G. R. No.

134241 - August 11, 2003

DAVID REYES (Substituted by Victoria R. Fabella), Petitioner, v. JOSE LIM, CHUY CHENG KENG
and HARRISON LUMBER, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Reyes led a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against
respondents alleging that petitioner as seller and respondent Lim as buyer entered into a
contract to sell a parcel of land. Lim paid ten million pesos as down payment upon the signing of
the contract. However, before the payment of the balance, Lim learned that Reyes had already
sold the property to another buyer. Lim sought the cancellation of the contract to sell and
requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the ten million down payment with
the trial court which was granted by the latter. Reyes led a Motion to Set Aside the Order but
the same was denied. Reyes led a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), but it
was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

Issues:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court could issue the
questioned Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and October 3, 1997, requiring
petitioner David Reyes to deposit the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
during the pendency of the action, when deposit is not among the provisional remedies
enumerated in Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in nding the trial court could issue the questioned
Orders on grounds of equity when there is an applicable law on the matter, that is, Rules 57 to
61 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

Ruling:

The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is hiatus in
the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will result in unjust
enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court excercised equity jurisdiction. The
purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution so that substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or
customary forms of ordinary law are inadequate.
The Supreme Court also state that rescission is possible only when the person demanding
rescission can return whatever he may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a
contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante.
In this case, it was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of
the P10 million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Silverio v. Republic

October 22, 2007 (GR. No. 174689)

PARTIES:

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel
Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila,
Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is
anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging
that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name
is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually
used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is
that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows
the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. The
Court denied the petition.

Ocampo v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973

Facts:

During the campaign period for 2016 presidential elections, candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte
oublicly announced that he woukd akkow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).
On August 7, 2016, Sc. of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memo to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Gen. Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the LNMB.
Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in
the Malacanang Palace.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Philippine Army regarding the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

Issues:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies
and hierarchy of courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws.

Ruling:
The petitions must be dismissed
Justiciable controversy
 It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless the following requisites for
judicial inquiry are present:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

In this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders
the discussion of the last two superfluous.
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the
ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative
Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided
a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
Locus standi
Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result
of an act complained of, such proper party has no standing.
 Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar
and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they
have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is
essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement of
public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either
express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means of
administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can
still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court’s judicial power can be sought.
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until
the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,

petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those exceptions.

Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are
lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts,
but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining
order and injunction when proven necessary.

Constitutionality
 The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because
it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people’s act of revolting against an
authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and
a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear
condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections
2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI,
and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.

There is no merit to the contention.

As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective
history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just
about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial
at the LNMB.

MUN. OF TANGKAL vs. HON. BALINDONG

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, Petitioner, vs. HON.
RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial
District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN
DIMNANG B. ALOMPO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017

Facts
The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with the
Shari'a District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality
of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of
approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged
that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with
the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the
construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed
a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until
1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed
that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period nor
returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as
successors-in-interest of Macalabo.
 The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents
no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have
been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

In its Order dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a District Court denied the Municipality of
Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is
a Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction
concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It added that venue was properly laid because the
Shari'a District Court has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del
Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss
is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts.
The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari'a
District Court. The Shari'a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer
within 10 days. The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer and raised as an affirmative
defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.
Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to
us via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the
Shari'a District Court has no jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious
affiliation.

Issue

Whether or not the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for
recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a
Muslim.

Held
The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, specifically in Article 143. Consistent with the purpose of the law
to provide for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among
Muslims, it has a catchall provision granting Shari'a district courts original jurisdiction over
personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. cralawred The
Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil courts, i.e.,
municipal trial courts and regional trial courts. There is, however, a limit to the general
jurisdiction of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such
jurisdiction may only be invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the
action must be filed before the regular courts.
The complaint below, which is a real action involving title to and possession of the land
situated at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari'a
District Court pursuant to the general jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b). In determining
whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold question is
whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as
plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because
the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim.

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the
parties involved are Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest.
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this
case, the parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the private respondents, as real
party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real party defendant. In their complaint,
private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Macalabo, entered into an
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land. Their cause of action is based
on the Municipality of Tangkal's alleged failure and refusal to return the land or pay for its
reasonable value in accordance with the agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the return of the
land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus, a judgment in favor of private
respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to rentals, would
undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of
Tangkal which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall
currently stands or be required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in
favor of the Municipality of Tangkal would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the
claims of private respondents.

It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was
impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of
Tangkal. When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither
does he become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a
Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement
under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real
party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition,
however, is a legal impossibility.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the
oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the
definition does not explicitly distinguish between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless
connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental personal right. The ability to testify to
the "oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to profess Islam is, by its nature,
restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with "no
consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33 They are considered persons
only by virtue of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the
Local Government Code, a municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as
a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory.

Ruling

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court
of Marawi City in Civil Case No. 201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No.
201-09 is DISMISSED.

Firestone Tire vs. CA

Firestone Tire & rubber Co. vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 113236 March 5, 2001

FACTS: Fojas-Arca Enterprises Company maintained a special account with respondent

Luzon Development Bank which authorized and allowed the former to withdraw funds from its
account through the medium of special withdrawal slips. Fojas-Arca purchased on credit
products from Firestone with a total amount of P4,896,000.00. In payment of these purchases,
Fojas-Arca delivered to plaintiff six special withdrawal slips drawn upon the respondent bank.
In turn, these were deposited by the plaintiff with its current account with the Citibank. All of
them were honored and paid by the Luzon Development Bank. However, in a subsequent
transaction involving the payment of withdrawal slips by Fojas-Arca for purchases on credit from
petitioner, two withdrawal slips for the total sum of P2,078,092.80 were dishonored and not
paid by respondent bank for the reason “NO ARRANGEMENT”.

As a consequence, the Citibank debited Firestone’s account for the total sum of
P2,078,092.80 representing the aggregate amount of the above-two special withdrawal slips.
Under such situation, plaintiff averred that the pecuniary losses it suffered is caused by and
directly attributable to defendants gross negligence. Hence, Firestone filed a case before the
RTC, but such was dismissed. The case was appealed by the CA.
 ISSUE:

Whether or not the acceptance and payment of the special withdrawal slips gives the
impression that it is a negotiable instrument like a check?

HELD: No.

The essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit

instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The withdrawal slips
in question lacked this character. As the withdrawal slips in question were non-negotiable, the
rules governing the giving of immediate notice of dishonor of negotiable instruments do not
apply.

The respondent bank was under no obligation to give immediate notice that it would not
make payment on the subject withdrawal slips. Citibank should have known that withdrawal slips
were not negotiable instruments. It could not expect these slips to be treated as checks by other
entities. Payment or notice of dishonor from respondent bank could not be expected
immediately, in contrast to the situation involving checks. Citibank was not bound to accept the
withdrawal slips as a valid mode of deposit. But having erroneously accepted them as such,
Citibank – and petitioner as account-holder – must bear the risks attendant to the acceptance of
these instruments.

It bears stressing that Citibank could not have missed the non-negotiable nature of the
withdrawal slips. The essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit
instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The withdrawal slips
in question lacked this character.

A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. The fact that
the other withdrawal slips were honored and paid by respondent bank was no license for
Citibank to presume that subsequent slips would be honored and paid immediately. By doing so,
it failed in its fiduciary duty to treat the accounts of its clients with the highest degree of care.
 CASE DIGEST: DAVID LU, Petitioner, v. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR.,
VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM, KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents. CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No. 157381 & G.R. No. 170889.

FACTS: The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for “Declaration of
Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution” filed on August 14, 2000 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al. against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father
and sons) and LLDC.
The RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by annulling the issuance of the shares of stock
subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father and sons at less than par value, and ordering the dissolution
and asset liquidation of LLDC.
n G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate court’s
resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the receivership
order which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the Court, by Decision of August
26, 2008 resolved that the issue was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the
trial court’s decision on the merits.

The Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009, reconsidered its position on

the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
for David Lu, et al.’s failure to pay the correct docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and
incidents subject of the present petitions must consequently be denied.

ISSUE: Have the resolutions become final and immutable?

HELD: The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final and executory
decisions.
Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained
doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered
unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final.
That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional error
cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of “occasional error”
but also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles
of law were modified or reversed by the Court’s Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution.
GRANTED.
YARED VS ILARDE
SOCIAL JUSTICE OFFICERS VS LIM
 BANCO DE ORO, et al. v.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 198756, 13 January 2015, EN BANC (Leonen, J.)
Should there have been a simultaneous sale to 20 or more lenders/investors, the
PEACE
Bonds are deemed deposit substitutes within the meaning of Section 22(Y) of the
1997 National
Internal Revenue Code and RCBC Capital/CODE-NGO would have been obliged to
pay the
20%final withholding tax on the interest or discount from the PEACE Bonds.
A notice by the Bureau of Treasury (BTr) to all Government Securities Eligible
Dealer (GSED) entitled Public Offering of Treasury Bonds denominated as the
Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates or the PEACE Bonds, announced
that P30 Billion worth of 10-year Zero-Coupon Bonds will be auctioned on Oct. 16,
2011. The notice stated that the Bonds “shall be issued to not more than 19
 buyers/lenders. Lastly, it stated that “while taxable shall not be subject to the 20%
final
withholding tax” pursuant to the BIR Revenue Regulation No. 020 2001. After the
auction, RCBC which participated on behalf of CODE-NGO was declared as the
winning bidder having tendered the lowest bids. On October 7, 2011, “the BIR
issued the assailed 2011 BIR Ruling imposing a 20% FWT on the Government
Bonds and directing the BTr to withhold said final tax at the maturity thereof.
Furthermore the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. DA
378-201157 clarifying that the final withholding tax due on the discount or interest
earned on the PEACE Bonds should “be imposed and withheld not only on
RCBC/CODE NGO but also onall subsequent holders of the Bonds.
Banco de Oro, et al. filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court contending that the assailed 2011 BIR Ruling
which ruled that “all treasury bonds are ‘deposit substitutes’ regardless of the
number of lenders, in clear disregard of the requirement of twenty (20) or more
lenders mandated under the NIRC. Furthermore it will cause substantial
impairment
of their vested rights under the Bonds since the ruling imposes new conditions by
“subjecting the PEACE Bonds to the twenty percent (20%) final withholding tax
notwithstanding the fact that the terms and conditions thereof as previously
represented by the Government, through respondents BTr and BIR, expressly
state
that it is not subject to final withholding tax upon their maturity.”
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue countered that the BTr has no
power to contractually grant a tax exemption in favour of Banco de Oro, et al..
Moreover, they contend that the word “any” in Section 22(Y) of the National
Internal Revenue Code plainly indicates that the period contemplated is the entire
 term of the bond and not merely the point of origination or issuance.
ISSUE:
Is the 10-year zero-coupon treasury bonds issued by the Bureau of Treasury
subject to 20% Final Withholding Tax?
UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015
RULING
Under Sections 24(B)(1), 27(D)(1), and 28(A)(7) of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code, a final withholding tax at the rate of 20% is imposed on interest on
any currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit
substitutes and from trust funds and similar arrangements. Under Section 22(Y),
deposit substitute is an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public (the
term 'public' means borrowing from twenty (20) or more individual or corporate
lenders at any one time).
Hence, the number of lenders is determinative of whether a debt instrument
should be considered a deposit substitute and consequently subject to the 20%
final
withholding tax. Furthermore the phrase “at any one time” for purposes of
determining the “20 or more lenders” would mean every transaction executed in
the
primary or secondary market in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
In the case at bar, it may seem that there was only one lender — RCBC on
behalf of CODE-NGO — to whom the PEACE Bonds were issued at the time of
origination. However, a reading of the underwriting agreement and RCBC term
sheet reveals that the settlement dates for the sale and distribution by RCBC
Capital
(as underwriter for CODE-NGO) of the PEACE Bonds to various undisclosed
investors.
 At this point, however, we do not know as to how many investors the PEACE
Bonds were sold to by RCBC Capital. Should there have been a simultaneous sale
to
20 or more lenders/investors, the PEACE Bonds are deemed deposit substitutes
within the meaning of Section 22(Y) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
and RCBC Capital/CODE-NGO would have been obliged to pay the 20%final
withholding tax on the interest or discount from the PEACE Bonds. Further, the
obligation to withhold the 20% final tax on the corresponding interest from the
PEACE Bonds would likewise be required of any lender/investor had the latter
turned around and sold said PEACE Bonds, whether in whole or part,
simultaneously to 20 or more lenders or investors.
QUEROBIN VS COMELEC
PEMBERTON VS DE LIMA
MAZA v. HON. TURLA
Liza L. Maza, et al. Vs. Hon. Evelyn A. Turla, et al.
G.R. No. 187094
February 15, 2017

LIZA L. MAZA v. EVELYN A. TURLA, GR No. 187094, 2017-02-15

Facts:

Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, and Rafael V. Mariano
(petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives. Liza represented
Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela), Saturnino and Teodoro represented Bayan Muna
Party-List (Bayan Muna), while Rafael represented Anakpawis Party-List (Anakpawis).
Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.[8] His
findings show that the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the
killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party List (AKBAYAN), a rival of Bayan Muna and
Gabriela.[9] Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community
organizers,[10] whereas Jimmy Peralta was mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an
AKBAYAN supporter.

Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted and that

an Information for each count of murder be filed against the 19 individuals.

The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint Resolution,[24] reviewed and
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor
Florendo). The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang
and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe, against
the nineteen 19 suspects. However, the panel considered one of the suspects, Julie Flores
Sinohin, as a state witness. The panel recommended that the corresponding Informations
be filed against the remaining suspects.[25] On the same day, two (2) Informations[26]
for murder were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva
Ecija, (Palayan cases) and an Information[27] for kidnapping with murder was filed in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).

Judge Turla REMANDED the case to the prosecutor.

On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A. Atienza-Turla (Judge Turla) issued an
Order[37] on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases"

There is no dispute that the two (2) Informations for murder were filed without first
affording the movants their right to file a motion for reconsideration. The denial thereof
is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone
already renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. The
inevitable conclusion is that the movants were not only effectively denied the
opportunity to file a "Motion for Reconsideration" of the "Joint Resolution" dated April
11, 2008 issued by the panel of prosecutors assigned in these cases, but were also
deprived of their right to a full preliminary investigation preparatory to the filing of the
Information against them.

Judge Turla added that her order of remanding the Palayan cases back to the provincial
prosecutors "for a complete preliminary investigation is not a manifestation of ignorance
of law or a willful abdication of a duty imposed by law ... but due, to the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in [the cases] and not just 'passing the buck' to the panel of
prosecutors[

ORDER the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to conduct the preliminary
investigation on the incidents subject matter hereof in accordance with the mandates of
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner to Supreme Court:

Petitioners pray that the July 18, 2008 and December 2, 2008 Orders of Judge Turla be
set aside and annulled and that the murder cases against them be dismissed for failure
to show probable cause. They also ask for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Turla from remanding the cases to
the provincial prosecutors, and "the respondent prosecutors from conducting further
preliminary investigation [on] these cases."

Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors
had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the
evidence submitted by the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have
determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the
dismissal of the Palayan cases.

Respondent's assignment of errors

Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of hierarchy
of courts.
Respondents also allege that respondent Secretary Gonzalez was wrongly impleaded.

On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her constitutional duty to determine
robable cause, respondents counter that she did not abandon her mandate.

Furthermore, respondent prosecutors' finding of probable cause is correct since evidence

against petitioners show that more likely than not, they participated in the murder of the
alleged victims.

Petitioners' Reply

Aside from reiterating their allegations and arguments in the petition, they added that
direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction was allowed as their petition involved
legal questions.

Issues:

whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she remanded the
Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary investigation

Ruling:

The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of another
preliminary investigation is improper

Petitioners assert that the documents submitted along with the Informations are
sufficient for Judge Turla to rule on the existence of probable cause. If she finds the
evidence inadequate, she may order the prosecutors to present additional evidence.
Thus, according to petitioners, Judge Turla's action in remanding the case to the
prosecutors for further preliminary investigation lacks legal basis.

Petitioners' contention has merit.

A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court
judge has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if
findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause.

The trial court judge's determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination
of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function.

In Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, et al.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and
on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard
the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation,

it was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the
accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting
documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or
require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to
remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation.
In doing so, she acted without any legal basis.

Principles:

Upon filing of an information in court, trial court judges must determine the existence or
non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's
report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant,
or require the submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case
for another conduct of preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier
preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.

No less than the Constitution commands that "no ... warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce[.]" This
requirement of personal evaluation by the judge is reaffirmed in Rule 112, Section 5 (a)
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure[.]

Therefore, the determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that
for issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the
trial court acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN & MARCOS

G.R. No. 155832 : December 7, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and

IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.

ABAD, J.:
FACTS:

Immediately after assuming power, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order
1, creating the PCGG. She empowered the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth allegedly
amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, and close associates during
his 20-year regime.

Acting on the authority given them, Attys. Ramirez and Abella issued a sequestration
order against the Marcoses Olot, Tolosa, Leyte property (Olot Resthouse), a 17-room
affair sitting on 42 hectares of beachfront land, with a golf course, swimming pool,
cottages, a pelota court, and a pavilion.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed a complaint for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth against President Marcos and his wife, respondent Mrs.
Marcos, before the Sandiganbayan.

Mrs. Marcos filed a motion to quash the March 18, 1986 sequestration order against the
Olot Resthouse, claiming that such order, issued only by Attys. Ramirez and Abella, was
void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. The rules required
the signatures of at least two PCGG Commissioners.

The Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, granting the motion to quash and
ordering the full restoration of the Olot Resthouse to Mrs. Marcos.

ISSUE: Whether or not sequestration order against the Olot Resthouse, issued by PCGG
agents before the enactment of the PCGG rules, was validly issued.

HELD: No. Sandiganbayan Decision Affirmed.

POLITICAL LAW- Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of
sequestration may only issue upon a showing "of a prima facie case" that the properties
are ill-gotten wealth under Executive Orders 1 and 2
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v. PCGG, the Court held that a prima facie
factual foundation that the properties sequestered are "ill-gotten wealth" is required.
The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG
as an incident to its investigatory powers. The two-commissioner rule is obviously
intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact.

Here, it is clear that the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the sequestration of the Olot Resthouse. The
Republic presented no evidence before the Sandiganbayan that shows differently. Nor
did the Republic demonstrate that the two PCGG representatives were given the quasi-
judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant such a prima facie
finding.

Parenthetically, the Republics supposed evidence does not show how the Marcoses
acquired the sequestered property, what makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how former
President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the resolution
of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered whether or not it
could prima facie be considered ill-gotten should be necessary.

Even assuming arguendo that Atty. Ramirez had been given prior authority by the PCGG
to place Dio Island Resort under sequestration, nevertheless, the sequestration order he
issued is still void since PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its
representatives and subordinates, and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective.

The absence of a prior determination by the PCGG of a prima facie basis for the
sequestration order is, unavoidably, a fatal defect which rendered the sequestration of
respondent corporation and its properties void ab initio. Being void ab initio, it is deemed
non-existent, as though it had never been issued.

POLITICAL LAW- judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated

Although the two PCGG lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18,
1986, before the passage of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial
following our above ruling.

In PCGG v. Judge Pe, the Court held that the powers, functions and duties of the PCGG
amount to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, and the exercise of such functions
cannot be delegated by the Commission to its representatives or subordinates or task
forces because of the well-established principle that judicial or quasi-judicial powers may
not be delegated.

DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST: ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EIJI* YANAGISAWA

Published by geline on July 26, 2013 | Leave a response
ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) V. EIJI* YANAGISAWA

G.R. No. 175303, [April 11, 2012]

DOCTRINE:

An undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation, made in open court and
embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on the title of the said property, creates
a right in favor of the person relying thereon. The latter may seek the annulment of
actions that are done in violation of such undertaking.

FACTS:

Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanesenational, and Evelyn F. Castañeda (Evelyn),

a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the City Hall of Manila.
On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit located at Bo.
Sto. Niño, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Parañaque townhouse unit). The Registry of Deeds
for Parañaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 99791 to “Evelyn P. Castañeda,
Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa, Japanese citizen[,] both of legal age.”

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Evelyn on
the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed
a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a
Writ of a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the said
motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties
registered in her name during the pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application
and motion moot. Said undertaking was annotated on the title of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner Pacific
Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage
(REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Parañaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.
The instrument was submitted to the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City for annotation
on the same date.

At the time of the mortgage, Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered
the liquidation of their registered properties, including the Parañaque townhouse unit,
with its proceeds to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did
not lift or dissolve its Order on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the
properties registered in her name.

Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the mortgage as
a violation of the Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM
(annulment of mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN.

For its defense, PAFIN denied prior knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order against
Evelyn. It admitted, however, that it did not conduct any verification of the title with the
Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City “because x x x Evelyn was a good, friendly and trusted
neighbor.” PAFIN maintained that Eiji has no personality to seek the annulment of the
REM because a foreign national cannot own real properties located within the
Philippines.

Evelyn also denied having knowledge of the October 2, 1996 Order. Evelyn asserted that
she paid for the property with her own funds and that she has exclusive ownership
thereof.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA Decision, which allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC
ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged property. PAFIN insists that the CA
sustained a violation of the constitution with its declaration that an alien can have an
interest in real property located in the Philippines.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether a real property in the Philippines can be part of the community property of
a Filipina and her foreigner spouse;

2. Whether a real property registered solely in the name of the Filipina wife is
paraphernal or conjugal;

3. Who is entitled to the real property mentioned above when the marriage is declared
void?

4. Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same
issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

RATIO:

Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the CA did notmake any disposition as to who between
Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC
had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with
by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified that it was improper for the Parañaque RTC
to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.

Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the
ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the REM.

The Court disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of
the Parañaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking
its annulment. Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to
dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996 Order of the
Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.

It was Evelyn and PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real property as their defense
to the suit. They maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the
Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this argument is
beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This defense
does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to
hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on
the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this defense.

Petitioner did not question the rest of the appellate court’s ruling, which held that Evelyn
and PAFIN executed the REM in complete disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996
Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on TCT No. 99791. It did not dispute the legal
effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s capacity to encumber the Parañaque
townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a mortgagee in bad faith.
The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a
standing injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are
not in good faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action
to seek the annulment of the offending actions.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised by
the petitioner.

CONRADO B. NICART v. MA. JOSEFINA C. TITONG, GR No. 207682, 2014-12-10

Facts:
A few days prior to the end of his term, then Governor of Eastern Samar Ben P. Evardone
(Evardone) issued ninety-three (93) appointments between May 11, 2010 and June 29,
2010, including that of herein respondents Ma. Josefina Titong (Titong) and
JoselitoAbrugar, Sr. (Abrugar),... which appointments were later confirmed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Consequently, the appointees immediately assumed their
respective positions.
Upon submission, however,of the appointments to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Regional Office (CSCRO) No. VIII, all 93 appointments were disapproved for having been
made in violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007
Evardone appealed the disapproval but it was dismissed for non-payment of the requisite
filing fee and the appointments having been issued in violation of said circular.
Respondents, for their part, individually moved for reconsideration of the disapproval of their
respective... appointments but later withdrew their motions via an Omnibus Joint Motion and
separately converted the same to an Appeal by means of a petition for review with the CSC
proper.
Titong and Abrugar requested the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of
their first salary which was denied by the Commission on Audit (COA) Provincial Office and
by petitioner, who at that time was already the incumbent
Governor.
petitioner, in the main, argues that the appointments were in violation ofsaid Section 21 of
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, s. 2007 and that the exemptions laid down in Nazareno
v City of Dumaguete[4] were not met for the following reasons:
(a) there was no need to fill up the vacancies immediately; and (b) the appointments were
made en masse.
In view of petitioner's continued refusal to pay their salaries, among others, despite the
service of the writ of executionupon him and with CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 still pending
resolution, respondents filed before the RTC a Petition for Mandamus with Unspecified
Damagesagainst... herein petitioner, the Vice Governor, and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan,docketed as in Civil Case No. 4236.[5] In it, they prayed that
therein respondents be directed to: (a) pay Titong and Abrugar their salaries and other
emoluments or... benefits due them from their assumption of office on June 21, 2010 up to
the present; (b) incorporate their salaries in the annual budget of the Province; (c) pay
herein respondents damages and attorney's fees; and (d) recognize their appointments as
valid, among... others.
On July 3, 2012, with Civil Case No. 4236 still pending, the CA rendered a Decision[8] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 granting the petition and ruling that respondents' appointments are
not valid for having been issued in violation of CSC Rules and for failure to... comply with
the requisites set forth by jurisprudence.[9] Consequently, the CA held, respondents can no
longer claim entitlement to the payment of their salaries from the government and that it is
the appointing authority who shall be personally liable for... their salaries, as directed by
Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel
Actions
RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4236
Pending this Court'saction onrespondents' motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 203835,
the RTC, on April 11, 2013, rendered the assailed Decision[11] in Civil Case No. 4236 in
favor of Titong and Abrugar, disposing of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the herein Petition for Mandamus is
hereby GRANTED. The prayer of respondents in their Comment asking for the dismissal of
this petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
According to the RTC, the non-issuance by the CA of a restraining order or injunction
restraining it from proceeding with Civil Case No. 4236, coupled with respondents' filing of a
Rule 45 petition before this Court (G.R. No. 203835) thereby staying the Decision of the CA
which... reversed the ruling of the CSC and declared respondents' appointment as invalid,
results in the continued effectivity of the CSC Decision in respondents' favor.
Issues:
whether or not the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC upholding the legality of
respondents' appointment remains to be proper considering Our affirmation of the invalidity
thereof in Our Resolutions of February 27, 2013 and
February 10, 2014.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The central foundation for the RTC's continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4236
and the rendering of the assailed Decision, among others, is Section 82 of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999.[18] Said provision states that the filing and...
pendency of a petition for review with the [CA] or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall not
stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a
restraining order or an injunction. This, coupled with the non-issuance by the CA of an
injunction... or restraining order upon CSC Resolution No. 1100653, and itsopinion that the
CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 119975 will not constitute res judicata or in any way affect
the petition for mandamus considering that the reliefs sought were allegedly not founded on
the same facts,... convinced the trial court that there is sufficient basis to grant the petition
and issue a writ of mandamus compelling petitioner, among others, to acknowledge
respondents' appointment and to pay the salaries and emoluments due them.
Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or restraining order would make the
CSC Resolution executory pending appeal per Section 82 of CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 19, s. 1999, making it a proper subject of a petition for mandamus. However, what the
RTC failed to... take into account is the fact that the propriety of the very directives under
the writ of mandamus sought is wholly reliant on the CA's resolution of CA-G.R. SP No.
119975 and that judicial courtesy dictates that it suspend its proceedings and await the
CA's resolution of the... petition for review.
When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well aware of the pendency of CA-
G.R. SP No. 119975 the subject of which is the reversal and setting aside of the CSC's
affirmation of respondents' appointments, embodied in the very Resolution which
respondents seek to be... enforced in the petition for mandamus. Nevertheless, the trial
court, implying that the petition for review pending before the CA will not, in any way, affect
or be affected by the petition for mandamus, held that "such review of the [CA] deals
primarily with the validity or... invalidity of the alleged midnight appointments xxx,"[19] as
opposed to the petition before it which only seeks the enforcement of the CSC's
Resolution.It then went on to state that "the ground relied upon by [petitioner] is the mere
fact that
[respondents'] appointments were allegedly a 'midnight appointments' (sic) which the [CSC],
however, ruled out to be devoid with (sic) merit. The prohibition under Article VII, Section 15
of the Constitution, it must be noted, applies only to presidential appointments, but not... to
local appointments, like in this case. This is true even if the grounds relied [upon] by
[petitioner] are with respect to CSC Circulars and/or Memorandum, Resolutions, Laws,
Rules, and Regulations relative to the civil service."[20]
Furthermore, the trial court held that it is an accepted principle that "quasi-judicial bodies
like the Civil Service Commission are better-equipped in handling cases involving the
employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of
their... expertise"[21] and that "the appointments of [respondents] having been accepted by
them and in fact assumed office[,] shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by
the [CSC], the only office who has the authority to recall such appointments by
[respondents]."[22]
To cap it all off, the trial court issued the writ of mandamus and directed petitioner, among
others, to immediately pay respondents' salaries, emoluments, and other benefits due them
by virtue of the positions to which they were appointed to, and to recognize the... validity of
their appointments, among others.
In this regard, the Court has, in several cases, held that there are instances where, even if
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher
court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings... on
the precept of judicial courtesy.[23] Unfortunately, the RTC did not find the said principle
applicable in Civil Case No. 4236 as it disregarded the fact that there is an intimate
correlation between the two proceedings though technically no... prejudicial question exists
as it properly pertains to civil and criminal cases.[24]
To Our mind, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or
invalidity of the appointments which issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo
incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without erroneously
disregarding the... principle of judicial courtesy. What is more, the RTC went beyond the
issues of the case when it affirmed the validity of respondents' appointments, considering
that the only issue presented before it is the propriety of executing CSC Resolution No.
1100653 through a writ of... mandamus despite the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
119975.[25] By making said findings, conclusions, and directives, the RTC, in effect,
affirmed the CSC's finding that the disputed appointments were valid, pre-empted the CA's
Resolution of the appeal, and... made its own determination thereon, despite the non-
presentation of said question before it and the pendency thereof before the CA. And all of
this was made under the pretext of enforcing CSC Resolution No. 1100653 via a writ of
mandamus.
Nevertheless, enforcementof the disputed CSC Resolution is no longer proper and
necessary in light of Our Resolutions dated February 27, 2013 and February 10, 2014,
affirming the CA's ruling that respondents' appointments were not valid, making the issue on
the propriety of... enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal, moot and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue
of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a
rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[26]
Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.[27]
Here, the supervening event contemplated is Our issuance of two minute resolutions one
denying the petition, and the second denying reconsideration thereof thereby affirming CA's
finding against the validity of respondents appointments and effectively reversing the
RTC's... affirmation of the CSC's findings. It is well to note that although contained in a
minute resolution, Our dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 203835 was definitely a
disposition of the merits of the case and constituted a bar to a relitigation of the issues
raised there under... the doctrine of res judicata. When we dismissed the petition and
denied reconsideration thereof, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.[28]
Having written finis to the issue of whether respondents' were validly appointed or not, the
mandamus now has no basis upon which its issuance can be anchored under the principle
of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.[29]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED
Principles:

SARA LEE PHILIPPINES v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, GR No. 180147, 2015-01-14

Facts:
In the Decision dated 4 June 2014, this Court directed SLPI, Aris, SLC, Cesar Cruz, and
FAPI, collectively known as the Corporations, to post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond,
within 10 days from the receipt of the Decision.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris employees illegal
and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. They
posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and
ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4.5 Million bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition),
filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not
perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which
is... equivalent to the judgment award.
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an additional
appeal bond of P1 Billion.
In our Decision dated 4 June 2014, we modified the Court of Appeals' Decision
The Corporations are directed to post P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within TEN (10)
days from the receipt of this DECISION.
Issues:
The Corporations score this Court for failing to consider the ruling in McBurnie v. Ganzon[4]
which purportedly required only the posting of a bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary
award.
Ruling:
The Corporations gravely misappreciated the ruling in McBurnie. The 10% requirement
pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the minimum of the
bond that should accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period to
perfect an... appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on the judgment award and
should in no case be construed as the minimum amount of bond to be posted in order to
perfect appeal.
McBurnie made it clear that the... percentage of bond set is provisional
The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion and determine... the final
amount of bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards
of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount." Should the NLRC, after considering the
motion's merit, determine that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond needs to... be
posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be
given a period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal
by posting the required appeal bond.
Principles: