FIRST DIVISION
represented by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent
A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT, EDWIN A. PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY.
DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the respondent attorney
did not arise from any attorney-client relationship gone
wrong between the parties but from the ejectment action
in which the respondent attorney, as the plaintiff,
successfully defeated the local congregation of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc., Pico Local
Center (CSP-PLC), whose church building and other
structures were the objects of the action. After the
defendants filed their notice of appeal, the parties agreed
to settle among themselves, with the defendants
withdrawing the notice of appeal and agreeing to
voluntarily vacate and remove their structures by August
31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite receiving the
respondent's financial assistance, the defendants reneged
on their end of the agreement; hence, at the respondent's
instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and
the writ of demolition, by virtue of which the structures
of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC, represented by
its local Minister, Edwin A. Pante (Pante), to bring the
disbarment complaint against the respondent based on
his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in causing the
demolition of the structures without the demolition order
from the court, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and
disobedience to a lawful order of the court, positing that
he thereby abused his legal knowledge.
Antecedents
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its church
building on the land located in JE 176 Pico, La Trinidad,
Benguet, which was owned by Maria Omiles who had
bought it from Larry Ogas;1 that on June 11, 2012,
Omiles and Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer the
complaint for unlawful detainer filed against them by the
respondent; that based on the allegations of the
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. R-1256
entitled Daniel Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino
Omiles and all persons staying with and/or acting on her
behalf, including all Officers and/or patrons of the
Church of the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines,
claimed ownership of the land where the church of the
CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by
declaring the respondent to have the better right of
possession; and that the MTC further declared that the
CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without prejudice
to the respondent exercising his option to appropriate the
building in accordance with Article 448 of the Civil
Code.3
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and
obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on the
promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the premises
by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the respondent's
financial assistance of P300,000.00. The writ of
execution was issued on December 13, 2013 and the writ
of demolition on December 19, 2013. Sheriffs Joselito S.
Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla, accompanied by
the respondent and elements of the Philippine National
Police, implemented the writ of execution and writ of
demolition on January 22 and January 23, 2014 by
demolishing the church building and the pastoral house
of the CSP-PLC.4
Pante now insists that the demolition was done without a
demolition order from the MTC; that the dismantled
materials worth P462,236.00 were forcibly taken away
by the respondent, who had taken advantage of his legal
knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the
structures sans the demolition order; that such taking
away of the dismantled materials constituted robbery
and malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his
disbarment.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing. He
counters that the demolition was backed up by a court
order;5 that after receiving the decision of the MTC, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement by virtue of
which the CSP-PLC withdrew its appeal and promised to
voluntarily vacate and surrender the disputed premises in
consideration of P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that
despite his having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not
vacate the premises even within the grace period given
to them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the
judgment, and his motion was granted by the MTC;8that
the sheriffs report dated November 21, 20139 stated that
after the CSP-PLC did not comply with the writ of
execution to remove or demolish its structures on the
premises; that he consequently sought from the MTC the
writ of demolition; and that the MTC issued the writ of
1
demolition.10
The respondent avers that it was not he but the sheriffs
who implemented the writ of demolition; that the
sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that the
conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and that
Pante and the other members of the church personally
observed the conduct of the demolition; and that the
sheriffs report further stated that Pante showed no
defiance of the lawful order of the court.11
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong in
his appropriating the dismantled materials to ensure
compensation for the expenses incurred in the
demolition; and that the complaint for his disbarment
should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely devoid of
merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, provides as
follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys
including those in the government service. Provided,
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers
are jointly charged with them, shall be filed with the
Supreme Court; Provided, further,That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including
those filed prior to their appointment in the Judiciary,
shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed
with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of any of
its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the
IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator. (As amended, Bar Matter No. 1960, May 1,
2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of an attorney may
be taken by the Court, motu proprio, or by the IBP itself
upon the verified complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the attorney be
filed directly with the Court, the complaint is referred to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
The reference to the IBP is resorted to whenever the
factual basis for the charge may be contested or
disputed, or may require the reception of the evidence of
the complainant and the respondent attorney. After the
referral and hearings, the IBP renders its findings and
recommendations on the complaint, subject to the review
by the Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the
referral to the IBP and resolve the charge without delay.
This happens particularly when the charge is patently
frivolous, or insincere, or unwarranted, or intended only
to harass and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits the
direct filing with it of administrative complaints against
attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the guardian
of the legal profession with the ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys. The disciplinary power of the
Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite recently,
however, the Court has revised Rule 139-B14 to
eliminate any ambiguity about the authority of the Court
to directly receive administrative complaints against
attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may
be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or upon
the filing of a verified complaint of any person before
the Supreme Court or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported
by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as
may substantiate said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment,
suspension and discipline filed against incumbent
Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court
of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, or against
lawyers in the government service, whether or not they
are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and
whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated
to the discharge of their official functions. If the
complaint is filed before the IBP. six (6) copies of the
verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the
IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall
forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
2

xxxx
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings
initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme
Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which
case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review
of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly
by the Supreme Court.
The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation, [bold
emphasis supplied to indicate the revisions]
Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the
administrative complaints against attorneys are generally
not dismissed outright but are instead referred for
investigation, report and recommendation either to the
IBP, or the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), or any
office of the Court or even a judge of a lower court. Such
referral ensures that the parties' right to due process is
respected as to matters that require further inquiry and
which cannot be resolved by the mere evaluation of the
documents attached to the pleadings.15 Consequently,
whenever the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the
OBC or other authorized office or individual must
conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint, and this investigation is a mandatory
requirement that cannot be dispensed with except for
valid and compelling reasons because it serves the
purpose of threshing out all the factual issues that no
cursory evaluation of the pleadings can determine.16
However, the referral to the IBP is not compulsory when
the administrative case can be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed with the Court, or when the referral to the
IBP for the conduct of formal investigation would be
redundant or unnecessary, such as when the protraction
of the investigation equates to undue delay. Dismissal of
the case may even be directed at the outset should the
Court find the complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not be read as
preventing the giving of speedy relief whenever such
speedy relief is warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need to refer the
complaint against the respondent to the IBP for the
conduct of the formal investigation. The documents he
submitted to substantiate his denial of professional
wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial court, and,
as such, are sufficient to establish the unworthiness of
the complaint as well as his lawful entitlement to the
demolition of the structures of the defendants in Civil
Case No. R-1256.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order
issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013.18 In the
execution of the final and executory decision in Civil
Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their
functions. The presence of the respondent during the
execution proceedings was by no means irregular or
improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-
1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante
and some other members of the congregation, who did
not manifest any resistance' or objection to any
irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all,
elements of the Philippine National Police were also
present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ
of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal,
in the act of the respondent of taking away the materials
of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to
their dispute by the defendants, including the
complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice
of appeal and undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to
peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by
August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter's financial
assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the
amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount
was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano
Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives
of the CSP-PLC on the same day.19 But the latter
reneged on their part of the agreement without returning
the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left to
exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment
against them. It is notable that the judgment expressly
directed him "to exercise his option pursuant to the
provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of
this judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by
the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448 of
the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the
premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548." His act
of taking the materials of the demolished structures was
undoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating
them in light of the fact that the P300,000.00 earlier
delivered as financial assistance was most likely meant
to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith.
The respondent has called attention to the letter of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,21 the mother
organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged, to the
effect that it was disavowing knowledge of or
3
participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it was
categorically declaring that the complaint had been filed
by Pante only for his personal interest at the expense of
the congregation. The sentiments expressed in the letter
manifested the inanity of the complaint, and the ill
motives behind Pante's filing of the complaint against
the respondent. The proper outcome for such a
complaint is its immediate dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint

for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay
for its utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

4
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 11043, March 08, 2017
LIANG FUJI, Complainant, v. ATTY. GEMMA
ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the
immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the
alien's wrongful detention, opens the special prosecutor
in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative liability.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated
November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his
family, against Bureau of Immigration Special
Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross
ignorance of the law in relation to her issuance of a
Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.
Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk
of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa
directed the complainants to file a verified complaint
"with supporting documents duly authenticated and/or
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts alleged"3 in the complaint.
Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with
copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No.
BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM-15-420) and for
Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Immediate
Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified
Petition and Administrative Complaint),5 which Fuji
filed with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as their
verified complaint. Complainants further informed this
Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true
copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the Board of
Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa,
Summary Deportation Order dated June 17, 2015, and
Warrant of Deportation from the Bureau of Immigration
personnel who just gave them the "run[-]around."6 They
alleged that the Bureau of Immigration personnel were
not particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's case with
urgency.7
The facts of this case show that in a Summary
Deportation Order8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese
national, was ordered deported for overstaying. From the
Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz was
the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge
against Fuji and another person upon her finding that
Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with
extension expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for
one (1) year and six (6) months in violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).10 Her
investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit
dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo
alleging that Fuji and another person had defrauded
him.11
On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for
Reconsideration.12
On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration
Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of
Deportation, and thereafter arrested him at Brgy.
Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance from
local police.13 Fuji was brought to and detained at the
Bureau of Immigration Detention Facility, National
Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City.14
On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied
Fuji's Motion for Reconsideration.15
On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition
and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently, on
March 10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus Motion to
Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and Release on
Bail through counsel.17
On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued
a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against
Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records show that Liang
has a working visa valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang
Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing
Liason."18 Fuji was directed to be released from Bureau
of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19
In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his
rights to due process were violated since he was not
afforded any hearing or summary deportation
proceedings before the deportation order was issued
against him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her
duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau of
Immigration records would have revealed that he was
not overstaying because his Section 9(g) work visa was
valid until April 30, 2016.21
In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special
Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any
grave misconduct.23 She claimed that Fuji was accorded
due process during the summary deportation
proceedings.24 He was directed, through an Order dated
May 14, 2015 of the Legal Division, to submit his
Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to
do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for
reconsideration and verified petition to reopen the case.26
5

Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated
June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration -
Management Information System (BI-MIS) constituted a
substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the country,
hence, her formal charge had legal basis.27
Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her
duties.28 She had no intention to violate any law and did
not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules, or
unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for
herself or for other persons.29 Respondent pointed out
that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the
complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji
stated in his March 29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that
he had mistakenly signed some documents including the
administrative complaint.31
We find respondent administratively liable for her
negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before
levying the formal charge against Fuji for
overstaying.
I considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of
disbarment complaints against lawyers in government
service arising from their administrative duties, and
refers the complaint first either to the proper
administrative body that has disciplinary authority over
the erring public official or employee or the
Ombudsman.32
For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court
dismissed the disbarment complaint against former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former
Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and
former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona,
holding that the respondents were public officials being
charged for actions involving their official functions
during their tenure, which should be resolved by the
Office of the Ombudsman.34 In that case, one (1) of the
respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received
an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing
him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same
administrative complaint filed before the Office of the
Bar Confidant.35
Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v.
Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint against
respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service
Commission. The Court held that the acts or omissions
alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . .
official functions in the [Civil Service Commission] and
within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of
their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman."37 It
would seem that the complainant directly instituted a
disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an
administrative complaint before the proper
administrative body.
This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances
in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show
that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously
dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the
pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative
Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and
considered the case closed.38
The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's
petition to reopen his case and ordered his release.
However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent
on the charges levelled by Fuji.
Thus, with the termination of the administrative
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and
the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on
complainant's administrative complaint, this Court
determine whether there is sufficient ground to
discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary
authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported
Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss
this administrative complaint. This Court has previously
held that proceedings of this nature cannot be
"interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same."41 The primary object of disciplinary proceedings
is to determine the fitness of a member to remain in the
Bar. It is conducted solely for the public welfare,42 and
the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will
be decisive are the facts borne out by the evidence
presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:43
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This
rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare.
They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit
6
to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The Result/s : 1. LIANG FUJI
complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense - Derogatory Record Not Found
a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.44 - Latest Travel Record Found (Please
see the attached files for your ready
II reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 October
1991)
Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the
formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the basis - Immigration Status Found
of the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the BI-
MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with attachments - Latest Payment Record Found in BI-
was attached to respondent's Comment.46 Main (Please see the attached files for
your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18
However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated October 1991)48
that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa
expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV expired on 6
December 2013"47 as respondent claims. Relevant
portions of the Memorandum ....
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of
immigration records showing details of filing of
ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA applications, such as official receipts, - and travel record
For :
CRUZ of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who made the
determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of
the'documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS.
From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION
Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were
REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION computer print-outs showing details of official receipts
STATUS; VISA EXTENSION dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013, and November 19,
Re : PAYMENT, LATEST TRAVEL AND 2013 for temporary visitor visa extension and official
DEROGATORY OF THE receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change
FOLLOWING: of immigration status. Also, the travel records of Fuji
show the following details:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. MR./MS. LIANG FUJI
Date &
: 4 June 2015 3:05 PM
Time
2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE
Verifier : DIMARUCOT J
3. MR./MS. JACKY CHANG HE
Database : TRAVEL - ARRIVAL
Date : 04 June 2015

-------------------------------------------------------------------- IM
-------------------------------------------------------------------- TR FL
TRA MI P
------------- AV IG OFFI RE
VEL G O ACT
EL HT C3E MA
DAT ST R ION
Further to your request for verification of Immigration TI N R RKS
E AT T
Status; Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL ME O
US
RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:

....

7
 Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may
10- N
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
FEB 11: CZ A MIJ ALL
RUA 34P 37 9G I ARE OW misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a
government official.52 However, if said misconduct as a
RY- M 7 A S ED
government official also constitutes a violation of her
2014 1
oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary
06- N sanction by this Court.
JAN 11: CZ A PAR ALL
UAR 51P 37 9A I ANG OW Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code
Y- M 7 A UE ED of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates that
2012 1 "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau
22- N
of Immigration, she is the representative, not of any
SEPT 11: CZ A ALL
NUN private party, but of the State. Her task was to
EMB 25P 37 9A I OW
EZ investigate and verify facts to determine whether a
ER- M 7 A ED49
ground for deportation exists, and if further
2011 1
administrative action — in the form of a formal charge
— should be taken against an alien.
Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival
in the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji,
visa immigration status.50 Simple prudence dictates that she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's
respondent Atty. Dela Cruz should have verified whether application, which would negate her finding of
or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was
had been approved by the Bureau of Immigration deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8) months, until
Commissioners, especially since she had complete and his release on March 23, 2016.
easy access to the immigration records.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to give
Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. attention to a task due to carelessness or
Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should indifference.54 In this case, respondent's negligence
exercise such degree of vigilance and attention in shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every
reviewing the immigration records, whenever the legal person, including aliens, to due process and to the
status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For consequences of her actions.
while a deportation proceeding does not partake of the
nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and Lawyers in government service should be more
extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the conscientious with their professional obligations
freedom and liberty of a person.51 consistent with the time-honored principle of public
office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under
Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered
her review of the documents transmitted to her by the even more exacting as to government lawyers because
BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately result in the they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the
deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee. She State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence,
should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by and professionalism in public service.56 In this case,
a personnel from the BI-MIS at the bottom portion of the respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with
receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension the strict demands and high standards of public service
stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she inquired and the legal profession.
further, she would have discovered that Fuji's application
dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this
visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was approved by the Court.57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for
Board of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 — or simple neglect of duty is suspension for one (1) month
one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with validity and one (1) day to six (6) months. In previous
until April 30, 2016. Thus, even if Fuji's temporary cases,59this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of
visitor (9A) visa had expired on December 6, 2013 his three (3) months to six (6) months for erring lawyers,
stay in the country was still valid under the 9G work who were negligent in handling cases for their clients.
visa. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three

8
(3) months considering the consequence of respondent's
negligence. This suspension includes her desistance
from performing her functions as a special prosecutor in
the Bureau of Immigration.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M.

Dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months.

The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall

immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally
manifest to this Court that her suspension has started,
and copy furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies
where she has entered her appearance, within five (5)
days upon receipt of this Resolution. Respondent shall
also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse
parties in all the cases she entered her formal
appearance.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of

the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi
M. Dela Cruz's personal record. Copies of this
Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

9
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5333, March 13, 2017
ROSA YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. JUSTO DE
JESUS PARAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment
complaint1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras
(complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras
(respondent) for which he was suspended from the
practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court
now are (a) whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for allegedly violating his
suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should
be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court
suspended respondent from the practice of law for six
(6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for
one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his
family, with the penalties to be served
simultaneously.3 Respondent moved for
reconsideration4 but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to
declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his
associate, Atty. Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging
that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty.
Enojo signed a pleading prepared by respondent, in
violation of the suspension order.7Moreover,
complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a
court in Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby
violating the suspension order.8 On March 26, 2001,
complainant filed a second motion for contempt and
disbarment,9 claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty.
Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates, in
willful disobedience of the suspension order issued
against respondent.10 Complainant filed two (2) more
motions for contempt dated June 8, 200111 and August
21, 200112 raising the same arguments. Respondent and
Atty. Enojo filed their respective comments,13 and
complainant filed her replies14 to both comments. Later
on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift Suspension15 dated
May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed
the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter,
respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients
and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift
Suspension.16 Also, complainant manifested that
respondent appeared before a court in an election case on
July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift
suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for report and recommendation.17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Clarificatory Order18 on the status of
respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether
respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's
order to lift his suspension.19 Meanwhile, the Office of
the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry
through a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by
Acting Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge
Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros
Oriental. Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing
queries to the OBC for report and recommendation.21
In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004,
the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order
declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice
of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the
Court.23 Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting
of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of
the period stated in the Court's decision and an order
from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to
enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In
this regard, the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's
suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his
receipt of the Court resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the
suspensions were to be served simultaneously, the period
of suspension should have ended on May 22,
2002.24 To date, however, the Court has not issued any
order lifting the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004,
the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it.
Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was
constrained to issue a Resolution26 dated January 20,
2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report
regarding the said incidents. In response, the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to the
Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had
passed a Resolution dated April 15, 2013 affirming
respondent's suspension from the practice of
law.28 However, in view of the pendency of respondent's
motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook
to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said
motion is resolved.29 Thereafter, in a letter30 dated
September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it
denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. The
Court received the records and relevant documents only
on February 15, 2016.31
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16,
2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents
10
referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against
respondent which had been resolved with finality by the
Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and
Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for
falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan
documents and for immorality.33
In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with
modification decreasing the recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.35 Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for
reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative
liability based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had
been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's
Decision dated October 18, 2000. He added that to
suspend him anew for another year based on the same
grounds would constitute administrative double
jeopardy. He stressed that the post-decision referral of
this case to the IBP was limited only to pending
incidents relating to the motion to declare him in
contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such
motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June
7, 2015.37
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent
should be administratively held liable for practicing law
while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court
should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters
referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged
violation of the suspension order and his request for the
Court to lift the suspension order. However, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on
such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's
liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein
complainant – which was already resolved with finality
by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse:
(a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to see the IBP
Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore,
erroneously upheld the latter's report and
recommendation; and (b) it took the IBP more than a
decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this
leaves the Court with no factual findings to serve as its
basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory
requirement which may not be dispensed with, except
for valid and compelling reasons,38 as it is essential to
accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the
issues raised.39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation,
the Court usually remands the administrative case to the
IBP for further proceedings.40 However, in light of the
foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own
admission that he resumed practicing law even without a
Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a
compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it
even without the IBP's factual findings and
recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law
embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, as well as legal principles,
practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge,
training[,] and experience."41 During the suspension
period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must
desist from practicing law.42 It must be stressed,
however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically
lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period.43 The
lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for
an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he
or she resumes the practice of law.44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that
respondent's suspension period became effective on May
23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22,
2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting
of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and
without waiting for a Court order approving the same,
respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases,
and even working on an amicable settlement for his
client with the Department of Agrarian
Reform.45 Indubitably, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without waiting for the Court order
lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he
must be held administratively liable therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and willfully appearing as an attorney without
authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in
this case – are grounds for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law,46 to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
11
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) 138 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, six (6) months. However, considering that respondent
prevailing case law47 shows that the Court consistently has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can
imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on no longer be imposed.
lawyers who continue practicing law despite their
suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in
months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that
suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
considering that just recently, respondent had already the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's
been disbarred from the practice of law and his name personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let
had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
Paras.48 In Sanchez v. Torres,49 the Court ruled that the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
imposed on a lawyer who had been previously country for their information and guidance.
disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the SO ORDERED.
lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes
in the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the
Court held that respondent therein should be suspended
from the practice of law, although the said penalty can
no longer be imposed in view of his previous
disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon
respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although
the said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of
his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be
adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the
issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is
already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a
pleading dated February 21, 200151 and indicating
therein the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo
conspired with respondent to violate the suspension
order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of
representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign
pleadings on their behalf. The Court cannot give
credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that
respondent prepared the pleading and only requested
Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted
to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when
respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the
contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for
lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to
meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the
matters referred to it for investigation, report, and
recommendation, and to submit its report with
reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper administration
of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.

12
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7186, March 13, 2018
ROMEO A. ZARCILLA AND MARITA
BUMANGLAG, Complainants, v. ATTY. JOSE C.
QUESADA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated February 9,
2006 filed by complainants Romeo A. Zarcilla (Zarcilla)
and Marita Bumanglag (Bumanglag) against respondent
Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) for gross
misconduct.
The facts are as follows:
On August 5, 2002, complainant Zarcilla executed an
Affidavit-Complaint2 against respondent Atty. Quesada
and complainant Marita Bumanglag, among others, for
falsification of public documents docketed as I.S. No.
02-128-SF. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired
with certain spouses Maximo Quezada and Gloria
Quezada (Spouses Quezada) and Atty. Quesada to falsify
a Deed of Sale3 dated April 12, 2002 by making it
appear that his parents, Perfecto G. Zarcilla and Tarcela
A. Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land under TCT No. T-
18490 in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite
knowledge that his parents were already deceased since
March 4, 2001 and January 9, 1988, respectively, as per
Death Certificates4issued by the Office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Santo Tomas, La Union. Said signing
of deed of sale was allegedly witnessed by a certain
Norma Zafe and Bumanglag, and notarized by Atty.
Quesada.
Other than the alleged falsified deed of sale, Zarcilla also
claimed that on March 20, 2002, the Spouses Quezada
filed a petition for the administrative reconstitution of
the original copy of TCT No. 18490 where they
presented the Joint Affidavit of his then already
deceased parents, the spouses Perfecto Zarcilla and
Tarcela A. Zarcilla as the petitioners.5 Said Joint-
Affidavit of the Spouses Quezada was again notarized
by Atty. Quesada.
However, on October 9, 2002, Bumanglag executed a
Counter-affidavit6 in the same case where she claimed to
be the real owner of the property after Perfecto Zarcilla
sold the same to her mother. Bumanglag also stated
therein that she facilitated the sale transaction to the
Spouses Quezada which, in effect, exonerated her co-
respondents, including Atty. Quesada, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
xxxx
6. That after the death of my mother I needed money to
pay for the expenses she incurred when she was sick and
need medication and all the (sic) to pay for the expenses
of her burial. I offered to sell the property to Spouses
MAX QUEZADA and GLORIA QUEZADA. I showed
them the Deed of Sale between PERFECTO
ZARCILLA and my mother. I also showed them the
paper that my mother signed giving me the land;
7. That the Spouses Quezada told me that they will buy
the land provided I will be the one to transfer the said
land to their name. They gave me an advance payment
so that I could transfer the land to them. I made it
appear that PERFECTO ZARCILLA sold the
property to the said spouses because the title of the
land was still in the name of Perfecto Zarcilla. I did
not have [any] criminal intent when I did it because
the land no longer belong to Perfecto Zarcilla. I did
all the subsequent acts like Petition for Reconstitution in
the name of Perfecto Zarcilla because then, the title was
still in his name. However, there was no damage to the
heirs of PERFECTO ZARCILLA because the land had
long been sold to my mother and the sons and daughters
no longer had no legal claim to the said land;
8. That SPOUSES MAXIMO QUEZADA &
GLORIA QUEZADA did not falsify any document
because I was the one who facilitated the transaction
knowing that the land I was selling really belonged to
me. Not one of my brothers and (sic) sisters never
(sic) complained when I sold the land. I just delivered
the document to the Spouses MAXIMO QUEZADA
& GLORIA QUEZADA including the title in their
name. I was paid the balance after the Certificate of
Title in their name was finally delivered.7
All other respondents in the said falsification case,
except for Atty. Quesada, also filed their respective
counter-affidavits where they reiterated Bumanglag's
admission.8
In a Resolution9 dated April 14, 2003, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of La Union held Bumanglag only
to undergo trial. All other respondents, including Atty.
Quesada who did not even file his counter-affidavit,
were exonerated for insufficiency of evidence.
Both Zarcilla and Bumanglag filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, but both were denied.
Consequently, Bumanglag was indicted for four counts
of falsification of public documents before the
Municipal Trial Court of Sto. Tomas, La Union,
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3594, 3595, 3597, and
3598.
However, Zarcilla later on withdrew said cases when he
learned that Bumanglag was not aware of the contents of
her counter-affidavit when she signed the same. He also
found out that Bumanglag was deceived by her co
13
accused, including Atty. Quesada. Thus, upon the
motion of Zarcilla, in an Order10dated July 27, 2005, the
court dismissed all falsification cases against
Bumanglag.
In a Resolution11 dated June 26, 2006, the Court resolved
to require Atty. Quesada to file a comment on the
complaint against him.
On August 28, 2006, Atty. Quesada file a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Comment12 due to voluminous
workload. On September 18, 2006, Atty. Quesada filed a
second motion for extension to file comment. In a
Resolution13 dated November 20, 2006, the Court
granted Atty. Quesada's motions for extension with a
warning that the second motion for extension shall be
the last and that no further extension will be given.
On September 26, 2007, due to Atty. Quesada's failure to
file a comment on the complaint against him within the
extended period which expired on October 17, 2006, the
Court resolved to require Atty. Quesada to (a) show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt from such failure, and (b) comply with
the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the
required comment.14
Due to Atty. Quesada's failure to comply with the Show
Cause Resolution dated September 26, 2007, the Court
resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada, a fine of
P1,000.00, and (b) require Atty. Quesada to comply with
the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 by filing the
comment required therein.15
No payment of fine was made as of January 13, 2009 as
evidenced by a Certification16 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff
Officer.
Again, failing to comply with the directives of the Court
to pay the fine imposed against him and to submit his
comment, the Court, in a Resolution17 dated February
16, 2009, resolved to (a) impose upon Atty. Quesada an
additional fine of P1,000.00, or a penalty of
imprisonment of five (5) days if said fines are not paid
within 10 days from notice, and (b) order Atty. Quesada
to comply with the Resolution dated June 26, 2006 to
submit his comment on the complaint against him. Atty.
Quesada was also warned that should he fail to comply,
he shall be ordered arrested and detained by the National
Bureau of Investigation until he shall have made the
compliance or until such time as the Court may order.
Despite repeated notices and warnings from the Court,
no payment of fine was ever made as of September 3,
2010 as evidenced by a Certification18 which was issued
by Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff
Officer. On December 28, 2010, another
Certification19 was issued anew showing no record of
payment of fine by Atty. Quesada.
Thus, in a Resolution20 dated March 9, 2011, the Court
resolved to (1) increase the fine imposed on Atty.
Quesada to P3,000.00, or imprisonment often (10) days
if such fine is not paid within the prescribed period; and
(2) require Atty. Quesada to comply with the Resolution
dated June 26, 2006 by submitting the required comment
on the complaint.
No payment of fine was made as of July 12, 2011, as
evidenced by a Certification21 which was issued by
Araceli Bayuga, Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff
Officer.
It appearing that Atty. Quesada failed to comply with the
numerous Resolutions of the Court to pay the fine
imposed upon him and submit comment on the
complaint against him, in a Resolution22 dated August
24, 2011, the Court ordered the arrest of Atty. Quesada,
and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he
shall have compli[ed] with the Court's Resolution dated
March 9, 2011. Subsequently, the Court issued a
Warrant of Arrest.23
Apparently forced by his looming detention, after five
(5) years, Atty. Quesada filed his Comment24 dated
October 10, 2011, in compliance with Resolution dated
June 26, 2006. He claimed that he is a victim of political
harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the
instant case against him was filed solely for the purpose
of maligning his person. Attached to his compliance was
postal money order in the amount of P3,000.00 as
payment for the fine imposed upon him.
In a Letter25 dated October 10, 2011, Atty. Ricardo S.
Pangan, Jr., Regional Director of the NBI, informed the
Court that Atty. Quesada voluntarily surrendered before
the agents of the NBI on October 11, 2011, and claimed
that he had already complied with the Resolution of the
Court. Atty. Quesada submitted a copy of his comment
and payment of fine, thus, on the same day, Atty.
Quesada was immediately released from custody.
On February 1, 2012, the Court referred the instant case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.26
During the mandatory conference before the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), only
Bumanglag and her counsel appeared. Atty. Quesada
failed to appear thereto, thus, the mandatory conference
was reset to July 11, 2012. However, on July 11, 2012,
Atty. Quesada failed again to appear, thus, the
mandatory conference was reset anew to July 25, 2012.
Meanwhile, Bumanglag informed the IBP-CBD that co-
complainant Romeo Zarcilla passed away in 2005.
14
On July 23, 2012, Atty. Quesada requested that the
mandatory conference be reset due to health reasons. He
submitted his Medical Certificate dated May 2, 2012
showing that he underwent a head operation and that he
is still on recovery period.
On July 25, 2012, Atty. Quesada failed again to appear,
thus, the parties were directed to appear on August 23,
2012 and submit their respective verified position
papers. However, on August 23, 2012, only Bumanglag
and her counsel appeared, and Atty. Quesada failed to
appear anew. Thus, considering that the parties were
duly notified of the hearing, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On May 30, 2014, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty.
Quesada be disbarred from the practice of law.
In a Resolution No. XXI-2015-097 dated January 31,
2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-
CBD.
RULING
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by
the court into the conduct of its officers.27 The issue to
be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation
of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for
disbarment continues despite the desistance of a
complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to
answer the charges against him despite numerous
notices.
However, in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial
evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
As in this case, considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar,
this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty.28
Thus, in the instant case, the allegations of falsification
or forgery against Atty. Quesada must be competently
proved because falsification or forgery cannot be
presumed. As such, the allegations should first be
established and determined in appropriate proceedings,
like in criminal or civil cases, for it is only by such
proceedings that the last word on the falsity or forgery
can be uttered by a court of law with the legal
competence to do so. A disbarment proceeding is not the
occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery
simply because the sole issue to be addressed and
determined therein is whether or not the respondent
attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the
court in the dispensation of justice. Accordingly, We
decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had
committed the supposed falsification of the subject
affidavit in the absence of the prior determination
thereof in the appropriate proceeding.29
We, however, noted that Atty. Quesada Violated the
notarial law for his act of notarizing the: (1) Deed of
Sale30 dated April 12, 2002 purportedly executed by and
between the spouses Maximo F. Quezada and Gloria D.
Quezada, the buyers, and complainant Zarcilla's parents,
the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla; and
the (2) Joint Affidavit31 dated March 20, 2002
purportedly executed by the spouses Tarcela Zarcilla and
Perfecto Zarcilla for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-
18490, when in both occasions the spouses Tarcela
Zarcilla and Perfecto Zarcilla could no longer execute
said documents and appear before Atty. Quesada since
they have long been deceased as evidenced by their
death certificates. Tarcela Zarcilla died on January 9,
1988, while Perfecto Zarcilla died on March 4, 2001.32
Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal
appearance before the notary public:
xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time
of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the person who signed the same is the very same
person who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are
stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who
actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party's free act or deed. Here,
Atty. Quesada's act of notarizing the deed of sale
appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud. This is
more evident when he certified in the acknowledgment
thereof that he knew the vendors and knew them to be
15
the same persons who executed the document. When he
then solemnly declared that such appeared before him
and acknowledged to him that the document was the
vendor's free act and deed despite the fact that the
vendors cannot do so as they were already deceased,
Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations,
and was not merely negligent.
Thus, by his actuations, Atty. Quesada violated not only
the notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he
notarized the deed of sale without all the affiant's
personal appearance. His failure to perform his duty as a
notary public resulted not only damage to those directly
affected by the notarized document but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public and in
degrading the function of notarization. The
responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment orjurat is
more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer
because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers
commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest.33
Time and again, We have held that notarization of a
document is not an empty act or routine. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document, thus, making that document admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.34
For this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of
their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in
the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize
a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement
is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature of the acknowledging party and to
ascertain that the document is the party's free act and
deed.35
Aside from Atty. Quesada's violation of his duty as a
notary public, what this Court find more deplorable was
his defiant stance against the Court as demonstrated by
his repetitive disregard of the Court's directives to file
his comment on the complaint. Despite several Court
resolutions, notices, directives and imposition of fines
for Atty. Quesada's compliance and payment, he ignored
the same for more than five years. Consequently, this
case has dragged on for an unnecessary length of time.
More than five (5) years have already elapsed from the
time the Court issued the first Resolution dated June 26,
2006 which required Atty. Quesada to file his comment
until his eventual submission of comment on October
10, 2011. It took a warrant of arrest to finally move Atty.
Quesada to file his Comment and pay the fines imposed
upon him. While the Court has been tolerant of his
obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he
shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court's
time and resources.
And even with the submission of his comment, he did
not offer any apology and/or any justification for his
long delay in complying with the directives/orders of
this Court. We surmised that when Atty. Quesada finally
complied with the Court's directives, his compliance was
neither prompted by good faith or willingness to obey
the Court nor was he remorseful of his infractions but
was actually only forced to do so considering his
impending arrest. There is, thus, no question that his
failure or obstinate refusal without justification or valid
reason to comply with the Court's directives constitutes
disobedience or defiance of the lawful orders of Court,
amounting to gross misconduct and insubordination or
disrespect.36
Atty. Quesada's acts constitute willful disobedience of
the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. His
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. His conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court's
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Atty. Quesada's obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court's orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant
flaw in his character; it also underscores his disrespect of
the Court's lawful orders which this Court will not
tolerate."37
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
16
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's duty to uphold
the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form
of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer's
obedience to court orders and processes.38 Considering
Atty. Quesada's predisposition to disregard not only the
laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court,
it only shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor. Worse, with his
repeated disobedience to this Court's orders, Atty.
Quesada displayed no remorse as to his misconduct
which, thus, proved himself unworthy of membership in
the Philippine Bar. Clearly, Atty. Quesada is unfit to
discharge the duties of an officer of the court and
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find
respondent ATTY. JOSE C. QUESADA JR.
GUILTY of gross misconduct and willful disobedience
of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is, thus,
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken-off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately. We, likewise, REVOKE his incumbent
notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a
notary public.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the
Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which
shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and
all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the
Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

17

THIRD DIVISION
April 24, 2017
A.C. No. 8658
FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. JOHAN A. TABUZO, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June
18, 2010 filed by Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio), seeking
the disbarment of Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo)
for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
The Facts
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint
filed by Arsenio before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) against JS
Contractor, a recruitment agency.2 During a scheduled
hearing on May 10, 2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas
Employment Adjudicator who was assigned to hear the
case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to
which Arsenio complied.
A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty.
Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank sheets
of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily said, "Bwiset!
Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya
pagdating.ng kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called
up the office of Senator Rene Cayetano who advised him
to make a clarification regarding the signed sheets of
blank paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but
the latter again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset!
Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa
POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo further
said, "Sabihin mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na
baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila ang pinirmahan
mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang pangalan ko ay Atty.
Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi ka bumalik bukas ay
mawawala ang kaso mo!"3
Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS
Contractor was dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint
against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before the Office of the
Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. "
In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft
Investigation Officer II Wilfred Pascasio ordered that an
Information be filed against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo upon
finding of probable cause against him.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration
alleging, among others, that there is no Atty. Romeo
Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never handed any
copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking
the initiative in filing the said motion to clear his name
as he believed he was the person referred to in the earlier
Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless,
such motion was subsequently denied in an Order dated
July 16, 2002.
Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City
acquitted Atty. Tabuzo for violation of RA No.
3019.1âwphi1
Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit before this Court. In a Resolution 5 dated
November 24, 2010, this Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBPCBD) docketed the case as CBD
Case No. 11-2912, entitled "Francis C. Arsenio v. Atty.
Johan Tabuzo ".
In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6
Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him,
claiming that the alleged unethical acts are baseless. He
averred that he had never acted in any conduct
unbecoming of a public officer or uttered invectives and
other alleged acts. To support his claim, he attached the
Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas Employment
Adjudicators (OEA) who occupied the tables
immediately adjacent to him in the Recruitment
Regulations Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs
attested to the effect that no such incident or any
untoward event that called for attention transpired. Atty.
Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due
process was violated since he was not notified of the
case against him before the Office of the Ombudsman as
he was never served nor had personally received Orders
from such Office.
The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board
of Governors
In his Report and Recommendation, 8 Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Eldrid Antiquierra recommended
that reprimand be imposed upon Atty. Tabuzo. The
Investigating Commissioner ruled in such wise on the
basis of the sworn affidavit of Arsenio and the
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the said Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner upon finding that Atty.
Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.01 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, the IBP
18
Board of Governors suspended Atty. Tabuzo from the Atty. Johan Tabuzo, not as Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even
practice of law for three months. before he filed his complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it discrepancy as to the name of herein respondent when a
was denied. 10 clarification was already made. Nevertheless, Atty.
The Issue Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case filed against
him on the basis of the Resolution of the Office of the
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint Ombudsman.
constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.
Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a
The Court's Ruling criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the
After examining the records of this case, the Court
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one
resolves to dismiss the instant disbarment complaint.
administratively. 16Thus, it is proper to deal with the
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and other evidence presented by Arsenio.
not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil
The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of
case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
Arsenio failed to discharge the necessary burden of
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect
proof. In his Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio merely narrated
the public and the courts. 11
that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in other evidence was presented to substantiate his claim.
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon Emphatically, such Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.
the complainant. 12 In the recent case of Reyes v.
Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the
Nieva, 13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the
Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of Arsenio
proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is
cannot be considered as substantial evidence. For one,
substantial evidence.
the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was
In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason decided on the basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to
advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending reprimand controvert the allegations of Arsenio. Also, the
against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of the: (1) Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence
Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, was further offeted to prove the allegations contained
which states that there was probable cause against Atty. therein.
Tabuzo for violating RA 3019; and (2) Complaint-
While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment
Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo
cases is substantial evidence, this Court is not persuaded
made offensive statements.
to exercise its disciplinary authority over Atty. Tabuzo.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a
resolved to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against
disbarment case was not met.
Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo.
Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the
SO ORDERED.
Ombudsman is predicated on the fact that the allegations
of Arsenio were uncontroverted; hence, the Office of the
Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true.
However, there was a seeming discrepancy as to the
name of Atty. Tabuzo when a case against him was filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Undisputedly, the
case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty.
Romeo Tabuso, when the name of herein respondent is
Atty. Johan Tabuzo. As such, the respondent claimed
that he failed to controvert Arsenio' s claims because he
never received any notice or order from the Office of the
Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the Office of
the Ombudsman was made on the basis of the complaint
of Arsenio alone since Atty. Tabuzo failed to file his
answer. 14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision
reveals that Arsenio was able to verify the identity of

19
THIRD DIVISION
August 31, 2016
A.C. No. 9090
TEODORO B. CRUZ, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTYS. JOHN G. REYES, ROQUE BELLO and
CARMENTCITA A. TOUS-GONZAGA,
Respondents
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration1 of the
Resolution2 of the Court dated 22 August 2012 finding
respondent Atty. John G. Reyes guilty of "negligence of
contumacious proportions" and suspending him from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
The Facts
The present case arose out of a petition for disbarment
filed by Atty. Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant)
charging respondent Atty. John G. Reyes (respondent)
with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly handling a
case involving conflict of interest, falsification,
knowingly alleging untruths in
pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the following
incidents:
The First Incident
(Intentional Misrepresentation and Knowingly
Handling a Case Involving Conflict of Interest)
Complainant alleged that respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for Mayor Rosi to Velarde
(Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in an
election protest case that was on appeal before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The case,
entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de Guzman, Protestant,
versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated
from the Regional Trial Comi (R TC) of Calabanga,
Branch 63, Camarines Sur. According to the petition for
disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the course of the
trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up
to the COMELEC on certiorari. 3
While the case was being tried at the RTC level,
protestant Raquel Reyes De Guzman (De Guzman) was
represented by the Sales Law Office ofNaga City,
although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated
in the pleadings that his address is in Cainta, Rizal, was
the chief counsel. Mayor Velarde, on the other hand, was
represented by Atty. Gualberto Manlagnit (Atty.
Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit prepared
the pleadings in connection with the appeal to the
COMELEC but, according to complainant, unknown to
Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed before the
COMELEC, which pleading was apparently prepared in
Cainta, Rizal but was signed by respondent whose given
address is in Quezon City. 4
Complainant explained that De Guzman used to be allied
with former Speaker Arnulfo Fuentebella (Speaker
Fuentebella) under the Nationalist People's Coalition
(NPC) party, whereas Mayor Velarde was a member of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) party, led
by Camarines Sur Governor Luis R. Villafue1ie (Gov.
Villafuerte). The Fuentebellas and the Villafue1ies are
known to be politically at odds with each other.
However, De Guzman subsequently changed her
political allegiance and became affiliated with the
Villafuertes by transferring to the LDP party. Mayor
Velarde, on the other hand, became an ally of the
Fuentebellas under the NPC. 5
According to complainant, Atty. Bello agreed to
represent De Guzman in the election protest case
because she was a political ally of Speaker Fuentebella.
Complainant emphasized that Atty. Bello has always
represented the political interests of the Fuentebellas.
There is, therefore, no doubt that Atty. Bello is the
lawyer of the Fuentebellas.6 As a result, with the sudden
shifting of the political loyalty of De Guzman and
Mayor Velarde, Atty. Bello suddenly stopped appearing
for De Guzman in the protest case without formally
withdrawing as her counsel.7 Mayor Velarde now had to
be defended by Atty. Bello because he is already an ally
of the Fuentebellas. However, Atty. Bello cannot
actively defend Mayor Velarde because he appeared for
De Guzman before the RTC.8 Thus, complainant
concluded, Atty. Bello found the expedient of passing
the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty.
Reyes, making the latter guilty of representing
conflicting interests,9 in violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Second Incident
(Falsification, Knowingly Alleging Untruths in
Pleadings and Unethical Conduct)
On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker
Fuentebella filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur.
Complainant also filed a COC for the same position.
Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz (Ebeta) and a
certain Marita Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita)
likewise filed their respective COCs for the
aforementioned position. The former is an indigent
laundry woman from San Jose, Camarines Sur, while the
latter was a former casual laborer of the municipal
government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.10 Clearly, both
Ebeta and Marita had no real intention of running for the
20
position for which they filed their COC, but were merely
instigated to do so in order to confuse the electorate of
the district, to the disadvantage of complainant.
Consequently, complainant filed a petition to declare
Ebeta and Marita as nuisance candidates.11
In connection with the petition to declare Ebeta and
Marita as nuisance candidates, complainant filed a
Memorandum with the COMELEC through the Office
of the Camarines Sur Provincial Election
Supervisor(PES). Pertinent portions of the Memorandum
were quoted by the complainant in his petition for
disbarment,12 to wit:
1. Complainant received a copy of the Verified Answer
of Marita signed by respondent as counsel, whose given
address is in Quezon City;
2. From the Answer, it was made to appear that Marita
caused the preparation thereof, read the allegations
therein contained, and understood them. It was also
made to appear that Marita signed the verification;
3. During the hearing at the PES in San Jose, Pili,
Camarines Sur, on 23 January 2004, respondent
appeared and:
a.) on record, admitted that the signature appearing on
the Verified Answer is his;
b.) officially manifested that he was hired by Marita as
her counsel to prepare the Verified Answer;
c.) officially confirmed that the allegations in the
Verified Answer were supplied by Marita; and
d.) said that Marita was in his office in Quezon City
when she "signed" the Verified Answer.
4. Marita arrived at the hearing to file a formal
withdrawal of her COC. She was immediately put on the
witness stand wherein she testified that:
a.) she did not know respondent;
b.) she never solicited his legal services, particularly, to
file the Verified Answer;
c.) she never supplied the allegations contained in the
Answer;
d.) the signature appearing in the Answer is not her
signature; and
e.) she could not have signed the verification in the
Answer in Quezon City on 15 January 2004 because she
was in Bicol on that date.13
The petition for disbarment also alleged that respondent
admitted to Attys. Adan Marcelo Botor and Atty.
Manlagnit - complainant's counsels in the petition for
disqualification before the PES-COMELEC - that Atty.
Bello merely gave the Verified Answer to him already
signed and notarize.14
For his part, respondent narrated the following version
of the events:
Anent the first incident, respondent alleged that he first
met Atty. Bello sometime in May, 2003 when the latter
was introduced to him by a friend. A few months after
their meeting, Atty. Bello called him up to ask if he
could handle a case to be filed with the COMELEC
since Atty. Bello had so many cases to handle. The case
would be to secure a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) with application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction from the COMELEC.15
According to respondent, he informed Atty. Bello that he
has never before handled an election case, much less one
with an application for a TRO with Preliminary
Injunction. Atty. Bello assured him that things would be
difficult at first, but he would assist respondent and
things will tum out easier. Due to the assurance given
and his desire for a more comprehensive experience in
law practice, respondent agreed to accept the case. Since
he made it clear from the start that he has no knowledge
or experience in election cases, he was never part of the
preparations in connection with the case. Atty. Bello
simply called him up for a meeting when the pleading
was ready so that he could sign the same. They agreed to
meet somewhere in Timog, Quezon City and after he
read the pleading and sensing that there was no problem,
he signed the same inside Atty. Bello's car. Thereafter,
he attended the initial hearing of the case, during which,
the parties were required to submit their respective
Memoranda.16
Respondent claimed that up to that point, there were no
indications about the true nature of the case. However,
when he was preparing the required Memorandum, he
found telltale signs. After his two appearances before the
COMELEC and the submission of the Memorandum,
respondent declared that he never knew what happened
to the case as he formally withdrew therefrom
immediately upon knowing the circumstances of the
case. He maintained that he cannot be held guilty of
representing conflicting interests because he never
handled any previous case involving either of the parties
in the COMELEC case. Moreover, he was not properly
apprised of the facts and circumstances relative to the
case that would render him capable of intelligently
deciding whether or not to accept the case. He likewise
did not receive a single centavo as attorney's, acceptance
or appearance fees in connection with the case. He
agreed to handle the same simply to accommodate Atty.
Bello and to improve his skills as a lawyer and never for
monetary considerations.17
21
With respect to the second incident, respondent related
that he was at home in Pangasinan on 17 January 2004
when he received a call from Atty. Bello asking him to
attend a hearing in Camarines Sur. He declined the
request three times due to his tight schedule. Atty. Bello
pleaded, saying that even on Saturdays, hearings could
be scheduled. Thus, even if he did not want to attend the
hearing due to its distance and because of his full
calendar, he could not refuse because he really did not
schedule appointments and/or hearings on Saturdays. All
that was told him regarding the case was that a
congressional candidate was being disqualified and a
lawyer is needed to defend him and his candidacy.
Respondent alleged that according to Atty. Bello, the
candidate was qualified and financially capable of
funding his campaign. Nevertheless, he clarified from
Atty. Bello if the candidate is not a nuisance candidate
and Atty. Bello allegedly replied: "Qualified na qualified
naman talaga eh." Respondent added that it was not
disclosed to him that the disqualification case involved a
candidate for the third congressional district of
Camarines Sur. He was simply informed that the
scheduled hearing of the disqualification case would be
on 23 January 2004 in Naga City.18
Since respondent was in Pangasinan and due to the fact
that the deadline for the filing of the necessary pleading
was nearing, Atty. Bello advised respondent that he
would just prepare the Answer and sign for respondent's
name in the pleading. Respondent maintained that he
would not have agreed to Atty. Bello's proposal, had it
not been for the pressed urgency, trusting that he would
not get into any trouble.19
While waiting for the scheduled date of the hearing to
arrive, he wondered why he has not been furnished a
copy of the pleading or given additional instructions
relative to the case. Atty. Bello, in the meantime, has
ceased to communicate with him and suddenly became
inaccessible. He thus toyed with the impression that he
was being left out of the case for reasons he could not
then understand.20
According to respondent, he was able to get a copy of
the Answer only when he was already in Naga City and
it was only then and there, while reading it, that he
realized that the case was, in reality, about a nuisance
candidate and that the client he was to appear for was,
indeed, a nuisance candidate. What was even more
surprising to him was that the copy of the Answer that
was given to him was unsigned: neither by him nor by
his supposed client. It was likewise not notarized.
Finding the indefensibility of his client and in order not
to make matters worse, he opted to appear and just
submit the case for resolution. To prove this point,
respondent alleged that all he had with him for the
hearing were only the unsigned and unnotarized Answer,
the petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates, his case calendar and nothing else. He had
not in his person any evidence whatsoever in support of
the defense of his client. Respondent added that even at
this point, he had no knowledge that his supposed client
"had already jumped ship." More importantly, he did not
know that her signature on the Answer was forged,
precisely because the copy of the Answer that was given
to him was unsigned.21
Before the start of the hearing, respondent started
looking for his client but she could not be found. He,
nevertheless, proceeded to the hearing for it was
immaterial to him whether she was present or not as he
had already planned to simply submit the case for
resolution . Unfortunately, respondent claimed, the
proceedings before the PES started as a casual
conversation with the lawyers for herein complainant
and went on to a full trial, "wittingly or unwittingly."22
Respondent admitted that, during the hearing, he
acknowledged that the signature appearing on The
Answer was his. He alleged that despite his personal
aversion and objection to certain allegations in the
Answer, he could not anymore deny the signature above
his printed name, even if it was only signed for and in
his behalf, because he had previously agreed, although
unwillingly, that his name be signed in the pleading. It,
therefore, came as a surprise to him that of all the
questions that can be asked of him during the trial, he
was questioned about his signature. Belatedly he realized
that he should have objected to the line of questioning as
he was being presented as an unwilling witness for
therein petitioner. However, without sufficient exposure
in the legal practice and wanting of the traits of a
scheming lawyer, he failed to seasonably object to the
line of questioning. 23
Nevertheless, respondent vehemently denied
complainant's allegation that he admitted having seen
Marita sign the document in his presence. According to
him, he vividly recalls his response to the then query
whether or not Marita signed the document in his
presence as: "I suppose that is her signature." Likewise,
when queried fmiher on the ideal that the pleading
should be signed by Marita in his presence as her
counsel, he allegedly responded: "While it is the ideal,
sometimes we lawyers, like you and I, sign documents
even if the client is not around due to our busy
schedules." He pointed out to the two lawyers of herein
complainant that whether Marita signed the Answer in
his presence or not is inconsequential since he was not
the notary public who notarized the Answer. He argued
that his signature pertains to the allegations in the
Answer, while the signature of his client forms part of
the verification and certification and that it is the duty of
the notary public to see to it that the person signing the
pleading as a party is really the person referred to in the
verification/certification. 24
22
Finally, respondent declared that except for the modest
appearance cum transportation fees that he received,
there was no monetary consideration for handling the
petition to declare Ebeta and Marita as nuisance
candidates. He explained that when the case was offered
to him, it was in haste and under a tenor of urgency that
the only impression he got was that the client was well-
to-do and could wage a decent campaign and was really
a qualified candidate. He repeated the words of Atty.
Bello: "qualified na qualifed sya." He emphasized that
all he wanted was to expand his experience an practice
as a lawyer.25
In his report and recommendation dated 17 April 2007,
Investigating Commissioner Edmund T. Espina found
respondent guilty of the charges against him and
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension
for one (1) month. The report, in part, reads:
It taxes the undersigned Commissioner's imagination,
however, that respondent disclaims any knowledge in
the above incidents and that he was just a "willing
victim" of the rather scheming tactics of a fellow lawyer,
who, surprisingly he did not even thought (sic) of
running after and holding liable, even after all these
charges filed against him. Be that as it may, it cannot be
denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and
allowed himself to be used by whoever should be
properly held liable for these fraud and
misrepresentation.
As regards the second incident, respondent argues that
he could not be held guilty of forgery, misrepresentation,
and other related offenses. x x x If at all, respondent was
forced to unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all
in the name of accommodation. Undersigned
Commissioner disagrees.
Respondent violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent should
have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be
counsel for an unknown client. x x x
Undersigned Commissioner finds sufficient legal basis
for disciplinary action against respondent for the various
misrepresentations and later, admissions before the
COMELEC when confronted with his "supposed client",
claiming that it was Atty. Roque [sic] who merely gave
him instructions and whose requests he merely
accommodated. x x x
His shortcomings when he accepted to be a counsel for
an unknown client in the COMELEC protest (first
incident) is in itself, already deplorable but to repeat the
same infraction in the petition for disqualification (in the
second incident) constitutes negligence of contumacious
proportions. It is even worse that respondent has
attempted to mitigate his liability by professing
ignorance or innocence of the whole thing, a matter that,
too, is inexcusable. Clearly, it is a lame excuse that
respondent did offer. By his own confession, he was
woefully negligent.26
On 19 September 2007, Resolution No. XVIII-2007-99
was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) resolving to adopt and
approve the above report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. It thereafter forwarded the
report to the Supreme Court as required under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.27
On 22 August 2012, the Court issued the questioned
Resolution adopting the above-quoted findings of the
IBP Investigating Commissioner. The Court, however,
increased the period of suspension from the
recommended one (1) month to one (1) year. The same
Resolution also resolved to:
xxxx
2. IMPLEAD Aitys. Roque Bello and Carmencita A.
Rous-Gonzaga in this administrative proceedings; and
3. REMAND the whole records of this case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further
investigation, report and recommendation with respect to
the charges against ATTY. ROQUE BELLO and ATTY.
CARMENCITA A. ROUS-GONZAGA.
Respondent is now before us seeking a reconsideration
of the aforementioned Resolution insofar as the penalty
imposed against him is concerned.
Respondent points out that from the very start, he had
been very candid as to the factual backdrop of the
present case. He never denied that he should have
evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be a
counsel for an unknown client. He does not refute, nor
does he argue against, the finding of the Commission on
Bar Discipline that he was remiss in his duties as a
lawyer when he accommodated the requests of a fellow
lawyer to represent an unknown client. However,
respondent argues, such negligence is not the negligence
"of contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition
of the penalty of suspension. Likewise, such negligence
is not tantamount to having knowledge of the alleged
fraud and misrepresentation, for the simple reason that
he did not know the details of the election case until its
hearing on 23 January 2004 in Naga City. He maintains
that if such fraud and misrepresentation really exists, his
"only fault was that he allowed himself to be duped to
unwittingly represent an 'unwilling' client, all in the
name of accommodation."
Our Ruling
We find respondent's motion for reconsideration
partially meritorious.
23
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment
or the suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the said administrative penalties28 and the
burden of proof rests upon the
complaint. 29 "Preponderance of the evidence means that
the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior
to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief compared to the presented contrary
evidence."30 In the case at bar, complainant failed to
present clear and preponderant evidence in support of his
claim that respondent "knowingly" handled a case
involving conflict of interest, "knowingly" alleged
untruths in pleadings, and that he "intentionally"
committed misrepresentation and falsification.
In connection with the first incident, complainant alleged
that respondent perpetrated acts constituting intentional
misrepresentation and knowingly handling a case
involving conflict of interest when he appeared as
counsel for Mayor Velarde in the COMELEC case. Rule
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Jurisprudence has provided three tests in
determining whether a violation of this rule is present in
a given case, to wit:
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for
an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same
time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a
lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by
that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a
violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interest is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon
in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.31 (Emphasis
omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, there must be a previous
lawyer-client relationship in order for the liability to
attach. Clearly, respondent cannot be held liable under
any of the three aforementioned tests because he was
never a counsel for either party in the COMELEC case
prior to the filing of the said action. Complainant,
however, would have us believe that respondent is the
"furtive" or "clandestine" partner of Atty. Bello so as to
justify his accusation that respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests. Complainant,
however, failed to present sufficient evidence in support
of his allegation. The mere fact that respondent agreed to
handle a case for Atty. Bello does not - alone - prove
that they are indeed partners. This Court is inclined to
give more weight and credence to the explanation
proffered by respondent: that is, he accepted the case
without being fully aware of the real facts and
circumstances surrounding it. His narration is
straightforward enough to be worthy of belief, especially
considering that he withdrew from the case after he
realized its true nature, as evidenced by the "Withdrawal
as Counsel"32 he filed before the COMELEC.
With respect to the charge of intentional
misrepresentation, complainant failed to specify which
act of respondent constituted the alleged offense. If the
alleged misrepresentation pertains to the act of
respondent of signing the pleading prepared by Atty.
Bello, we do not agree with complainant and the same
cannot be considered as misrepresentation since
respondent specified in his Comment that he read the
pleading before he affixed his signature thereto. He was,
therefore, aware of the statements contained in the
pleading and his act of signing the same signifies that he
agreed to the allegations therein contained. On the other
hand, if the misrepresentation alleged by complainant
refers to the allegations in the pleading filed by
respondent before the COMELEC, again, it cannot be
said that there was "intentional" misrepresentation on the
part of respondent since, as admitted by respondent and
as complainant himself asserted, the allegations therein
contained were supplied by Atty. Bello, which
allegations, at that time the pleading was signed,
respondent did not know were inaccurate. As pointed out
above, as soon as the true nature of the situation revealed
itself, respondent withdrew from the case.
Regarding the second incident, complainant claimed
that, in connection with the petition to declare Marita as
a nuisance candidate, respondent committed falsification
and knowingly alleged untruths, not only in Marita's
Verified Answer to the disqualification case against her,
but during the hearing of the case, as well. As with the
first incident, respondent maintained that he accepted the
case without being fully aware of the circumstances
relative thereto, this time because of the insistence and
urgency with which Atty. Bello made the request.
We earlier noted respondent's candor in explaining his
cause. His candidness about the events leading to this
administrative complaint against him is demonstrated by
the following declarations he made: (1) having agreed to
have his name signed in the pleading on his behalf, he
cannot now deny the signature above his printed
name; 33(2) he believed the assurances of his fellow
lawyers (counsels for herein complainant) that whatever
may have been said in confidence between them will not
be revealed to anybody for whatever reason; 34 and (3)
24
he failed to seasonably object to the line of questioning
relative to his signature on Marita's Answer, thereby
incriminating himself and making him an unwilling
witness for the opposing party, because of his
insufficient experience in the legal practice and as a
result of his lack of the traits of a scheming
lawyer. 35 These straightforward statements, coupled
with the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges against him until the contrary is proven, 36keep
us from treating respondent's proffered explanation as an
indication of mendacity. 37 This Court is, therefore,
compelled to give him the benefit of the doubt and apply
in his favor the presumption that he acted in good faith,
especially considering the failure of complainant to
present clear and convincing evidence in support of his
allegations.
Thus, with respect to the charge that respondent
"knowingly" alleged untruths in the supposed Verified
Answer of Marita, he admitted that Marita's Answer was
prepared by Atty. Bello, whom respondent likewise
authorized to sign his name on the pleading on his
behalf. This statement was corroborated by complainant
himself when he alleged in his petition for disbarment
that "Atty. John Reyes admitted to the two counsels of
then candidate Teodoro Cruz, Jr.x x x that the Answer
was merely passed to him by Atty. Bello already signed
and notarized." Consequently, respondent cannot be held
liable for "knowingly" alleging untruths for the simple
reason that the allegations in the Answer were not
supplied by him.
Neither can respondent be held guilty of falsification in
connection with the forged signature of
Marita.1âwphi1 "The basic rule is that mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot
be given credence."38 Complainant merely alleged that
Marita's signature in the Answer "was forged either by
Attorney Roque Bello or respondent x x x"39 and that
respondent falsified or caused the falsification of the
signature because "he is the one who presented the same
to the COMELEC, hence, presumed to be the one who
falsified the same."40 Other than this presumption and
bare allegation, complainant has not adduced any proof
in support thereof. As a result, this Court cannot give
any merit to his accusation.
The same is true in connection with complainant's
allegation that respondent falsely testified and made
misrepresentations during the nuisance candidate case
hearing before the PES by manifesting that he is the
lawyer of Marita, that the allegations in the Answer were
supplied by Marita and that Marita was in his office
when she signed the Answer's verification. Apart from
his allegations, complainant has not presented any
evidence, as for instance, the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN) of the proceedings, to prove that
respondent indeed made the statements attributed to him
and to enable this Court to properly evaluate the
transgressions ascribed to respondent.
It is well to note that respondent vehemently denied
having admitted seeing Marita sign the Verification
before his presence in his office in Quezon City. He
insisted that his response, when queried about Marita's
signature, was that: "I suppose that is her signature."
This Court finds it unreasonable - illogical, even - that
after having admitted the blunders he committed in this
case, he would now deny this particular circumstance,
unless he was in fact telling the truth. In any case, as
explained by respondent, it is of no moment whether or
not he saw Marita sign the Verification since he was not
the notary public who notarized the Answer.
Respondent's signature in the Answer refers to the
allegations therein, whereas the signature of Marita
forms part of the Verification which states that "she has
caused the preparation of the foregoing Answer and has
read the contents thereof which are true and correct of
her own personal knowledge." Respondent is, therefore,
correct when he pointed out that it is the responsibility of
the notary public administering the oath to make sure
that the signature in the Verification really belongs to the
person who executed the same.
It must be emphasized that "the Court exercises its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes
[his] case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. x x x When the pieces of evidence of the
parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the
preponderance of evidence, the equipoise rule dictates
that the decision be against the party carrying the burden
of proof."41
The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be said that
respondent has no liability at all under the
circumstances. His folly, though, consists in his
negligence in accepting the subject cases without first
being fully apprised of and evaluating the circumstances
surrounding them. We, nevertheless, agree with
respondent that such negligence is not of contumacious
proportions as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of
suspension. This Court finds the penalty of suspension
for one (1) year earlier imposed on respondent too harsh
and not proportionate to the offense committed. "The
power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great
caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment or suspension be imposed as a
penalty."42 The penalty to be meted out on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion taking into consideration the facts surrounding
each case.43
25
In this connection, the following circumstances should
be taken into consideration in order to mitigate
respondent's responsibility: first respondent exhibited
enough candor to admit that he was negligent and remiss
in his duties as a lawyer when he accommodated the
request of another lawyer to handle a case without being
first apprised of the details and acquainted with the
circumstances relative thereto; and second, since this is
his first offense, respondent "is entitled to some measure
of forbearance."44
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court dated 22
August 2012 is hereby modified in that respondent Atty.
John G. Reyes is REPRIMANDED for his failure to
exercise the necessary prudence required in the practice
of the legal profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

26
Second DIVISION
November 6, 2017
A.C. No. 10333
CORNELIO V. YAGONG, Complainant
vs.
CITY PROSECUTOR NEOPITO ED G. MAGNO
and ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR DON S.
GARCIA, Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The present case is an administrative complaint filed by
Cornelio V. Yagong against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed
G. Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia
for alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
David Flores charged complainant Cornelio V. Yagong
and his neighbor, Jimmy Coronel, with violation of
Presidential Decree (PD) 16121 and theft, respectively,
before the City Prosecution Office of Island Garden City
of Samal, Davao del Norte. Yagong claimed that when
he filed his Counter-Affidavit on January 2, 2012,
respondents City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and
Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia had already
come out with their Resolution indicting them of said
criminal cases. He contended that Magno and Garcia
were bias and partial, and into the scheme of money-
making for a favorable resolution. Thus, he filed the
present administrative complaint.
On the other hand, Magno and Garcia insisted that in
resolving cases filed before their office, they are only
guided by the concepts of prevailing laws and
jurisprudence in conducting Preliminary Investigations.
They filed the proper Information against Yagong in the
performance of their official functions. As a matter of
procedure, the complaint against Yagong and Coronel
was raffled among the associate prosecutors for
Preliminary Investigation. The case was then assigned to
Garcia for evaluation as to the existence of probable
cause to warrant indictment. After a thorough
examination of all the evidence adduced by the parties,
Garcia found the existence of probable cause. In his
capacity as the Approving Authority, Magno authorized
the consequent filing of the Criminal Information for
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against Yagong.
On January 30, 2016, the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) recommended the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Magno and Garcia, to
wit:2
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint filed against
respondents - City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G. Magno and
Associate City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia is
hereby DISMISSED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
On September 24, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XXII-2016-542,3 which adopted
the foregoing recommendation, hence:
RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from
the findings and recommendation of the IBP that the
instant administrative complaint must be
dismissed.1âwphi1
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary
sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always
be exercised with great caution, only for the most
imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the bar. As a
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges proffered against him until the
contrary is proved, and that, as an officer of the court, he
has performed his duties in accordance with his oath. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
complainant and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the
serious consequence of disbarment, this Court has
consistently held that only a clear preponderant evidence
would warrant the imposition of such a harsh penalty. It
means that the record must disclose as free from doubt a
case that compels the exercise by the court of its
disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act
done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly
demonstrated.4
Here, Y agong miserably failed to discharge said burden.
Indubitably, Magno and Garcia were only performing
their official duties of ascertaining whether or not
probable cause exists in the case before them, and filing
the necessary Information if probable cause is found
present. A preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial. It is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his Complaint
or Information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no objective except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the respondent is guilty
27
thereof. In the conduct of preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not decide whether there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of respondent. A
prosecutor merely determines the existence of probable
cause, and to file the corresponding information if he
finds it to be so. In the exercise of their powers and in
the discharge of their functions and responsibilities,
prosecutors enjoy the presumption of regularity. This
presumption of regularity includes the public officer's
official actuations in all the phases of his work.5
The Court reiterates that protection is afforded to
members of the Bar who are at times maliciously
charged. Yagong's failure to discharge its burden of
showing that the acts of the respondent lawyers truly
violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath warrants the
dismissal of the instant administrative complaint.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Court DISMISSES the instant
Complaint against City Prosecutor Neopito Ed G.
Magno and Assistant City Prosecutor Don S. Garcia for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

28