WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
CASE 1 CASTILLO VS CRUZ GR 182165
Facts: Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos
(the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local
projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The
pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of
Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC,
which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the
TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al.,
who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by
Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property,” entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting
that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing
it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment
for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.
Held:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage
of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the
writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended
to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue
on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property
dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any
considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’
right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’
entry into the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of
petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No
undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to
post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.
On the 2nd issue:
Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have
been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted
thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before
a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.
CASE 2 ROXAS VS MACAPAGAL – ARROYO GR NO. 189155
FACTS: Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United
States, enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a
member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions
rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her
companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was
informed that she is being detained for being a member of Communist Party of the
Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated from her
companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of
gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her
communist beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who
tortured her came from the “Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted
because her name is included in the “Order of Battle.”
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a
sim card. She was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas
continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of
apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of
military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the
Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court
of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the
court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the
respondents were responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo
petition.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of
the writ may be extended.
ANSWERS: No.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence.
Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally
inaccurate – The use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in
impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v.
Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by
the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative
under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.
However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained
acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which
case, commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence – In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to
parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of
directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of
identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based
on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as
to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life,
liberty or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended – An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the
writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the
case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual or threatened violation of
such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be
actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding
the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy
becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike
down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it
modified the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows:
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by
the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the
Constitution and existing laws.
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this
decision.
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its
corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection
to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may
hereinafter be determined by this Court.
The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least,
accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its
own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its consideration. It was
declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in
order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
CASE 3 MERALCO VS LIM GR NO. 184769
FACTS: An anonymous letter denouncing Rosario G. Lim, an administrative clerk at
the Manila Electric Co. [MERALCO], was posted and spread at their Plaridel Bulacan
office. Lim reported it to the local police. With these threats against her from unknown
individuals and which could possibly compromise her safety, Deyto, head of Human
Resources [HR] Staffing, transferred Lim to MERALCO Alabang.
Lim wrote to Sapitula, Vice President of HR, requesting for the deferment of transfer
pending her appeal, which states that (a) her side be heard, else a deprivation of due
process, as the transfer is ‘punitive’ in nature, considering (i) the travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and (ii) Alabang being unfamiliar to her, ‘betray[s]
the real intent of management’ (b) violates her job security (c) she should’ve been
informed of the alleged threats, dismissing the anonymous letter’s threats as highly
suspicious, or mere jokes.
With Sapitula not responding, Lim filed at the Bulacan Regional Trial Court Branch 7
(a) a Temporary Restraining Order on the transfer, and (b) a petition for the issuance
of a writ of habeas data [alleging that MERALCO’s failure to disclose the alleged
security threats against Lim is unlawful and violated her right to privacy to life, liberty
and security] against MERALCO.
MERALCO responds, stating that (a) the National Labor Relations Commission and
not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction, and (b) a writ of habeas data is out of
order. The RTC rules in favor of Lim.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: WON writ of habeas data is rightfully granted to Lim.
HELD: NO.
“A writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of ... a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person...”against abuse in this age of information
technology. It is intended usually for victims of extra-legal killings and political activists
and the RTC erred in extending such right to an ordinary citizen like Lim.
Employment is a property right under the due process clause. A writ of habeas data
neither protects purely property concerns nor supports vague or doubtful grounds for
petition. Lim’s allegation that her right to privacy was breached by MERALCO’s failure
to disclose to her the reports on the threats to Lim’s security is at best speculative.
Lim (a) dismissed the letter suspicious or a joke and (b) unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related in stating that management’s real intent is punitive.
The National Labor Relations Commission [and Labor Arbiters] indeed has jurisdiction
over the case, which concerns an employer-employee relationship, and its terms and
conditions, specifically Lim’s transfer.
Petition granted. RTC Decision dismissed.
CASE 4 VIVARES VS ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE GR NO. 202666
FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College
(STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz
and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments. Thereafter, some of their
classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through
her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to
STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action. Later, STC found Tan et al to have
violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation
ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the
Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies,
STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They argued, among
others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends
Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to
STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and
printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in
violation of the children’s right to privacy. The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper on the ground that
there in an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in the case.
HELD: YES it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.
Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case
of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity
engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would
suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
On the Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has
privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a
reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such
privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of
such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were
published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his
“wall” (profile page):
a. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
b. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
c. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
d. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and
e. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must
choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set
the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them (as they
claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was
not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their
teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use
the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
on the pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school
gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates
of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it
was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards
of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the first place
because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).