RAKES vs.
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC degree to the injury as a proximate, although
CO.;
FACTS:
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro
laborers in the employment of the defendant,
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge
in the harbor to the company's yard near the
malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant
has proved that there were two immediately
following one another, upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560
pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but
without side pieces or guards to prevent them
from slipping off. According to the testimony of
the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near
the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke,
the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off
and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which
was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
ISSUE:
Whether the company is liable
RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing
to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact
and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the
track he continued his work; and
Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties
at the side of the car instead of along the
boards, either before or behind it.
The Court ruled that His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a
nature as to constitute negligence, barring his
recovery under the severe American rule. While
the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
only were they not forbidden to proceed in this
way, but were expressly directed by the
foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that
there was a general prohibition frequently made
known to all the gang against walking by the
side of the car, and the foreman swears that he
repeated the prohibition before the starting of
this particular load. On this contradiction of
proof we think that the preponderance is in
favor of the defendant's contention to the extent
of the general order being made known to the
workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff
in placing himself in danger contributed in some
not as its primary cause.
Distinction must be between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it,
independent of it, but contributing under review
was the displacement of the crosspiece or the
failure to replace it. this produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the
sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails.
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order
to enforce the liability of an employer for
injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that
a criminal action be first prosecuted against the
employer or his representative primarily
chargeable with the accident. No criminal
proceeding having been taken, the civil action
may proceed to judgment.
2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. —
The responsibility of an employer to his
employee of a fellow-servant of the employee
injured, is not adopted in Philippine
jurisprudence.
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa
nocet. The doctrine known as the "Fellow-
servant rule," exonerating the employer where
the injury was incurred through the negligence
of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is
not adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
VASQUEZ vs. DE BORJA, 74 PHIL 560
(1944);
Facts:
Francisco de Borja purchased from
Natividad-Vasquez Sabani Development Co.
(NVSD) , Inc. 4,000 cavans of palay at PhP 2.10
per cavan to be delivered on February 1932. On
behalf of the company, Antonio Vasquez
executed the contract as acting president and
manager and Fernando Busuegoas as corporate
treasurer. However, NVSD had only delivered
2,488 cavans of palay of the value of PhP
5,224.80 and refused to liver the remaining
balance of PhP 1,512 cavans of the value of PhP
3,175.20. It also failed to return 1,510 empty
sacks owned by De Borja amounting to PhP
377.50. Moreover, the company became
insolvent. De Borja incurred damages resulting
from the undelivered cavans and that prompted
him to sue Vasquez and Busuegoas for the
damages.
Vasquez contends that he did not enter
the contract in his own individual and personal
capacity but as the manager at the time of the
transaction. As a counterclaim, Vasquez alleged
that he suffered damages in the sum of PhP
1,000 on account of the complaint action.
CFI found Vasques guilty of negligence
in the performance of the contract and held him
personally liable on that account. It ruled in
favor of the plaintiff and ordered Vasquez to pay
De Borja of the damages. The Court also
absolved Busuego from the complaint and
plaintiff from the counterclaim. CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC but reduced the sum. It
found Vasquez liable for gross negligence under
Articles 1102, 1103, and 1902 of the Old Civil
Code and subsidiary liable with NVSD. On the
motion of recommendation, CA set aside its
judgment and ordered the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
• WON the Antonio Vasquez entered into
the contract with the De Borja in his personal
capacity or as manager of the Natividad-
Vazquez Sabani Development Co., Inc.
• WON Vasquez his personally liable for
the damages
Held:
Vasquez had entered the contract as a
manager of NVSD and not on his personal
capacity. It is well known that a corporation is
an artificial being invested by law with a
personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of its stockholders and from that of its
officers who manage and run its affairs. The
mere fact that its personality is owing to a legal
fiction and that it necessarily has to act thru its
agents, does not make the latter personally
liable on a contract duly entered into, or for an
act lawfully performed, by them for an in its
behalf. The legal fiction by which the personality
of a corporation is created is a practical reality
and necessity. Without it no corporate entities
may exists and no corporate business may be
transacted. Such legal fiction may be
disregarded only when an attempt is made to
use it as a cloak to hide an unlawful or
fraudulent purpose. No such thing has been
alleged or proven in this case. It has not been
alleged nor even intimated that Vazquez
personally benefited by the contract of sale in
question and that he is merely invoking the legal
fiction to avoid personal liability. Neither is it
contended that he entered into said contract for
the corporation in bad faith and with intent to
defraud the plaintiff. We find no legal and
factual basis upon which to hold him liable on
the contract either principally or subsidiarily.
SC also held that the CFI and CA both
erred in holding Vasquez liable for negligence in
the performance of the contract. They have
manifestly failed to distinguish a contractual
obligation from an extracontractual obligation,
or an obligation arising from contract from an
obligation arising from culpa aquiliana. The fault
and negligence referred to in articles 1101-1104
of the Civil Code are those incidental to the
fulfillment or nonfullfillment of a contractual
obligation; while the fault or negligence referred
to in article 1902 is the culpa aquiliana of the
civil law, homologous but not identical to tort of
the common law, which gives rise to an
obligation independently of any contract. The
fact that the corporation, acting thru Vazquez as
its manager, was guilty of negligence in the
fulfillment of the contract, did not make
Vazquez principally or even subsidiarily liable
for such negligence. Since it was the
corporation's contract, its nonfulfillment,
whether due to negligence or fault or to any
other cause, made the corporation and not its
agent liable.
On the other hand, if Vasquez were to
be held liable for its negligence independently of
the contract by his fault or negligence cause
damaged to the plaintiff, he would be liable to
the latter under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
But then the plaintiff's cause of action should be
based on culpa aquiliana and not on the contract
alleged in his complaint and Vazquez' liability
would be principal and not merely subsidiary, as
the Court of Appeals has erroneously held.
As for the counterclaim filed by Vasquez against
De Borja, SC ruled that finding of the CA does
not warrant his contention that the suit against
him is malicious and tortious. As a matter of
moral justice, the indignant attitude adopted by
the defendant towards the plaintiff for having
brought this action against him is in estimation
not wholly right. Thus, he does not have a cause
of action against the plaintiff.
AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCO, 18 SCRA 155
(1966);
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a
group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body. After some
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay
respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal
rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint
until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees;
and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on
Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to
P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that
he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific flight, although he had
tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first
class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first
class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will;
he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for
ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract
may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public
duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
SINGSON vs. BPI (1968);
Facts: Appeal by plaintiffs from a decision of the
CFI Mla dismissing their complaint against
defendants.
On May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the
present action against the Bank and its
president, Freixas, for damages in consequence
of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.
After appropriate proceedings, the CFI Mla
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint
upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover
from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-
delict, because the relation between the parties
is contractual in nature.
Issue: WON the existence of a contractual
relation between the parties bar recovery of
damages.
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is reversed
holding defendant BPI to pay to the plaintiffs
nominal damages, and attorney's fees, apart
from the costs.
The SC have repeatedly held that the existence
of a contract between the parties does not bar
the commission of a tort by the one against the
order and the consequent recovery of damages
therefore.
In view, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar,
and considering, particularly, the circumstance,
that the wrong done to the plaintiff was
remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake they had committed, the
Court finds that an award of nominal damages
the amount of which need not be proven in the
sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in
the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate
plaintiff's rights.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. CA, 143 SCRA 657
(1986(;
Facts:
Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages
against Radio Communiciations of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent
through its Manila Office to the former, reading
as follows:
176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL
22-66 LORETO DIONELA CABANGAN LEGASPI
CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL
OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA
DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT
BULBUL MO
Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory
words on the telegram sent to him wounded his
feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and
affected adversely his business because other
people have come to know of said defamatory
words. RCPI alleges that the additional words in
Tagalog was a private joke between the sending
and receiving operators, that they were not
addressed to or intended for plaintiff and
therefore did not form part of the telegram, and
that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words are
libelous for any person reading the same would
logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus
RCPI was ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision ruling that the company
was negligent and failed to take precautionary
steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating
incident, and the fact that a copy of the
telegram is filed among other telegrams and
open to public is sufficient publication; however
reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00
Issue:
Whether or not the company should answer
directly and primarily for the civil liability arising
from the criminal act of its employee.
Ruling:
Yes. The cause of action of the private
respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the
New Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s
breach of contract thru the negligence of its own
employees. By adding extraneous and libelous
matters in the message sent to the private
respondent, there is a clear breach of contract;
for upon payment of the fixed rate, the company
undertakes to transmit the message accurately.
In contracts, the negligence of the employee
(servant) is the negligence of the employer
(master). This is the master and servant rule.
As a corporation, the petitioner can act only
through its employees. Hence the acts of its
employees in receiving and transmitting
messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold
that the petitioner is not liable directly for the
acts of its employees in the pursuit of
petitioner’s business is to deprive the general
public availing of the services of the petitioner
of an effective and adequate remedy.
In most cases, negligence must be proved in
order that plaintiff may recover. However, since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some
cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by
considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.
The judgment of the CA is affirmed.
CALALAS vs. SUNGA, 332 SCRA 356
(2000);
Facts:

Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a
passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
already full, she was just given an “extension
seat”, a wooden stool, at the rear end of the
vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the
rear end, she gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
Elf Truck driven by Igclerio Verena and owned
by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end
of the jeepney. This incident cause injury to
Sunga.
She filed a compliant for damages against
Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of
carriage. On the other hand, Calalas filed a
third-party complaint against Salva, the owner
of the truck.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva
guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding
that it was the truck owner who is responsible
for the accident based on quasi-delict.
However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s
decision, on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a breach of contract of
carriage and not on quasi-delict.
Hence, this appeal from Calalas.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the
truck driver as the proximate cause of the
accident which negates petitioner’s liability?
RULING:
No.
First, the issue in this case is the liability under
contract of carriage.
In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination as a common
carrier in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
New Civil Code.
Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the
RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision was the truck
driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause
applies only to cases of quasi-delict.
The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. But in
the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation
between petitioner and respondent in their
contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of
the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him
liable.
HUANG vs. PHIL. HOTELIERS, INC., G.R.
NO. 18040, 2012;
Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a
registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her
friend, Dr. Genevieve L.Huang, for a swim at the
hotel‘s pool.
At around 7:00 p.m., the hotel‘s pool attendant
informed them that the swimming pool area was
about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower
room adjacent to the swimming pool to take a
shower anddress up. When they came out of the
bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was
already pitch black and there were theonly ones
there. The doors were also locked. After some
time, Huang saw a phone behind the lifeguard‘s
counter.As she went inside, the wooden
countertop fell onher head and knocked her
down almost unconscious.
Delia immediately notified the hotel phone
operator of the incident. Not long after, the
hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door of
the swimming pool area and gave her an
icepack.Huang demanded the services of the
hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr.
Dalumpines, instead of immediately
providingthe needed medical assistance,
presented a ―Waiver‖ and demanded that it be
signed by Huang, otherwise, the
hotelmanagement will not render her any
assistance. Huang refused to do so and left the
hotel.Thereupon, Huang consulted several
doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because she began
experiencing ―on‖ and ―off‖ severeheadaches
that caused her three sleepless nights.
They all said she had a serious brain injury.In
defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material
allegations. According to them, a sufficient
notice on the glass door ofthe hotel leading to
the swimming pool area to apprise the people,
especially the hotel guests, that the swimming
pool areais open only from 7am to 7pm.
Nevertheless, the lights thereon are kept on
until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons;
(2)housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of
the swimming pool surroundings; and (3)
people doing their exercise routineat the
Slimmer‘s World Gym, which was open until
10pm. Even granting that the lights in the
hotel‘s swimming pool areawere turned off, it
would not render the area completely dark as
the Slimmer‘s World Gym near it was well-
illuminated.Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel
nurse) was informed that there was a guest
requiring medical assistance.
She hurriedlywent to the pool area. Although
Huang looked normal as there was no indication
of any blood or bruise on her head, Ms.Pearlie
still asked her if she needed any medical
attention to which she replied that she is a
doctor, she was fine and shedid not need any
medical attention. Instead, requested for a
hirudoid cream to which Ms. Pearlie acceded.
Dr. Dalumpinescame to check Huang‘s
condition. Huang insisted that she was fine and
that the hirudoid cream was enough.
Dr.Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a
handwritten certification regarding the incident
that occurred that night.
An X-Ray test was also suggested to Huang but
she replied that it was not necessary. She also
refused further medical attention.On Aug 1996,
Huang filed a complaint for damages against
respondents. The trial court dismissed the
Complaint for lackof merit. On appeal, Huang
belatedly raises the defense on breach of
contract. She maintains that that an implied
contractexisted between them in view of the
fact that the hotel guest status extends to all
those who avail of its services — its patrons and
invitees.
The CA affirmed the TC‘s decision. MR denied.
Hence, this Petition for certiorari under Rule
45.She also avows that the doctrines ofres ipsa
loquitur andrespondeat superior are applicable
in this case. It was anaccident caused by the
fact that the hotel staff was not present to lift
the heavy counter top for Huang as is
normallyexpected of them because they
negligently locked the main entrance door of the
hotel‘s swimming pool area.
Issue:
Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to
Dr. Huang.
Held:
NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on
account of their negligence but not on any
breach of contract.Presently, she claims that her
cause of action can be based both on quasi-
delict and breach of contract. A perusal of
thecomplaint evidently shows that her cause of
action was based solely on quasi-delict
(negligence).
It is evident from thecomplaint and from her
open court testimony that the reliance was on
the alleged tortious acts committed against her
byrespondents, through their management and
staff. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of
negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured
party to prove the negligence ofthe defendant,
otherwise, the former‘s complaint will be
dismissed. In a breach of contract, negligence is
presumed solong as it can be proved that there
was breach of the contract and the burden is on
the defendant to prove that there was
nonegligence in the carrying out of the terms of
the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed.
It is now too late toraise the said argument for
the first time before the SC without causing
injustice.As Huang‘s cause of action is based on
quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon her to prove
the presence of the followingrequisites before
respondents PHI and Dusit can be held liable, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(b)fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond;
and (c) the connectionof cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. Further, since her case is for quasi-
delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of heraction. The
burden of proof is upon her.Second element
Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to
prove the alleged negligence of respondents.
Other than herself-serving testimony that all the
lights in the hotel‘s swimming pool area were
shut off and the door was locked, whichallegedly
prompted her to find a way out and in doing so
a folding wooden counter top fell on her head
causing her injury,no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same. Even her
own companion during the night of the accident
insidethe hotel‘s swimming pool area was never
presented to corroborate her allegations.On the
other hand, the witnesses presented by the
respondents positively declared that it has been
a normal practice of the hotel management not
to put offthe lights until 10pm. to allow the
housekeepers to do the cleaning of the
swimming pool surroundings, including
thetoilets and counters.
There is a remote possibility that the hotel‘s
swimming pool area was in complete darkness
as theaforesaid gym was then open until 10pm,
and the lights radiate to the hotel‘s swimming
pool area.Ergo, she cannot faultthe Hotel for the
injury she allegedly suffered because she
herself did not heed the warning at the pool to
the effect that itwas only open from 7:00 to
7:00 P.M. Thus, when the own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of hisinjury,
she then cannot recover damages.Even Huang‘s
assertion of negligence on the part of
respondents in not rendering medical assistance
to her is preposterous.Her own Complaint
affirmed that respondents afforded medical
assistance to her after she met the unfortunate
accidentinside the hotel‘s swimming pool
facility. Moreover, the Hotel shouldered the
expenses for the MRI services at the Makati
Med.
Res Ipsa Loquitur&RespondeatSuperior :With
regard to Huang‘s contention that the principles
ofresipsaloquitur andrespondeat superior are
applicable in this case, this Court holds
otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
whichliterally means ―the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.‖ It relates to the
fact of an injury that sets out an inference tothe
cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff‘s prima
facie case. The doctrine finds no application if
there is direct proof of absence or presence of
negligence. In the case at bench, even granting
that respondents‘staff negligently turned off
thelights and locked the door, the folding
wooden counter top would still not fall on
Huang‘s head had she not lifted the
same.Records showed that she lifted the said
folding wooden counter top that eventually fell
and hit her head.Doctrine ofrespondeat superior
finds no application in the absence of any
showing that the employees
respondentswere negligent.
suffered at the hotel‘s swimming pool area,
theCourt holds that there is no cogent reason to
depart from thelower courts ‘findings.(1)Huang
had a past medical history which might have
been the cause of her recurring brain
injury.(2)The findings of Dr. Perez did not prove
a causal relation between the 11 June 1995
accident and the brain damagesuffered by
Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that the
symptoms being experienced might have been
due to factors other than the head trauma she
allegedly suffered.(3)Dr. Sanchez‘s testimony
was hearsay. (4)Medical
reports/evaluations/certifications issued by
myriads of doctors whom petitioner sought for
examinationor treatment were neither identified
nor testified to by those who issued them. Being
deemed as hearsay, theycannot be given
probative value.All told, in the absence of
negligence on the part of respondents as well as
their management and staff, they cannot
bemade liable to pay for the millions of damages
prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it
necessarily follows that FirstLepanto cannot also
be made liable under the contract of Insurance.
of

Since in this case, the trial court and the CA

found no negligence on the part of the
employees ofrespondents, thus, the latter
cannot also be held liable for negligence. With
the foregoing, the following were
clearlyestablished, to wit: (1) petitioner stayed
in the hotel‘s swimming pool facility beyond its
closing hours; (2) she lifted the folding wooden
counter top that eventually hit her head;and (3)
respondents extended medical assistance to
her. As such, no negligence can be attributed
either to or to their staff and/or
management.Third element:On the issue on
whetherHuang‘sdebilitating and permanent
injuries were the result of the accident she
5. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS;
Art. 1314, Civil Code;
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.
FACTS:
 Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar
 April 24: He rented it to C. S. Gilchrist for
a week for P125
 A few days to the date of delivery, Cuddy
sent the money back to Gilchrist
 Cuddy rented the film to Espejo and his
partner Zaldarriaga P350 for the week
knowing that it was rented to someone
else and that Cuddy accepted it because
he was paying about three times as much
as he had contracted with Gilchrist but
they didn't know the identity of the other
party
 Gilchrist filed for injunction against these
parties
 Trial Court and CA: granted - there is a
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy
ISSUE: W/N Espejo and his
partner Zaldarriaga should be liable for
damages though they do not know the identity
of Gilchrist
HELD: YES. judgment is affirmed
 That Cuddy was liable in an action for
damages for the breach of that contract,
there can be no doubt.
 the mere right to compete could not justify
the appellants in intentionally inducing
Cuddy to take away the appellee's
contractual rights
 Everyone has a right to enjoy the fruits
and advantages of his own enterprise,
industry, skill and credit. He has no right
to be free from malicious and wanton
interference, disturbance or annoyance. If
disturbance or loss come as a result of
competition, or the exercise of like rights
by others, it is damnum absque
injuria(loss without injury), unless some
superior right by contract or otherwise is
interfered with
 Cuddy contract on the part of the
appellants was a desire to make a profit by
exhibiting the film in their theater. There
was no malice beyond this desire; but this
fact does not relieve them of the legal
liability for interfering with that contract
and causing its breach.
 liability of the appellants arises from
unlawful acts and not from contractual
obligations, as they were under no such
obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist
 So that if the action of Gilchrist had been
one for damages, it would be governed by
chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil
Code.
 Article 1902 of that code provides that a
person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the
damage do done
 There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of a tort-feasor that he must know
the identity of a person to whom he causes
damages
 An injunction is a "special remedy" which
was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and
limited, as in order cases where equitable
relief is sought, to cases where there is no
"plain, adequate, and complete remedy at
law," which "will not be granted while the
rights between the parties are
undetermined, except in extraordinary
cases where material and irreparable
injury will be done," which cannot be
compensated in damages, and where there
will be no adequate remedy, and which will
not, as a rule, be granted, to take property
out of the possession of one party and put
it into that of another whose title has not
been established by law
 irreparable injury
 not meant such injury as is beyond the
possibility of repair, or beyond possible
compensation in damages, nor necessarily
great injury or great damage, but that
species of injury, whether great or small,
that ought not to be submitted to on the
one hand or inflicted on the other; and,
because it is so large on the one hand, or
so small on the other, is of such constant
and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor in
a court of law
 Gilchrist was facing the immediate
prospect of diminished profits by reason of
the fact that the appellants had induced
Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist
had counted upon as his feature film
 It is quite apparent that to estimate with
any decree of accuracy the damages which
Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an
event would be quite difficult if not
impossible
 So far as the preliminary injunction issued
against the appellants is concerned, which
prohibited them from exhibiting the
Zigomar during the week which Gilchrist
desired to exhibit it, we are of the opinion
that the circumstances justified the
issuance of that injunction in the discretion
of the court
 the remedy by injunction cannot be used
to restrain a legitimate competition,
though such competition would involve the
violation of a contract
So Ping Bun v. CA
Facts:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan and Sons,
Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo,
which the former used to store textiles. The
agreements were for one (1) year, with
provisions for month-to-month rental should
the lessee continue to occupy the properties
after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co.
was dissolved, and the former members formed
Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of the defunct
company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun,
his grandson, occupied the warehouse for his
own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On
March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a
letter to petitioner, demanding that the latter
vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and on
March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of
lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed.
Private respondents moved for the nullification
of the contract and claimed damages. The
petition was granted by the trial court, and
eventually by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
(1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous
interference of contract
(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to
attorney’s fees
Held:
(1) Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. One becomes liable in an
action for damages for a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to
the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the
invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant's
conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d)
the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under general negligence rules. The elements of
tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse. Petitioner's Trendsetter
Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease
contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner
deprived respondent corporation of the latter's
property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed
by the appellate court, the three elements of
tort interference above-mentioned are present
in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may
be justified where the defendant acts for the
sole purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. One view is that, as a general
rule, justification for interfering with the
business relations of another exists where the
actor's motive is to benefit himself. Such
justification does not exist where his sole motive
is to cause harm to the other. Added to this,
some authorities believe that it is not necessary
that the interferer's interest outweigh that of
the party whose rights are invaded, and that an
individual acts under an economic interest that
is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that
wrongful and malicious motives are negatived,
for he acts in self-protection. Moreover
justification for protecting one's financial
position should not be made to depend on a
comparison of his economic interest in the
subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient
if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful
motives. Where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse
behind one's conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party
cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the
alleged interferer is financially interested, and
such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be
said that he is an officious or malicious
intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So
Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
respondent corporation. Though petitioner took
interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on
record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or
malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is
an essential element of tort interference, and
since the trial court and the appellate court
ruled that private respondents were not entitled
to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it
follows that he ought to be absolved of any
liability, including attorney's fees.
While we do not encourage tort interferers
seeking their economic interest to intrude into
existing contracts at the expense of others,
however, we find that the conduct herein
complained of did not transcend the limits
forbidding an obligatory award for damages in
the absence of any malice. The business desire
is there to make some gain to the detriment of
the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not
relieve petitioner of the legal liability for
entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The respondent appellate court
correctly confirmed the permanent injunction
and nullification of the lease contracts between
DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without
awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury
caused by petitioner's interference.
(2) Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages, is
allowed under the circumstances provided for in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such
occasion is when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest. But we have consistently
held that the award of considerable damages
should have clear factual and legal bases. In
connection with attorney's fees, the award
should be commensurate to the benefits that
would have been derived from a favorable
judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the
award of damages by the trial court calls for
appellate review such that the award if far too
excessive can be reduced. This ruling applies
with equal force on the award of attorney's fees.
In a long line of cases we said, "It is not sound
policy to place in penalty on the right to litigate.
To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of
counsel for his successful opponent would throw
wide open the door of temptation to the
opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees
to undue proportions."
Considering that the respondent corporation's
lease contract, at the time when the cause of
action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month
basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we
find even the reduced amount of attorney's fees
ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant
in the light of prevailing jurisprudence.
Consequently, the amount of two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by
respondent appellate court should be reduced to
one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as
the reasonable award or attorney's fees in favor
of private respondent corporation.
LAGON vs. CA, (2005);
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate
of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court,
two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan
Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private
respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint
for torts and damages against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan
Kudarat.
Private respondent claimed that he entered into
a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi
Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land
(the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao
beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed
upon was for private respondent to put up
commercial buildings which would, in turn, be
leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by
those tenants would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi
for the lease of the land. The lease contract
ended but since the construction of the
commercial buildings had yet to be completed,
the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent
started remitting his rent to the court-appointed
administrator of her estate. But when the
administrator advised him to stop collecting
rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner,
representing himself as the new owner of the
property, had been collecting rentals from the
tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the
latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs
of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him,
thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied
that he induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell
the property to him, contending that the heirs
were in dire need of money to pay off the
obligations of the deceased. He also denied
interfering with private respondents leasehold
rights as there was no lease contract covering
the property when he purchased it; that his
personal investigation and inquiry revealed no
claims or encumbrances on the subject lots
ISSUE:
Whether or not the purchase by Lagon of the
subject property, during the supposed existence
of the private respondent’s lease contract with
the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous
interference for which Lagon should be held
liable for damages.
RULING:
No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal
justification (in furtherance of a personal
financial interest) and without bad faith
The elements of Tortuous Interference with
contractual relation are: (1) Existence of a valid
contract; (2) Knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of the contract; (3)
Interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse.
As regard to the first element, the existence of
a valid contract must be duly established. In the
given case the Court ruled that the notarized
copy of lease contract presented in court
appeared to be an incontestable proof that Bai
Tonin Sepi and private respondent renewed
their contract. The second element on the other
hand, requires that there be knowledge on the
part of the interferer that the contract exists. In
this case, Lagon had no knowledge of the lease
contract as he even conducted his own personal
investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no
suspicious circumstance that would have made
a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for
any conflicting claim over the property; that an
examination of the entire property title bore no
indication of the leasehold interest of private
respondent and that even the registry of
property had no record of the same. As to the
third element, a party may be held liable only
when there was no legal justification or excuse
for his action or when his conduct was stirred by
a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for
tortuous interference, the other party must
have acted with malice or must have been
driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
other. In the case, even assuming that private
respondent was able to prove the renewal of his
lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was
that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner in purchasing the
property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous
interference was never established.
B. NEGLIGENCE
1. CONCEPT
Article 1173, Civil Code;
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When
negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall
apply.
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
GAN vs. CA, (1988);
The facts of the case as found by the appellate
court are as follows:
In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00
o'clock, the accused Hedy Gan was driving a
Toyota car along North Bay Boulevard, Tondo,
Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North
Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck
and a jeepney parked on one side of the road,
one following the other about two to three
meters from each other. As the car driven by
the accused approached the place where the
two vehicles were parked, there was a vehicle
coming from the opposite direction, followed by
another which tried to overtake and bypass the
one in front of it and thereby encroached the
lane of the car driven by the accused. To avoid
a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle,
the defendant swerved to the right and as a
consequence, the front bumper of the Toyota
Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to
cross the boulevard from south to north, pinning
him against the rear of the parked jeepney. The
force of the impact caused the parked jeepney
to move forward hitting the rear of the parts
truck ahead of it. The pedestrian was injured,
the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its front, the
jeep suffered damages on its rear and front
paints, and the truck sustained scratches at the
wooden portion of its rear. The body of the old
man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino
was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital but was (pronounced) dead
on arrival.2
An information for Homicide thru Reckless
Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view
of the above incident. She entered a plea of not
guilty upon arraignment and the case was set
for trial.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was granted a
re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of
which the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of
the case against petitioner during the
resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest
on the part of the complaining witness to
prosecute the case as evidenced by an affidavit
of desistance submitted to the trial court and
lack of eyewitness to sustain the charge.
The motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal was
never resolved. The Court instead ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence. After the
prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
On December 22, 1972, the trial court rendered
judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the of- offense charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide thru simple imprudence and,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to
the indeterminate penalty of three (3) months
and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor and to
indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum
of Twelve Thousand Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without,
however, any subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 3
Petitioner now appeals to this Court on the
following assignments of errors:
I not only have swerved the car she was driving
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that when
the petitioner saw a car travelling directly
towards her, she should have stepped on the
brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle
to the right should have also stepped on the
brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the
death of a pedestrian.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the
petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence.
III
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the
petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in
the sum of P12,000.00.4
We reverse.
The test for determining whether or not a
person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent
man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution
against its mischievous results and the failure to
do so constitutes negligence. 5
A corollary rule is what is known in the law as
the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who
suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence."
6
Applying the above test to the case at bar, we
find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of
Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
The appellate court in finding the petitioner
guilty said:
The accused should have stepped on the brakes
when she saw the car going in the opposite
direction followed by another which overtook
the first by passing towards its left. She should
to the right but should have also tried to stop or
lessen her speed so that she would not bump
into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time
but also the jeepney which was then parked
along the street. 7
The course of action suggested by the appellate
court would seem reasonable were it not for the
fact that such suggestion did not take into
account the amount of time afforded petitioner
to react to the situation she was in. For it is
undeniable that the suggested course of action
presupposes sufficient time for appellant to
analyze the situation confronting her and to
ponder on which of the different courses of
action would result in the least possible harm to
herself and to others.
Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no evidence
was presented by the prosecution with respect
to the relative distances of petitioner to the
parked jeepney and the oncoming overtaking
vehicle that would tend to prove that petitioner
did have sufficient time to reflect on the
consequences of her instant decision to swerve
her car to the light without stepping on her
brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the
prosecution on this point is the petitioner's
statement to the police 8 stating::
And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa
isang sasakyan na biglang nagovertake sa
sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung kaya ay
aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit
siya naman biglang pagtawid ng tao o victim at
hindi ko na ho naiwasan at ako ay wala ng
magawa . Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang
nasabing aksidente.9 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution having presented this exhibit as
its own evidence, we cannot but deem its
veracity to have been admitted by it. Thus,
under the circumstances narrated by petitioner,
we find that the appellate court is asking too
much from a mere mortal like the petitioner who
in the blink of an eye had to exercise her best
judgment to extricate herself from a difficult and
dangerous situation caused by the driver of the
overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not
be expected to act with all the coolness of a
person under normal conditions. 10 The danger
confronting petitioner was real and imminent,
threatening her very existence. She had no
opportunity for rational thinking but only
enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct
of self-preservation.
Also, the respondent court itself pronounced
that the petitioner was driving her car within the
legal limits. We therefore rule that the
"emergency rule" enunciated above applies with
full force to the case at bar and consequently
absolve petitioner from any criminal negligence
in connection with the incident under
consideration.
We further set aside the award of damages to
the heirs of the victim, who by executing a
release of the claim due them, had effectively
and clearly waived their right thereto.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
acquitting petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the
crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. She
is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil
indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the
heirs of the victim.
SO ORDERED.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC., vs.
AGANA, (2007);
Facts:
Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel
movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr.
Miguel Ampil, diagnosed her to be suffering
from “cancer of the sigmoid.” Dr. Ampil,
assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City
Hospital, performed an anterior resection
surgery on Natividad. He found that the
malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on
her left ovary, necessitating the removal of
certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained
the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique
Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, to perform
hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the
hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed
the operation and closed the incision. However,
the operation appeared to be flawed. After a
couple of days, Natividad complained of
excruciating pain in her anal region. She
consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about
it. They told her that the pain was the natural
consequence of the surgery.
Two weeks after Natividad returned from the
United States to seek further treatment, her
daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from
her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr.
Ampil proceeded to her house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze
measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured
her that the pains would soon vanish.
Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true.
Instead, the pains intensified, prompting
Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined there, Dr.
Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina — a foul-
smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-
vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive
organs which forced stool to excrete through the
vagina. Another surgical operation was needed
to remedy the damage.
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a
complaint for damages against the Professional
Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They
alleged that the latter are liable for negligence
for leaving two pieces of gauze inside
Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing
their acts of negligence.
Pending the outcome of the above cases,
Natividad died and was duly substituted by her
children (the Aganas). The RTC rendered its
Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and
malpractice.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes with Dr.
Ampil liable to reimburse Professional Services,
Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had
paid to the plaintiffs.
Issues: Whether or not PSI may be held
solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.
Held: Yes, PSI is solidarily liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil. In Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, the court held that private hospitals,
hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While
‘consultants’ are not, technically employees, the
control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important
hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment
of wages. The court held that for the purpose of
allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in
effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians.
In addition to the pronouncement in Ramos vs
CA, Its liability is also anchored upon the agency
principle of apparent authority or agency by
estoppel and the doctrine of corporate
negligence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes
referred to as the “holding out” theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel, imposes liability, not as the result of
the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an
employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority
exists.
In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of
Hospital the names and specializations of the
physicians associated or accredited by it,
including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. It
is now estopped from passing all the blame to
the physicians whose names it proudly paraded
in the public directory leading the public to
believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence. PSI’s act is tantamount to holding
out to the public that Medical City Hospital,
through its accredited physicians, offers quality
health care services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their
qualifications, the hospital created the
impression that they were its agents, authorized
to perform medical or surgical services for its
patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad
being one of them, accepted the services on the
reasonable belief that such were being rendered
by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
Under the doctrine of corporate negligence or
corporate responsibility, PSI as owner, operator
and manager of Medical City Hospital, did not
perform the necessary supervision nor exercise
diligent efforts in the supervision of Drs. Ampil
and Fuentes and its nursing staff, resident
doctors, and medical interns who assisted Drs.
Ampil and Fuentes in the performance of their
duties as surgeons. Premised on the doctrine of
corporate negligence, the trial court held that
PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty.
In the present case, it was duly established that
PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
purpose and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the public.
Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect from harm all
patients admitted into its facility for medical
treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform
such duty.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff,
composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude
that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has
actual or constructive knowledge of the
procedures carried out, particularly the report of
the attending nurses that the two pieces of
gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans, it was
held that a corporation is bound by the
knowledge acquired by or notice given to its
agents or officers within the scope of their
authority and in reference to a matter to which
their authority extends. This means that the
knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City
Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the
failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’
report, to investigate and inform Natividad
regarding the missing gauzes amounts to
callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its
duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed
to take an active step in fixing the negligence
committed. This renders PSI, not only
vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also
directly liable for its own negligence under
Article 2176.
PSI, apart from a general denial of its
responsibility, failed to adduce evidence
showing that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the accreditation and
supervision of Dr. Ampil. In neglecting to offer
such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden
under the last paragraph of Article 2180 and,
therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable
with Dr. Ampil.
CANTRE vs. GO, (2007);
Facts: Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a
specialist in obstetrics and gynecology at the Dr.
Jesus Delgado memorial Hospital. She was the
attending physician of respondent Nora Go, who
was admitted at the said hospital on April 19,
1992. At 1:30am of April 20, 1992, Nora gave
birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However,
at around 3:30am Nora suffered profuse
bleeding insider her womb due to some parts of
the placenta were not completely expelled from
her womb after delivery consequently, Nora
suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop
in her blood pressure to 40/0. Petitioner said the
assisting resident physician performed various
medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to
restore Nora’s blood pressure. Her blood
pressure was frequently monitored with the use
of a sphygmamometer. While petitioner was
massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and
stop bleeding, she ordered a drop light to warm
Nora and her baby. Nora remained unconscious
until she recovered. While in the recovery room,
her husband, respondent John David Z. Go
noticed a fresh gasping wound 2 1/2″ x 3 1/2″
in the inner portion of her left arm, close to the
armpit. He asked the nurses what caused the
injury. He was informed, it was a burn. An
investigation was filed by Nora’s husband and
found out from the petitioner that it was caused
by the blood pressure cuff, however, this was
contrary to the findings from a medico-legal
report which stated that it was indeed a burn
and that a drop light when placed near a skin
for about 10mins could cause such burn. Nora
was referred to a plastic surgeon from the
hospital and skin grafting was done on her and
scar revision but both still left a mark on Nora’s
arm compelling the respondent spouse to file a
complaint for damages against petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the
injury referred by Nora.
Held: Yes. The Hippocratic oath mandates
physicians to give primordial consideration to
the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails
to live up to his precept, he is accountable for
his acts. This is notwithstanding, courts face a
unique restraint in adjudicating medical
negligence cases because physicians are not
guardians of care and they never set out to
intentionally cause injury to their patients.
However, intent is immaterial in negligence
cases because where negligence exist and is
proven, it automatically gives the injured a right
to reparation for the damage caused.
In cases, involving medical negligence, the
doctrine of res ipsa liquitor allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption
of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury,
provided that the following requisites concur:
The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants;
The possibility of contributing conduct which
would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
All of these three requisites were present in the
case at bar.
Under the the captain of the ship doctrine, the
surgeon in charge of the operation is liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time
when those are under the surgeons control.
MERCURY DRUG vs. BAKING, (2007);
Facts:
Respondent Sebastian Baking went to the clinic
of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up.
Subsequently, after several tests, Dr. Sy
prescribed two medical prescriptions
Diamicron for his blood Sugar and Benalize
tablets for his triglyceride.
Connection of the cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff
The Court stressed that there is no dispute that
respondent suffered damages. It is generally
recognized that the drugstore business is
imbued with public interest. The health and
– safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if
the drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence.

Respondent then proceeded to petitioner That petitioner’s employee was grossly

Mercury Drug Store (MDC) to buy the prescribed
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the
prescription for Diamicron for Dormicrum – a
potent sleeping tablet.
Unaware of the mistake, Respondent took it for
three consecutive days. On the third day, he
figured in a vehicular accident. His car collided
with another car driven by one Josie Peralta. It
turned out that Respondent fell asleep while
driving and has no idea regarding the accident.
Suspecting that the tablet he took may have
caused the accident, he returned to Dr. Sy and
the latter was shocked because of the wrong
medicine sold to his patient.
negligent. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and
the skill employed must correspondent with the
superior knowledge of the business which the
law demands.
Hence, the Court sustained that the proximate
cause of the accident was the petitioner’s
employee’s negligence. The vehicular accident
could have not occurred had the employee been
careful to his job.

Respondent thereafter filed with the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) complaint for damages against
petitioner.

The RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiff; decision

of which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. Hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent,

if so, whether such negligence was the
proximate cause of respondent’s accident?

Ruling:

YES.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that

“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no re-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict”.

The Court also enumerated the three (3)

elements of Quasi-delict, to wit:

Damage suffered by the plaintiff;

Fault or negligence of the defendant