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We all have been taught that short-term policy rates drive the whole yield curve
– specifically, that market expectations about the future path of the overnight
federal funds rate are reflected in 10-year yields and beyond.
In recent years, that transmission mechanism has broken down, with policy
rate hikes not percolating to the long end of the yield curve. Since the US
Federal Reserve’s liftoff in December 2015 from zero to 2.5%, the 10-year
Treasury yield actually declined from 2.30% to 2.06% before the most recent
rate cut in July.
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9/9/2019 How collateral scarcity reshaped the US yield curve - Risk.net
Our research shows that a $1 trillion change in pledged collateral can move
short-term rates by as much as 20 basis points.
The financial crisis in 2008 led to a structural change in the collateral markets.
The longer-term pledged collateral market grew to about $10 trillion pre-
Lehman. Immediately after Lehman’s bankruptcy, this market collapsed to
about half its peak, and remained unchanged until 2016. This decline was
initially due to crisis-related haircuts and counterparty risk in dealers and was
cemented by quantitative easing (QE) and regulatory changes.
QE lowered long-tenor spreads as central banks took duration risk out of the
market. This also meant there were fewer long-tenor bonds to pledge in the
collateral markets, which compressed short-term rates. Regulatory changes –
such as the liquidity coverage ratio, which requires banks to maintain sufficient
holdings of high-quality liquid assets to cover stressed outflows – had a similar
effect.
For almost a decade after the Lehman crisis, there was a continuous decline in
collateral reuse due to a combination of QE, regulatory changes and balance
sheet constraints at large dealer banks. During this period, transmission to
short-end rates remained muted.
The effect has been most noticeable in the 6–12 month part of the curve,
where the utility of collateral peaks, with enough tenor for reuse and limited
duration risks. In our recent research
research
researchpaper
paper,
paper we document the impact of
collateral demand on the yield curve risk premia. We regress the risk premia
variable – the actual yield minus overnight index swap forwards – at the three,
six, 12 and 24 month points against our measure of global collateral and a
proxy:
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9/9/2019 How collateral scarcity reshaped the US yield curve - Risk.net
Figure 1 shows the change in risk premia associated with a $1 trillion change
in the supply of collateral over a 3–24 month horizon. The kink in the 6–12
month points confirms the moneyness concept in the pledged collateral market
Jiang,
Jiang, Krishnamurthy,
(Jiang, Krishnamurthy,
Krishnamurthy,Lustig,
Lustig,
Lustig,2019
2019).
2019
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9/9/2019 How collateral scarcity reshaped the US yield curve - Risk.net
0.20
Betas for collateral
0.15
0.10
0.05
-0.05
3m 6m 12m 24m
So
Share
Since 2017, the role of pledged collateral markets has started to improve.
Large banks that are active in peddling collateral globally are optimising their
businesses to accommodate new regulations that constrained balance sheet
space. The unwind of QE has also contributed to the recovery of collateral
markets, as excess reserves are drained and securities are released.
This should be good news for markets – and portends higher short-term rates
in the 3–24 month parts of the curve.
High-quality bonds when pledged with title transfer are constantly reused in a
process that is akin to the money creation that takes place when banks take
deposits and make loans. Excess reserves held at central banks and collateral
available to pledge have very different implications for market functioning.
Collateral in the market, with reuse, is likely to lubricate markets, while excess
reserves have remained idle in recent years.
For example, overnight rates in the euro area would probably be much more
negative if not for securities lending activity by national central banks. This has
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9/9/2019 How collateral scarcity reshaped the US yield curve - Risk.net
The holdings of high-quality liquid assets across global banks do vary, with
some holding more collateral and others biased towards reserves. There are
several reasons for this, including the fact that some make a market in
reserves, while others prefer collateral and its reuse potential to reserves. But
with dealer balance sheets now more elastic than at any point since the
financial crisis, a smaller footprint of central banks will likely improve the
financial system’s plumbing and in turn monetary policy transmission.
The result should be the return of the kink in 6–12 month rates.
Manmohan Singh and Rohit Goel are part of the IMF’s monetary and capital
markets department. Singh is the author of Collateral
Collateral
Collateraland
and
andFinancial
Financial
Financial
Plumbing
Plumbing
Plumbing and a fellow at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. All views
expressed are of the authors only, and do not necessarily represent the views
of the IMF, or its executive board, or management.
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