Macua Vda.

De Avenido v Avenido

GR No. 173540, 22 Jan 2014

FACTS:

 Both respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido and petitioner Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido
claimed that they validly married the deceased Eustaquio Avenido.

 Respondent filed a complaint for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against petitioner on
the ground that she is the lawful wife of the deceased. She alleged that her marriage to the
deceased was solemnized on 30 Sept 1942 in Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest.
They have 4 children. Said marriage was evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. However, due to WWII, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification was issued by the registrar.

 It was stated in the Certification that the registrar cannot verify and issue a certified true
copy of the records of marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio since records from 1932 to
early part of 1945 were totally destroyed due to WWII.

 In 1954, Eustaquio left the family. In 1958, he lived with another woman who later died without
any issue.

 In 1979, respondent learned that her husband got married to petitioner, which she claimed
must be declared null and void for being bigamous. This action sought to protect the right of
her children over the properties left by the deceased.

 Petitioner filed her Answer with counterclaim. She claimed to be the legal surviving spouse of
the deceased. They got married in 30 Mar 1979 in a church in Davao. She contended that the
action filed against her was instituted to deprive her of the properties she own in her own right
and as an heir of the deceased.

 RTC: denied respondent’s petition as well as petitioner’s counterclaim. The court relied on
respondent’s failure to present a marriage certificate and found the Certification issued by the
registrar to be useless. It did not give credence to the testimony of respondent and her
witnesses and considered them self-serving absence of the marriage contract.

 CA: ruled in favor of respondent declaring the validity of her marriage to the deceased and
pronouncing that the marriage between the deceased and petitioner to be bigamous thus, null
and void. It ruled that there was a presumption of marriage as they deported themselves as
husband and wife and had 4 children. Such presumption was supported by documentary
evidence including the Certification which the RTC disregarded.

 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the evidence presented during the trial absent the marriage certificate proves the
existence of the marriage of the respondent to the deceased.

RULING:

YES, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Tecla
and her witnesses; the unrebutted fact of birth within cohabitation of 4 children coupled
with certificates of their birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage issued by the
parish priest.

This Court upholds the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, 636 SCRA 420 (2010) we said, citing
precedents, that: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.

In this case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent
loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial
and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

Thus, the marriage between the deceased and the petitioner is declared NULL and VOID.

Bakunawa III v Bakunawa

GR No. 217993, 9 Aug 2017

FACTS:

 Manuel Bakunawa and Nora Bakunawa met in UP and became sweethearts. When Nora
became pregnant, they got married.

 At that time they lived with Manuel’s parents since both of them were college undergraduates.
However, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in their business.

 Manuel was assigned in provincial projects and came home only during weekends.
Whenever he came back, he always spent his time with friends and girlfriends instead of his
family. Nora resented this and they started quarreling. Worse, Manuel depended on his father
and Nora for their family needs.

 In 1976, the couple decided to live separately from Manuel’s parents. During this time,
Manuel observed for the first time Nora’s passiveness and laziness; she was also moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more irritated
with Nora and their verbal argument escalated to physical violence.

 Nora gave birth to their 2nd child but nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel spent most
of his time with his friends and engaged in drinking sprees. He had also an extramarital affair
and rarely came home. Eventually, he left Nora and their children to cohabit with another girl.
 Subsequently, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with RTC on the
ground that both of them are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.

 Manuel presented a psychiatrist (Dr. Villegas) who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not
proportionate to the cause. She also diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality
Disorder, marked by display of negative attitude and passive resistance in her relationship
with Manuel. The findings were based on the psychiatrist’s interview with Manuel and the
eldest son.

 RTC: granted the petition

 CA: reversed RTC’s decision. It ruled that the totality of evidence presented by Manuel
comprising of his testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter’s psychological
evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage.

 Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the marriage contracted by the parties is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. NO.

RULING:

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, 650 SCRA 524 (2011), the Court held that “[i]f the
incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist’s examination and report.” In Toring v. Toring, et al., 626 SCRA 389 (2010), the Court
stated that:

“Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify
on the allegedly incapacitated spouses’ condition at or about the time of marriage, or to
subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the
time of marriage.”

In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses’
psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code,
since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

NOTES:

With regard to the Confirmatory Decree of the National Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the
decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of
nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect
but does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
 Lukban v Republic

No. L-8492, 29 Feb 1956

FACTS:

 Petitioner Lourdes Lukban married Francisco Chuidian on 10 Dec 1933.

 Days after their marriage, Francisco left Lourdes after an argument and since then the latter
had no idea of his whereabouts despite diligent search. She already inquired from the parents
and friends of Francisco but to no avail.

 Lourdes then filed a petition for declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is
presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to remarry. Lourdes believes that her
husband is already dead since he had been absent for more than 20 years. And since she
intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may
relieved of any liability under the law.

 SolGen opposed the petition on the ground that such petition is not authorized by law.

 The Court denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s petition for judicial declaration that her husband is presumed to be dead
should prosper. NO.

RULING:

A petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a
special proceeding much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since
this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the Court can
declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead (Nicolai
Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243).

The philosophy behind this ruling is that “A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass * * *. It is,
therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final.” (Nicolai Szartraw, supra).

While it is true that a special proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact”, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the
declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of
death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny
a declaration to that effect.1

Notes:

“For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living,
that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the
time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68)."

1
Petitioner invoked the case of Hagans v Wislizenus in which it was declared that a special proceeding is
“an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.”