Lawyer's Oath

I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance

to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance)
in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already,
as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in

Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the
bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys."

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).

Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see
attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is
purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address
and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has
not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated June
3, 1998, respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of
the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.

The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October
28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4
of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any
manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all
past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not
for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in
all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues.

Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22,
1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the
IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his
pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier
that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being
a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the
payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the
practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up
to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the
same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does
not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or
until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
94, respondents.
R E S O L U T I ON

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private respondent New
Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria Legarda to sign a
lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc. intended to use in
operating a restaurant.1

As prayed for in the complaint, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Victoria Legarda and her agents from
stopping the renovation of the property which was being done by New Cathay House, Inc. After hearing, the lower court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

Thereafter, Antonio P. Coronel of the Coronel Law Office at 146 Katipunan Road, White Plains, Quezon City, entered his appearance
as counsel for Victoria Legarda. He also filed an urgent motion for an extension of ten (10) days from February 6, 1985 within which to
file an answer to the complaint. The motion was granted by the court which gave Victoria Legarda until February 20, 1985 to answer the
complaint.

However, Victoria Legarda failed to file her answer within the extended period granted by the court. Hence, upon motion of New Cathay
House, Inc., she was declared in default, thereby paving the way for the presentation of evidence ex parte.

On March 25, 1985, the lower court rendered a decision by default. It ordered Victoria Legarda to execute and sign the lease contract
and to pay the following: (a) exemplary damages of P100,000.00, (b) actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of
P278,764.37 and (c) attorney's fees of P10,000.00.

Atty. Coronel received a copy of the lower court's decision on April 9, 1985 but he did not interpose an appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period. Consequently, the decision became final and, upon motion of New Cathay House, Inc., the lower court issued a
writ of execution. In compliance with the writ, on June 27, 1985, the sheriff levied upon, and sold at public auction, the property subject
of the litigation to New Cathay House, Inc., the highest bidder. The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

The one-year redemption period having expired on July 8, 1986, the sheriff issued a final deed of sale which, on July 11, 1986, was
duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. On November 6, 1986, Victoria Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact
Ligaya C. Gomez, filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the judgment against her in Civil Case No. Q-43811. She
alleged therein that the decision was obtained through fraud and that it is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings nor by the
evidence submitted.

Forthwith, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from dispossessing petitioner of the
premises in question. Private respondent New Cathay House, Inc. then filed its consolidated comment on the petition with a motion for
the lifting of the temporary restraining order. Victoria Legarda, through Atty. Coronel, filed a reply to the consolidated comment. The
petition was thereafter orally argued. Required by the Court of Appeals to manifest if the parties desired to file their respective
memoranda, Dean Coronel informed the appellate court that he was adopting Victoria Legarda's reply to the consolidated comment as
her memorandum.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on November 29, 1989. On the issue of fraud, for which Victoria Legarda claimed that
Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., who represented New Cathay House, Inc., made her believe through false pretenses that he was agreeable to
the conditions of the lease she had imposed on the lessee and that the latter would withdraw the complaint against her, thereby
prompting her to advise her lawyer not to file an answer to the complaint anymore, the Court of Appeals 2 said:

On the other hand, petitioner's above allegation of fraud supposedly practiced upon her by Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr. is
so improbable as to inspire belief. For the Coronel Law Office had already entered its appearance as petitioner's
counsel by then, so that if it were true that Cabrera had already agreed to the conditions imposed by petitioner, said
law office would have asked plaintiff to file the proper motion to dismiss or withdraw complaint with the Court, and if
plaintiff had refused to do so, it would have filed defendant's answer anyway so that she would not be declared in
 default. Or said law office would have prepared a compromise agreement embodying the conditions imposed by their
client in the lease contract in question which plaintiffs had allegedly already accepted, so that the same could have
been submitted to the Court and judgment on a compromise could be entered. All these, any conscientious lawyer of
lesser stature than the Coronel Law Office, headed by no less than a former law dean, Dean Antonio Coronel, or
even a new member of the bar, would normally have done under the circumstances to protect the interests of their
client, instead of leaving it to the initiative of plaintiff to withdraw its complaint against defendant, as it had allegedly
promised the latter. Thus, it is our belief that this case is one of pure and simple negligence on the part of the
defendant's counsel, who simply failed to file the answer in behalf of defendant. But counsel's negligence does not
stop here. For after it had been furnished with copy of the decision by default against defendant, it should then have
appealed therefrom or file (sic) a petition for relief from the order declaring their client in default or from the judgment
by default. Hence, defendant is bound by the acts of her counsel in this case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different if it had proceeded differently (Pulido v. C.A., 122 SCRA 63; Ayllon v. Sevilla, 156
SCRA 257, among other cases). And the rationale of this rule is obvious and clear. For "if such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be
employed who could allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or
learned" (Fernandez v. Tan Tiong Tick, 1 SCRA 1138). (Emphasis supplied.)

Finding the second ground for the petition to be likewise unmeritorious, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Surprisingly,
however, inspite of the Court of Appeals' tirade on his professional competence, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for
reconsideration. Neither did he initiate moves towards an appeal to this Court of the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his
client.

Thus, the Court of Appeals decision became final. On December 8, 1989, counsel for New Cathay House, Inc. sent petitioner through
the Coronel Law Office, a letter demanding that she vacate the property within three days from receipt thereof. Atty. Coronel did not
inform petitioner of this development until sometime in March, 1990. Due to petitioner's persistent telephone calls, Atty. Coronel's
secretary informed her of the fact that New Cathay House, Inc. had demanded her eviction from the property. Consequently, petitioner
had no recourse but to oblige and vacate the property. 3

On August 7, 1990, Victoria Legarda, represented by a new counsel, 4 filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
contending that the decisions of the courts below "are null and void as petitioner was deprived of her day in court and divested of her
property without due process of law through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel.5

In its decision of March 18, 1991, this Court declared as null and void the decisions of March 25, 1985 and November 29, 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals, respectively, as well as the sheriff's certificate of sale dated June 27,
1985 of the property involved and the subsequent final deed of sale covering the same. The Court further directed private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. to reconvey the property to the petitioner and the Register of Deeds to cancel the registration of said property
in the name of said private respondent and to issue a new one in the name of the petitioner.

The same decision required the former counsel of petitioner, Atty. Antonio Coronel, to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
he should not be held administatively liable for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner. Said counsel
having been inadvertently omitted in the service of copies of said decision, 6 on February 11, 1992, the Clerk of Court of this Division to
which this case was transferred, sent Atty. Coronel a copy thereof which he received on February 12, 1992. 7

On the tenth day from his receipt of said copy, Atty. Coronel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for an extension of thirty (30) days from
February 22, 1992 within which to file his explanation. He alleged as reason for the motion pressure of work "consisting of daily
hearings in several forums and preparations of pleadings in equally urgent cases, such as the more than 80 civil and criminal cases
against the Marcoses. 8

The Court, in its resolution of March 9, 1992, granted said motion for extension with warning that no further extension will be given. Atty.
Coronel received a copy of said resolution on March 27, 1992 but it appears that on March 24, 1992, 9 a day after the expiration of the
30-day extended period prayed for in his first motion for extension, he had mailed another urgent motion for a second extension of thirty
(30) days within which to submit his explanation on the ground that since March 2, 1992, he had been "treated and confined at the St.
Luke's Hospital." Attached to the motion is a medical certificate stating that Atty. Coronel had "ischemic cardiamyopathy, diabetes
mellitus, congestive heart failure class IV and brain infarction, thrombotic." 10

While off-hand, the reasons cited in the second motion for reconsideration seem to warrant another extension, the fact that it was filed
on day late, coupled with the circumstances of this case do not call for a reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1992. Hence, the
second motion for extension must be denied. Lawyers should not presume that their motions for extension of time will always be
granted by the Court. The granting or denial of motions for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court with a
view to attaining substantial justice. 11

It should be emphasized that the show-cause resolution was addressed to Atty. Coronel not in his capacity as a lawyer of a litigant in
this Court. It was addressed to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to the disciplinary powers of this Court. That he failed to
immediately heed the directive of the decision of March 18, 1991 to show cause, notwithstanding the grant of a 30-day extension for
him to do so, reflects an unbecoming disrespect towards this Court's orders. We cannot countenance such disrespect. As a lawyer,
Atty. Coronel is expected to recognize the authority of this Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. 12
Hence, the Court considers his failure to show cause, not-withstanding reasonable notice therefor, as a waiver of his rights to be heard
and to due process, thereby warranting an ex parte determination of the matter for which he had been required to explain. 13

The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that
"a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable."

Indeed, petitioner could not have gone through the travails attending the disposition of the case against her not to mention the
devastating consequence on her property rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member of the Bar. By
neglecting to file the answer to the complaint against petitioner, he set off the events which resulted in the deprivation of petitioner's
rights over her house and lot. In this regard, worth quoting is the observation of Justice Emilio A. Gancayco in his ponencia of March
18, 1991:

Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have abandoned
the cause of petitioner. After agreeing to defend the petitioner in the civil case filed against her by private respondent,
said counsel did nothing more than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the answer.
Nevertheless, he failed to file the answer. Hence, petitioner was declared in default on the motion of private
respondent's counsel. . . .

This is not the only case wherein, in dealing with this Court's orders, Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a pattern of negligence, inattention
to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness and superciliousness. In G.R. No. 97418, "Imelda R. Marcos, et al. v. PCGG, et al., the
Court en banc, in its Resolution of May 28, 1992, imposed upon Atty. Coronel a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) after he was
found guilty of inexcusable negligence in his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. The Court said:

We find the explanation for his failure to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
unsatisfactory, Atty. Coronel had obviously taken this Court for granted. Although he received a copy of the 4 June
1991 Resolution on 4 July 1991, he nonchalantly let the 10-day period pass and even deliberately chose to remain
silent about it even after he received a copy of the Resolution of 27 August 1991. It was only on the last day of the
period granted to him under said Resolution that he showed initial efforts to comply with the Resolution by filing a
motion for a 20-day extension from 30 September 1991 to file the Reply. This was a self-imposed period and,
therefore, he was expected to faithfully comply with it not only because of the respect due this Court, but also
because he had put his honor and virtues of candor and good faith on the line. For reasons only known to him, he did
not. Worse despite his receipt on 27 November 1991 of the Resolution of 5 November 1991 which granted his 30
September 1991 motion, Atty. Coronel did not even move for a new period within which to comply with the
Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991. This Court had to issue the Resolution of 30 January 1992 to
compel compliance. When he finally did, he committed, allegedly through inadvertence, the blunder of placing his
Reply under a wrong caption.

For deliberately failing, if not stubbornly refusing, to comply with the Resolutions of 4 June 1991 and 27 August 1991
and meet his self-imposed deadline. Atty. Coronel was both unfair and disrespectful to this Court. Furthermore, he
has unduly delayed the disposition of the pending incidents in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Undoubtedly, in the case at hand, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client
caused the latter material prejudice. 14 It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause, he covenants that he
will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause
makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the
latter. 15 Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey
this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be bent on
professional self-destruction. Be that as it may, Atty. Coronel cannot escape this Court's disciplinary action for gross negligence which
resulted in depriving petitioner of her property rights, for, as this Court enunciated in the aforecited Cantiller v. Potenciano case:

Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong
and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one's oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative.

Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.

WHEREFORE, the second motion for an extension of time to file explanation is hereby DENIED. Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby
found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution. A repetition
of the acts constituting gross negligence shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his personal record, another copy be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
copies thereof be circulated in all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
Bautista, Picazo, Buyco, Tan & Fider for petitioner.
Arturo A. Alafriz & Associates for and in their own behalf.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-
08268 1 affirming the order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil Cases Nos.
19123-28, 19136 and 19144, fixing attorney's fees and directing herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank, for brevity), as defendant in said civil cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and
Associates, movant therein, the amount of P936,000.00 as attorney's fees on a quantum meruit basis.

The records show that from March, 1974 to September, 1983, private respondent handled the above-mentioned civil
cases before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig (Branches I, II, VI, X, XIII, XIX, XX AND XXIV) in behalf of
petitioner. 2 The civil cases were all for the declaration of nullity of certain deeds of sale, with damages.

The antecedental facts 3 which spawned the filing of said actions are undisputed and are hereinunder set forth as found
by the trial court and adopted substantially in the decision of respondent court.

A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of
about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan
obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner
foreclosed the mortgages after which certificates of sale were issued by the provincial sheriff in its favor as purchaser
thereof Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by Javier in the sale
of the parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein.

It was during the pendency of these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation,
Service Leasing Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. On the same day, the properties
were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation for the purported price of P2,500,000.00.
Three months later, or on June 7, 1983, Herby mortgaged the same properties with Banco de Oro for P9,200,000.00. The
lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these transfers and transactions.
As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion
for substitution of party on July 28, 1983. Private respondent, on its part, filed on August 16, 1983 a verified motion to
enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's
fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted
the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the
parcels of land.

Meanwhile, the plaintiffs Alejandro, et al. in the aforesaid civil cases, which had been consolidated and were pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, filed a motion to dismiss their complaints therein, which motion the lower court
granted with prejudice in its order dated September 5, 1983. On December 29, 1983, the same court ordered the Register
of Deeds to annotate the attorney's liens of private respondent on the derivative titles which cancelled Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 453093 to 453099 of the original seven (7) parcels of land hereinbefore adverted to.
On May 28,1984, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion
precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid
private respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be
considered as full payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15,
1980. It further appears that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit,
offering a compromise amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
Finally, on October 15,1984, the court a quo issued the order assailed on appeal before respondent court, granting
payment of attorney's fees to private respondent, under the following dispositive portion:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the motion is hereby granted and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (METROBANK)
and Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation 4 are hereby ordered to pay the movant Arturo Alafriz and
Associates the amount of P936,000.00 as its proper, just and reasonable attorney's fees in these cases. 5
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its decision promulgated on February 11, 1988. A
motion for reconsideration, dated March 3, 1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in a resolution
promulgated on November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.

The issues raised and submitted for determination in the present petition may be formulated thus: (1) whether or not
private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's fees; (2) whether or not a
separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien and (3) whether or not private respondent is entitled to
twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that private respondent has no enforceable attorney's charging lien in the civil cases
before the court below because the dismissal of the complaints therein were not, in the words of Section 37, Rule 138,
judgments for the payment of money or executions issued in pursuance of such judgments. 6

We agree with petitioner.

On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
. . . He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or
issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party;
and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires
as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main
action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an
incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from which
the fee is to be paid. 7

In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill satisfaction of
their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any
litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so, private respondent's supposed
charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that there is nothing to generate it and to
which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and attaches to real or personal property.

In point is Morente vs. Firmalino, 9 cited by petitioner in support of its position. In that case, movant-appellant attorney
sought the payment of his fees from his client who was the defendant in a complaint for injunction which was dismissed by
the trial court after the approval of an agreement entered into by the litigants. This Court held:
. . . The defendant having suffered no actual damage by virtue of the issuance of a preliminary injunction, it follows that no
sum can be awarded the defendant for damages. It becomes apparent, too, that no amount having been awarded the
defendant, herein appellant's lien could not be enforced. The appellant, could, by appropriate action, collect his fees as
attorney.

Private respondent would nevertheless insist that the lien attaches to the "proceeds of a judgment of whatever
nature," 10 relying on the case of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. vs. Henares 11 and some American cases holding that
the lien attaches to the judgment recovered by an attorney and the proceeds in whatever form they may be. 12
The contention is without merit just as its reliance is misplaced. It is true that there are some American cases holding that
the lien attaches even to properties in litigation. However, the statutory rules on which they are based and the factual
situations involved therein are neither explained nor may it be said that they are of continuing validity as to be applicable
in this jurisdiction. It cannot be gainsaid that legal concepts of foreign origin undergo a number of variegations or nuances
upon adoption by other jurisdictions, especially those with variant legal systems.
In fact, the same source from which private respondent culled the American cases it cited expressly declares that "in the
absence of a statute or of a special agreement providing otherwise, the general rule is that an attorney has no lien on the
land of his client, notwithstanding such attorney has, with respect to the land in question, successfully prosecuted a suit to
establish the title of his client thereto, recovered title or possession in a suit prosecuted by such client, or defended
successfully such client's right and title against an unjust claim or an unwarranted attack," 13 as is the situation in the case
at bar. This is an inescapable recognition that a contrary rule obtains in other jurisdictions thereby resulting in doctrinal
rulings of converse or modulated import.

To repeat, since in our jurisdiction the applicable rule provides that a charging lien attaches only to judgments for money
and executions in pursuance of such judgment, then it must be taken in haec verba. The language of the law is clear and
unequivocal and, therefore, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, barring any necessity for elaborate
interpretation. 14

Notably, the interpretation, literal as it may appear to be, is not without support in Philippine case law despite the dearth of
cases on all fours with the present case. In Caina et al. vs. Victoriano, et al., 15 the Court had the occasion to rule that "the
lien of respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal claim enforceable
by a writ of execution." In Ampil vs. Juliano-Agrava, et al., 16 the Court once again declared that a charging lien
"presupposes that the attorney has secured a favorable money judgment for his client . . ." Further, in Director of Lands
vs. Ababa, et al., 17 we held that "(a) charging lien under Section 37, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited only
to money judgments and not to judgments for the annulment of a contract or for delivery of real property as in the instant
case."

Even in the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private respondent, there was an express
declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not attach to the property in litigation."

Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client from the adverse party in any
action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter
of the litigation. 18 More specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not entitled
to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the
client's title to property already in the client's possession. 19

While a client cannot defeat an attorney's right to his charging lien by dismissing the case, terminating the services of his
counsel, waiving his cause or interest in favor of the adverse party or compromising his action, 20 this rule cannot find
application here as the termination of the cases below was not at the instance of private respondent's client but of the
opposing party.

The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion which amply demonstrates that
private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien. Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that
an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction
subsists until the lien is settled. 21 There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition to
determine attorney's fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. 22 These decisional rules, however, apply
only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the rules.

On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or interfere with the authority and
adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought
by private respondent.

A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be
prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim. The persons who are entitled to or who
must pay attorney's fees have the right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious
necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.

Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, the
elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the
services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. 24 These are aside from the several other
considerations laid down by this Court in a number of decisions as pointed out by respondent court. 25 A determination of
all these factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private respondent can adduce
evidence to establish its right to lawful attorney's fees and for petitioner to oppose or refute the same.

Nothing in this decision should, however, be misconstrued as imposing an unnecessary burden on private respondent in
collecting the fees to which it may rightfully be entitled. But, as in the exercise of any other right conferred by law, the
proper legal remedy should be availed of and the procedural rules duly observed to forestall and obviate the possibility of
abuse or prejudice, or what may be misunderstood to be such, often to the undeserved discredit of the legal profession.
Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job
done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. 26
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of
February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such
appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

FACTS:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas. In a letter-
complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that Atty.
Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge of Makati. He
also had criminal case involving estafa but was appealed pending in the Court of Appeals.

On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is only engaged in a limited practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the payment of membership dues

In the numerous violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law.

CANON 7: A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated
bar.

CANON 10: A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his
pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions.

Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of law and for being a
senior citizen.

Or

Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

Even if he had “limited” practice of law, it does not relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues.

Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues
for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for
six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal
of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of
law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

Legarda v CA

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements located at 123 West Avenue,
Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific
performance with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with
the private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner.
Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign
the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion
for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file
the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare
petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal
therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to
satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of
private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a
final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to
private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her great shock, what happened to
her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such
appropriate action possible under the circumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But
that was all he did. After an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said
counsel did not inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for
review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner
that she learned from the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.

HELD: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client
except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not
be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public. 12

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning
and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court,
but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process of law.

The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was compounded
by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a
petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that
after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do anything to save the situation or
inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross
negligence should not be allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.

Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the property of petitioner, private
respondent went to court, and that because of the gross negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as
well as the title and ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the owner of
the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all because her lawyer appear to have
abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.

G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (petitioner)

vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Arturo Alafriz and Associates (respondents)

FACTS:

A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area
of about ten (10) hectares. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to secure a loan
obligation of one Felix Angelo Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. During the pendency of these suits that these
parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation, Service Leasing Corporation and on the same day, the
properties were resold by the latter to Herby Commercial and Construction Corporation. Three months later, mortgaged the
same properties with Banco de Oro wherein the lower court found that private respondent, did not have knowledge of these
transfers and transactions.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party as a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to
Service Leasing Corporation. Private respondent, on its part, filed a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid
civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%)
of the actual and current market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. Despite due notice, petitioner failed
to appear and oppose said motion, as a result of which the lower court granted the same and ordered the, Register of Deeds
of Rizal to annotate the attorney's liens on the certificates of title of the parcels of land.
 Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an
exchange of arguments between the parties. On May 30, 1984, petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent; the latter, in turn, countered that the amount of P50,000.00 given by petitioner could not be considered as full
payment but merely a cash advance, including the amount of P14,000.00 paid to it on December 15, 1980. It further appears
that private respondent attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, offering a compromise
amount of P600,000.00 but the negotiations were unsuccessful.

ISSUES:
Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney's
fee.
Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current market values of the
litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD:

NO. On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides: He shall also have a lien to the same extent
upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured
in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written
notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements. Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in
the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition
as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from
which the fee is to be paid. The civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the frill
satisfaction of their claims."

NOT NECESSARY. At this juncture an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is within the jurisdiction of the court
trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the lien is settled. Court trying main case will determine attorney’s
fees.