Such remarks muld very well be dismissed were it not for the

wide meamre of acceptance they have received.

Discussion Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, A. Translated by Fr.
Slade. In: N. Langiulli (ed.), The Existential Tradition: Selected Writings. New
York: Doubleday, 1971.
1971. (1929e)
(1929e)

A Disczcssion Between Emst Cassiret

and Martin Heidegger"
Ttmzslated by Francis Slade

[P. 17.1 CASSIRER: U?lnt does Heidegget understand by Ne6

Kantianism? Who is the opponent whom Heidegger has in
mind? T h e concept "NedCantianism"must not he defined sub
stantially, but functionally. What is a t issue is not the character
of that philosophy as a dogmatic doctrinal system, but a way of
formulating the question.
HEIDECCER:
If I am to begin by naminn names, I will men-
1The following piece is a translatian of "ArMtsgerneinsehaft
CassimHeideggcrV'(printed in Guido Scbneeberger, E r g Z m ~ g e n
rrc eim Heideggdikliaglraphie, Bern, 1960, pp. r7-27) and i s a
record of the discussion betwem C a d @ and Heidegger which tmk
place a t Dams, Switzerland, in March 1929 during the semn,d
Da~asec Hochscbulkurse. Since this record was made by ~ W O
auditors of the discussian, the statements contained in what is here
translated under the title "A Discussion Between Ernst Csslrer and
Martin Heidegger" do not represent the written statements either of
Cassirer or of Heidegger. However, thev do not contradict the known
and a c h m 1 d g e d views of dtha of t h e philosophers. Contrasting
accounts of this encounter between Cassim and Heidegger a n be
found in Hendrick J. Pos, "RecoIleaions of Ernst Caszirer" in The
Philosophy of E m Cdrer, &tied by Paul A. Sehilpp, New York,
1949, pp. 67-69 and in Straus, uKurr Riezler: In hkrnm5am"
in What I s Polirieal: PhiIosqhy# Glencoe (Illinois), ~ g b o ,pp. 245-
246. Also of interest is the account gimn in T.Cassim, Aus winem
Lehm m i t E m Carsirer, New York, 1950, 167-167. m.
T h e tmaslator wishes to thank Joseph Carpino and Thomas Pmkr
for their many comments and suggestions during the course of the
prepmeion of this transladon. H e would also like to acknowledge the
generodty of U7illi Schmidt who read parts of this tanslation and
made suggestions for its improvement.
tion M e n , Windelband, Rickert, Erdrnann, Riehl. Whs t i s
common to every form of Neo-Kantianisrn can only be under-
stood in terms of i t s origin. This is the embarrassing dilemma of
philosophy before the question of what still really remains to it
[as a field of inquiry12 within the totality of knowledge. There
appeared to remain only the knowledge about science, not of
"that-which-is" [das Seiende]. It w a s this paint of view that de-
f i n d the movement back to Kant. Kant was seen as the theoreti-
cian of the mathematico-physical theory of knowledge. Kan t,
however, did not wish to provide a theory of natural science, but
to show the problematic of metaphysics, more specifically of
ontology. My intention is to wmk this essential content of the
positive basis of the Critique of Pure Reason into ontology. B y
reason of my interpretation of the Dialectic as ontology, I believe
that the problem of Being [Sein] in the Transcendental Logic,
seemingly only negative in Kant, i s really a positive problem.
C A S ~ ~ RCohen
E R : is only undefstcmd correctly if he is under-
stood historically, not simply as an epistemologist. I do not con-
ceive of my own development as a defection from Gohen. The
positioning of the mathematical sciences of nature is for me only
a paradigm, not the whole of the problem.-Heidegger and I
are in agreement on one point: for Kant the ~roductiveimagina-
don is of central significance. I have been led to this through
my work on the symbolic. T h e imagination is the relation of
all thinking to intuition, synthesis speciosa. The synthesis i s the
fundamental power of thought. W h a t matters far Kant i s
the synthesis which makes use of the species. [P.r8J And this
leads to the heart of the image-concept: of the ~ymbolancept.
-Kant's major problem is h w is freedom pmsiile. Kant says
that we conceive only that freedom is inconceivable. And yet
t 1 a m is the Kanrian ethics. T h e categorical imperative ought to
be such that the moral law holds not only fur men, but for all
rational beings in general. The moral as such leads beyond the
2 Material e n c l d within b r a c k ~[ ~] has bem insated by the
transkitor. Material enclosed within pammthe~es( ) appears in paren-
theses in the German tart. Page numbers in brackets an the page
numbers of the German t a t .
a Reading "Bildbegriffos" far "BBdmgbe~iffe"as emended by
Guido Schneeberga in a letter to the editor of th;s anthology.
194 MART'IN HEmEIGGER

wmld of appeatances. 'What is a t snke here is the break-through

to the mundus intelligibilis. In the ethical m!m a point is
reached which is no longer relative to the finitude of the cagniz-
ing being.-And this ties in with what Heidegger has done. T h e
extraordinary importance of the schematisrn cannot be overesti-
mated. Yet in tbe ethical realm Kant suppresses the schematism.
Far he say our concepts are "senses of
cognitions), Usen- of ..
. ." [Einsicbten] (not
." which can na longer be schema-
tized. There i s at most a typology, not a schematism, of Practical
Reason. For Kent the schematism i s a tminus a quo, not a
tmim~ ad q m . Kanis point of departure i s the problem
posed by Heidegger. However* this citcle widened for Kant.
Heidegger has made the p i n t that our cognitive power is finite.
It is relative and confined. But haw does such a finite being
attain howledge, reason, truth?-Heidgget formulates the prob
Iem of truth and says there cannot be any truths in themselves,
or eternal truths, but truths are always relative to Dasein. For
Kant, on the other hand, this was exactly the prablm. Cmnted
this finitude, how can there be rncesary and universal truths?
Now are synthetic judgmen~a picripossible? 'That i s the prob-
lem which Kant exemplifies with mathematics. Finite copition
hvolves itself with truth, but this relationship again works into
a " m d y " [i.e., is qualified] (?) H e i d e w has said that Kant
has given no demonstration of tbe possibility of mathematics.
But this problem is posed in the Pmtegomena. Once more, then,
this pure theoretical question, how does a finite being come to
a determination of objects which as such are not limited by
finitude, must fint of all be clarified.-My question now is this:
Does Heidegger wish to renounce this complete objectivity, this
fonn of absoluteness, which Kant has s d far in the realms
of the ethical and the theoretical and in the CMqw of Judg
mmt?
H m ~ ~ c o rT
ro
~ :begin with the q u d o n of the mathematical
sciences of nature* [P. 19.1 In Kant nature does not mean an
object d the mathematical science of nature, but rather the to-
tality OF "thatwhich-iS in f i e sense OF the presenwt-hand [das
G m e des Seienden im Sinm des Vorhmrdenen]. Kant means
"that-which-is" as mch without limimtim to s determinate area
of "that-which-is." W h a t I want to show is that the Analytic is
 not an ontology of nature ss object of natural science, but a
general ontology, that i5 a mitically hsed metaphysics generalis.
Kant himseIf saps that the problematic of she P~olegomenais
not the centraI theme. This is, rather, the question concerning
the possibility of a mziaphyk generalis, more exactly, of its
=ahation.-Cslsh wants to &OW further that fmitade is tmn-
xended in the ethical writings. There is something in the cat*
gon'ca1 imperative which exceeds the finite being. Yet precisely
the concept of the imperative displays in itself the inner relation
to a finite being. Even this transcendence still remains within
finitude. For Kant human reason is completely dependent u p
itself and cannot escape from i ~ l into f an eternal and ahlute
nor into the world of things. Thk "In-between"is the essence
of practical zeason. One goes astray in the interpretation. of the
KaTatian ethics if m e does not see the inner E u n d ~ nof the Law
for Dasein. Certainly there is something in the m d law which
goes beyond sensibility. However, the question is, what i s the
character of the jnner structure of itseIf? Is this S~IU~~U.E
finite or infinite? There lies in this question a redly centcaI pb-
lem. Just in that which one puts forward as constitutive infinity,
the character of the h i t e comes to light. Kant designates the
imagination of the schemarim as exhibitkt o r i g i h . This power
of origination is, i t is true, in a certain way, a creative power
there, but as exhibitiu it m o t dispense with receptivity. Man
is r am infinite and a h l u t e in the matian of "that-which-is"
itself [des Seienden ~eIb~t], but he ir infinite in the sene of
the understanding d Being [des Seins]. This infinity of the
ontobgical js by its very nature bound to ontic experience, so
that one must say just the opposite: this i n h i t p which breaks
forth in the imagination is precisely the most acute argument
for finitude, Ontology is an index of finitude. Cod does not have
it. [i.e., ontoIogy1-The~upon CaJsirer's next question with ref-
erence to the concept of truth axis*At tbe most profound level
truth itself is at one with ihe mucture of tmmcendence & m g h
the fact that Dasein is "something-which-is" which i s open to
other "things-which-sre" and to itself. W e are "something
which-is" thst keeps itselE in the unhiddenness of "that-
which-is." [P. zo.] To keep oneself in this way in the
openness of "thatwhich-is" is what I cell Beingin-the-truth
[In-dm-Wahrheitsein]. And I go further. Because of its fini-
tude man's Being-in-thetruth is a t the same time a Being-in-
the-untruth. Untruth belongs to the inmost core of D ~ e i n .
I believe &at I have found only here the root which estab
lishes a metaphysical explanation for what Kant called "meta-
physical illusion."-To take Cassirer's question concerning uni-
versalIy valid eternal truths. When J say truth is relative
to Dasein, that is no ontic statement in the sense that what
is m e is always only what the individual man thinks. T h e
proposition is metaphysical. Truth as such can only be as truth
if Dasein exists. Only with tbe existence of something such as
Dasein does tnrth first come about But now to the question:
What about tbe validity, the etemitp OF truth? O n e commonly
formulates this question in terms of the problem of validity, i.e.,
in terms of the asserted proposition. The problem must be
broached differently. Truth is relative to Dasein. T h e transsub-
jectivity of truth, this breaking-out of truth beyond the indi-
vidual, signifies that ~eing-in-the-truthmeans to be given aver
to end to be taken up with "thatwhich-is." W h a t can here be
separated as objective knowledge, taking into account the par-
ticular matted-fact individual existence, has a truth content
which says something about "that-which-%."T h i s is, however,
badly interpreted if it is said that over against the flow of ex-
perience there i s something permanent, the eternal, the mean-
ing and concept. At this point, then, I pose the question: W h a t
does eternal really mean here7 Is this eternity not merely
permanence in the sense of the aei [the "forevern] OF time? Is i t
possible only by r e a m of an inner transcendence of time itself?
What do a11 those expressions of transcendental metaphysics,
a prim+, aei on, ow&$ mean? They are only to be undmtood
end are only possible through the fact that time itself has the
character of horizon, so that I have always conjointly in an an-
ticipatory remembering stance, s horizon of present, EUturi~,
and pastmess, and, consequently, there is given a transcendental-
ontological time determination dthin which alone something
mch as the permanence of substance is constituted.-My entire
interpretation of temporality f to be understood from this point
of view. The whole problematic in Sein und Zeit, which treats
of the Dasein of man, is no philosophical snthropalogy. It is
DISCUSSXON BETWEEN CASSIRBR AND HETDEGGER 1197
much tao limited and much too sketchy for that. Here there is a
problematic which has not as such hitherto been broached.
T h e question [of Sein tlnd Zeit] i s this: if the possibility of the
understanding of "that-which-is" i s based on an understanding
of Being, and if this ontological understanding is in some sense
in terms of time [P. 211,then the task i s to expose the t e m p
rality af Dasein in terms of the possibility of the understanding
of Being. And all problems [in Sein 1md Zeit] are in terms of
this. The analysis of death i s intended to expose in one direction
Dasein's radical futurity, and not to furnish a final and mea-
physical teaching concerning the essence of death. The analysis
of dread [Angst] has the sole function of preparing the ques-
tion: On she basis of what metaphysical meaning of Dasein it-
self is it possible that man as such can be put before such a thing
as Nothjng [das Nichts]? Only if I understand Nothing or
Dread do I have the possibility of understanding Being. Only in
the unity of the understanding of Being and Nothing does the
question of the origin of the ' W y " suddenly arise. This cen-
tral problem of Being, of Nothing, and of the Why, i s the most
elementary, the most concrete problem. T h e entire Analytic of
Dusein is directed toward this. At the same time I pose a further
question of method. In what way must a metaphysics of Das&
be initiated? Is there not a definite wer-all view of life
[Weltanschm~.~g] at its basis? It is not the task of philosaphy
to provide such an over-all view of life, though certainly such a
is already the presupposition of the activity of philosophiz-
ing. The over-all view of life which the philosopher provides is
not a direct m e in the sense of a doctrine, but rests in this, that
in the act of philosophizing it comes about that the transcend-
ence of Dmein itself, i.e., the inner possibility gossessed by this
finite being to be in relation to "that-which-is" in its totality, i s
made radical. The question, how is hedm possible, dws not
make sense because freedom is not an object of theoretical com-
prehension, but an object of the act of philosophizing. That can
mean nothing else than that freedom is, and can only be, in the
ace of freeing. The sole adequate relation which man has to free
dam is [in terms of] the act by which freedom sets itself free in
man.
1 9 ~ MARTIN FtEIQEGGRR

Q d m Add~ese~l
to Cassirer (by a student of philosophy):
I. What way can man find to infinity? In what fashion can
man participate ia infinity?
Z. Is infinity M be achieved as a privative determination of
finitude, or is i t a domain in its own right?
[P.22.3
3. To what extent should itbe the task of philosophy to eF-
fect a liberation from dread, or is it its task to hand man wer
quite radically to dread?

CASSIRER: Ad r. In no other way than through the medium

of F m . The function of Fonn is such that man, while he
changes his existence [ h e i n ] in to Form, i.e., while he has to
transform everything which is in him as experience into some
kind of objective structure, does not, it is true, thereby b m e
radically freed from the finitude of the point af departure (For
this is still definitely related to his finitude), but in so fat as his
wistmce develops out of finitude, his existence leads finitude
out of itself into something new, immanent infinity. Man can-
not make the jump out of his own finitude into a realistically
understood infinity. Howmr, he can have, and must have, a
metnbaris which leads him from the immdacy of his own
existence into the region of pure F m . H e possesses his in-
finity excIusivcly in this Form. Tram the chalice of this realm
of spirits, infinity pours forth for him." The reah of spirits is
not a metaphysical realm of spirits. T h e realm of spirits is just
that spiritual m l d which he himhimself has created. That he
could create it is the seal of his infinity,-Ad 2. It i s not only a
privative determinatim, but is a domain in its own right. Not,
however, a domain that i s won only in inflict with finitude, but
rather infinity is precisely the totality, the p e r k t fulfillment of
finitude itself. And this fulfinment of finitude is just what con-
stitutes infinitg. Thus Coethe's 'Wouldst thou stride into the
4 The h n text reads: #Aus d m Ke'lche diem Ckistmeiches
strtht ihm die Unmdlichkeit*"Cf. Schiller's poem "Die Freund-
shaft," lines 5 e o ; and Hegel's Phiinamenulagic dcr Geirtes, con-
cluding lines.
infinite, thou hast but to go in the finite in every direction."'
Ad 3. That is a question which goes right to the mots, and one
can answer it only with a kind of pmksion of faith. Philosophy
has allowed man to become free just x, far as he can become
free. Thereby i t frees him radically, to be sure, from dread as a
pure state of feeling. T h e aim i s liberation in this sense: *Cast
the anxiety of the terrestrial from yourselves." That is the posi-
tion of Idedirm which I have myself always p f d .

HEIDHOCER: In his first lecture Cassirer has used the expres

$ions tennixus a qm md tmmhw ad q m . One could
that the terminus ad quem is a complete Philosophy OF Culture
in the sans of a dadicalpjon of h e wholeness of the Fom of a
structure-cteating cansciouwess. T h e fxm~i+l*;a qw h Cassirer
is completely [P. 23.1 My podtion is the op
posite: the minzrr a quo i s my central problematic The que+
tion i s whether the terminus ad quem is just as clear for me.
This, I hdd, consists not in a mmp1ete Philosophy of Culture,
but in rbe question: ti to on? T h e problematic of a metaphysics
of Dasein, for me, grows out of this question. Or,to come once
again to the heart of the Kant interpretation, I attempted to
show that to staa from a concept of the logos is not quite such
an obvious p d u but, ~ on the mntrary, that the question of
the pmsibihty of metaphysics requixes a metaphysics of D d n
itself, in such a way that the question, what man is, doem't
have to be a n m d 50 much in he sense of an anthropological
system, but that this question must f i s t of all be d l y clarified
with mipet to the perspective in which it will be posed. A= the
concepts tenninzcs a quo and t m m i m s ad qum only a heuristic
formulation of the question or are they based in rbe essence o f
philosophy itself? This problematic does not seem to me to bc
clearly worked out in Cassirer's philosophy up till now. What
matters first of all for Csssirer is to expose the diEennt Forms OF
the fom-giving activity and then, subsequendy, to push h d
fTom there into a certain dimension of the b m a t a t i n g p e ~ ~
themselves. Now one muld say i t follows that this dimen-
sion is stiIl basically the same as that which I call Dasein.
6"Gott, Gemtit und Welt," Sprikhe In Rcimtm
This would be wrong, however. T h e difference appean most
clearly in the concept of freedom. I have spoken of an act of
freeing in the sense that the setting free of the inner transcend-
ence of Dasein is the very character of the act of philosophizing.
And h a the real meaning of this act of freeing consists in be-
coming free for the finitude of Dmeis entering directly into
the thrownness [Gworfenheit] of Dasein. I have not given
f d o m to m y d f although I can be the self that Iam only
through being free. The self that I am, however, now not in
the sense of a n undiRerentiated ground of explanation, but in
the sense that Dasein is the really fundamental event in which
the act of exisring of man, and with that, every of
existence as such essentially comes about.-I believe that what I
designate with the term Dnsdn cannot be translated by one of
Caniret's concepts. W h a t I call D&n i s e m t i a l l y charac
terizcd not only through that which is designated as "spirit," or
as "life; b t rather i t is the original unity and the immanent
s ~ ~ c t u ofr e the relatedness of a man who, in his shackledness
to the body, stands in a special boundness with 'that-which-is"
[P.241, in the sense that Dasein as bee, thrown in the midst
of "thatulhich-is:' effects a breaking-into "thatuvhich-is," a
breaking-into which is always historically in the final sense for-
tuitous; x, fortuitous that man exists at the highhest point of bis
own pwibility only in a wry faK moments of Dwa'fi's duration
between life and death.-ln all my philosophical work I have
completely left out of consideration the traditional form and
division of the philosophical disciplines, because I believe that
orienting oneself in terms of these constitutes the greatest snare
in the way of getting hck to the inner pbIemstic af philoso-
phy. Neid~aPlato nor Aristode knew anything about such a
division in phikmphy. This was an affair of the Schools. EfFoa
is required to break through these disciplines and to come back
again to the @tally metaphysical mode of Being of the r e
spective areas [underlying these disciplines]. Art is not merely a
Form of the fomenting consciousness, rather art has itself a
metaphysical sense within the fundamental event that Dasdn
itself- i s . 4 have intentionally stressed these differences. T h e
work that really has to be done is not helped by smoothing them
over. For h e sake of clarity I would like K, place o u r entire
divrussion once more under the sign oE Ksnt's Critique of Pzue
Rmm, and once more to fm upon the question, what man is,
as the central question. This question need not be put anthm-
pocentrically, but it must be shown, &rough the fact that man
is the being who transcends, i.e., i s open to "that-which-is" in its
totality and to himself, that by means of this eccentric character
man i s also at the same time put into the totality of "that-
which-is" as such. The question and the idea of a philosophical
a n & m p 1 0 ~has this meaning. not that of investigating man
empiricalIy as a given object. Rather it has to be motivated out
of the central problematic of philosophy itself which must lead
man back beyond himself into the whole of "that-which-is," in
order to make manifet to him, for all his freedom, the nothing-
ness of his Dmei7t. T h i s nothingness is not an inducement to
p~simirmand dejection, but to the understanding of this,
namely, that there is genuine activity only where there is opps
sition aad that philosophy has the task of thrct*g man back
into the h a d n s of his fate from out u# the sofmess of one who
merely lives off the work of the spirit.
[P.25.1 CASSWR:I believe it has already herome dearer in
what the opposition m i s t s . It is, howeverpnot fruitful to s h e s
this opposition repeatedly. We ere a t a point where little is to be
gained through purely logical arpmtmts. It seems, then, we are
condemned here to some sort of relativity. Howwer, we may
not persist in this relativity which would place empirical man
in the center, What Heidegger said st the end was most im-
portant. His position cannot be a n t h m ~ a i either.
c And then,
I ask, where now lies the common center in our opposition? We
do not need to look for this. For we have this center, and we
have it indeed because there i s one ccnnmcm objective human
world in which, although the differences of individuals are in
no way cancelled, a bridge is built from individual to indiridusl.
T h a t I 6nd again and again in the primal phenomenon of lan-
guage. Everyone speaks his own language, and yet we under-
stand one another through the medium of language. There is
something such as the language, something such as a unity over
and above the endlessly different ways of speaking. Thesein lies
the decisive pdint for me. And therefore I s t a d f*orm the ob-
jectivity of the symbolic Form because here "the inmnceivabIe
262 M A R T I N FIEIDEGGER

is schieved,"fl That is what I should like to a 11 the world OF

objective spirit. There is no other way from one existence
[Dasein] to another existence [DmeinJ than through this world
of Form. If it did not exist, then I would not h a w how such a
thing as a common understanding could be. Cognition, too, is
therefore simpfy only a basic instance of this position, because
an objective assertion is formulated which no longer takes into
consideration the subjectivity of the particular individual.-Hei-
degger has correctly said that the fundaments1 question of his
metaphysics i s the same one which formed Plata and Aristotle:
VVhat is, "bat-which-is*? And he has a i d fu&m that Kant
once again took up with this question. However, here an essen-
tial difference seems to me to obtain, which i s in fact what Kant
called the Copernican revolution. The question of being seems
to me, I admit, to be in no way eliminated as a result of this
revolution. However, the question of being acquires a much
more complicated form. In what daes that rmolurion consist?
The question of how objects are determined is preceded by a
question about the constitution of the being of a n objectivity as
such. W h a t is new in this revolution seems to me to lie in this,
that there is now no longer r single such structure of being, .-
but rather that we have completely different structures of be-
ing. [P.26.1 Each new struetue of. being has new a priori p r e
suppositions. Kant shms how levmy kind OF new Form always
bean upon a new world of objectivities. In that way a whole
new multiplicity enters into the problem of the object as such.
By that means rhe old dogmatic metaphysics becomes the new
Kantian metaphysia Tbe being of the old metaphysics was
substance, that onc which underlies. In the new metaphysics
being is in my language no longer the being of a substance,
but the being that proceeds from n manifold of bctimal de
terminations and meanings. Arid here appears to me to lie the
essential point of distinction of my position in opposition to
Heidegger.-I hoId to the Kantian formulation of the question
of the transmdenta1. The essential of the trarascendentd
a'rlle German text, in quotation marks here, reads: W d him
nhd
'arUnbegr&#liche getmr* ist, It seems intended to recall "Dm
Unberehrcibliehe, Him ist cr gemMin F a t , Part IL
DISCUSSION B&TWT!EN CASSIRER kND HEIDEGGEIR 203
methad lies in this, that i t begins with s given. T h u s X inquire
into the possibility of the given called 'language." How is it nm-
ceivable that we as one existence [Dasein] to another can under-
stend each other in this medium? Or, how js it possible that we
are able to see at all a work of a n as an objective determinate
thing? This question must be solved. Perhaps not all questions
in philosophy are to be solved an this basis. I believe that only
if one has posed this question does he gain access to Heideg
ger's formulation of the question.

HB~BGGER: TOrepeat Plato's question cannot mean that we

fall back upan the answer of the Creeks. Being itself i s splintered
into a multiplicity, and a central problem consists in gaining a
position from which to understand the inner diversity of the
ways of Being out of the idea of Being.-Just reconciling &Eer-
ences will never be reaIly producthe. It is the eaence of phi-
losophy, as a finite affair of man, that it is limited within the
finitude of man. Since philosophy is concerned with the whole
of man and the highest in man, this finitude must show itself
in m a completely radical manner+-What matters
to me is that you retain this one thing Emm our confrontation:
don't fasten on our differences as the disagffements of individ-
uals engaged in philosophy, but rather come to feel that we are
once again on the way towards taking seriously the cenml ques-
tion of metaphysics. W h a t you see bere on a small scale, the
difference of individuals engaged in philosophy within the
unity of the pblIematic, i s also to be found, though quite dif-
ferently, on e large scaIe [P.271; and that is just the essential
thing in canfronting the history of philosophy, to see how i t i s
precisely the differentiating of standpoints which is the mt of
philosophical work.