy facilityg Unknown Dhanush ShLBM, For use by 2 Sukanya patrol ships and 1 Arihant SSBN
K-15 SLBM
Subtotal 5+
Italy Aviano AB Friuli-Venezia Giulia B61-3/4 For delivery by US F-16s of the 31st Fighter Wing
Ghedi AB Lombardia B61-3/4 US bombs for delivery by Italian PA-200 Tornados of the 6th
Fighter Wing. Weapons in custody of US 704th MUNSS
Subtotal 2
Israelh Dimona site ? Various Negev Nuclear Research Center. Plutonium, tritium, and
warhead production
Soreq Nuclear Research ? Various Possible warhead design, fabrication, and maintenance
Center
Sdot Micha missile base ? Jericho II SSMs 25–50 mobile MRBMs in caves. Warhead components potentially
on base or at separate depot
Nevatim AB ? Bombs For potential use by F-16A/B fighter-bombers. Bomb
components probably at separate depot
Tel Nof AB ? Bombs For potential use by F-16I and/or F-15I fighter-bombers. Bomb
components probably at separate depot
Subtotal 5
Netherlands Volkel AB Noord-Brabant B61-3/4 US bombs for delivery by Dutch F-16s of the 1st Fighter Wing.
Weapons in custody of US 703rd MUNSS
Subtotal 1
(Continued )
 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 291

Table 1. (Continued).
Estimated worldwide locations of nuclear weapons 2017
Country Base/location Region Weapon system Remarks
Pakistani Akro Garrison Sindh Possibly Babur Possible underground weapons storage site
GLCM
Gujranwala Garrison Punjab Possibly NASR SSM Possible weapons storage with components in remote depot
Khuzdar Garrison Balochistan Possibly Shaheen-2 Possible underground weapons storage site
SSM
Masroor Depot (Karachi) Sindh Bombs Potential storage of bombs for Mirage Vs at Masroor AB
National Development Punjab SSMs SSM launcher assembly and potential warhead component
Complex (Fatehjang) storage
Pano Akil Garrison Sindh Possibly Shaheen- Possible weapons storage with components in remote depot
1, Ghaznavi, or
NASR SSM
Sargodha Depot Punjab Possibly SSM and Possible storage site of bombs for F-16s at nearby Sargodha AB
bombs and warheads for SSMsj
Tarbala Underground Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Various Potential warhead storage
Depot
Wah Ordnance Facility Punjab Various Possible warhead production, disassembly, and dismantlement
facility
Subtotal 9
Russiak Alekseyevka-Mongokhto Khabarovsk Depth bombs For Tu-142 naval aviation. Weapons storage site southeast of
AB runway
Barnaul Missile Division Altai Krai SS-25 ICBMs Warheads for 36 ICBMs
Belaya AB Irkutsk AS-4, bombs For Tu-22M3 bombers. Weapons storage site west of runway
Borisoglebsk (Voronezh-45) Voronezh Various National-level weapons storage site
Borovsk-1 Moscow ABM Warheads for Moscow ABM system
Chazma (Abrek) Bay Primorsky SLBMs/SLCMs/ Storage site of warheads for SLBMs and other naval weapons
ASWs
Chebsara (Vologda-20) Vologda Various National-level weapons storage site
Dodonovo (Krasnoyarsk- Krasnoyarsk Various National-level weapons storage site
26, sometimes referred
to as Shivera)
Dombarovsky Missile Orenburg SS-18 ICBMs Warheads for 18 ICBMs
Division
Engels AB Saratov AS-15 ASM, bombs For Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear bombers. Weapons storage
site south of base
Gatchina Leningrad Various Regional weapons storage sitem
Golovchino (Belgorod-22) Belgorod Various National-level weapons storage site
Gorny Zabaykalsky Bombs Regional Air Force storage site
Irkutsk Missile Division Irkutsk SS-25 ICBMs Warheads for 27 ICBMs
(upgrading to
SS-27)
Karabask (Chelyabinsk- Chelyabinsk Various Possible national-level weapons storage site near Chelyabinsk-
115) 70
Kolosovka (Kulikovo) Kaliningrad Various Regional weapons storage sitel
Korfovskiy (Khabarovsk- Khabarovsk Various National-level weapons storage site
47)
Korolev Moscow Gazelle ABMs 12 Gazelle ABM interceptorsn
Kozelsk Missile Division Kaluga SS-19 and SS-27 Warheads for 20 ICBMs
ICBMs
(upgrading to
SS-27)
Krasnoarmeyskoye Saratov Various National-level weapons storage siteo
(Saratov-63)
Lesnoy-4 (Sverdlovsk-45/ Sverdlovsk Various One of Russia’s two warhead production plants. Sverdlovsk-16 is
16) a national-level weapons storage site eight kilometers west of
the Sverdlovsk-45 plant
Lytkarino Moscow Gazelle ABMs 16 Gazelle ABM interceptorsp
Mozhaysk-10 Moscow Various National-level weapons storage site
Nerpichya (Zaozyorsk) Kola Various Possible storage facility for naval weapons, including for nearby
Bolshaya Lopatka and Nerpichya Naval Bases
Nizhniy Tagil Missile Sverdlovsk SS-25 ICBMs Warheads for 27 ICBMs
Division (upgrading to
SS-27)
Novosibirsk Missile Novosibirsk SS-25 ICBMs (SS-27 Warheads for 27 ICBMs
Division upgrade)
Okolnaya (Severomorsk) Kola Various Possible storage facility for SLBMs and other naval weapons
Ramozero (Olenegorsk-2) Kola Various National-level storage sites
Rybachiy Naval Base Kamchatka SS-N-18 and SS-N- Warheads for Delta III and Borei SSBNs
32 SLBMs
Rzhanitsa (Bryansk-18) Bryansk Various National-level weapons storage site
Selikhino (Komsomolsk-31) Khabarovsk Various National-level weapons storage site
Shaykovka AB Kaluga AS-4, bombs For Tu-22M3 bombers. Weapon storage site northeast of runway
(Continued )
292 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS

Table 1. (Continued).
Estimated worldwide locations of nuclear weapons 2017
Country Base/location Region Weapon system Remarks
Shchukozero Kola Various Naval weapons storage site
Skhodnya Moscow Gazelle ABMs 16 Gazelle ABM interceptorsp
Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk- Chelyabinsk Various Former nuclear warhead design laboratory, possibly with a
70) weapons storage role
Sofrino Moscow Gazelle ABMs 12 Gazelle ABM interceptorsp
Soltsy AB Novogorod AS-4, bombs For Tu-22M3 bombers. Weapons storage site north of runway
Tatishchevo Missile Saratov SS-27 ICBMs Warheads for 60 ICBMs
Division
Teykovo Missile Division Ivanovo SS-27 ICBMs Warheads for 36 ICBMs
Trekhgorny (Zlatoust-36) Chelyabinsk Various One of Russia’s two warhead production plants. National-level
warhead storage site 10 km to the east
Ukrainka AB Amur AS-15 ASM, bombs For Tu-95 Bear bombers. Weapons storage area east of base
Uzhur Missile Division Krasnoyarsk SS-18 ICBMs Warheads for 28 ICBMs
Vilyuchinsk Kamchatka SS-N-18 and SS-N- Warheads for Delta-III and Borei SSBNs
32 SLBMs
Vnukovo Moscow Gazelle ABMs 12 Gazelle ABM interceptorsp
Vypolzovo Missile Division Novogorod/Tver SS-25 ICBMs Warheads for 18 ICBMs
Yagelnaya (Gadzhiyevo) Kola SS-N-23 and SS-N- Warheads for Delta IV and Borei-class SSBNs. Weapons storage
NB 32 SLBMs east of base. Might also store other naval weapons
Yoshkar-Ola Missile Mari El SS-25 ICBMs Warheads for 27 ICBMs
Division
Zalari (Irkutsk-45) Transbaikal Various National-level warhead storage site
Subtotal 48q
Turkey Incirlik AB Adana B61-3/4 US bombs for delivery by rotational F-16s from other US bases.
No US fighter-wing permanently deployed
Subtotal 1
United Aldermaston Atomic England British Trident Warhead design. Possibly a few warheads present
Kingdom Weapons Establishment System
Burghfield Atomic England British Trident Warhead assembly, disassembly, and dismantlement
Weapons Establishment System
Coulport Royal Navy Scotland British Trident National-level warhead storage site
Ammunition Depot System
Faslane Royal Navy Base Scotland Warheads and For Vanguard-class SSBNs
Trident II D5
SLBMs
Subtotal 4
United Bangor (Kitsap) NSB Washington W76-0, W76-1, For eight Ohio-class SSBNs of which five to six are normally
States W88, Trident II deployed
D5 SLBMs
Kings Bay NSB Georgia W76-0, W76-1, For six Ohio-class SSBNs of which three to four are normally
W88, Trident II deployed
D5 SLBM
KUMMSCr New Mexico B61 (all types), Air Force storage site with 40 bays of 300,000 square feet
W80-1, B83-1, (28,000 square meters)
W78-0, W87s
Lawrence Livermore California (W80-1, B83-1, Warhead design, surveillance, and maintenance
National Laboratory W87)t
Los Alamos National New Mexico (B61 (all types), Warhead design, surveillance, and maintenance
Laboratory W76-0, W76-1,
W78-0, W88)t
Malmstrom AFB and Montana W78-0, W87 Warheads for 150 Minuteman III ICBMs
Missile Field
Minot AFB and Missile North Dakota W78-0, W80-1, Warheads for 150 Minuteman III ICBMs and ALCMs for B-52Hs of
Field W87 the 5th Bomb Wing (Minot) and the 2nd Bomb Wing
(Barksdale)
Pantex Plant Texas Various Assembly, disassembly, and dismantlement of all warhead types
Strategic Weapons Facility Georgia W76-0, W76-1, Navy warhead storage site
Atlantic (Kings Bay W88, Trident II
NSB) D5 SLBMs
Strategic Weapons Facility Washington W76-0, W76-1, Navy warhead storage site
Pacific (Bangor NSB) W88, Trident II
D5 SLBMs
Warren AFB and Missile Colorado, Nebraska, W78-0, W87 Warheads for 150 Minuteman III ICBMs
Field Wyoming
Whiteman AFB Missouri B61-7/11, B83-1 For B-2As of the 509th Bomb Wing
Subtotal 12u
Total 107
The table lists locations where nuclear bombs or warheads are estimated to be present. In addition to these sites, a large number of bases have delivery
systems that are capable of delivering nuclear bombs or warheads but where nuclear weapons are not present under normal circumstances. For additional
information about these facilities, visit this web page: https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/08/nuclear-storage-locations/
 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 293

Table 1. (Continued).
AB: air base; ABM: antiballistic missile; AFB: Air Force Base; ALCM: air-launched cruise missile; ASM: air-to-surface missile; ASMPA: Air-Sol Moyenne Portee
Amélioré; ASW: antisubmarine warfare; DB: depth bomb; GLCM: ground-launched cruise missile; ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; MRBM: medium-
range ballistic missile; MUNSS: Munitions Support Squadron; NB: naval base; NSB: Naval Submarine Base; SAM: surface-to-air missile; ShLBM: ship-launched
ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile; SLCM: sea-launched cruise missile; SRBM: short-range ballistic missile; SSBN: nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine; SSM: surface-to-surface missile; TNA: Tête Nucleaire Aéroportée; TNO: Tête Nucléaire Océanique; CAEP: Chinese Academy of
Engineering Physics; KUMMSC: Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex.
a
It is thought that China does not deploy nuclear warheads on missiles and aircraft under normal circumstances but stores the warheads in central and
regional storage facilities under control of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In a crisis, the CMC would release the warheads to the armed forces for
deployment onto delivery systems.
Essential sources for estimating locations of Chinese land-based missile forces include: Mark A. Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,
Project 2049 Institute, 12 March 2010; Mark S. Stokes, Second Artillery Unit and Leadership Report: 1st Quarter 2012, Project 2049 Institute, 21 February 2012;
Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Zenith Press, 2009), pp. 84–113, 220–234,
354–363; Bates Gill, et al., “The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, eds., The
People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v. 1.0 (RAND, 2002); William M. Arkin, et al., Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998,
Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1998; Robert S. Norris, et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons
(Westview Press, 1994); Google Earth; and authors’ research and estimates.
b
All Jin-class SSBNs are homeported at the Longpo Naval Base on Hainan Island where their missile storage facility is also thought to be located.
Jianggezhuang might still have some SLBM service function.
c
This might be the nuclear weapon production and storage facility reported in The Nuclear Express on page 358 (Reed and Stillman 2009) as located two-and-
a-half hours north of Mianyang near the city of Pingtung.
d
It is thought that Indian nuclear warheads are in central storage and not deployed on delivery vehicles under normal circumstances.
e
The storage locations for warheads earmarked for use by aircraft are not known.
f
The storage locations for warheads earmarked for use by Prithvi and Agni missiles are not known.
g
The storage locations for warheads earmarked for use by Dhanush and K-15 missiles are not known.
h
Israel’s nuclear warheads are not mated with delivery vehicles and are thought to be only partially assembled under normal circumstances.
i
Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are not mated with delivery vehicles under normal circumstances but kept in central storage facilities. For a profile of possible
Pakistani missile facilities, see: Hans M. Kristensen, “Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 16 November 2016,
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/11/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/.
j
In response to reports about terrorist attacks on suspected nuclear facilities, including Sargodha Depot, Pakistani military spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas
stated, “These are nowhere close to any nuclear facility” (Mahsud 2009).
k
It is thought that Russian warheads for all nonstrategic nuclear weapon systems have been placed in central storage and that only warheads for operational
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers are present at the bases. There are unconfirmed rumors that some air force, air-defense, and navy sites might also store
tactical warheads.
Locations listed in this table are based on US Defense Department, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report to Congress” (various years); US
Department of State, START Treaty documents (various years); “U.S. Efforts to Secure Russia’s Nuclear Warheads: Background and Issues”; Oleg Bukharin,
et al., in New Perspectives in Russia’s Ten Secret Cites (Natural Resources Defense Council, October 1999); Joshua Handler, Russian Nuclear Warhead
Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the Implementation of START II and de-alerting Initiatives (Princeton University, February
1999); William M. Arkin, et al., Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998 (Natural Resources Defense Council, October 1998); Thomas B. Cochran,
et al., Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume IV: Soviet Nuclear Weapons (Harper & Row, 1989). Other valuable resources include Gunnar Arbman and Charles
Thornton, Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations (Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2005); Pavel
Podvig, ed., Russian Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001); Pavel Podvig and Javier Serrat, Lock Them Up: Zero-Deployed Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe
(UNIDIR, 2017); Sean O’Connor, IMINT & Analysis, http://geimint.blogspot.com/; Google Earth; authors’ research and estimates.
l
The security perimeter of this site was upgraded between 2006 and 2010. It is unclear if the site has warheads present under normal circumstances or is
maintained for contingencies.
m
This is a newly upgraded site where security perimeters were strengthened in 2012–2013 with triple-fence perimeter. It is unclear if the site has warheads
present under normal circumstances or is maintained for contingencies.
n
It is possible that these nuclear warheads are not mated with interceptors under normal circumstances but stored at the Borovsk-1 site.
o
Gen. Eugene Habiger, the former commander of STRATCOM, visited Saratov, the Russian national storage site, in 1998 and later described being shown strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons: “We went to Saratov, a national nuclear weapons storage site, where I saw not only strategic weapons, but tactical weapons. . .. And
they took me into the side of a mountain, a hill, where we went behind two doors that were each several thousands of tons in weight. And you had to open up
one door at a time, these sliding, massive doors, in order to get into the inner sanctum. In the inner sanctum, there were five nuclear weapon storage bays. They
took me into one of those bays, and we had an interesting discussion.” Defense Department news briefing, 16 June 1998.
p
It is possible that these nuclear warheads are not mated with interceptors under normal circumstances but stored at the Borovsk-1 site.
q
In addition to the storage sites and strategic bases listed here, a significant number of temporary storage sites include railhead and transfer stations.
Moreover, it is assumed that all warheads have been removed from nonstrategic nuclear weapon bases and units and placed in the national-level central
storage sites maintained by the 12th Main Directorate (GUMO). This includes air bases with Su-24 Fencer and Su-34 Fullback fighter-bombers, army bases
with SS-21 and SS-26 SSMs, naval bases with surface ships, attack-submarines, and antisubmarine warfare aircraft, coastal defense units with SSC-1B
launchers, and dozens of air-defense bases with nuclear-capable S-300 surface-to-air units. Some of the GUMO sites are close to bases with operational
forces.
r
The nuclear storage mission at Nellis Air Force Base, which until a decade ago contained one of the largest concentrations of nuclear weapons in the world,
appears to have been phased out and all remaining weapons consolidated at Kirtland Air Force Base.
s
As a joint storage site, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC) might also store some naval warheads, but they
are largely thought to be in the US Navy’s strategic weapons facilities in Georgia and Washington State.
t
Weapons are not normally present but a few weapons or components may occasionally be brought in for surveillance or maintenance.
u
The United States also deploys nuclear weapons at six facilities in five European countries. See Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey for
details. If including the European bases in the total US count, the United States stores nuclear weapons at 18 facilities. Barksdale Air Force Base has
nuclear-capable B-52H bombers, but their weapons are no longer stored at Barksdale but rather at Minot Air Force Base.
294 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS

The storage locations for operational warheads maintenance complex at Valduc. We estimate that the
include 11 ICBM fields and garrisons, two ballistic mis- French warheads are spread over seven locations.11
sile submarine bases, and two heavy bomber bases.6 The
national-level storage sites maintained by the 12th Main
Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense include 12 China
separate locations. The warhead production complexes
Researching Chinese nuclear weapons storage is diffi-
also have some warhead storage capacity. There are also a
cult given the almost complete official secrecy that
number of regional sites that appear to be nuclear, some
surrounds China’s nuclear forces.12 Moreover, as is
of which have been upgraded in recent years.
the case with other nuclear-armed states, Western gov-
ernments say very little about what they know.13
United States Even so, important new information has become
available from other sources since we made our pre-
The United States today stores nuclear weapons at 18
vious estimate in 2014. This includes more satellite
sites, including 12 sites in 11 US states and another six
images on Google Earth that allow the public to moni-
sites in five European countries.7
tor developments in Chinese forces. Moreover, a num-
All Air Force nuclear warheads are now stored at
ber of publications by Mark Stokes at the Project 2049
five US locations: the F.E. Warren and Malmstrom Air
Institute have made invaluable new information and
Force Bases, which store intercontinental ballistic mis-
analysis available to the public.
siles (ICBMs), Whiteman Air Force Base, which stores
We cautiously estimate that China may have nuclear
bombers, Minot Air Force Base, which stores both
warheads at 12 facilities. Nearly all of China’s 270
ICBMs and bombers, and one central storage facility,
nuclear warheads are concentrated in the central
the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
nuclear weapons storage site, known as 22 Base and
and Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
located in the western part of Shaanxi province in
The US Navy stores its nuclear weapons at the
central China (Stokes 2010). The missiles intended to
Strategic Weapons Facilities at Kitsap in Washington
deliver these warheads are dispersed across China at
State and at Kings Bay in Georgia, the only two
approximately 25 brigade bases organized under six
remaining naval nuclear weapon storage sites. Some
base headquarters. Each of these base headquarters
naval warheads may also be present at the KUMMSC.
probably has a small number of nuclear warheads in
The United States is the only country that deploys
regional storage sites.
nuclear weapons in other countries, but the number
The Chinese navy has two bases with nuclear-cap-
kept abroad significantly shrank with the end of the
able missile submarines, each of which might have an
Cold War.8 Approximately, 150 nonstrategic nuclear
adjacent warhead storage facility. The Air Force has a
bombs are stored in underground vaults beneath 87 air-
couple of intermediate-range bomber bases that might
craft shelters at six bases in five European countries
have a secondary nuclear mission, although Chinese
(Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey)
bombers do not currently have a nuclear mission.
for delivery by US and NATO fighter-bombers. Likewise,
China also has a small number of warhead design,
most of the nuclear weapons the United States used to
production, and maintenance facilities, presumably
deploy at sea have been retired, including all tactical
with a small number of warheads present.
weapons. Today, only strategic weapons remain at sea.9

Britain and France Pakistan

London and Paris have reduced the size of their arsenals
and limited where their weapons are deployed. Britain
only has one type of nuclear weapon, the Trident II
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). The mis-
siles and associated warheads are located at two facilities
in Scotland, although warheads are also serviced at two
factories southwest of London.10
France has retained two types of nuclear weapons:
SLBMs at a submarine base in Bretagne and air-to-
surface missiles for land- and carrier-based aircraft.
France also has a warhead production and
Islamabad is quantitatively and qualitatively increasing
its arsenal and deploying weapons at more sites, yet the
locations are difficult to pinpoint. For example, no
reliable public information exists on where Pakistan
produces or stores its nuclear weapons. Thus, we have
used commercial satellite images, expert studies, and
local news reports and articles to make the assumption
that nuclear weapons are likely to be at, or near, wher-
ever nuclear-capable weapon systems are deployed.
Based on this work, we cautiously estimate that
Pakistan stores nuclear weapons at nine locations.

Pakistan has a rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal of
130–140 warheads and an increasing portfolio of deliv-
ery systems.14 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not
believed to be fully operational under normal circum-
stances. We have found no credible information that
identifies permanent nuclear weapons storage loca-
tions, but there are a few clues.
The most detailed public statements we’re aware of
were made by former US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton in 2009 when she told Congress that
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons “are widely dispersed in
the country.” She said the weapons “are not at a central
location” but that Pakistan has “adopted a policy of
dispersing their nuclear weapons and facilities”
(Clinton 2009). Senior US officials subsequently said
that most of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal was south of
Islamabad (Kralev and Slavin 2009; Sanger 2009). We
have previously identified a number of facilities that
appear to be related to Pakistani nuclear missile forces
(Kristensen 2016).
Former President Pervez Musharraf reportedly told
Seymour Hersh of The New Yorker that Pakistan had
constructed a huge tunnel system for the transport and
storage of nuclear weapons. “The tunnels are so deep
that a nuclear attack will not touch them,” he said,
adding that it was impossible to monitor the move-
ments of nuclear components by satellite (Hersh 2009).
One potential underground facility is near Tarbala in
the country’s north.
India
As with Pakistan, we have found little reliable informa-
tion that indicates where India’s 120–130 nuclear war-
heads are stored.15 Based on available unclassified
sources and satellite imagery, we cautiously estimate
that India stores nuclear weapons at at least five
locations.
India is thought to keep its nuclear warheads and
bombs in central storage locations rather than on
bases with operational forces. But India’s missile
force is evolving rapidly as larger missiles with
longer ranges and shorter response times appear.
And India is putting the final touches on its first
nuclear submarine, to be able to deploy a secure
second strike capability. One of the key questions is
whether India will begin to deploy nuclear weapons
on its subs under normal circumstances. Although
not yet on our list (because it is not complete), the
first submarine base is under construction near
Rambilli in Andhra Pradesh on the Indian east
coast.
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 295
Israel
Israel is a wild card because of the opacity of its nuclear
weapons program. Like other nuclear-armed states,
however, Israel has been modernizing its arsenal and
probably also its storage facilities. Israel’s nuclear weap-
ons are not believed to be fully operational under nor-
mal circumstances but are estimated to include 80–85
warheads.16 We estimate that Israel might store nuclear
warhead components at five locations.
North Korea
North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests, pro-
duced sufficient fissile material to potentially make 20
weapons, and made considerable progress in develop-
ing ballistic missiles. Yet, the extent to which North
Korea has weaponized its nuclear test devices and
deployed nuclear weapons is still uncertain, as is
where any such weapons would be stored.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This research was carried out with grants from the New Land
Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund.
Notes
1. Valuable open-source reference material for estimat-
ing deployments of nuclear weapons include START
and New START data published by the US State
Department; Arkin and Fieldhouse (1985); Arkin
et al. (1998); McKinzie et al. (2001); Cirincione et al.
(2005); the SIPRI Yearbook, various issues; the
Monterey Institute for International Studies’ open-
source research database on the Nuclear Threat
Initiative website, available at http://www.nti.org/e_
research/profiles/index.html; FAS Nuclear Notebooks
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Google Earth;
and the authors’ analysis.
2. For previous estimates of Russian nuclear weapons
storage sites, see: US Department of Defense, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response, November 1997, p. 43; William M. Arkin,
et al., Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments
1998, Natural Resources Defense Council, March
1998, pp. 26–38; Susan Koch, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense For Threat Reduction Policy,
testified before Congress, Senate Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, 6 March 2000, p. 2; Kristensen and
Norris (2014a).
296 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
3. According to the US government, “In peacetime, all
nuclear munitions except those on deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs are stored in nuclear weapons storage
sites” (CIA 2011). The statement does not define
“nuclear weapons storage sites,” which exist both as
large centralized storage sites separated from bases
with operational delivery systems and as smaller sto-
rage sites at or close to bases. Moreover, with the
expiration of the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro-
gram in 2013, public information about the status of
Russian nuclear weapons storage facilities will likely
become scarcer. Future US–Russian security coopera-
tion will take place under the 2003 Framework
Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental
Program in the Russian Federation and a related pro-
tocol, which do not cover nuclear weapons storage
security.
4. The New START list is secret, and the United States
agreed during treaty negotiations not to publish it.
During the previous START, which expired in 2010,
the US State Department released the list of Russian
weapons and warheads counted by the treaty.
5. Weapons are also occasionally present at an unknown
number of temporary storage sites when in transit
between bases and production facilities.
6. Unlike ICBMs and nuclear submarines, heavy
bombers do not carry nuclear weapons under nor-
mal circumstances. But we estimate that some
nuclear weapons are present in storage bunkers at
the two heavy bomber bases. Intermediate-range
Tu-22M3 Backfire-C bomber bases could possibly
also store nuclear weapons. We assume that all
weapons for Su-34 Fullback and Su-22M Fencer-D
tactical fighter-bombers are in central storage
alongside all other nonstrategic nuclear warheads.
7. For an overview of US nuclear forces, see Kristensen
and Norris (2017a).
8. For US nuclear weapons deployments in the period of
1951–1977, see Norris, Arkin, and Burr (1999) and
Norris, Arkin, and Burr (2000).
9. For an overview of US deployments of nuclear weap-
ons at sea, see Kristensen and Norris (2016a).
10. For an overview of British nuclear forces, see
Kristensen and Norris (2011).
11. For an overview of French nuclear forces, see
Kristensen (2015).
12. For an overview of Chinese nuclear forces, see
Kristensen and Norris (2016b).
13. During the Obama administration, information pub-
lished by the US government about Chinese nuclear
forces decreased. An overview of Chinese nuclear
missiles previously published in the annual Pentagon
report on China’s military forces has completely dis-
appeared from the publication (Kristensen 2013).
14. For an overview of Pakistan’s nuclear forces, see
Kristensen and Norris (2016c).
15. For an overview of India’s nuclear arsenal, see
Kristensen and Norris (2017b).
16. For analyses of Israeli nuclear forces, see Cohen
(2010); Cohen and Burr (2009); Kristensen and
Norris (2014b); and the Avner Cohen profile page
(https://www.wilsoncenter.org/person/avner-cohen)
and Avner Cohen Collection page (https://www.wil
soncenter.org/publication/the-avner-cohen-collection)
at the Wilson Center.
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