2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

Eminent Domain

Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular
uses to promote public welfare.

It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to

serve the common need and advance the general welfare. The power of eminent domain is inseparable
in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government.

But the exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake the
nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated. National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville Development Corporation, G.R. No. 223366,
August 1, 2017

Requisites of Taking

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. National Transmission Corporation v.
Oroville Development Corporation, G.R. No. 223366, August 1, 2017 citing Republic v. Vda. De
Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

Just compensation is “the sum equivalent of the market value of the property, broadly described as the
price fixed in open market by the seller in the usual and ordinary course of legal action or competition,
or the fair value of the property as between one who receives and who desires to sell it, fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the government.

The word “just” is used to emphasize the meaning of the word “compensation” so as to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken should be real, substantial, full and ample.
The nature and character of the land at the time of taking is thus the principal criterion in determining
just compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as well as its
improvements and capabilities, must be considered. The “just”-ness of the compensation can only be

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 1 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the condemned property. Paz E.
Rebadulla, et al. v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 222159 and 222171, January 31, 2018

The valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies.

The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but when a party claims
a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use
without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking
into the ‘just-ness’ of the decreed compensation. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Eugenio Dalauta, G.R.
No. 190004, August 8, 2017, citing EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

There is no basis for the executive branch to limit the period for landowners to assert their right to just
compensation under RA No. 6657.

Considering that RA No. 6657 does not provide a limit on the period within which a landowner can file a
petition for the determination of just compensation, and considering further that the right to just
compensation is a constitutional right, there is no basis for the executive branch to limit the period for
landowners to assert their right to just compensation under this act. Any attempt to do so should be struck
down for being outside the constitutional confines of the eminent domain powers of the state. Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Eugenio Dalauta, G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017

BILL OF RIGHTS

In order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be
compliance with both the substantive and the procedural requirements thereof.

Substantive due process refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person
to his property. Procedural due process, on the other hand, means compliance with the procedures or
steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without
arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it. Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc. (ALFI), et al. v. Hon. Janette Garin, et al., G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866, April 26, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 2 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously provide relief to violations of a
person’s constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The writ of amparo covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. Lorie Marie Tomas
Callo v. Comm. Jaime H. Morente, et al., G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017

The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life.

The right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive — upon which the enjoyment of all other rights
is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e.,
the life, to which each person has a right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Mayor William N. Mamba, et al. v. Leomar Bueno, G.R. No.
191416, February 7, 2017

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through
a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived
and an accused is “estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest.”

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation
during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is
that “the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused”.
Mario Veridiano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

But failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning
the admissibility of evidence seized.

The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court’s jurisdiction
over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest. Mario
Veridiano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 3 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes “immediacy in point of time.” That a crime was in fact
committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b)
of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of
arrest. Mario Veridiano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Stop and Frisk Search

“Stop and frisk” search is defined as “the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.” Thus, the allowable scope of a “stop and frisk” search is
limited to a “protective search of outer clothing for weapons.” Although a “stop and frisk” search is a
necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to
safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Mario Veridiano v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle; The extent of routine inspections must
be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform
warrantless searches.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of
individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government’s survival is
in danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude “on [a] motorist’s right to ‘free passage’” to a
certain extent, they must be “conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists”. Mario Veridiano v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

But an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle’s passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains
instruments of an offense.

Extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence
obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution. Mario Veridiano v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 4 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based
on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one (1) specific offense to prevent
the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.

In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. People v. Amador
Pastrana and Rufina Abad, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is

primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties
to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with
no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.

It is not, however, required that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. One of the tests to determine the
particularity in the description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described
are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. People
v. Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018

A laborer does not lose his or her right to freedom of expression upon employment.

This is apolitical right essential to man’s enjoyment of his or her life, to his or her happiness, and to his or
her full and complete fulfillment. While the Constitution and the courts recognize that employers have
property rights that must also be protected, the human rights of laborers are given primacy over these
rights. Property rights may prescribe. Human rights do not. Charlie Hubilla, et al. v. HSY Marketing. Ltd..
Co., et al. v. G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018

The State still recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of belief system, whether
such may be belief in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of religion.

Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and religiosity of our people as reflected in
Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146 (2014), as follows: At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live
in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority
groups and is tolerant towards all — the religious people of different sects and the nonbelievers. The
undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to
Who they called for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. In Re: Letter of Tony Q.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 5 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-
SC, March 7, 2017

The right to religious profession and worship has a two (2)-fold aspect — freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs.

The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. In Re: Letter of
Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No.
10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of Church and State. In fact,
these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other.

The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose members believe in the divinity of Jose
Rizal. Yet, it does not implement measures to suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or
indifference on the part of the State gives meaning to the separation of Church and State, and at the same
time, recognizes the religious freedom of the members of these sects to worship their own Supreme
Being. As pointed out by Judge Lutero, “the Roman Catholics express their worship through the holy mass
and to stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our
Muslim brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office
hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty
because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have been allowed to
conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these have been allowed in respect of the workers’
right to the free exercise of their religion. In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals
at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of
accommodation.

Accommodation is a recognition of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on
a certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious
beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the
attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. In Re:
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 6 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation between Church and State.

It simply means that the State cannot set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion,
or prefer one religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion; that the state cannot punish a
person for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activity
or institution whatever they may be called or whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion;
that the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious organization or group
and vice versa. Its minimal sense is that the state cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. In Re:
Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

Indeed, there is a thin line between accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more
imperative to understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society’s perspective.
The holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the Quezon City (QC) Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation.

First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement. Second, when judiciary employees
attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will
and volition, without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no government funds
are being spent because the lightings and air-conditioning continue to be operational even if there are no
religious rituals there. Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor
has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful. Fifth, the allowance of the
masses has not prejudiced other religions. In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious
Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

No undue religious bias is being committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily
used by the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and
for other purposes.

The basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or employed for the sole purpose of
supporting the Roman Catholics. Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the
exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciano. Judge Maceren reported that the
basement is also being used as a public waiting area for most of the day and a meeting place for different
employee organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch break period from
twelve (12) o’clock to one (1) o’clock in the afternoon. Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run
for just a little over thirty (30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being
committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by the Catholics to celebrate
mass, as the same area can be used by other groups of people and for other purposes. Thus, the basement

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 7 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because the holding
of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose. In Re: Letter of Tony
Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-
19-SC, March 7, 2017

Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

What is proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not merely to
accommodate the free exercise thereof. In Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals
at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017

A student’s religious obligations takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship.

The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) imposed a positive duty on all Higher Education Institutions
(HEIs) to exempt students, as well as faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities
interfere with their religious obligations. Denmark S. Valmores v. Dr. Cristina Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453,
July 19, 2017

Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.

It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

In this case, petitioners’ invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they
do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that
one may act accordingly. The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations,
which are absent from this particular claim. Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 8 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

Overbreadth Doctrine

The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Right to Travel

This right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty. Liberty — a birthright of every
person — includes the power of locomotion and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in
lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as
the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny used to determine the reasonableness of classifications.

1. Strict Scrutiny Test. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with
the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.

2. Intermediate Scrutiny Test. This applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender
and legitimacy.

3. Rational Basis Test. This applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.

NOTE: In the case of SPARK v. Quezon City, the Court found it proper to examine the assailed regulations
under the strict scrutiny test as the Curfew Ordinances set restrictions on the minors’ exercise of their right
to travel under Section 6, Art. III of the Constitution.

Strict Scrutiny Test

Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 9 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly
tailored to accomplish the interest.

1. Compelling State Interest. Children’s welfare and the State’s mandate to protect and care for
them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State. The
State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults.

2. Least Restrictive Means. The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in
the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State’s
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn
to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

The presumption of regularity cannot be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused.

the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when no reason exists in the
records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. Applied to dangerous drugs
cases, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption when there is a showing that the apprehending
officers failed to comply with the requirements laid down in Section 21. And, in any case, the presumption
of regularity cannot be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a
mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent. People v.
Richael Luna, G.R. No. 219164, March 21, 2018

An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays,
its ‘salutary objective’ being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense
of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time
compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.

In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such right, the following factors may be
considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused; and (d) the prejudice caused by the delay. Angelito Magno v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 10 of 11
 2019 BAR REVIEW POLITICAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Handout No. 47

The Supreme Court expounded that the guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III
of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.

Hence, whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the
respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated. Juanito Victor C. Remulla
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017

CITIZENSHIP

Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards
natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the
said law.

Only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became
naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship. Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
retroacts to the date it was lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be
considered a Philippine citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship.

In this case, during the time petitioner Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, RA No. 9225 was not yet enacted
and the applicable law was still Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, both the renunciation of
Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign country through naturalization
are grounds to lose Philippine citizenship. Vivenne K. Tan v. Vincent “Bingbong” Crisologo, G.R. No.
193993, November 8, 2017

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 11 of 11