1 Lechugas v CA |GR L-39972

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against private respondents alleging that the latter unlawfully entered the
subject property (Lot 5456) owned by petitioner. She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and
refused to surrender the possession of the same despite demands. Petitioner claims that she purchased the subject property
from Leoncia Lasangue. She had the land segregated by contracting a private land surveyor to survey the land and establish
boundaries. She also caused the declaration of the said portion in her name and paid taxes due thereon.

Private respondents maintain that the land petitioner bought is different from the land which is the subject property of this
action and that the lot bought by petitioner from Lasangue is situated south of the subject property and designated during
cadastral survey Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the name of petitioner. Private respondents presented Lasangue as witness and
testified that she did not intend to sell the land she sold to petitioner as she could not have sold a piece of land already sold by
her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.

On the basis of such testimony, the Court of Appeals held that the deed of sale entered into by petitioner and Lasangue is null
and void ab initio insofar as Lasangue was concerned. Petitioner contends that the appellate court had no legal justification
when it subjected the true intent and agreement to parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.

Issue: Whether the parol evidence rule does not apply in the case at bar

Held: Yes. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of
sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of petitioner. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and
the private respondents.

2 Dela Rama v Ledesma | 143 SCRA 1

Facts: Plaintiff alleged that the Inocentes de la Rama Inc. had an approved war damage claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission. The first payment on said claim was paid by the Commission while he was still a stockholder. Before the additional
liquidation of said claim, plaintiff sold to defendant his shares in the corporation with an alleged understanding that plaintiff
reserved to himself his proportionate equity in the war damage benefits.

The corporation received a final payment of its claim. When defendant received the dividends, plaintiff demanded the return
and delivery to him of his corresponding share in the claim in question. Defendant refused and plaintiff filed subject complaint.

Defendant admits the allegation in the complaint except their alleged verbal understanding regarding the unpaid war damage
claim; claimed that the indorsement by plaintiff of the Stock Certificate in question without qualification or condition
constituted the sole and exclusive contract between the parties; and to allow De la Rama to prove any alleged simultaneous oral
agreement would run counter to the Parol Evidence Rule.

Issue: Whether evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument.
Held: No. While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless
there has been fraud or mistake. Such exceptions do not apply in the instant case, there being no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud,
mistake, etc. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like the parties would have placed in writing
such an important reservation.

3 Zulueta v CA | 253 SCRA 699

Facts: Petitioner is the wife of private respondent. Petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a medical doctor, and forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
private respon dent and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action for recovery of the documents and papers. The trial court declared the documents and papers to
be properties of private respondent and ordered petitioner to return them and enjoined from using as evidence. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence

Held: Yes. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
“lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.”

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife
may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one
to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

4 People v Saliling | 100 SCRA 427

Facts:
Issue: Whether Rogenio’s dying declaration can be admitted as evidence
Held: Yes. A dying declaration is admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. To be admissible, it is necessary (a)
that a dying declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it
was made the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that he was a competent witness, and (d) that
the declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the victim.

All those requisites are present in this case. The declarant's wife testified that he was conscious of his imminent death when he
revealed to Barandino that Saliling was his assailant. As correctly observed by the trial court, the prosecution's evidence proves
appellants' guilt even without taking into account Argenio's dying declaration.

5 People v Amajul | GR L-14626-27

Facts: Yakan Djalalang, Moros Salihuddin, Djalim, Hamiddin alias Sauril, Asakil, Sahadain, Amajul, Albani, Musa, Lahud, and
Wadja Madjid met at the house of Moro Amdad to discuss plans to waylay the payroll jeep of the Western Mindanao Lumber
Company. A second meeting at the same place was held by the conspirators on the eve of the ambush to finalize the details of
the plot.
The company jeep of WMLC was used to get the payroll money from PNB Basilan branch. In the jeep was the driver, security
guard and accountant. On the return trip from the bank, four other passengers were picked up on the way to Kapatagan. Along
the KM 12 Isaebla-Kapatagan road were the accused taking their assigned places. Djalalang was armed with a rifle and all except
the two look-outs, Madjid and Asakil, were armed with barongs. When the jeep was approaching, Madjid signalled to the armed
group and the jeep was fired upon several times instantly killing the guard and wounding the driver. When the vehicle finally
stopped, the wounded driver and the rest of the passengers scampered for safety, leaving whatever things they had inside the
jeep. They in time reached a PU car which brought them back to Kapatagan. Another unsuspecting passenger jeep went on and
was also fired upon. The driver lost control of the vehicle and turned turtle by the side of the road killing the driver.

None of the survivors was able to recognize or identify the malefactors. On suspicion of having taken part in the ambushes,
Yakan Djalalang, Djalim, Hamiddin alias Sauril, Asakil, Amajul, Albani, Lahud, Wadja, Madjid and Amdad were apprehended by
the police, and later charged with robbery in band with murder and frustrated murder.

Relying on the extra-judicial confessions of Yakan Djalalang, who escaped from detention during the pendency of the cases
below; of Hamiddin alias Sauril, who pleaded guilty to both criminal cases; and of Wadja Madjid, the trial court convicted the
accused-appellants as conspirators. Wadja Madjid having earlier withdrawn his appeal, this, review will be confined only to the
cases of Asakil, Amdad, Amajul, Albani, and Lahud.

Issue: Whether in the absence of other identification, the extra-judicial confessions of Djalalang; Sauril and Wadja Madjid,
implicating the appellants herein are sufficient to convict the appellants

Held: No. "A confession made by a defendant is admissible against him but not against his co-defendant as to whom said
confession is hearsay evidence for he had no opportunity to cross-examine the former."

Neither Djalalang nor Sauril was called to the witness stand. Wadja Madjid, upon the other hand, denied having voluntarily
implicated his co-accused in his extra-judicial confession, and indeed denied having any knowledge that his co-accused had
taken part in the commission of the crimes in question. While it is true, as stated by the Solicitor General, that voluntary
extra-judicial confessions may be admitted to confirm direct testimonial evidence, without the latter, the confessions do not
warrant consideration. Here, aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the persons referred to, no direct evidence of
conspiracy or of involvement in the crimes in question was introduced.

6 Ong v. CA |

Facts: Petitioner, together with Tony Chua, received from Mrs. Flroentina Buyco 7 pieces of jewelries with the obligation to sell
the same and turn over the proceeds of the sale or to return if unsold an hour after the delivery of the same. However,
petitioner failed and refused to comply with their obligation despite repeated demands. An information for estafa was filed
against petitioner and Tony Chua.

Tony Chua, who disappeared with the jewelry and was charged in absentia, was later found and arrested in Manila. He became a
mental case and was confined in the mental hospital. Before the hearing of the instant case, he died. Hence, the trial on the
merits proceeded only against the petitioner.

The deceased Tony Chua had executed an affidavit absolving the petitioner from any participation in his jewelry transaction.
This affidavit confirmed his signature on Exhibit "A".

Issue: Whether Tony Chua's declaration

Held: Yes. Affidavit of co-accused who died during the trial absolving appellant of any part in the jewelry transaction in question
is an admission against interest and should be given weight.

7 People v. Nierra

Facts: Juliana Nierra and accused Paciano Nierra, her brother-in-law, were competitors in the business of launch transportation
and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. In order to monopolize the business in the locality, Paciano
conceived the idea of liquidating Juliana. Felicisimo Doblen accompanied Gaspar Misa, a convicted murderer who escaped from
Davao Penal Colony, to Paciano's house.

In the presence of Paciano's wife, Gaudencia, Misa agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of P3,000. The arrangement was
confirmed by Gaudencia. Misa contacted his friend Vicente Rojas to act as a lookout. In the evening of the killing, Doblen
delivered to Misa at the beach a caliber .38 pistol with 5 bullets.

Misa secluded himself near the back of Juliana's house where he had previously observed some nights before, she used to
answer the call of nature. The house was near the beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago. Juliana went to the beach and when
she squatted, Misa appeared behind her, thus tilting her face. He inserted the muzzle of the pistol into her mouth and fired it.
Paciano and Gaudencia who were near the beach witnessed the actual killing.

Misa was interrogated by the police. He signed a confession admitting the killing of Juliana and implicated Paciano and
Gaudencia Nierra, Rojas and Doblen. He also testified at the preliminary investigation admitting the killing and confirmed the
implication of his co-accused.

Appellants contend that before Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy could be admitted as evidence, the alleged
conspiracy ,ist first be proven by evidence other than such testimony and that there is no such independent evidence.

Issue: Whether Misa’s testimony implicating appellants Nierra can be admitted in the absence of proving the alleged conspiracy

Held: Yes. The rule that "the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given
in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration" applies only
to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial where the defendant has the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.

8 People v. Cusi

Facts: Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with
robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, and while Sgt. Lurio Baño, of the Police Force of Digos, Davao, was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding
the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Puesca. He said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in
the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the
name of each and everyone of them.

The prosecution asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused
Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as
his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning the names of the accused who objected.

The prosecution contends that its purpose was to establish the fact that the accused hail mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of
those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged.

Issue: Whether the Sgt. bano can testify as to the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused including the names of his
alleged co-conspirators in the commission of the offense

Held: Yes. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement.

In the instant case, the prosecution manifested that its purpose was to establish the fact that the accused hail mentioned to Sgt.
Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged. The question propounded to the witness was
proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not
to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took
part in the commission of the offense.

People v. Serrano | 105 PHIL 531

Facts: Eulogio told Cenon, Domingo, Santiago, Filemon and Anastacio who were gathered at the house of Eulogio that Pablo
Navarro had been prompting people to call on Senator Pablo David and testify on the Maliwalu massacre and for that he
manifested his desire and plan to do away with Pablo. Eulogio instructed them to wait for PABLO in Bacolor, lure him to go with
them to Dolores and there kill him. In pursuance of the plan, the group waited for PABLO in Bacolor where he used to hang
around. After three days of waiting, the group finally got to invite Pablo to a drink using a jeep driven by Simplicio Manguerra.
He was brought to Dolores where he was killed together with the jeepney driver.

Cenon, Benjamin Tolentino, Melchor Esguerra, Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul, Filemon Cenzon and Anastacio Reyes were
charged with illegal detention with murder for the death of Pablo Navarro an information filed by the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga. Upon motion of the assistant provincial fiscal, the Court ordered the discharge of Anastacio Reyes from the
information to testify as witness for the prosecution.

The appellants contend that in order that the testimony of a conspirator may be admissible in evidence against his
co-conspirator, it must appear and be shown by evidence other than the admission itself that the conspiracy actually existed and
that the person who is to be bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. And as there is nothing but the lone
testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy has been
established and in convicting the appellants based upon the lone testimony of their co-conspirator.

Issue: Whether the lone testimony of the co-conspirator is admissible in evidence against the appellants sufficient to establish
the conspiracy

Held: Yes. Section 30, Rules 130 that provides "The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration," applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime
is always subject to grave suspicion, "coming as it does from a polluted source," and should be received with great caution and
doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent