51. Gonzales v. CA, 343 Phil.

297 [1997]

Gonzales vs CA

GR No. 95523 – August 18, 1997

Romero, J.

FACTS:

2 separate information were filed against petitioner Reynaldo Gonzales y Rivera for attempted homicide
and violation of PD 1866 (illegal possession of firearms)

Facts according to prosecution:

May 20, 1984 – Jaime, Dionisio, and Zenaida Verde chilling in front of their house at around 6 pm

Petitioner arrives with Bening Paguia and started insulting Zenaida and pushed her

Jaime tried to restrain petitioner but then petitioner pulled out his Revolver (Caliber .22/ aka Paltik)
from his pocket and fired at Jaime but missed.

Incident was reported to the police which conducted paraffin test that showed petitioner’s right hand
was positive for gunpowder residue

Defense Version:

On the said date and time, a commotion within his barrio attracted his attention

They saw a group chasing an unidentified person running towards them with a gun in hand; the mob
shouted “Harangin.”

During the chase, unidentified person tripped and dropped the gun which the petitioner grabbed

Unidentified person boarded a passing bus. At this point, the group chasing turned out to be the Verdes
who demanded the gun from the petitioner

Petitioner refused to surrender gun which resulted into a scuffle during which the gun accidentally went
off without hitting anyone

Trial court a quo acquitted him of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the offence of illegal
possession of firearms.

Appealed to Court of Appeals; CA affirmed Trial Court decision

ISSUE/S:

1. W/N the petitioner has waived his right to a preliminary investigation

2. W/N the petitioner is actually guilty of illegal possession of firearms

Ruling:
YES. It is a well-settled rule that the right to a preliminary investigation may be waived by the failure to
invoke it prior to or at least at the time of the accused’s plea

When the petitioner entered into a plea to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to
preliminary investigation

YES. 2 requisites: (1) the existence of the subject firearm, and (b) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess.

First requisite proven beyond dispute; subject firearm was recovered, identified, and presented as
evidence during trial

Second requisite proven beyond dispute by prosecution; ownership not required but only mere
possession (not only physical possession but also constructive possession, or subjection of a thing to
one’s control or management)

Testimony of petitioner is a lame defense that cannot overcome the solid evidence

Testimony not in line with human experience (unidentified person being able to board a bus despite
tripping; unidentified person did not even attempt to recover his revolver)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court
of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty is reduced to “four (4) years and two (2) months, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum.”

Since the petitioner has already served nine (9) years, nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days,
which is well beyond the maximum principal penalty imposed for his offense, as well as the subsidiary
penalty for the unpaid fine, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

52. People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 - February 27, 1974

Antonio J.

FACTS:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the
conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was
in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite
license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and
was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess
fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently
abandoned in people vs. mapa.

ISSUE:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in
Mapa?

RULING:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at
the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.

3. Tan, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

Jaime Tan Jr. vs CA

G.R. No. 136368 – January 16, 2002

FACTS:

On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan
was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for
reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as
deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared
and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision
P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed,
until paid;

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the
appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in
the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment
which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day
period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13,
1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?

RULING:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule
51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration
is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final
resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the
dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate
that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the
proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by
providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the judgment oblige, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with
notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive
effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the
right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural
rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of
redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with
the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

4. Mecano v. COA, G.R. No.103982, December 11, 1992

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

(G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)

CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC
had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that
the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on
Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of
1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits. Repeal
by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.
Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the
intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of
the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes
should be read in pari materia.

5. Aisporna v. CA, G.R. No. L-47533, October 27, 1981

Aisporna v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-39419- April 12, 1982

FACTS:

Petitioner Aisporna was charged for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Petitioner’s husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna (Rodolfo) was duly licensed by the Insurance Commission as
agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. Thru Rodolfo, a 12- month Personal Accident Policy was issued by
Perla with beneficiary to Ana M. Isidro for P50,000. The insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged because the aforementioned policy was issued with her active
participation, which is not allowed because she did not possess a certificate of authority to act as agent
from the office of the Insurance Commission.

Petitioner contended that being the wife of Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, and that the
policy was merely a renewal and was issued because her husband was not around when Isidro called by
telephone. Instead, appellant left a note on top of her husband’s desk.

The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decisions was affirmed by
respondent appellate court, finding petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Sec 189 of
the insurance act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the
Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. Petition appealed from is reversed, and accused is acquitted of the crime
charged.
A perusal of the provision in question shows that the first paragraph thereof prohibits a person from
acting as agent, sub-agent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner, while its
second paragraph defines who an insurance agent is within the intent of this section and, finally, the
third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.

The definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to
define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More
significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is
within the intent of Section 189.

Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the
first and second paragraphs would give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section
189. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its
provisions whenever possible. More importantly the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the
company in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable
to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential
element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section.

In the case at bar, the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the
accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been
omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence that
to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.

The accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.