SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997.]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as O cer-in-Charge (OIC),

Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN,
JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural
Resources O cer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) , petitioners, vs . COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and
SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN , respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE; EXCEPTIONS. — This Court in a long line of cases has
consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
to by giving the administrative o cer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted rst before
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is
fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any nding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons
of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we
are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
exibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is
patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6)
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount
to a nulli cation of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The assumption by the trial
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 court of the replevin suit led by private respondents constitutes an unjusti ed
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which
was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned O cials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court
held: "Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long
line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies."
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy
beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within
the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, AS APPLIED TO ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS; CASE AT BAR. — Considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we
can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they
argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of the con scation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand
on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity
or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given
the opportunity to present their side when they led a letter of reconsideration dated June
28, 1989 which was, however denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that: "The essence due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satis ed when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the
absolute lack of notice or hearing.
4. ID.; ID.; P.D. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. 277; SECTION 68-A THEREOF; THE
PHRASE "TO DISPOSE OF THE SAME, CONSTRUED. — It is clear from Section 68-A of P.D.
705, as amended by E.O. 277, that the Secretary and his duly authorized that the courts
representatives are given the authority to con scate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase "to dispose of the
same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in accordance with pertinent
laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the construction of statutes, it must be read
in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be
suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 277, CONSTRUED. — With, the introduction
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 of Executive Order No. 277, amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a
distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order
No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of quali ed theft as de ned and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code" and inserted the words
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code." When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI OR PROHIBITION;
PROPER REMEDY TO QUESTION ORDERS OF CONFISCATION AND FORFEITURE UNDER
P.D. 705, AS AMENDED. — The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of con scation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the
authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that
actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the
enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary except
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

DECISION

TORRES , JR ., J : p

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an

action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to con scate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of
private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose,
Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources O cer
(CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of con scation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the
truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR
sustained petitioner Layugan's action of con scation and ordered the forfeiture of the
truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277. Private respondents led a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the
June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a
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 subsequent order of July 12, 1989. 2 Subsequently, the case was brought by the
petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents' statement in their
letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied
then "this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 3 Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was led by the
private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan 4 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the return of the
truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan led a
motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had
no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was led by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial court's order
ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8 Hence, this present petition, 9
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to
reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was led by the petitioners on
September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, 10 the prayer
for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that
the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the
justi cation that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to
be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to con scate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as
admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on
the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative o cer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then
such remedy should be exhausted rst before court's judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. 1 1
Accordingly, absent any nding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal
for lack of cause of action. 1 2 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative
remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It
is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is
not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its exibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, 1 3 (2) when the issue involved is
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 purely a legal question, 1 4 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 1 5 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, 1 6 (5) when there is irreparable injury, 1 7 (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 1 8 (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 1 9 (8) when it would amount to a
nulli cation of a claim, 2 0 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, 2 1 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 2 2
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the
Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of
the motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989.
In their letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, 23 private respondents clearly
recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did
avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus: cdtai

". . . If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action,
then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary." 24

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary
for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek court's intervention by ling an action for replevin for the
grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit led by private
respondents constitutes an unjusti ed encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant
a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 2 5 In Felipe
Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 2 6 which was reiterated in the recent
case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, 2 7 this Court held:
"Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies."

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the
circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process
because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of con scation of petitioner Layugan.
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 This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. 2 8 One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable
than oral argument, through pleadings. 2 9 In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 3 0 Indeed, deprivation
of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration, 3 1 as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they led
a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in an order of
July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, 3 2 we ruled that:
"The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A
formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirements are satis ed when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
is the absolute lack of notice or hearing."

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of
the truck because the administrative o cers of the DENR allegedly have no power to
perform these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to
con scate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be
gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
The pertinent provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 68. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The court shall further order the con scation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed,
as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegally [sic] used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found." (Emphasis ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private

respondents' thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not
mention nor include "conveyances" that can be the subject of con scation by the courts,
but to a large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other
provision of Section 68-A, which is quoted herein below:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly
Authorized Representative To Order Con scation. In all cases of violation of this
Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly
authorized representative, may order the con scation of any forest products
illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose
of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the
matter." (Emphasis ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly
authorized representatives are given the authority to con scate and forfeit any
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 conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The
phrase "to dispose of the same" is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting
conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made "in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter." In the construction
of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute. 3 3 Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will
advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the bene ts intended. 3 4 In this
wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant, thus:
"But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws 'more responsive
to present situations and realities' and in view of the 'urgency to conserve the
remaining resources of the country,' that the government opted to add Section 68-
A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally separate and
distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything else, it is intended to
supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of forestry laws through
criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277 — the law that added Section 68-A to
PD 705 — is most revealing:
'WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest
resources of the country for the bene t and welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos;

WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and

protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our
forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from
technical di culties. due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines: and
WHEREAS, to overcome this di culties, there is a need to penalize
certain acts more responsive to present situations and realities;'
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the
DENR to con scate, not only 'conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the
other hand, con scation of forest products by the 'court' in a criminal action has
long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist. the power
on con scation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section
68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A
would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277, supra."
35

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the
petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan that the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the
crime. This order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private
respondents, reads in part, viz.:
". . . while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the
commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable
for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be led against her as provided
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. . . ." 36

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order
and obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the
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 petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime"
is that it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being
used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as
amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
". . . However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further
amended by Executive Order No. 277 speci cally provides for the con scation of
the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not covered by the
required legal documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and
gathering of the product in question but the fact that she accepted the goods for
a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. . . ." 3 7

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime de ned and

punishable under Section 68 other than quali ed theft, so that, when petitioners admitted
in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as
provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily
private respondents could not have committed an act constituting a crime under Section
68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment
by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products
without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and
disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of quali ed theft as
de ned and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . ."
(Emphasis; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277)
"SEC. 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
'Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . ." (Emphasis; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending
Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705,
the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that
provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the
language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of
quali ed theft as de ned and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code " and inserted the words " shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code". When the statute is clear and explicit, there is
hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 3 8
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 From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be
sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents' failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies
in the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one's recourse to the
courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents' right of action, is
too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the
claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies
to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. 39 "To detain" is
de ned as to mean "to hold or keep in custody," 40 and it has been held that there is
tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or
claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual
seizing of the property is su cient. 41 Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in.
replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own a davit that he is entitled to
the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,
alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or
seized under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure,
and the actual value of the property. 42 Private respondents miserably failed to convince
this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It
should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the con scation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of
DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by
the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar. aisadc

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the
orders of con scation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority
given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken
by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts
may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for
certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
SEC. 8. REVIEW . — All actions and decisions of the Director are
subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by
the Department Head whose decision shall be nal and executory after the lapse
of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless
appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series of
1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of

Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET
ASIDE AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is
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 hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy
with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo p. 235.
2. Rollo pp. 241-242.
3. Rollo p. 239.
4. Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in office by
Petitioner Leonardo Paat.
5. Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.
6. Rollo pp. 251-252.
7. Rollo pp. 274-275.
8. Rollo pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices Luis A.
Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.

9. Rollo pp. 14-35.

10. Rollo pp. 117-119.
11. National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas Consolidated
Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-15809, August 30, 1961; Aboitiz v. Collector of
Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v. Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February
27, 1978.
12. Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-18276,
January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L-4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. District Engineer, L-
22782, August 29, 1975.
13. Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.
14. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.
15. Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.
16. Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.
17. De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.
18. Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata v. Peralta,
G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.
19. Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.
20. Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.
21. Soto v. Jareno, supra.
22. Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.
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 23. Rollo pp. 236-240.
24. Rollo p. 239.
25. Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.
26. G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.
27. G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.

28. Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15, 1995.
29. Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, supra.
30. Ibid.
31. Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23, 1995.
32. G R No. 101875, July 14, 1995.

33. Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.
34. De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.
35. Rollo pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.
36. Rollo p. 242.
37. Ibid.
38. Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.
39. American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote 57; I, Tanenbaum
Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85, 184 NE 503, 86
ALR 102.

40. Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 III 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27 Okla 754, 116
P 428.
41. Id., footnote 60; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.
42. Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.

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