RULE 65: CERTIORARI
Gonzales
Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank
G.R. No. 172299. April 22, 2008
SUMMARY
This case involves determination of whether the foreclosed
property was in fact exempt from execution, being a family
home. RTC ruled that it was not exempt. To assail the RTC
decision, a petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, which
was dismissed even on MR. to assail the CA rulings, another
petition for certiorari was filed with the SC, which the latter
denied for being an improper remedy.
FACTS
Petitioner was the registered owner of the property foreclosed
by the respondent. However, the petitioner said the property
should be exempt from execution because it was constituted
as his family home and that he was not the one who
mortgaged the property but a certain Josefino who entered into
a loan contract with respondent.
Respondent filed a petition for issuance of writ of possession
with the RTC, which was granted. Aggrieved, the petitioner,
after his MR was denied, filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the CA. the CA dismissed the petitioner for lack of
attachment of the order of the RTC being assailed, as well as
the relevant pertinent documents.
An MR was filed, this time certified true copies of the order
were attached but the CA again denied the petition as the
same did not cure the formal defects, which required the
original copy of the decision, not merely copies.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, this time with the SC to assail the CA decisions.
ISSUE
Whether certiorari under Rule 65 with the SC was the proper
remedy to assail an adverse decision of CA in a certiorari case
under Rule 65.
RULING
Short Answer
Hell no. One of the elements for certiorari under 65 may be
availed is that appeal is not available as a remedy. Here, since
appeal was in fact available to assail the decision of CA,
certiorari was therefore effectively barred.
Long Answer
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites
that have to concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
It is fairly obvious that the third requisite for a petition for
certiorari is wanting, that is, there must be no appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The availability to petitioner Alfredo of the remedy of a
petition for review on certiorari from the assailed Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals effectively barred his right to resort to a
petition for certiorari.
Basic is the rule that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the
remedy of appeal is available to an aggrieved party. A remedy
is considered “plain, speedy and adequate” if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment
and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal
was not only available but also a speedy and adequate
remedy. Moreover, petitioner Alfredo failed to show
circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general
rule as to make available to him a petition for certiorari in lieu
of making an appeal.
Dacudao vs.
G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
SUMMARY
This case involves a department order which was being
assailed by petitioner for being unconstitutional. The petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari directly with the SC which the latter
denied for being violative of the judicial hierarchy.
FACTS
The DOJ issued a department order directing all regional state
prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles to the
Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate
action.
Aggrieved by the DO, petitioners filed petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 directly with the SC. The petitioners argue that
the DO was unconstitutional as it was an obstruction of justice,
violative of enactment of law with retroactive effect, violative of
right to due process, and equal protection of the laws.
ISSUE
Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the
SC was the proper remedy to assail the department order
issued by the DOJ.
RULING
Short Answer
No. First, the filing of the petition directly with the SC was a
violation of the principle of the hierarchy of courts. It should
have been filed with the CA. Second, one of the elements for
certiorari to be available is that it must be directed against a
person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function, which was
not alleged by the petitioners.
Long Answer
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of
courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.4
An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the
Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse.
The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from
having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the
Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential
tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
Secondly, the writ of certiorari is available only when any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the
requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary
of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice
was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not
exercising any judicial or quasijudicial functions because his
questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy
Group. The function involved was purely executive or
administrative.
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The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial
function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on
the finding of probable cause in any case.
Fortich vs. Corona
G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998
SUMMARY
This case involves a resolution issued by the OP which was
aimed to modify a resolution issued by the same office which
has already attained finality. The petitioners assailed the
resolution via a petition for certiorari directly with the SC,
without first filing an MR. The respondents argued that the
remedy was improper was appeal via Rule 43 was available,
and alternatively, the petition for certiorari should only have
been filed with the CA. the SC ruled in favor of the petitioners.
FACTS
A 144 hectare lot located in Bukidnon was the property of
Quisumbing. The province of Bukidnon expropriated the
property to be converted from agricultural to industrial land.
The expropriation was successful however the conversion was
vehemently opposed by the tenants and other farmers, despite
favorable recommendations from different government
agencies.
The DAR Sec denied the application for conversion. The case
was appealed to the OP, which reversed the decision of DAR
and granted the application. A month thereafter, an MR was
filed with the OP which was also dismissed for being filed out
of time. The decision became final at this point.
Several farmers staged a hunger strike which compelled then
President Ramos to have a dialogue with the farmers.
Subsequently, the OP released the so called “Win-Win”
resolution. What it did was to modify the previous OP decision,
which was already final and executory. Pursuant to the “win-
win” resolution, not all the 144 hectares will be converted, but
only 40 hectares.
The petitioners then sought to nullify the resolution via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 directly with the SC instead
of filing an appeal via Rule 43 with the CA.
The respondents argue that the petition for certiorari was
improper on the following grounds: (1) appeal via Rule 43 was
available, (2) no MR was filed, and (3) the petition was directly
filed with the SC instead of the CA.
ISSUE
Whether the filing of the petition for certiorari proper.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, appeal via Rule 43 is not the proper remedy
because this is not a case of error in judgment but an error in
jurisdiction. The OP was without power to modify a decision
that has already attained finality. Second, while MR as a rule is
a pre-requisite for the filing of certiorari, by way of exception it
may be dispensed with when the assailed resolution is a patent
nullity. Third, the SC may take cognizance of a petition for
certiorari, even if it should have been filed first with the CA,
when the case involves matters of national interest.
Long Answer
The crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction,
not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal
under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set
aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done.
Under the Rules, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the
jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that,
if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition
must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial
agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of
Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of
Court.
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly
observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because
of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the
assailed resolution.
As to the issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal
procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking
judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not
necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity.
Dauz vs. Eleosida
No. L-15950. April 20, 1961
SUMARY
This case involves a criminal case wherein the accused filed a
motion to quash which was denied. He assailed such denial via
certiorari but the court said it was an improper remedy. The
remedy should be to appeal the judgement itself, after the trial.
FACTS
The petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of nonpayment of
business license pursuant to a local ordinance. The petitioner
filed a motion to quash information on the ground that the
charges therein did not constitute criminal offense. The justice
of the peace (JOP) denied the motion.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
court of first instance assailing the denial of his motion. The
judge dismissed the petition for being an improper remedy.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari was proper.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Where appeal is available, certiorari does not lie.
Long Answer
The petitioner’s remedy was to appeal, if he should after
hearing on the merits, be convicted in the justice of the peace
court. Needless to add, where appeal is available, certiorari
and prohibition do not lie.
Philippine National Bank vs. Intestate Estate of Francisco
de Guzman
G.R. No. 182507. June 16, 2010
SUMMARY
This case involves annulment and cancellation of mortgage.
Petitioner filed a total of 3 motions to dismiss which were
essentially reiterations of the same arguments. When all of the
motions were denied, petitioner filed a certiorari case,
reckoned from the notice of denial of the last (3rd) motion. The
SC said the petition was filed out of time. As the 3 motions
were identical, the subsequent 2 motions were deemed
motions for reconsiderations, and therefore the reckoning of
the 60 day period is the denial of the 1 st motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
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Respondent filed a complaint for declaration of nullity and
cancellation of mortgage against the petitioner. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure of the petitioner to pay legal
fees for an alias summons to be issued. When the RTC
dismissed the case, it did not specify whether the same was
with prejudice or otherwise. No appeal was taken, hence the
decision became final.
Thereafter, the respondent filed another complaint for
declaration of nullity and cancellation of mortgage against
petitioner. This complaint essentially included similar
allegations as the first dismissed case. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, which the RTC
denied.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed another motion to dismiss,
this time on the ground of forum shopping, which was also
denied by the RTC. 3 years later, another motion to dismiss on
the grounds of res judicata and forum shopping were filed by
the petitioner, which was also denied by the court.
18 days from the notice of denial of the last motion to dismiss,
the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari was filed on time.
RULING
Short Answer
No. There were 3 motions to dismiss filed in total. However,
the 2nd and 3rd reiterated practically the same arguments as the
1st motion to dismiss. Essentially then, the subsequent motions
were in the nature of motion for reconsideration. In view
thereof, the 60 day regelementary period must be reckoned
from the notice of denial of the second motion, and not from
the third.
Long Answer
Although the ground stated in the second Motion to Dismiss
was forum-shopping and the subsequent motions included
other grounds, nonetheless, all of these motions raised a
similar argument—that since the dismissal in the first case is
already final and executory and there is no reservation made
by the court in its judgment that the dismissal is without
prejudice, the filing of the second case is barred. Therefore,
the subsequent motions, being reiterations of the first motion,
technically partook of the nature of a motion for reconsideration
of the interlocutory order denying the first Motion to Dismiss.
In a parallel case, San Juan, Jr. v. Cruz, the Court
acknowledged that there is actually no rule prohibiting the filing
of a pro forma motion against an interlocutory order as the
prohibition applies only to a final resolution or order of the
court. The Court held, nonetheless, that a second motion can
be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere
reiteration of the grounds and arguments already passed upon
and resolved by the court.
In San Juan, the Court was also confronted with the question
of when the reglementary period for filing a petition for
certiorari shall be reckoned. Petitioner therein filed second and
third motions for reconsideration from the interlocutory order
and when he filed the petition for certiorari with the CA, he
counted the 60-day reglementary period from the notice of
denial of his third motion for reconsideration. He argued that,
since there is no rule prohibiting the filing of a second or third
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, the 60-day
period should be counted from the notice of denial of the last
motion for reconsideration. Having declared that the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates the
arguments in the first motion is subject to denial, the Court held
that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first motion for
reconsideration, otherwise, indefinite delays will ensue.
Applying the ruling in San Juan, the petition for certiorari was
evidently filed out of time, as its filing was reckoned from the
denial of the last motion. The subject Motion to Dismiss was
filed in an attempt to resurrect the remedy of a petition for
certiorari, which had been lost long before its filing.
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141947. July 5, 2001
SUMMARY
This pertains to a labor case involving illegal dismissal. The
complaint of the petitioners were denied by the LA, and such
denial was affirmed by the NLRC. Subsequently, a certiorari
case was filed with the CA but was dismissed for failure to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and for failure to
indicate certain material dates. The SC affirmed the denial of
the petition.
FACTS
Petitioners filed complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent with the LA. The LA denied the complaint. On
appeal before the NLRC, the LA decision was affirmed. Hence
the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In their petition for certiorari, the petitioners committed the
following errors: (1) the certification against forum shopping
was signed not by the parties but by the lawyers, (2) the date
of receipt of the NLRC decision was not indicated, (3) the date
of filing of the MR was not indicated. In view thereof, the CA
dismissed the petition. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for certiorari was properly dismissed for
failure to comply with rules on certification against forum
shopping and failure to indicate material dates.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, petition for certiorari is an initiatory pleading, hence
it must comply with the rules on verification and certification
against forum shopping, which requires that the certification
must be signed by the parties themselves and not by the
counsels. Second, omission of material dates as required by
the rules is a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Long Answer
It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held
that there is substantial compliance if the same is executed by
an attorney, it being presumed that facts alleged by him are
true to his knowledge and belief. However, the same does not
apply as regards the requirement of a certification against
forum shopping.
It is clear from the provision of the Rules that the certification
must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel since it
is petitioner who is in the best position to know whether he has
previously commenced any similar action involving the same
issues in any other tribunal or agency.
Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that
would show the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of
Appeals. There are three (3) essential dates that must be
stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First,
the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial
or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the
denial thereof was received. Petitioners failed to show the first
and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned
NLRC Decision as well as the date of filing of their motion for
reconsideration.
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its
timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution
sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari
was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of
Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period
commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration
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itself was filed on time since the material dates were not
stated.
Ga, Jr. vs. Tubungan
G.R. No. 182185. September 18, 2009
SUMMARY
This case involves recovery of real property. The petitioners
filed the case with COSLAP which granted the prayer.
Respondents assailed the decision for being void via petition
for certiorari with the RTC, which was dismissed for judicial
interference. Respondents filed another certiorari case with the
CA, which was not granted. The petitioners assail the CA
decision for giving due course to an improper remedy and
being filed out of time. The SC affirmed the CA.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property
against respondents with Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP). COSLAP granted the petition.
Respondents, instead of filing an appeal via Rule 43 with the
CA, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, with the RTC.
The RTC denied the petition on the ground of judicial
interference, the RTC and COSLAP being co-equal and
coordinate courts.
Subsequently, the respondents filed the same petition for
certiorari, this time with the CA. The CA granted the petition on
the ground that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the case, as
the land in question was not a public land.
Petitioners assailed the CA decision on the following grounds:
(1) the remedy was improper as appeal via Rule 43 was
available, and in the alternative (2) the petition was filed out of
time as the same was filed 7 years later.
ISSUE
Whether petition for certiorari was proper to assail the decision
of a quasi-judicial body which was void for being rendered
without jurisdiction.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, this is an issue of jurisdiction therefore the proper
remedy is certiorari under Rule 65. Second, a certiorari case
assailing a void decision cannot be dismissed on the ground of
timeliness because. It is imprescriptible.
Long Answer
We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that
respondents’ remedy from the decision of the COSLAP was to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as they assailed the
lack of jurisdiction of said body over the dispute. However, the
petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals and
not the trial court. In other words, while respondents availed of
the correct remedy, they sought the same from the wrong
court. This mistake would have rendered the assailed COSLAP
decision final and executory, were it not for its patent nullity
and invalidity.
We also declared that such a nullity is correctible only through
a petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari that seeks the
nullification of a void judgment cannot be dismissed for
timeliness as the same does not prescribe. A judgment issued
by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never
become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the
question.
In the instant case, COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of petitioners’ complaint. The disputed lot was
not shown to be public land and the nature of the dispute is not
among those which fall under the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
Bank of Commerce vs RPN
G.R. No. 195615. April 21, 2014
SUMMARY
This case involves an execution implemented on one who was
not party to the case. It assailed such decision by way of
certiorari without filing first an MR. The CA dismissed the
petition for failure to comply with the requisite MR, but the SC
favored the petitioner and held that the case falls within the
exceptions.
FACTS
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) offered to sell its banking business,
consisting of specified assets and liabilities to Bank of
Commerce, herein petitioner. BSP approved the agreement
subject to the condition that an escrow fund shall be
established to answer for the liabilities of TRB. The escrow
fund was established.
In a separate action, TRB was adjudged liable to RPN. Instead
of implementing the execution by levying the escrow fund,
respondent RPN filed a supplemental motion for execution
impleading petitioner, alleging that there was merger between
petitioner and TRB, which in fact there was none.
Petitioner was forced to make a special appearance to
question the jurisdiction of the RTC over its person. However
the RTC granted the motion for execution against petitioner. In
response, petitioner filed a certiorari case in the CA, which was
denied. The CA merely clarified that the execution shall only be
implemented to the extent of the properties of TRB in the
possession of petitioner.
In view of the CA decision, RPN filed a motion for the issuance
of an alias writ against petitioner. The RTC granted the motion
and directed the sheriff to release the garnished funds to the
respondent.
Aggrieved, the petitioner immediately filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA to assail the RTC order.
The CA dismissed the petition for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration first. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the certiorari was properly dismissed for failure to
comply with the requisite motion for reconsideration.
RULING
Short Answer
No. By way of exception, the requisite motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with, on the ground that any
further delay will result in prejudice to the petitioner.
Long Answer
In this case, the records amply show that Bancommerce’s
action fell within the recognized exceptions to the need to file a
motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari.
An urgent necessity for the immediate resolution of the case by
the CA existed because any further delay would have greatly
prejudiced Bancommerce.
The Sheriff had been resolute and relentless in trying to
execute the judgment and dispose of the levied assets of
Bancommerce. Indeed, on April 22, 2010 the Sheriff started
garnishing Bancommerce’s deposits in other banks, including
those in Banco de Oro-Salcedo-Legaspi Branch and in the
Bank of the Philippine Islands Ayala Paseo Branch.
Further, the Sheriff forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s Lipa
Branch cash on hand amounting to P1,520,000.00 and
deposited the same with the Landbank. He also seized the
bank’s computers, printers, and monitors, causing the
temporary cessation of its banking operations in that branch
and putting the bank in an unwarranted danger of a run.
Clearly, Bancommerce had valid justifications for skipping the
technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
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RULE 65: PROHIBITION
Yusay vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 156684. April 6, 2011
SUMMARY
This case involves a resolution which authorizes the Mayor to
initiate expropriation. Even prior to any steps being taken by
the government for expropriation, the petitioner already filed a
certiorari petition to annul the resolution. The SC said the filing
was premature because resolution is merely an expression of
sentiment, hence no act has yet been committed.
Note: This is still a certiorari case despite being included in the
Prohibition topic.
FACTS
The Sanggunian of Mandaluyong City adopted a resolution
authorizing Mayor Abalos to take the necessary steps for the
expropriation of the land belonging to the petitioner for
purposes of low cost housing in favor of city inhabitants.
Alarmed upon learning the resolution, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in the RTC to annul the resolution. Initially,
the RTC denied the petition, with the opinion that the action
was premature. Since what was adopted was merely a
resolution, then no act of encroachment or any act that could
be deemed committed with grave abuse of discretion was yet
done. However, on MR, the RTC granted the petition since the
adoption of the resolution would necessarily pave the way for
the deprivation of the petitioner’s property.
The City appealed to the CA, which was granted. Hence this
present petition.
ISSUE
Whether certiorari was a proper remedy to annul the resolution
of Sangguinan.
RULING
Short Answer
No. There is a difference between a resolution and an
ordinance. A resolution is merely a manifestation of the
sentiment of the body, and as such, no right nor obligation can
be derived therefrom. The expression of sentiment is
constitutionally protected, and therefore cannot be said to be
an exercise tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Long Answer
Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the
Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally
demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted
Resolution No.552, but a legislative and policy-making body
declaring its sentiment or opinion.
Nor did the Sangguniang Panglungsod abuse its discretion in
adopting Resolution No. 552. To demonstrate the absence of
abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a
resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter
of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is permanent
in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred
from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what
the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion
through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all
gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a
constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a
resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding.
Aurillo, Jr. vs. Rabi
G.R. No. 120014. November 26, 2002
SUMMARY
This case involves conflicting actions in the office of the
prosecutor. Upon inquest, the city prosecutor found no
probable cause and dismissed the case. However, the regional
state prosecutor motu proprio assumed jurisdiction and
ordered the reinvestigation. Subsequently, an information was
filed. The respondent filed a petition for prohibition which was
granted by the court. The preliminary investigation was nullified
as well as the information filed as the function of prohibition
includes undoing what has already been done, and not only
preventing what is yet to be done.
FACTS
Petitioner was subjected to warrantless arrest, charged with
violation of illegal possession of firearms. After the inquest
investigation, public prosecutor Isidro issued resolution
recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.
However, Regional State Prosecutor Aurillo decided to assume
jurisdiction over the case and order the conduct of a new
preliminary investigation. The petitioner was notified that there
was a reinvestigation but this time, not only for illegal
possession of firearms, but also for violations of COMELEC
resolution on gun ban, possession of deadly weapon, and
malicious mischief.
A week before the scheduled preliminary investigation, the
petitioner filed a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 in the
RTC with prayer for TRO. The RTC issued the TRO. When the
TRO expired and the resolution of the petition for prohibition
was still pending, the investigation resumed, and subsequently,
an information was filed against respondent. The RTC
eventually granted the petition for prohibition, nullifying both
the preliminary investigation, and the information filed.
Hence this present petition. The petitioner proffered the
following arguments: (1) the petition for prohibition filed in the
RTC was a violation of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
(2) the nullification by the RTC of the information filed was
improper, the proper remedy being a motion to quash.
ISSUE
Whether the nullification of the information filed thru the grant
of the petition for prohibition was proper.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. First, by way of exception, exhaustion of administrative
remedies may be dispensed with, when time is of the essence,
as is the case here. Second, the office of prohibition is not only
to prevent what remains to be done, but also to undo what has
been done.
Long Answer
The general rule is that an aggrieved party is mandated to first
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a judicial
action for redress from acts of administrative bodies or offices
in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions; otherwise,
said action may be dismissed for prematurity. However, the
principle is not without exceptions. The aggrieved party may
validly resort to immediate judicial action where the (a)
question raised is purely legal; (b) when the act complained of
is patently illegal; (c) when there is an urgent need for judicial
intervention; (d) when the disputed act is performed without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (e) the administrative
remedy does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; and (f) when due process is disregarded.
Being a resident of Tacloban City, Rabi did not have adequate
time to seek redress from the Secretary of Justice whose
offices is located in Manila and request that the scheduled
investigation be forestalled. Given this factual milieu, time was
of the essence. Inaction was not an option; it was, in fact,
sheer folly. Judicial intervention was imperative. By then have
been a fait accompli to his gross prejudice, and his prayer for a
writ of prohibition and for injunctive relief, an exercise in utter
futility.
5
Although the general rule is that a writ of prohibition issues
only to restrain the commission of a future act, and not to undo
an act already performed, where anything remains to be done
by the court, prohibition will give complete relief, not only by
preventing what remains to be done but by undoing what has
been done. Under some statutes, the court must grant the
appropriate relief whatever the proceeding is called if facts
stating ground for relief are pleaded. Although prohibition is
requested only as to a particular matter, the court has authority
to grant any appropriate relief within the issues presented by
the pleadings. If the application for prohibition is too broad, the
court may mould the writ and limit it to as much as is proper to
be granted. In the exercise of its jurisdiction to issue writs, the
court has, as a necessary incident thereto, the power to make
such incidental order as may be necessary to maintain its
jurisdiction and to effectuate its final judgment. The court may
retain jurisdiction of the cause to enable it to make an
appropriate order in the future, even though the petition for a
writ of prohibition is dismissed.
Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista
No. L-3452. 7 December 1949
SUMMARY
Respondent was holding both offices as Sol Gen and member
of COMELEC. In view thereof, the petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition to assail such setup. The respondent argued that
only by way of quo warranto may he be removed from office,
and not thru prohibition. The SC granted the petition, despite
being improper, by way of exception, because clearly the Sol
Gen will not initiate quo warranto against himself.
FACTS
At the outset, it must be noted that during this time, there was
no law preventing a person from holding multiple offices at the
same time. The only restriction was that, one office must be
held in a full time capacity, while the other, in a temporary
capacity.
Respondent Bautista was Sol Gen, acting in a full time
capacity when President Marcos designated him as acting
member of the Commission on Elections. In view thereof, the
petitioner Nacionalista Party filed a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65 directly with the Supreme Court to assail the
validity of respondent holding office as member of the
COMELEC while at the same time being the Sol Gen.
The respondent argued that the action was essentially for the
purpose of removing him from office, hence the proper remedy
was quo warranto, and not prohibition.
ISSUE
Whether prohibition may lie to remove a person unlawfully
holding office in lieu of quo warranto.
RULING
Short Answer.
Yes, but only by way of exception. There were exceptional
circumstances attendant in this case. Clearly the holding of the
office in the manner described herein was unconstitutional
because the membership in the COMELEC is always
permanent and cannot be temporary, and therefore the proper
remedy to remove him was quo warranto. However, only the
Sol Gen in this case may initiate the quo warranto, and he
would not do so against himself. By reason of such bizarre
circumstance, prohibition was allowed in lieu of quo warranto.
Long Answer
The only basis for the petition is that the designation of the
respondent as temporary member of the Commission on
Elections is illegal and invalid because it offends against the
Constitution. This special civil action as our Rules call it, or this
extraordinary legal remedy following the classical or chancery
nomenclature, is in effect to test the validity or legality of the
respondent's designation in a temporary capacity as member
of the Commission on Elections pending the appointment of a
permanent member or Commissioner. It is in the nature of a
quo warranto, and as such it may only be instituted by the
party who claims to be entitled to the office (sec. 6, Rule 68) or
by the Solicitor General (secs. 3, 4, Rule 68). The authorities
and decisions of courts are almost unanimous that prohibition
will not lie to determine the title of a de facto judicial officer,
since its only function is to prevent a usurpation of jurisdiction
by a subordinate court.
In the case at bar, however, as we have found that the
respondent's designation to act temporarily as member of the
Commission on Elections is unlawful because it offends
against the provisions of the Constitution creating the
Commission on Elections, the dismissal of the petition would
deny and deprive the parties that are affected by such
designation of a remedy and relief, because no one is entitled
now to the office and a party who is not entitled to the office
may not institute quo warranto proceedings, and the
respondent as Solicitor General, the only other party who may
institute the proceedings, would not proceed against himself. In
these circumstances, it is incumbent upon and the duty of this
Court to grant a remedy.
Enriqwez vs. Macadaeg
No. L-2422. September 30, 1949
SUMMARY
The respondent filed an action for recovery of property located
in Negros in the CFI of Cebu. A motion to dismiss was filed by
petitioner on the ground of improper venue but it was denied.
In view thereof, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to
compel the judge to dismiss the case. the SC ruled that
mandamus was not the proper remedy, but prohibition.
FACTS
The respondent file a complaint for recovery of real property
situated in Negros Oriental. The complaint however was filed in
the CFI of Cebu. In view thereof, the petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue. The motion was
denied by the CFI.
The petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus with the SC
to compel the CFI to dismiss the case. The judge countered
that the denial of the motion to dismiss cannot be a subject of
mandamus because it required exercise of judicial discretion.
ISSUE
Whether mandamus may lie to compel the judge to dismiss the
petition.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Mandamus will not lie because this is not a case of a judge
neglecting a duty which the law enjoins, but rather a case
where the judge disobeys Rules of Court in error. The proper
remedy is then prohibition and not mandamus. However, the
SC treated the mandamus as one for prohibition.
Long Answer
While the respondent judge committed a manifest error in
denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for
correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal
"unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or
"unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right." (Section 3, Rule 67, Rules of Court.) It is rather a case
where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court
by ref using to dismiss an action which would not be
maintained in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition
(section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the
present case because the order complained of, being merely of
an interlocutory nature, is not appealable.
While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be
treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to
technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
6
RULE 65: MANDAMUS
Calim vs. Guerrero
G.R. No. 156527. March 5, 2007
SUMMARY
The petitioner’s permit was cancelled. When he sent a letter to
inquire, it was not answered. He filed a complaint with the
Ombudsman, but the latter instead of filing criminal charges,
only issued stern warning against respondents. The petitioner
filed mandamus to compel the office of the ombudsman to file
criminal charges. The SC dismissed the petition as the duty
was not ministerial.
FACTS
Petitioner, on the force of a Mayor’s permit duly issued was
operating as a common carrier transporting tourists from
Manila to Laguna and vice versa. A certain Amador Igos filed a
letter complaint with the Sanggunian alleging that the petitioner
did not have a franchise of public conveyance. The
Sangguninan thereafter unanimously resolved to cancel the
permit issued to petitioner causing cessation of his businesses,
and to the benefit of its direct competitor owned by one of the
members of Sanggunian.
The petitioner sent a letter addressed individually to the
members of the Sangunian inquiring as to the basis of the
cancellation, however after more than 2 months, the
Sanggunian had failed to answer. In view thereof, the petitioner
filed with the Ombudsman anchored on 2 causes of actions:
(1) violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (2)
failure to answer inquiry within the required period.
Ombudsman resolved the complaint as follows: (1) dismissed
for lack of probable cause, and (2) stern warning for failure to
answer within required period, and that repetition will be dealt
with more severely.
Aggrieved by the decision on his second cause of action,
petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel Ombudsman
to file criminal charges, and not only stern warning.
ISSUE
Whether the Ombudsman prosecutor may be compelled by
mandamus to initiate criminal charges.
RULING
Short Answer
No. Mandamus will only lie against a person in the exercise of
ministerial duty, and not when the duty involves exercise of
discretion.
Long Answer
It is elementary that mandamus applies as a remedy only
where petitioner’s right is founded clearly on law and not when
it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and
reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus
only if those rights are well defined, clear and certain. A writ of
mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s legal right to
the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter
of law.23 Mandamus, therefore, is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its
chief use and not a discretionary duty.
Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said
public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
The Rules clearly provides the Office of the Ombudsman with
wide latitude of discretion in determining what and which acts
to prosecute criminally and/or administratively.
Enriquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. Nos. 174902-06. February 15, 2008
SUMMARY
The Ombudsman failed to resolve the criminal and
administrative cases filed against the petitioner for 8 years. A
motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of violation of the
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, but the
same was not acted. In view thereof, the petitioner filed a
mandamus case to compel the dismissal of the case. the SC
granted the petition because right to speedy disposition of
cases is a public right mandated no less by the Constitution.
FACTS
Among others, herein petitioner was charged with
administrative and criminal offenses in relation to the
computerization project of the Land Registration Authority, by
the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Ombudsman.
The complaints were filed before the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the same office, Ombudsman. The
petitioners vehemently denied the charges.
4 years after both parties have formally offered their pieces of
evidence, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss due to
respondent’s inordinate delay which constitutes violation of
their constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases.
Interestingly, FFIB did not interpose any objection to the
motion. The motion was not acted by the Ombudsman.
8 years later (or 4 years from the filing of the motion to
dismiss), with still no action from Ombudsman to resolve their
cases, the petitioners filed petition for mandamus to compel
the dismissal of their cases due to violation of their right to
speedy disposition of cases.
ISSUE
Whether mandamus may lie to compel the Ombudsman to
dismiss the case it failed to act on for an unreasonable length
of time.
RULING
Short Answer
Yes. Mandamus is the proper recourse to enforce a public right
and to compel performance of a duty, most especially when
such duty is mandated by the Constitution.
Long Answer
Ordinarily, a petition for a writ of mandamus is proper to
compel the public official concerned to perform a ministerial act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. However, it is inaccurate to say that the
writ will never issue to control the public official’s discretion.
Our jurisprudence is replete with exceptions to that rule. Thus,
this Court held that if the questioned act was done with grave
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, the writ will be issued to control the exercise of such
discretion. Likewise, mandamus is a proper recourse for
citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the
performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated
by the Constitution. Thus, a party to a case may demand
expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
Under the undisputed facts before us, we hold that respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by failing to resolve the administrative
and criminal cases against petitioners even to this day, or a
period of almost eight (8) years from the filing of their
complaints- affidavits.
UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel his
mother (the petitioner) to produce his father’s will. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the will. RTC ruled in favour
7
of petitioner. CA ruled otherwise and ordered the production of
the will. SC ruled that petition for mandamus is not the proper
remedy because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
FACTS:
Alleging that his father passed away and left a holographic will,
which is now in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his
mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus
with damages before the RTC of Manila, to compel petitioner
to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the
allowance thereof could be instituted. In her answer with
counterclaim, petitioner denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts.
The RTC heard the case. Petitioner contends that respondent
did not prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to
issue the writ of mandamus. RTC ruled in favour of petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court.
The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. However,
upon Motion for Reconsideration, CA granted the motion and
ordered the production of the will. It ruled this time that
respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his
mother had in her possession the holographic will.
Dissatisfied with this turn of events, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied this motion.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper
remedy
RULING: NO.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the
official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law. The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who
seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance
of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved
is mandated by the Constitution.
The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is
his duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which
he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial
doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical
question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of
any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board,
or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b]
that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator,
it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act
required.
In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily
ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe
production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy
of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the
allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or
not.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the
remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of.
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., et al., vs. LTFRB and DOTC
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner sought for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents to require PUVs to use compressed
natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Solicitor General
explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy.
SC ruled that the writ of mandamus sought by petitioners, i.e.,
a writ of mandamus is unavailing because mandamus is
available only to compel the doing of an act specifically
enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates
the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG.
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents to require public utility vehicles
(PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative
fuel.
Petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial
action against the bane of air pollution and related
environmental hazards. Meantime, the Court granted
petitioners' motion to implead the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the
Solicitor General, explains that the writ of mandamus is not the
correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command
a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess
the administrative and regulatory powers to implement
measures in accordance with the policies and principles
mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, Lastly, petitioners aver that
other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE: Whether writ of mandamus is the proper remedy
RULING: NO.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies
under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally
entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus
commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of
an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no
law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to
order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the
LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii),
Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of
Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
8
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY CREDIT UNION, INC., vs.
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-25316 February 28, 1979
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel respondents to recognize that the obligation of
labourers and employees payable to credit unions shall enjoy
first priority in the deduction from the employees' wages and
salaries. The lower court dismissed the petition ruling that
there is nothing in the law which provides for such first priority
credit. SC ruled that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded. In the present case, petitioner was unable
to show a clear legal right. Hence, Mandamus does not lie.
FACTS:
In this mandamus petition dismissed by the lower court,
petitioner seeks a reversal of such decision relying on what it
considered to be a right granted by Section 62 of the RA No.
2023, wherein it is stated, as petitioner had interpreted, that the
loans granted by credit union to its members enjoy first priority
in the payroll collection from the respondent's employees'
wages and salaries.
To show that such is futile, the appealed decision, stated that
there is nothing in the provision of Rep. Act 2023 which
provides that obligation of laborers and employees payable to
credit unions shall enjoy first priority in the deduction from the
employees' wages and salaries. The mandatory character of
Rep. Act 2023 is only to compel the employer to make the
deduction of the employees' debt from the latter's salary and
turn this over to the employees' credit union but this mandatory
character does not convert the credit union's credit into a first
priority credit.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued
RULING: NO.
This petition being one for mandamus and the provision of law
relied upon being clear on its face, it would appear that no
favorable action can be taken on this appeal. We affirm.
Mandamus does not lie. Petitioner-appellant was unable to
show a clear legal right. The very law on which he would base
his action fails to supply any basis for this petition. A more
rigorous analysis would have prevented him from instituting a
suit of this character. If the legal rights are of the petitioner are
not well defined, clear, and certain, the petition must be
dismissed.
The latest reported case, Province. of Pangasinan v.
Reparations Commission, this court speaking through Justice
Concepcion Jr., reiterated such a well-settled doctrine: "It has
also been held that it is essential to the issuance of the writ of
mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded, and it must be the imperative duty of the
defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in
doubtful cases.
STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE AGENCY
vs. PUERTO PRINCESA CITY
G.R. No. 181792 April 21, 2014
QUICK SUMMARY:
A decision was rendered in favour of herein petitioners for the
payment of just compensation by the respondents. However,
respondents failed to pay hence petitioner filed a complaint
before the RTC. RTC dismissed petitioner’s motion on the
ground that government funds could not be subjected to
execution and levy. Aggrieved, petitioners wrote a letter to
COA, however the latter reasoned that it no longer have
jurisdiction over the matter as the case was already in the
execution stage. Petitioner filed a petition for Mandamus
before the SC. The SC ruled that COA erred in not acting on
the claim and that it still retained its jurisdiction to adjudicate
the money claim. Further, SC ruled that petitioners should
have filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. Hence, petition
for mandamus is not proper because the COA's refusal to act
did not leave the petitioners without any remedy at all.
FACTS:
Petitioners were the owners of 2 parcels of land which were
used and developed as a road by the City of Puerto Princesa.
In view of the encroachment, petitioners filed an action for
Payment of Just Compensation against respondents before the
RTC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.
Pursuant thereto, respondents made an initial payment of
petitioners’ claim. Eventually, respondents failed to fulfil their
obligation so petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC for
the collection of unpaid just compensation.
Subsequently, petitioners filed 2 motions both asking the RTC
to order the Land Bank of the Philippines to deliver the
garnished account of respondents and/or to order respondents
to appropriate funds for the payment of the money judgment
rendered against them and in favor of petitioners. RTC denied
both motions on the ground that government funds could not
be subjected to execution and levy unless there was a
corresponding appropriation law or ordinance.
Petitioners wrote a letter to the Commission On Audit (COA)
requesting that it order respondents to pay petitioners the
amount adjudged in the decision of the RTC. COA informed
petitioners that it could not act upon his request to order
respondents to because it had no jurisdiction over the matter
as the case was already in the execution stage. Undaunted,
petitioners filed similar complaints against respondents before
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the
Undersecretary of the DILG praying that respondents pay the
subject money judgment and that they be suspended from
office for their refusal to comply with the money judgment.
Hence, this Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the remedy of mandamus is proper to compel
respondents to comply with the decision of the RTC
RULING: NO.
The Court cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy
of mandamus because they have done everything in the books
to satisfy their just and demandable claim. They went to the
courts, the COA, the Ombudsman, and the DILG. They
resorted to the remedy of mandamus because in at least three
(3) cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final
judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU).
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and
PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails
or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a
final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may
avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor
Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner
when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a
municipality or city, as in this case. It has been held, however,
that a resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the
standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy are still
available and capable of affording relief.
Regarding final money judgment against the government or
any of its agencies or instrumentalities, the legal remedy is to
seek relief with the COA. Considering that a writ of execution
was already issued by RTC-Br. 223, the remedy of petitioners
is to follow up their claim with the COA. Petitioners rightfully did
so, but the COA erred in not acting on the claim.
9
It is clear that the COA has the authority and power to settle
"all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities." This authority and power can still be
exercised by the COA even if a court’s decision in a case has
already become final and executory. In other words, the COA
still retains its primary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim even
after the issuance of a writ of execution.
Considering that the COA still retained its primary jurisdiction
to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court pursuant to Section 50 of
P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave
the petitioners without any remedy at all.
JOSEPH OMAR O. ANDAYA v. RURAL BANK OF
CABADBARAN, INC., DEMOSTHENES P. ORAIZ and
RICARDO D. GONZALEZ
G.R. No. 188769, August 03, 2016
QUICK SUMMARY:
This case concerns the dismissal of an action for
mandamus that sought to compel respondents to register the
transfer of shares of stock and issue the corresponding stock
certificates in favor of petitioner. The Cabadbaran City RTC
ruled that petitioner Andaya was not entitled to the remedy of
mandamus, since the transfer of the subject shares of stock
had not yet been recorded in the corporation's stock and
transfer book, and the registered owner had not given him a
special power of attorney to make the transfer. Andaya filed a
Rule 45 petition directly before SC, insisting that he has a
cause of action to institute the suit. SC ruled that petitioner has
been able to establish that he is a bona fide transferee of the
shares of stock and therefore has legal standing to initiate an
action for mandamus.
FACTS:
Andaya bought from Chute shares of stock in the Rural Bank
of Cabadbaran. Chute duly endorsed and delivered the
certificates of stock to Andaya and, subsequently, requested
the bank to register the transfer and issue new stock
certificates in favor of the latter. A few days later, the bank
wrote Chute to inform her that he could not register the
transfer. Andaya also separately communicated with the bank
reiterating Chute's request for the issuance of new stock
certificates in petitioner's favor.
The bank denied the request of Andaya. It reasoned that he
had a conflict of interest, as he was then president and chief
executive officer of a competitor bank. Respondent bank
concluded that the purchase of shares was not in good faith.
Consequently, Andaya instituted an action for mandamus and
damages against the Rural Bank of Cabadbaran. Petitioner
sought to compel them to record the transfer in the bank's
stock and transfer book and to issue new certificates of stock
in his name.
The RTC issued a Decision dismissing the complaint. The trial
court ruled that Andaya had no standing to compel the bank to
register the transfer and issue stock certificates in his
name. Consequently, Andaya directly filed with this Court a
Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari assailing the RTC
Decision on pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether a writ of mandamus should issue in favour of
petitioner
RULING:
It is already settled jurisprudence that the registration of a
transfer of shares of stock is a ministerial duty on the part of
the corporation. Aggrieved parties may then resort to the
remedy of mandamus to compel corporations that wrongfully or
unjustifiably refuse to record the transfer or to issue new
certificates of stock. This remedy is available even upon the
instance of a bona fide transferee who is able to establish a
clear legal right to the registration of the transfer. We also rule
that Andaya has been able to establish that he is a bona
fide transferee of the shares of stock of Chute.
In contrast, at the crux of this petition are the registration of the
transfer and the issuance of the corresponding stock
certificates. Requiring petitioner to register the transaction
before he could institute a mandamus suit in supposed
abidance by the ruling in Ponce was a palpable error. It led to
an absurd, circuitous situation in which Andaya was prevented
from causing the registration of the transfer, ironically because
the shares had not been registered.
Accordingly, a writ of mandamus to enforce a ministerial act
may issue only when petitioner is able to establish the
presence of the following: (1) right clearly founded in law and is
not doubtful; (2) a legal duty to perform the act; (3) unlawful
neglect in performing the duty enjoined by law; (4) the
ministerial nature of the act to be performed; and (5) the
absence of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.31chanrobleslaw
After finding that petitioner has legal standing to initiate an
action for mandamus, the Court now reinstates the action he
filed and remands the case to the RTC to resolve the propriety
of issuing a writ of mandamus.
RULE 65: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS A PRE
REQUISITE; EXCEPTIONS
ELSIE S. CAUSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
HERNAN D. BIRON, SR.
G.R. No. 199139 September 9, 2014
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner was relocated by private respondent Mayor Biron
from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the
Mayor. Petitioner filed the complaint claiming that the order
issued by Mayor Biron was illegal. The Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES) recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. COMELEC En
Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
SC ruled that motion for reconsideration is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and since petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration,
her petition for certiorari was dismissed.
FACTS:
Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued a Memorandum
which relocated her from her office as the Local Civil Registrar
to the Office of the Mayor
In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing
filed the complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Regional
Election Director, claiming that the order issued by Mayor Biron
being made within the election period and without prior
authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of a
COMELEC Resolution.
In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the purpose
of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise
the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her
negative behavior had been received and that she was not
demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and
other benefits.
The Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended the
dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause
to charge Mayor Biron with the violation. COMELEC En Banc
affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES observing
that Mayor Biron did not strip Causing of her functions as the
Municipal Civil Registrar. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether the petition for certiorari should be
dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for
reconsideration in the COMELEC
RULING: YES.
10
Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration before filing
the petition for certiorari.
The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration
is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can
resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the
public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the
legal and factual aspects of the case.
The rule is not absolute, however, considering that
jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for
the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion
for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where
the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of
the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the
petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or public interest is involved.
A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of
the foregoing exceptions was applicable herein. Hence,
Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration,
especially because there was nothing in the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for
reconsideration in election offense cases.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs.
SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO
G.R. No. 195594 September 29, 2014
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondents sought for the payment of just compensation
from the petitioner. When respondents’ demands were not
acted upon, they decided to file a complaint against petitioner.
The trial court granted respondents’ complaint and issued an
ex parte 72-hour TRO, the court also granted respondents’
application for preliminary injunction. Without moving for a
reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged Orders of the trial court. The appellate court ruled
that petition for certiorari suffers from fatal defect since it was
filed without seeking first the reconsideration of the trial court.
SC ruled jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the
filing of a petition for certiorari is proper notwithstanding the
failure to file a motion for reconsideration and this case falls
within the exceptions.
FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of Monte Vista Homes. They
voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a
portion of Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation
canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation Project
(BPIP). Subsequently, respondents found out through a
Geohazard Assessment Report (GAR), that the ground
shaking and channel bank erosion are possible hazards that
could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing Monte Vista.
Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur adopted the
recommendations contained in the GAR. Respondent Rogelio
Lazo brought to NIA’s attention payment of just compensation
for the entire buffer zone.
When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they
decided to file a complaint for just compensation with damages
against NIA. Prior to the filing of an Answer, respondents filed
an Amended Complaint with application for a TRO and
preliminary injunction. The trial court issued an ex parte 72-
hour TRO and granted respondents’ application for preliminary
injunction.
Without moving for a reconsideration, petitioner directly filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition
and affirmed the challenged Orders of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that petition for certiorari suffers from fatal
defect since it was filed without seeking first the
reconsideration of the trial court. It was said that petitioner
omitted to show sufficient justification that there was no appeal
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
ISSUE: Whether the facts of this case justified petitioner’s
immediate resort to the court of appeals without filing a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed orders of the trial court.
RULING: YES.
A petition for certiorari may be given due course
notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration was filed in
the trial court. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari
with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to
remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of
due course to a petition for certiorari is generally addressed to
the sound discretion of the court because the technical
provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non before a petition for certiorari may lie,
its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not
absolute and jurisprudence has laid down the following
exceptions when the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper
notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for reconsideration:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parteor in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public
interest is involved.
We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls within
instances (a), (b), (c), (d), and (i) above-mentioned. Also, the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as
those already raised and passed upon in the lower court;
hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be useless and
serve no practical purpose. There is likewise an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.
The CA and this Court unquestionably have full discretionary
power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special
civil actions for certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
11
clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We deem it proper
to adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.
RULE 66: QUO WARRANTO
ERNESTO CAMPOS and FLORENCIO OROC vs. ESTEBAN
DEGAMO and FELINO PALARCA
G.R. No. L-18315 September 29, 1962
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioners questioned respondent’s assumption to office and
prayed that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting and
excluding respondents from the office and that they
(petitioners) be declared entitled to said offices. The lower
court ruled that quo warranto cannot prosper because it fails to
state a cause of action. The SC ruled that petitioners are not
the proper parties to institute the present action.
FACTS:
Petitioners were elected and proclaimed councilor No. 1 and
councilor No. 2, respectively, of the municipality of Carmen,
Agusan; while respondents Esteban Degamo and Felino
Palarca were proclaimed Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively,
of the said municipality, notwithstanding that there was no valid
canvass for the offices of Mayor and Vice Mayor effected and
the respondents could not legally occupy the said positions.
Petitioner made verbal demands upon respondents to stop
forming the duties and functions of said offices, but
respondents denied and refused. Petitioners, therefore, prayed
a that a writ quo warranto be issued ousting and excluding
respondents from the office of mayor and vice-mayor of
Carmen, respectively and that they be declared entitled to said
offices and placed forthwith possession thereof.
Respondents answered that they were duly elected by the
people and validly proclaimed by the said Board. Respondents
claimed that petitioners had no legal personality or authority to
file the present case. The lower court ruled that quo warranto
cannot prosper because it fails to state a cause of action.
Petitioners appealed directly to the Supreme Court on purely
questions of law.
ISSUE: Whether the quo warranto action of herein petitioners
will prosper
RULING: NO.
On the assumption that the present action is presented as an
ordinary quo warranto case (Rule 68, Rules of Court), same
cannot also prosper. Section 7, Rule 68, provides:
What complaint for usurpation to set forth, and who may be
made parties. - When the action is against a person for
usurping an office or franchise, the complaint shall set forth the
name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, if any,
with an averment of his right to the same and that the
defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof. All persons who
claim to be entitled to the office or franchise may be made
parties, and their respective rights to such office or franchise
determined, in the same action.
Malimit and Acain who claimed to be entitled to the offices of
mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, are not parties herein.
The complaint must likewise allege that plaintiffs were duly
elected to such positions. Where the office in question is an
elective one, the complaint must show that the plaintiff was
duly elected thereto (Luna vs. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 401; Acosta
vs. Flor, 5 Phil. 18). Petitioners-appellants Campos and Oroc,
having been candidates and elected for the office of councilors
and not for the office of mayor and vice-mayor, they are not the
proper parties to institute the present action.
The appeal is dismissed and the order appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners-appellants.
ABRAHAM C. SISON vs. HON. PANGRAMUYEN,
Commissioner of Civil Service, et al.,
G. R. No. L-40295 July 31, 1978
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and quo warranto for the
annulment of the actions of respondents. Petitioner contends
that based on the rule of next-in-rank, he, instead of
respondent Maliwanag, should have been appointed to the
position of City Assessor. SC ruled that the most fatal
drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out
of time. Petition herein was filed more than 1 year after the
pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question
arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any
judicial remedy in his favour.
FACTS:
Petition denominated as for certiorari and quo warranto and
seeking the annulment of the actions of respondents in
affirming such attestation of private respondent Eureka F.
Maliwanag's appointment as Assistant City Assessor and
further asking that respondent Commissioner be mandated to
appoint petitioner as such Assistant City Assessor and that
private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully
usurping said position under a void and illegal appointment.
In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since he
was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising immediate
administrative control and supervision over respondent the
appointment of aforementioned is illegal and contrary to law
being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains
that upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the
position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent
Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s petition for certiorari and quo
warranto may be granted
RULING: NO.
We are loathe to substitute Our own judgment for that of the
Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily charged with
the administration of the Civil Service Law and rules and
regulations, absent, as in this case, convincing showing of
palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.
Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he
came to the courts out of time. As already stated, the
appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973
and respondent. On the other hand, the petition herein was
filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after
the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question
arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any
judicial remedy in his favour.
Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of
Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to actions of quo
warranto and since his petition is also
for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such
contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the
allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action
boil down to no more than the removal of respondent
Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed
in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his
favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo
warranto has to be based on a nullification of her appointment,
which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His
ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it
could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that
his latter remedy prescribes also after one year.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON, et al., vs.
HON. MENDEZ, SR., et al.
G.R. No. 103702 December 6, 1994
QUICK SUMMARY:
12
Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto with the RTC against
the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. On the basis
that EO No. 353 which created the Municipality of San Andres
is a nullity because it amounted to a usurpation of the inherent
powers of the legislature, petitioner now contends that the
officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres
had no right to exercise the duties and functions of their
respective offices. The lower court dismissed the petition for
lack of cause of action. The case was elevated to SC. SC ruled
that petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider
had the case been seasonably brought. SC added that a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision must be timely raised.
FACTS:
President Garcia, issued, EO No. 353 creating the municipal
district of San Andres, Quezon. By virtue of EO No. 174,
issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, the municipal
district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have
gained the status of a fifth class municipality.
The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo
warranto with the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the
officials of the Municipality of San Andres. The petition sought
the declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 and prayed that the
respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be
permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and
functions of their respective offices. Petitioning municipality
contended that EO No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Hence, petitioner municipality argued, the officials of the
Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to
exercise the duties and functions of their respective offices that
righfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the
Municipality of San Narciso.
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the
petition, averring that, considering the petition to be one
for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was not the proper
party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the
State acting through the Solicitor General.
The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of
action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State.
The same court denied petitioner municipality's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari."
ISSUE: Whether the petition for quo warranto may be given
due course
RULING: NO.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by
which the Government can call upon any person to show by
what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise." When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence
of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
proceeding for quo warranto or any other credit proceeding. It
must be brought "in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines" and commenced by the Solicitor General or the
fiscal "when directed by the President of the Philippines . . .
." Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such
an action "at the request and upon the relation of another
person" with the permission of the court. The Rules of Court
also allows an individual to commence an action for quo
warranto in his own name but this initiative can be done when
he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another."
While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by petitioner
municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality
of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually, however, a
denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal
District of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity. At
any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the
legal status of the Municipality of San Andres, the Court shall
delve into the merits of the petition.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic
Act No. 7160 may have converted the Municipality of San
Andres into a de facto municipality, they, however, contend
that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to
the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a
vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No.
353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act
7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process
and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had
the case been seasonably brought. Executive Order No. 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on
05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the
meantime, the Municipal District, and later the Municipality, of
San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and
authority of a duly created local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster
or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year
period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo
warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by
SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, vs. MARIA
LOURDES P.A. SERENO
G.R. No. 237428 June 19, 2018
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the
Supreme Court contending that the Court is without jurisdiction
to oust an impeachable officer through quo warranto. SC ruled
that a quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. SC further ruled that there is
nothing in the Constitution that says that impeachable officers
are immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo
warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined
therein is the status of an officer as such. SC denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
FACTS:
Respondent claims denial of due process because her case
was allegedly not heard by an impartial tribunal. She reiterates
her arguments that the Court is without jurisdiction to oust an
impeachable officer through quo warranto.
By way of Comment, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeks a denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration for
being proforma. In any case, the OSG argues that
respondent's motion lacks merit as there was no denial of due
process and that quo warranto is the appropriate remedy to
oust an ineligible impeachable officer. The OSG maintains that
the petition is not time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court does not apply to the State and that the peculiar
circumstances of the instant case preclude the strict
application of the prescriptive period.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to oust an
impeachable officer through quo warranto.
RULING: YES.
The Court reaffirms its authority to decide the instant quo
warranto action. This authority is expressly conferred on the
Supreme Court by the Constitution under Section 5, Article VIII
which states that:
13
 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warran
to, and habeas corpus.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's quo
warranto jurisdiction only to certain public officials or
that excludes impeachable officials therefrom.
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine a person's right or title to a public office and to oust
the holder from its enjoyment. It is the proper action to inquire
into a public officer's eligibility or the validity of his
appointment. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo
warranto proceeding involves a judicial determination of the
right to the use or exercise of the office.
The Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers
also finds basis in paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of
whom are impeachable officers. With this authority, the remedy
of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting
as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET).
This Court has the constitutional mandate to exercise
jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions. And as Estrada and
the PET Rules show, impeachable officers are not immune
to quo warranto actions. Thus, a refusal by the Court to take
cognizance of this case would not only be a breach of its duty
under the Constitution, it would also accord respondent an
exemption not given to other impeachable officers.
Quo warranto, not impeachment, is the constitutional remedy
prescribed to adjudicate and resolve questions relating to
qualifications, eligibility and entitlement to public office. Those
who chose to ignore this fact are Constitutionally blind. There
is nothing in Our Constitution that says that impeachable
officers are immuned, exempted, or excluded from quo
warranto proceedings when the very issue to be determined
therein is the status of an officer as such. No amount of public
indignation can rewrite or deface the Constitution.
RULE 67: EXPROPRIATION
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. THE ARELLANO LAW
COLLEGES, INC.,
G.R. No. L-2929 February 28, 1950
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner seeks to expropriate the land of respondent for the
purpose of subdivision and resale. The lower court dismissed
the action on the ground that RA No. 267empowers cities to
purchase but not to expropriate lands. SC ruled that the
necessity for the condemnation has not been shown. Any good
that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a few
families fades into insignificance in comparison with the
preparation of a young men and young women for useful
citizenship.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 267 provides that cities and municipalities are
authorized to contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation and the Philippine National Bank for the purpose
of purchasing or expropriating homesites within their respective
territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents of
the said cities and municipalities.
The court below ruled that Republic Act No. 267empowers
cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose
of subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action,
which seeks to expropriate several parcels of land situated on
Legarda Street, City of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether a necessity exists to justify the expropriation
of the parcels of land
RULING: NO.
We are inclined to believe that Act No. 267 empowers cities to
expropriate as well as to purchase lands for homesites. The
word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is
susceptible of only meaning. But this power to expropriate is
necessarily subject to the limitations and conditions. The
National Government may not confer its instrumentalities
authority which itself may not exercise. A stream cannot run
higher than its source.
To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a
grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must
exist for the taking thereof for the proposed uses and
purposes.
Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary. Does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and
property owner consistent with such benefits. But measured
even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the private
character of the intended use, necessity for the
condemnation has not been shown.
On the other hand, the defendant not only has invested a
considerable amount for its property but had the plans for
construction ready and would have completed the project a
long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities.
And again, while a handful of people stand to profits by the
expropriation, the development of a university that has a
present enrollment of 9,000 students would be sacrificed. Any
good that would accrue to the public from providing homes to a
few families fades into insignificance in comparison with the
preparation of a young men and young women for useful
citizenship and for service to the government and the
community, a task which the government alone is not in a
position to undertake. The Mayor of the City of Manila himself
confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep this
land.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON.
DULAY and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
QUICK SUMMARY:
Petitioner filed with the CFI of Cebu a complaint for
expropriation against the private respondent. The respondent
judge issued the order of condemnation and also appointed
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated. Petitioner objected on the
ground that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners. SC ruled that the
provisions of P.D. No. 1533 on just compensation are
unconstitutional and void. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle in determining just compensation
but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded.
FACTS:
The President issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City
of Lapu-Lapu for the establishment of an export processing
zone by petitioner. The proclamation included parcels of land
owned and registered in the name of the private respondent.
Upon failure of the parties to reach an agreement regarding the
14
sale of the property, the petitioner filed with the then CFI of
Cebu, a complaint for expropriation against the private
respondent. The respondent judge issued the order of
condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right
to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the
payment of just compensation. The respondent judge also
issued a second order appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated.
Petitioner objected to Commissioner's Report on the grounds
that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67
of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners. The trial court denied
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
Petitioner flied this present petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial
court from further proceeding with the hearing of the
expropriation case.
ISSUE: Whether Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules
of Court had been repealed by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the
appointment of commissioners to determine the just
compensation is concerned
RULING: NO.
We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on
just compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly
dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding
the court technically would still have the power to determine
the just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower
value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless
for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the
same question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which
contains the same provision on just compensation as its
predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to
determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by
the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for
such purpose. This time, we answer in the affirmative.
We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly
stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court's own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold
otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this
Court exists in the first place.
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. JUDGE
JESUS V. QUITAIN and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 135042. September 23, 1999
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against
petitioner. NPC deposited at the Philippine National Bank and
thereafter, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession. Before
counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court
directing the implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC
occupied the disputed property. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA contending that the issuance of the
Writ of Possession is highly irregular because there was no
hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for the
taking of the disputed property. The CA affirmed the decision
of the lower court. SC ruled that there is no prohibition against
a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings may be taken. And even
with the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the
Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional
compensation is deposited.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land which the
National Power Corporation (NPC) is seeking to
expropriate. The property forms part of a proposed low-cost
housing project. NPC filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
against petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner
countered with a Motion to Dismiss. Before this Motion could
be resolved, NPC filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Possession. NPC deposited at the Philippine National Bank.
The trial court denied the petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Without awaiting the outcome of the Motion for
Reconsideration, NPC filed a Motion to Implement the Writ of
Possession. The trial court issued a Writ of Possession. Before
counsel for the petitioner received any order from the trial court
directing the implementation of the Writ of Possession, NPC
occupied the disputed property.
In a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner assailed the
Writ. The CA upheld the trial court on the ground that the
issuance of the Writ of Possession was proper in view of NPCs
compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, by depositing with the Philippine National Bank an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the disputed
property. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Possession was validly
issued, considering that the trial court had not conducted
any hearing on the amount to be deposited
RULING: YES.
Petitioner objects to the issuance of the Writ of Possession for
being highly irregular, arbitrary and despotic, because the
Motion to Dismiss was yet to be resolved. It stresses that there
was no hearing on the correct amount of just compensation for
the taking of the disputed property, as required in Panes v.
Visayas State College of Agriculture. We cannot uphold this
contention.
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate
possession of the land involved in expropriation proceedings
may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to
secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just
compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have
changed.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure revised Section 2 of Rule
67 and clearly reverted to the San Diego,
Daet and Haguisan rulings. Section 2 now reads:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value
with authorized government depositary. Upon the
filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall
have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation to be
held by such bank subject to the orders of the
court. xxxx
After such deposit is made the court shall order
the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place
the plaintiff in possession of the property involved
15
 and promptly submit a report thereof to the court
with service of copies to the parties. [Underscoring
ours.]
In the present case, although the Complaint for expropriation
was filed on June 6, 1997, the Motion for the Issuance of the
Writ of Possession was filed on July 28, 1997; thus, the
issuance of the Writ is covered by the 1997 Rules. As earlier
stated, procedural rules are given immediate effect and are
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
they are passed; new court rules apply to proceedings that
take place after the date of their effectivity. Therefore, Section
2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is the
prevailing and governing law in this case.
With the revision of the Rules, the trial court's issuance of the
Writ of Possession becomes ministerial, once the provisional
compensation mentioned in the 1997 Rule is deposited. Thus,
in the instant case the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the NPCs Motion for the issuance of
the Writ, despite the absence of hearing on the amount of the
provisional deposit.
SPOUSES MARIAN B. LINTAG and ANGELO T. ARRASTIA
vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 158609 July 27, 2007
QUICK SUMMARY:
Respondent filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain against
petitioners in order to acquire an easement of a right of way
over a portion of the said property. After the deposit of the
initial assessed value of the subject property, the RTC ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Possession. When RA No. 8974 was
approved, petitioners filed a Motion asking the RTC to direct
the NPC to comply with the said law. RTC granted the same.
CA declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied retroactively
since the subject property had already been obtained by NPC.
SC ruled that to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is
necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a property located
at Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon. Respondent filed a
Complaint for Eminent Domain against petitioners in order to
acquire an easement of a right of way over a portion of the said
property. Respondent averred that such acquisition was
necessary and urgent for the construction and maintenance of
a Power Transmission Project.
After the deposit of the initial assessed value of the subject
property, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Possession. However, RA No. 8974 was approved.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion asking the RTC to
direct the NPC to comply with RA No. 8974. In the said motion,
petitioners asseverated that pursuant to Sec. 4 of RA No.
8974, they are entitled to 100% of the value of the subject
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation made
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
The RTC issued an Order directing the NPC to comply with RA
No. 8974. The court held that RA No. 8974 is procedural in
nature, and, thus, may be given retroactive effect.
NPC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC. Aggrieved, NPC went to the CA via Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. CA
declared that RA No. 8974 cannot be applied retroactively
since an initial deposit had already been made and possession
of the subject property had already been obtained by NPC.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA
denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of the writ of possession
effectuates the transfer of ownership of the property
expropriated
RULING: NO.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action
is concerned with the determination by the court of
"the just compensation for the property sought to
be taken." This is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation.
Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this
case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings.
To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for
the NPC to pay the property owners the final just
compensation.
We observe that petitioners are not questioning the authority of
the NPC to exercise the power of eminent domain nor the
propriety of its exercise. While the constitutional restraint of
public use has been overcome, the imperative just
compensation is still wanting. Thus, petitioners now appeal for
the prompt payment of just compensation. Indeed, just
compensation is not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment
of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered just.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD vs. PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT
AND HOUSING CORPORATION and SY CHI SIONG AND
CO., INC; G.R. No. 172243; June 26, 2007; Garcia, J
Summary: Republic filed a complaint for expropriation for the
acquisition of 2 lands registered under the name of
respondents. Respondents separately filed a MTD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the res. The TC denied the
motion. Republic filed a motion for issuance of order of
expropriation. The TC denied the motion. Repiblic filed a MR
arguing that since the case had been set for determination of
just compensation the MIOE citing Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the ROC.
The TC denied the MR. On appeal, the CA affirmed the TC.
SC reversed the TC and CA. It ruled that payment of just
compensation is not a condition sine qua non to the issuance
of an order of expropriation.
Facts: Petition for review. Petitioner filed a complaint for
expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
for the acquisition of two (2) parcels of land registered under
the names of herein respondents Phil-Ville Development and
Housing Corporation. Petitioner deposited with the Land Bank
of the Philippines the amount of Two Million Three Hundred
Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱2,311,200.00),
representing the total zonal value of the properties under
expropriation. Thereafter, it filed with the court a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession.
Respondents separately moved to dismiss the complaint on
the main ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
res. The trial court denied both motions. In the same Order, the
court directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
petitioner and required the respondents to file their respective
answers to the complaint. Only Sy Chi Siong filed its Answer,
thereunder reiterating the grounds pleaded in its earlier motion
to dismiss. In the alternative, it prayed for just compensation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Expropriation
and Appointment of Commissioners on the rationale that the
respondents had never challenged its right to expropriate their
16
properties subject of the suit. The trial court, deferred action on
the petitioner’s prayer for an order of expropriation and instead
set the same motion for hearing. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that since
the case had been set for hearing on March 7, 2005 for the
nomination of the commissioners and necessarily for the
conduct of hearing for the determination of just compensation,
"it is proper that an order of expropriation be forthwith issued
before such determination of just compensation proceeds,"
citing, as basis therefor, Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, and adding that where a defendant in an
expropriation case raises only the issue of just compensation,
the court "should forthwith enter an order of expropriation.".
The trial court denied petitioner's motion for partial
reconsideration.
On appeal, the appellate court, in its herein assailed Decision
dated January 27, 2006, upheld the trial court. . Disagreeing,
petitioner Republic, as represented by the Toll Regulatory
Board, has come to this Court via this recourse to seek the
annulment and setting aside of the CA decision and resolution.
Issue: WON a final determination of just compensation in an
expropriation proceedings must first be made before an order
of expropriation may be issued by the court.
Decision:
Yes. There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation,
namely: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and 2.
Determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.
Petitioner Republic is correct in saying that an order of
expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of
expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second
stage—the determination of just compensation, and, ultimately,
payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any
ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the
respondents’ properties. Because an order of expropriation
merely determines the authority to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its
issuance does not hinge on the payment of just compensation.
After all, there would be no point in determining just
compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiff’s right to
expropriate the property was not first clearly established.
After the trial court determined the right of petitioner to
condemn the subject properties for the expansion and
rehabilitation of the North Luzon Expressway, the first stage of
the expropriation proceedings should have been properly
terminated with the issuance of an order of expropriation
declaring that petitioner has the right to take the properties. To
stress, payment of just compensation is not a condition sine
qua non to the issuance of an order of expropriation. In
expropriation proceedings, it is the transfer of title to the land
expropriated that must wait until the indemnity is actually paid.
This is made all the more clear when note is taken of the
second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 67, supra, which states
that the defendant may appeal from the order of expropriation
by filing a record on appeal, which appeal does not prevent the
court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS vs.
FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC
G.R. No. 176487; August 25, 2009; Chico-Nazario, J:
Summary: Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation against
respondent lands. Respondents separately filed their Answers.
The TC ordered petitioner to correct its zonal valuation and the
Motion for the issuance of WP shall be acted upon after the
correct deposit. TC issued a resolution requiring petitioner to
make the additional deposit of ₱425.00 per square meter. CA
affirmed the TC. SC affirmed. It ruled that upon compliance
with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case
is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, and it
becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue
the writ of possession
Facts: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation against
respondent lands located in Nasugbu, Batangas to construct
the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali Batangas Road. Respondents
separately filed their respective answers. Petitioner filed
separate replies to the Answers of Arsol and Far East/the
Bernasconis. Far East and the Bernasconis submitted their
respective rejoinders to the reply filed by petitioner.
Respondent Arsol filed a Motion to Release Deposit, praying
that the amount that may properly accrue for its lands sought
to be expropriated be released as partial payment, to be taken
from the funds deposited by petitioner for the benefit of all the
defendants. The trial court ordered petitioner to comply and
manifest its compliance with the guidelines. Petitioner filed its
Compliance and Motion for Issuance of Order and Writ of
Possession. In their respective comments on petitioner’s
compliance, both Far East and the Bernasconis claimed that
petitioner intentionally and wantonly disregarded and misled
the trial court by stating that their properties were classified as
agricultural to justify the deposit it made.
The trial court ordered petitioner to correct its zonal valuation
with respect to Far East and the Bernasconis and to make the
corresponding deposit therefor. It added that the motion for the
issuance of an order and a writ of possession filed by petitioner
shall be acted upon after the correct deposit was made.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the
trial court erred in ordering it to correct the zonal valuation of
Far East and the Bernasconis’ properties at ₱500.00 per
square meter instead of ₱75.00 per square meter. The trial
court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Far East and the Bernasconis filed their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to Defendants’
Joint Motion for Reconsideration, to which Far East and the
Bernasconis filed a Reply. trial court issued a Resolution. After
a re-assessment of the respective arguments of both parties,
the Court finds merit in the joint motion for reconsideration. It
ruled that RA 8974 gives no discretion to the Court to
determine the classification of the expropriated properties.
Plaintiff cannot question the very contents of its documents
which are parts and parcels of its complaint. It is a cardinal rule
in adjective law that pleadings are binding on the pleader. In an
Order dated 20 August 2002, the trial court ordered petitioner
to pay the amounts of ₱953,775.00 and ₱5,272,550.00 to the
Bernasconis and Far East, respectively, or to deposit said
amounts in court for payment to respondents within ten days
from receipt, after which a writ of possession shall be issued.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals seeking the reversal of the trial court’s Resolution
dated 17 June 2002 requiring it to make the additional deposit
of ₱425.00 per square meter.
The Court of Appeals held that the Regional Trial Court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 674, did not
act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated 17 June 2002
ordering petitioner to make an additional payment of ₱425.00
per square meter for the subject properties of respondents Far
East and the Bernasconis before the issuance of an Order to
take possession of the subject properties, and a writ of
possession
Issue: WON the CA gravely erred in refusing to apply the
standards set in R.A. No. 8974 in determining the classification
of properties subject of expropriation
Decision:
No. Under said law, the requirements for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real
17
property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the
defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of
the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the
improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation
is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of
the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4)
presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds
from the proper officials
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an
expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession as a
matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial
court to forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is
required, and the court exercises neither its discretion nor its
judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of
the properties to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed
the amount under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.
In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that the
provisional value to be paid before a writ of possession can be
issued is 100% of the value of the property based on the
current relevant zonal valuation by the BIR. What it questions
is the classification of the properties sought to be
expropriated, which will then be used in determining the 100%
value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the BIR.
Well settled is the principle that by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality,
by the courts. Accordingly, since specialized government
agencies tasked to determine the classification of parcels of
land, such as the Bureau of Soils and the HLURB, among
other agencies, have already certified that the subject land is
residential/commercial, the Court must accord such
conclusions great respect, if not finality, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary
CITY OF ILOILO vs. HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA
G.R. No. 168967; February 12, 2010; Del Castillo, J:
Summary: Petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation. TC
granted petitioner’s WP. Respondent filed a complaint for
recovery of possession where he alleged that when he finally
sought to withdraw the ₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the
petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made.
TC denied the motion. SC affirmed but awarded attorney’s fees
and exemplary damages in favor of respondent.
Facts: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner filed a
Complaint4 for eminent domain against private respondent
Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros
Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. The complaint
sought to expropriate two parcels of land to be used as a
school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited
the amount of ₱40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-
Iloilo Branch. The trial court issued an Order 11 which granted
petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Sixteen
Years later, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation,
where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the
₱40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he
discovered that no such deposit was ever made.
Private respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner for
Recovery of Possession Fixing and Recovery of Rental and
Damages. Petitioner filed its Answer, arguing that Javellana
could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject
Property was already taken for public use. Private respondent
filed a Motion/Manifestation dated November 19, 2003 claiming
that before a commission is created, the trial court should first
order the condemnation of the property, in accordance with the
Rules of Court. RTC issued an Order dated November 21,
2003 denying the Motion. Javellana filed on November 25,
2003, an Omnibus Motion to Declare Null and Void the Order
of May 17, 1983 and to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or
₱254,000.00. Javellana claimed that the amount is equivalent
to the 10% of the fair market value of the Subject Property, as
determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal Committee in 2001, at
the time when the parties were trying to negotiate a settlement.
Issue: WON the expropriation order is final
Decision
Yes. An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving
the question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and
legally exercised its power of eminent domain. 36 Once the first
order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use can no longer be
questioned.
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.—x x x
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the
taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the
subject lot without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and
without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the
lot and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To
our mind, these are wanton and irresponsible acts which
should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order. x x x.
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC
vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164195; April 5, 2011; Brion, J:
Summary: Republic sought to expropriate the lands of AFC
and HPI At the assessed valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare.
AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just
compensation with DARAB. AFC and HPI file separate
complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation with the RTC for DARAB’s inaction with the
complaint. RTC fixed the just compensation of 1,338.6027
hectares of land at P1,383,179,000.00. RTC modified its ruling
and fixed the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
time the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. All
parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling.
The Court uniformly denied all the motions. Entry of Judgment
followed on May 16, 2008. The Court En Banc, by a majority
vote, denied the petitioners second motion for reconsideration.
SC granted the petition. It ruled that “we have recognized
exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling
their entries in the interest of substantial justice and where
special and compelling reasons called for such actions.”
Facts: AFC and HPI received separate notices of land
acquisition and valuation of their properties from the DARs
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). At the assessed
valuation of P165,484.47 per hectare, AFCs land was valued
at P86,900,925.88, while HPIs property was valued
at P164,478,178.14. HPI and AFC rejected these valuations for
being very low. DAR requested the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to deposit P26,409,549.86 in AFCs bank
account and P45,481,706.76 in HPIs bank account, which
amounts the petitioners then withdrew. The titles over AFC and
HPIs properties were thereafter cancelled, and new ones were
issued on December 9, 1996 in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines.
AFC and HPI filed separate petitions for determination of just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
When the DARAB failed to act on these petitions for more than
three years, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for
determination and payment of just compensation with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City, acting as a Special
18
Agrarian Court. RTC resolved the consolidated cases, fixing
the just compensation for the petitioners 1,338.6027 hectares
of land at P1,383,179,000.00, with interest on this amount at
the prevailing market interest rates, computed from the taking
of the properties on December 9, 1996 until fully paid, minus
the amounts the petitioners already received under the initial
valuation. LBP moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
The RTC, in its order of December 5, 2001, modified its ruling
and fixed the interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the
time the complaint was filed until finality of the decision.
The Third Division of this Court, in its Decision of February 6,
2007, affirmed this RTC decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division issued its Resolution of
December 19, 2007, modifying its February 6, 2007 Decision
by deleting the 12% interest due on the balance of the
awarded just compensation.
All parties moved for the reconsideration of the modified ruling.
The Court uniformly denied all the motions in its April 30, 2008
Resolution. Entry of Judgment followed on May 16, 2008. The
Court En Banc, by a majority vote, denied the petitioners
second motion for reconsideration based on two
considerations. First, the grant of the second motion for
reconsideration runs counter to the immutability of final
decisions. Second, on the merits, the petitioners are not
entitled to recover interest on the just compensation and
attorneys fees because they caused the delay in the payment
of the just compensation due them; they erroneously filed their
complaints with the DARAB when they should have directly
filed these with the RTC acting as an agrarian court.
Issue: WON the principle of immutability of judgment does not
apply since the Entry of Judgment was issued even before the
lapse of fifteen days from the parties receipt of the April 30,
2008 Resolution and the petitioners timely filed their second
motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from their receipt
of this resolution
Decision
No. The Principle of Immutability of judgement does not apply.
As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended
or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification
is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the
highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we
have recognized exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments
and recalling their entries in the interest of substantial justice
and where special and compelling reasons called for such
actions.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure
are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice.
As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 38
(1998): Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as
to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to
be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
In the present case, while the DAR initially valued the
petitioners’ landholdings at a total of P251,379,104.02, the
RTC, acting as a special agrarian court, determined the actual
value of the petitioners’ landholdings to be P1,383,179,000.00.
This valuation, a finding of fact, has subsequently been
affirmed by this Court, and is now beyond question. In eminent
domain terms, this amount is the “real, substantial, full and
ample” compensation the government must pay to be “just” to
the landowners.
Apart from the requirement that compensation for expropriated
land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be
“just,” must also be made without delay. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” if the
property is immediately taken as the property owner suffers the
immediate deprivation of both his land and its fruits or income.
We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 611
(2002), the need for prompt payment and the necessity of the
payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the
payment of compensation for property already taken. We ruled
in this case that: x x x Thus, if property is taken for public
use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation
must include interest[s] on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred.” [Emphasis
supplied.]
In Republic, the Court recognized that the just compensation
due to the landowners for their expropriated property
amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the
State. Applying the Eastern Shipping Lines ruling, the Court
fixed the applicable interest rate at 12% per annum, computed
from the time the property was taken until the full amount of
just compensation was paid, in order to eliminate the issue of
the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the
currency over time.
Let it be remembered that shorn of its eminent domain and
social justice aspects, what the agrarian land reform program
involves is the purchase by the government, through the LBP,
of agricultural lands for sale and distribution to farmers. As a
purchase, it involves an exchange of values—the landholdings
in exchange for the LBP’s payment. In determining the just
compensation for this exchange, however, the measure to
be borne in mind is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s
loss since what is involved is the takeover of private
property under the State’s coercive power. As mentioned
above, in the value-for-value exchange in an eminent domain
situation, the State must ensure that the individual whose
property is taken is not shortchanged and must hence carry the
burden of showing that the “just compensation” requirement of
the Bill of Rights is satisfied.
The Court imposed 12% interest based on the ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 611 (2002), that “x x x
if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the
final compensation must include interest[s] on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken
to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.”
This is the same legal principle applicable to the present case,
as discussed above
That the legal interest due is now almost equivalent to the
principal to be paid is not per se an inequitable or
unconscionable situation, considering the length of time the
interest has remained unpaid— almost twelve long years.
From the perspective of interest income, twelve years would
have been sufficient for the petitioners to double the principal,
even if invested conservatively, had they been promptly paid
the principal of the just compensation due them. Moreover, the
interest, however enormous it may be, cannot be inequitable
and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the
application of law and jurisprudence—standards that have
taken into account fairness and equity in setting the interest
rates due for the use or forbearance of money. As our last
point, equity and equitable principles only come into full play
when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. As we have
shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for
full application to the present case. There is thus no occasion
for the equitable consideration that Justice Chico-Nazario
suggested
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF BORBON
G.R. No. 165354; January 12, 2015; Bersamin, J:
19
Summary: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation
against respondent lands. Respondent filed an Answer with
MTD. TC adopted the Joint report submitted by 2 of the 3
panel of commissioners which valued the land at
₱550.00/square meter. During the pendency of appeal,
NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue
Expropriation Proceedings since the element of public use had
already ceased. SC ruled in favor of NAPOCOR. It ruled that to
continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite
cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in
the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the expropriator
due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San
Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-
Pinamucan Power Transmission Project.2 Respondents heirs
of Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property, with a total area of
14,257 square meters. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City
(RTC),4seeking the acquisition of an easement of right of way.
In their answer with motion to dismiss,8 the respondents
staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with
them before entering the property and that the entry was done
without their consent. Nonetheless, they tendered no objection
to NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just compensation
not only for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the
entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not
totally lost, due to the project;11 and that their property was
classified as industrial land.
The RTC constituted the panel of three commissioners. Two
commissioners submitted a joint report on April 8, 1999, 16 in
which they found that the property was classified as industrial
land located within the Industrial 2 Zone. The two
commissioners appraised the value at ₱550.00/square
meter.19However, the third commissioner filed a separate
report dated March 16, 1999,20 whereby he recommended the
payment of "an easement fee of at least ten percent (10%) of
the assessed value indicated in the tax declaration 21plus cost
of damages in the course of the construction, improvements
affected and tower occupancy fee. The RTC adopted the
recommendation contained in the joint report.
During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation
Proceedings,31informing that the parties failed to reach an
amicable agreement; that the property sought to be
expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose
because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines
installed on the respondents’ property.
Issue: WON the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued or dismissed pending appeal.
Decision:
Yes. The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the
private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty,
to public purpose.” But the exercise of such right is not
unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that
just compensation be paid to the property owner. These
requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that
should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the
property expropriated.
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be
maintained throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The
effects of abandoning the public purpose were explained in
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., 613
SCRA 618 (2010), to wit: More particularly, with respect to the
element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition
for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if
the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would
lack one indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely, the particular public
purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly,
the private property owner would be denied due process of
law, and the judgment would violate the property owner’s right
to justice, fairness and equity.
Here, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation
proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines
constructed on the respondents’ property had already been
retired. Considering that the Court has consistently upheld the
primordial importance of public use in expropriation
proceedings, NAPOCOR’s reliance on Metropolitan Water
District v. De los Angeles, 55 Phil. 776 (1931), was apt and
correct. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines
necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the
element of public use. To continue with the expropriation
proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public
purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid
judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the
essential element of public use.
We must point out that NAPOCOR entered the property
without the owners’ consent and without paying just
compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any
amount as required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is
explicit in obliging the Government and its entities to pay just
compensation before depriving any person of his or her
property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit
trees and plants without payment, and the installation of the
transmission lines went through the middle of the land as to
divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively rendering
the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair
for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until
the time of restoration of the possession of the property. There
should be no question about the taking.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the
eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no
need to pay “just compensation” to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full
market value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should
compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the
time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual
or other compensatory damages. This conforms with the
following pronouncement in Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr.: In light of these premises, we now
expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain,
is always subject to the condition that the property be devoted
to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or
not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the
property, subject to the return of the amount of just
compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the
required factual justification.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF RABIE
G.R. No. 210218; August 17, 2016; Carpio, J:
Summary: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation
against respondent lands. Respondent filed an Answer arguing
that the current market value of the property was 10,000 and
12,000 per square meter. NAPOCOR deposited 411,000 which
was 500 per square meter. TC ruled in favor of respondents.
Respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. TC
granted. SC reversed. It ruled that discretionary execution
does not apply to eminent domain proceedings and that a
mere statement of “good reasons as stated in the motion” does
not suffice to justify execution pending appeal.
Facts: Petition for review on certiorari. NAPOCOR filed a
complaint for expropriation5 against respondents Heirs of
Antonina Rabie (respondents) for the acquisition of the 822-
square meter portion of Lot No. 1439, a residential lot located
20
in Barangay Lewin, Lumban, Laguna to be used as access
road for the Caliraya Hydro Electric Power Plant of the Caliraya
Botocan-Kalayaan Build Rehabilitate and Operate Transfer
Project of the NAPOCOR. Respondents filed a Verified
Answer,6 claiming that the then current market value of the
property was ₱10,000 per square meter on the inner portion
and ₱12,000 per square meter near the highway. NAPOCOR
deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank)
the amount of ₱411,000 representing the BIR zonal valuation
of the affected portion of the subject property, which was ₱500
per square meter. Respondents filed a Motion to Withdraw
Deposit dated 15 November 2010,7 which the trial court
granted in an Order dated 17 November 2010. NAPOCOR filed
a Motion to Issue Order of Expropriation. Trial court granted
the motions and constituted the Board of Commissioners to
assist the trial court in the determination of just compensation
for the affected portion of the subject property.
The trial court issued an Order. WHEREFORE, the Eight
Hundred Twenty Two (822) square meters of the land owned
by the defendants is hereby expropriated in favor of the
National Power Corporation effective December 2009 upon
payment of the fair market value of the property at Eleven
Thousand (₱11,000.00) Pesos per square meter or a total of
Nine Million Forty-Two Thousand (₱9,042,000.00) Pesos.
Defendants’ claim that said property was occupied by plaintiff
since 1940 is unrebutted, hence, reasonable rentals of Twelve
Thousand Pesos (₱12,000.00) yearly is hereby awarded to
defendants from the year 1940 to the present at a twelve
percent (12%) annual interest rate, until fully paid.
Respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal.
NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal.
The trial court gave due course to NAPOCOR’s Notice of
Appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals. The trial court granted the motion for
execution pending appeal. NAPOCOR filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue: WON the trial court still had jurisdiction when it ruled on
the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
Decision
Yes. Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary
execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is
allowed upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after
due hearing. Further, prior to transmittal of the records of the
case, the trial court does not lose jurisdiction over the case and
in fact, may issue an order for execution pending appeal.
While the trial court still had jurisdiction when it issued the
order granting execution pending appeal, the Court holds that
discretionary execution does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings.
It is basic that the trial court should make a finding on whether
the allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal
constitute good reasons as required in Section 2 of Rule 39.—
A mere statement of “good reasons as stated in the motion”
does not suffice to justify execution pending appeal. It is basic
that the trial court should make a finding on whether the
allegations in the motion for execution pending appeal
constitute good reasons as required in Section 2 of Rule 39.
The trial court should have expressed clearly and distinctly the
facts and law on which the order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal was based, but it did not.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF TAÑADA
AND EBARLE
G.R. No. 170506; January 11, 2017, Leonardo-De Castro, J:
Summary: Land bank filed an expropriation complaint against
respondent. Dissatisfied with the valuation respondents filed a
summary administrative proceedings for the preliminary
determination of just compensation. DARAB ruled in favor of
respondent. TC ruled in favor of respondent and valued the
property at 150,000 per hectare. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the TC. SC reversed the TC. It ruled that the trial court acting
as a SAC must take into consideration the factors prescribed
by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and is obliged to apply
the formula crafted by the DAR.
Facts: Petition for review under Rule 45. The record shows
that sometime in 1988, the aforesaid parcels of land were
placed under the land reform program of the government.
Pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 405,
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the
properties to be taken at ₱223,837.29 for 16.7692 hectares
and ₱192,610.16 for 13 hectares or a total of ₱416,447.43.
Dissatisfied with this valuation for being unreasonably and
unconscionably low, respondents instituted the summary
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of
just compensation in 1992 and 1993.
With the DARAB's affirmation of the acquisition cost fixed by
petitioner for the subject properties, respondents instituted
separate petitions for the determination and payment of just
compensation. The trial court acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC) rendered a decision which favored the
respondents in this case and pegged the value of the lots in
question at fifteen pesos per square meter or P-150,000.00 per
hectare. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed
by petitioner but this was denied by the trial court in its Order.
Dissatisfied with the adverse judgment, petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court
merely denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the appealed
decision of the trial court.
Issue: WON the Special Agrarian Court can disregard the
valuation guideline or formula prescribed under DAR AO No. 6,
Series of 1992
Decision
No. Since there is no dispute that the subject properties are
qualified for coverage under the agrarian reform law, the just
compensation for the said properties must be governed by the
valuation factors under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657
which provides: SEC. 17. Determination of Just
Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as
the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
Thus, we have held that when handling just compensation
cases, the trial court acting as a SAC should be guided by the
following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the
current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and
income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax
declarations; (6) the assessment made by government
assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to
the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if
any.
The Supreme Court (SC) discussed the long line of cases
calling for the mandatory application of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) formula in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, 685 SCRA 76
(2012).—It is settled in jurisprudence that, in order to
determine just compensation, the trial court acting as a SAC
must take into consideration the factors prescribed by Section
17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and is obliged to apply the formula
crafted by the DAR. We discussed the long line of cases
calling for the mandatory application of the DAR formula in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, 685 SCRA 76 (2012).
21
RULE 68: FORCLOSURE OR REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
ROLDAN vs. SPOUSES BARRIOS
G.R. No. 214803; April 23, 2018; Peralta, J:
Summary: Roldan filed an action for foreclosure or REM
against respondent land. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction. SC affirmed the RTC. It ruled that the court's
jurisdiction will be determined by the assessed value of the
property involved.
Facts: Petition for certiorari. Roldan filed an action for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against respondents. She
alleged that Sps. Barrios borrowed from her 250,000 pesos
secured by a REM situated in Baybay, Makato, Aklan.
Spouses Barrios filed their Answer contending that the
computation of their alleged loan obligation was not accurate.
Respondent Matorres filed his Answer that petitioner had no
cause of action against him as they did not have any
transaction with each other; admitting that the subject land was
mortgaged to him; that he had also filed a judicial foreclosure
case against respondents spouses Barrios pending with the
RTC.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled
that It appearing from the complaint that the assessed value of
the property mortgaged is only ₱13,380.00 and the instant
cases being a real action, the assessed value of the property
determines the jurisdiction. The assessed value of the property
involved being below ₱20,000.00, it is the first level court that
has jurisdiction over the cases.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Decision
No. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law and an
objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the
parties.
From the foregoing, the RTC exercises exclusive original
jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil
cases involving title to, or possession of, real property or any
interest in it where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds ₱20,000.00, and if it is below 20,000.00, it is the first
level court which has jurisdiction. An action "involving title to
real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based
on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal
right to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or
disposition of the same.
The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for
foreclosure of mortgage showed that the loan obtained by
respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they
failed to pay such loan which was secured by a mortgage on
the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in
case of default of payment of such mortgage indebtedness to
the court, the property be ordered sold to answer for the
obligation under the mortgage contract and the accumulated
interest. It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract
of mortgage indebtedness is that a property has been identified
or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-
mortgagor as security for the payment of money or the
fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of
indebtedness, in case of default in payment. 15 Foreclosure is
but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage
indebtedness. 16 In a real estate mortgage when the principal
obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to
foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and
sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of
the obligation. 17 Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action
so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial
recognition of a property debt, and an order for the sale of the
res.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they
are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the
assessed value of the real property involved does exceed
₱20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or ₱50,000.00, if located
elsewhere. If the value exceeds ₱20,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 as
the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have
jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION.
Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it
is not for recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction will be
determined by the assessed value of the property involved.
REHABILITATION FINANCE CORPORATION vs. ALTO
SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC
G.R. No. L- 14303; March 24, 1960; Barrera, J
Summary: Palma executed a first mortgage in favor of RFC
and a second mortgage in favor of Alto. Palma assigned all his
rights over the said property to Trinidad. RFC consolidated the
title in its favor. RFC sought to cancel Alto’s encumbrance
alleging that with the consolidation of the title in its favor, the
lien of the property had ceased. The TC denied the petition for
cancellation. CA certified the case to the SC. SC affirmed the
RTC. It ruled that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act may only be allowed if there is a unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the
case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an
ordinary case.
Facts: Palma executed a first mortgage to secure a loan of
20,000 in favor of RFC and subsequently a second mortgage
over the same property in favor of Alto. Both mortgages were
duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Sur and annotated on the corresponding certificate
of title. RFC forclosed the mortgage extrajudicially and the
property was sold in favor of mortgagee RFC as the highest
bidder. Palma, by a deed of assignment dated October 15,
1951, transferred and conveyed all his rights, title and interest
in and to the mortgaged property to the spouses Anacleto
Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, the assignees assuming the
obligation of paying the repurchase price of the auctioned
property. The assignee-spouses and the RFC executed a
"Deed of Resale" whereby the mortgaged property was resold
and reconveyed. However, instead of paying the whole
redemption price, only P5,500 was paid on hand and the sum
of P21,505.11, balance of the total indebtedness including 6%
interest was agreed to be paid in ten annual amortizations.
Alto, as junior encumbrancer, wrote the RFC inquiring as to the
actual status of the property subject to redemption expiring.
RFC advised Alto that the auctioned property had already been
sold to the Trinidad spouses "under a deed of redemption on
the installment plan". This notwithstanding, the RFC, on
October 2, 1952, executed an affidavit consolidating ownership
on the purchased property, stating therein that the period of
redemption had expired on April 18, 1952 without the debtor or
any lien-holder thereon exercising said right of redemption or
repurchase. The second mortgage in favor of Alto, however,
was carried and annotated at the back of the new title.
It is this annotation on its certificate of title No. 1155 that the
RFC sought to have cancelled, alleging that with the
consolidation and transfer to it as the first mortgagee of the
mortgagee's rights on the property, the junior encumbrancer's
lien on the same property had ceased. Alto, the second
mortgagee, opposed the petition contending that with the
execution of the Deed of Resale between RFC and the
spouses Anacleto Trinidad and Rosa S. de Trinidad, assignees
of the mortgagor, the mortgaged property had been completely
released from the first mortgage and the second mortgage had
been automatically transformed into a first lien on the property.
22
From the order denying the petition for cancellation, RFC
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case, however, was
certified to this Court, the questions raised therein being purely
of law.
Issue: WON the petition to cancel the annotation of the second
mortgage must be granted
Decision:
No. The relief afforded by Section 112 of the Land Registration
Act may only be allowed if there is a unanimity among the
parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case.
The court a quo acted correctly in denying, under the
circumstances, the petition to cancel the annotation of the
second mortgage at the back of the title covering the property
originally owned by Eustaquio Palma. It has been consistently
held by this Court, that the relief afforded by Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act may only be allowed if "there is a
unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise,
the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in
an ordinary case.1 In another case, this Court2 has held that
"Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which
do not impair rights recorded in the decree, or alterations
which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to by all
parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes".
This doctrine is but sound and proper. The proceedings
provided in the Land Registration Act being summary in nature,
they are inadequate for the litigation of issues properly
pertaining to ordinary civil actions,3 thus, questions involving
ownership of or title to a real property,4 or relating to the validity
or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage should properly be
ventilated in an ordinary proceeding."5
An interest in the mortgaged property acquired subsequent to
the first mortgage may be divested or barred only by making
the holder thereof a party to the proceedings to foreclose.
While as a general rule, the junior encumbrancer is not a
necessary party to a suit to foreclose by a senior mortgagee, it
is always proper and prudent to join him as a defendant, both
to give an opportunity to defend and to extinguish his right of
redemption. When a senior mortgagee forecloses and
becomes the purchaser at his own foreclosure sale, but the
holder of a subsequent mortgage or other subordinate interest
has not been joined or has been eliminated from the
proceeding, equity will keep the senior mortgage alive against
the subsequent encumbrance and the senior mortgagee will be
entitled to an action de novo to reforeclose the mortgage as to
the omitted persons.
TIGLAO VS. BOTONES
G.R. No. L-3619; October 29, 1951; Paras, C.J:
Summary: Plaintiff emerged as the highest bidder of the
mortgaged properties ordered by the CFI of Tarlac. Plaintiff
filed a motion for confirmation of. TC approved. Plaintiff filed a
WP. Defendant opposed alleging lack of notice of the motion
for confirmation or its hearing. TC granted the WP. SC
reversed. It ruled notice and hearing of a notice for
confirmation of a sheriff's sale is essential to the validity of the
order of confirmation.
Facts: Court of First Instance of Tarlac on July 20, 1943,
ordered the issuance of a writ of execution. Accordingly, on
October 9, 1943, the provincial sheriff sold at public auction the
mortgaged properties to the plaintiff as the highest bidder.
Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion with the Court of for the
confirmation of the sale in his favor. The Court approved the
sale.
Plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac a motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession. The defendant filed an
opposition alleging (1) that the judgment of March 24, 1943, is
null and void, because the defendant's former counsel had no
special authority to settle the case in the manner stated in said
judgment, and (2) that the sheriff's sale was not legally
confirmed, because the defendant was not given notice of the
motion for confirmation or its hearing. The court granted
plaintiff's motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The
defendant appealed.
Issue: WON the TC erred in sustaining the order confirming
the sheriff’s sale and in issuing the corresponding writ of
possession in favor of the appellee.
Decision
Yes. Notice and hearing of a notice for confirmation of a
sheriff's sale is essential to the validity of the order of
confirmation. Notice and hearing of a notice for confirmation of
a sheriff's sale is essential to the validity of the order of
confirmation.
In the case at bar, the lower court undoubtedly had acquired
jurisdiction over the foreclosure proceedings but, in confirming
the sheriff's sale without the essential requisite as to notice of
the motion for confirmation, it exceeded its power, with the
result that the order of confirmation is null and void. As stated
by Mr. Justice Feria in Caluag et al., *46 Off. Gaz., 514. "a
wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void, and may be
set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court exceeds
its jurisdiction and power in rendering it." In Ang Lam vs.
Rosillosa,** 47 Off. Gaz., Supp.(12), 103, it was held that "a
void judgment may be assailed or impugned at any time either
directly or collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same
case or by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
judgment in any action or proceeding wherein it is invoked."
Hence there is no merit in appellee's contention that the order
of confirmation had become final and cannot be set aside after
the 6-month period provided in rule 38 of the Rules of Court,
within which relief could be asked, had expire.
The second contention of the appellant is that the trial court
erred in not suspending the proceedings because of the
Moratorium Law (Republic Act No. 342). This contention is
untenable. The foreclosure judgment had long become final.
By his motion for confirmation of the sheriff's sale and his
motion for a writ of possession, the appellee sought to recover,
not a monetary obligation, but the properties sold to him at
public auction.
GSIS vs. CFI OF ILOILO
G.R. No. L- 45322; July 5, 1989; Grino-Aquino, J:
Summary: Sps. Bacaling obtained a loan from GSIS secured
by a REM. Bacaling failed to pay the loan. Upon foreclosure,
GSIS emerged as the highest bidder. GSIS asked for the
deficiency of the foreclosure sale. MTIDC as the assignee of
Sps. Bacaling filed a motion to exercise redemption. TC
granted the motion. Upon motion, the TC declared the
redemption of the property by MTIDC void. Nelita Bacaling
filed a motion to re-open the case so she could prove the
inadequacy of the price. 14 yrs later MTIDC filed a MR. TC
granted the motion. SC ruled that only foreclosure of
mortgages to banking institutions (including the Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation) and those made extrajudicially are
subject to legal redemption, by express provision of statute,
and the present case does not come under exceptions.”
Facts: A real estate loan of P600,000 payable in monthly
installments within a period of ten (10) years with 7% interest
per annum, was granted to the spouses Ramon and Nelita
Bacaling by the petitioner, Government Service Insurance
System (hereafter GSIS) for the development of the Bacaling-
Moreno subdivision. To secure the repayment of the loan, the
Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real estate
mortgage on four (4) lots owned by them. Out of the approved
loan of P600,000, only P240,000 had been released to them
by the GSIS as of November 11, 1957.
23
Bacalings failed to finish the subdivision project and pay the
amortizations on the loan so the GSIS filed in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo a complaint for judicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. During the pendency of the case, Ramon Bacaling
passed away. The court ordered the widow, for herself and as
administratrix of the estate of Ramon Bacaling, to pay the
GSIS. Mrs. Bacaling failed to pay the judgment debt within 90
days after receipt of the decision of the court. Consequently,
the mortgaged lots were sold at public auction on February 28,
1961. The GSIS was the highest bidder at the sale. GSIS filed
a motion for confirmation of the sale of the property to it. GSIS
reiterated said motion and further asked for a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor, its bid of P74,558.25 being
inadequate to cover the judgment debt which had swelled to
P339,302.58.
Respondent Maria Teresa Integrated Development
Corporation (MTIDC), as alleged assignee of the mortgagor's
"right of redemption," filed a "Motion to Exercise the Right of
Redemption". The motion was granted by the trial court. On
motion of the GSIS the court issued on February 3, 1973 an
order declaring null and void the redemption of the property by
respondent MTIDC.
Respondent Nelita Bacaling filed a motion to re-open the case
so she could prove the inadequacy of the price of the sale of
the mortgaged property. Fourteen (14) years after the
foreclosure sale on February 28, 1961 and almost three (3)
years after the court had annulled on February 3, 1973 its
redemption of the foreclosed property, respondent MTIDC filed
a motion for reconsideration of the court's order and sought the
restoration of its right of redemption. Trial Court granted the
motion. The court modified its order of January 19, 1976 by
giving MTIDC one (1) year from January 19, 1976 within which
to redeem the Bacaling property, instead of one year from the
finality of the January 19, 1976 order.
Issue: WON after the judicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage and the confirmation of the sale, the trial court may
grant or fix another period for the redemption of the foreclosed
property by the assignee of the mortgagor's equity of
redemption.
Decision
No. There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure
sale after the confirmation of the sale, except those granted by
banks or banking institutions as provided by the General
Banking Act (Limpin vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
70987, Sept. 29, 1988). This has been the consistent
interpretation of Rule 68 in a long line of decisions of this
Court. “x x x When the foreclosure sale is validly confirmed by
the court title vests upon the purchaser in the foreclosure sale,
and the confirmation retroacts to the date of the sale
(Binalbagan Estate, Inc. vs. Gatuslao, et al., 74 Phil. 128). Only
foreclosure of mortgages to banking institutions (including the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) and those made
extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption, by express
provision of statute, and the present case does not come under
exceptions.”
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of
judicial foreclosure of a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the
PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such a case, the
foreclosure sale, ‘when confirmed by an order of the court, x x
x shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the
action and to vest their rights in the purchaser.’ There then
exists only what is known as the equity of redemption. This is
simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the
secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment
becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after the
foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.”
Since the GSIS is not a bank or banking institution, its
mortgage is covered by the general rule that there is no right of
redemption after the judicial foreclosure sale has been
confirmed. Hence, Judge Numeriano Estenzo exceeded his
jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
the respondent, MTIDC, another one-year period to redeem
the Bacaling properties over the opposition of petitioner GSIS
as mortgageepurchaser thereof at the public sale. His orders
dated January 19, 1976 and February 12, 1976 are null and
void.
CRUZ vs. IAC CALIXTRO O. ADRIATICO, RUFINO J.
SANTIAGO and GODOFREDO VALMEO
G.R. No. 72806; January 9, 1989; Regalado, J
Summary: Petitioner mortgaged certain properties to
respondents. For failure to complay with certain provisions of
the agreement, respondent mover for a WE. SC
Facts: Petitioners mortgaged certain properties to private
respondents who eventually sued them for non-payment and
for the judicial foreclosure of aforementioned mortgages. . In
the course of the proceedings a compromise agreement was
reached. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan ruled that
Upon full payment of the sums of P55,000.00 and P320,000.00
within the period agreed upon, the plaintiff shall deliver to the
defendants Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-32286 (M) of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, Meycauayan Branch, together
with all the documents submitted to the plaintiff. For failure of
the petitioners to comply with certain provisions of the
agreement, private respondent moved for a writ of execution.
The mortgaged properties were foreclosed upon in an auction
sale and were purchased by the private respondents as the
highest bidder. The sale was latter judicially confirmed.
Petitioners seek herein the review and reversal of the decision
of the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court which
dismissed their petition for certiorari questioning, inter alia, the
judicial foreclosure and the judicial confirmation of the
subsequent sale of their property pursuant to the judgment of
the therein respondent Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Malolos Branch VIII; 2 as well as the resolution 3 of the herein
respondent court denying their motion for reconsideration.
Issue: WON the aforestated judgment on compromise was
null and void ab initio
Decision:
No. Petitioners’ justification of their remedy, contending that
the compromise agreement was null and void and that the writ
of execution thereafter issued and enforced was invalid, as
well as their arguments thereon, are pointless at this stage.
The fact remains that, obviously in the broader interests of
justice, the respondent court nevertheless proceeded to decide
the petition for certiorari and ruled on the specific points raised
therein in a manner akin to what would have been done on
assignments of error in a regular appeal. The petition therein
was, therefore, disposed of on the merits and not on a
dismissal due to erroneous choice of remedies or
technicalities.
The procedure outlined therein obviously refers to the situation
where a full-blown trial, with the introduction of evidence is
entailed, such that the trial court has to thereafter determine
whether the allegations in the complaint have been proved,
then ascertain the total amount due to the plaintiff, and
thereafter render judgment for such amount with an order for
the payment thereof in accordance with the prescription of the
aforequoted section, sans the agreement of the parties on
those particulars. There being no such agreement, the
specified procedure has necessarily to be followed and the
minimum period of ninety (90) days for payment, also referred
to as the period for the exercise of the equity as distinguished
from the right, of redemption has to be observed and provided
for in the judgment in the foreclosure suit. Jurisprudentially, it
has also been held that the exercise of the equity of
redemption may be made beyond the 90-days period but
before the foreclosure sale is confirmed by the court.
24
It stands to reason, however, that the aforesaid procedure
cannot be of substantial application to, and can be modified by,
a valid agreement of the parties, such as in the compromise
agreement subject of and constituting the basis for the
judgment on compromise rendered in Civil Case No. 7418-M
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, as hereinbefore stated.
The dispositions of Section 2 of Rule 68 clearly cannot apply
since the parties therein had specifically agreed on the
amounts to be paid, when they should be paid and the effects
of nonpayment or violation of the terms of their agreement.
Thus, the petitioners undertook to pay on the obligation subject
of the compromise agreement, P55,000.00 on or before
August 20, 1984 and P320,000.00 on or before September 30,
1984 and, in case of default on their part, the consequences
are spelled out in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of their aforequoted
compromise agreement, all of which are premised on the
precise contingency of failure by the petitioners to comply
within the period stipulated.
Paragraph 5 lucidly provides that, upon the happening of the
aforesaid contingency contemplated therein, private
respondent Godofredo Valmeo shall be entitled to a writ of
execution directing the foreclosure of all the mortgages subject
matter of said litigation. It is noteworthy that this particular
proviso is what distinguishes this case from other judicial
foreclosure cases decided on the bases of compromise
agreements but which did not have the same specification.
Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioners herein thereby waived
their so-called equity of redemption and the case was
necessarily removed from the operation of Section 2, Rule 68
insofar as its provisions are inconsistent with the judgment on
compromise.
In the same manner, the procedural requirements for the
appointment of and proceedings by commissioners in actions
for expropriation and judicial partition may be said to likewise
confer substantive rights on the party defendants therein,
which procedural steps may not be omitted over their objection
but can likewise be waived or dispensed with on mutual
agreement. In these three special civil actions, although
dissimilar in the specific procedure in their special features,
their rationale and specific objectives are congruent in that
they afford added protection to proprietary rights, but which
additional protection may be waived, as by stipulations to that
effect in compromise agreements.
It is hornbook knowledge that a judgment on compromise has
the effect of res judicata on the parties and should not be
disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. To challenge
the same, a party must move in the trial court to set aside the
said judgment and also to annul the compromise agreement
itself, before he can appeal from that judgment. Definitely, the
petitioners have ignored these remedial avenues.
There can be no pretension that the compromise agreement
as formulated and approved is contrary to law, public policy or
morals or that the same was tainted with circumstances
vitiating consent. The petitioners entered into the same duly
assisted by competent counsel and the entire judicial
proceeding was under judicial scrutiny and supervision.
Petitioners’ complaints about the supposed irregularity in the
publication of the notice of sale involve questions of fact which
cannot be resolved by this Court. Furthermore, petitioners had
all the opportunity, in the several motions filed in and heard by
the trial court and especially in the hearing for the confirmation
of sale, to ventilate the alleged irregularities but they never did
so.
Neither are We inclined to nor justified in disturbing the factual
findings of the respondent court debunking petitioners’ claim
that private respondent Valmeo had, subsequent to the
foreclosure sale of the property, agreed to allow petitioners to
redeem the property.
Petitioners close their jeremiad by an appeal for consideration
on grounds of equity. However, We also recognize the
principle of countervailing equity in favor of the adverse party,
opposed to that which petitioners seek to be recognized, and
which should not be subordinated because it is of equal
strength and equally deserving of consideration.
SPS KHO vs. CA and BANCO FILIPINO
G.R. No. 83498; October 22, 1991; Paras, J
Facts: Petitioner executed a REM in favor of respondent.
Petitioner defaulted in the payment of some amortization.
Hence respondent extrajudicialy forclosed the mortgage.
Counting one year from June 17, 1982, the petitioners had until
June 17, 1983, within which to redeem the property. In the
meantime, the foreclosed property was leased out to third
parties and the rentals (fruits thereof) were remitted monthly by
petitioners to respondent bank, being the purchaser in the
extrajudicial foreclosure. Petitioners filed a complaint for
annulment of specific performance with preliminary injunction.
The RTC of Cebu granted the petition.
In the meantime, present counsel of record for respondent
bank entered his appearance. Judge Aguinaldo claimed some
relationship with him. Hence, the reraffle of the case to another
sala, Branch XIV — presided over by Judge Juan Y. Reyes.
After more than 5 months' series of extensions, particularly on
October 26, 1984, the petitioners finally submitted their
Memorandum in support of their opposition to the respondent
bank's aforestated Motion to Lift Injunction. On April 30, 1985,
respondent bank's motion was denied and a motion for
reconsideration was thereafter immediately filed. While the
motion for reconsideration was pending, Judge Reyes retired
and again there was a reraffle of the case which resulted in its
being assigned to Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, of RTC XIII
who denied on April 29, 1987, respondent bank's aforestated
motion for reconsideration. Finally the three (3) above
mentioned orders of November 4, 1983 (granting writ of
injunction); April 30, 1985 (denying respondent bank's motion
to lift injunction), and April 29, 1987 (denying respondent
bank's motion for reconsideration) were all reversed by
respondent Court in its decision dated February 17, 1988.
Issue: WON the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession
Decision
Yes. The law and jurisprudence are clear that
both during and after the period of redemption, the purchaser
at the foreclosure sale is entitled as of right to a writ of
possession, regardless of whether or not there is a pending
suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself
(without prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said
case). Hence, an injunction to prohibit the issuance of the writ
of possession is entirely out of place (See Act 3135)
ROXAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RURAL BANK OF
DUMALAG, INC.
G.R. No. 100480; May 1, 1993; Nocon, J
Facts: Petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner she
executed a special power of attorney appointing her brother,
the late Manuel Roxas, as her attorney-in-fact for the purpose
of applying for an agricultural loan with private respondent
Rural Bank of Dumalag, Inc. using said land as collateral.
private respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage for
failure to pay the loan on maturity. For failure to exercise the
right of redemption, private respondent consilidated its
ownership over the subject land.
Petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of foreclosure of
mortgage and annulment of auction sale against private
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. She
argued that the foreclosure did not comply with the
requirement of giving written notices to all possible
redemptioners, neither did Manuel Roxas inform her about the
foreclosure. She consigned with the trial court the amount of
P4,194.50 as redemption price of the subject land. Refuting the
claims of petitioner, private respondent contended in its answer
that petitioner never cared about the payment of her loan
although she knew of the status of her account. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The trial court
ratiocinated that private respondent failed to give notice of
foreclosure to petitioner as owner of the property and there
was no compliance with the requirements of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 720.
25
Court of Appeals, said court reversed the decision of the trial
court.4 According to the appellate court, Section 5 of R.A. NO.
720 does not require personal notification to the martgagor in
case of foreclosure and there was substantial compliance with
the requirements of said law.
Issue: WON the CA acted correctly in reversing the decision of
the trial court, despite failure to post notices in the barrio where
the land lies
Decision:
No. It is settled doctrine that failure to publish notice of auction
sale as required by the statute constitutes a jurisdictional
defect which invalidates the sale. Even slight deviations
therefrom are not allowed. Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as
amended by R.A. No. 5939, provides that notices of
foreclosure should be posted in at least three (3) of the most
conspicuous public places in the municipality and barrio where
the land mortgaged is situated. In the case at bar, the
Certificate of Posting which was executed by the sheriff states
that he posted three (3) copies of the notice of public auction
sale in three (3) conspicuous public places in the municipality
of Panay, where the subject land was situated and in like
manner in Roxas City, where the public auction sale took
place. It is beyond dispute that there was a failure to publish
the notices of auction sale as required by law.
In this case, the sheriff executed a certificate of posting, which
is not the affidavit required by law. The rationale behind this is
simple: an affidavit is a sworn statement in writing whereas a
certificate is merely a statement in writing. Strict compliance
with the aforementioned provision is mandated. We, therefore,
cannot sustain the view of respondent court that there was
substantial compliance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 720, as
amended, with respect to the affidavit of posting by the sheriff
and the non-posting of the required notice in the barrio where
the land mortgaged is situated. Instead, We declare the
foreclosure and public auction sale of the subject land void.
MONZON vs. SPS. NIEVES
G.R. No. 171827; September 17, 2008; Chico-Nazario J:
Facts: Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Sps
Relova and Sps. Perez filed against Atty. Ana Liza Luna and
herein petitioner Teresita Monzon an initiatory pleading
captioned as a Petition for Injunction. Respondents alleged
that on 28 December 1998, Monzon executed a promissory
note in favor of the spouses Perez for the amount
of P600,000.00, with interest of five percent per month,
payable on or before 28 December 1999. This was secured by
a 300-square meter lot in Barangay Kaybagal, Tagaytay City.
Respondents also claim in their Petition for Injunction that on
29 March 1999, Monzon executed another promissory note,
this time in favor of the spouses Relova for the amount
of P200,000.00 with interest of five percent per month payable
on or before 31 December 1999. This loan was secured by a
200 square meter lot. The Coastal Lending Corporation
extrajudicially foreclosed the entire 9,967-square meter
property covered by Psu-232001, including the portions
mortgaged and subsequently sold to respondents. The winning
bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties Inc.,
paid the amount of P5,001,127.00, thus leaving
a P1,602,393.65 residue. According to respondents, this
residue amount, which is in the custody of Atty. Luna as
Branch Clerk of Court, should be turned over to them pursuant
to Section 4, Rule 68 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Monzon likewise claimed that respondents could no longer ask
for the enforcement of the two promissory notes because she
had already performed her obligation to them by dacion en
pago as evidenced by the Deed of Conditional Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale. She claimed that petitioners could still
claim the portions sold to them if they would only file the proper
civil cases. As regards the fund in the custody of Atty. Luna,
respondents cannot acquire the same without a writ of
preliminary attachment or a writ of garnishment in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 57 and Section 9(c), Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal. the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the appeal.
According to the Court of Appeals, Monzon showed tepid
interest in having the case resolved with dispatch. She, thus,
cannot now complain that she was denied due process when
she was given ample opportunity to defend and assert her
interests in the case. The Court of Appeals reminded Monzon
that the essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to
be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense.
What the law proscribes is lack of opportunity to be heard.
Monzon’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated 7 March 2006.
Issue: WON Monzon was denied due process to present her
evidence
Decision
Yes. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the
reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the hearing,
is the sole ground for an order of default (Rosario, et al. vs.
Alonzo, et al., L-17320, June 29, 1963), except the failure to
appear at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default
on the part of the defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff
shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment
based thereon may be rendered against the defendant
(Section 5, Rule 18). Also, a default judgment may be
rendered, even if the defendant had filed his answer, under the
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
In Philippine National Bank v. De Leon, 181 SCRA 583 (1990),
we held: We have in the past admonished trial judges against
issuing precipitate orders of default as these have the effect of
denying a litigant the chance to be heard, and increase the
burden of needless litigations in the appellate courts where
time is needed for more important or complicated cases. While
there are instances when a party may be properly defaulted,
these should be the exception rather than the rule, and should
be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal or inordinate
neglect to comply with the orders of the court
It is even worse when the court issues an order not
denominated as an order of default, but provides for the
application of effects of default. Such amounts to the
circumvention of the rigid requirements of a default order, to
wit: (1) the court must have validly acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant either by service of summons or
voluntary appearance; (2) the defendant failed to file his
answer within the time allowed therefor; and (3) there must be
a motion to declare the defendant in default with notice to the
latter. In the case at bar, petitioner had not failed to file her
answer. Neither was notice sent to petitioner that she would be
defaulted, or that the effects of default shall be imposed upon
her. “Mere nonappearance of defendants at an ordinary
hearing and to adduce evidence does not constitute default,
when they have already filed their answer to the complaint
within the reglementary period. It is error to default a defendant
after the answer had already been filed. It should be borne in
mind that the policy of the law is to have every litigant’s case
tried on the merits as much as possible; it is for this reason that
judgments by default are frowned upon.”
Unlike Rule 68, which governs judicial foreclosure sales,
neither Act No. 3135 as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0
grants to junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance
of the purchase price. The only right given to second
mortgagees in said issuances is the right to redeem the
foreclosed property pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, which provides: Sec. 6.
Redemption. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor,
his successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment
creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under
which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time
within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale;
and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
26
sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as
these are not inconsistent with this Act.
Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, such right can only be
given to second mortgagees who are made parties to the
(judicial) foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper
and in a sense even a necessary party to a proceeding to
foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not an
indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as
between the mortgagor and the first mortgagee, without regard
to the second mortgage; but the consequence of a failure to
make the second mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that
the lien of the second mortgagee on the equity of redemption
is not affected by the decree of foreclosure.
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages. In view of the foregoing
discussions, we find that respondents do not have a cause of
action against Atty. Ana Liza Luna for the delivery of the
subject amounts on the basis of Section 4, Rule 68 of the
Rules of Court, for the reason that the foregoing Rule does not
apply to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
In Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 437 SCRA 565 (2004), we held that
where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a
cause of action clearly appears from the complaint filed with
the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio, even
if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds.
However, while the case should indeed be dismissed insofar
as Atty. Luna is concerned, the same is not necessarily true
with respect to Monzon. Other than respondents’ prayer that
the amount due to respondents be delivered by Atty. Luna to
them, they also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon liable for
such amounts. Said prayer, as argued by Monzon herself, may
constitute a cause of action for collection of sum of money
against Monzon.
The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to
waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to
recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment
thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject
matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he
fails in the remedy elected by him, he cannot pursue further
the remedy he has waived.
SPOUSES SALVADOR F. DE VERA and FELIZA V. DE
VERA vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. AGLORO
[G.R. No. 155673. Jan. 14, 2005. CALLEJO, SR., J ]
FACTS:
Spouses De Vera secured a loan from the BPI and executed a
Real Estate Mortgage over their property. When the Spouses
De Vera defaulted, BPI filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortagage. At the pubic auction, BPI
was declared the highest bidder.
Spouses De Vera filed a Complaint for the nullification of the
real estate mortgage against the Bank and the Sheriff as well
as the extrajudicial sale of the property at public auction
Thereafter, the Bank filed an Ex Parte Petition for Writ of
Possession with the RTC
When the petition was called for hearing, no oppositor
appeared. Forthwith, the trial court authorized its Branch Clerk
of Court to receive the testimonial and documentary evidence
of the Bank ex parte to which the Bank adduced.
Spouses De Vera filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proceedings to await the resolution of Civil Case for the
nullification of REM or for the consolidation of the two cases
The trial court denied the motion of the Spouses. Citing the
case of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. IAC,
which reiterated the rule that a purchaser in a foreclosed sale
of mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and
that upon an ex parte petition of the purchaser, it is ministerial
upon the trial court to issue such writ in the latter's favor. It
added that the pendency of a separate civil action questioning
the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal
ground for refusing the issuance of the writ of possession
Aggrieved, the Spouses De Vera filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus with temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction before the CA. CA rendered a decision
denying due course to and dismissing the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not suspending the
proceedings because of the pendency of a civil case seeking
the nullity, not only of the foreclosure and auction, but also the
mortgage itself.
RULING: NO. The CA did not err in not suspending the
proceedings because of the pendency of a civil case
In the present case, the petitioners-mortgagors failed to
redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of
the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with the Register of Deeds. The
respondent, being the purchaser of the property at public
auction, thus, had the right to file an ex parte motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession; and considering that it was its
ministerial duty to do so, the trial court had to grant the motion
and to thereafter issue the writ of possession.
There was no need for the court to suspend the proceedings
merely and solely because the petitioners filed a complaint in
the RTC for the nullification of the real estate mortgage, the
sale at public auction and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
issued in favor of the respondent
First. An ex parte petition for the issuance of a possessory writ
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a
"judicial process" as contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil
Code. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's
right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not
an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party "sues another
for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong." It is a non-litigious
proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended. It is brought
for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or
consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding
where the relief is granted without an opportunity for the
person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No
notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the
subject property. Hence, there is no necessity of giving notice
to the petitioners since they had already lost all their interests
in the property when they failed to redeem the same
Second. As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the
mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for
refusing the issuance of a writ of execution. The right of the
purchaser to have possession of the subject property would
not be defeated notwithstanding the pendency of a civil case
seeking the annulment of the mortgage or of the extrajudicial
foreclosure. Indeed, under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, even if
the mortgagor files a petition assailing the writ of possession
granted to the buyer and the sale at public auction within thirty
(30) days from the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the buyer at public auction of the property, and the court
denies the same, the buyer may appeal the order of denial.
However, the buyer at public auction remains in possession of
the property pending resolution of the appeal. We have
consistently ruled that it is the ministerial duty of the court to
issue writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale. The trial court has no discretion on this
matter.
27
SPOUSES ARQUIZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EQUITABLE PCIBANK
[G.R. No. 160479. June 8, 2005. CALLEJO, SR., J]
FACTS:
Spouses Arquiza obtained a loan from private respondent
Equitable PCIBank. To secure the payment, the spouses
executed a REM. Spouses defaulted in the payment of their
loan, the respondent bank filed a petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Property was sold to
the respondent bank as the highest bidder. Following the
expiry date of the redemption period without the spouses
having exercised their right to redeem the property, the
respondent bank consolidated its ownership over the subject
property.
Spouses petitioners filed a complaint for the declaration of the
nullity of the promissory note, real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure sale and damages with a plea for injunctive relief
for the suspension redemption period
Meanwhile, respondent bank demanded that the petitioners
vacate and surrender possession of the subject property, but
the latter refused to do so. This compelled respondent bank to
file an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Instead of acting on the petition and receiving the evidence of
respondent bank ex parte, as mandated by Act No. 3135, as
amended, the RTC set the case for hearing. The petitioner
spouses filed their Answer alleging that (1) the private
respondent failed to incorporate a Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping in its petition; and (2) the petition was abated by the
pendency of their complaint involving the nonpayment of their
mortgage obligation, the validity of the foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property and their failure to redeem the same. The
petitioners prayed that the trial court dismiss the petition
outright.
The trial court conducted a hearing of the petition and rendered
a decision that petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession is
meritorious and should be granted. CA rendered judgment
affirming the decision of RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not failure to attach a certification against
forum shopping warrants the dismissal of the petition
RULING: NO. Failure to attach a certification against forum
shopping does not warrant the dismissal of the petition
The certification against forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or other initiatory pleading. The ex parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is
not an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent
denominated its pleading as a “petition,” it is, nonetheless, a
motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other
pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing
it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate
new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter
arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed.
A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined
to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to
some question that is collateral to the main object of the action
and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere
incident in the registration proceeding. Hence, although it was
denominated as a "petition," it was in substance merely a
motion.
Indeed, it is well-settled that an ordinary action to acquire
possession in favor of the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property is not necessary. There is no law
in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriff's sale of
real property is obliged to bring a separate and independent
suit for possession after the one-year period for redemption
has expired and after he has obtained the sheriff's final
certificate of sale. The basis of this right to possession is the
purchaser's ownership of the property. The mere filing of an ex
parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession would
suffice, and no bond is required
Well established is the rule that after the consolidation of title in
the buyer's name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial
function. The issuance of the writ of possession being a
ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said
to be a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the
transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for annulment of
mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis
pendentia or res judicata.
HELEN E. CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS, as
represented by NORY ABELLANES
[G.R. No. 196950. June 18, 2014. BRION, J.]
FACTS:
Petitioner was the highest bidder in an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale conducted. Title to the property was duly transferred to the
petitioner. Further, petitioner filed an Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession. RTC issued an order
granting the petitioner's application.
Respondent Joselin Tan Lumapas, filed a Motion for Leave of
Court for Intervention as Party Defendant (with Urgent Motion
to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Writ of Possession)
and an Answer in Intervention, as a third party in actual
possession of the foreclosed property. She claimed that the
property had previously been sold to her by Aida Ibabao, the
property's registered owner and the judgment
debtor/mortgagor in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, pursuant
to a Deed of Conditional Sale.
However, RTC recalled and rendered ineffective the writ of
possession issued to the petitioner, stating that "an ex-parte
writ of possession issued cannot be enforced against a third
person who is in actual possession of the foreclosed property
and who is not in privity with the debtor/mortgagor."
Considering that the respondent was not a party to the
extrajudicial foreclosure, the RTC held that she cannot be
ousted of her possession by a mere ex parte motion for the
issuance of a possessory writ, and that the petitioner must now
resort to the appropriate judicial process in order to recover the
foreclosed property
CA affirmed in toto the RTC's assailed orders
ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is an exception to the
ministerial issuance of a writ of possession.
RULING: NO. The present case is not an exception to the
ministerial issuance of a writ of possession
The well-settled rule is that in the extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgages, the issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court after the foreclosure sale and during
the redemption period when the court may issue the order for a
writ of possession upon the mere filing of an ex parte motion
and the approval of the corresponding bond.
There is, however, an exception to the rule.
Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is
made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate
mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually
holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment
obligor. Thus, the court's obligation to issue an ex parte writ of
possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial when there is a third
party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to
that of the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
We emphasize that the exception provided under Section 33,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court contemplates a situation in which
a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as
that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the
property in his own right, and is not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the
owner of the property.
28
In the present case, the respondent cannot be said to possess
the subject property by adverse title or right as her possession
is merely premised on the alleged conditional sale of the
property to her by the judgment debtor/mortgagor.
The execution of a contract of conditional sale does not
immediately transfer title to the property to be sold from seller
to buyer. In such contract, ownership or title to the property is
retained by the seller until the fulfillment of a positive
suspensive condition which is normally the payment of the
purchase price in the manner agreed upon.
In the present case, the Deed of Conditional Sale between the
respondent (buyer) and the subject property's registered owner
(seller) expressly reserved to the latter ownership over the
property until full payment of the purchase price, despite the
delivery of the subject property to the respondent.
It likewise appears from the records that no deed of absolute
sale over the subject property has been executed in the
respondent's favor. Thus, the respondent's possession from
the time the subject property was "delivered" to her by the
seller cannot be claimed as possession in the concept of an
owner, as the ownership and title to the subject property still
then remained with the seller until the title to the property was
transferred to the petitioner. In order for the respondent not to
be ousted by the ex parte issuance of a writ of possession, her
possession of the property must be adverse in that she must
prove a right independent of and even superior to that of the
judgment debtor/mortgagor
JUANITO M. GOPIAO vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
CO.
[G.R. No. 188931. July 28, 2014. PERALTA, J.]
FACTS:
RTC granted the petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession
of real properties filed by respondent bank. Consequently, a
Notice to Vacate was served on Green Asia Construction and
Development Corporation, represented by spouses Legaspi.
Upon learning of the notice to vacate, petitioner Gopiao filed an
Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion for
Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement/Implementation of the Writ of Possession alleging
that there are in actual occupation of the subject properties and
further claiming ownership by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated
executed by the Spouses Legaspi in his favor.
RTC denied petitioner's claims in its Order stating that
petitioner Gopiao's motion for intervention is too late to
entertain. It has been 23 long years ago since the alleged
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and yet he has not
registered the properties in his name.
Upon appeal, CA dismissed said petition ruling that petitioner
offered in evidence an un-notarized and unregistered deed of
sale. Petitioner even failed to prove the due execution and
authenticity of the said deed of absolute sale. On the other
hand, the respondent bank was a mortgagee in good faith
ISSUE: Whether or not the present case is an exception to the
ministerial issuance of a writ of possession.
RULING: NO. The present case is not an exception to the
ministerial issuance of a writ of possession
It is a well-established rule that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained,
even by the filing of a civil case for the declaration of nullity of
the foreclosure and consequent auction sale
The judge to whom the application for writ of possession is
filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the
manner of its foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial
duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the
filing of a complaint questioning the mortgage.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of a few exceptions, one
of which is when a third party in possession of the property
claims a right adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor, as this
Court has time and again upheld in numerous cases,
consistent with Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As
such, petitioner claims that since the following rulings squarely
apply to the instant case, the writ of possession should not be
enforced against him.
Petitioner's possession of the subject properties in this case is
questionable. As correctly observed by the courts below,
petitioner failed to substantiate his possession with sufficient
evidence. On its face, the Deed of Absolute Sale relied upon
by petitioner is neither complete nor in due form. Certain
essential details are missing therein, such as the tax account
numbers of the interested parties and the names of the
witnesses. More importantly, the same was not notarized. As
pointed out by the CA, petitioner even failed to prove the due
execution and authenticity of the document.
If petitioner had really purchased the subject properties from
the Spouses Legaspi back in 1995, why is it that he has not, up
until now, taken any steps in obtaining the titles thereto? If
petitioner really believed himself to be the true owner of the
disputed properties, he should have at least registered the
document that evidences his ownership thereof and paid real
estate taxes thereon under his name. Petitioner, however,
failed to provide evidence of any attempt in registering his
ownership much less any reason for his failure to do so
To cast more doubt on petitioner's claim of possession, the
RTC and CA are in agreement as to the fact that respondent
Bank found no occupants in the subject properties when it
inspected the same before approving the loan applied for by
the Spouses Legaspi
All told, we observe that there is nothing that would indicate
that the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
intervention. Had petitioner properly substantiated his claim of
possession with sufficient evidence, the lower court could have
applied the exception instead of the general rule, permitted his
intervention, and prevented the implementation of the subject
writ of possession. Yet, as previously mentioned, not only did
petitioner present an unnotarized and unregistered Deed of
Absolute Sale but there exists no trace of petitioner's claim of
ownership on the titles of the subject properties. Verily, the
exception cannot be made to apply in the instant case as
petitioner failed to establish his actual possession of the same.
Measured against established parameters, the rejection by the
lower court of petitioner's intervention was not without basis
and, hence, could not have been arrived at capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically.
FE H. OKABE vs. ERNESTO A. SATURNINO
[G.R. No. 196040. August 26, 2014. PERALTA, J.]
FACTS:
Couple Saturnino obtained a loan with the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), which was secured by the subject property
registered under the name of respondent. Because of the
couple's failure to settle their loan obligation with the bank,
PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The property was
not redeemed by respondent during the redemption period,
consolidation of ownership was inscribed and a new TCT was
issued in favor of PNB. Without taking possession of the
subject property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H. Okabe
Petitioner filed with the RTC an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance
of Writ of Possession
The RTC granted the petition and opined that the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the petitioner was merely a
ministerial and complementary duty of the court. RTC ruled,
among other things, that the right of the petitioner to be placed
in absolute possession of the subject property was a
consequence of her right of ownership and that petitioner
cannot be deprived of said possession being now the
registered owner of the property
29
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
questioning the Orders of the RTC
Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. The RTC
issued an Order granting the motion. On even date, the branch
clerk of court issued a Writ of Possession addressed to the
Sheriff ordering the latter to place petitioner in possession of
the subject property
In the proceedings before the CA, respondent filed a Motion to
Admit Herein Memorandum of Authorities in
Amplification/Support of the Position of Petitioner in this Case
and Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. In the
said motion, respondent alleged that the RTC was about to
issue the writ of possession prayed for by the petitioner and
that a TRO was necessary to prevent great and irreparable
injury which respondent may suffer if removed from possession
of the property in question
CA issued a Resolution granting the issuance of a TRO in
favor of the respondent and commanding petitioner and the
RTC to refrain from committing any acts relative to the
proceedings before it upon the posting of a bond.
RTC Presiding Judge informed the CA that as much as the
court would like to comply with its directive, it can no longer do
so because the writ of possession had already been
implemented by the Branch Sheriff
CA rendered the assailed Decision which granted respondent's
petition and vacated the challenged orders of the RTC. The CA
opined, among other things, that although it may be true that
by virtue of the contract of sale, petitioner obtained the same
rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she derived from
erstwhile mortgagee turned owner PNB, this does not mean
that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession
under Act 3135 had also been transferred to the petitioner.
Such a special right is granted only to purchasers in a sale
made under the provisions of Act 3135.
The CA ruled that to allow a second, third, or even tenth
subsequent buyer of the foreclosed property to evict the
mortgagor-debtor or his successor-in-interest from the said
property or wrench away possession from them via a mere ex-
parte motion is to trample upon due process because whatever
defenses that the owner mortgagor/actual possessor may have
would have been drowned and muted by the ex-parte writ of
possession. Considering that the transaction between PNB
and the petitioner was by an ordinary contract of sale, an ex-
parte writ of possession may not therefore be issued in favor of
the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the case at bar, an ex-parte petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession was the proper remedy
of the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject
property.
RULING: YES. An ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession was the proper remedy of the petitioner in
obtaining possession of the subject property.
Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period, upon an ex parte
motion and after furnishing a bond
In GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank, the Court
held that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in
nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer
of title. Also, in China Banking Corporation v. Ordinario, we
held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the circumstances of the
aforequoted case and the provisions of Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, since she bought the property long after
the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it
was the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, or the purchaser
during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte petition
for the issuance of writ of possession during the redemption
period, but it will only issue upon compliance with the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Nevertheless, the purchaser is not left without any remedy.
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights,
title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property,
and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which case, the
issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be exparte and
non-adversarial. Thus, where the property levied upon on
execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor,
the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine
the nature of said possession, i.e., whether or not he is in
possession of the subject property under a claim adverse to
that of the judgment debtor.
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
be applied to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed
properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to
third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period.
The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available
to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the
foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a
subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after
determining that the subject property is still in the possession
of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee
or a third party during the redemption period, a writ of
possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other
words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the
property after the redemption period, a hearing must be
conducted to determine whether possession over the subject
property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the
possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the
defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the
possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus
be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no
longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest
possession over the property through an ordinary action of
ejectment.
To be sure, immediately requiring the subsequent purchaser to
file a separate case of ejectment instead of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession, albeit not exparte, will only
prolong the proceedings and unduly deny the subsequent
purchaser of possession of the property which he already
bought
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (formerly Prudential
Bank) vs. SPOUSES DAVID M. CASTRO and CONSUELO
B. CASTRO
[G.R. No. 195272. January 14, 2015. PEREZ, J.]
FACTS:
The Complaint has its origins from the two loans contracted by
respondent Spouses David M. Castro (David) and Consuelo B.
Castro (Consuelo) from Prudential Bank in the amounts of
P100,000.00 and P55,000.00. The P100,000.00 loan was
secured by a REM over petitioners' property located in Quezon
City while the P55,000.00 loan was secured by another REM
over two parcels of land located in Alaminos, Laguna,
registered in the name of David's mother, Guellerma
Malabanan
The loans remained unpaid and the balances ballooned to
P290,205.05 on the P100,000.00 loan and P96,870.20 on the
P55,000.00 loan. Prudential Bank, through counsel, filed two
separate petitions for foreclosure of the mortgage.
In their first petition, Prudential Bank admitted that through
inadvertence, the photocopies of the first two pages of the
REM covering the properties in Laguna were mixed and
attached to the photocopies of the last two pages of the REM
covering the Quezon City property. Thus, in the Notice of
Sheriff's Sale, the name "Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF
David M. Castro" appeared as mortgagor while the amount of
30
mortgaged indebtedness is P96,870.20. The real property
described therein however is the Quezon City property.
Afterwhich, the Quezon City property was sold at a public
auction in favor of Prudential Bank whose winning bid was
P396,000.00.
In their Complaint, Spouses Castro alleged that the
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of the Quezon City property
is null and void for lack of notice and publication of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Spouses Castro proffered that
the property foreclosed is not one of the properties covered by
the REM executed by Guellerma Malabanan which was the
basis of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale which was posted and
published.
Prudential Bank cited a clerical and harmless inadvertence in
the preparation of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure but
nonetheless, it claimed that Spouses Castro, having been
notified of the scheduled foreclosure of the mortgage of the
Quezon City property, should have noticed the inadvertence
and alerted the sheriff. Their failure to do so, Prudential Bank
added, clearly amounted to laches
The issue before the RTC was whether Prudential Bank legally
complied with the jurisdictional requirement of due notice prior
to the extrajudicial sale of the property in question. The trial
court ruled in favor of Prudential Bank and dismissed the
complaint
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court. The appellate court stressed the importance of notice in
a foreclosure sale and ruled that failure to advertise a
mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with statutory
requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the
sale.
Prudential Bank filed a MR.
In a Resolution, the CA, expounded on the previous Decision.
The appellate court clarified that the erroneous designation of
Guellerma Malabanan as mortgagor, instead of David, did not
affect the validity of the notice. With respect to the amount of
the mortgaged indebtedness however, the appellate court
noted that the discrepancy vis-a-vis the actual amount owed by
Spouses Castro is so huge that it can hardly be considered
immaterial. The appellate court opined that declaring a small
amount of indebtedness in the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure and in the notice of sheriff's sale would effectively
depreciate the value of the property. The appellate court then
concluded that statutory provisions governing publication of
notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied
with and that even slight deviations will invalidate the notice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the errors in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale
invalidate the notice and render the sale and the certificate of
such sale void.
RULING: NO. The errors in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale will not
invalidate the notice and render the sale and the certificate of
such sale void.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that foreclosure proceedings
have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the party
who seeks to challenge the proceedings has the burden of
evidence to rebut the same. In this case, respondent failed to
prove that Prudential Bank has not complied with the notice
requirement of the law.
In Philippine National Bank v. Maraya, Jr., we elucidated that
one of the most important requirements of Act No. 3135 is that
the notice of the time and place of sale shall be given. If the
sheriff acts without notice, or at a time and place other than
that designated in the notice, the sheriff acts without warrant of
law
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the
nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time,
place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose
of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If
these objects are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will
not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or
omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are
(1) calculated to deter or mislead bidders,
(2) to depreciate the value of the property, or
(3) to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes
or omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice,
and also to the sale made pursuant thereto
With jurisprudence as the measure, the errors pointed out by
respondents appear to be harmless. The evils that can result
from an erroneous notice did not arise. There was no intention
to mislead, as the errors in fact did not mislead the bidders as
shown by the fact that the winning registered bid of
P396,000.00 is over and above the real amount of
indebtedness of P209,205.05. As correctly observed by the
trial court, the amount mentioned in the notice did not indicate
a collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and the
respondent bank. Notably, the mentioned amount of
P96,870.20 refers to the mortgage indebtedness not the value
of the property. Equally notable is the announcement in the
notice that the amount excludes "penalties, charges, attorney's
fees and all legal fees and expenses for the foreclosure and
sale."
As regards the designation of Guellerma Malabanan as the
mortgagor, we rule that the erroneous designation of an entity
as the mortgagor does not invalidate the notice of sale.
There is much significance in the fact that David admitted on
the witness stand that he knew that there was an application
for foreclosure on their Quezon City property but the REM
used as basis of the foreclosure covered the Laguna
properties. Upon learning this information, he should have
registered his objection or sought clarification from the sheriff's
office. Instead, he let the public auction run its course and
belatedly objected to the sale.
RULE 69: PARTITION
CONCEPCION ROQUE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ERNESTO ROQUE et. al
[G.R. No. 75886. August 30, 1988. FELICIANO, J]
FACTS:
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of
land situated in San Juan, Malolos, Bulacan, was registered
originally in the name of Januario Avendaño, a bachelor who
died intestate and without issue.
Co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino,
Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendaño, in
consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred
their collective and undivided 3/4 share to respondent Ernesto
Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and
complete ownership of the property. The transactions were
embodied in two separate deeds of sale and both duly
notarized.
Respondents Ernesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a 3/4
undivided portion of lot to their half-sister, petitioner
Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property,
however, remained registered in the name of the decedent,
Januario Avendaño.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and
allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, lot was surveyed.
However, Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of
Victor Roque refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of
ownership of any portion of lot and rejected the plan to divide
the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through,
petitioner Concepcion Roque filed a Complaint for "Partition
with Specific Performance"
Petitioner claimed legal ownership of an undivided 3/4 portion
of Lot by virtue of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in
her favor by Ernesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque.
Petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of lot, she had a right to
seek partition of the property,
31
RTC in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque and co-defendant
Ernesto Roque, to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale
made by Ernesto and Victor Roque in favor of plaintiff
Concepcion Roque. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land
Respondents appealed. The Intermediate Appellate Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court stating in its decision:
Upon the issue thus joined by the pleadings, it is obvious that
the case has become one of ownership of the disputed portion
of the subject lot. It is well settled that an action for partition will
not prosper as such from the moment an alleged co-owner
asserts an adverse title. The action that may be brought by an
aggrieved co-owner is accion reivindicatoria or action for
recovery of title and possession
ISSUE: Whether or not an action, separate and independent
from that for partition originally instituted is necessary.
RULING: NO. Accion reinvindicatoria is unnecessary
An action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously
two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be
partitioned. Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully
hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) —
i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute
the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the court can forthwith
proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In
case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in
themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not
dismiss the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary
and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the
question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the
trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his
claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or have
become the sole and exclusive owners of the property
involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action
for partition. This result would be reached, not because the
wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather
because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-ownership
rights in himself
If, upon the other hand, the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court
may and should order the partition of the property in the same
action
In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the
plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from
that for partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved
PETRA FABRICA et.al. v. COURT OF APPEALS and
ZACARIAS BAS et.al.
[G.R. No. L-47360. December 15, 1986. PARAS, J. ]
FACTS:
All the plaintiffs and the other defendants are the grandchildren
and/or great grandchildren of spouses Catalino Bas and
Cristeta Niebres, leaving six children, namely: Alberto, Andres,
Diogracias, Miguel, Pedro and Restituta, all surnamed Bas,
now all deceased.
Lots 2464 and 2467 in question were originally sold on
installments by the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate to
spouses Catalino Bas and Cristeta Niebres
The trial court ruled that the only issue to be resolved in this
case is whether Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 registered in the
name of the legal heirs of Catalino Bas, are still owned in
common pro-indiviso by the heirs of Catalino Bas and Cristeta
Niebres, or whether the said lots belong exclusively to Pedro
Bas or his heirs by virtue of an oral partition allegedly made in
favor of defendants and the two deeds of conveyance
Trial court declared Lots Nos. 2464 and 2467 as properties still
owned in common by the heirs of Catalino Bas and Cristeta
Niebres, and ordering their partition among the children of
Catalino Niebres
Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court ruled that
the judgment of the court a quo in the partition case is not
appealable, it being interlocutory, and ordered the remanding
of the case to the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the court a quo in the
partition case is not appealable, it being interlocutory
RULING: NO. The judgment of the court a quo in the partition
case is appealable, it being judgment on the merits.
The records of the case clearly reveal that the main purpose of
the complaint is to determine who between the parties are the
true owners and entitled to the exclusive use of the disputed
properties. While it is true that the complaint is one for partition,
it is one which is premised on the resolution of the issue on the
validity of the oral partition allegedly made in favor of
defendants and the two deeds of conveyance executed in the
names of the heirs of the deceased spouses Catalino Bas and
Cristeta Niebres.
Unless this issue of ownership is definitely and finally resolved,
it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties. Thus, when the trial court rendered its judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting defendants' claim of exclusive
ownership of the properties by oral partition, it rendered a final
or definitive judgment on the merits from which the party
adversely affected can make an appeal
Judgment which grants recovery of the ownership and
possession of property in favor of one party as against the
adverse claim of title of the other is in effect a final judgment
which is appealable. To wit, that where the primary purpose of
a case is to ascertain and determine who, as between plaintiff
and defendant, is the true owner and entitled to the exclusive
use of the disputed property, the judgment rendered by the
lower court is a judgment on the merits as to those questions,
and that the order for an accounting is merely incidental to
such judgment.
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA vs. CONSTANCIA Q.
LICHAUCO et.al.
[G.R. No. 170080. April 3, 2007. TINGA, J.]
FACTS:
The petitioners and respondents are siblings and co-owners of
two (2) parcels of land. The aforesaid parcels of land have
permanent improvements thereon which straddle both lots,
namely, a residential bungalow and two units, two-storey
apartments, the titles of which are registered jointly in the
names of the parties as co-owners thereof.
Plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early part of
1996, they informed defendant-appellant of their desire to have
the subject properties partitioned based on the percentage of
each co-owner's respective share.
A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by which
the subject properties could be physically partitioned among
the co-owners. However, the defendant-appellant Austria
refused to accede to any of the schemes presented by the
realtor for the physical apportionment of the subject properties
between the co-owners thereof
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the against the
defendant-appellant Austria and two other defendants namely
Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as unwilling co-
plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.
RTC ordered the partition of the subject property and allowed
the sale of the entire property in dispute to a third party
32

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court's decision alternatively
ordering the partition of the subject property and authorizing its
sale is valid.
RULING: Qualified.
There are two stages in every action for partition. The first
phase is the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact
exists and a partition is proper, i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end
either:
(a) with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have
a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or
(b) with a determination that a co-ownership does in truth
exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order
In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed
upon
The second phase commences when it appears that the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by
the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court
after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard
thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties
thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the
real estate in question.
The proceedings in this case have only reached the first
phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order
decreeing partition leaves something more to be done by the
trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the
appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the
determination of just compensation by the appointed
commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing
thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is considered a
final order and may be appealed by the party aggrieved
thereby
There is no question that a co-ownership exists between
petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was
correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil Code
provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
coownership
However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized the
sale of the subject properties to a third party and the division of
the proceeds thereof.
CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION et.al. v.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA
[G.R. No. 151334. February 13, 2013. REYES, J.]
FACTS:
Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
originally owned by Eulalio Adviento. Eulalio begot Agripina
Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko
(Marcela), whom Eulalio survived. When he remarried, Eulalio
had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with his
second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina)
Agripina executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of
Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
Petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and
exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina.
On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa.
Consequently, TCT No. 42244 was issued in the name of
Felipa and Hilaria
Respondent Emilia and her family went to the United States.
Upon her return to the Philippines and relying on the Deed of
Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
Respondent Emilia instituted the herein Complaint for the
partition of Lot Nos. 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of
eastern half portion of Lot No. 707, TCT, and quieting of title
and damages.
During pre-trial conference, whether or not respondent Emilia
is the owner of the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
The RTC ruled that a Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner
Carolina transferred only her one-half (1/2) share to Felipa and
Hilaria and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to
Agripina was void While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it
refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lot's eastern half
portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the
estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.
Upon appeal, CA agreed with the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not issuance of a certificate of title in the
name of any person (Felipa and Hilaria) foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
RULING: NO. The issuance of a certificate of title in the name
of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real
property may be under co-ownership.
The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the
issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant
has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the
parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to
set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their
title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition
until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
resolved.
Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern
half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by
Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of
the legitimate heirs of Eulalio. It is well to recall that the
petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of the
Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been
rendered ineffective by TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa
and Hilaria — this contention is, of course, flawed.
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate,
or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other
parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated
differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. In this case,
co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent
Emilia was able to successfully establish, as correctly found by
the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA vs. CORONACION PARILLA
et.al.
[G.R. No. 196750. March 11, 2015, PERLAS-BERNABE, J]
FACTS:
Conrado, Sr. owned a 313-square meter parcel of land. During
his lifetime, he contracted two marriages:
(a) the first was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had
two (2) children, namely, Cresencio and Conrado, Jr.;
and
33
 (b) the second was with Eusela Niangar with whom he
had seven (7) children, namely, Mateo, Sr.,
Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial, Celedonio, Ceruleo,
and Cebeleo, Sr.
(c) He also begot three (3) illegitimate children, namely,
Eduardo, Rogelio, and Ricardo.
Mateo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and was survived by his
children Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni, Mateo, Jr., Tito,
and Gaylord. Cebeleo, Sr. also pre-deceased his father and
was survived by his wife, Maude, and children Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.'s death, Cresencio,
Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation of his father, Mateo,
Sr., and his siblings), Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio,
Eduardo, and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the
subject land to Santiago for a consideration.
However, Santiago was not able to have TCT cancelled and
the subject document registered because of Ceruleo,
Celedonio, and Maude's refusal to surrender the said title. This
fact, coupled with Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude's failure to
partition the subject land, prompted Santiago to file a
Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership
Santiago became a co-owner of the subject land and, as such,
has the right to demand the partition of the same. However, the
RTC held that Santiago did not validly acquire Mateo, Sr.'s
share over the subject land, considering that Felcon admitted
the lack of authority to bind his siblings with regard to Mateo,
Sr.'s share thereon
The CA set aside the RTC Rulings and, consequently,
dismissed Santiago's complaint for judicial partition. It held that
Felcon's siblings, as well as Maude's children, are
indispensable parties to the judicial partition of the subject land
and, thus, their non-inclusion as defendants in Santiago's
complaint would necessarily result in its dismissal.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's
children are indispensable parties to Santiago's complaint for
judicial partition
Whether or not CA correctly dismissed Santiago's complaint for
his failure to implead said omitted heirs.
RULING:
YES. Felcon's siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude's
children are indispensable parties to Santiago's complaint
for judicial partition
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected
by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. Thus, the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
Rule 69, SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real
estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition
of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting
forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and
an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all
other persons interested in the property.
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the
property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties
The aforementioned heirs — whether in their own capacity or
in representation of their direct ascendant — have vested
rights over the subject land and, as such, should be impleaded
as indispensable parties in an action for partition thereof.
However, a reading of Santiago's complaint shows that as
regards Mateo, Sr.'s interest, only Felcon was impleaded,
excluding therefrom his siblings and co-representatives.
Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.'s interest over the subject
land, the complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when pursuant
to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the proper representatives to
his interest should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel. Verily, Santiago's omission of the aforesaid heirs
renders his complaint for partition defective.
In fine, the absence of the aforementioned indispensable
parties in the instant complaint for judicial partition renders all
subsequent actions of the RTC null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as
to those present
NO. CA erred in dismissing Santiago's complaint for his
failure to implead said omitted heirs
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding
and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the
motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for
the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
RENE MICHAEL FRENCH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 220057. July 12, 2017. CARPIO, J.]
FACTS:
Magdalena O'dell (Magdalena), an American citizen residing in
USA, through her attorney-in-fact Thomas O'dell (Thomas),
filed a complaint for ejectment against Rene Michael French
(Rene).
Magdalena alleged that she is one of the owners of a parcel of
land. Magdalena alleged that sometime in the 1980s, Henry
French (Henry), Rene's father, sought her permission to
cultivate a portion of the land without paying any rental.
According to Magdalena, she and Henry had an agreement
that he would pay some of her loans with the PNB and would
vacate the land once she needs it. However, Magdalena
alleged that upon Henry's death in 1991, Rene took over
possession of the land without her permission. As such, Rene
was occupying the land by mere tolerance of the owner.
Magdalena sent a letter demanding Rene to vacate the land
but he failed to comply, prompting Magdalena to file a case
against him.
The MTCC ruled that Rene's occupation of the land was by
mere tolerance of the owner. It ordered the defendant Rene
and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate and turn
over the possession thereof to the plaintiff. MTCC reiterated
that lands registered under the Torrens System cannot be
acquired by prescription, and possession of the transfer
certificate of title does not, in itself, vest title or ownership. The
MTCC held that material possession of the land cannot prevail
over the superior right of the registered owner.
The RTC sustained the MTCC's finding that neither Rene nor
his predecessor-ininterest was the owner of the land.
According to the RTC, Rene only presented evidence of
payment of loan and discharge of mortgage but not transfer of
ownership. The RTC likewise sustained the MTCC in ruling
that Rene's occupation of the land was by mere tolerance of
the owner. However, the RTC sustained Rene that the MTCC
had no jurisdiction over the action hence, set aside MTCC’s
decision.
Magdalena filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals questioning the RTC's decision
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Magdalena. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the allegations in the complaint comprise a
cause of action for unlawful detainer and not for forcible entry
as claimed by Rene. The Court of Appeals ruled that all the
requisites for an action for unlawful detainer are present in the
34
complaint. The Court of Appeals further noted that both the
MTCC and the RTC agreed that Rene's occupation of the land
was by mere tolerance. The Court of Appeals also noted that
Rene did not even challenge the jurisdiction of the MTCC to try
the case.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in ruling
that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case filed by
Magdalena O'dell against Rene Michael French.
RULING: NO. CA did not commit a reversible error in ruling
that the MTCC had jurisdiction over the case filed by
Magdalena O'dell against Rene Michael French.
The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of the court over a
case are determined by the allegations in the complaint.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are distinct from each
other
In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning,
and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession
while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, all the allegations in
the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
The complaint clearly indicated that Magdalena allowed Henry
to occupy the land subject to certain conditions. Among the
conditions is that Henry will vacate the land when the time
comes for Magdalena to use it. In 1991, Henry died and Rene
took over the property. On 10 January 2008, Magdalena,
through her counsel, sent a demand letter to Rene to vacate
the land but the latter failed to comply. Rene's refusal to vacate
the land prompted Magdalena to file the complaint for unlawful
detainer, well within the one year period from the demand to
vacate. Thus, all the requirements for an action for unlawful
detainer have been sufficiently shown in the complaint.
In addition, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that in an
ejectment case, the issue of ownership is only provisional. The
only issue in an unlawful detainer case is the material or
physical possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., and
PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C., INC vs. FAITH IN CHRIST
JESUS BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. and REYNALDO GALVAN
[G.R. No. 191527. August 22, 2016. PERALTA, J.]
FACTS:
The instant petition originated from a Complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages filed by Balibago Faith Baptist Church,
Inc. (BFBC) and Philippine Baptist S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC)
against Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and
Reynaldo Galvan (Galvan) before the MTC.
A contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and
BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the former to
enable it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter, BFBC
took possession of the subject property and held therein their
religious activities
Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon
Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus,
in a Letter, LCSBC upheld BFBC's right over the subject
property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev. Rolando T.
Santos, as its legitimate pastor.
However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property,
thus, in a Demand Letter, BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate
the property within five days from notice and to pay the amount
of P10,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for its
use. Due to non-compliance with its demand, BFBC and
PBSBC filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against FCJBC and Galvan.
MTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent BFBC. The
MTC ruled that the case was one of forcible entry and not
unlawful detainer.
RTC issued the assailed Decision which affirmed the Decision
of the MTC
CA reversed the RTC decision reasoning that MTC has no
jurisdiction
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the complaint
for unlawful detainer and ruling that MTC has no jurisdiction
over the case.
RULING: NO. CA did not err in dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer and ruling that MTC has no jurisdiction over
the case.
Unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes
of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on
illegal occupation from the beginning — forcible entry; and (b)
action founded on unlawful detention by a person who
originally acquired possession lawfully — unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both
the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The
cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of
the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the
complaint define and describe. It cannot be made to depend on
the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set
up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration
The allegations of the complaint states:
4. While plaintiff BFBC was in possession of the subject
premises, defendant Reynaldo Galvan and his companions
joined the regular religious services of plaintiff BFBC at the
subject premises;
5. It turned out that defendants have an interest in the
subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed
and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of
the subject premises
6. The take-over of the defendants was brought to the
attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist
Churches, Inc., and the latter, in letter it has affirmed the
right of the plaintiff BFBC, headed by Rev. Rolando T.
Santos, to occupy the subject premises.
7. Despite LCSBC's letter and plaintiff's peaceful overtures
for the defendants to turn over to plaintiffs the subject
premises, defendants ignored the same;
8. Due to exhaustion, expense and exasperation, plaintiffs
were constrained to refer this matter to the undersigned
counsel and, accordingly, a demand letter was sent to the
defendants for them to pay the reasonable compensation of
P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 for the use
of the subject premises and to vacate the same within 5
days upon their receipt thereof
In this case, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FCJBC's
occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of
contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation
that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the
subject property. Neither was there any averment in the
complaint which shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and
PBSBC indicative of permission to occupy the land. In an
unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession becomes
illegal only upon the plaintiff's demand for the defendant to
vacate the property and the defendant's subsequent refusal.
Here, paragraphs 7 and 8 characterize the defendant's
occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters
were written by the petitioner's counsel. Given these
35
allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not
be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the
alleged unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified
date.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry
as it has been long settled that in forcible entry cases, no force
is really necessary. The act of going on the property and
excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies
the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary. However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that they
had prior physical possession of the subject property, nothing
has been said on how FCJBC's entry was effected or when
dispossession started. It is in this light that we rule that the
present complaint is similarly defective even if we are to
treat the same as forcible entry as it failed to allege how
and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of BFBC
that "[i]t turned out that defendants have an interest in the
subject premises and defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed
and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of
the subject premises," would not suffice since it only
shows that FCJBC entered the land and occupied the
house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's consent or
permission which are constitutive of forcible entry.
Unfortunately, BFBC and PBSBC's failure to allege when the
dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the
complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.
Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of
actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made
through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned thereof. If the dispossession did not occur
by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this
case, the proper recourse is to file a plenary action to recover
possession with the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the
MTC has no jurisdiction over the case
FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE vs. SPOUSES SILVINO
S. ESTOMO and CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO
[G.R. No. 223399. April 23, 2018.]
FACTS:
Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor. Upon
Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure
proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of the
property. However, the writ of possession was returned
unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property and
that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the ame. It
was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered and
verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the
property. In a letter, she demanded them to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property and pay the
corresponding compensation. The Spouses Estomo refused to
heed to her demands. Hence, a Complaint for unlawful
detainer filed by petitioner Fuerte against respondents spouses
Estomo.
Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed
on the ground that the allegations are insuffiicient to establish a
cause of action for unlawful detainer. By Fuerte's own
allegation, the Spouses Estomo's entry to the property was
unlawful from the beginning. The case cannot be considered
as one for forcible entry since it was never alleged that their
entry was by means of force, intimidation, threat, stealth or
strategy. Lastly, prescription has already set.
MTCC dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that
Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the demand
letter and establish that the same was duly received by the
spouses
RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held
that Fuerte established the existence of the demand letter,
which was sent through registered mail and such was a
substantial compliance
CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that
the complaint in ejectment cases should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
of cases for which Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its
face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parole
evidence. The CA found that the complaint failed to describe
that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal
or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful
possession.
MR denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the complaint
filed by the petitioner does not constitute unlawful detainer and
thereupon concluded that MTCC had no jurisdiction to try it,
being without legal and/or factual basis
RULING: NO. CA did not err in ruling that the complaint filed
by the petitioner does not constitute unlawful detainer and
thereupon concluded that MTCC had no jurisdiction to try it,
being without legal and/or factual basis
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it states the following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of its
enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand
to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature
of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the complaint
must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer.
In the absence of these factual allegations, an action for
unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal
trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case.
A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the
requirements for unlawful detainer. A requisite for a valid cause
of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was
originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of
the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially
lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be
established. Allegation is the complaint provides that Spouses
Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent.
Likewise, the Complaint did not contain an allegation that
Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the spouses'
possession on account of an express or implied contract
between them. Neither was there any averment which shows
any overt act on Fuerte's part indicative of her permission to
occupy the land
Demand letter supports the fact that she characterized the
Spouses Estomo's possession of the subject property as
unlawful from the start, to wit:
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Estomo:
We represent our client, DR. FATIMA O. DE
GUZMAN-FUERTE , the absolute and registered
owner in fee simple of the above premises you are
presently occupying without her consent, permission
nor approval…
The complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Since the complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts
to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take
36
cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA correctly
dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the Spouses
Estomo
EVA FLOYD and RODOLFO CALIXTRO vs. BENJAMIN
GONZALES, et.al.
[G.R. No. 169047. November 3, 2008. QUISUMBING, J.]
FACTS:
The complaint charged Abarnas of constructing a house on the
subject land through stealth and strategy. The Nisperoses
claimed ownership and prior possession of the land by
succession, alleging that their father, Igmedio Nisperos,
occupied and tilled it from 1950 to 1982
MTC dismissed the ejectment complaint. On appeal however,
RTC reversed the dismissal of the complaint and ordered
Abarnas to remove any improvements introduced on the land
and surrender possession thereof to the Nisperoses.
CA affirmed the RTC's Decision. When the appellate court's
decision attained finality, the RTC issued an Alias Writ of
Execution and an Alias Writ of Special Demolition. A Notice to
Vacate was likewise issued
When respondents Sheriffs Benjamin Gonzales and Atilano
Nanquil went to the subject land to implement the writs, they
found that petitioners and Fe Ongsotto were also occupying
the property. To prevent the demolition, petitioners and
Ongsotto filed a complaint for injunction, before the RTC.
The complaint was transferred to the RTC of San Fernando
City. RTC of San Fernando City, dismissed the injunction
complaint. It considered petitioners as occupants in bad faith
and squatters on the lots, making the judgment in the
ejectment case binding on them. The court recognized the
Nisperoses' prior possession and claim over the lots which
started in 1950 with their father, Igmedio.
Appellate court ruled against petitioners. CA held that
petitioners have not shown a clear and unmistakable right to
be protected, and found that they occupied the land during the
pendency of the ejectment case, thereby taking advantage of
such conflict
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners bound by the decision in the
ejectment case although they were not impleaded as party
defendants therein.
RULING: NO. Petitioners are not bound by the decision in the
ejectment case since they were not impleaded as party
defendants.
An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is
binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were not made party-
defendants by the Nisperoses. Hence, they can be bound by
said judgment in the ejectment suit, even if they were not
impleaded as defendants, only if they are shown to be:
(a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant
fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment;
(b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the
permission of the defendant;
(c) transferees pendente lite;
(d) sublessees;
(e) co-lessees; or
(f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of
the defendant.
In such cases, court hearing is a must to determine the
character of such possession. If the execution court finds that
they are mere successors-in-interest, guests, or agents of the
defendant, the order of execution shall be enforced against
them.
Bejar vs. Caluag
G.R. No. 171277 February 15, 2007
FACTS:
The late Almario Bejar, substituted by his heirs, herein
petitioners, filed with the MeTC a complaint for illegal detainer
and damages against respondent Maricel Caluag.
Respondent filed a MD on the ground that the MeTC has no
jurisdiction over the case as it involves the issue of ownership.
Respondent also filed a supplement to her MD alleging that
pursuant to the “Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Bahay,” Almario Bejar
sold to Fernando Mijares both his house and the entire lot on
which it was constructed.
MeTC: The MeTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
The MeTC holds that the actual issue between the parties is
the enforceability of the subsequent sale by Fernando Mijares
to respondent of the subject property; and that, therefore,
jurisdiction properly lies with the RTC.
RTC: On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTC. The RTC held
that the issue in the case is that who has better possession of
the disputed property. The RTC then directed the MeTC to
hear the case on the merits. MR was denied.
CA: On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the
ruling of MeTC. The appellate court held that the allegations of
the complaint do not make out a case for illegal detainer or
forcible entry. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the instant case
for illegal detainer.
HELD:
Yes. The MeTC has jurisdiction over the instant case for illegal
detainer.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and
the character of the relief sought.
An examination of the allegations in the complaint in instant
case does not show that Almario Bejar was deprived of his
possession of the property by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth.
Here, the case is for unlawful detainer. The complaint clearly
alleges that Almario Bejar sold one-half portion of his house to
Fernando Mijares; that the latter, in turn, sold the same portion
of the house to respondent; that eventually, Almario Bejar
became the owner in fee simple of the entire lot where his
house was built; that he needs the portion of the lot occupied
by respondent for the construction of a house for the use of his
family; and that despite demand, respondent failed and still
fails to vacate the premises. From the records, it appears that
Almario Bejar filed his complaint within one year from the date
of his last demand upon respondent to vacate the contested
portion of the land.
A suit for unlawful detainer will prosper if the complaint
sufficiently alleges that there is a withholding of possession or
refusal to vacate the property by a defendant. The cause of
action arises from the expiration or termination of the
defendant’s right to continue possession which is upon
plaintiff’s demand to vacate the premises. The complaint for
unlawful detainer must then be instituted within one year from
the date of the last demand.
All these incidents are present in the instant case.
Del Rosario vs. Spouses Manuel
G.R. No. 153652 January 16, 2004
37
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Jose and Concordia Manuel filed with
the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner-
spouses Alfredo Yasay del Rosario, petitioner. They alleged
that they are the true and lawful owners of a lot located at
Rizal. Because of their compassion, they allowed petitioner,
whose house was destroyed by a strong typhoon, to occupy
their lot. They agreed that he could build thereon a temporary
shelter of light materials. But without their consent, what he
constructed was a house of concrete materials.
Respondents asked petitioner to vacate the lot. This was
followed by repeated verbal demands but to no avail,
prompting them to bring the matter to the barangay. But the
parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The barangay
chairman issued a Certification to File Action.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner claimed that
respondents allowed him to build his house on the lot, provided
he would guard the premises to prevent landgrabbers and
squatters from occupying the area. When respondents visited
this country, they agreed verbally to sell the portion on which
his house was constructed. A year later, he made an offer to
buy the portion occupied by him and to spend for its
survey. But what respondents wanted to sell was the whole
area. He then informed them that he would first consult his
children and they said they will wait. Instead, they filed the
instant complaint.
MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
petitioner to vacate.
RTC: On appeal to the RTC, the decision of the MTC was
affirmed in toto.
CA: On appeal to the CA, the petition was dismissed for
having filed out of time.
Hence, this petition.
In his appeal to the SC, petitioner claimed that the trial court
(MTC) has no jurisdiction over the case considering that there
is no allegation in the complaint that respondents have prior
physical possession of the lot and that they were ousted
therefrom by force, threat, strategy or stealth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment
case.
HELD:
Yes. The MTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Prior physical possession is not always a condition sine qua
non in an ejectment case.
There must be distinction between the two kinds of ejectment,
namely, forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry,
the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. In this light, he must allege and prove prior physical
possession. In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
What respondents filed is a complaint for unlawful
detainer. Prior physical possession is not required. Hence,
respondents need not allege the same in their complaint.
As found by the trial court, petitioner’s possession of the land
was by mere tolerance of the respondents.
The SC held in a number of cases that one whose stay is
merely tolerated becomes a deforciant occupant the moment
he is required to leave. He is bound by his implied promise, in
the absence of a contract, that he will vacate upon demand.
Javier vs. Veridiano
G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicidad Javier was forcibly dispossessed of a
portion of a land by a certain Ben Babol. She instituted a
complaint for forcible entry before the City Court.
The City Court dismissed the forcible entry. The Decision of
the City Court became final and executory when the then CFI
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and
conclusions of the City Court holding that petitioner failed to
give sufficient evidence to prove that the area in question was
within the boundaries of the subject lot.
Meanwhile, Ben Babol who was the respondent in the
complaint for forcible entry had sold the property he was
occupying, including the portions in question, to a certain
Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the
same area in dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly
refused to comply with the demand.
After about four years from the finality of the dismissal of the
forcible entry case, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting
of title and recovery of possession with damages against Ben
Babol and Reino Rosete before the CFI.
Instead of filing a responsive pleading, private respondent
Reino Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata. Ben Babol did not file any pleading.
CFI: The CFI sustained the argument of private respondent
Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not between the case for forcible entry and quieting
of title in the instant case, there is identity of parties and of
causes of action which would bar the institution of the quieting
of title case.
HELD:
Qualified. There is identity of parties but there is no identity of
causes of action in the instant case.
Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties
between the two actions is without merit.
The SC have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply,
what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of
parties. The SC have said that there is still identity of parties
although in the second action there is one party who was not
joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is not a
necessary party either in the first or second action, or is a mere
nominal party.
In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino
Rosete is a successor in interest of Ben Babol by title
subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first
action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of
parties between the two actions.
But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no
identity of causes of action between the forcible entry case and
quieting of title case.
The first case is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at
issue is prior possession, regardless of who has lawful title
over the disputed property. Thus, "the only issue in an action
for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real
property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective
of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case
for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of
38
possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way
bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.
On the other hand, the second case while inaccurately
captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a
parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434, NCC
and should be distinguished from the forcible entry case, which
is an accion interdictal.
From the averments of the complaint in the quieting of title
case, petitioner clearly sets up title to herself and prays that
private respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land
and that she be declared the owner and given possession
thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of
an accion reivindicatoria.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an
action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land
and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff
merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim
of title.
In forcible entry case, petitioner merely claimed a better right or
prior possession over the disputed area without asserting title
thereto. It should be distinguished from quieting of title case
where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying
that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession
of the disputed portion.
Hence, in forcible entry case, petitioner merely alleged that she
was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical
possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in quieting
of title case, she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in
fee simple" of a parcel of land. The complaint in quieting of title
case definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly
gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive
and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is
an elemental attribute of such ownership.
Thus, the SC has ruled that a judgment in a forcible entry or
detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and
declares only who has the right of possession, but by no
means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who
has the right or title of ownership.
Even if the SC treats quieting of title case as a petition to quiet
title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action
different from that for ejectment.
Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action
between the two cases, the prior complaint for ejectment
cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to
quiet title.
Baens vs. CA and Seng
G.R. No. 57091 November 23, 1983
FACTS:
Private respondent Chua Seng filed a case for forcible entry
with the CFI against petitioner Dra. Paz Baens. Chua Seng
alleged that Dra. Baens' refusal to remove the padlocks in the
subject leased premises was a breach of the contract of lease
consisting in the deprivation of private respondent’s right to
occupy and use the leased premises.
Petitioner Baens alleged, among others, that private
respondent’s right to occupy the subject premises had long
expired and that respondent failed to pay the rentals due and
had voluntarily vacated the premises.
Petitioner filed with the City Court her own complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondent alleging the same
facts raised in her answer to private respondent’s complaint for
forcible entry. Private respondent answered the complaint for
unlawful detainer with the same allegations in his complaint for
forcible entry.
The two complaint were consolidated.
City Court: The City Court ruled in favor of private respondent
and ordered petitioner to restore private respondent in his
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises. The
complaint of petitioner for unlawful detainer was dismissed.
Petitioner was also ordered to attorney’s to private respondent.
Both parties appealed to the CFI.
CFI: The CFI affirmed the decision of the City Court relative to
the possession and enjoyment of private respondent in the
leased premises. The complaint for unlawful detainer was still
dismissed. However, the CFI reversed the ruling of the City
Court insofar as it awarded only attorney’s fees to private
respondent. The CFI added actual, moral and exemplary
damages. The CFI also increased the award for attorney’s
fees. Costs of the suit were likewise ordered.
CA: On appeal, the CA modified the CFI’s decision by
reducing the award for damages and attorney’s fees awarded
by the CFI.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits that the damages which private respondent
may claim in an action for forcible entry and detainer are only
those which he may have sustained as a mere possessor and
are limited only to such damages as are caused by his loss of
the use and occupation of the property, but not those which he
may suffer having no direct relation to such use and
occupation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error in merely reducing,
instead of eliminating the award for damages to private
respondent.
HELD:
Yes. The CA committed an error in merely reducing, instead of
eliminating the award for damages to private respondent.
Rule 70, Sec. 1 provides …
The case of Reyes vs. CA interprets the scope of damages
that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry. The case
states:
“On the last issue of whether temperate damages may be
awarded in favor of respondent landlord, it has been held that
while damages may be adjudged in forcible entry and detainer
cases, these 'damages' mean 'rents' or 'the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,' or
'fair rental value of the property.' Profits which the plaintiff
might have received were it not for the forcible entry or
detainer do not represent a fair rental value.”
Although Rule 70, Sec. 1 uses the word "damages", the
authors of the Rules of Court, in drafting Rule 70, Sec. 6 on the
judgment to be pronounced, eliminated the word "damages",
placing in lieu thereof, the words "reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises."
Moreover, in the case of Torres vs. Ocampo, the SC held that
“the damages which a plaintiff expects to obtain from his
business to be located in the premises, or for material injury
caused to the premises cannot also be claimed in connection
with or as incidental to an action of illegal detainer or forcible
entry. “
Therefore, since moral, exemplary, and actual damages are
neither "rents" nor "reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises", nor "fair rental value", the SC is
constrained to deny moral damages and exemplary damages
awarded by the CA and the actual damages awarded by the
City Court.
39
Azcuna, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116665 March 20, 1996
FACTS:
Under a one-year lease contract but renewable upon
agreement, petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied three
units of the building owned by private respondent Barcelona’s
family.
Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal
thereof and coupled by petitioner’s failure to surrender the
leased units despite private respondent’s demands, private
respondent filed before the MTC an ejectment case against
petitioner.
The judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by
the RTC and public respondent CA on subsequent appeals
taken by petitioner, favored private respondent.
Petitioner now comes to the SC via the instant petition not to
contest his ouster from the leased premises nor the amount of
monthly rental he was adjudged to pay until he vacates the
same, but only to take particular exception to respondent CA’s
decision insofar as it affirmed the MTC’s award of P3,000 per
day as damages. It is petitioner’s claim that such award, in
addition to the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, is improper in the light
of the prevailing doctrine that "the only damages that can be
recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
real property. Other damages must be claimed in an ordinary
action."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the award of 3,000 per day as damages by the
CA is proper.
HELD:
Yes. The award of 3,000 per day as damages by the CA is
proper.
Petitioner’s reliance on such doctrine is misplaced, inasmuch
as the cases mentioned by petitioner dealt with additional
damages and charges other than liquidated damages, defined
as "those agreed upon by the parties to a contract, to be paid
in case of breach thereof".
Here, the municipal trial court, in making the "P3,000.00 per
day" award, was merely enforcing what was stipulated upon in
black and white by private respondent-lessor and petitioner-
lessee appearing in paragraph 10 of their lease contract.
This is clearly an agreement for liquidated damages - entitling
private respondent to claim a stipulated amount by way of
damages (correctly totalling P3,000.00 per day as there were
three units being leased by petitioner) over and above other
damages still legally due him, i.e., the fair rental value for the
use and occupation of the property as provided for in Rule 70,
Sec. 8. The freedom of the contracting parties to make
stipulations in their contract provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy is so
settled, and the Court finds nothing immoral or illegal with the
indemnity/ penalty clause of the lease contract (paragraph 10)
which does not appear to have been forced upon or
fraudulently foisted on petitioner.
Petitioner cannot now evade further liability for liquidated
damages, for "after entering into such an agreement, petitioner
cannot thereafter turn his back on his word with a plea that on
him was inflicted a penalty shocking to the conscience and
impressed with iniquity as to call for the relief sought on the
part of a judicial tribunal."
Penas, Jr. vs. CA and Calaycay
G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994
FACTS:
In a letter of January 18, 1990, petitioner-spouses Penas
notified private respondent that effective March 1990, they
were terminating the written month to month lease contract as
they were no longer interested to renew the same and
demanded from the latter to vacate the premises in question
on or before February 28, 1990.
In the same letter, petitioners opted to allow the defendant to
continue occupying the leased premises provided he will agree
to execute a new lease contract for a period of one-year at an
increased monthly rental of 2,500 pesos and further gave
private respondent up to February 28, 1990 to decide,
otherwise judicial action for unlawful detainer shall ensue.
Petitioners later finally reduced the monthly rental 2,000 pesos.
Private respondent failed to abide by the demand of
petitioners. However, he continued staying on the leased
premises and effective March 1990, he deposited the monthly
rentals in the subject premises with the PNB in his name ITF
(in trust for) spouses-petitioners. There was no instance that
[petitioners] manifested any desire to withdraw the same
deposit in the bank.
On August 10, 1992, petitioners sent another letter to the
private respondent to vacate the subject premises and to pay
back rental arrearages in the sum 2,000 pesos per month from
March 1990 in the total sum 60,000.00) pesos, which private
respondent failed to satisfy.
Accordingly, on September 25, 1992, petitioners filed the
present suit for unlawful detainer on the grounds of termination
of the month to month lease contract and failure of the
defendant to execute a new lease agreement with increased
rentals. Petitioners tried to impress the Court that after they
had agreed to a new monthly rental 2,000 pesos, private
respondent refused to enter into a new contract and insisted in
paying at a lower rate; that they gave defendant allowance of
more than one-year within which to sign a new contract of
lease but still he refused to do so.
MTC: The MTC dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The MTC based its decision on the finding that the
complaint was filed more than one year after private
respondent began unlawfully occupying the premises.
RTC & CA: The RTC and the CA affirmed MTC’s ruling.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint
filed by petitioner-spouses.
HELD:
Yes. The MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
petitioner-spouses.
The one-year period provided for in Rule 70, Sec. 1 within
which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be
counted from the last letter of demand to vacate, the reason
being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action
based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.
In the present case, it is of note that the first demand letter
addressed by petitioners to private respondent gave the latter
the option to either vacate the premises on or before 28
February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease contract for
one-year at an increased rental rate of P2,500 per month.
In Vda. de Murga v. Chan, the SC held that:
"The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay
the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is not the
demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful
detainer cases. When after such notice, the lessee elects to
stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be
40
ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessary
demand is first made.”
The facts of this case do not warrant a departure from said
settled doctrine. It should be noted that even if private
respondent was depositing rentals in trust for petitioners, what
was being deposited were rentals at the old rate, which
petitioners were not bound to accept or withdraw.
When private respondent elected to remain in the premises
after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 January 1990
giving him the option to vacate by 28 February 1990 or to sign
a new lease contract for one (1) year at an increased rental
rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) a month, he
assumed the new rental rate and could be ejected from the
premises only upon default and by a proper demand from the
petitioners. The demand was made on 10 August 1992,
followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September
1992.
Lim Keih Tong vs. CA and Lim
G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991
FACTS:
Private respondent and his family resided in Room 301 of the
building of petitioner until they transferred to their present
residence. However, private respondent retained possession
of said room to keep his important belongings. The building
has only one common main door through which all the
occupants of the various rooms therein can get in and
out. Accordingly, all occupants including private respondent
were given a key to the main doorlock by petitioner.
However, when private respondent wanted to go inside his
room to get three of his lawbooks which he needed to read in
connection with a case he was then handling, he found that the
key he possessed was no longer compatible with the lock, i.e.,
the same was changed. Private respondent had to buy three
new lawbooks to prepare for his cases.
He requested private respondent to provide him the
appropriate key but his request was denied. Petitioner also
alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of
said room entitling him to the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to command petitioner to provide him the appropriate
key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.
MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of private respondent.
CA: Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main thrust of petitioner in this petition for review before
the SC is that the action being one for specific performance the
jurisdiction thereof is vested in the RTC and not with the MTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action in the instant case is one for for
forcible entry and detainer or one for specific performance.
HELD:
The action in the instant case is one for for forcible entry and
detainer. (The case was therefore properly filed with the MTC.)
From the foregoing facts alleged in the complaint, the SC holds
that the suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule
70.
Private respondent retained the possession of Room 301 of
petitioner's building which he claimed to have the right to use
and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right
by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress through the
main door of the building. Through stealth, petitioner changed
the key to the main door thus depriving private respondent of
the possession of his rented room.
Any person deprived of possession of any land or
building or part thereof, may file an action for forcible entry and
detainer in the proper inferior court against the person
unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him.
This relief is not only available to a landlord, vendor,
or vendee, but also to a lessee or tenant or any other person
against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part
thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully
deprived possession thereof, within one year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.
Spouses Clutario Vs. CA and Spouses Gandia
G.R. No. 76656 December 11, 1992
Romero, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents wrote a letter to petitioners giving them
ninety days to vacate the premises. According to them, due to
their advanced age and failing health, they have decided to
occupy the entire apartment, including the ground floor leased
to petitioners. Another demand letter was sent by private
respondents to petitioners on January 20, 1981.
In the meantime, it appears that from August 1980, petitioners
were in arrears in the payment of their rentals. On March 4,
1981, private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment
against petitioner Araceli Clutario before the MTC citing as a
ground, among others is the non-payment of rentals by
petitioners from August 1980.
Pending the proceedings before the MTC, petitioners paid the
back rentals from August 1980 until May 1981.
MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners on the ground that
private respondents failed to support their causes of action with
substantial evidence.
RTC: The RTC reversed the MTC. Respondent Judge ruled
that petitioners' non-payment of rentals for more than three
months (and private respondents' genuine need for the leased
premises are)/is a sufficient cause(s) for petitioners' ejectment.
CA: The CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that private respondents, by accepting the
payment of the back rentals, waived their non-payment of
rentals (for more than three months) as a ground for ejectment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acceptance by private respondents of back
rentals constitutes a waiver of their right of non-payment of
rentals as a ground for ejectment.
HELD:
No. The acceptance by private respondents of back rentals
does not constitute a waiver of their right of non-payment of
rentals as a ground for ejectment.
Case law is to the effect that the acceptance by the lessor of
the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears does not
constitute a waiver of the default in the payment of rentals as a
valid cause of action for ejectment.
The SC notes that when petitioners paid the back rentals,
private respondents had already filed the complaint for
ejectment earlier. The conduct of private respondents
subsequent to their acceptance of the back rentals belies any
intention to waive their right to eject petitioners as a result of
the latter's failure to pay the rent for more than three months.
They did not enter into an amicable settlement with petitioners.
Neither did they notify the trial court of their intention to have
the complaint dismissed. Instead, they participated actively in
the proceedings before the MTC during all the time that the
41
case dragged on for almost three years. When the MTC
decided adversely against them, private respondents appealed
the judgment to the RTC. Not only have they participated
earnestly in all subsequent proceedings even after they
obtained favorable judgments from the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, but they have likewise been consistent in their
position that petitioners should be ejected, not only because
they need the leased premises, but also because of petitioners'
default in the payment of rentals for more than three months.
In light of the surrounding circumstances of the case, as well
as the prevailing jurisprudence, the SC rules that the
acceptance by private respondents of the petitioners-lessees’
back rentals did not constitute a waiver or abandonment of
their cause of action for ejectment against the latter.
Proof of any one of the factors enumerated in section 5 of B.P.
Blg. 25 (1979) is sufficient cause for judicial ejectment of a
lessee. Having proved one of such grounds, i.e., arrears in
payment of rent for three (3) months at any one time, private
respondents may legally eject petitioners without having to
prove the other grounds for ejectment.
Cursino vs. Bautista
G.R. No. 50335 August 7, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondent is the lawful owner and lessor of the
subject premises leased by petitioner. Petitioner defaulted in
the payment of his monthly rental for the 3 month. Petitioner
sent two postal money orders to private respondent. Prior to
the sending of said postal money orders, private respondent
demanded that defendant pay the back rental and vacate the
premises within a period of five days from the receipt of the
letter (demand letter).
Despite the formal demand, petitioner failed and refused to
vacate the subject premises without justifiable cause.
Petitioner contends that he has not defaulted in the payment of
rents and that it was the plaintiff who refused to accept the
same. Petitioner claimed that he sent 2 Postal Money Orders
for the payment of the October, November and December
1977 rentals.
MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of private respondent and
ordered petitioners to vacate the subject premises.
CFI: The CFI affirmed MTC’s ruling in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that in spite of his payment of back rentals
within five days from receipt of the demand letter, private
respondent filed the complaint for ejectment which allegedly is
contrary to the provision of Rule 70, Sec. 2.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent CFI committed grave error in the
interpretation and application of Rule 70, Sec. 2.
HELD:
No. Respondent CFI committed grave error in the
interpretation and application of Rule 70, Sec. 2.
Petitioner’s argument that in spite of his payment of back
rentals within five days from receipt of the demand letter,
private respondent filed the complaint for ejectment which
allegedly is contrary to the provision of Rule 70, Sec. 2 is
untenable.
It will be recalled that private respondent formally demanded
from petitioner, the following: (a) to pay the back rentals, and
(b) to vacate the premises.
Petitioner was able to pay the back rentals but refused to
vacate the premises. Undoubtedly, petitioner's belated
payments of his back rentals do not automatically restore the
contract of lease without private respondent's consent. The
terms of the contract of lease have been violated and
the lessor-owner has the unquestionable right to withdraw from
said contract or agreement whether oral or written.
The SC has consistently ruled that it is the landlord's demand
for tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to
pay the rents on time and tenant's refusal or failure to vacate,
which make unlawful withholding of possession. In fact, the SC
stressed that consent, no matter how long it may last makes
lawful tenant's possession. Only when that consent
is withdrawn and the owner demands tenant to leave
the property is the owner's right of possession asserted and
the tenant's refusal or failure to move out makes his
possession unlawful because it is violative of the owner's
preferential right of possession.
In the case at bar, respondent-lessor did not consent
to petitioner's possession of the leased premises after the
latter's default in the payment of the monthly rents. On the
contrary, respondent demanded that petitioner pay the back
rental and vacate the premises.
The refusal of the petitioner to vacate the premises
after demand, makes his withholding of possession unlawful.
Acab vs. CA and Villanueva
G.R. No. 112285 February 21, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioners' father, Jose Acab, was the owner of the subject
residential lot. He entered into a verbal lease agreement with
private respondent and her now-deceased husband. Under the
agreement, the Villanueva spouses were obliged to pay Acab a
monthly rental of fifty pesos.
Nine years after the verbal lease agreement, petitioners'
counsel, wrote private respondent and her husband a letter
informing them of the sale between petitioners and their father
Jose. In view of the sale, petitioners wanted to repossesses
the property. Petitioners then, in the same letter, informed
private respondents of the non-renewal of the lease contract.
Because the contract is paid monthly, petitioner deemed the
contract as terminated by the end of the month or 30 days from
the letter.
Despite receipt of the letter, private respondent, then already
widowed, refused to vacate the subject lot.
Petitioners, armed with a Certification to File Action from the
proper Barangay Lupon Tagapayapa, filed their complaint for
ejectment with the MTC.
MTC: The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered private
respondent to vacate the subject premises.
RTC: The RTC affirmed MTC’s ruling.
CA: On appeal, the CA reversed the MTC’s and RTC’s ruling.
The CA reasoned, among others, that ejectment based solely
on termination of a month-to-month lease contract is not
justified.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent may legally be ejected from
the subject lot on the sole basis of the expiration of the verbal
lease agreement under which rentals are paid monthly.
HELD:
Yes. Private respondent may legally be ejected from the
subject lot on the sole basis of the expiration of the verbal
lease agreement under which rentals are paid monthly.
42
Lease agreements with no specified period, but in which
rentals are paid monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-
month basis. They are for a definite period and expire after the
last day of any given thirty-day period, upon proper demand
and notice by the lessor to vacate.
In the case at bench, it was found by all three lower courts that
the lease over the subject property was on a month-to-month
basis, and that there was proper notice of non-renewal of
contract and demand for vacation of premises made by
petitioners on private respondent. Unquestionably, therefore,
the verbal lease agreement entered into by private respondent
and petitioners' father and predecessor-in-interest has been
validly terminated, in which case there is sufficient cause for
ejectment under Section 5(f) of B.P. Blg. 877 which states that
one of the grounds for ejectment is expiration of the lease
contracts.
This is in line with the SC’s holding in the case of Palanca v.
IAC that:
" … this Court ruled that a month to month lease under Article
1687 is a lease with a definite period, the expiration of which
upon previous demand by the lessor to vacate, can justify
ejectment.
… in a month to month lease situation, when petitioners
(lessor) gave private respondent (lessee) notice to vacate the
premises in question, the contract of lease is deemed to have
expired as of the end of the month.'"
Furthermore, it must be noted that, since the month-to-month
lease in the case at bench is considered one with a definite
period, it falls within the exception provided in Section 6 of B.P.
Blg. 877.
In other words, the first paragraph of Article 1673, NCC which
provides that:
"Art. 1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of
the following causes:
"(1) When the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the
duration of leases under Articles 1682 and 1687 has expired;
applies to the case at bench.
Thus, ejectment of private respondent by petitioners is justified.
Peran vs. CFI, Espera and Evasco
G.R. No. L-57259 October 13, 1983
FACTS:
The subject property was originally owned by Jose Evasco.
Jose Evasco executed a 'Reparticion Ex-Trajudicial' whereby
he partitioned his properties among his five heirs. Subject
property was one of those allotted to his son, Alejandro Evasco
and who had it declared in his name.
Alejandro Evasco sold his property to Jose Torell. Jose
Torella, in turn, sold the land to Jose Enriquez Sabater.
Petitioner Angel P. Peran acquired the land by purchase from
Jose Enriquez Sabater.
Petitioner personally asked private respondents, Encarnacion
Evasco and her common-law husband Ramon Espera, whose
house is erected on the lot in question, to remove the same
and vacate the premises. Respondents refused, and
consequently, a confrontation between the parties was had
before the Municipal Mayor and later before the Municipal
Judge to settle the dispute, but to no avail.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Illegal
Detainer against private respondents before the Municipal
Circuit Court seeking the ejectment of the latter from the
portion in question contending that respondents are mere
squatters thereon; and that they had prevented plaintiff from
entering the property and deprived him of possession.
Private respondents answered denying the material allegations
of the Complaint, and alleging that they are the lawful
possessors for more than twenty years of the said portion,
which formerly belonged to Jose Evasco, grandfather of
Encarnacion Evasco; and that petitioner has no right to eject
them therefrom.
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT COURT: The Municipal Circuit Court
rendered its decision in favor of petitioner and ordered private
respondents to vacate.
CFI: On appeal, the CFI reversed the Municipal Circuit Court
and dismissed the case. The CFI ruled that since the only
issue in an illegal detainer case is physical possession,
"whoever has prior possession, no matter in what character, is
protected by law." MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court erred when it ruled that prior
possession in whatever character is protected by law.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Court erred when it ruled that prior
possession in whatever character is protected by law.
Private respondents admit that the land in question was
originally owned by Jose Evasco. The tax declarations
covering their house clearly state that the house built on the
land is owned by Jose Evasco. Since the land had been
partitioned to Alejandro Evasco by his father, Jose Evasco,
respondent Encarnacion can lay no claim to the property even
as a grand-daughter of Jose Evasco. Respondents may have
been in possession of the portion they occupy prior to
petitioner but they have not proved their title thereto, nor their
right to possess the same. As the Municipal Circuit Court
found, no concrete evidence was introduced by respondents
on this point. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the validity of the
"Reparticion Ex-trajudicial" whereby said lot was adjudicated to
Alejandro Evasco by his father Jose Evasco, predecessors-in-
interest of petitioner, had never been challenged.
If at all, private respondents' possession of their portion of the
property was by mere tolerance of petitioner's predecessors-in-
interest, which, however, does not vest in them a right which
they can assert against petitioner.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but this becomes illegal
when, upon demand to vacate by the owner, the possessor
refuses to comply with such demand. A possessor by tolerance
is necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against him. It is not necessary that there be a
formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful
detainer suit may be filed against a possessor by tolerance.
Neither is prior physical possession of the property by
petitioner an indispensable requisite.
The ruling of respondent Court, therefore, that "since the only
issue in forcible entry and illegal detainer action is the physical
possession of real property - possession de facto and not
possession dejure - whoever has prior possession, no matter
in what character, is protected by law," is erroneous under the
factual milieu herein.
Once vs. Gonzales and Pena
G.R. No. 44806 March 31, 1977
FACTS:
The City Court ordered petitioner Bienvenido Once to vacate
an apartment in a building owned by private respondent
Juanito Peña and to pay a monthly rental of P290 until the
premises have been vacated, plus attorney's fees. It was not
indicated in the decision when the payment of the monthly
rental should commence. No back rentals were adjudged.
43
Bienvenido Once filed a MR. However, the City Court denied
the motion. Bienvenido Once appealed. He deposited in the
city court P580 as rentals for April and May, 1976. In the CFI,
he deposited P290 as rental for June, 1976; P290 as rental for
July 1976 and P290 as rental for August, 1976.
Juanito Peña, the owner of the apartment, filed in the CFI a
motion for immediate execution of the City Court's judgment.
He invoked, as one of the grounds, Once's alleged failure to
file a supersedeas bond.
Bienvenido Once opposed the motion for execution. Once
alleged, among others, that he had deposited the current
rentals.
The Executive Judge granted the motion for execution
reasoning that the petitioner has not filed the superesedeas
bond. Bienvenido Once filed a MR. He reiterated his contention
that the execution was improper because he had deposited in
court the current rentals. He cited the rule that
a supersedeas bond is not necessary in case the tenant had
deposited in court the rentals due.
The lower court denied the motion. It issued a writ of
execution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering execution of
the city court's judgment pending appeal.
HELD:
Yes. The lower court erred in ordering execution of the city
court's judgment pending appeal.
The SC holds that the lower court committed a patent error in
ordering execution of the city court's judgment on the ground
that Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such
bond was necessary because no back rentals were adjudged
in the city court's judgment. The attorney's fees need not be
covered by a supersedeas bond.
Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July
and August, 1976 stayed the execution of the judgment
pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeasbond was
required to stay execution of the city court's judgment.
Consequently, the order of execution was groundless. It was
not justified under Rule 70, Sec. 8. Sec. 8 requires
a supersedeas bond only if there are accrued rentals in
arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant
deposits in court the rentals due from time to time.
The execution proceeding already mentioned is void.
Dizon vs. Beltran
G.R. No. 221071 January 18, 2017
FACTS:
Eddie, a seafarer, has two children, namely, Bryan and James
Christopher Dizon.
Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Spouses Dizon) got
married. Verona and her mother, together with Bryan and
James, resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot
(disputed property). The registered owners were "[Verona],
married to [Eddie]."
Spouses Dizon entered into a Compromise Agreement,
whereby they contemplated selling the disputed property in the
amount of not less than 4M which price shall be increased by
100k for every succeeding year until the same is finally sold.
Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship. Verona died
on December 8, 2009. The next day, Eddie was informed about
Verona’s death. He informed Verona’s relatives to wait for his
arrival. It took a while before Eddie's employer finally permitted
him to go home. Verona was already buried before Eddie's
arrival.
Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed), dated
December 1, 2009, was shown to Eddie. Its subject was the
disputed property conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda
Vida P. Beltran (Vida), for 1.5M.
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's
signatures thereat were forgeries. Thus, In January 2010,
Eddie filed two complaints against Vida. One was a civil case
for nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and
attorney's fees. The other was a criminal complaint for
falsification of public document.
In June 2010, Vida filed before the MTCC an action for
unlawful detainer against petitioners, James and their unnamed
relatives, house helpers and acquaintances residing in the
disputed property.
Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the disputed
property. While the Deed evidencing the conveyance in her
favor was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie pre-signed
the same on April 9, 2008 before he left to work abroad. After
Verona's death, Vida tolerated the petitioners' stay in the
disputed property. Vida sent a formal letter requiring the
petitioners to vacate the disputed property, but to no avail.
The petitioners sought the dismissal of Vida's complaint
arguing that at the time the Deed was executed, Verona was
already unconscious. Eddie, on the other hand, could not have
signed the Deed as well since he left the Philippines on
September 27, 2009 and returned only on December 21, 2009.
Further, Eddie argued that purchase price of 1.5M was not in
accord with Spouses Dizon's agreement to sell the disputed
property for not less than 4M.
MTCC: The MTCC ruled in favor of respondent Vida and
directed petitioners to turn over the possession of the disputed
property to respondent.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC. During its
pendency, Vida filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
RTC: The RTC reversed the MTCC ruling, dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution.
CA: On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC ruling and
reinstated the ruling of MTCC. The CA further ruled that the
failure of petitioners to comply with any of the conditions
provided under Rule 70, Sec. 19 is a ground tor the outright
execution of the judgment. Thus, as the supersedeas bond
was filed out of time or beyond the period to appeal, Vida's
motion for immediate execution should have been acted upon
by the RTC and the writ of execution should have been issued
as a matter of right. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that the RTC should
have issued a writ of execution relative to the MTCC’s decision
in respondent Vida’s favor.
HELD:
Yes. The CA erred in concluding that the RTC should have
issued a writ of execution relative to the MTCC’s decision in
respondent Vida’s favor.
Petitioners admit that they posted the supersedeas bond
beyond the period to perfect an appeal, but claim that it was
the MTCC, which belatedly fixed the amount. Pending the
appeal, they had filed before the RTC, they promptly posted
the bond after the amount was determined by the MTCC.
44
Petitioners' failure to post the supersedes bond within the
allowable period shall result in the immediate execution of the
MTCC judgment. Nonetheless, in City of Naga v. Hon.
Asuncion, et al., the Court has carved exceptions to immediate
execution of judgment in ejectment cases. Thus:
“Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the
judgment) bring about a material change in the situation of the
parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there
is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not
justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay
immediate execution of the judgment.”
Applying by analogy the ruling in Laurel, et al. vs. Hon. Abalos,
etc. et. al., in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant
petition arose, Eddie was originally a co-owner of the disputed
property, and he remains in possession thereof. Vida, on the
other, is not even a resident of Davao City. Moreover, prior to
Vida's filing of the unlawful detainer case, Eddie had already
instituted actions for nullification of the Deed and falsification of
public documents. The Office of the Davao City Prosecutor had
likewise made a preliminary determination of probable cause
that forgery was committed. Eddie, thus, insists that no valid
conveyance was made by Verona to Vida.
In the mind of the SC, the foregoing are persuasive reasons
justifying the non-immediate execution of the MTCC judgment
despite the petitioners' belated posting of the supersedeas
bond.
Hence, the CA erred in declaring that the RTC improperly
denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal.
Racaza vs. Susana Realty
G.R. No. L-20330 December 22, 1966
FACTS:
Petitioner is the lessee of a portion of a piece of land owned by
respondent corporation. He started renting this portion of the
lot in 1952 when his wife, Evarista Racaza, bought an
unfinished house that had been built on it. On assurance of
respondent that petitioner's family could stay on the land by
paying a monthly rent of P15, petitioner finished the
construction of the house and he and his family lived in it. On
December 16, 1955, however, petitioner was asked to vacate
the land because respondent needed it. The demand was
followed by the filing on February 10, 1956 of a complaint for
ejectment in the MTC. Petitioner and his family remained in the
premises as the case was dismissed for failure of respondent
to proceed to trial.
On December 17, 1957, petitioner received another letter from
respondent demanding anew the surrender of the premises.
On February 19, 1958, another ejectment suit was filed against
him, the complaint alleging that respondent needed the lot "for
the purpose of constructing improvements thereon and for
other uses," but that despite repeated demands petitioner
refused to leave the premises.
In his answer, petitioner denied that the lease was on a month-
to-month basis and claimed that his understanding with
respondent was that he would be allowed to stay on the
premises as long as he paid a monthly rent of P15.
MTC: After trial, the court ordered petitioner to vacate the
premises and pay P15 a month until he had done so.
CFI: On appeal to the CFI, petitioner was ordered evicted. The
MTC’s decision was affirmed.
CA: On appeal to the CA, the ruling of both the MTC and CFI
was affirmed.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent's complaint is defective
and did not vest jurisdiction in the MTC because it does not
state the date when the alleged unlawful detainer started so as
to afford a basis for determining whether the case was filed
within a year from the accrual of the cause of action. In this
connection, it is claimed that, according to the evidence,
petitioner stopped paying rents in July, 1955 and that it should
be from this date that the one-year period should be counted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
Yes. The MTC has jurisdiction over the case.
To begin with, this case was brought not on the theory that
petitioner, as lessee, failed to pay rents, but on the theory that
the lease had expired and that respondent had asked
petitioner to vacate the land. Thus, the complaint states that
respondent needs the land but that despite his demands
petitioner refused to vacate it. The averment that the lease was
on a month-to-month basis is equivalent to an allegation that
the lease expired at the end of every month. It is therefore
immaterial that rents had not been paid since July, 1955, since
what made petitioner liable for ejectment was the expiration of
the lease. This being the case, demand to vacate was
unnecessary.
As the SC explained in Co Tiamco v. Diaz, Rule 70, section 2
requires previous demand only when the action is "for failure to
pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of his lease."
Where the action is to terminate the lease because of the
expiration of its term, no such demand is necessary. In the
latter case, upon the expiration of the term of the lease, the
landlord may go into the property and occupy it, and if the
lessee refuses to vacate the premises, an action for unlawful
detainer may immediately be brought against him even before
the expiration of the fifteen or five days provided in Rule 70,
section 2.
Accordingly, upon the expiration of the lease in this case,
petitioner became a deforciant unlawfully withholding
possession of the property. There was no need for a demand
to be served on him, except to negate any inference that
respondent, as lessor, had agreed to an extension of the term
of the lease under article 1687 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to petitioner's next point. As earlier stated,
petitioner was twice asked to quit the premises. The first was
on December 16, 1955, but as pointed out in the beginning, the
complaint filed afterwards was dismissed for non-suit. The
second time he was asked to move out was on December 17,
1957, followed by a complaint filed on February 19, 1958.
Petitioner insists that respondent's cause of action must be
deemed to have accrued on December 16, 1955. But, as
already stated, respondent's action is not based on non-
payment of rent coupled with a demand; Its action is based on
the expiration of the term of the lease and the demand made
by it to vacate the premises merely evidences Its determination
not to extend the lease. Moreover, even if the action were
based on non-payment of rent, the one-year period should be
reckoned from the second notice, on the theory that
respondent has the right to waive his action based on the first
demand and to let the lessee remain in the premises.
San Miguel Wood Products vs. Tupas
MTJ-93-892 October 25, 1995
FACTS:
Complainant San Manuel Wood Products charged Judge
Tupas of the MTCC with grave partiality, serious misconduct,
abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the law. Complainant is
the defendant in an unlawful detainer case.
Respondent judge rendered a decision in the said unlawful
detainer case, in favor of the plaintiffs therein and against
herein complainant. The parties received their copies of the
decision on June 14, 1993.
45
Within the reglementary period to appeal, the plaintiffs filed a
"Motion for Immediate Execution," of the MTCC decision.
On June 24, 1993, while the motion for immediate execution
was pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a "Notice of
Appeal and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond" to stay the
execution of the unlawful detainer decision. The notice of
appeal and the supersedeas bond were approved by
respondent judge in an Order, dated July 16, 1993.
On September 3, 1993, complainant deposited with the clerk of
court the sum of 8,000, the rentals due from June 6, 1993 to
October 5, 1993.
Plaintiffs filed a "Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal," dated June 30, 1993, in the MTCC. The supplemental
motion was opposed by complainant in its "Comment or
Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending
Appeal”.
On August 11, 1993, respondent judge issued a special order,
granting plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution pending
appeal. Respondent judge used as a basis in granting the writ
of execution pending appeal the provisions of the Rules of
Court, particularly, Rule 39, Sec. 2. The good reasons of
plaintiffs were for the use of the members of the latter’s
(plaintiff’s) families, the bonafide intention to cultivate the land
and that the defendant, complaint herein, already owned more
than 10 hectares thus, complainant is already prohibited from
acquiring the subject lot.
Plaintiffs posted a bond as required by the special order.
Respondent judge approved the bond in an order, dated
September 8, 1993. MR of both the special order and the order
approving the bond was not acted upon by respondent judge.
Complainant now accuses respondent judge of grave partiality,
serious misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the
law for issuing the August 11, 1993 Special Order and the
September 8, 1993 Order.
Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal on
July 16, 1993, respondent judge lost its jurisdiction over the
case. Thus, the Special Order, dated August 11, 1993,
ordering the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal,
is null and void. Complainant argues, further, that the issuance
of the July 16, 1993 Order should be considered as a denial of
the motion for execution pending appeal filed by the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, complainant points out that the rule governing
execution of judgment in ejectment cases Rule 70, Sec. 8 not
Rule 39, Sec. 2, the provision relied upon by respondent judge.
COURT ADMINISTRATOR: The Court administrator held that
since both plaintiffs and defendant (complainant in this case)
received their respective copies of the decision on June 14,
1993, the last day to appeal was June 29, 1993 and, by
operation of law, the appeal of complainant was perfected on
June 30, 1993, it having filed its Notice of Appeal on June 24,
1993. The Court administrator held that the settled rule is:
“Should the defendant fail to make the payments above
prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the
appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of
which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such
failure shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from
with respect to the restoration of possession, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until
the final disposition thereof on its merits.”
Judge Tupas had, therefore, no jurisdiction and authority to
issue his Special Order. He should have dismissed all of the
plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because Rule
70, Sec. 8 and not Rule 39, Sec. 2 is what is applicable as this
is an ejectment case. Furthermore, it ruled that it is only the
appellate court — the RTC for ejectment cases — which can
order the issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal but
only for the explicit reason that the periodic rentals as found in
the inferior court decision were not paid, with notice and
hearing mandated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of
law in applying Rule 39, Sec. 2 instead of Rule 70, Sec. 8 in
ejectment cases.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of law in
applying Rule 39, Sec. 2 instead of Rule 70, Sec. 8 in
ejectment cases.
This is an ejectment case, hence, the applicable rule is Rule
70, Sec. 8….
Respondent judge missed the foregoing rule when it applied
Rule 39, Sec. 2…
It ought to be mentioned that Rule 39, Sec. 2 applies to
execution pending appeal in ordinary civil actions. This rule
requires good reasons before a writ of execution can be issued
in favor of the prevailing party. Its issuance is subject to the
sound discretion of the court and is usually not favored
because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be
ascertained on appeal.
In stark contrast, under Rule 70, Sec. 8, it is not necessary to
show good reasons for the immediate execution of the
judgment against the defendant. The judgment is executed
immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a matter of right, to
prevent further damage arising from the loss of possession.
It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior
court, the losing defendant in an ejectment case must: (a)
perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) make a
periodic deposit of the rentals due or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property
during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must
concur.
In the case at bar, complainant filed his appeal on time and
deposited the required supersedeas bond in the inferior court,
but it failed to comply with the third requisite as related above.
As borne by the records, the rentals accruing for the months of
June, July and August were deposited only on September 3,
1993. Upon its failure to meet the third requisite prescribed
under the rules, the plaintiffs have the right to move for
execution of the judgment appealed from. The order of
execution, however, has to be issued by the appellate court, in
this case the RTC, since the respondent judge had lost his
jurisdiction over the ejectment case after the appeal to the RTC
had been perfected.
In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, the
respondent judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any
malice or corrupt motive.
Quintina Vda. De Ampil et al v. Judge Alvendia
G.R. No. L-19761, April 30, 1964
FACTS
Petitioners pray for a writ directing Judge Alvendia of the CFI of
Manila to order the execution pending appeal of a decision of
the Municipal Court directing Vicente Manuel to vacate the
premises held by him as lessee of petitioners and until such
time, to pay petitioners P70 rental within the first five days of
each month.
Pending Manuel's appeal from the judgment, petitioners filed a
motion averring that the appellant-lessee had failed to deposit
the P70 monthly set by the lower court within the first five days
of each month.
After hearing, the respondent judge found that the appellant had
been making the monthly deposits exacted by the appealed
judgment "within the first ten days of the month following that for
which the deposit was made", and "it can not, therefore, be said
46
that the defendant has failed to make the monthly deposit on
time
ISSUE
Whether the CFI was correct in ruling that deposit of rentals can
be made within the first ten days of each month instead within
the first five days as ordered by the Municipal Court.
RULING:
YES. The CFI was correct, there being no finding in the decision
by the Municipal Court that the contract of lease required the
monthly rent to be paid within the first five days of each month.
Section 8 of Rule 72 expressly prescribes that the defendant-
appellant should pay or deposit, during the pendency of the
appeal,—
"the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, as
found by the judgment of the justice of the peace or municipal
court to exist, or in the absence of contract, he pays to the
plaintiff or unto tile Court, on or before the tenth day of each
calendar month,
In the absence of any finding as to the provisions of the lease
contract by the Municipal Court, the monthly deposit may be
made within the first ten days of each succeeding month. In the
absence of a contract' covers not only the situation where there
is no contract in actuality, but also where the judgment does not
make findings as to the existence and/or terms of the contract.
The amount required to be paid in such case being equivalent to
the reasonable value of occupation.
As ruled in Kim vs. Yan, the rule "requires as a condition sine
qua non that the judgment shall make specific findings as to the
existence and the terms of the contract. The words "as found by
the judgment" are very material".
City of Manila v. CA
G.R. No. L-42364, April 09, 1987
FACTS
After the expiration of its contract of lease involving two market
stalls owned by the City of Manila, the lessor-City wanted to
increase the lease rentals. Despite the refusal of the lessee to
agree to the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises,
prompting the City to file ejectment proceedings against it. The
City Court fixed new rental rates from P3500 to P5000 and
allowed the eventual ejectment of the lessee in case of non-
compliance.
The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the CFI
because it was not satisfied with the increased rentals. In the
meantime, in view of the lessee's adamant refusal to pay the
increased rates, the City without filing any supersedeas bond,
asked for immediate execution of the City Court's judgment
pending appeal. The lessee opposed this execution on the
theory that there can be no execution pending appeal because
the City had not filed any supersedeas bond. The CFI granted
the writ of execution prayed for.
On appeal, the CA reversed the CFI and set aside the writ of
execution, explaining that Sec. 8, Rule 70 on execution pending
appeal in ejectment cases does not apply for said provision
operates only when it is the lessee not the lessor who appeals,
for in such a case, it is the lessee who is supposed to file a
supersedeas bond and to deposit the monthly rentals in court,
as said rentals fall due citing the decision in Cruz v Jugo, as
authority for the ruling.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 8 of Rule 70 applies if it is the lessor who appeals.
RULING:
YES. Sec 8 of Rule 70 applies even if it is the lessor who
appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee desires to
prevent execution pending appeal, the lessee must still file the
supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing
rentals. The doctrine in Cruz v. Jugo is reversed insofar as it
conflicts with the present case. The rationale is simple: why
should the lessee continue occupying the premises without filing
the supersedeas bond and making the necessary deposit for
ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the
lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents)?
Catalino San Pedro et al v. CA and William Ledesma
G.R. No. 114300, August 04, 1994
FACTS
William Ledesma filed a complaint against the Spouses Loresto
for unlawful detainer with preliminary injunction. The MeTC
rendered judgment against the Lorestos ordering them to vacate
and surrender to the the possession of the premises and to pay
P12,000 until such surrender. The spouses appealed to the
RTC.
Later, the Lorestos, together with Catalino San Pedro, instituted
an action for the annulment of Ledesma's title over the disputed
property.
Ledesma filed a motion for execution pending appeal for failure
of the spouses to make the periodic deposits of P12,000. The
motion was granted and a writ of execution and notice to vacate
were issued.
ISSUE
Whether the execution of the decision in the eviction case could
be ordered despite the pendency of the annulment suit in
another court.
RULING:
YES. Firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action
questioning the ownership of property will not abate ejectment
suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein.
In Wilmon Auto Supply Corp. v. CA, the SC specified the cases
where this principle was applied, thus:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in
ejectment actions in the municipal trial courts or other courts of
the first level do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings
on consignation of rentals
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit
against the plaintiff in the former.
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly
the principal issue before the Regional Trial Court does not
preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful
detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material
possession or possession de facto of the premises
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an
ejectment suit involving the same property
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect
ejectment actions (e.g. to compel renewal of a lease contract)
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of
absolute sale to one of sale with pacto de retro) does not
suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties
7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion
reivindicatoria" also has no effect on ejectment suits regarding
the same property
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting
the same property.
The rationale of the rule is that an ejectment suit involves only
the issue of material possession or possession de facto while an
action for annulment of title, such as the case at bar, involves
the question of ownership. There may be identity of parties and
subject matter but not of the cause of action or the relief prayed
for.
47
Sunflower Neighborhood Association v. CA
G.R. No. 136274, September 03, 2003
FACTS
Elisa Malaqui Caparas in her capacity as executor of the testate
estate of her Macaria Maglaqui filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other persons who
occupied parcels of land registered in the name of Macaria
Maglaqui.
The MeTC decided in favor of Elisa and a writ of demolition was
issued by the MeTC. However, another group of persons
occupying portions of the parcels of land subject of the unlawful
detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower
Neighborhood Association. Sunflower filed a complaint before
the RTC for prohibition/injunction arguing that its members
should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not
parties to the unlawful detainer case. The RTC granted the
injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to
petitioner from demolition.
Elisa filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with the CA assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge
Tolentino in the expropriation case and by Judge How in the
prohibition case.
The CA however held that as the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case had already become final, the execution could not
be enjoined.
Sunflower assailed the decision of the CA in this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner's members, who were not parties to the
unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of
this case
RULING:
YES. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an
action in personam wherein the judgment is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be
heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone who has not
been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser, squatter or
agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to
frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the premises
with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee pendente
lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the
family, relative or privy of the defendant.
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioner's members
are trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to
occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner's only defense
against the eviction and demolition orders is their supposed
non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense,
however, has no legal support since its members are
trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment.
Manuel Pagtalunan v. Rufina Dela Cruz Vda. de Manzano
G.R. No. 147695, September 13, 2007
FACTS
Patricio Pagtalunan entered into a Contract to Sell with Teodoro
Manzano over a house and lot whereby the latter agreed to pay
P17,800 with P1,500 as downpayment and the balance to be
paid in equal monthly installments of P150. It was stipulated in
the contract that Manzano could immediately occupy the
premises, that in case of default, the contract would be
automatically rescinded without need of judicial declaration.
Claiming that respondent paid only P12,950 and stopped paying
without justification, petitioner wrote respondent a letter
demanding that she vacate the premises on the ground that her
possession had become unlawful. Respondent ignored the
demand. Petitioner thus filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
against respondent. The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The
RTC however reversed the MTC and dismissed the case for
unlawful detainer ruling that a judicial determination of
rescission must be secured by petitioner as a condition
precedent to convert the possession de facto of respondent
from lawful to unlawful. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling the
Contract to Sell was not validly rescinded under RA 6552.
Petitioner now contends that respondent also had more than the
grace periods provided under the within which to pay and that
that his demand letter should be considered the notice of
cancellation since the demand letter informed respondent that
she had "long ceased to have any right to possess the premises
in question due to her failure to pay without justifiable cause." In
support of his contention, he cited Layug v. IAC which held that
"the additional formality of a demand for rescission by notarial
act would…be merely circuitous and consequently superfluous."
He stated that in Layug, the seller already made a written
demand upon the buyer.
ISSUE
Whether the CA was correct in affirming the dismissal of the
unlawful detainer case.
RULING:
YES. While RA 6552 recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds
of real estate the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon
non-payment of an installment by the buyer, the cancellation of
the contract by the seller must be in accordance with RA 6552,
which requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the
buyer of the full payment of the cash surrender value of the
payments on the property.
Based on the records of the case, the Contract to Sell was not
validly rescinded under Sec. 3 b) (of RA 6552. The SC found
that the letter was merely made formal demand upon
respondent to vacate the premises. Clearly, the demand letter is
not the same as the notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission by a notarial act required by RA 6552. Petitioner
cannot rely on Layug v. IAC to support his contention that the
demand letter was sufficient compliance. Layug held that "the
additional formality of a demand on [the seller's] part for
rescission by notarial act would appear, in the premises, to be
merely circuitous and consequently superfluous" since the seller
therein filed an action for annulment of contract, which is a
kindred concept of rescission by notarial act. Evidently, the case
of unlawful detainer filed by petitioner does not exempt him from
complying with the said requirement.
There being no valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell, the CA
correctly recognized respondent's right to continue occupying
the property subject of the Contract to Sell and affirmed the
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case by the RTC.
Irene Ofilada v. Spouses Andal
G.R. No. 192270, January 26, 2015
FACTS
Irene Ofilada with her husband Carlos Ofilada bought from the
heirs of Teresita Liwag a parcel of land. The sale was evidenced
by an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Sale
wherein Miraflor Andal who brokered the sale of the property,
signed as ‘tenant.’
Ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Council Chairman and executed a
Pagpapatunay stating that the there were no tenants in the
subject parcel of land. Two weeks after the sale, Miraflor
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein she acknowledged
Irene and Carlos as the new owners of the property. While it
was stated therein that she will continue to take care of the
property, she nevertheless waived any tenancy rights that she
and her husband might have over the land.
Eight years later, Irene filed against the Spouses Andal a
Complaint for Ejectment. In their Answer, the spouses Andal
claimed that they were tenants of Irene’s predecessor-in-interest
and continued to be such and since the suit is an action to
dispossess them as tenants, it is not the MTC which has
48
jurisdiction over the complaint but the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board.
The MTC found no prima facie showing of tenancy relations
between the parties and ruled that the spouses Andal were in
possession of the properties by mere tolerance. The RTC
affirmed the MTC ruling. The CA, on the other hand, took a
different view of the case. The CA ratiocinated that since the
existence of tenancy relations between the previous owners of
the properties and the spouses Andal is undisputed, the
question of whether the said spouses may be dispossessed
therefrom constitutes an agrarian dispute despite the severance
of such relations. This is considering that severance of the
tenurial arrangement does not render the action beyond the
ambit of an agrarian dispute and, hence, jurisdiction over the
same remains with the DARAB.
ISSUE
Whether a tenancy relationship between the parties exists as to
strip off the MTC of its jurisdiction over Irene’s suit for unlawful
detainer.
RULING:
NO. The tenancy relationship between the former owners of the
properties and the spouses Andal was clearly severed prior to
Irene’s purchase of the same; no such relationship was
subsequently created between Irene and the spouses Andal.
Certainly telling are the Pagpapatunay and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay which were voluntarily executed and never impugned
by the spouses Andal. Both contain express declarations that at
the time Irene and her husband bought the property, the
tenancy then existing between the heirs of Teresita as former
owners and the spouses Andal as tenants had already ceased,
and that no tenancy relations would continue between the latter
and the new owner, Irene. Notably, the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
being a public document, is evidence of the facts in the clear
unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity. The spouses Andal are bound by their
admissions against their own interest.
While a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by the sale,
alienation, or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding,
the same may nevertheless be terminated due to circumstances
more advantageous to the tenant and his/her family. Here,
records show that Miraflor, who brokered the sale between the
heirs of Teresita and Irene, voluntarily executed her
Pagpapatunay stating that she and her parents have already
received a ‘sufficient consideration’ for her to release her former
landlord and the purchaser of the lot from liability. Such
‘sufficient consideration’ amounted to P1.1 million by way of
disturbance compensation. To the Court, the said amount is
adequate enough for the spouses Andal to relinquish their rights
as tenants. In fine, it can be reasonably concluded that the
tenancy relationship between the previous owners and the
spouses Andal had already been severed.
As to the question of whether a new tenancy relationship
between Irene and the spouses Andal was subsequently
formed, the SC held that evidence is necessary to prove the
allegation of tenancy. The Court agrees with the conclusion of
both the MTC and the RTC that for dearth of evidence, tenurial
relationship between the parties was not sufficiently shown.
Thus, the said courts correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
ejectment case.
Absent any tenurial relationship between them, the spouses
Andal’s possession of Irene’s properties was by mere tolerance
of the latter. The action to dispossess the spouses Andal
therefrom is therefore a clear case of summary action for
ejectment cognizable by the regular courts.
Dominga Quito v. Stop & Save Corporation
G.R. No. 186657, June 11, 2014
FACTS
Dominga filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Stop &
Save. The MCTC rendered judgment ordering Stop & Save to
pay the plaintiff all the rentals in arrears and the succeeding rent
until fully paid. The RTC however ordered the dismissal of
Dominga’s unlawful detainer complaint due to the pending case
for annulment of lease contract filed by Stop & Save with the
same RTC. It appeared that Stop & Save had earlier filed a
case to annul its Lease Agreement with Dominga on the ground
that the building was not owned exclusively by Dominga.
Dominga filed a petition for review with the CA but the CA
dismissed Dominga’s petition for ruling that the RTC correctly
abated the unlawful detainer case because Stop & Save’s
annulment case was filed first in time and was the more
appropriate vehicle in litigating the issues between the parties,
since both their claims were anchored on the same lease
contract.
ISSUE
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the subject unlawful
detainer case on the ground of litis pendentia.
RULING:
NO. To constitute litis pendentia, there must be: (1) identity of
the parties in the two actions; (2) substantial identity in the
causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; (3) and
the identity between the two actions should be such that any
judgment that may be rendered in one case would amount to
res judicata in the other.
In the present case, while there is an identity in the facts
between the two actions, involving as they do the same lease
contract, the issues and the relief prayed for are different so that
the causes of action remain entirely distinct from each other.
In the unlawful detainer suit, the issue is who between the
parties has a better right to physical possession over the
property or possession de facto and the principal relief prayed
for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for failure to pay
the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the
issue is the validity of the lease contract, where Stop and Save
puts in issue Dominga’s ownership.
In these lights, there exists no reason to prevent the subject
unlawful detainer case and annulment of lease contract from
proceeding separately and independently from one another.
Spouses Manzanilla v. Waterfields Industries
G.R. No. 177484, July 18, 2014
FACTS
Spouses Manzanilla, owners of a parcel of land, leased a
portion of the said property to Waterfields Industries
represented by its President Aliza Ma. Under their Contract of
Lease, the lessors “acknowledge receipt from lessee a rental
deposit in the amount of P216,000, to answer for any unpaid
rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges...”
When Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rentals, Ma sent the
spouses Manzanilla a letter stating the lease contract shall be
amended to the effect that that the deposit shall be used
exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other
incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the
lease.
The spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment against Waterfields
alleging that Waterfields had committed violations of the lease
agreement by not paying the rentals on time. In its Answer,
Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the
monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit as rental
payment in accordance with the original Contract of Lease.
The MTC found Ma’s letter to have amended the Contract of
Lease. In particular, Section 4 of the Contract of Lease which
provides that the rental deposit shall answer for any unpaid
rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges was
superseded by the portion in Ma’s letter which states that “the
deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively
for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental
expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease”.
Hence, the MTC declared that Waterfields violated the lease
49
agreement due to non-payment of rentals. The RTC affirmed
the MeTC. The CA, however held that the rental deposit should
have been applied as payment for unpaid utilities and other
incidental expenses by way of compensation ratiocinating that
the Spouses are bound to return the deposit upon the
termination of the contract considering that the Spouses did
alleged that the contract was already terminated.
ISSUE
Whether there is failure on the part of Waterfields to pay rent as
to constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
RULING:
YES. Since Waterfields denies that it failed to pay rent and puts
up the claim that it was utilizing the rental deposit as rental
payment, a preliminary question emerges, viz: May the rental
deposit be utilized as rental payment?
The MTC declared that the rental deposit cannot be utilized as
payment for the rentals in view of the the amendment brought
about by the letter sent to the Spouses. Clearly, there was
failure on the part of Waterfields to pay rent and, consequently,
it committed a violation of the lease. It is this violation which
gave rise to a cause of action for unlawful detainer against
Waterfields.
The SC held that the CA should not have immediately assumed
as true the spouses Manzanilla’s allegation that the contract
was already terminated. It must be stressed that in this case,
the violation of the lease through non-payment of rent is what
constitutes the cause of action. Hence, once the failure to pay
rent is established, a cause of action for unlawful detainer
arises. The CA should have therefore limited itself to the
determination of whether Waterfields failed to pay rents.
The problem is that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to
when a cause of action arises. It did not base its determination
of the existence of the cause of action from the fact that
Waterfields failed to pay rents. To it, the cause of action in this
case only arose after the contract was terminated and the rental
deposit was found sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals. This is
erroneous since as already discussed, it is the failure to pay rent
which gives rise to the cause of action.
Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract
due to non-payment of rent. It therefore follows that the cause of
action for unlawful detainer in this case must necessarily arise
before the termination of the contract and not the other way
around as what the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the
termination of the contract, the CA went a bit too far in its
resolution of this case.
Ruben Manalang et al v. Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani
G.R. No. 156995, January 12, 2015
FACTS
Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land covered by an
approved survey plan while respondents own a parcel of land
adjacent to that of petitioners. When petitioners caused the
relocation and verification survey of their lot and the adjoining
lots, the result showed that the respondents had encroached on
the lot owned by petitioners. A preliminary relocation survey
conducted by the DENR confirmed the result on the
encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the
encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession
thereof despite demands, the petitioners commenced this action
for unlawful detainer.
The MTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction based on its
finding that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute
that should be properly resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.
The RTC however reversed the MTC and remanded the case
for further proceedings. Upon remand, the MTC dismissed the
complaint ruling that the petitioners failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence showing that the respondents had
encroached on their property. Once more, the petitioners
appealed to the RTC. At that point, the RTC ordered the
petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their
allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the
surveyor of the DENR. The RTC reversed the MTC’s decision,
observing that the respondents had encroached on the
petitioners’ property based on the court-ordered relocation
survey.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC ruling that the RTC,
by ordering the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction” upon motion of the petitioners and over
the objection of the respondents, and making a determination of
whether there was an encroachment based on such survey and
testimony of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in complete
disregard of the second paragraph of Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. It declared such action by the RTC as
unwarranted because it amounted to the reopening of the trial,
which was not allowed under Section 13(3) Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC may conduct a rehearing of the case.
RULING:
NO. Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that
“The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or
detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only
and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the
appropriate RTC which shall decide the same on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.”
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the
conduct of the relocation and verification survey “in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of the
surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial
de novo. The violation was accented by the fact that the RTC
ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the
surveyor’s testimony instead of the record of the proceedings
had in the court of origin.
The CA was correct when it held that a boundary dispute must
be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an
ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession,
but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary
dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful
detainer and forcible entry.
RULE 71: CONTEMPT
Lorenzo Shipping Corporation et al v. Distribution
Management Association of the Philippines
G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
FACTS
The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-
Resolution, advising Distribution Management Association of
the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required
freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for
freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in
accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153.
MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to EO 213 entitled
Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates.
DMAP challenged the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and
the Letter-Resolution before the CA which dismissed the petition
and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the
Letter-Resolution. DMAP appealed to the SC which denied
DMAP's petition for review on certiorari on technical grounds as
well as the MR.
50
DMAP subsequently publicly circulated the Sea Transport
Update, which stated among other things that “the Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the SC was denied based on
technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented” and
that the “SC ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is
at least 3 to 6 months.”
Thereupon, petitioners brought this special civil action for
contempt against the respondents, insisting that the publication
of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of
court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the
petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the
publication unfairly debased the SC by making "scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" to the effect that
the SC had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as
to lead the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to
6 months."
ISSUE
Whether statements contained in the Sea Transport Update
constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents'
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the
acts punishable as indirect contempt of court.
The petitioners' mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly
debases the SC because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless,
and baseless innuendo therein that the SC allowed itself to be
influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of
the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly
conclude: SC ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time
is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to
sustain the charge of indirect contempt.
Nor did the SC consider contemptuous either the phrase stating:
"The MR filed with the SC was denied based on technicalities
and not on the legal issue DMAP presented", or the phrase in
the Sea Transport Update reading "SC ruling issued in one
month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary
to the petitioners' urging that such phrases be considered as
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" and as
indicative that "the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the
petitioners" or that "the point that respondents wanted to convey
was crystal clear: `defy the decision, for it was based on
technicalities, and the SC was influenced!'", the SC found the
phrases as not critical of the Court. The unmistakable intent
behind the phrases was to inform DMAP's members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable
move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of
the Court of Appeals instructed.
CONCEPTS
“Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt
is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a
legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the
respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual
sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of
different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and
need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core
of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to
be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very
creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their
presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts,
and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. The
reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect
of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without
such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on
a very shaky foundation.
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt,
which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to
obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or
indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the
lawful process or order of the court.
The punishment for the first is generally summary and
immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because
the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power of
courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of
the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial
is not open to question, considering that this power is essential
to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of
justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and
punishment accord with due process of law. There is authority
for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt
punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in
the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct
justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the
courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the
presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open
court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt,
although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person
charged to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the
misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the
contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons.
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less
summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of
the contumacious act committed outside the personal
knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the
elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges,
and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before
guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.
Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the
punishment for contempt refers not to the timing of the action
with reference to the offense but to the procedure that
dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result
from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer,
holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments,
awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a
conventional court trial.
A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court
proceedings and for which a hearing and formal presentation of
evidence are dispensed with, and out-of-court contempts, which
require normal adversary procedures, is drawn for the purpose
of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise of a
court's authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not
limit the ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the
summary punishment of in-court contempts that interfere with
the judicial process.
The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts
without further proof and without issue or trial in any form to
punish a contempt committed directly under its eye or within its
view. But there must be adequate facts to support a summary
order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise of
the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one
and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.
The reason for the extraordinary power to punish criminal
contempt in summary proceedings is that the necessities of the
administration of justice require such summary dealing with
obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the
law, in its active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.
Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but
may be resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and
independently of any action. They are of two classes, the
criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A criminal
contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as
in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority and dignity of
51
the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. A civil
contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to be
done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the
opposing party therein…The proceedings are to be regarded as
criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil
when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an
order of a court for the benefit of a party in whose favor the
order runs, the contempt is civil; where the dominant purpose is
to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and to protect
the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal.
Indeed, the criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the
courts, but the civil proceedings protect, preserve, and enforce
the rights of private parties and compel obedience to orders,
judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.
Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or
disrespect. There is no question that in contempt the intent goes
to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of
it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. Where the
act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show on its
face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in
good faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a
contumacious intent is, in some instances, held to be
determinative of its character. A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he
believes to be right and in good faith institutes proceedings for
the purpose, however erroneous may be his conclusion as to
his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully
and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to
embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in
a pleading…they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt
in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of
the lawyer's oath and a transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.”
People v. Godoy
G.R. No. 115908-09, March 29, 1995
FACTS
Judge Eustaquio Gacott filed a complaint to cite for indirect
contempt Mauricio Reynoso a columnist, and Eva Ponce de
Leon, publisher of the Palawan Times based on an article
written by Reynoso.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct,
belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice
and that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and
honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to
administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an
imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed
before him.
The SC held that the statements complained of are not
contumacious in nature. On the other hand, a reading of the
subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not
constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair
criticism.
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily
assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. Neither is the publication in question
intended to influence the Court for it could not conceivably be
capable of doing so. The article has not transcended the legal
limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it has not
been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is
extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so
exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free
speech and press.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not post-litigation publications can be the subject
of contempt proceedings
2. Which court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed
against the trial court while the case is on appeal
RULING:
1. YES. There may be a contempt of court, even though the
case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the
court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court;
or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. While the right of
free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution, an abuse thereof
is expressly prohibited and must not be permitted to destroy or
impair the efficiency of the courts or the public respect and
confidence therein.
2. As a matter of practical judicial administration, jurisdiction has
been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with
respect to a given controversy. Partly because of administrative
considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the
punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no other
court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt. The
rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the
power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is
that contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only
by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged;
the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of
enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and
processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to
its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has
been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency.
The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the
present incident, is that where the entire case has already been
appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the
appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the
proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect the
status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the
appellate court. Accordingly, the SC having acquired jurisdiction
over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein
respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance thereof and has
accordingly resolved the same.
For Reference: There are, however, several jurisprudentially
and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both
under Philippine and American jurisprudence, viz.:
1. Indirect contempt committed against an inferior court may
also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the
imposable penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused
to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may
be filed in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may
be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the
charge involves questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in
the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated
judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of
another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and decorum which are not its own.
The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and
this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to
deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the
appeal." The apparent reason is that both the moral and legal
effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were
regarded as the resentment of personal affronts offered to
judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the
administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial
order is punishable by the court which is charged with its
enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the
order. However, the rule presupposes a complete transfer of
jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that
where the contempt does not relate to the subject matter of the
appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or
judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of
a court composed of several coordinate branches or divisions.
52
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the
singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from
the contemned court to another court. One of the most common
reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper
venue. The cases involving venue deal primarily with the
question whether a change of venue is available after a
contempt proceeding has been begun. While generally a
change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding,
some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to
punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor,
although where the successor court is created by a statute
which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an
affirmative transfer of jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is
necessary to empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced
numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has
been punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some
appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed
after an appeal is taken is particularly contemptuous of the
appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to
upset the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction
of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a
contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may
require a transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is
disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do
not disqualify him in a contempt proceeding, the regular judge
should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the
regular judge is absent or otherwise unavailable and an order is
entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper
court, the regular judge may punish for violations of orders so
entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more
courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that
there is also a contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been
resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view
is that punishment is of secondary importance to the need to
protect the courts and the people from improper professional
practice. To the substantial extent that disciplinary action
remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by
another court than the one contemned furnish an exception to
the rule against punishing for contempt of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crimes, usually
misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than
those against which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has
been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the
defendant to make timely objection operated as a waiver of the
right to be tried before the court actually contemned.
Armando Ang v. Judge Jose Castro
G.R. No. 66371, May 15, 1985
FACTS
Armando Ang filed before the SC an administrative complaint
against Judge Castro with respect to a decision by respondent
judge in a particular civil case. Upon learning of the complaint
filed against him, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear
before him and to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable
disrespect and contemptuous attitude towards the court and
towards him. Respondent judge found petitioner guilty of
contempt of court, sentenced him to suffer five days
imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure, despite
notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing.
The SC found that the alleged malicious imputations were not
uttered in the presence of or so near respondent Judge Castro
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather,
they were contained in the pleadings and/or letters-complaint
filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential Assistant
on Legal Affairs and before the SC in the aformentioned
administrative case
Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that the
failure of petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled
hearing of the contempt charge for the use of derogatory
language in the administrative complaint filed against him,
constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded,
embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice.
ISSUE
Whether use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against
a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or
proceeding constitutes direct contempt.
RULING:
NO. The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against
a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or
proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not
tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Considering the aforecited provisions,
petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and, if
found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court.
People v. Luis Torio et al, Brigido Estrada
G.R. No. L-27152, November 02, 1982
FACTS
This is an appeal from the order of the CFI finding Municipal
Judge Brigido Estrada guilty of contempt of court for having
failed to appear at the scheduled time of the hearing in a
criminal case.
The appellant was the attorney of record for the accused Jose
Vinluan, one of the four accused in said criminal case. Upon
agreement of the parties the continuation of the hearing of said
case was set for July 28, 1966, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Said criminal case was later called at 2:30 in the afternoon but
when the case was called for hearing, the presiding judge
noticed that the accused Jose Vinluan, although present, was
not represented by counsel. Appellant arrived at 2:45 o'clock in
the afternoon or 15 minutes later. The presiding judge asked the
appellant why he was not present when the case was called for
hearing at 2:30 in spite of the fact that it was scheduled at 2:00
o'clock to which he answered that his 'car stopped while on his
way to the Court. The judge considered the explanation as 'not
satisfactory' and imposed a fine of P50 upon the appellant and
without any charge in writing nor an opportunity given to be
heard by himself or counsel, held him in contempt of court.
ISSUE
Whether failure to appear in court for trial constitutes direct
contempt summarily punishable under Section 1 of Rule 71.
RULING:
NO. Failure to appear in court for trial is not a direct contempt
under Section 1 of Rule 71 for it is not a misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. It may, however, constitute an indirect
contempt punishable only after written charges and hearing
under Section 3, Rule 71.
Considering that the accused is a municipal court judge, the SC
remarked that the CFI might have accorded him some credence
by accepting his explanation at face value and given him a
warning that a similar offense would be drastically dealt with.
After all appellant was only 15 minutes late.
53
Ignacio Pascua et al v. Heirs of Segundo Simeon
G.R. No. L-47717, May 02, 1988
FACTS
Petitioners were among the defendants in civil case before the
CFI of Tarlac Judge Anacleto Alzate, presiding, while
respondents are the heirs of the plaintiff in said civil case.
Judgment was rendered against petitioners. To satisfy the
judgment, parcels of land were levied upon and then sold at
public auction in which the highest bidders were the
respondents. Petitioners failed to redeem the properties and
consequently a writ of possession was issued in favor of
respondents. Petitioners however would not vacate the
premises. So respondents filed a motion to declare the
defendants in contempt of court which was granted by Judge
Alzate.
ISSUE
Whether refusal of petitioners to vacate the premises constitutes
direct contempt.
RULING:
NO. Mere refusal or unwillingness on the part of petitioners to
relinquish the properties would not constitute contempt
especially since the writ of possession was directed not to
petitioners, but to the sheriff for him to deliver the properties to
respondents. As the writ did not command the petitioners to do
anything, they cannot be held guilty of "disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or
command of a court.
The proper procedure if the petitioners refuse to deliver
possession of the lands is not for the court to cite them for
contempt but for the sheriff to dispossess them of the premises
and deliver the possession thereof to the respondents.
However, if subsequent to such dispossession, petitioners enter
into or upon the properties for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession or in any manner disturb the
possession of respondents, then and only then may they be
charged with and punished for contempt
Rolando Tacardon v. Ramon Ang
G.R. No. 159286. April 5, 2005
FACTS
Subsequent to this SC’s Resolution denying his petition for
review on certiorari, Attorney Francisco Cruz, counsel for
petitioners, filed "A Practicing Lawyer's Plaint" and other
manifestations containing improvident and disrespectful
language, highly reflecting his contemptuous regard for the SC.
In his pleading entitled "A Practicing Lawyer's Plaint," Atty. Cruz
alleged that the SC has "desecrated legal and jurisprudential
norms." He cautioned its members that "acts not anchored on
the rule of law but on the rule of the powerful and the influential
can be worse than the most heinous crimes." He concluded that
the SC "has become unpredictable" and thus, it is time for him
"to consider retiring from the practice of law."
Atty. Cruz's "Manifestation" contains a rather more direct
innuendo, stating that he has a "nascent suspicion that the
Minute Resolutions denying his petition for review and motion
for reconsideration did not emanate from the SC and are of
dubious authorship."
In the Resolution, the SC, in order to enlighten him, called his
attention to Borromeo vs. CA which held that "Minute
resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court
who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require
the certification of the Chief Justice..."
Unfortunately, Atty. Cruz refused to be enlightened. He
persisted in demanding that the names of the Justices who took
part in the deliberation of his petition be revealed. He even
insinuated that the withholding of their names shows that
"something is indeed amiss," "there is a lot of corruption going
around…to which even Justices and Judges have not been
immune," and that he should not be blamed for doubting the
authorship of the said Resolutions involving several violations of
procedural rules and considering that respondent is a powerful
and influential person.
ISSUE
Whether Atty. Cruz’s statements constitute direct contempt of
the court.
RULING:
YES. In Ante vs. Pascua, the SC held that contemptuous
statements made in the pleadings filed with the court constitute
direct contempt. This is a reiteration of the ruling in Ang vs.
Castro, declaring that if the pleading containing derogatory,
offensive or malicious statements is submitted in the same court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.
While professing reverence for the Court, Atty. Cruz has
repeatedly insulted and threatened it in the most loutish and
insolent manner. He accused the Justices who deliberated on
his case of "desecrating legal and jurisprudential norms" and of
being "unpredictable." He threatened them that "acts not
anchored on the rule of law but on the rule of the powerful and
the influential can be worse than the most heinous crimes. He
broadly hinted that, "something is indeed amiss" in the issuance
of the subject Minute Resolutions and that the non-disclosure of
the names of the Justices was due to some irregularities. He
justified his suspicions on the premise that "there is a lot of
corruption going around involving ...Justices" and that
respondent is "a very powerful and influential person to whom
many will kowtow and pay obeisance, even without being
asked." He insulted this Court by stating that with its
unpredictability, he might as well consider "retiring from the
practice of law." And lastly, he even challenged the Court to
censure him if there is no basis for his suspicions. His
statements, without any basis, are grossly disrespectful, casting
dishonor and disdain to this Court.
The SC thus found Atty. Cruz guilty both of direct contempt of
court and gross misconduct as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar and suspended him as a member of the Bar.
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN vs. PRIMA JESUSA B.
QUINSAYAS, et al.
G.R. No. 194578 February 13, 2013
QUICK SUMMARY:
Before the Court is a petition for Contempt filed by petitioner
against respondents for disseminating the details of the
disbarment complaint against him. SC ruled that petitioner
failed to prove that, except for Atty. Quinsayas, the other
respondents had a hand in the dissemination and publication
of the disbarment complaint against him. Hence, only Atty.
Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas if found guilty of indirect contempt.
FACTS:
A convoy of 7 vehicles carrying the relatives of then
Maguindanao vice-mayor Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers
and journalists, was on their way to the COMELEC office to file
Mangudadatu’s Certificate of Candidacy when they were
accosted by a group of about 100 armed men and were taken
hostage. The hostages were systematically killed and their
bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered
with the use of a backhoe. Subsequently, criminal cases for
Murder were filed and raffled to RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner
is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., the principal
accused in the murder cases.
Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner
before the Supreme Court which is still pending. Petitioner
alleged the respondents actively disseminated the details of
the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B
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of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment
proceedings.
In their Comments, respondents alleged that petitioner failed to
prove that they actively participated in disseminating details of
the disbarment complaint against him. They alleged that while
they were the ones who filed the disbarment complaint against
petitioner, it does not follow that they were also the ones who
caused the publication of the complaint. They alleged that
petitioner did not provide the name of any particular person,
dates, days or places to show the alleged confederation in the
dissemination of the disbarment complaint.
ISSUE: Whether respondents violated the confidentiality rule in
disbarment proceedings, warranting a finding of guilt for
indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
First, the contempt charge filed by petitioner is in the nature of
a criminal contempt. In People v. Godoy, this Court made a
distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court
declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it
is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand,
civil contempt consists in failing to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing
party therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in
whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and
authority of the court, is an offense against organized society
and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public
justice which raises an issue between the public and the
accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive. On the
other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are
remedial and for the purpose of the preservation of the right of
private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is neither a
felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.
The records of this case showed that the filing of the
disbarment complaint against petitioner had been published
and was the subject of a televised broadcast by respondent
media groups and personalities.
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for
reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment
proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution
and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the
filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a
matter of public concern considering that it arose from the
Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not
on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and
participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre
case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint
relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
Maguindanao Massacre case.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the
disbarment complaint, by itself, is not sufficient to absolve the
media from responsibility for violating the confidentiality rule.
However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a
public figure because he is representing a matter of public
concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of
the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the
disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been
different if the disbarment case against petitioner was about a
private matter as the media would then be bound to respect
the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings under
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that, except for Atty.
Quinsayas, the other respondents had a hand in the
dissemination and publication of the disbarment complaint
against him. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was
responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment
complaint. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the disbarment
case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an
officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However,
instead of preserving its confidentiality, Atty. Quinsayas
disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against
petitioner to members of the media which act constitutes
contempt of court.
ELISA ANGELES vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 178733. September 15, 2014. DEL CASTILLO, J]
FACTS:
A complaint for annulment of REM, foreclosure sale,
reconveyance and damages was filed by spouses Coronels
against petitioner Elisa Angeles and several others.
Trial court rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs and
against defendants
Petitioner and her co-defendants in “Civil Case No. 1” filed
their Notice of Appeal, while the Coronels filed a motion for
execution judgment pending appeal, which the trial court
denied
Petitioner and her co-defendants' appeal to the CA case no.1
The trial court directed that the entire record of Civil Case No.
1 be transmitted to the CA for appropriate action.
The trial court reconsidered its order and thus granted the
Coronels' motion for execution pending appeal. A Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal was thus issued
Petitioner was evicted from the subject property as a result of
the enforcement of the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt with the CA against
herein respondents Officer-in-Charge Marilou C. Martin,
Deputy Sheriff Joselito SP Astorga, Clerk III Marco Boco, and
John Does.
The Petition alleged that Martin defied the trial court's Order to
elevate the records of Civil Case No. 1 to the CA and acted in
collusion with the Coronels to ensure that the latter obtain
execution pending appeal; that the Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal was hastily and irregularly issued; that Astorga and
Boco cleverly contrived" and used trickery in ejecting petitioner
from the subject property; that Astorga and Boco favored other
tenants and did not evict them from the property; that Astorga
did not have the authority to enforce the writ of execution
inasmuch as the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after
the records of Civil Case No. 1 were elevated to the CA.
CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following
pronouncement
This petition should have been filed with the court a
quo. It bears stressing that the power to determine
whether . . . the acts alleged by petitioner constitute
indirect contempt, rests exclusively in the court
against which the contumacious act was committed.
The reason being that it was the court a quo which
issued the subject orders and is vested with the right
to determine whether . . . such orders have been
complied with or have been defied, which acts may
constitute contempt of court.
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 Further, basic is the rule that unless an
order/resolution/directive issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction is declared null and void, such
orders are presumed to be valid. But in this case,
there is nothing on record to show that petitioner
availed herself of any of the legal remedies under the
Rules of Court to assail the validity of the said order
or writ, hence, the same remained valid and
enforceable.
MR denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the petition to hold the respondent public officers
in contempt of court for defying the orders and directives of the
trial court, and for disregarding the CA's authority after it
acquired jurisdiction over the case through the appeal
interposed by petitioner and her co-defendants in Civil Case
No. 1.
RULING: NO. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition holding respondent public officers in
contempt
Indeed, contrary to petitioner's claims, it appears that the
respondent public officers acted faithfully in carrying out the
trial court's directives. If petitioner doubted these directives —
arguing as she does that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case when her appeal was perfected — then she should have
questioned them by filing the corresponding appeal or petition
in order to set them aside. Punishing the respondents for
contempt will not solve her dilemma; it will not reverse the
effects of the trial court's orders and processes.
And, speaking of contempt, the appellate court is likewise
correct in its position that if respondent public officers should
be punished for their perceived defiance or failure to abide by
the trial court's directives and processes, then the contempt
charge should have been initiated in the court a quo, and not in
the CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court state,
respectively, that "proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed" and "where the charge for indirect contempt
has been committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court
of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by
it, the charge may be filed with such court.
Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are friable only by
the court against whose authority the contempts are charged;
the power to punish for contempt exists for the purpose of
enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its
presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders and
processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to
its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there has
been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of
disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive the
proceeding of half its efficiency
Having found no irregularity in the assailed pronouncement,
and instead declaring herein that judgment was rendered
correctly, it cannot be said that the appellate court committed
any abuse of its discretion at all as to allow the remedy of
certiorari petitioner prays for.
Fortune Life Insurance Company v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 213525, November 21, 2017
FACTS
The SC issued a resolution in this case deying the petitioner's
MR on the following grounds, namely: (a) failure to comply with
the rule on proof of service; (b) late filing; (c) failure to file a
verified declaration under the Efficient Use of Paper Rule; and
(d) failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Commission on Audit (COA). In the same
resolution, the SC required the petitioner and its counsel, Atty.
Fortaleza, to show cause why they should not be punished for
indirect contempt of court for using in the MR harsh and
disrespectful language towards the Court. To wit:
“24. With regard to the proof of service required under Section
2(c), Rule 56 in relation to Section 13, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedures, as amended, even a perfunctory scrutiny of the
present petition and its annexes would have yielded the
observation that the last document attached to the petition is the
affidavit of service dated August 12, 2014, by Marcelino Pascua
in compliance with Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, & 13, Rule 13 of the
1997 Revised Rules Of Civil Procedure. A copy of the affidavit
of service is attached hereto as annex "b", and made an integral
part hereof.
25. Apparently, the staff of the Justice-in-charge failed to verify
the petition and its annexes up to its last page, thus, the
erroneous finding that there were non-submission of the proof of
service;
26. In turn, the same omission was hoisted upon the other
members of this Honorable Court who took the observation from
the office of the Justice-in-charge, to be the obtaining fact, when
in truth and in fact, it is not”
ISSUE
Whether a party and its counsel who make offensive and
disrespectful statements in their motion for reconsideration may
be properly sanctioned for indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
YES. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,
and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the
core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there
ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of
their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in
their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to
preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and
insults of pollution. The power to punish for contempt essentially
exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and
for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice.
The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
The petitioner and its counsel thereby exhibited their plain
inability to accept the ill consequences of their own
shortcomings, and instead showed an unabashed propensity to
readily lay blame on others like the Court and its Members. In
doing so, they employed harsh and disrespectful language that
accused the Court and its Members of ignorance and
recklessness in the performance of their function of
adjudication.
The SC considered the accusatory language particularly
offensive because it was unfounded and undeserved. The
statements of the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza unquestionably
tended to attribute gross inefficiency and negligence to the
Court and its staff. It is worse because the statements were
uncalled for and unfounded. As such, the statements should be
quickly deterred and gravely sanctioned for actually harming
and degrading the administration of justice by the Court itself.
The wrong the statements wrought on the reputation and
prestige of the Court and its operating staff must by all means
be vindicated, and even undone if that was at all possible.
The courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for
contempt that is reasonably commensurate with the gravity of
the offense. The degree of punishment lies within the sound
discretion of the courts. Ever mindful that the inherent power of
contempt should be exercised on the preservative, not on the
vindictive, principle, and that the penalty should be meted
according to the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of
punishment, the Court must justly sanction the contempt of
court committed by the petitioner and its counsel. Under Section
7, Rule 71, the penalty of fine not exceeding P30,000 or
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imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both fine and
imprisonment, may be meted as punishment for contemptuous
conduct committed against a RTC or a court of equivalent or
higher rank. Upon considering all the circumstances, the Court
imposes a fine of P15,000 on the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza.
Atty. Bartolome vs. Atty. Basilio
A.C. No. 10783 January 31, 2018
FACTS:
In a Decision, the SC suspended Basilio from the practice of
law for one year, revoked his incumbent commission as a
notary public, and prohibited him from being commissioned as
a notary public for two years, effective immediately, after
finding him guilty of violating the 2004 Rules of Notarial
Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Decision was circulated to all courts for the information
and implementation of the order of suspension. Basilio, thru his
counsel, Atty. Robea, claimed to have received a copy of the
Decision on December 2, 20I5. In a Resolution dated April 20,
2016, the Court denied with finality Basilio's MR of the
Decision.
However, Atty. Rambayon inquired from the SC about the
status of Basilio's suspension, alleging that the latter still
appeared before the MTC on April 26, 20I6. The letter was
subsequently referred to the OBC for appropriate action.
Consequently, in a Report and Recommendation, the OBC
recommended that Basilio be required to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for not immediately
complying with the SC’s order of suspension upon receipt of
the Decision.
In another letter, Rambayon informed the SC that in the
schedule of cases before the RTC, there were five cases
where the litigants were supposedly represented by Basilio.
In a Resolution, the SC, among others, noted Rambayon's
letter and further required Basilio to: (a) show cause within ten
days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of
court for not immediately complying with the order of
suspension upon receipt of the Decision; and (b) file a sworn
statement with certifications affirming that he has fully served
his penalty of suspension.
Complying with the show cause order, Basilio explained that he
did not immediately comply with the suspension order because
he believed that his suspension was held in abeyance pending
resolution of his MR of the Decision, following the guidelines
in Maniago v. De Dios (Maniago), wherein it was stated that
"unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has
[fifteen (15)] days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render
the decision final and executory." On this score, he maintained
that what was immediately executory was only the revocation
of his notarial commission and the two-year prohibition of being
commissioned as a notary public.
In a Resolution, the SC noted Basilio's compliance, and
referred the case to the OBC for evaluation, report, and
recommendation.
Before the SC could act on the OBC's Report and
Recommendation, Basilio filed a Motion to Lift Suspension
(Motion), attaching an Affidavit of Cessation/Desistance from
Practice of Law or Appearance in Court. In his motion, Basilio
stated that he "has commenced to serve his penalty on July 9,
2016 and continue to serve his penalty until the present upon
his receipt of the Order of the the SC denying his MR." He
further mentioned that he "immediately ceased and desisted
from the practice of his notarial commission on December 2,
2015 until the present."
THE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OBC: In a
Report and Recommendation, the OBC recommended that
Basilio be meted with an additional penalty for his failure to
immediately comply with the SC’s order of suspension from the
practice of law. Likewise, it recommended that the lifting of the
order of suspension from the practice of law be held in
abeyance pending his payment of the fine. The OBC
maintained that Basilio, through his counsel, Robea, received
the Decision on November 3, 2015. Hence, the one-year
suspension order from the practice of law imposed upon him
commenced from the said date should end on November 3,
2016. On the other hand, the two-year order of revocation of
notarial commission and prohibition from being commissioned
as a notary public should end on November 3, 2017. However,
the OBC observed that Basilio served his suspension order
from the practice of law beginning only on July 9, 2016 and
desisted from his notarial practice on December 2, 2015, as
shown by the attached Certifications; hence, the recommended
fine.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Basilio's suspension should
now be lifted.
HELD:
No. Respondent Atty. Basilio's suspension should not be lifted.
The dispositive portion of the Decision explicitly states that the
penalties imposed on Basilio for violation of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility - namely: (a) suspension from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year; (b) revocation of his
incumbent commission as a notary public; and (c) prohibition
from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years,
were all "effective immediately".
Accordingly, Basilio's compliance with the order of suspension,
as well as all the other penalties, should have commenced on
the day he received the Decision. According to the OBC,
Basilio received the Decision on November 3, 2015. However,
records show that Basilio, through Robea, actually received the
Decision on December 2, 2015, as per the Registry Return
Receipt, and that the same was merely mailed on November
13 (not 3), 2015. The OBC - albeit still inaccurately - must have
thought that this latter date was to be considered as the date of
receipt. In fact, Basilio, in his MR and compliance to the Court's
October 5, 2016 Resolution, has repeatedly maintained that he
received the Decision on December 2, 2015. This averment
appears to be consistent with the documents on record and
hence, ought to prevail. This notwithstanding, Basilio himself
admitted that he served his suspension only on July 9, 2016,
proffering that he believed that what was immediately
executory was only the revocation of his notarial commission
and the two-year prohibition against being commissioned as a
notary public. Unfortunately, the Court cannot accept such
flimsy excuse in light of the Decision's unequivocal wording.
Irrefragably, the clause "effective immediately" was placed at
the end of the enumerated series of penalties to indicate that
the same pertained to and therefore, qualified all three
penalties, which clearly include his suspension from the
practice of law. The immediate effectivity of the order of
suspension - not just of the revocation and prohibition against
his notarial practice - logically proceeds from the fact that all
three penalties were imposed on Basilio as a result of the
Court's finding that he failed to comply with his duties as a
notary public, in violation of the provisions of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice, and his sworn duties as a lawyer, in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Thus, with the Decision's explicit wording that the same was
"effective immediately", there is no gainsaying that Basilio's
compliance therewith should have commenced immediately
from his receipt of the Decision on December 2, 2015. On this
score, Basilio cannot rely on the Maniago ruling as above-
57
claimed since it was, in fact, held therein that a decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof if the decision so
indicates, as in this case.

58