G.R.  No.  143130.

 July  10,  2000]   numbering   twenty   in   all,   went   to   Elsa's   house   and   asked   her  
parents  for  the  hand  of  their  daughter.  
ELSA  NATIVIDAD,  et  al.  vs.  RONALD  TUNAC,  et  al.  
The  two  families  agreed  to  have  the  wedding  in  January  1993  as  
SECOND  DIVISION   Elsa's  sister  had  gotten  married  that  year,  and  they  thought  it  was  
not  good  to  have  two  weddings  in  a  family  within  the  same  year.  
Gentlemen:   Meanwhile,   Elsa   started   living   with   Ronald   in   the   house   of   the  
latter's  family  while  waiting  for  the  baby  to  be  born.  Unfortunately,  
Quoted   hereunder,   for   your   information,   is   a   resolution   of   this   on   December   19,   1992,   Elsa   gave   birth   to   a   premature   baby  
Court  dated  JUL  10  2000.   which   died   after   five   (5)   hours   in   the   incubator.   After   Elsa's  
discharge   from   the   hospital,   the   two   families   decided   that   Elsa  
G.R.  No.  143130.  (Elsa  Natividad,  et  al.  vs.  Ronald  Tunac,  et  al.)   should  go  back  to  her  parents  so  her  mother  could  take  care  of  
her   during   her   postnatal   period.   During   said   period,   Ronald  
This  case  originated  in  a  complaint  for  damages  filed  by  petitioner   occasionally  slept  in  Elsa's  house.  
Elsa   Natividad   against   respondent   Ronald   Tunac   for   breach   of  
promise  to  marry.  The  Regional  Trial  Court,  Branch  81,  Quezon   It   seems   that   after   Elsa's   miscarriage,   a   marked   change   in  
City  rendered  judgment  for  petitioner,  ordering  respondent  to  pay   Ronald's   attitude   towards   the   former   occurred.   In   January   of  
moral  and  exemplary  damages,  but,  on  appeal,  the  decision  was   1993,   the   Natividads   confronted   the   Tunacs.   In   that   meeting,  
reversed  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.  Hence,  this  petition  for  review   Ronald  informed  Elsa  that  he  no  longer  wanted  to  get  married  to  
on  certiorari.   her.  Hence,  this  case.  

It  appears  that  petitioner  Elsa  Natividad  and  respondent  Ronald   Petitioners   succinctly   contend   they   are   suing   respondents   not  
Tunac  grew  up  together  in  Barangay  Quiling,  Talisay,  Batangas   merely   because   Elsa   became   pregnant   but   because   Ronald  
where   their   respective   parents,   petitioners   Marino   and   Clarita   reneged  on  his  promise  to  marry  her  after  their  agreement  had  
Natividad  and  respondent  Eusebio  and  Elisa  Tunac,  resided.  At   already  been  much  publicized  in  their  town.  
age   nineteen   (19),   the   two   became   lovers.   One   day,   Ronald  
asked  Elsa  to  go  with  him  to  his  boarding  house  in  Pasig  City  to   This   contention   has   no   merit.   As   correctly   pointed   out   by   the  
get   the   bio-­data   which   he   needed   in   connection   with   his   Court  of  Appeals,  our  laws  do  not  provide  for  a  right  to  relief  for  
application  for  employment.  Upon  arrival  at  the  boarding  house,   cases   arising   purely   from   a   breach   of   one's   promise   to   marry  
they  found  no  one  there.  Ronald  asked  Elsa  to  go  with  him  inside   another,  the  chapter  on  breach  of  promise  to  marry  proposed  by  
his  room  and,  once  inside,  started  kissing  Elsa  until  he  succeeded   the   Code   Commission   having   been   deleted   by   Congress   in  
in  making  love  with  her.  Elsa  cried  at  the  loss  of  her  virginity,  but   enacting  the  Civil  Code  apparently  because  of  lessons  from  other  
Ronald  appeased  her  by  promising  to  marry  her.   countries,   particularly   the   United   States   and   England,   that   the  
action   readily   lends   itself   to   abuse   by   designing   women   and  
Their   intimate   relations   continued,   resulting   in   Elsa   getting   unscrupulous   men   (Congressional   Record,   vol.   IV,   No.   79,   14  
pregnant  sometime  in  June  1992.  Ronald  reassured  her,  again   May  1949,  2352).  
promising   her   marriage.   True   enough,   on   October   31,   1992,  
Ronald   and   his   parents,   accompanied   by   several   relatives   In   cases   where   this   Court   has   allowed   moral   or   exemplary  
damages   arising   from   similar   circumstances,   there   was   found  
moral  seduction  or  misrepresentation  (Gashem  Shookat  Basksh   miscarriage,   is   already   beyond   the   punitive   scope   of   our   laws.  
v.   Court   of   Appeals   (219   SCRA   115   (1993));;   Hermosisima   v.   This  is  simply  a  case  of  a  relationship  gone  awry.  
Court  of  Appeals  (109  Phil.  629  (1960)).  In  Baksh,  it  was  held  -­  
For   the   foregoing   reasons,   the   petition   is   DENIED   for   lack   of  
[T]hat  where  a  man's  promise  to  marry  is  in  fact   merit.  
the   proximate   cause   of   the   acceptance   of   his  
love   by   a   woman   and   his   representation   to    
fulfill   that   promise   thereafter   becomes   the  
proximate   cause   of   the   giving   of   herself   unto    
him  in  a  sexual  congress,  proof  that  he  had,  in  
reality,   no   intention   of   marrying   her   and   that    
the   promise   was   only   a   subtle   scheme   or  
deceptive   device   to   entice   or   inveigle   her   to    
accept   him   and   to   obtain   her   consent   to   the  
sexual  act,  could  justify  the  award  of  damages    
pursuant   to   Article   21   not   because   of   such  
promise  to  marry  but  because  of  the  fraud  and    
deceit   behind   it   and   the   willful   injury   to   her  
honor   and   reputation   which   followed    
thereafter.   It   is   essential,   however,   that   such  
injury   should   have   been   committed   in   a    
manner  contrary  to  morals,  good  customs,  or  
public  policy.    

(Id.,  p.  128)    

In   the   case   at   bar,   it   is   clear   that   no   moral   seduction   was    

employed   by   Ronald,   much   less   by   his   parents.   Form   the  
narration  of  the  trial  court,  the  evident  conclusion  is  that  the  two    
became   lovers   before   they   engaged   in   any   sexual   intercourse.  
Also,  the  moral  seduction  contemplated  by  the  Code  Commission    
in  drafting  Article  21  of  the  Civil  Code  is  one  where  the  defendant  
is  in  a  position  of  moral  ascendancy  in  relation  to  the  plaintiff.  We    
fail  to  see  any  of  these  circumstances  in  this  case.  
 
In  addition,  as  the  trial  court  noted,  marriage  plans  were  in  fact  
arranged   between   the   families   of   the   parties.   That   their  
relationship   turned   sour   afterwards,   or   immediately   after   Elsa's  
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   she  is  twenty-­two  (22)  years  old,  single,  Filipino  and  a  pretty  
SUPREME  COURT   lass  of  good  moral  character  and  reputation  duly  respected  in  
Manila   her  community;;  petitioner,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  Iranian  
citizen  residing  at  the  Lozano  Apartments,  Guilig,  Dagupan  City,  
THIRD  DIVISION   and  is  an  exchange  student  taking  a  medical  course  at  the  
Lyceum  Northwestern  Colleges  in  Dagupan  City;;  before  20  
    August  1987,  the  latter  courted  and  proposed  to  marry  her;;  she  
accepted  his  love  on  the  condition  that  they  would  get  married;;  
G.R.  No.  97336  February  19,  1993   they  therefore  agreed  to  get  married  after  the  end  of  the  school  
semester,  which  was  in  October  of  that  year;;  petitioner  then  
GASHEM  SHOOKAT  BAKSH,  petitioner,     visited  the  private  respondent's  parents  in  Bañaga,  Bugallon,  
vs.   Pangasinan  to  secure  their  approval  to  the  marriage;;  sometime  
HON.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  MARILOU  T.   in  20  August  1987,  the  petitioner  forced  her  to  live  with  him  in  
GONZALES,  respondents.   the  Lozano  Apartments;;  she  was  a  virgin  before  she  began  
living  with  him;;  a  week  before  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  
Public  Attorney's  Office  for  petitioner.   petitioner's  attitude  towards  her  started  to  change;;  he  
maltreated  and  threatened  to  kill  her;;  as  a  result  of  such  
Corleto  R.  Castro  for  private  respondent.   maltreatment,  she  sustained  injuries;;  during  a  confrontation  with  
a  representative  of  the  barangay  captain  of  Guilig  a  day  before  
  the  filing  of  the  complaint,  petitioner  repudiated  their  marriage  
agreement  and  asked  her  not  to  live  with  him  anymore  and;;  the  
DAVIDE,  JR.,  J.:   petitioner  is  already  married  to  someone  living  in  Bacolod  City.  
Private  respondent  then  prayed  for  judgment  ordering  the  
This  is  an  appeal  by  certiorari  under  Rule  45  of  the  Rules  of   petitioner  to  pay  her  damages  in  the  amount  of  not  less  than  
Court  seeking  to  review  and  set  aside  the  Decision1  of  the   P45,000.00,  reimbursement  for  actual  expenses  amounting  to  
respondent  Court  of  Appeals  in  CA-­G.R.  CV  No.  24256  which   P600.00,  attorney's  fees  and  costs,  and  granting  her  such  other  
affirmed  in  toto  the  16  October  1939  Decision  of  Branch  38   relief  and  remedies  as  may  be  just  and  equitable.  The  complaint  
(Lingayen)  of  the  Regional  Trial  Court  (RTC)  of  Pangasinan  in   was  docketed  as  Civil  Case  No.  16503.  
Civil  Case  No.  16503.  Presented  is  the  issue  of  whether  or  not  
damages  may  be  recovered  for  a  breach  of  promise  to  marry  on   In  his  Answer  with  Counterclaim,3  petitioner  admitted  only  the  
the  basis  of  Article  21  of  the  Civil  Code  of  the  Philippines.   personal  circumstances  of  the  parties  as  averred  in  the  
complaint  and  denied  the  rest  of  the  allegations  either  for  lack  of  
The  antecedents  of  this  case  are  not  complicated:   knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief  as  to  the  
truth  thereof  or  because  the  true  facts  are  those  alleged  as  his  
On  27  October  1987,  private  respondent,  without  the  assistance   Special  and  Affirmative  Defenses.  He  thus  claimed  that  he  
of  counsel,  filed  with  the  aforesaid  trial  court  a  complaint2  for   never  proposed  marriage  to  or  agreed  to  be  married  with  the  
damages  against  the  petitioner  for  the  alleged  violation  of  their   private  respondent;;  he  neither  sought  the  consent  and  approval  
agreement  to  get  married.  She  alleges  in  said  complaint  that:   of  her  parents  nor  forced  her  to  live  in  his  apartment;;  he  did  not  
maltreat  her,  but  only  told  her  to  stop  coming  to  his  place  
because  he  discovered  that  she  had  deceived  him  by  stealing   IN  THE  LIGHT  of  the  foregoing  consideration,  
his  money  and  passport;;  and  finally,  no  confrontation  took  place   judgment  is  hereby  rendered  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  
with  a  representative  of  the  barangay  captain.  Insisting,  in  his   and  against  the  defendant.  
Counterclaim,  that  the  complaint  is  baseless  and  unfounded  and  
that  as  a  result  thereof,  he  was  unnecessarily  dragged  into  court   1.  Condemning  (sic)  the  defendant  to  pay  the  
and  compelled  to  incur  expenses,  and  has  suffered  mental   plaintiff  the  sum  of  twenty  thousand  (P20,000.00)  
anxiety  and  a  besmirched  reputation,  he  prayed  for  an  award  of   pesos  as  moral  damages.  
P5,000.00  for  miscellaneous  expenses  and  P25,000.00  as  
moral  damages.   2.  Condemning  further  the  defendant  to  play  the  
plaintiff  the  sum  of  three  thousand  (P3,000.00)  
After  conducting  a  pre-­trial  on  25  January  1988,  the  trial  court   pesos  as  atty's  fees  and  two  thousand  (P2,000.00)  
issued  a  Pre-­Trial  Order4  embodying  the  stipulated  facts  which   pesos  at  (sic)  litigation  expenses  and  to  pay  the  
the  parties  had  agreed  upon,  to  wit:   costs.  

1.  That  the  plaintiff  is  single  and  resident  (sic)  of   3.  All  other  claims  are  denied.6  
Bañaga,  Bugallon,  Pangasinan,  while  the  
defendant  is  single,  Iranian  citizen  and  resident   The  decision  is  anchored  on  the  trial  court's  findings  and  
(sic)  of  Lozano  Apartment,  Guilig,  Dagupan  City   conclusions  that  (a)  petitioner  and  private  respondent  were  
since  September  1,  1987  up  to  the  present;;   lovers,  (b)  private  respondent  is  not  a  woman  of  loose  morals  or  
questionable  virtue  who  readily  submits  to  sexual  advances,  (c)  
2.  That  the  defendant  is  presently  studying  at   petitioner,  through  machinations,  deceit  and  false  pretenses,  
Lyceum  Northwestern,  Dagupan  City,  College  of   promised  to  marry  private  respondent,  d)  because  of  his  
Medicine,  second  year  medicine  proper;;   persuasive  promise  to  marry  her,  she  allowed  herself  to  be  
deflowered  by  him,  (e)  by  reason  of  that  deceitful  promise,  
3.  That  the  plaintiff  is  (sic)  an  employee  at   private  respondent  and  her  parents  —  in  accordance  with  
Mabuhay  Luncheonette  ,  Fernandez  Avenue,   Filipino  customs  and  traditions  —  made  some  preparations  for  
Dagupan  City  since  July,  1986  up  to  the  present   the  wedding  that  was  to  be  held  at  the  end  of  October  1987  by  
and  a  (sic)  high  school  graduate;;   looking  for  pigs  and  chickens,  inviting  friends  and  relatives  and  
contracting  sponsors,  (f)  petitioner  did  not  fulfill  his  promise  to  
4.  That  the  parties  happened  to  know  each  other   marry  her  and  (g)  such  acts  of  the  petitioner,  who  is  a  foreigner  
when  the  manager  of  the  Mabuhay  Luncheonette,   and  who  has  abused  Philippine  hospitality,  have  offended  our  
Johhny  Rabino  introduced  the  defendant  to  the   sense  of  morality,  good  customs,  culture  and  traditions.  The  trial  
plaintiff  on  August  3,  1986.   court  gave  full  credit  to  the  private  respondent's  testimony  
because,  inter  alia,  she  would  not  have  had  the  temerity  and  
After  trial  on  the  merits,  the  lower  court,  applying  Article  21  of   courage  to  come  to  court  and  expose  her  honor  and  reputation  
the  Civil  Code,  rendered  on  16  October  1989  a   to  public  scrutiny  and  ridicule  if  her  claim  was  false.7  
decision5  favoring  the  private  respondent.  The  petitioner  was  
thus  ordered  to  pay  the  latter  damages  and  attorney's  fees;;  the   The  above  findings  and  conclusions  were  culled  from  the  
dispositive  portion  of  the  decision  reads:   detailed  summary  of  the  evidence  for  the  private  respondent  in  
the  foregoing  decision,  digested  by  the  respondent  Court  as   Bacolod  City.  That  was  the  time  plaintiff  left  
follows:   defendant,  went  home  to  her  parents,  and  
thereafter  consulted  a  lawyer  who  accompanied  
According  to  plaintiff,  who  claimed  that  she  was  a   her  to  the  barangay  captain  in  Dagupan  City.  
virgin  at  the  time  and  that  she  never  had  a   Plaintiff,  her  lawyer,  her  godmother,  and  a  
boyfriend  before,  defendant  started  courting  her   barangay  tanod  sent  by  the  barangay  captain  went  
just  a  few  days  after  they  first  met.  He  later   to  talk  to  defendant  to  still  convince  him  to  marry  
proposed  marriage  to  her  several  times  and  she   plaintiff,  but  defendant  insisted  that  he  could  not  
accepted  his  love  as  well  as  his  proposal  of   do  so  because  he  was  already  married  to  a  girl  in  
marriage  on  August  20,  1987,  on  which  same  day   Bacolod  City,  although  the  truth,  as  stipulated  by  
he  went  with  her  to  her  hometown  of  Bañaga,   the  parties  at  the  pre-­trial,  is  that  defendant  is  still  
Bugallon,  Pangasinan,  as  he  wanted  to  meet  her   single.  
parents  and  inform  them  of  their  relationship  and  
their  intention  to  get  married.  The  photographs   Plaintiff's  father,  a  tricycle  driver,  also  claimed  that  
Exhs.  "A"  to  "E"  (and  their  submarkings)  of   after  defendant  had  informed  them  of  his  desire  to  
defendant  with  members  of  plaintiff's  family  or  with   marry  Marilou,  he  already  looked  for  sponsors  for  
plaintiff,  were  taken  that  day.  Also  on  that   the  wedding,  started  preparing  for  the  reception  by  
occasion,  defendant  told  plaintiffs  parents  and   looking  for  pigs  and  chickens,  and  even  already  
brothers  and  sisters  that  he  intended  to  marry  her   invited  many  relatives  and  friends  to  the  
during  the  semestral  break  in  October,  1987,  and   forthcoming  wedding.  8  
because  plaintiff's  parents  thought  he  was  good  
and  trusted  him,  they  agreed  to  his  proposal  for   Petitioner  appealed  the  trial  court's  decision  to  the  respondent  
him  to  marry  their  daughter,  and  they  likewise   Court  of  Appeals  which  docketed  the  case  as  CA-­G.R.  CV  No.  
allowed  him  to  stay  in  their  house  and  sleep  with   24256.  In  his  Brief,9  he  contended  that  the  trial  court  erred  (a)  in  
plaintiff  during  the  few  days  that  they  were  in   not  dismissing  the  case  for  lack  of  factual  and  legal  basis  and  
Bugallon.  When  plaintiff  and  defendant  later   (b)  in  ordering  him  to  pay  moral  damages,  attorney's  fees,  
returned  to  Dagupan  City,  they  continued  to  live   litigation  expenses  and  costs.  
together  in  defendant's  apartment.  However,  in  the  
early  days  of  October,  1987,  defendant  would  tie   On  18  February  1991,  respondent  Court  promulgated  the  
plaintiff's  hands  and  feet  while  he  went  to  school,   challenged  decision  10  affirming  in  toto  the  trial  court's  ruling  of  
and  he  even  gave  her  medicine  at  4  o'clock  in  the   16  October  1989.  In  sustaining  the  trial  court's  findings  of  fact,  
morning  that  made  her  sleep  the  whole  day  and   respondent  Court  made  the  following  analysis:  
night  until  the  following  day.  As  a  result  of  this  live-­
in  relationship,  plaintiff  became  pregnant,  but   First  of  all,  plaintiff,  then  only  21  years  old  when  
defendant  gave  her  some  medicine  to  abort  the   she  met  defendant  who  was  already  29  years  old  
fetus.  Still  plaintiff  continued  to  live  with  defendant   at  the  time,  does  not  appear  to  be  a  girl  of  loose  
and  kept  reminding  him  of  his  promise  to  marry   morals.  It  is  uncontradicted  that  she  was  a  virgin  
her  until  he  told  her  that  he  could  not  do  so   prior  to  her  unfortunate  experience  with  defendant  
because  he  was  already  married  to  a  girl  in   and  never  had  boyfriend.  She  is,  as  described  by  
the  lower  court,  a  barrio  lass  "not  used  and   accepted  defendant's  proposal  (pp.  6-­7,  tsn  March  
accustomed  to  trend  of  modern  urban  life",  and   7,  1988).  
certainly  would  (sic)  not  have  allowed    
"herself  to  be  deflowered  by  the  defendant  if  there   Upon  the  other  hand,  appellant  does  not  appear  to  
was  no  persuasive  promise  made  by  the   be  a  man  of  good  moral  character  and  must  think  
defendant  to  marry  her."  In  fact,  we  agree  with  the   so  low  and  have  so  little  respect  and  regard  for  
lower  court  that  plaintiff  and  defendant  must  have   Filipino  women  that  he  openly  admitted  that  when  
been  sweethearts  or  so  the  plaintiff  must  have   he  studied  in  Bacolod  City  for  several  years  where  
thought  because  of  the  deception  of  defendant,  for   he  finished  his  B.S.  Biology  before  he  came  to  
otherwise,  she  would  not  have  allowed  herself  to   Dagupan  City  to  study  medicine,  he  had  a  
be  photographed  with  defendant  in  public  in  so   common-­law  wife  in  Bacolod  City.  In  other  words,  
(sic)  loving  and  tender  poses  as  those  depicted  in   he  also  lived  with  another  woman  in  Bacolod  City  
the  pictures  Exhs.  "D"  and  "E".  We  cannot  believe,   but  did  not  marry  that  woman,  just  like  what  he  did  
therefore,  defendant's  pretense  that  plaintiff  was  a   to  plaintiff.  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  he  felt  so  
nobody  to  him  except  a  waitress  at  the  restaurant   little  compunction  or  remorse  in  pretending  to  love  
where  he  usually  ate.  Defendant  in  fact  admitted   and  promising  to  marry  plaintiff,  a  young,  innocent,  
that  he  went  to  plaintiff's  hometown  of  Bañaga,   trustful  country  girl,  in  order  to  satisfy  his  lust  on  
Bugallon,  Pangasinan,  at  least  thrice;;  at  (sic)  the   her.  11  
town  fiesta  on  February  27,  1987  (p.  54,  tsn  May  
18,  1988),  at  (sic)  a  beach  party  together  with  the   and  then  concluded:  
manager  and  employees  of  the  Mabuhay  
Luncheonette  on  March  3,  1987  (p.  50,  tsn  id.),   In  sum,  we  are  strongly  convinced  and  so  hold  that  
and  on  April  1,  1987  when  he  allegedly  talked  to   it  was  defendant-­appellant's  fraudulent  and  
plaintiff's  mother  who  told  him  to  marry  her   deceptive  protestations  of  love  for  and  promise  to  
daughter  (pp.  55-­56,  tsn  id.).  Would  defendant   marry  plaintiff  that  made  her  surrender  her  virtue  
have  left  Dagupan  City  where  he  was  involved  in   and  womanhood  to  him  and  to  live  with  him  on  the  
the  serious  study  of  medicine  to  go  to  plaintiff's   honest  and  sincere  belief  that  he  would  keep  said  
hometown  in  Bañaga,  Bugallon,  unless  there  was   promise,  and  it  was  likewise  these  (sic)  fraud  and  
(sic)  some  kind  of  special  relationship  between   deception  on  appellant's  part  that  made  plaintiff's  
them?  And  this  special  relationship  must  indeed   parents  agree  to  their  daughter's  living-­in  with  him  
have  led  to  defendant's  insincere  proposal  of   preparatory  to  their  supposed  marriage.  And  as  
marriage  to  plaintiff,  communicated  not  only  to  her   these  acts  of  appellant  are  palpably  and  
but  also  to  her  parents,  and  (sic)  Marites  Rabino,   undoubtedly  against  morals,  good  customs,  and  
the  owner  of  the  restaurant  where  plaintiff  was   public  policy,  and  are  even  gravely  and  deeply  
working  and  where  defendant  first  proposed   derogatory  and  insulting  to  our  women,  coming  as  
marriage  to  her,  also  knew  of  this  love  affair  and   they  do  from  a  foreigner  who  has  been  enjoying  
defendant's  proposal  of  marriage  to  plaintiff,  which   the  hospitality  of  our  people  and  taking  advantage  
she  declared  was  the  reason  why  plaintiff  resigned   of  the  opportunity  to  study  in  one  of  our  institutions  
from  her  job  at  the  restaurant  after  she  had   of  learning,  defendant-­appellant  should  indeed  be  
 made,  under  Art.  21  of  the  Civil  Code  of  the   On  26  August  1991,  after  the  private  respondent  had  filed  her  
Philippines,  to  compensate  for  the  moral  damages   Comment  to  the  petition  and  the  petitioner  had  filed  his  Reply  
and  injury  that  he  had  caused  plaintiff,  as  the  lower   thereto,  this  Court  gave  due  course  to  the  petition  and  required  
court  ordered  him  to  do  in  its  decision  in  this   the  parties  to  submit  their  respective  Memoranda,  which  they  
case.  12   subsequently  complied  with.  

Unfazed  by  his  second  defeat,  petitioner  filed  the  instant  petition   As  may  be  gleaned  from  the  foregoing  summation  of  the  
on  26  March  1991;;  he  raises  therein  the  single  issue  of  whether   petitioner's  arguments  in  support  of  his  thesis,  it  is  clear  that  
or  not  Article  21  of  the  Civil  Code  applies  to  the  case  at  bar.  13   questions  of  fact,  which  boil  down  to  the  issue  of  the  credibility  
of  witnesses,  are  also  raised.  It  is  the  rule  in  this  jurisdiction  that  
It  is  petitioner's  thesis  that  said  Article  21  is  not  applicable   appellate  courts  will  not  disturb  the  trial  court's  findings  as  to  the  
because  he  had  not  committed  any  moral  wrong  or  injury  or   credibility  of  witnesses,  the  latter  court  having  heard  the  
violated  any  good  custom  or  public  policy;;  he  has  not  professed   witnesses  and  having  had  the  opportunity  to  observe  closely  
love  or  proposed  marriage  to  the  private  respondent;;  and  he  has   their  deportment  and  manner  of  testifying,  unless  the  trial  court  
never  maltreated  her.  He  criticizes  the  trial  court  for  liberally   had  plainly  overlooked  facts  of  substance  or  value  which,  if  
invoking  Filipino  customs,  traditions  and  culture,  and  ignoring   considered,  might  affect  the  result  of  the  case.  15  
the  fact  that  since  he  is  a  foreigner,  he  is  not  conversant  with  
such  Filipino  customs,  traditions  and  culture.  As  an  Iranian   Petitioner  has  miserably  failed  to  convince  Us  that  both  the  
Moslem,  he  is  not  familiar  with  Catholic  and  Christian  ways.  He   appellate  and  trial  courts  had  overlooked  any  fact  of  substance  
stresses  that  even  if  he  had  made  a  promise  to  marry,  the   or  values  which  could  alter  the  result  of  the  case.  
subsequent  failure  to  fulfill  the  same  is  excusable  or  tolerable  
because  of  his  Moslem  upbringing;;  he  then  alludes  to  the   Equally  settled  is  the  rule  that  only  questions  of  law  may  be  
Muslim  Code  which  purportedly  allows  a  Muslim  to  take  four  (4)   raised  in  a  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  under  Rule  45  of  the  
wives  and  concludes  that  on  the  basis  thereof,  the  trial  court   Rules  of  Court.  It  is  not  the  function  of  this  Court  to  analyze  or  
erred  in  ruling  that  he  does  not  posses  good  moral  character.   weigh  all  over  again  the  evidence  introduced  by  the  parties  
Moreover,  his  controversial  "common  law  life"  is  now  his  legal   before  the  lower  court.  There  are,  however,  recognized  
wife  as  their  marriage  had  been  solemnized  in  civil  ceremonies   exceptions  to  this  rule.  Thus,  in  Medina  vs.Asistio,  Jr.,  16  this  
in  the  Iranian  Embassy.  As  to  his  unlawful  cohabitation  with  the   Court  took  the  time,  again,  to  enumerate  these  exceptions:  
private  respondent,  petitioner  claims  that  even  if  responsibility  
could  be  pinned  on  him  for  the  live-­in  relationship,  the  private   xxx  xxx  xxx  
respondent  should  also  be  faulted  for  consenting  to  an  illicit  
arrangement.  Finally,  petitioner  asseverates  that  even  if  it  was   (1)  When  the  conclusion  is  a  finding  grounded  
to  be  assumed  arguendo  that  he  had  professed  his  love  to  the   entirely  on  speculation,  surmises  or  conjectures  
private  respondent  and  had  also  promised  to  marry  her,  such   (Joaquin  v.  Navarro,  93  Phil.  257  [1953]);;  (2)  
acts  would  not  be  actionable  in  view  of  the  special   When  the  inference  made  is  manifestly  mistaken,  
circumstances  of  the  case.  The  mere  breach  of  promise  is  not   absurb  or  impossible  (Luna  v.  Linatok,  74  Phil.  15  
actionable.  14   [1942]);;  (3)  Where  there  is  a  grave  abuse  of  
discretion  (Buyco  v.  People,  95  Phil.  453  [1955]);;  
(4)  When  the  judgment  is  based  on  a  
 misapprehension  of  facts  (Cruz  v.  Sosing,     been  definitely  decided  in  the  case  of  De  Jesus  vs.  
L-­4875,  Nov.  27,  1953);;  (5)  When  the  findings  of   Syquia.  18  The  history  of  breach  of  promise  suits  in  
fact  are  conflicting  (Casica  v.  Villaseca,  L-­9590  Ap.   the  United  States  and  in  England  has  shown  that  
30,  1957;;  unrep.)  (6)  When  the  Court  of  Appeals,   no  other  action  lends  itself  more  readily  to  abuse  
in  making  its  findings,  went  beyond  the  issues  of   by  designing  women  and  unscrupulous  men.  It  is  
the  case  and  the  same  is  contrary  to  the   this  experience  which  has  led  to  the  abolition  of  
admissions  of  both  appellate  and  appellee   rights  of  action  in  the  so-­called  Heart  Balm  suits  in  
(Evangelista  v.  Alto  Surety  and  Insurance  Co.,  103   many  of  the  American  states.  .  .  .  19  
Phil.  401  [1958]);;    
(7)  The  findings  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  are   This  notwithstanding,  the  said  Code  contains  a  provision,  Article  
contrary  to  those  of  the  trial  court  (Garcia  v.  Court   21,  which  is  designed  to  expand  the  concept  of  torts  or  quasi-­
of  Appeals,  33  SCRA  622  [1970];;  Sacay  v.   delict  in  this  jurisdiction  by  granting  adequate  legal  remedy  for  
Sandiganbayan,  142  SCRA  593  [1986]);;  (8)  When   the  untold  number  of  moral  wrongs  which  is  impossible  for  
the  findings  of  fact  are  conclusions  without  citation   human  foresight  to  specifically  enumerate  and  punish  in  the  
of  specific  evidence  on  which  they  are  based   statute  books.  20  
(Ibid.,);;  (9)  When  the  facts  set  forth  in  the  petition  
as  well  as  in  the  petitioners  main  and  reply  briefs   As  the  Code  Commission  itself  stated  in  its  Report:  
are  not  disputed  by  the  respondents  (Ibid.,);;  and  
(10)  The  finding  of  fact  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is   But  the  Code  Commission  had  gone  farther  than  
premised  on  the  supposed  absence  of  evidence   the  sphere  of  wrongs  defined  or  determined  by  
and  is  contradicted  by  the  evidence  on  record   positive  law.  Fully  sensible  that  there  are  countless  
(Salazar  v.  Gutierrez,  33  SCRA  242  [1970]).   gaps  in  the  statutes,  which  leave  so  many  victims  
of  moral  wrongs  helpless,  even  though  they  have  
Petitioner  has  not  endeavored  to  joint  out  to  Us  the  existence  of   actually  suffered  material  and  moral  injury,  the  
any  of  the  above  quoted  exceptions  in  this  case.  Consequently,   Commission  has  deemed  it  necessary,  in  the  
the  factual  findings  of  the  trial  and  appellate  courts  must  be   interest  of  justice,  to  incorporate  in  the  proposed  
respected.   Civil  Code  the  following  rule:  

And  now  to  the  legal  issue.   Art.  23.  Any  person  who  wilfully  
causes  loss  or  injury  to  another  in  a  
The  existing  rule  is  that  a  breach  of  promise  to  marry  per  se  is   manner  that  is  contrary  to  morals,  
not  an  actionable  wrong.  17  Congress  deliberately  eliminated   good  customs  or  public  policy  shall  
from  the  draft  of  the  New  Civil  Code  the  provisions  that  would   compensate  the  latter  for  the  
have  made  it  so.  The  reason  therefor  is  set  forth  in  the  report  of   damage.  
the  Senate  Committees  on  the  Proposed  Civil  Code,  from  which  
We  quote:   An  example  will  illustrate  the  purview  of  the  
foregoing  norm:  "A"  seduces  the  nineteen-­year  old  
The  elimination  of  this  chapter  is  proposed.  That   daughter  of  "X".  A  promise  of  marriage  either  has  
breach  of  promise  to  marry  is  not  actionable  has   not  been  made,  or  can  not  be  proved.  The  girl  
 becomes  pregnant.  Under  the  present  laws,  there   negligent  acts  or  omissions  are  to  be  covered  by  Article  
is  no  crime,  as  the  girl  is  above  nineteen  years  of   2176  of  the  Civil  Code.  22  In  between  these  opposite  
age.  Neither  can  any  civil  action  for  breach  of   spectrums  are  injurious  acts  which,  in  the  absence  of  
promise  of  marriage  be  filed.  Therefore,  though   Article  21,  would  have  been  beyond  redress.  Thus,  
the  grievous  moral  wrong  has  been  committed,   Article  21  fills  that  vacuum.  It  is  even  postulated  that  
and  though  the  girl  and  family  have  suffered   together  with  Articles  19  and  20  of  the  Civil  Code,  Article  
incalculable  moral  damage,  she  and  her  parents   21  has  greatly  broadened  the  scope  of  the  law  on  civil  
cannot  bring  action  for  damages.  But  under  the   wrongs;;  it  has  become  much  more  supple  and  adaptable  
proposed  article,  she  and  her  parents  would  have   than  the  Anglo-­American  law  on  torts.  23  
such  a  right  of  action.  
In  the  light  of  the  above  laudable  purpose  of  Article  21,  We  are  
Thus  at  one  stroke,  the  legislator,  if  the  forgoing   of  the  opinion,  and  so  hold,  that  where  a  man's  promise  to  marry  
rule  is  approved,  would  vouchsafe  adequate  legal   is  in  fact  the  proximate  cause  of  the  acceptance  of  his  love  by  a  
remedy  for  that  untold  number  of  moral  wrongs   woman  and  his  representation  to  fulfill  that  promise  thereafter  
which  it  is  impossible  for  human  foresight  to   becomes  the  proximate  cause  of  the  giving  of  herself  unto  him  
provide  for  specifically  in  the  statutes.  21   in  a  sexual  congress,  proof  that  he  had,  in  reality,  no  intention  of  
marrying  her  and  that  the  promise  was  only  a  subtle  scheme  or  
Article  2176  of  the  Civil  Code,  which  defines  a  quasi-­delict  thus:   deceptive  device  to  entice  or  inveigle  her  to  accept  him  and  to  
obtain  her  consent  to  the  sexual  act,  could  justify  the  award  of  
Whoever  by  act  or  omission  causes  damage  to   damages  pursuant  to  Article  21  not  because  of  such  promise  to  
another,  there  being  fault  or  negligence,  is  obliged   marry  but  because  of  the  fraud  and  deceit  behind  it  and  the  
to  pay  for  the  damage  done.  Such  fault  or   willful  injury  to  her  honor  and  reputation  which  followed  
negligence,  if  there  is  no  pre-­existing  contractual   thereafter.  It  is  essential,  however,  that  such  injury  should  have  
relation  between  the  parties,  is  called  a  quasi-­ been  committed  in  a  manner  contrary  to  morals,  good  customs  
delict  and  is  governed  by  the  provisions  of  this   or  public  policy.  
Chapter.  
In  the  instant  case,  respondent  Court  found  that  it  was  the  
is  limited  to  negligent  acts  or  omissions  and  excludes  the   petitioner's  "fraudulent  and  deceptive  protestations  of  love  for  
notion  of  willfulness  or  intent.  Quasi-­delict,  known  in   and  promise  to  marry  plaintiff  that  made  her  surrender  her  virtue  
Spanish  legal  treatises  as  culpa  aquiliana,  is  a  civil  law   and  womanhood  to  him  and  to  live  with  him  on  the  honest  and  
concept  while  torts  is  an  Anglo-­American  or  common  law   sincere  belief  that  he  would  keep  said  promise,  and  it  was  
concept.  Torts  is  much  broader  than  culpa   likewise  these  fraud  and  deception  on  appellant's  part  that  made  
aquiliana  because  it  includes  not  only  negligence,  but   plaintiff's  parents  agree  to  their  daughter's  living-­in  with  him  
international  criminal  acts  as  well  such  as  assault  and   preparatory  to  their  supposed  marriage."  24  In  short,  the  private  
battery,  false  imprisonment  and  deceit.  In  the  general   respondent  surrendered  her  virginity,  the  cherished  possession  
scheme  of  the  Philippine  legal  system  envisioned  by  the   of  every  single  Filipina,  not  because  of  lust  but  because  of  moral  
Commission  responsible  for  drafting  the  New  Civil  Code,   seduction  —  the  kind  illustrated  by  the  Code  Commission  in  its  
intentional  and  malicious  acts,  with  certain  exceptions,   example  earlier  adverted  to.  The  petitioner  could  not  be  held  
are  to  be  governed  by  the  Revised  Penal  Code  while   liable  for  criminal  seduction  punished  under  either  Article  337  or  
Article  338  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code  because  the  private   enticement,  superior  power  or  abuse  of  confidence  
respondent  was  above  eighteen  (18)  years  of  age  at  the  time  of   on  the  part  of  the  seducer  to  which  the  woman  has  
the  seduction.   yielded  (U.S.  vs.  Buenaventura,  27  Phil.  121;;  U.S.  
vs.  Arlante,  9  Phil.  595).  
Prior  decisions  of  this  Court  clearly  suggest  that  Article  21  may  
be  applied  in  a  breach  of  promise  to  marry  where  the  woman  is   It  has  been  ruled  in  the  Buenaventura  case  (supra)  
a  victim  of  moral  seduction.  Thus,  in  Hermosisima  vs.  Court  of   that  —  
Appeals,25  this  Court  denied  recovery  of  damages  to  the  woman  
because:   To  constitute  seduction  there  must  in  
all  cases  be  some  sufficient  promise  
.  .  .  we  find  ourselves  unable  to  say  that  petitioner   or  inducement  and  the  woman  must  
is  morally  guilty  of  seduction,  not  only  because  he   yield  because  of  the  promise  or  other  
is  approximately  ten  (10)  years  younger  than  the   inducement.  If  she  consents  merely  
complainant  —  who  was  around  thirty-­six  (36)   from  carnal  lust  and  the  intercourse  
years  of  age,  and  as  highly  enlightened  as  a   is  from  mutual  desire,  there  is  no  
former  high  school  teacher  and  a  life  insurance   seduction  (43  Cent.  Dig.  tit.  
agent  are  supposed  to  be  —  when  she  became   Seduction,  par.  56)  She  must  be  
intimate  with  petitioner,  then  a  mere  apprentice   induced  to  depart  from  the  path  of  
pilot,  but,  also,  because  the  court  of  first  instance   virtue  by  the  use  of  some  species  of  
found  that,  complainant  "surrendered  herself"  to   arts,  persuasions  and  wiles,  which  
petitioner  because,  "overwhelmed  by  her  love"  for   are  calculated  to  have  and  do  have  
him,  she  "wanted  to  bind"  him  by  having  a  fruit  of   that  effect,  and  which  result  in  her  
their  engagement  even  before  they  had  the  benefit   person  to  ultimately  submitting  her  
of  clergy.   person  to  the  sexual  embraces  of  her  
seducer  (27  Phil.  123).  
In  Tanjanco  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  26  while  this  Court  likewise  
hinted  at  possible  recovery  if  there  had  been  moral  seduction,   And  in  American  Jurisprudence  we  find:  
recovery  was  eventually  denied  because  We  were  not  
convinced  that  such  seduction  existed.  The  following   On  the  other  hand,  in  an  action  by  
enlightening  disquisition  and  conclusion  were  made  in  the  said   the  woman,  the  enticement,  
case:   persuasion  or  deception  is  the  
essence  of  the  injury;;  and  a  mere  
The  Court  of  Appeals  seem  to  have  overlooked   proof  of  intercourse  is  insufficient  to  
that  the  example  set  forth  in  the  Code   warrant  a  recovery.  
Commission's  memorandum  refers  to  a  tort  upon  a  
minor  who  had  been  seduced.  The  essential   Accordingly  it  is  not  seduction  where  
feature  is  seduction,  that  in  law  is  more  than  mere   the  willingness  arises  out  of  sexual  
sexual  intercourse,  or  a  breach  of  a  promise  of   desire  of  curiosity  of  the  female,  and  
marriage;;  it  connotes  essentially  the  idea  of  deceit,   the  defendant  merely  affords  her  the  
 needed  opportunity  for  the   .  .  .  if  there  be  criminal  or  moral  seduction,  but  not  
commission  of  the  act.  It  has  been   if  the  intercourse  was  due  to  mutual  lust.  
emphasized  that  to  allow  a  recovery   (Hermosisima  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,    
in  all  such  cases  would  tend  to  the   L-­14628,  Sept.  30,  1960;;  Estopa  vs.  Piansay,  Jr.,  
demoralization  of  the  female  sex,   L-­14733,  Sept.  30,  1960;;  Batarra  vs.  Marcos,  7  
and  would  be  a  reward  for  unchastity   Phil.  56  (sic);;  Beatriz  Galang  vs.  Court  of  Appeals,  
by  which  a  class  of  adventuresses   et  al.,  L-­17248,  Jan.  29,  1962).  (In  other  words,  if  
would  be  swift  to  profit.  (47  Am.  Jur.   the  CAUSE  be  the  promise  to  marry,  and  the  
662)   EFFECT  be  the  carnal  knowledge,  there  is  a  
chance  that  there  was  criminal  or  moral  seduction,  
xxx  xxx  xxx   hence  recovery  of  moral  damages  will  prosper.  If  it  
be  the  other  way  around,  there  can  be  no  recovery  
Over  and  above  the  partisan  allegations,  the  fact   of  moral  damages,  because  here  mutual  lust  has  
stand  out  that  for  one  whole  year,  from  1958  to   intervened).  .  .  .  
1959,  the  plaintiff-­appellee,  a  woman  of  adult  age,  
maintain  intimate  sexual  relations  with  appellant,   together  with  "ACTUAL  damages,  should  there  be  any,  
with  repeated  acts  of  intercourse.  Such  conduct  is   such  as  the  expenses  for  the  wedding  presentations  (See  
incompatible  with  the  idea  of  seduction.  Plainly   Domalagon  v.  Bolifer,  33  Phil.  471).  
there  is  here  voluntariness  and  mutual  passion;;  for  
had  the  appellant  been  deceived,  had  she   Senator  Arturo  M.  Tolentino  29  is  also  of  the  same  persuasion:  
surrendered  exclusively  because  of  the  deceit,  
artful  persuasions  and  wiles  of  the  defendant,  she   It  is  submitted  that  the  rule  in  Batarra  
would  not  have  again  yielded  to  his  embraces,   vs.  Marcos,  30  still  subsists,  notwithstanding  the  
much  less  for  one  year,  without  exacting  early   incorporation  of  the  present  article31  in  the  Code.  
fulfillment  of  the  alleged  promises  of  marriage,  and   The  example  given  by  the  Code  Commission  is  
would  have  cut  short  all  sexual  relations  upon   correct,  if  there  was  seduction,  not  necessarily  in  
finding  that  defendant  did  not  intend  to  fulfill  his   the  legal  sense,  but  in  the  vulgar  sense  of  
defendant  did  not  intend  to  fulfill  his  promise.   deception.  But  when  the  sexual  act  is  
Hence,  we  conclude  that  no  case  is  made  under   accomplished  without  any  deceit  or  qualifying  
article  21  of  the  Civil  Code,  and  no  other  cause  of   circumstance  of  abuse  of  authority  or  influence,  
action  being  alleged,  no  error  was  committed  by   but  the  woman,  already  of  age,  has  knowingly  
the  Court  of  First  Instance  in  dismissing  the   given  herself  to  a  man,  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  
complaint.  27   is  an  injury  which  can  be  the  basis  for  indemnity.  

In  his  annotations  on  the  Civil  Code,  28  Associate  Justice   But  so  long  as  there  is  fraud,  which  is  
Edgardo  L.  Paras,  who  recently  retired  from  this  Court,  opined   characterized  by  willfulness  (sic),  the  action  lies.  
that  in  a  breach  of  promise  to  marry  where  there  had  been   The  court,  however,  must  weigh  the  degree  of  
carnal  knowledge,  moral  damages  may  be  recovered:   fraud,  if  it  is  sufficient  to  deceive  the  woman  under  
the  circumstances,  because  an  act  which  would  
 deceive  a  girl  sixteen  years  of  age  may  not   circumstances  could  not  have  even  remotely  occurred  to  him.  
constitute  deceit  as  to  an  experienced  woman   Thus,  his  profession  of  love  and  promise  to  marry  were  empty  
thirty  years  of  age.  But  so  long  as  there  is  a   words  directly  intended  to  fool,  dupe,  entice,  beguile  and  
wrongful  act  and  a  resulting  injury,  there  should  be   deceive  the  poor  woman  into  believing  that  indeed,  he  loved  her  
civil  liability,  even  if  the  act  is  not  punishable  under   and  would  want  her  to  be  his  life's  partner.  His  was  nothing  but  
the  criminal  law  and  there  should  have  been  an   pure  lust  which  he  wanted  satisfied  by  a  Filipina  who  honestly  
acquittal  or  dismissal  of  the  criminal  case  for  that   believed  that  by  accepting  his  proffer  of  love  and  proposal  of  
reason.   marriage,  she  would  be  able  to  enjoy  a  life  of  ease  and  security.  
Petitioner  clearly  violated  the  Filipino's  concept  of  morality  and  
We  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  petitioner's  alternative   brazenly  defied  the  traditional  respect  Filipinos  have  for  their  
proposition  to  the  effect  that  granting,  for  argument's  sake,  that   women.  It  can  even  be  said  that  the  petitioner  committed  such  
he  did  promise  to  marry  the  private  respondent,  the  latter  is   deplorable  acts  in  blatant  disregard  of  Article  19  of  the  Civil  
nevertheless  also  at  fault.  According  to  him,  both  parties  are   Code  which  directs  every  person  to  act  with  justice,  give  
in  pari  delicto;;  hence,  pursuant  to  Article  1412(1)  of  the  Civil   everyone  his  due  and  observe  honesty  and  good  faith  in  the  
Code  and  the  doctrine  laid  down  in  Batarra  vs.  Marcos,  32  the   exercise  of  his  rights  and  in  the  performance  of  his  obligations.  
private  respondent  cannot  recover  damages  from  the  petitioner.  
The  latter  even  goes  as  far  as  stating  that  if  the  private   No  foreigner  must  be  allowed  to  make  a  mockery  of  our  laws,  
respondent  had  "sustained  any  injury  or  damage  in  their   customs  and  traditions.  
relationship,  it  is  primarily  because  of  her  own  doing,  33  for:  
The  pari  delicto  rule  does  not  apply  in  this  case  for  while  indeed,  
.  .  .  She  is  also  interested  in  the  petitioner  as  the   the  private  respondent  may  not  have  been  impelled  by  the  
latter  will  become  a  doctor  sooner  or  later.  Take   purest  of  intentions,  she  eventually  submitted  to  the  petitioner  in  
notice  that  she  is  a  plain  high  school  graduate  and   sexual  congress  not  out  of  lust,  but  because  of  moral  seduction.  
a  mere  employee  .  .  .  (Annex  "C")  or  a  waitress   In  fact,  it  is  apparent  that  she  had  qualms  of  conscience  about  
(TSN,  p.  51,  January  25,  1988)  in  a  luncheonette   the  entire  episode  for  as  soon  as  she  found  out  that  the  
and  without  doubt,  is  in  need  of  a  man  who  can   petitioner  was  not  going  to  marry  her  after  all,  she  left  him.  She  
give  her  economic  security.  Her  family  is  in  dire   is  not,  therefore,  in  pari  delicto  with  the  petitioner.  Pari  
need  of  financial  assistance.  (TSN,  pp.  51-­53,  May   delicto  means  "in  equal  fault;;  in  a  similar  offense  or  crime;;  equal  
18,  1988).  And  this  predicament  prompted  her  to   in  guilt  or  in  legal  fault."  35At  most,  it  could  be  conceded  that  she  
accept  a  proposition  that  may  have  been  offered   is  merely  in  delicto.  
by  the  petitioner.  34  
Equity  often  interferes  for  the  relief  of  the  less  
These  statements  reveal  the  true  character  and  motive  of  the   guilty  of  the  parties,  where  his  transgression  has  
petitioner.  It  is  clear  that  he  harbors  a  condescending,  if  not   been  brought  about  by  the  imposition  of  undue  
sarcastic,  regard  for  the  private  respondent  on  account  of  the   influence  of  the  party  on  whom  the  burden  of  the  
latter's  ignoble  birth,  inferior  educational  background,  poverty   original  wrong  principally  rests,  or  where  his  
and,  as  perceived  by  him,  dishonorable  employment.  Obviously   consent  to  the  transaction  was  itself  procured  by    
then,  from  the  very  beginning,  he  was  not  at  all  moved  by  good   fraud.  36  
faith  and  an  honest  motive.  Marrying  with  a  woman  so  
In  Mangayao  vs.  Lasud,  37  We  declared:    

Appellants  likewise  stress  that  both  parties  being    

at  fault,  there  should  be  no  action  by  one  against  
the  other  (Art.  1412,  New  Civil  Code).  This  rule,    
however,  has  been  interpreted  as  applicable  only  
where  the  fault  on  both  sides  is,  more  or  less,    
equivalent.  It  does  not  apply  where  one  party  is  
literate  or  intelligent  and  the  other  one  is  not.  (c.f.    
Bough  vs.  Cantiveros,  40  Phil.  209).  
 
We  should  stress,  however,  that  while  We  find  for  the  private  
respondent,  let  it  not  be  said  that  this  Court  condones  the    
deplorable  behavior  of  her  parents  in  letting  her  and  the  
petitioner  stay  together  in  the  same  room  in  their  house  after    
giving  approval  to  their  marriage.  It  is  the  solemn  duty  of  parents  
to  protect  the  honor  of  their  daughters  and  infuse  upon  them  the    
higher  values  of  morality  and  dignity.  
 
WHEREFORE,  finding  no  reversible  error  in  the  challenged  
decision,  the  instant  petition  is  hereby  DENIED,  with  costs    
against  the  petitioner.  
 
SO  ORDERED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   Paquing  
SUPREME  COURT  
Manila   But  the  next  day,  September  3,  he  sent  her  the  following  
telegram:  
EN  BANC  
NOTHING  CHANGED  REST  ASSURED  
  RETURNING  VERY  SOON  APOLOGIZE  MAMA  
PAPA  LOVE  .  
 
PAKING  
G.R.  No.  L-­20089            December  26,  1964  
Thereafter  Velez  did  not  appear  nor  was  he  heard  from  again.  
BEATRIZ  P.  WASSMER,  plaintiff-­appellee,    
vs.   Sued  by  Beatriz  for  damages,  Velez  filed  no  answer  and  was  
FRANCISCO  X.  VELEZ,  defendant-­appellant.   declared  in  default.  Plaintiff  adduced  evidence  before  the  clerk  
of  court  as  commissioner,  and  on  April  29,  1955,  judgment  was  
Jalandoni  &  Jamir  for  defendant-­appellant.   rendered  ordering  defendant  to  pay  plaintiff  P2,000.00  as  actual  
Samson  S.  Alcantara  for  plaintiff-­appellee.   damages;;  P25,000.00  as  moral  and  exemplary  damages;;  
P2,500.00  as  attorney's  fees;;  and  the  costs.  
BENGZON,  J.P.,  J.:  
On  June  21,  1955  defendant  filed  a  "petition  for  relief  from  
The  facts  that  culminated  in  this  case  started  with  dreams  and   orders,  judgment  and  proceedings  and  motion  for  new  trial  and  
hopes,  followed  by  appropriate  planning  and  serious  endeavors,   reconsideration."  Plaintiff  moved  to  strike  it  cut.  But  the  court,  on  
but  terminated  in  frustration  and,  what  is  worse,  complete  public   August  2,  1955,  ordered  the  parties  and  their  attorneys  to  
humiliation.   appear  before  it  on  August  23,  1955  "to  explore  at  this  stage  of  
the  proceedings  the  possibility  of  arriving  at  an  amicable  
Francisco  X.  Velez  and  Beatriz  P.  Wassmer,  following  their   settlement."  It  added  that  should  any  of  them  fail  to  appear  "the  
mutual  promise  of  love,  decided  to  get  married  and  set   petition  for  relief  and  the  opposition  thereto  will  be  deemed  
September  4,  1954  as  the  big  day.  On  September  2,  1954  Velez   submitted  for  resolution."  
left  this  note  for  his  bride-­to-­be:  
On  August  23,  1955  defendant  failed  to  appear  before  court.  
Dear  Bet  —   Instead,  on  the  following  day  his  counsel  filed  a  motion  to  defer  
for  two  weeks  the  resolution  on  defendants  petition  for  relief.  
Will  have  to  postpone  wedding  —  My  mother   The  counsel  stated  that  he  would  confer  with  defendant  in  
opposes  it.  Am  leaving  on  the  Convair  today.   Cagayan  de  Oro  City  —  the  latter's  residence  —  on  the  
possibility  of  an  amicable  element.  The  court  granted  two  weeks  
Please  do  not  ask  too  many  people  about  the   counted  from  August  25,  1955.  
reason  why  —  That  would  only  create  a  scandal.  
Plaintiff  manifested  on  June  15,  1956  that  the  two  weeks  given   be  obtained  for  he  was  declared  in  default  and  thus  had  no  
by  the  court  had  expired  on  September  8,  1955  but  that   standing  in  court  (Velez  vs.  Ramas,  40  Phil.  787;;  Alano  vs.  
defendant  and  his  counsel  had  failed  to  appear.   Court  of  First  Instance,  L-­14557,  October  30,  1959).  

Another  chance  for  amicable  settlement  was  given  by  the  court   In  support  of  his  "motion  for  new  trial  and  reconsideration,"  
in  its  order  of  July  6,  1956  calling  the  parties  and  their  attorneys   defendant  asserts  that  the  judgment  is  contrary  to  law.  The  
to  appear  on  July  13,  1956.  This  time.  however,  defendant's   reason  given  is  that  "there  is  no  provision  of  the  Civil  Code  
counsel  informed  the  court  that  chances  of  settling  the  case   authorizing"  an  action  for  breach  of  promise  to  marry.  Indeed,  
amicably  were  nil.   our  ruling  in  Hermosisima  vs.  Court  of  Appeals  (L-­14628,  Sept.  
30,  1960),  as  reiterated  in  Estopa  vs.  Biansay  (L-­14733,  Sept.  
On  July  20,  1956  the  court  issued  an  order  denying  defendant's   30,  1960),  is  that  "mere  breach  of  a  promise  to  marry"  is  not  an  
aforesaid  petition.  Defendant  has  appealed  to  this  Court.  In  his   actionable  wrong.  We  pointed  out  that  Congress  deliberately  
petition  of  June  21,  1955  in  the  court  a  quo  defendant  alleged   eliminated  from  the  draft  of  the  new  Civil  Code  the  provisions  
excusable  negligence  as  ground  to  set  aside  the  judgment  by   that  would  have  it  so.  
default.  Specifically,  it  was  stated  that  defendant  filed  no  answer  
in  the  belief  that  an  amicable  settlement  was  being  negotiated.   It  must  not  be  overlooked,  however,  that  the  extent  to  which  acts  
not  contrary  to  law  may  be  perpetrated  with  impunity,  is  not  
A  petition  for  relief  from  judgment  on  grounds  of  fraud,  accident,   limitless  for  Article  21  of  said  Code  provides  that  "any  person  
mistake  or  excusable  negligence,  must  be  duly  supported  by  an   who  wilfully  causes  loss  or  injury  to  another  in  a  manner  that  is  
affidavit  of  merits  stating  facts  constituting  a  valid  defense.  (Sec.   contrary  to  morals,  good  customs  or  public  policy  shall  
3,  Rule  38,  Rules  of  Court.)  Defendant's  affidavit  of  merits   compensate  the  latter  for  the  damage."  
attached  to  his  petition  of  June  21,  1955  stated:  "That  he  has  a  
good  and  valid  defense  against  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  his   The  record  reveals  that  on  August  23,  1954  plaintiff  and  
failure  to  marry  the  plaintiff  as  scheduled  having  been  due  to   defendant  applied  for  a  license  to  contract  marriage,  which  was  
fortuitous  event  and/or  circumstances  beyond  his  control."  An   subsequently  issued  (Exhs.  A,  A-­1).  Their  wedding  was  set  for  
affidavit  of  merits  like  this  stating  mere  conclusions  or  opinions   September  4,  1954.  Invitations  were  printed  and  distributed  to  
instead  of  facts  is  not  valid.  (Cortes  vs.  Co  Bun  Kim,  L-­3926,   relatives,  friends  and  acquaintances  (Tsn.,  5;;  Exh.  C).  The  
Oct.  10,  1951;;  Vaswani  vs.  P.  Tarrachand  Bros.,  L-­15800,   bride-­to-­be's  trousseau,  party  drsrses  and  other  apparel  for  the  
December  29,  1960.)   important  occasion  were  purchased  (Tsn.,  7-­8).  Dresses  for  the  
maid  of  honor  and  the  flower  girl  were  prepared.  A  matrimonial  
Defendant,  however,  would  contend  that  the  affidavit  of  merits   bed,  with  accessories,  was  bought.  Bridal  showers  were  given  
was  in  fact  unnecessary,  or  a  mere  surplusage,  because  the   and  gifts  received  (Tsn.,  6;;  Exh.  E).  And  then,  with  but  two  days  
judgment  sought  to  be  set  aside  was  null  and  void,  it  having   before  the  wedding,  defendant,  who  was  then  28  years  old,:  
been  based  on  evidence  adduced  before  the  clerk  of  court.  In   simply  left  a  note  for  plaintiff  stating:  "Will  have  to  postpone  
Province  of  Pangasinan  vs.  Palisoc,  L-­16519,  October  30,  1962,   wedding  —  My  mother  opposes  it  ...  "  He  enplaned  to  his  home  
this  Court  pointed  out  that  the  procedure  of  designating  the  clerk   city  in  Mindanao,  and  the  next  day,  the  day  before  the  wedding,  
of  court  as  commissioner  to  receive  evidence  is  sanctioned  by   he  wired  plaintiff:  "Nothing  changed  rest  assured  returning  
Rule  34  (now  Rule  33)  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  Now  as  to   soon."  But  he  never  returned  and  was  never  heard  from  again.  
defendant's  consent  to  said  procedure,  the  same  did  not  have  to  
Surely  this  is  not  a  case  of  mere  breach  of  promise  to  marry.  As    
stated,  mere  breach  of  promise  to  marry  is  not  an  actionable  
wrong.  But  to  formally  set  a  wedding  and  go  through  all  the    
above-­described  preparation  and  publicity,  only  to  walk  out  of  it  
when  the  matrimony  is  about  to  be  solemnized,  is  quite  different.    
This  is  palpably  and  unjustifiably  contrary  to  good  customs  for  
which  defendant  must  be  held  answerable  in  damages  in    
accordance  with  Article  21  aforesaid.  
 
Defendant  urges  in  his  afore-­stated  petition  that  the  damages  
awarded  were  excessive.  No  question  is  raised  as  to  the  award    
of  actual  damages.  What  defendant  would  really  assert  
hereunder  is  that  the  award  of  moral  and  exemplary  damages,    
in  the  amount  of  P25,000.00,  should  be  totally  eliminated.  
 
Per  express  provision  of  Article  2219  (10)  of  the  New  Civil  Code,  
moral  damages  are  recoverable  in  the  cases  mentioned  in    
Article  21  of  said  Code.  As  to  exemplary  damages,  defendant  
contends  that  the  same  could  not  be  adjudged  against  him    
because  under  Article  2232  of  the  New  Civil  Code  the  condition  
precedent  is  that  "the  defendant  acted  in  a  wanton,  fraudulent,    
reckless,  oppressive,  or  malevolent  manner."  The  argument  is  
devoid  of  merit  as  under  the  above-­narrated  circumstances  of    
this  case  defendant  clearly  acted  in  a  "wanton  ...  ,  reckless  [and]  
oppressive  manner."  This  Court's  opinion,  however,  is  that    
considering  the  particular  circumstances  of  this  case,  
P15,000.00  as  moral  and  exemplary  damages  is  deemed  to  be    
a  reasonable  award.  
 
PREMISES  CONSIDERED,  with  the  above-­indicated  
modification,  the  lower  court's  judgment  is  hereby  affirmed,  with    
costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   pay  Dan  T.  Lim  the  value  of  the  raw  materials  or  deliver  to  him  
SUPREME  COURT   their  finished  products  of  equivalent  value.6  
Manila  
Dan  T.  Lim  alleged  that  when  he  delivered  the  raw  materials,  
THIRD  DIVISION   Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  issued  a  post-­dated  check  dated  April  18,  
20077  in  the  amount  of  1,487,766.68  as  partial  payment,  with  
G.R.  No.  206806                              June  25,  2014   the  assurance  that  the  check  would  not  bounce.8  When  he  
deposited  the  check  on  April  18,  2007,  it  was  dishonored  for  
ARCO  PULP  AND  PAPER  CO.,  INC.  and  CANDIDA  A.   being  drawn  against  a  closed  account.9  
SANTOS,  Petitioners,    
vs.   On  the  same  day,  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  and  a  certain  Eric  Sy  
DAN  T.  LIM,  doing  business  under  the  name  and  style  of   executed  a  memorandum  of  agreement10  where  Arco  Pulp  and  
QUALITY  PAPERS  &  PLASTIC  PRODUCTS   Paper  bound  themselves  to  deliver  their  finished  products  to  
ENTERPRISES,  Respondent.   Megapack  Container  Corporation,  owned  by  Eric  Sy,  for  his  
account.  According  to  the  memorandum,  the  raw  materials  
D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N   would  be  supplied  by  Dan  T.  Lim,  through  his  company,  Quality  
Paper  and  Plastic  Products.  The  memorandum  of  agreement  
LEONEN,  J.:   reads  as  follows:  

Novation  must  be  stated  in  clear  and  unequivocal  terms  to   Per  meeting  held  at  ARCO,  April  18,  2007,  it  has  been  mutually  
extinguish  an  obligation.  It  cannot  be  presumed  and  may  be   agreed  between  Mrs.  Candida  A.  Santos  and  Mr.  Eric  Sy  that  
implied  only  if  the  old  and  new  contracts  are  incompatible  on   ARCO  will  deliver  600  tons  Test  Liner  150/175  GSM,  full  width  
every  point.   76  inches  at  the  price  of  ₱18.50  per  kg.  to  Megapack  Container  
for  Mr.  Eric  Sy’s  account.  Schedule  of  deliveries  are  as  follows:  
Before  us  is  a  petition  for  review  on  certiorari1  assailing  the  
Court  of  Appeals’  decision2  in  CA-­G.R.  CV  No.  95709,  which   .  .  .  .  
stemmed  from  a  complaint3  filed  in  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  
Valenzuela  City,  Branch  171,  for  collection  of  sum  of  money.   It  has  been  agreed  further  that  the  Local  OCC  materials  to  be  
used  for  the  production  of  the  above  Test  Liners  will  be  supplied  
The  facts  are  as  follows:   by  Quality  Paper  &  Plastic  Products  Ent.,  total  of  600  Metric  
Tons  at  ₱6.50  per  kg.  (price  subject  to  change  per  advance  
Dan  T.  Lim  works  in  the  business  of  supplying  scrap  papers,   notice).  Quantity  of  Local  OCC  delivery  will  be  based  on  the  
cartons,  and  other  raw  materials,  under  the  name  Quality  Paper   quantity  of  Test  Liner  delivered  to  Megapack  Container  Corp.  
and  Plastic  Products,  Enterprises,  to  factories  engaged  in  the   based  on  the  above  production  schedule.11  
paper  mill  business.4  From  February  2007  to  March  2007,  he  
delivered  scrap  papers  worth  7,220,968.31  to  Arco  Pulp  and   On  May  5,  2007,  Dan  T.Lim  sent  a  letter12  to  Arco  Pulp  and  
Paper  Company,  Inc.  (Arco  Pulp  and  Paper)  through  its  Chief   Paper  demanding  payment  of  the  amount  of  7,220,968.31,  but  
Executive  Officer  and  President,  Candida  A.  Santos.5  The   no  payment  was  made  to  him.13  
parties  allegedly  agreed  that  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  would  either  
Dan  T.  Lim  filed  a  complaint14  for  collection  of  sum  of  money   On  one  hand,  petitioners  argue  that  the  execution  of  the  
with  prayer  for  attachment  with  the  Regional  Trial  Court,  Branch   memorandum  of  agreement  constituted  a  novation  of  the  
171,  Valenzuela  City,  on  May  28,  2007.  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper   original  obligation  since  Eric  Sy  became  the  new  debtor  of  
filed  its  answer15  but  failed  to  have  its  representatives  attend  the   respondent.  They  also  argue  that  there  is  no  legal  basis  to  hold  
pre-­trial  hearing.  Hence,  the  trial  court  allowed  Dan  T.  Lim  to   petitioner  Candida  A.  Santos  personally  liable  for  the  transaction  
present  his  evidence  ex  parte.16   that  petitioner  corporation  entered  into  with  respondent.  The  
Court  of  Appeals,  they  allege,  also  erred  in  awarding  moral  and  
On  September  19,  2008,  the  trial  court  rendered  a  judgment  in   exemplary  damages  and  attorney’s  fees  to  respondent  who  did  
favor  of  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  and  dismissed  the  complaint,   not  show  proof  that  he  was  entitled  to  damages.27  
holding  that  when  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  and  Eric  Sy  entered  into  
the  memorandum  of  agreement,  novation  took  place,  which   Respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  argues  that  the  Court  of  
extinguished  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  obligation  to  Dan  T.  Lim.17   Appeals  was  correct  in  ruling  that  there  was  no  proper  novation  
in  this  case.  He  argues  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  was  correct  in  
Dan  T.  Lim  appealed18  the  judgment  with  the  Court  of  Appeals.   ordering  the  payment  of  7,220,968.31  with  damages  since  the  
According  to  him,  novation  did  not  take  place  since  the   debt  of  petitioners  remains  unpaid.28  He  also  argues  that  the  
memorandum  of  agreement  between  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  and   Court  of  Appeals  was  correct  in  holding  petitioners  solidarily  
Eric  Sy  was  an  exclusive  and  private  agreement  between  them.   liable  since  petitioner  Candida  A.  Santos  was  "the  prime  mover  
He  argued  that  if  his  name  was  mentioned  in  the  contract,  it  was   for  such  outstanding  corporate  liability."29  In  their  reply,  
only  for  supplying  the  parties  their  required  scrap  papers,  where   petitioners  reiterate  that  novation  took  place  since  there  was  
his  conformity  through  a  separate  contract  was  indispensable.19   nothing  in  the  memorandum  of  agreement  showing  that  the  
obligation  was  alternative.  They  also  argue  that  when  
On  January  11,  2013,  the  Court  of  Appeals20  rendered  a   respondent  allowed  them  to  deliver  the  finished  products  to  Eric  
decision21  reversing  and  setting  aside  the  judgment  dated   Sy,  the  original  obligation  was  novated.30  
September  19,  2008  and  ordering  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  to  jointly  
and  severally  pay  Dan  T.  Lim  the  amount  of  ₱7,220,968.31  with   A  rejoinder  was  submitted  by  respondent,  but  it  was  noted  
interest  at  12%  per  annum  from  the  time  of  demand;;  ₱50,000.00   without  action  in  view  of  A.M.  No.  99-­2-­04-­SC  dated  November  
moral  damages;;  ₱50,000.00  exemplary  damages;;  and   21,  2000.31  
₱50,000.00  attorney’s  fees.22  
The  issues  to  be  resolved  by  this  court  are  as  follows:  
The  appellate  court  ruled  that  the  facts  and  circumstances  in  
this  case  clearly  showed  the  existence  of  an  alternative   1.  Whether  the  obligation  between  the  parties  was  
obligation.23  It  also  ruled  that  Dan  T.  Lim  was  entitled  to   extinguished  by  novation  
damages  and  attorney’s  fees  due  to  the  bad  faith  exhibited  by  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  in  not  honoring  its  undertaking.24   2.  Whether  Candida  A.  Santos  was  solidarily  liable  with  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  Co.,  Inc.  
Its  motion  for  reconsideration25  having  been  denied,26  Arco  Pulp  
and  Paper  and  its  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer,   3.  Whether  moral  damages,  exemplary  damages,  and  
Candida  A.  Santos,  bring  this  petition  for  review  on  certiorari.   attorney’s  fees  can  be  awarded  
The  petition  is  denied.   The  appellate  court,  therefore,  correctly  identified  the  obligation  
between  the  parties  as  an  alternative  obligation,  whereby  
The  obligation  between  the   petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper,  after  receiving  the  raw  materials  
parties  was  an  alternative   from  respondent,  would  either  pay  him  the  price  of  the  raw  
obligation   materials  or,  in  the  alternative,  deliver  to  him  the  finished  
products  of  equivalent  value.  
The  rule  on  alternative  obligations  is  governed  by  Article  1199  of  
the  Civil  Code,  which  states:   When  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  tendered  a  check  to  
respondent  in  partial  payment  for  the  scrap  papers,  they  
Article  1199.  A  person  alternatively  bound  by  different   exercised  their  option  to  pay  the  price.  Respondent’s  receipt  of  
prestations  shall  completely  perform  one  of  them.   the  check  and  his  subsequent  act  of  depositing  it  constituted  his  
notice  of  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  option  to  pay.  
The  creditor  cannot  be  compelled  to  receive  part  of  one  and  part  
of  the  other  undertaking.   This  choice  was  also  shown  by  the  terms  of  the  memorandum  of  
agreement,  which  was  executed  on  the  same  day.  The  
"In  an  alternative  obligation,  there  is  more  than  one  object,  and   memorandum  declared  in  clear  terms  that  the  delivery  of  
the  fulfillment  of  one  is  sufficient,  determined  by  the  choice  of   petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  finished  products  would  be  to  a  
the  debtor  who  generally  has  the  right  of  election."32  The  right  of   third  person,  thereby  extinguishing  the  option  to  deliver  the  
election  is  extinguished  when  the  party  who  may  exercise  that   finished  products  of  equivalent  value  to  respondent.  
option  categorically  and  unequivocally  makes  his  or  her  choice  
known.33   The  memorandum  of  
agreement  did  not  constitute  
The  choice  of  the  debtor  must  also  be  communicated  to  the   a  novation  of  the  original  
creditor  who  must  receive  notice  of  it  since:  The  object  of  this   contract  
notice  is  to  give  the  creditor  .  .  .  opportunity  to  express  his  
consent,  or  to  impugn  the  election  made  by  the  debtor,  and  only   The  trial  court  erroneously  ruled  that  the  execution  of  the  
after  said  notice  shall  the  election  take  legal  effect  when   memorandum  of  agreement  constituted  a  novation  of  the  
consented  by  the  creditor,  or  if  impugned  by  the  latter,  when   contract  between  the  parties.  When  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  
declared  proper  by  a  competent  court.34   Paper  opted  instead  to  deliver  the  finished  products  to  a  third  
person,  it  did  not  novate  the  original  obligation  between  the  
According  to  the  factual  findings  of  the  trial  court  and  the   parties.  
appellate  court,  the  original  contract  between  the  parties  was  for  
respondent  to  deliver  scrap  papers  worth  ₱7,220,968.31  to   The  rules  on  novation  are  outlined  in  the  Civil  Code,  thus:  
petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper.  The  payment  for  this  delivery  
became  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  obligation.  By   Article  1291.  Obligations  may  be  modified  by:  
agreement,  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper,  as  the  debtor,  had  
the  option  to  either  (1)  pay  the  price  or(2)  deliver  the  finished   (1)  Changing  their  object  or  principal  conditions;;  
products  of  equivalent  value  to  respondent.35  
(2)  Substituting  the  person  of  the  debtor;;  
 (3)  Subrogating  a  third  person  in  the  rights  of  the  creditor.   initiative  for  the  change  does  not  come  from  —  and  may  even  
(1203)   be  made  without  the  knowledge  of  —  the  debtor,  since  it  
consists  of  a  third  person’s  assumption  of  the  obligation.  As  
Article  1292.  In  order  that  an  obligation  may  be  extinguished  by   such,  it  logically  requires  the  consent  of  the  third  person  and  the  
another  which  substitute  the  same,  it  is  imperative  that  it  be  so   creditor.  In  delegacion,  the  debtor  offers,  and  the  creditor  
declared  in  unequivocal  terms,  or  that  the  old  and  the  new   accepts,  a  third  person  who  consents  to  the  substitution  and  
obligations  be  on  every  point  incompatible  with  each  other.   assumes  the  obligation;;  thus,  the  consent  of  these  three  
(1204)   persons  are  necessary.  Both  modes  of  substitution  by  the  
debtor  require  the  consent  of  the  creditor.  
Article  1293.  Novation  which  consists  in  substituting  a  new  
debtor  in  the  place  of  the  original  one,  may  be  made  even   Novation  may  also  be  extinctive  or  modificatory.  It  is  extinctive  
without  the  knowledge  or  against  the  will  of  the  latter,  but  not   when  an  old  obligation  is  terminated  by  the  creation  of  a  new  
without  the  consent  of  the  creditor.  Payment  by  the  new  debtor   one  that  takes  the  place  of  the  former.  It  is  merely  modificatory  
gives  him  the  rights  mentioned  in  Articles  1236  and  1237.   when  the  old  obligation  subsists  to  the  extent  that  it  remains  
(1205a)   compatible  with  the  amendatory  agreement.  Whether  extinctive  
or  modificatory,  novation  is  made  either  by  changing  the  object  
Novation  extinguishes  an  obligation  between  two  parties  when   or  the  principal  conditions,  referred  to  as  objective  or  real  
there  is  a  substitution  of  objects  or  debtors  or  when  there  is   novation;;  or  by  substituting  the  person  of  the  debtor  or  
subrogation  of  the  creditor.  It  occurs  only  when  the  new  contract   subrogating  a  third  person  to  the  rights  of  the  creditor,  an  act  
declares  so  "in  unequivocal  terms"  or  that  "the  old  and  the  new   known  as  subjective  or  personal  novation.  For  novation  to  take  
obligations  be  on  every  point  incompatible  with  each  other."36   place,  the  following  requisites  must  concur:  

Novation  was  extensively  discussed  by  this  court  in  Garcia  v.   1)  There  must  be  a  previous  valid  obligation.  
Llamas:37  
2)  The  parties  concerned  must  agree  to  a  new  contract.  
Novation  is  a  mode  of  extinguishing  an  obligation  by  changing  
its  objects  or  principal  obligations,  by  substituting  a  new  debtor   3)  The  old  contract  must  be  extinguished.  
in  place  of  the  old  one,  or  by  subrogating  a  third  person  to  the  
rights  of  the  creditor.  Article  1293  of  the  Civil  Code  defines   4)  There  must  be  a  valid  new  contract.  
novation  as  follows:  
Novation  may  also  be  express  or  implied.  It  is  express  when  the  
"Art.  1293.  Novation  which  consists  in  substituting  a  new  debtor   new  obligation  declares  in  unequivocal  terms  that  the  old  
in  the  place  of  the  original  one,  may  be  made  even  without  the   obligation  is  extinguished.  It  is  implied  when  the  new  obligation  
knowledge  or  against  the  will  of  the  latter,  but  not  without  the   is  incompatible  with  the  old  one  on  every  point.  The  test  of  
consent  of  the  creditor.  Payment  by  the  new  debtor  gives  him   incompatibility  is  whether  the  two  obligations  can  stand  together,  
rights  mentioned  in  articles  1236  and  1237."   each  one  with  its  own  independent  existence.38  (Emphasis  
supplied)  
In  general,  there  are  two  modes  of  substituting  the  person  of  the  
debtor:  (1)  expromision  and  (2)  delegacion.  In  expromision,  the  
Because  novation  requires  that  it  be  clear  and  unequivocal,  it  is   petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  to  respondent.  Neither  of  these  
never  presumed,  thus:   circumstances  is  present  in  this  case.  

In  the  civil  law  setting,  novatio  is  literally  construed  as  to  make   Petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  act  of  tendering  partial  
new.  So  it  is  deeply  rooted  in  the  Roman  Law  jurisprudence,  the   payment  to  respondent  also  conflicts  with  their  alleged  intent  to  
principle  —  novatio  non  praesumitur  —that  novation  is  never   pass  on  their  obligation  to  Eric  Sy.  When  respondent  sent  his  
presumed.At  bottom,  for  novation  tobe  a  jural  reality,  its  animus   letter  of  demand  to  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper,  and  not  to  
must  be  ever  present,  debitum  pro  debito  —  basically   Eric  Sy,  it  showed  that  the  former  neither  acknowledged  nor  
extinguishing  the  old  obligation  for  the  new  one.39  (Emphasis   consented  to  the  latter  as  his  new  debtor.  These  acts,  when  
supplied)  There  is  nothing  in  the  memorandum  of  agreement   taken  together,  clearly  show  that  novation  did  not  take  place.  
that  states  that  with  its  execution,  the  obligation  of  petitioner   Since  there  was  no  novation,  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  to  respondent  would  be  extinguished.  It   obligation  to  respondent  remains  valid  and  existing.  Petitioner  
also  does  not  state  that  Eric  Sy  somehow  substituted  petitioner   Arco  Pulp  and  Paper,  therefore,  must  still  pay  respondent  the  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  as  respondent’s  debtor.  It  merely  shows   full  amount  of  ₱7,220,968.31.  
that  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  opted  to  deliver  the  finished  
products  to  a  third  person  instead.   Petitioners  are  liable  for  
damages  
The  consent  of  the  creditor  must  also  be  secured  for  the  
novation  to  be  valid:   Under  Article  2220  of  the  Civil  Code,  moral  damages  may  be  
awarded  in  case  of  breach  of  contract  where  the  breach  is  due  
Novation  must  be  expressly  consented  to.  Moreover,  the   to  fraud  or  bad  faith:  
conflicting  intention  and  acts  of  the  parties  underscore  the  
absence  of  any  express  disclosure  or  circumstances  with  which   Art.  2220.  Willfull  injury  to  property  may  be  a  legal  ground  for  
to  deduce  a  clear  and  unequivocal  intent  by  the  parties  to   awarding  moral  damages  if  the  court  should  find  that,  under  the  
novate  the  old  agreement.40  (Emphasis  supplied)   circumstances,  such  damages  are  justly  due.  The  same  rule  
applies  to  breaches  of  contract  where  the  defendant  acted  
In  this  case,  respondent  was  not  privy  to  the  memorandum  of   fraudulently  or  in  bad  faith.  (Emphasis  supplied)  
agreement,  thus,  his  conformity  to  the  contract  need  not  be  
secured.  This  is  clear  from  the  first  line  of  the  memorandum,   Moral  damages  are  not  awarded  as  a  matter  of  right  but  only  
which  states:   after  the  party  claiming  it  proved  that  the  breach  was  due  to  
fraud  or  bad  faith.  As  this  court  stated:  
Per  meeting  held  at  ARCO,  April  18,  2007,  it  has  been  mutually  
agreed  between  Mrs.  Candida  A.  Santos  and  Mr.  Eric  Sy.  .  .  .41   Moral  damages  are  not  recoverable  simply  because  a  contract  
has  been  breached.  They  are  recoverable  only  if  the  party  from  
If  the  memorandum  of  agreement  was  intended  to  novate  the   whom  it  is  claimed  acted  fraudulently  or  in  bad  faith  or  in  wanton  
original  agreement  between  the  parties,  respondent  must  have   disregard  of  his  contractual  obligations.  The  breach  must  be  
first  agreed  to  the  substitution  of  Eric  Sy  as  his  new  debtor.  The   wanton,  reckless,  malicious  or  in  bad  faith,  and  oppressive  or  
memorandum  of  agreement  must  also  state  in  clear  and   abusive.42  
unequivocal  terms  that  it  has  replaced  the  original  obligation  of  
Further,  the  following  requisites  must  be  proven  for  the  recovery   (6)  Illegal  search;;  
of  moral  damages:  
(7)  Libel,  slander  or  any  other  form  of  defamation;;  
An  award  of  moral  damages  would  require  certain  conditions  to  
be  met,  to  wit:  (1)first,  there  must  be  an  injury,  whether  physical,   (8)  Malicious  prosecution;;  
mental  or  psychological,  clearly  sustained  by  the  claimant;;  (2)  
second,  there  must  be  culpable  act  or  omission  factually   (9)  Acts  mentioned  in  Article  309;;  
established;;  (3)  third,  the  wrongful  act  or  omission  of  the  
defendant  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  sustained  by  the   (10)  Acts  and  actions  referred  to  in  Articles  21,  26,  27,  
claimant;;  and  (4)  fourth,  the  award  of  damages  is  predicated  on   28,  29,  30,  32,  34,  and  35.  
any  of  the  cases  stated  in  Article  2219  of  the  Civil  Code.43  
Breaches  of  contract  done  in  bad  faith,  however,  are  not  
Here,  the  injury  suffered  by  respondent  is  the  loss  of   specified  within  this  enumeration.  When  a  party  breaches  a  
₱7,220,968.31  from  his  business.  This  has  remained  unpaid   contract,  he  or  she  goes  against  Article  19  of  the  Civil  Code,  
since  2007.  This  injury  undoubtedly  was  caused  by  petitioner   which  states:  Article  19.  Every  person  must,  in  the  exercise  of  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  act  of  refusing  to  pay  its  obligations.   his  rights  and  in  the  performance  of  his  duties,  act  with  justice,  
give  everyone  his  due,  and  observe  honesty  and  good  faith.  
When  the  obligation  became  due  and  demandable,  petitioner  
Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  not  only  issued  an  unfunded  check  but   Persons  who  have  the  right  to  enter  into  contractual  relations  
also  entered  into  a  contract  with  a  third  person  in  an  effort  to   must  exercise  that  right  with  honesty  and  good  faith.  Failure  to  
evade  its  liability.  This  proves  the  third  requirement.   do  so  results  in  an  abuse  of  that  right,  which  may  become  the  
basis  of  an  action  for  damages.  Article  19,  however,  cannot  be  
As  to  the  fourth  requisite,  Article  2219  of  the  Civil  Code  provides   its  sole  basis:  
that  moral  damages  may  be  awarded  in  the  following  instances:  
Article  19  is  the  general  rule  which  governs  the  conduct  of  
Article  2219.  Moral  damages  may  be  recovered  in  the  following   human  relations.  By  itself,  it  is  not  the  basis  of  an  actionable  tort.  
and  analogous  cases:   Article  19  describes  the  degree  of  care  required  so  that  an  
actionable  tort  may  arise  when  it  is  alleged  together  with  Article  
(1)  A  criminal  offense  resulting  in  physical  injuries;;   20  or  Article  21.44  

(2)  Quasi-­delicts  causing  physical  injuries;;   Article  20  and  21  of  the  Civil  Code  are  as  follows:  

(3)  Seduction,  abduction,  rape,  or  other  lascivious  acts;;   Article  20.  Every  person  who,  contrary  to  law,  wilfully  or  
negligently  causes  damage  to  another,  shall  indemnify  the  latter  
(4)  Adultery  or  concubinage;;   for  the  same.  

(5)  Illegal  or  arbitrary  detention  or  arrest;;  

Article  21.Any  person  who  wilfully  causes  loss  or  injury  to   of  moral  damages,  not  only  under  Article  2220,  but  also  under  
another  in  a  manner  that  is  contrary  to  morals,  good  customs  or   Articles  19  and  20  in  relation  to  Article  1159.  
public  policy  shall  compensate  the  latter  for  the  damage.  
Moral  damages,  however,  are  not  recoverable  on  the  mere  
To  be  actionable,  Article  20  requires  a  violation  of  law,  while   breach  of  the  contract.  Article  2220  requires  that  the  breach  be  
Article  21  only  concerns  with  lawful  acts  that  are  contrary  to   done  fraudulently  or  in  bad  faith.  In  Adriano  v.  Lasala:46  
morals,  good  customs,  and  public  policy:  
To  recover  moral  damages  in  an  action  for  breach  of  contract,  
Article  20  concerns  violations  of  existing  law  as  basis  for  an   the  breach  must  be  palpably  wanton,  reckless  and  malicious,  in  
injury.  It  allows  recovery  should  the  act  have  been  willful  or   bad  faith,  oppressive,  or  abusive.  Hence,  the  person  claiming  
negligent.  Willful  may  refer  to  the  intention  to  do  the  act  and  the   bad  faith  must  prove  its  existence  by  clear  and  convincing  
desire  to  achieve  the  outcome  which  is  considered  by  the   evidence  for  the  law  always  presumes  good  faith.  
plaintiff  in  tort  action  as  injurious.  Negligence  may  refer  to  a  
situation  where  the  act  was  consciously  done  but  without   Bad  faith  does  not  simply  connote  bad  judgment  or  negligence.  
intending  the  result  which  the  plaintiff  considers  as  injurious.   It  imports  a  dishonest  purpose  or  some  moral  obliquity  and  
conscious  doing  of  a  wrong,  a  breach  of  known  duty  through  
Article  21,  on  the  other  hand,  concerns  injuries  that  may  be   some  motive  or  interest  or  ill  will  that  partakes  of  the  nature  of  
caused  by  acts  which  are  not  necessarily  proscribed  by  law.   fraud.  It  is,  therefore,  a  question  of  intention,  which  can  be  
This  article  requires  that  the  act  be  willful,  that  is,  that  there  was   inferred  from  one’s  conduct  and/or  contemporaneous  
an  intention  to  do  the  act  and  a  desire  to  achieve  the  outcome.   statements.47  (Emphasis  supplied)  
In  cases  under  Article  21,  the  legal  issues  revolve  around  
whether  such  outcome  should  be  considered  a  legal  injury  on   Since  a  finding  of  bad  faith  is  generally  premised  on  the  intent  of  
the  part  of  the  plaintiff  or  whether  the  commission  of  the  act  was   the  doer,  it  requires  an  examination  of  the  circumstances  in  
done  in  violation  of  the  standards  of  care  required  in  Article  19.45   each  case.  

When  parties  act  in  bad  faith  and  do  not  faithfully  comply  with   When  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper  issued  a  check  in  partial  
their  obligations  under  contract,  they  run  the  risk  of  violating   payment  of  its  obligation  to  respondent,  it  was  presumably  with  
Article  1159  of  the  Civil  Code:   the  knowledge  that  it  was  being  drawn  against  a  closed  account.  
Worse,  it  attempted  to  shift  their  obligations  to  a  third  person  
Article  1159.  Obligations  arising  from  contracts  have  the  force  of   without  the  consent  of  respondent.  
law  between  the  contracting  parties  and  should  be  complied  
with  in  good  faith.   Petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  actions  clearly  show  "a  
dishonest  purpose  or  some  moral  obliquity  and  conscious  doing  
Article  2219,  therefore,  is  not  an  exhaustive  list  of  the  instances   of  a  wrong,  a  breach  of  known  duty  through  some  motive  or  
where  moral  damages  may  be  recovered  since  it  only  specifies,   interest  or  ill  will  that  partakes  of  the  nature  of  fraud."48  Moral  
among  others,  Article  21.  When  a  party  reneges  on  his  or  her   damages  may,  therefore,  be  awarded.  
obligations  arising  from  contracts  in  bad  faith,  the  act  is  not  only  
contrary  to  morals,  good  customs,  and  public  policy;;  it  is  also  a  
violation  of  Article  1159.  Breaches  of  contract  become  the  basis  
Exemplary  damages  may  also  be  awarded.  Under  the  Civil   malice,  gross  negligence  or  recklessness,  oppression,  insult  or  
Code,  exemplary  damages  are  due  in  the  following   fraud  or  gross  fraud—that  intensifies  the  injury.  The  terms  
circumstances:   punitive  or  vindictive  damages  are  often  used  to  refer  to  those  
species  of  damages  that  may  be  awarded  against  a  person  to  
Article  2232.  In  contracts  and  quasi-­contracts,  the  court  may   punish  him  for  his  outrageous  conduct.  In  either  case,  these  
award  exemplary  damages  if  the  defendant  acted  in  a  wanton,   damages  are  intended  in  good  measure  to  deter  the  wrongdoer  
fraudulent,  reckless,  oppressive,  or  malevolent  manner.   and  others  like  him  from  similar  conduct  in  the  
future.50  (Emphasis  supplied;;  citations  omitted)  
Article  2233.  Exemplary  damages  cannot  be  recovered  as  a  
matter  of  right;;  the  court  will  decide  whether  or  not  they  should   The  requisites  for  the  award  of  exemplary  damages  are  as  
be  adjudicated.   follows:  

Article  2234.  While  the  amount  of  the  exemplary  damages  need   (1)  they  may  be  imposed  by  way  of  example  in  addition  to  
not  be  proven,  the  plaintiff  must  show  that  he  is  entitled  to   compensatory  damages,  and  only  after  the  claimant's  
moral,  temperate  or  compensatory  damages  before  the  court   right  to  them  has  been  established;;  
may  consider  the  question  of  whether  or  not  exemplary  
damages  should  be  awarded.   (2)  that  they  cannot  be  recovered  as  a  matter  of  right,  
their  determination  depending  upon  the  amount  of  
In  Tankeh  v.  Development  Bank  of  the  Philippines,49  we  stated   compensatory  damages  that  may  be  awarded  to  the  
that:   claimant;;  and  

The  purpose  of  exemplary  damages  is  to  serve  as  a  deterrent  to   (3)  the  act  must  be  accompanied  by  bad  faith  or  done  in  
future  and  subsequent  parties  from  the  commission  of  a  similar   a  wanton,  fraudulent,  oppressive  or  malevolent  manner.51  
offense.  The  case  of  People  v.  Ranteciting  People  v.  Dalisay  
held  that:   Business  owners  must  always  be  forthright  in  their  dealings.  
They  cannot  be  allowed  to  renege  on  their  obligations,  
Also  known  as  ‘punitive’  or  ‘vindictive’  damages,  exemplary  or   considering  that  these  obligations  were  freely  entered  into  by  
corrective  damages  are  intended  to  serve  as  a  deterrent  to   them.  Exemplary  damages  may  also  be  awarded  in  this  case  to  
serious  wrong  doings,  and  as  a  vindication  of  undue  sufferings   serve  as  a  deterrent  to  those  who  use  fraudulent  means  to  
and  wanton  invasion  of  the  rights  of  an  injured  or  a  punishment   evade  their  liabilities.  
for  those  guilty  of  outrageous  conduct.  These  terms  are  
generally,  but  not  always,  used  interchangeably.  In  common   Since  the  award  of  exemplary  damages  is  proper,  attorney’s  
law,  there  is  preference  in  the  use  of  exemplary  damages  when   fees  and  cost  of  the  suit  may  also  be  recovered.  
the  award  is  to  account  for  injury  to  feelings  and  for  the  sense  of  
indignity  and  humiliation  suffered  by  a  person  as  a  result  of  an   Article  2208  of  the  Civil  Code  states:  
injury  that  has  been  maliciously  and  wantonly  inflicted,  the  
theory  being  that  there  should  be  compensation  for  the  hurt   Article  2208.  In  the  absence  of  stipulation,  attorney's  fees  and  
caused  by  the  highly  reprehensible  conduct  of  the  defendant— expenses  of  litigation,  other  than  judicial  costs,  cannot  be  
associated  with  such  circumstances  as  willfulness,  wantonness,   recovered,  except:  
(1)  When  exemplary  damages  are  awarded[.]   corporate  fiction  is  a  question  of  fact  which  cannot  be  the  
Petitioner  Candida  A.  Santos   subject  of  a  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  under  Rule  45,  this  
is  solidarily  liable  with   Court  can  take  cognizance  of  factual  issues  if  the  findings  of  the  
petitioner  corporation   lower  court  are  not  supported  by  the  evidence  on  record  or  are  
based  on  a  misapprehension  of  facts.53  (Emphasis  supplied)  
Petitioners  argue  that  the  finding  of  solidary  liability  was  
erroneous  since  no  evidence  was  adduced  to  prove  that  the   As  a  general  rule,  directors,  officers,  or  employees  of  a  
transaction  was  also  a  personal  undertaking  of  petitioner   corporation  cannot  be  held  personally  liable  for  obligations  
Santos.  We  disagree.   incurred  by  the  corporation.  However,  this  veil  of  corporate  
fiction  may  be  pierced  if  complainant  is  able  to  prove,  as  in  this  
In  Heirs  of  Fe  Tan  Uy  v.  International  Exchange  Bank,52  we   case,  that  (1)  the  officer  is  guilty  of  negligence  or  bad  faith,  and  
stated  that:   (2)  such  negligence  or  bad  faith  was  clearly  and  convincingly  
proven.  
Basic  is  the  rule  in  corporation  law  that  a  corporation  is  a  
juridical  entity  which  is  vested  with  a  legal  personality  separate   Here,  petitioner  Santos  entered  into  a  contract  with  respondent  
and  distinct  from  those  acting  for  and  in  its  behalf  and,  in   in  her  capacity  as  the  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer  of  
general,  from  the  people  comprising  it.  Following  this  principle,   Arco  Pulp  and  Paper.  She  also  issued  the  check  in  partial  
obligations  incurred  by  the  corporation,  acting  through  its   payment  of  petitioner  corporation’s  obligations  to  respondent  on  
directors,  officers  and  employees,  are  its  sole  liabilities.  A   behalf  of  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper.  This  is  clear  on  the  
director,  officer  or  employee  of  a  corporation  is  generally  not   face  of  the  check  bearing  the  account  name,  "Arco  Pulp  &  
held  personally  liable  for  obligations  incurred  by  the  corporation.   Paper,  Co.,  Inc."54  Any  obligation  arising  from  these  acts  would  
Nevertheless,  this  legal  fiction  may  be  disregarded  if  it  is  used   not,  ordinarily,  be  petitioner  Santos’  personal  undertaking  for  
as  a  means  to  perpetrate  fraud  or  an  illegal  act,  or  as  a  vehicle   which  she  would  be  solidarily  liable  with  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  
for  the  evasion  of  an  existing  obligation,  the  circumvention  of   Paper.  
statutes,  or  to  confuse  legitimate  issues.  
We  find,  however,  that  the  corporate  veil  must  be  pierced.  In  
.  .  .  .   Livesey  v.  Binswanger  Philippines:55  

Before  a  director  or  officer  of  a  corporation  can  be  held   Piercing  the  veil  of  corporate  fiction  is  an  equitable  doctrine  
personally  liable  for  corporate  obligations,  however,  the   developed  to  address  situations  where  the  separate  corporate  
following  requisites  must  concur:  (1)  the  complainant  must   personality  of  a  corporation  is  abused  or  used  for  wrongful  
allege  in  the  complaint  that  the  director  or  officer  assented  to   purposes.  Under  the  doctrine,  the  corporate  existence  may  be  
patently  unlawful  acts  of  the  corporation,  or  that  the  officer  was   disregarded  where  the  entity  is  formed  or  used  for  non-­
guilty  of  gross  negligence  or  bad  faith;;  and  (2)  the  complainant   legitimate  purposes,  such  as  to  evade  a  just  and  due  obligation,  
must  clearly  and  convincingly  prove  such  unlawful  acts,   or  to  justify  a  wrong,  to  shield  or  perpetrate  fraud  or  to  carry  out  
negligence  or  bad  faith.   similar  or  inequitable  considerations,  other  unjustifiable  aims  or  
intentions,  in  which  case,  the  fiction  will  be  disregarded  and  the  
While  it  is  true  that  the  determination  of  the  existence  of  any  of   individuals  composing  it  and  the  two  corporations  will  be  treated  
the  circumstances  that  would  warrant  the  piercing  of  the  veil  of   as  identical.56  (Emphasis  supplied)  
According  to  the  Court  of  Appeals,  petitioner  Santos  was   To  recapitulate  and  for  future  guidance,  the  guidelines  laid  down  
solidarily  liable  with  petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper,  stating  that:   in  the  case  of  Eastern  Shipping  Linesare  accordingly  modified  to  
embody  BSP-­MB  Circular  No.  799,  as  follows:  
In  the  present  case,  We  find  bad  faith  on  the  part  of  the  
[petitioners]  when  they  unjustifiably  refused  to  honor  their   I.  When  an  obligation,  regardless  of  its  source,  i.e.,  law,  
undertaking  in  favor  of  the  [respondent].  After  the  check  in  the   contracts,  quasi-­contracts,  delicts  or  quasi-­delicts  is  breached,  
amount  of  1,487,766.68  issued  by  [petitioner]  Santos  was   the  contravenor  can  be  held  liable  for  damages.  The  provisions  
dishonored  for  being  drawn  against  a  closed  account,   under  Title  XVIII  on  "Damages"  of  the  Civil  Code  govern  in  
[petitioner]  corporation  denied  any  privity  with  [respondent].   determining  the  measure  of  recoverable  damages.  
These  acts  prompted  the  [respondent]  to  avail  of  the  remedies  
provided  by  law  in  order  to  protect  his  rights.57   II.  With  regard  particularly  to  an  award  of  interest  in  the  concept  
of  actual  and  compensatory  damages,  the  rate  of  interest,  as  
We  agree  with  the  Court  of  Appeals.  Petitioner  Santos  cannot   well  as  the  accrual  thereof,  is  imposed,  as  follows:  
be  allowed  to  hide  behind  the  corporate  veil.1âwphi1  When  
petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  obligation  to  respondent   1.  When  the  obligation  is  breached,  and  it  consists  in  the  
became  due  and  demandable,  she  not  only  issued  an  unfunded   payment  of  a  sum  of  money,  i.e.,  a  loan  or  forbearance  of  
check  but  also  contracted  with  a  third  party  in  an  effort  to  shift   money,  the  interest  due  should  be  that  which  may  have  
petitioner  Arco  Pulp  and  Paper’s  liability.  She  unjustifiably   been  stipulated  in  writing.  Furthermore,  the  interest  due  
refused  to  honor  petitioner  corporation’s  obligations  to   shall  itself  earn  legal  interest  from  the  time  it  is  judicially  
respondent.  These  acts  clearly  amount  to  bad  faith.  In  this   demanded.  In  the  absence  of  stipulation,  the  rate  of  
instance,  the  corporate  veil  may  be  pierced,  and  petitioner   interest  shall  be  6%  per  annum  to  be  computed  from  
Santos  may  be  held  solidarily  liable  with  petitioner  Arco  Pulp   default,  i.e.,  from  judicial  or  extrajudicial  demand  under  
and  Paper.   and  subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  1169  of  the  Civil  
Code.  
The  rate  of  interest  due  on  
the  obligation  must  be   2.  When  an  obligation,  not  constituting  a  loan  or  
reduced  in  view  of  Nacar  v.   forbearance  of  money,  is  breached,  an  interest  on  the  
Gallery  Frames58   amount  of  damages  awarded  may  be  imposed  at  the  
discretion  of  the  court  at  the  rate  of  6%  per  annum.  No  
In  view,  however,  of  the  promulgation  by  this  court  of  the   interest,  however,  shall  be  adjudged  on  unliquidated  
decision  dated  August  13,  2013  in  Nacar  v.  Gallery   claims  or  damages,  except  when  or  until  the  demand  can  
Frames,59  the  rate  of  interest  due  on  the  obligation  must  be   be  established  with  reasonable  certainty.  Accordingly,  
modified  from  12%  per  annum  to  6%  per  annum  from  the  time  of   where  the  demand  is  established  with  reasonable  
demand.   certainty,  the  interest  shall  begin  to  run  from  the  time  the  
claim  is  made  judicially  or  extrajudicially  (Art.  1169,  Civil  
Nacar  effectively  amended  the  guidelines  stated  in  Eastern   Code),  but  when  such  certainty  cannot  be  so  reasonably  
Shipping  v.  Court  of  Appeals,60  and  we  have  laid  down  the   established  at  the  time  the  demand  is  made,  the  interest  
following  guidelines  with  regard  to  the  rate  of  legal  interest:   shall  begin  to  run  only  from  the  date  the  judgment  of  the  
court  is  made  (at  which  time  the  quantification  of  
 damages  may  be  deemed  to  have  been  reasonably    
ascertained).  The  actual  base  for  the  computation  of  legal  
interest  shall,  in  any  case,  be  on  the  amount  finally    
adjudged.  
 
3.  When  the  judgment  of  the  court  awarding  a  sum  of  
money  becomes  final  and  executory,  the  rate  of  legal    
interest,  whether  the  case  falls  under  paragraph  1  or  
paragraph  2,  above,  shall  be  6%  per  annum  from  such    
finality  until  its  satisfaction,  this  interim  period  being  
deemed  to  be  by  then  an  equivalent  to  a  forbearance  of    
credit.  
 
And,  in  addition  to  the  above,  judgments  that  have  become  final  
and  executory  prior  to  July  1,  2013,  shall  not  be  disturbed  and    
shall  continue  to  be  implemented  applying  the  rate  of  interest  
fixed  therein.61  (Emphasis  supplied;;  citations  omitted.)    

According  to  these  guidelines,  the  interest  due  on  the  obligation    
of  ₱7,220,968.31  should  now  be  at  6%  per  annum,  computed  
from  May  5,  2007,  when  respondent  sent  his  letter  of  demand  to    
petitioners.  This  interest  shall  continue  to  be  due  from  the  finality  
of  this  decision  until  its  full  satisfaction.    

WHEREFORE,  the  petition  is  DENIED  in  part.  The  decision  in    
CA-­G.R.  CV  No.  95709  is  AFFIRMED.  
 
Petitioners  Arco  Pulp  &  Paper  Co.,  Inc.  and  Candida  A.  Santos  
are  hereby  ordered  solidarily  to  pay  respondent  Dan  T.  Lim  the    
amount  of  ₱7,220,968.31  with  interest  of  6%  per  annum  at  the  
time  of  demand  until  finality  of  judgment  and  its  full  satisfaction,    
with  moral  damages  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00,  exemplary  
damages  in  the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00,  and  attorney's  fees  in    
the  amount  of  ₱50,000.00.  
 
SO  ORDERED.  

 
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   conceal  her  pregnancy  from  her  parent,  and  acting  on  the  
SUPREME  COURT   advice  of  her  aunt,  she  had  herself  aborted  by  the  
Manila   defendant.  After  her  marriage  with  the  plaintiff,  she  again  
became  pregnant.  As  she  was  then  employed  in  the  
EN  BANC   Commission  on  Elections  and  her  pregnancy  proved  to  
be  inconvenient,  she  had  herself  aborted  again  by  the  
G.R.  No.  L-­16439                          July  20,  1961   defendant  in  October  1953.  Less  than  two  years  later,  
she  again  became  pregnant.  On  February  21,  1955,  
ANTONIO  GELUZ,  petitioner,     accompanied  by  her  sister  Purificacion  and  the  latter's  
vs.   daughter  Lucida,  she  again  repaired  to  the  defendant's  
THE  HON.  COURT  OF  APPEALS  and  OSCAR   clinic  on  Carriedo  and  P.  Gomez  streets  in  Manila,  where  
LAZO,  respondents.   the  three  met  the  defendant  and  his  wife.  Nita  was  again  
aborted,  of  a  two-­month  old  foetus,  in  consideration  of  the  
Mariano  H.  de  Joya  for  petitioner.   sum  of  fifty  pesos,  Philippine  currency.  The  plaintiff  was  
A.P.  Salvador  for  respondents.   at  this  time  in  the  province  of  Cagayan,  campaigning  for  
his  election  to  the  provincial  board;;  he  did  not  know  of,  
REYES,  J.B.L.,  J.:   nor  gave  his  consent,  to  the  abortion.  

This  petition  for  certiorari  brings  up  for  review  question  whether   It  is  the  third  and  last  abortion  that  constitutes  plaintiff's  basis  in  
the  husband  of  a  woman,  who  voluntarily  procured  her  abortion,   filing  this  action  and  award  of  damages.  Upon  application  of  the  
could  recover  damages  from  physician  who  caused  the  same.   defendant  Geluz  we  granted  certiorari.  

The  litigation  was  commenced  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of   The  Court  of  Appeals  and  the  trial  court  predicated  the  award  of  
Manila  by  respondent  Oscar  Lazo,  the  of  Nita  Villanueva,   damages  in  the  sum  of  P3,000.06  upon  the  provisions  of  the  
against  petitioner  Antonio  Geluz,  a  physician.  Convinced  of  the   initial  paragraph  of  Article  2206  of  the  Civil  Code  of  the  
merits  of  the  complaint  upon  the  evidence  adduced,  the  trial   Philippines.  This  we  believe  to  be  error,  for  the  said  article,  in  
court  rendered  judgment  favor  of  plaintiff  Lazo  and  against   fixing  a  minimum  award  of  P3,000.00  for  the  death  of  a  person,  
defendant  Geluz,  ordering  the  latter  to  pay  P3,000.00  as   does  not  cover  the  case  of  an  unborn  foetus  that  is  not  endowed  
damages,  P700.00  attorney's  fees  and  the  costs  of  the  suit.  On   with  personality.  Under  the  system  of  our  Civil  Code,  "la  criatura  
appeal,  Court  of  Appeals,  in  a  special  division  of  five,  sustained   abortiva  no  alcanza  la  categoria  de  persona  natural  y  en  
the  award  by  a  majority  vote  of  three  justices  as  against  two,   consscuencia  es  un  ser  no  nacido  a  la  vida  del  Derecho"  
who  rendered  a  separate  dissenting  opinion.   (Casso-­Cervera,  "Diccionario  de  Derecho  Privado",  Vol.  1,  p.  
49),  being  incapable  of  having  rights  and  obligations.  
The  facts  are  set  forth  in  the  majority  opinion  as  follows:  
Since  an  action  for  pecuniary  damages  on  account  of  personal  
Nita  Villanueva  came  to  know  the  defendant  (Antonio   injury  or  death  pertains  primarily  to  the  one  injured,  it  is  easy  to  
Geluz)  for  the  first  time  in  1948  —  through  her  aunt  Paula   see  that  if  no  action  for  such  damages  could  be  instituted  on  
Yambot.  In  1950  she  became  pregnant  by  her  present   behalf  of  the  unborn  child  on  account  of  the  injuries  it  received,  
husband  before  they  were  legally  married.  Desiring  to   no  such  right  of  action  could  derivatively  accrue  to  its  parents  or  
heirs.  In  fact,  even  if  a  cause  of  action  did  accrue  on  behalf  of   are  that  he  was  likewise  aware  of  the  first.  Yet  despite  the  
the  unborn  child,  the  same  was  extinguished  by  its  pre-­natal   suspicious  repetition  of  the  event,  he  appeared  to  have  taken  no  
death,  since  no  transmission  to  anyone  can  take  place  from  on   steps  to  investigate  or  pinpoint  the  causes  thereof,  and  secure  
that  lacked  juridical  personality  (or  juridical  capacity  as   the  punishment  of  the  responsible  practitioner.  Even  after  
distinguished  from  capacity  to  act).  It  is  no  answer  to  invoke  the   learning  of  the  third  abortion,  the  appellee  does  not  seem  to  
provisional  personality  of  a  conceived  child  (conceptus  pro  nato   have  taken  interest  in  the  administrative  and  criminal  cases  
habetur)  under  Article  40  of  the  Civil  Code,  because  that  same   against  the  appellant.  His  only  concern  appears  to  have  been  
article  expressly  limits  such  provisional  personality  by  imposing   directed  at  obtaining  from  the  doctor  a  large  money  payment,  
the  condition  that  the  child  should  be  subsequently  born  alive:   since  he  sued  for  P50,000.00  damages  and  P3,000.00  
"provided  it  be  born  later  with  the  condition  specified  in  the   attorney's  fees,  an  "indemnity"  claim  that,  under  the  
following  article".  In  the  present  case,  there  is  no  dispute  that   circumstances  of  record,  was  clearly  exaggerated.  
the  child  was  dead  when  separated  from  its  mother's  womb.  
The  dissenting  Justices  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  have  aptly  
The  prevailing  American  jurisprudence  is  to  the  same  effect;;  and   remarked  that:  
it  is  generally  held  that  recovery  can  not  had  for  the  death  of  an  
unborn  child  (Stafford  vs.  Roadway  Transit  Co.,  70  F.  Supp.   It  seems  to  us  that  the  normal  reaction  of  a  husband  who  
555;;  Dietrich  vs.  Northampton,  52  Am.  Rep.  242;;  and  numerous   righteously  feels  outraged  by  the  abortion  which  his  wife  
cases  collated  in  the  editorial  note,  10  ALR,  (2d)  639).   has  deliberately  sought  at  the  hands  of  a  physician  would  
be  highminded  rather  than  mercenary;;  and  that  his  
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  parents  are  not  entitled  to  collect  any   primary  concern  would  be  to  see  to  it  that  the  medical  
damages  at  all.  But  such  damages  must  be  those  inflicted   profession  was  purged  of  an  unworthy  member  rather  
directly  upon  them,  as  distinguished  from  the  injury  or  violation   than  turn  his  wife's  indiscretion  to  personal  profit,  and  
of  the  rights  of  the  deceased,  his  right  to  life  and  physical   with  that  idea  in  mind  to  press  either  the  administrative  or  
integrity.  Because  the  parents  can  not  expect  either  help,   the  criminal  cases  he  had  filed,  or  both,  instead  of  
support  or  services  from  an  unborn  child,  they  would  normally   abandoning  them  in  favor  of  a  civil  action  for  damages  of  
be  limited  to  moral  damages  for  the  illegal  arrest  of  the  normal   which  not  only  he,  but  also  his  wife,  would  be  the  
development  of  the  spes  hominis  that  was  the  foetus,  i.e.,  on   beneficiaries.  
account  of  distress  and  anguish  attendant  to  its  loss,  and  the  
disappointment  of  their  parental  expectations  (Civ.  Code  Art.   It  is  unquestionable  that  the  appellant's  act  in  provoking  the  
2217),  as  well  as  to  exemplary  damages,  if  the  circumstances   abortion  of  appellee's  wife,  without  medical  necessity  to  warrant  
should  warrant  them  (Art.  2230).  But  in  the  case  before  us,  both   it,  was  a  criminal  and  morally  reprehensible  act,  that  can  not  be  
the  trial  court  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  have  not  found  any  basis   too  severely  condemned;;  and  the  consent  of  the  woman  or  that  
for  an  award  of  moral  damages,  evidently  because  the   of  her  husband  does  not  excuse  it.  But  the  immorality  or  
appellee's  indifference  to  the  previous  abortions  of  his  wife,  also   illegality  of  the  act  does  not  justify  an  award  of  damage  that,  
caused  by  the  appellant  herein,  clearly  indicates  that  he  was   under  the  circumstances  on  record,  have  no  factual  or  legal  
unconcerned  with  the  frustration  of  his  parental  hopes  and   basis.  
affections.  The  lower  court  expressly  found,  and  the  majority  
opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  contradict  it,  that  the   The  decision  appealed  from  is  reversed,  and  the  complaint  
appellee  was  aware  of  the  second  abortion;;  and  the  probabilities   ordered  dismissed.  Without  costs.  
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   in  the  death  of  his  wife,  Kadidia  Kalangtongan  and  his  six  
SUPREME  COURT   children,  namely,  Daduman  Malaguianon  Locaydal  Pinangcong,  
Manila   Baingkong  and  Abdul  Rakman  all  surnamed  Kusain  He  and  one  
of  his  daughters,  Undang  Kosain  who  was  about  six  years  old,  
EN  BANC   survived  although  wounded.  They  were  able  to  run  to  the  
houses  of  their  neighbors,  and  were  later  brought  to  the  
G.R.  No.  L-­30538  January  31,  1981   municipal  building  where  they  reported  to  the  police  and  were  
given  medical  attention.  
PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-­appellee,    
vs.   For  the  death  of  Kosains  wife  and  his  six  children,  as  well  as  for  
BONIFACIO  TIROL  and  CIRIACO  BALDESCO,  defendants-­ the  wounding  of  himself  and  his  daughter  Undang,  fourteen  (14)  
appellants.   persons  were  charged  (p.  3,  Vol.  II,  rec  with  multiple  murder  and  
double  frustrated  murder  by  the  Matalam  Chief  of  Police,  and  
  these  were:  Nicolas  Bate,  Beatingco  Junior,  Ruperto  Diosma  
Pablo  Diosma  Lorenzo  Canio  Durico  Sugang  Teofilo  Baldesco,  
PER  CURIAM:   Ciriaco  Baldesco,  Julian  Casiag  Nick  Bunque  a  certain  Miestizo  
Sofring  Romualdo,  and  Bonifacio  Bautista  [later  amended  to  
Review  of  the  decision  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of   Bonifacio  Tirol  p.  29,  Vol.  11,  record  of  the  fourteen,  only  Ciriaco  
Cotabato,  Branch  III,  in  Criminal  Case  No.  360,  dated  March  31,   Baldesco  and  Bonifacio  Tirol  were  apprehended,  while  the  rest  
1969,  imposing  on  Bonifacio  Tirol  and  Ciriaco  Baldesco  the   remain  at  large.  
death  penalty  for  each  of  the  seven  (7)  murders  and  an  
indeterminate  sentence  for  each  of  the  two  (2)  frustrated   On  February  17,  1966,  after  the  second  stage  of  prehn  iinary  
murders.   investigation  was  waived  by  accused  Ciriaco  Baldesco  and  
Bonifacio  Tirol,  the  acting  Provincial  Fiscal  of  Cotabato  filed  the  
The  following  facts  appear  uncontroverted.   following  information  (p.  37,  Vol.  II,  rec.)  against  the  two:  

In  the  evening  of  December  4,  1965,  while  Kosain  Manibpol  was   INFORMATION  
sleeping  with  his  family  in  their  house  at  Kabalangasan  
Matalam,  Cotabato,  he  was  awakened  by  the  barking  of  their   The  undersigned  Acting  Provincial  Fiscal  accuses  
dogs.  When  he  got  up  to  investigate,  he  saw  two  persons   Bonifacio  Tirol  and  Ciriaco  Baldisco  of  the  crime  of  
outside  their  house  who  had  already  come  up.  They  were   multiple  murder  with  double  frustrated  murder,  
Beatingco,  Jr.  and  Julian  Casian  He  asked  them  what  they   committed  as  follows:  
came  for,  and  they  answered  that  they  wanted  to  borrow  part  of  
his  land,  to  which  he  consented.  After  he  gave  his  consent,   That  on  or  about  December  4,  1965,  in  
Kulas  Bati  suddenly  arrived,  flashed  his  flashlight  on  his  face   Kobalangasan  Barrio  Lampayan,  Matalam,  
and  boxed  him.  When  he  fell  to  the  floor,  the  rest  of  his   Province  of  Cotabato,  Philippines,  and  within  the  
assailant's  companions,  numbering  more  than  ten,  who  were  afl   jurisdiction  of  this  Honorable  Court,  the  said  
armed  with  bladed  weapons  and  firearms,  also  came  and   accused,  in  company  with  Nicolas  Bate,  Beatingco  
hacked  or  boloed  him,  his  wife  and  his  seven  children,  resulting   Junior,  Ruperto  Diosma  Pablo  Diosma  Lorenzo  
 Canio  Durico  Sugang  Teofilo  Baldesco,  Julian   Kabalangasan  Matalam,  Cotabato.  Two  persons,  Beatingco  
Casiag  Nick  Bunque  Miestizo  Sopring  Romualdo   Junior  and  Julian  Casian  came  ahead,  immediately  after  he  got  
and  Bonifacio  Bautista  who  are  still  at  large,   up  from  his  sleep  to  check  what  was  causing  the  barking  of  their  
conspiring  and  confederating  together  and   dogs  which  awakened  him.  When  he  asked  why  they  were  
mutually  helping  one  another,  armed  with  bladed   there,  the  two  answered  that  they  wanted  to  borrow  his  land,  to  
weapons  and  firearms  did  then  and  there  wilfully,   which  he  consented.  Suddenly,  Kulas  Bate  arrived,  flashed  his  
unlawfully  and  feloniously,  with  treachery  and   flashlight  on  his  face  and  boxed  him.  When  he  fell  to  the  floor,  
evident  premeditation  and  with  intent  to  kilt  taking   the  rest  of  the  armed  men  came  and  hacked  or  boloed  not  only  
advantage  of  the  cover  of  the  night,  attack,  stab   him  but  also  Ws  wife  and  seven  children.  Among  the  assailants  
and  shoot  Kadidia  Kalangtogan  Duaduman  Kosain   he  recognized  aside  from  the  three  above-­named,  were  
Malaguianon  Kosain  Locayda  Kosain  Penangcong   Bonifacio  Tirol,  Ciriaco  Baldesco,  Ruperto  Diosma  Florencio  
Ko  Biacong  Kosain  and  Abdul  Rakman  Kosain   Cafio  Dorico  whose  family  name  he  forgot,  Teofilo  Baldesco,  a  
who  as  a  result  thereof,  sustained  mortal  wounds   certain  mestizo  and  Sopring  Romualdo.  He  actually  saw  Ciriaco  
which  directly  caused  their  death  and  Kosain   Baldesco  hacking  his  wife  with  a  bolo,  and  the  "bungi"  
Manibpol  and  Undang  Kosain  sustained  serious   harelipped  Bonifacio  Tirol  hacking  his  eldest  daughter.  He  had  
wounds  which  ordinarily  would  have  caused  their   known  Bonifacio  Tirol  for  two  years  before  the  incident  and  
death,  thus  performing  all  acts  of  execution  which   Ciriaco  Baldesco  for  a  longer  period.  His  wife  and  six  of  his  
should  have  produced  the  crime  of  double  murder   children  died  as  a  result  of  the  sudden  attack.  He  himself  was  
as  a  consequence  thereof,  but  nevertheless  did   wounded  at  the  outer  part  of  his  right  arm,  at  the  back  of  his  
not  produce  it  by  reason  of  causes  independent  of   right  wrist  and  on  his  forehead,  and  his  chest  was  badly  beaten;;  
the  will  of  the  accused,  that  is  by  the  timely  and   but  he  survived  because  he  was  able  to  run  to  the  house  of  a  
able  medical  assistance  rendered  to  said  Kosain   neighbor  named  Angcogan  (t.s.n.,  pp.  1-­10,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  
Manibpol  and  Undang  Kosain  which  prevented  
their  death.   On  cross-­examination,  Kosain  testified  that  when  he  was  
investigated  by  the  police,  he  was  not  sure  of  the  surname  of  
Contrary  to  law,  especially  Articles  248  and  6  of   accused  Bonifacio,  so  he  stated  that  it  may  be  Bautista.  He  
the  Revised  Penal  Code.   learned  later  that  the  surname  was  Tirol  He  admitted  that  he  
was  confused  when  he  stated  earlier  that  he  had  known  
The  prosecution  relied  mainly  on  the  testimonies  of  the  two   Bonifacio  Bautista  for  one  year  and  Bonifacio  Tirol  for  two  years.  
survivors,  Kosain  Manibpol  and  his  daughter  Undang  Kosain  to   Bonifacio  Bautista  and  Bonifacio  Tirol  are  one  and  the  same  
prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused.  The  only  other  witness  presented   person.  He  further  declared  that  after  he  had  fallen  down  as  a  
by  the  prosecution  was  the  municipal  health  officer  who  issued   result  of  the  blow  by  Kulas  Bate,  Sopring  immediately  hacked  
the  death  certificates  of  the  deceased  and  the  medical  certificate   him.  It  was  after  he  fell  that  he  was  able  to  observe  the  stabbing  
of  Kosain.   and  slashing  of  his  family,  because  his  assailants  must  have  
thought  him  dead.  He  later  fled  to  the  house  of  Angcogan  who  
Kosain  Manibpol  33  years  old,  widower  and  resident  of   ran  away  because  of  fear,  but  returned  afterwards  with  
Kabalangasan  Matalam,  Cotabato,  declared  on  direct   companions  and  went  to  their  house  to  verify  what  happened  
examination  that  at  about  8:00  P.M.  on  December  4,  1965,  more   (pp.  10-­24,  t.s.n.,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  
than  ten  (10)  persons,  all  armed,  entered  his  house  in  
On  questioning  by  the  court,  Kosain  testified  that  on  the  night  of   (Benangkong),  and  her  younger  brother  was  Abdul  Rakman  
December  4,  1965  he  slept  with  a  petroleum  fight  burning  in   They  all  died  when  more  than  ten  men  went  inside  their  house  
their  house  as  in  fact  they  always  slept  with  their  house  righted   wle  they  were  lying  down  on  the  mat.  She  did  not  see  who  
because  their  youngest  child  would  cry  if  there  was  no  light.   hacked  their  father,  but  she  saw  Bonifacio  Tirol  hacking  her  
When  he  was  attacked  he  was  not  able  to  shout  for  help   three  elder  sisters,  and  Ciriaco  Baldesco  hacking  his  younger  
because  he  was  caught  unaware.  His  eldest  daughter,  Danonan   brother.  They  used  kalsido  or  bolo.  The  other  men  were  also  
(Daduman)  was  the  one  who  pleaded  with  their  assailants  not  to   armed  with  boloes,  and  one  of  them,  Kulas  Bati  was  with  a  
hack  them  as  they  had  no  fault,  but  she  was  also  hacked  and  hit   firearm.  There  was  light  inside  their  house  at  that  time.  Besides,  
at  the  abdomen.  At  this  stage  he  interchanged  the  assailants  of   it  was  moonlight  night.  Before  the  night  of  the  hacking  incident,  
his  wife  and  children  by  saying  that  Bonifacio  Tirol  hacked  his   she  used  to  see  Bonifacio  Tirol  passing  by  their  house  in  going  
wife  and  Ciriaco  Baldesco  hacked  his  eldest  child  (p.  29,  t  s.  n   to  the  house  of  Kulas  Bati  which  is  near  their  house.  She  has  
Vol.  III,  rec.).   not  seen  Ciriaco  Baldesco  before  (t.s.n.,  pp.  69-­75,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  

Undang  Kosain  about  6  years  old,  resident  of  Kabalangasan   On  cross-­examination,  Undang  testified  that  she  used  to  see  
Matalam,  Cotabato,  corroborated  the  testimony  of  her  father,   Ciriaco  Baldesco  at  their  store  where  her  family  buys  things.  
Kosain  Manibpol  that  she  and  her  father  are  the  only  two  in  the   The  house  of  Baldesco  is  near  the  schools  of  her  elder  sisters.  
family  now,  after  her  mother,  sisters  and  brother  had  been  killed   She  sometimes  went  with  them  to  school.  Her  oldest  sister  was  
by  more  than  ten  armed  men  who  entered  their  house  and   hacked  by  Baldesco  at  the  abdomen.  Her  two  other  elder  sisters  
attacked  their  family.  Among  their  more  than  ten  assailants,  she   were  likewise  hacked  by  Baldesco  at  the  abdomen.  Her  younger  
knows  only  three,  namely,  Kulas  Bati,  Ciriaco  Baldesco  and   brother  was  hacked  by  Bonifacio  Tirol  Their  house  was  lighted  
another  person  whom  she  remembers  only  as  "bungi"   at  that  time,  aside  from  the  fact  that  it  was  bright  because  of  the  
(harelipped).  Of  the  three  she  knows  only  two  were  in  court,   round  moon.  The  accused  Baldesco  and  Tirol  were  dressed  in  
namely  Ciriaco  Baldesco  and  the  "bungi"  Bonifacio  Tirol  She   white  and  dark  clothes.  The  color  of  the  dark  clothes  was  black,  
Identified  them  by  touching  the  shoulders  of  Baldesco  and  Tirol   She  does  not  know  of  any  trouble  between  Ciriaco  Baldesco  or  
(p.  65,  t.s.n.,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  She  remembers  Tirol  distinctly   Bonifacio  Tirol  and  her  father  (t.s.n.,  PP79-­85,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  
because  of  his  appearance  as  "bungi."  She  did  not  see  who  
hacked  her  mother,  but  she  saw  "bungi"  hack  his  younger   The  defense  of  both  accused  is  alibi,  and  neither  of  them  
brother  and  sister.  Her  elder  sisters  were  hacked  by  Baldesco.   disputed  the  facts  established  by  the  prosecution  except  to  deny  
She  herself  was  hacked  at  her  back  by  Kulas  Bati  She  showed   involvement  in  the  crimes  alluded  to  them.  
in  court  her  scar  at  the  back  of  her  left  shoulder  going  diagonally  
to  the  spinal  column  and  measuring  about  6  inches  long  and  3/4   Accused  Ciriaco  Baldesco,  48  years  old,  married  and  residing  at  
of  an  inch  wide,  which  appear  to  have  scars  of  stiches.   Kabalangasan  Matalam,  Cotabato,  testifying  on  his  own  behalf,  
Afterwards,  she  went  to  the  house  of  a  neighbor  named  Antalig.   declared  that  on  December  4,  1965,  he  went  home  at  about  
6:00  P.M.  after  pasturing  his  carabao.  He  took  his  supper  at  
In  answer  to  the  court's  questions,  Undang  declared  that  she   6:00  P.M.  and  listened  to  the  radio  up  to  9:00  P.M..  Thereafter,  
had  three  older  sisters,  two  younger  sisters  and  one  younger   he  went  to  sleep  (t.s.n.,  pp.  125-­  130,  Vol.  Ill,  rec.).  
brother.  Her  elder  sisters  were  Danonang  (Daduman),  
Maguianon  (Malaguianan)  and  Lakaida  (Locayda).  Her  younger   To  bolster  his  alibi,  Baldesco  presented  Demetrio  Riparip  25  
sisters  were  Inangkong  (Penangkong)  and  Bayangkong   years  old,  single,  a  former  teacher  at  Kabalangasan  Elementary  
School  and  boarder  in  the  house  of  Baldesco,  who  declared  that   A  friend  from  the  logging  company,  Rufino  Duan  23  years  old,  
he  took  his  supper  with  the  latter  at  his  house  at  about  6:00  P.M.   single  and  residing  at  Paco,  Kidapawan,  Cotabato,  likewise  
on  December  4,  1965.  Then  he  went  to  sleep  at  7:00  P.M..  He   corroborated  Tirol's  testimony  that  he  was  in  Salat  from  
did  not  wake  up  till  the  following  morning  (t.s.n.,  pp.  96-­112,  Vol.   December  2  to  7.  1965.  The  said  accused  stayed  with  him  in  the  
III,  rec.).   camp  he  is  occupying  while  he  was  at  Salat  for  seven  (7)  days,  
looking  for  work.  In  order  to  go  to  Salat  froni  Kabalangasan  one  
A  daughter  of  Baldesco,  Teofista  Baldesco,  21  years  old,   has  to  take  a  ride  on  a  truck  (t.s.n.,  pp.  1  18122,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  
married,  housekeeper  and  residing  at  Lampayan,  Matalam,  
Cotabato,  likewise  corroborated  Baldesco's  testimony  that   After  trial,  the  trial  court  rendered  its  decision  (pp.  6-­28,  Vol.  I,  
family,  consisting  of  her  father,  mother,  brother,  and  sister  took   rec.)  dated  March  31,  1969,  the  dispositive  portion  of  which  
supper  in  their  house  after  6.00  P.M.,  then  listened  to  the  radio   reads  as  follows:  
up  to  9:00  P.M..  They  went  to  sleep  at  9:00  P.M.  (t.s.n.,  pp.  115-­
117,  Vol.  III,  rec.).   WHEREFORE,  the  court  hereby  finds  the  herein  
accused,  Bonifacio  Tirol  and  Ciriaco  Baldesco,  
Accused  Bonifacio  Tirol,  31  years  old,  married  and  residing  at   guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt,  of  the  crime  of  
Kabalangasan  Matalam,  Cotabato,  likewise  testified  on  his  own   murder  of  seven  (,7)  persons,  namely:  Daduman  
behalf.  He  declared  that  he  was  in  Salat,  a  part  of  Kabacan   Klantongan  Kosain  [also  written  in  the  transcript  of  
Cotabato,  from  December  2  to  7,  1965,  seeking  employment  as   steno-­type  notes  as  Danonan  and  Dananong  
a  laborer  in  the  logging  firm  of  Felipe  Tan.  He  left  Kabalangasan   Baingkong  Kosain  [also  written  in  the  transcript  as  
at  10:00  A.M.,  took  a  motorboat  and  arrived  in  Salat  at  5:00   Bai  Ingkong];;  Abdul  Kalatogan  Kosain  [also  written  
P.M.  He  did  not  see  the  manager,  Felipe  Tan,  of  the  logging  firm   in  the  transcript  as  Abdul  Rakman  Kadidia  
until  December  6,  1965,  and  so  he  was  able  to  return  to   Kalantongan  Malaguianon  Kosain  Locayda  Kosain  
Kabalangasan  only  on  December  7,  1965.  While  in  Salat,  he   [also  written  Lokaidal  Pinangkong  Kosain  [also  
stayed  in  the  camp  where  his  friend  Rufino  Duan  was  staying.   written  Maningdongi  and  Binangkong  and  of  the  
When  he  returned  to  Kabalangasan  his  family  had  already   crime  of  Frustrated  Murder  of  Kosain  Manibpol  
evacuated  out  of  fear  for  revenge,  because  of  the  massacre  of   [also  written  as  Kusain  Manedpoll  and  Undang  
the  fimily  of  Kosain  He  went  to  Malamaing  another  barrio  of   Kosain  and  hereby  sentences  each  of  them  to  
Matalam,  where  he  found  his  family.  In  Malamaing  they  stayed   suffer  the  supreme  penalty  of  death  for  each  of  the  
in  the  house  of  a  Cebuano  named  Kulas.  They  never  went  back   seven  murders  of  the  seven  deceased,  and  to  an  
to  Kabalangasan  because  they  were  afraid  that  Kosains  family   imprisonment  of  TEN  (10)  YEARS  to  
might  take  revenge  on  them  (t.s.n.,  pp.  131-­142,  Vol.  III,  rec.).   SEVENTEEN  (17)  YEARS  and  FOUR  (4)  
MONTHS  for  each  of  the  two  Frustra  Murders  of  
His  wife  Nicolasa  Tirol,  30  years  old  and  residing  at  Paco,   the  two  wounded  persons  and  to  indenuiify  jointly  
Kidapawan,  Cotabato,  confirmed  Tirol's  absence  from  Matalam   and  severally  the  heirs  of  each  of  the  seven  
from  December  2  to  7,  1965  while  he  was  looking  for  a  job  in   deceased  with  the  sum  of  SIX  THOUSAND  
Salat.  She  also  stated  that  she  evacuated  her  family  because   PESOS  (P6,000.00)  for  each  of  the  seven  
she  was  warned  that  the  family  of  Kosain  might  take  revenge  on   deceased,  or  FORTY-­TWO  THOUSAND  PESOS  
them  (t.s.n.,  pp.  145-­151,  Vol.  III,  rec.).   (P42,000.00)  in  all,  and  pay  the  costs,  fifty-­fifty.  
 It  appearing  that  the  accused  have  been  detained,   THIRD  ASSIGNED  ERROR:  
they  each  should  be  credited  one-­half  (1/2)  of  their  
preventive  imprisonment  in  the  cases  of  two   The  lower  court  erred  in  not  granting  new  trial  
frustrated  murders.   even  as  the  complaining  witness  himself  made  a  
voluntary  extra-­judicial  admission  by  means  of  a  
The  penalty  herein  imposed  for  each  of  the  seven   sworn  statement  (affidavit)  that  he  merely  involved  
murders  being  the  maximum  —  death  —  the   accused  Baldesco  for  a  consideration.  
records  of  this  case  are  hereby  automatically  
elevated  to  the  Supreme  Court.   FOURTH  ASSIGNED  ERROR:  

Let  copy  of  this  Judgment  be  furnished  the   The  evidence  failed  to  establish  conspiracy  among  
Philippine  Constabulary  and  the  NBI  at  Cotabato   the  accused.  
City,  and  the  Police  Department  of  Matalam,  
Cotabato,  so  that  they  may  exert  efforts  to   FIFTH  ASSIGNED  ERROR:  
apprehend  the  other  culprits  who  committed  the  
crimes  herein  dealt  with.   The  decision  is  contrary  to  law.  (p.  98,  Vol.  I,  rec.)  

SO  ORDERED.   During  the  pendency  of  this  appeal,  or  on  October  23,  1977,  
appellant  Baldesco  died  in  the  New  Bilibid  Prison  Hospital  (p.  
On  appeal,  accused  Baldesco  and  Tirol,  contend  in  their  joint   192,  Vol.  I,  rec.)  so  that  on  January  28,  1978,  We  resolved  to  
brief:   dismiss  this  case  insofar  as  the  criminal  liability  of  the  said  
appellant  is  concerned.  Following  the  doctrine  in  People  vs.  
FIRST  ASSIGNED  ERROR:   Sendaydiego  (81  SCRA  124,  134),  this  appeal  will  bd  resolved  
insofar  as  Baldesco  is  concerned  only  for  the  purpose  of  
The  lower  court  erred  in  admitting  in  the  death   determining  his  criminal  liability  which  is  the  basis  of  the  civil  
certificates  issued  by  the  doctor  who  did  not   liability  for  which  his  estate  may  be  liable.  
personally  view  and  examine  the  victims,  but  
whose  findings  therein  were  based  upon  the   Appellants  would  like  the  court  to  reject  the  death  certificates  of  
sketch  prepared  by  the  police.   the  victims  on  the  ground  that  they  are  hearsay  evidence,  since  
the  doctor  who  issued  them  did  so  on  the  strength  of  the  sketch  
SECOND  ASSIGNED  ERROR:   furnished  by  the  police,  without  personally  examining  the  bodies  
of  the  victims.  
The  lower  court  erred  in  disregarding  the  
testimony  of  both  accused  despite  the  convincingly   WE  find  no  error  in  the  admission  of  said  exhibits  "as  part  of  the  
strong  evidence  showing  that  they  were  not  at  the   testimony  of  the  witnesses"  (p.  9,  Vol.  I  and  p.  95,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  
scene  of  the  crime  on  4  December  1965,  and   The  fact  of  death  of  the  victims  is  not  in  issue.  The  testimonies  
therefore  their  non-­participation  in  the  crime   of  the  prosecution  witnesses  that  the  victims  died  because  of  
charged.   stab  wounds  inflicted  by  the  armed  men  who  entered  their  
residence  on  the  night  of  December  4,  1965  remain  
uncontroverted.  That  death  came  to  the  deceased  by  foul   unnatural  if  the  witnesses  who  were  themselves  victims  of  the  
means  is  a  moral  and  legal  certainty.  Their  death  certificates   horrible  deed  were  not  confused  during  that  terrifying  massacre  
therefore  are  only  corroborative  of  the  testimonies  of  the   committed  together  by  more  than  ten  persons  (p.  27,  Vol.  I,  
prosecution  witnesses.   rec.).  What  is  important  is  the  positive  Identification  of  the  two  
accused  appellants  as  having  been  in  that  group  and  who  
Appellants  would  likewise  have  the  Court  give  credence  to  their   participated  in  the  concerted  attack  on  the  hapless  victims.  "Alibi  
defense  of  alibi,  alleging  that  they  have  presented  convincingly   is  unavailing  once  the  accused  is  positively  Identified  by  one  
strong  evidence  showing  that  they  were  not  at  the  scene  of  the   without  motive  to  charge  falsely  said  accused,  specially  with  a  
crime  on  December  4,  1965.  This  contention  is  devoid  of  merit.   grave  offense  that  could  bring  death  by  execution  on  the  culprit"  
The  rule  is  well  settled,  to  the  point  of  being  trite  that  the   (People  vs.  Estante,  92  SCRA  122).  
defense  of  alibi,  which  is  easy  to  concoct,  must  be  received  with  
utmost  caution,  for  it  is  one  of  the  weakest  defenses  that  can  be   The  weakness  of  appellant  Baldesco's  defense  lies  in  the  fact  
resorted  to  by  an  accused  (People  vs.  Castafieda,  93  SCRA  58,   that  his  house  where  he  purportedly  stayed  from  6:00  P.M.  of  
69;;  People  vs.  Cortez,  57  SCRA  208).   December  4,  1965  to  the  following  day  —  is  only  about  one  
kilometer  from  the  house  of  the  victims,  the  scene  of  the  crime,  
Moreover,  the  alibi  of  both  appellants  cannot  prevail  over  the   according  to  his  own  daughter  and  witness,  Teofista  Baldesco  
positive  Identification  of  the  prosecution  witnesses  Identifying   (p.  116,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  And  although  Baldesco  himself  testified  
and  pointing  to  the  accused  as  among  the  group  of  armed  men   that  the  victims'  house  is  more  than  three  (3)  kilometers  from  
which  massacred  the  victims  (People  vs.  Tabion,  93  SCRA  566,   his,  it  still  does  not  belie  the  fact  that  he  could  easily  go  there  if  
570;;  People  vs.  Angeles,  92  SCRA  433).  The  two  survivors,   he  wanted  to,  considering  that  both  residences  are  within  the  
Kosain  and  his  6-­year  old  daughter  positively  Identified  both   same  barrio  of  Kabalangasan.  
accused  as  two  of  the  more  than  ten  persons  who  entered  their  
house  on  December  4,  1965  and  participated  in  the  hacking  and   So  also  is  the  house  of  Tirol  located  in  the  same  barrio.  
boloing  of  their  family.  Accused  Tirol  was  even  more  distinctly   According  to  him,  his  house  is  about  11/2  kilometers  from  that  of  
and  positively  recognized  as  the  "bungi"  harelipped  who  hacked   the  victim.  He  wants  to  impress  upon  this  Court,  however,  that  
some  of  the  victims.  The  credibility  of  these  two  prosecution   he  was  not  in  his  house  when  the  incident  occurred  but  in  
witnesses  was  never  successfully  assailed.  The  inconsistencies   another  town  looking  for  a  job  in  a  logging  company.  The  trial  
attributed  to  Kosain  Manibpol  refer  to  minor  details  (i.e.,  about   court  correctly  rejected  this  theory  because  of  the  
the  length  of  time  he  had  had  known  one  of  the  two  persons   inconsistencies  noted  in  Tirol's  evidence.  Said  the  trial  court:  
who  first  came  up  to  his  residence  on  the  pretext  of  borrowing  
his  lot  —  pp.  15-­16,  Vol.  III,  rec.,  in  relation  to  Exhibits  "I"  and   The  alibi  of  Bonifacio  Tirol  is  unbelievable.  His  
"2",  pp.  5  &  17,  Vol.  II,  rec.),  which  do  not  affect  his  credibility.   witness  Rufino  Duan  testified  that  from  
The  apparent  inconsistency  in  his  testimony  as  well  as  that  of  6-­ Kabalangasan  where  Bonifacio  Tirol  lived  to  Salat  
year  old  Undang  Kosain  whose  credibility  was  never   where  Bonifacio  was  supposed  to  be  on  
questioned,  as  to  who  among  the  armed  men  hacked  or   December  4,  1965,  people  would  take  a  truck  ride  
attacked  which  victim  is  likewise  insufficient  to  destroy  their   of  the  PTC  but  Bonifacio  Tirol  declared  that  he  
credibility,  considering  that  the  presence  of  a  number  of  armed   went  to  Salat  by  speedboat,  and  went  home  to  
men  simultaneously  participating  in  the  unlawful  aggression   Kabalangasan  by  banca.  Duan  testified  that  Salat  
could  really  be  confusing.  As  noted  by  the  trial  court,  it  would  be   is  very  far  from  Kabalangasan  because  it  takes  
one  day  to  reach  it  from  there;;  but  Bonifacio  Tirol   manager  on  a  Saturday  evening  when  the  next  
declared  that  he  started  at  Kabalangasan  by   day  was  a  Sunday,  therefore  not  a  work  day?  (pp.  
motorboat  at  10:00  A.M.,  and  arrived  at  Salat  at   2425,  Vol.  I,  rec.).  
5:00  P.M.  or  seven  hours  only.  He  modified  this  
afterwards,  in  the  cross-­examination,  by  testifying   It  is  a  well-­settled  doctrine  that  for  alibi  to  be  acceptable,  it  must  
that  from  his  house  in  Kabalangasan  to  the  log   be  shown  that  the  place  where  the  accused  was  alleged  to  
pond  where  he  took  the  speedboat,  he  had  to  walk   when  the  offense  was  committed  must  be  located  at  such  a  
from  6:00  A.M.  to  10:00  A.M.  or  for  3  hours;;  fixing   distance  that  it  is  well  nigh  impossible  for  him  to  be  at  the  scene  
the  time  from  his  home  to  Salat  at  10  hours,  But   of  the  crime  (People  vs.  dela  Cruz,  G.R.  No.  L-­30912,  April  30,  
this  testimony  about  the  log  pond  cannot  be   1980;;  People  vs.  Mercado,  et  al.,  L-­  39511-­13,  April  28,1980;;  
believed.  He  testified  he  did  not  know  where  the   People  vs.  Malibay,  63  SCRA  421).  
log  pond  was  located;;  that  was  the  first  time  he  
went  there.  How  he  located  a  long  pond  at  a  place   As  to  appellant  Baldesco,  the  testimonies  of  his  witnesses  do  
he  did  not  know  is  certainly  beyond  belief.  Of   not  at  all  bolster  his  alibi.  Demetrio  Riparip  stated  that  he  took  
course,  he  said,  Rufino  told  him  where  to  pass,  but   supper  with  Baldesco  at  6:00  P.M.  on  December  4,  1965,  after  
that  was  a  long  time  ago.  Bonifacio  Tirol  further   which  he  slept  at  7:00  P.M.  and  did  not  wake  up  until  the  next  
testified  that  when  he  went  home  to  Kabalangasan   morning  (p.  109,  t.s.n.,  Vol.  III,  rec.).  Baldesco's  daughter,  
he  took  a  banca  at  Salat  at  3:00  dawn  and  arrived   Teofista,  on  the  other  hand,  testified  that  she  took  supper  at  
in  his  house  at  Kabalangasan  at  9:00  in  the   6:00  P.M.  with  her  father,  mother,  brother  and  sister  (p.  116,  
morning,  or  6  hours.  He  changed  the  time  of   t.s.n.,  Vol.  III,  rec.),  without  mentioning  the  presence  of  Riparip  
arrival  to  10:00  A.M.  when  questioned  by  the  Court   in  their  house;;  then  she  listended  to  the  radio  with  her  father,  
about  it.  When  asked  by  the  Court  why  the   mother,  brother  and  sister  up  to  9:00  P.M.  and  went  to  sleep  
difference  in  the  period  of  time  of  travel  he   afterwards.  These  testimonies  do  not  rule  out  the  possibility  that  
reasoned  out  that  the  motorboat  in  going  to  Salat   he  could  have  left  the  house  that  same  evening  while  the  rest  of  
was  going  upstream,  and  the  paddled  banca  in   his  family  were  sound  asleep  and  returned  late  that  night  or  
going  to  Kabalangasan  was  going  downstream.   early  the  following  morning.  
Even,  if  that  were  so,  the  difference  cannot  be  
three  or  four  hours.   The  third  assigned  error  is  likewise  bereft  of  merit.  Counsel  for  
appellants  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  not  granting  a  
xxx  xxx  xxx   new  trial  even  as  the  complaining  witness  himself  made  a  
voluntary  extrajudicial  admission  by  means  of  sworn  statement  
But  even  granting  that  Bonifacio  really  went  to   (affidavit)  that  he  merely  involved  accused  Baldesco  for  a  
Salat  on  the  2nd  to  look  for  work,  there  was  no   consideration.  The  trial  court  rejected  the  motion  for  new  trial  on  
physical  impossibility  for  him  to  be  in   the  -­round  that  it  was  filed  out  of  time  (p.  97,  Vol.  II  rec.).  
Kabalangasan  on  the  evening  of  the  4th  which  
was  a  Saturday.  The  testimony  of  Duan  that  he   Section  9,  Rule  122  of  the  Rules  of  Court  requires  that  in  all  
saw  Bonifacio  of  the  4th  in  the  evening  cannot  be   cases  in  which  the  death  penalty  is  impo  the  records  should  be  
believed  because  of  his  interest  and  its   forwarded  to  this  Court  within  twenty  (20)  days  but  not  less  than  
improbability.  Why  should  Bonifacio  wait  for  the   fifteen  (15)  days  from  rendition  of  judgment.  This  20-­day  period  
is  not  rigid  or  absolute  nor  jurisdictional,  and  may  be  shortened   regarding  the  non-­involvement  and  non-­participation  of  
or  extended  (People  vs.  Bocar,  97  Phil.  398).  However,  the   Baldesco  in  the  crime  charged,  but  it  was  too  late  to  tell  the  
extension  of  period  is  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  lower  court   court  because  the  case  was  already  submitted  for  decision;;  and  
to  comply  with  the  mandatory  requirement  of  elevating  the   that  it  was  a  common  knowledge  in  their  barrio  that  Baldesco  
records  for  review,  and  not  to  lengthen  the  minimum  period   was  not  among  the  band  that  killed  Kosains  family.  
within  which  trial  courts  may  modify  or  alter  their  decision.  As  
enunciated  in  People  vs.  Bocar,  supra,  the  reason  for  the  15-­ This  so-­called  "extra-­judicial  admission,"  referring  to  Diosmas  
day  minimum  requirement  is  such  that  within  that  period,  the   sworn  statement  is  not  the  kind  of  newly-­discovered  evidence  
trial  court  may  on  its  own  motion  with  the  consent  of  the   contemplated  in  Section  2,  Rule  121  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  Well-­
defendant,  grant  a  new  trial.  Within  that  period  the  trial  court   settled  is  the  rule  that  before  a  new  trial  may  be  granted  on  the  
may  modify  its  judgment  by  reducing  the  penalty  or  fine,  or  even   ground  of  newly-­  discovered  evidence,  it  must  be  shown  that:  
set  it  aside  altogether  and  acquit  the  accused.   (a)  the  evidence  was  discovered  after  trial;;  (b)  such  evidence  
could  not  have  been  discovered  and  produced  at  the  trial  even  
In  the  case  at  bar,  the  motion  for  new  trial  was  filed  on  April   with  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence;;  (c)  the  evidence  is  
28,1969  (pp.  92-­94,  Vol.  II,  rec.)  or  twenty-­eight  days  after   material,  not  merely  cumulative,  corroborative  or  impeaching,  
rendition  of  the  judgment  on  March  31,  1969  (p.  90,  Vol.  II,  rec.).   and  (d)  it  must  be  to  the  merits  as  ought  to  produce  a  different  
Although  a  15-­day  extension  from  April  21,  1969  was  granted  to   result,  if  admitted  [Jose  vs.  CA,  70  SCRA  258].  
the  lower  court  within  which  to  forward  the  record  of  this  case  (p.  
30,  Vol.  I,  rec.),  that  extension  did  not  affect  the  15-­day  period   The  very  affidavit  of  Diosma  indicates  that  the  so-­called  extra-­
for  filing  a  motion  for  new  trial.   judicial  admission  of  Kosain  was  already  available  during  the  
trial,  otherwise,  he  would  not  have  demanded  from  Feliciano  
But  even  granting  that  the  said  motion  were  filed  on  time,  the  -­ Codoy  personally  one  carabao  so  that  he  will  not  testify  against  
game  does  not  merit  a  favorable  action.  The  ground  relied  on  is   accused  Baldesco.  
an  alleged  newly-­discovered  evidence,  referring  to  a  sworn  
statement  (p.  94,  Vol.  II,  rec.)  executed  on  April  17,  1969  by  a   For  how  could  he  have  offered  not  to  testify  against  Baldesco  if  
certain  Romualdo  Diosma  barrio  captain  of  barrio  Lampayan,   the  trial  was  already  concluded?  Codoy  should  have  been  
Matalam,  Cotabato.  In  the  said  affidavit,  the  affiant  declared  that   presented  as  a  defense  witness  if  such  was  the  fact,  together  
he  was  shocked  to  learn  that  the  accused  were  sentenced  to   with  some  other  barrio  residents  who  had  knowledge,  as  was  
death;;  that  Kosain  Manibpol  the  principal  witness,  had  confided   allegedly  "public  knowledge  in  our  barrio,"  that  Baldesco  was  
to  him  that  he  was  only  interested  in  commercializing  or  making   not  involved  in  the  crime.  The  purported  extrajudicial  admission  
money  out  of  his  case,  which  is  why  he  implicated  the  accused   is  a  last-­minute  concoction.  
Baldesco;;  that  Kosain  Manibpol  had  persuaded  him  to  convince  
Feliciano  Codoy,  a  son-­in-­law  of  Baldesco,  to  give  him  Kosain   Appellants  also  point  out  as  error  that  the  evidence  failed  to  
one  carabao  so  that  he  wili  drop  the  case;;  that  Kosain  Manibpol   establish  conspiracy.  While  it  has  been  held  that  conspiracy  
also  personally  demanded  from  Codoy  one  carabao  so  that  he   must  be  established  by  positive  evidence,  direct  proof  is  not  
Will  not  testify  against  Baldesco;;  that  he  (affiant)  even  went  with   essential  to  show  it,  since  by  its  very  nature  it  is  planned  in  
Kosain  to  see  Codoy  in  November,  1967  to  persuade  him  to   utmost  secrecy  (People  vs.  Peralta,  25  SCRA  760).  
give  a  carabao  to  Kosain  but  Codoy  refused;;  and  that  Kosain  
realizing  the  wrong  he  had  done,  was  willing  to  tell  the  truth  
In  the  rase  of  People  vs.  Madai  Santalani  (93  SCRA  316,  330),   The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  finding  the  accused  guilty  of  murder  
We  held:  "Conspiracy  implies  concert  of  design  and  not   of  seven  (7)  persons,  qualified  by  treachery,  and  of  two  
participation  in  every  detail  of  the  execution.  If  it  is  proved  that   frustrated  murders.  There  was  treachery  because  the  accused  
two  or  more  persons  aimed,  by  their  acts,  at  the   and  their  companions  made  a  deliberate  surprise  attack  on  the  
accomplishment  of  some  unlawful  object  each  doing  a  part  so   victims.  They  perpetrated  the  killings  in  such  a  manner  that  
that  their  acts,  though  apparently  independent,  were  in  fact   there  was  no  risk  to  themselves.  Treachery  has  absorbed  the  
connected  and  cooperative,  indicating  a  closeness  of  personal   circumstance  of  nighttime,  taking  advantage  of  superior  
association  and  a  concurrence  of  sentiments,  conspiracy  may   strength,  employing  means  to  weaken  the  defense,  and  that  the  
be  inferred  although  no  actual  meeting  between  them  to   crime  was  committed  by  a  band.  
conspire  is  proved,  for  the  prosecution  need  not  establish  that  
all  the  parties  thereto  agreed  to  every  detail  in  the  execution  of   The  aggravating  circumstance  of  evident  premeditation  was  not  
the  crime  or  that  they  were  actually  together  at  all  stages  of  the   proven,  hence  it  may  not  be  appreciated.  
conspiracy"  (see  also  People  vs.  Cabiling,  74  SCRA  285).  
The  aggravating  circumstance  of  dwelling,  the  crime  having  
In  this  case  under  review,  it  has  been  clearly  established  that   been  committed  in  the  dwelling  place  of  the  victims  who  had  not  
the  appellants  and  their  cohorts  acted  in  unison  when  they  went   given  any  provocation,  likewise  can  be  appreciated.  
up  the  house  of  Kosain  Manibpol  and  attacked  their  victims  in  a  
manner  showing  singleness  of  purpose  —  the  massacre  of  the   Considering  that  there  is  no  mitigating  circumstance,  the  trial  
entire  family  of  Kosain  The  fact  that  two  survived  is  of  no   court  did  not  err  in  imposing  the  maximum  penalty  provided  for  
moment.  The  intention  to  kill  all  of  them  was  most  patent.   in  Article  248.  

Thus,  the  fifth  assigned  error,  i.e.,  that  the  decision  is  contrary  to   Since  the  penal  liability  of  appellant  Ciriaco  Baldesco  had  been  
law,  need  not  be  considered  separately.  The  prosecution   extinguished  by  his  death  on  October  23,  1977,  only  his  civil  
evidence  has  clearly  established  the  guilt  of  the  accused   liability  remains  to  be  determined  which  can  be  recovered  from  
appellants.  In  addition,  there  are  more  incriminating  evidence   his  estate.  
that  emanate  from  the  appellants  themselves.  The  trial  court  
had  taken  judicial  notice  of  the  escape  of  accused  Baldesco   The  civil  liability  of  both  appellants  for  each  of  the  seven  victims  
from  police  custody  on  December  15,  1965,  (p.  27,  Vol.  II,  rec.),   of  the  seven  murders  is  hereby  raised  to  P12,000.00  and  their  
and  his  subsequent  re-­arrest  while  en  route  to  Davao  (p.  28,   civil  liability  for  each  of  the  two  victims  of  the  two  frustrated  
Vol.  II,  rec.).  On  the  other  hand,  accused  Tirol  himself  had   murders  is  hereby  increased  to  P8,000.00.  The  civil  liability  
testified  that  after  coming  from  Salat,  he  left  his  house  and   arising  from  the  crime  of  2  or  more  accused  is  solidary.  
never  returned,  for  the  reason  that  the  members  of  his  family  
were  afraid  of  some  vendetta  because  of  the  massacre  of  Ko   WHEREFORE  APPELLANTS  BONIFACIO  TIROL  AND  
Manibpols  family  (pp.  141-­142,  Vol.  II,  rec.).  The  trial  court  noted   CIRIACO  BALDESCO  ARE  HEREBY  SENTENCED  TO  (1)  
that  this  fear  was  entertained  even  before  the  chief  of  police   INDEMNIFY  JOINTLY  AND  SEVERALLY  KOSAIN  MANIBPOL  
could  ffle  a  complaint  and  before  a  warrant  of  arrest  could  be   AND  UNDANG  KOSAIN  AS  THE  ONLY  SURVIVING  HEIRS  OF  
issued.  These  actuations  could  only  indicate  a  sense  of  guilt.  As   THE  SEVEN  MURDER  VICTIMS  IN  THE  SUM  OF  TWELVE  
the  trial  court  pointed  out,  fear  of  reprisal  or  retaliation  could  only   THOUSAND  (P12,000.00)  PESOS  FOR  EACH  OF  THE  SEVEN  
haunt  one  who  is  aware  of  his  wrong  doing  (p.  26,  Vol.  I,  rec.).   MURDER  VICTIMS;;  AND  (2)  INDEMNIFY  JOINTLY  AND  
SEVERALLY  KOSAIN  MANIBPOL  IN  THE  SUM  OF  EIGHT    
THOUSAND  (P8,000.00)  PESOS  AND  UNDANG  KOSAIN  
ALSO  IN  THE  SUM  OF  EIGHT  THOUSAND  (P8,000.00)    
PESOS  AS  THE  TWO  VICTIMS  OF  THE  TWO  FRUSTRATED  
MURDERS.    

THUS  MODIFIED,  THE  JUDGMENT  IS  HEREBY  AFFIRMED    

IN  ALL  OTHER  RESPECTS.  
 
SO  ORDERED.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 Republic  of  the  Philippines   Accident  Insurance  for  dependent,  pursuant  to  the  Collective  
SUPREME  COURT   Bargaining  Agreement  (CBA)  concluded  between  Continental  
Manila   and  the  Union,  which  reads:  

THIRD  DIVISION   ARTICLE  X:  LEAVE  OF  ABSENCE  

G.R.  No.  182836                              October  13,  2009   x  x  x  x  

CONTINENTAL  STEEL  MANUFACTURING   Section  2.  BEREAVEMENT  LEAVE—The  Company  agrees  to  
CORPORATION,  Petitioner,     grant  a  bereavement  leave  with  pay  to  any  employee  in  case  of  
vs.   death  of  the  employee’s  legitimate  dependent  (parents,  spouse,  
HON.  ACCREDITED  VOLUNTARY  ARBITRATOR  ALLAN  S.   children,  brothers  and  sisters)  based  on  the  following:  
MONTAÑO  and  NAGKAKAISANG  MANGGAGAWA  NG  
CENTRO  STEEL  CORPORATION-­SOLIDARITY  OF  UNIONS   2.1  Within  Metro  Manila  up  to  Marilao,  Bulacan  -­  7  days  
IN  THE  PHILIPPINES  FOR  EMPOWERMENT  AND  REFORMS  
(NMCSC-­SUPER),  Respondents.   2.2  Provincial/Outside  Metro  Manila  -­  11  days  

D  E  C  I  S  I  O  N   x  x  x  x  

CHICO-­NAZARIO,  J.:   ARTICLE  XVIII:  OTHER  BENEFITS  

Before  Us  is  a  Petition  for  Review  on  Certiorari,  under  Rule  45   x  x  x  x  
of  the  Rules  of  Court,  assailing  the  Decision1  dated  27  February  
2008  and  the  Resolution2  dated  9  May  2008  of  the  Court  of   Section  4.  DEATH  AND  ACCIDENT  INSURANCE—The  
Appeals  in  CA-­G.R.  SP  No.  101697,  affirming  the   Company  shall  grant  death  and  accidental  insurance  to  the  
Resolution3  dated  20  November  2007  of  respondent  Accredited   employee  or  his  family  in  the  following  manner:  
Voluntary  Arbitrator  Atty.  Allan  S.  Montaño  (Montaño)  granting  
bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  to  Rolando  P.   x  x  x  x  
Hortillano  (Hortillano),  grounded  on  the  death  of  his  unborn  
child.   4.3  DEPENDENTS—Eleven  Thousand  Five  Hundred  Fifty  
Pesos  (Php11,550.00)  in  case  of  death  of  the  employees  
The  antecedent  facts  of  the  case  are  as  follows:   legitimate  dependents  (parents,  spouse,  and  children).  In  case  
the  employee  is  single,  this  benefit  covers  the  legitimate  
Hortillano,  an  employee  of  petitioner  Continental  Steel   parents,  brothers  and  sisters  only  with  proper  legal  document  to  
Manufacturing  Corporation  (Continental  Steel)  and  a  member  of   be  presented  (e.g.  death  certificate).4  
respondent  Nagkakaisang  Manggagawa  ng  Centro  Steel  
Corporation-­Solidarity  of  Trade  Unions  in  the  Philippines  for   The  claim  was  based  on  the  death  of  Hortillano’s  unborn  child.  
Empowerment  and  Reforms  (Union)  filed  on  9  January  2006,  a   Hortillano’s  wife,  Marife  V.  Hortillano,  had  a  premature  delivery  
claim  for  Paternity  Leave,  Bereavement  Leave  and  Death  and  
on  5  January  2006  while  she  was  in  the  38th  week  of   employees  of  MKK  Steel  Corporation  (MKK  Steel)  and  Mayer  
pregnancy.5  According  to  the  Certificate  of  Fetal  Death  dated  7   Steel  Pipe  Corporation  (Mayer  Steel),  sister  companies  of  
January  2006,  the  female  fetus  died  during  labor  due  to  fetal   Continental  Steel,  in  similar  situations  as  Hortillano  were  able  to  
Anoxia  secondary  to  uteroplacental  insufficiency.6   receive  death  benefits  under  similar  provisions  of  their  CBAs.  

Continental  Steel  immediately  granted  Hortillano’s  claim  for   The  Union  mentioned  in  particular  the  case  of  Steve  L.  Dugan  
paternity  leave  but  denied  his  claims  for  bereavement  leave  and   (Dugan),  an  employee  of  Mayer  Steel,  whose  wife  also  
other  death  benefits,  consisting  of  the  death  and  accident   prematurely  delivered  a  fetus,  which  had  already  died  prior  to  
insurance.7   the  delivery.  Dugan  was  able  to  receive  paternity  leave,  
bereavement  leave,  and  voluntary  contribution  under  the  CBA  
Seeking  the  reversal  of  the  denial  by  Continental  Steel  of   between  his  union  and  Mayer  Steel.15  Dugan’s  child  was  only  24  
Hortillano’s  claims  for  bereavement  and  other  death  benefits,   weeks  in  the  womb  and  died  before  labor,  as  opposed  to  
the  Union  resorted  to  the  grievance  machinery  provided  in  the   Hortillano’s  child  who  was  already  37-­38  weeks  in  the  womb  
CBA.  Despite  the  series  of  conferences  held,  the  parties  still   and  only  died  during  labor.  
failed  to  settle  their  dispute,8  prompting  the  Union  to  file  a  Notice  
to  Arbitrate  before  the  National  Conciliation  and  Mediation   The  Union  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  MKK  Steel  and  Mayer  
Board  (NCMB)  of  the  Department  of  Labor  and  Employment   Steel  are  located  in  the  same  compound  as  Continental  Steel;;  
(DOLE),  National  Capital  Region  (NCR).9  In  a  Submission   and  the  representatives  of  MKK  Steel  and  Mayer  Steel  who  
Agreement  dated  9  October  2006,  the  Union  and  Continental   signed  the  CBA  with  their  respective  employees’  unions  were  
Steel  submitted  for  voluntary  arbitration  the  sole  issue  of   the  same  as  the  representatives  of  Continental  Steel  who  
whether  Hortillano  was  entitled  to  bereavement  leave  and  other   signed  the  existing  CBA  with  the  Union.  
death  benefits  pursuant  to  Article  X,  Section  2  
Finally,  the  Union  invoked  Article  1702  of  the  Civil  Code,  which  
10
and  Article  XVIII,  Section  4.3  of  the  CBA.  The  parties  mutually   provides  that  all  doubts  in  labor  legislations  and  labor  contracts  
chose  Atty.  Montaño,  an  Accredited  Voluntary  Arbitrator,  to   shall  be  construed  in  favor  of  the  safety  of  and  decent  living  for  
resolve  said  issue.11   the  laborer.  

When  the  preliminary  conferences  again  proved  futile  in   On  the  other  hand,  Continental  Steel  posited  that  the  express  
amicably  settling  the  dispute,  the  parties  proceeded  to  submit   provision  of  the  CBA  did  not  contemplate  the  death  of  an  unborn  
their  respective  Position  Papers,  12  Replies,13  and   child,  a  fetus,  without  legal  personality.  It  claimed  that  there  are  
Rejoinders14  to  Atty.  Montaño.   two  elements  for  the  entitlement  to  the  benefits,  namely:  (1)  
death  and  (2)  status  as  legitimate  dependent,  none  of  which  
The  Union  argued  that  Hortillano  was  entitled  to  bereavement   existed  in  Hortillano’s  case.  Continental  Steel,  relying  on  Articles  
leave  and  other  death  benefits  pursuant  to  the  CBA.  The  Union   40,  41  and  4216  of  the  Civil  Code,  contended  that  only  one  with  
maintained  that  Article  X,  Section  2  and  Article  XVIII,  Section   civil  personality  could  die.  Hence,  the  unborn  child  never  died  
4.3  of  the  CBA  did  not  specifically  state  that  the  dependent   because  it  never  acquired  juridical  personality.  Proceeding  from  
should  have  first  been  born  alive  or  must  have  acquired  juridical   the  same  line  of  thought,  Continental  Steel  reasoned  that  a  fetus  
personality  so  that  his/her  subsequent  death  could  be  covered   that  was  dead  from  the  moment  of  delivery  was  not  a  person  at  
by  the  CBA  death  benefits.  The  Union  cited  cases  wherein   all.  Hence,  the  term  dependent  could  not  be  applied  to  a  fetus  
that  never  acquired  juridical  personality.  A  fetus  that  was   On  the  otherhand,  for  the  entitlement  to  benefit  for  death  and  
delivered  dead  could  not  be  considered  a  dependent,  since  it   accident  insurance  as  provided  under  Article  XVIII,  Section  4,  
never  needed  any  support,  nor  did  it  ever  acquire  the  right  to  be   paragraph  (4.3)  of  the  parties’  CBA,  four  (4)  indispensable  
supported.   elements  must  be  present:  (a)  there  is  "death";;  (b)  such  death  
must  be  of  employee’s  "dependent";;  (c)  such  dependent  must  
Continental  Steel  maintained  that  the  wording  of  the  CBA  was   be  "legitimate";;  and  (d)  proper  legal  document  to  be  
clear  and  unambiguous.  Since  neither  of  the  parties  qualified  the   presented.18  
terms  used  in  the  CBA,  the  legally  accepted  definitions  thereof  
were  deemed  automatically  accepted  by  both  parties.  The   Atty.  Montaño  found  that  there  was  no  dispute  that  the  death  of  
failure  of  the  Union  to  have  unborn  child  included  in  the   an  employee’s  legitimate  dependent  occurred.  The  fetus  had  the  
definition  of  dependent,  as  used  in  the  CBA  –  the  death  of   right  to  be  supported  by  the  parents  from  the  very  moment  
whom  would  have  qualified  the  parent-­employee  for   he/she  was  conceived.  The  fetus  had  to  rely  on  another  for  
bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  –  bound  the  Union   support;;  he/she  could  not  have  existed  or  sustained  
to  the  legally  accepted  definition  of  the  latter  term.   himself/herself  without  the  power  or  aid  of  someone  else,  
specifically,  his/her  mother.  Therefore,  the  fetus  was  already  a  
Continental  Steel,  lastly,  averred  that  similar  cases  involving  the   dependent,  although  he/she  died  during  the  labor  or  delivery.  
employees  of  its  sister  companies,  MKK  Steel  and  Mayer  Steel,   There  was  also  no  question  that  Hortillano  and  his  wife  were  
referred  to  by  the  Union,  were  irrelevant  and  incompetent   lawfully  married,  making  their  dependent,  unborn  child,  
evidence,  given  the  separate  and  distinct  personalities  of  the   legitimate.  
companies.  Neither  could  the  Union  sustain  its  claim  that  the  
grant  of  bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  to  the   In  the  end,  Atty.  Montaño  decreed:  
parent-­employee  for  the  loss  of  an  unborn  child  constituted  
"company  practice."   WHEREFORE,  premises  considered,  a  resolution  is  hereby  
rendered  ORDERING  [herein  petitioner  Continental  Steel]  to  
On  20  November  2007,  Atty.  Montaño,  the  appointed  Accredited   pay  Rolando  P.  Hortillano  the  amount  of  Four  Thousand  Nine  
Voluntary  Arbitrator,  issued  a  Resolution17  ruling  that  Hortillano   Hundred  Thirty-­Nine  Pesos  (₱4,939.00),  representing  his  
was  entitled  to  bereavement  leave  with  pay  and  death  benefits.   bereavement  leave  pay  and  the  amount  of  Eleven  Thousand  
Five  Hundred  Fifty  Pesos  (₱11,550.00)  representing  death  
Atty.  Montaño  identified  the  elements  for  entitlement  to  said   benefits,  or  a  total  amount  of  ₱16,489.00  
benefits,  thus:  
The  complaint  against  Manuel  Sy,  however,  is  ORDERED  
This  Office  declares  that  for  the  entitlement  of  the  benefit  of   DISMISSED  for  lack  of  merit.  
bereavement  leave  with  pay  by  the  covered  employees  as  
provided  under  Article  X,  Section  2  of  the  parties’  CBA,  three  (3)   All  other  claims  are  DISMISSED  for  lack  of  merit.  
indispensable  elements  must  be  present:  (1)  there  is  "death";;  (2)  
such  death  must  be  of  employee’s  "dependent";;  and  (3)  such   Further,  parties  are  hereby  ORDERED  to  faithfully  abide  with  
dependent  must  be  "legitimate".   the  herein  dispositions.  
Aggrieved,  Continental  Steel  filed  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  a   Following  [Continental  Steel’s]  theory,  there  can  be  no  
Petition  for  Review  on  Certiorari,19  under  Section  1,  Rule  43  of   experience  of  "death"  to  speak  of.  The  Court,  however,  does  not  
the  Rules  of  Court,  docketed  as  CA-­G.R.  SP  No.  101697.   share  this  view.  A  dead  fetus  simply  cannot  be  equated  with  
anything  less  than  "loss  of  human  life",  especially  for  the  
Continental  Steel  claimed  that  Atty.  Montaño  erred  in  granting   expectant  parents.  In  this  light,  bereavement  leave  and  death  
Hortillano’s  claims  for  bereavement  leave  with  pay  and  other   benefits  are  meant  to  assuage  the  employee  and  the  latter’s  
death  benefits  because  no  death  of  an  employee’s  dependent   immediate  family,  extend  to  them  solace  and  support,  rather  
had  occurred.  The  death  of  a  fetus,  at  whatever  stage  of   than  an  act  conferring  legal  status  or  personality  upon  the  
pregnancy,  was  excluded  from  the  coverage  of  the  CBA  since   unborn  child.  [Continental  Steel’s]  insistence  that  the  certificate  
what  was  contemplated  by  the  CBA  was  the  death  of  a  legal   of  fetal  death  is  for  statistical  purposes  only  sadly  misses  this  
person,  and  not  that  of  a  fetus,  which  did  not  acquire  any   crucial  point.20  
juridical  personality.  Continental  Steel  pointed  out  that  its  
contention  was  bolstered  by  the  fact  that  the  term  death  was   Accordingly,  the  fallo  of  the  27  February  2008  Decision  of  the  
qualified  by  the  phrase  legitimate  dependent.  It  asserted  that  the   Court  of  Appeals  reads:  
status  of  a  child  could  only  be  determined  upon  said  child’s  
birth,  otherwise,  no  such  appellation  can  be  had.  Hence,  the   WHEREFORE,  premises  considered,  the  present  petition  is  
conditions  sine  qua  non  for  Hortillano’s  entitlement  to   hereby  DENIED  for  lack  of  merit.  The  assailed  Resolution  dated  
bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  under  the  CBA   November  20,  2007  of  Accredited  Voluntary  Arbitrator  Atty.  
were  lacking.   Allan  S.  Montaño  is  hereby  AFFIRMED  and  UPHELD.  

The  Court  of  Appeals,  in  its  Decision  dated  27  February  2008,   With  costs  against  [herein  petitioner  Continental  Steel].21  
affirmed  Atty.  Montaño’s  Resolution  dated  20  November  2007.  
The  appellate  court  interpreted  death  to  mean  as  follows:   In  a  Resolution22  dated  9  May  2008,  the  Court  of  Appeals  
denied  the  Motion  for  Reconsideration23  of  Continental  Steel.  
[Herein  petitioner  Continental  Steel’s]  exposition  on  the  legal  
sense  in  which  the  term  "death"  is  used  in  the  CBA  fails  to   Hence,  this  Petition,  in  which  Continental  Steel  persistently  
impress  the  Court,  and  the  same  is  irrelevant  for  ascertaining   argues  that  the  CBA  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  so  that  the  
the  purpose,  which  the  grant  of  bereavement  leave  and  death   literal  and  legal  meaning  of  death  should  be  applied.  Only  one  
benefits  thereunder,  is  intended  to  serve.  While  there  is  no   with  juridical  personality  can  die  and  a  dead  fetus  never  
arguing  with  [Continental  Steel]  that  the  acquisition  of  civil   acquired  a  juridical  personality.  
personality  of  a  child  or  fetus  is  conditioned  on  being  born  alive  
upon  delivery,  it  does  not  follow  that  such  event  of  premature   We  are  not  persuaded.  
delivery  of  a  fetus  could  never  be  contemplated  as  a  "death"  as  
to  be  covered  by  the  CBA  provision,  undoubtedly  an  event   As  Atty.  Montaño  identified,  the  elements  for  bereavement  leave  
causing  loss  and  grief  to  the  affected  employee,  with  whom  the   under  Article  X,  Section  2  of  the  CBA  are:  (1)  death;;  (2)  the  
dead  fetus  stands  in  a  legitimate  relation.  [Continental  Steel]  has   death  must  be  of  a  dependent,  i.e.,  parent,  spouse,  child,  
proposed  a  narrow  and  technical  significance  to  the  term  "death   brother,  or  sister,  of  an  employee;;  and  (3)  legitimate  relations  of  
of  a  legitimate  dependent"  as  condition  for  granting   the  dependent  to  the  employee.  The  requisites  for  death  and  
bereavement  leave  and  death  benefits  under  the  CBA.   accident  insurance  under  Article  XVIII,  Section  4(3)  of  the  CBA  
are:  (1)  death;;  (2)  the  death  must  be  of  a  dependent,  who  could   unborn  child  acquired  any  rights  or  incurred  any  obligations  prior  
be  a  parent,  spouse,  or  child  of  a  married  employee;;  or  a  parent,   to  his/her  death  that  were  passed  on  to  or  assumed  by  the  
brother,  or  sister  of  a  single  employee;;  and  (4)  presentation  of   child’s  parents.  The  rights  to  bereavement  leave  and  other  
the  proper  legal  document  to  prove  such  death,  e.g.,  death   death  benefits  in  the  instant  case  pertain  directly  to  the  parents  
certificate.   of  the  unborn  child  upon  the  latter’s  death.  

It  is  worthy  to  note  that  despite  the  repeated  assertion  of   Second,  Sections  40,  41  and  42  of  the  Civil  Code  do  not  provide  
Continental  Steel  that  the  provisions  of  the  CBA  are  clear  and   at  all  a  definition  of  death.  Moreover,  while  the  Civil  Code  
unambiguous,  its  fundamental  argument  for  denying  Hortillano’s   expressly  provides  that  civil  personality  may  be  extinguished  by  
claim  for  bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  rests  on   death,  it  does  not  explicitly  state  that  only  those  who  have  
the  purportedly  proper  interpretation  of  the  terms  "death"  and   acquired  juridical  personality  could  die.  
"dependent"  as  used  in  the  CBA.  If  the  provisions  of  the  CBA  
are  indeed  clear  and  unambiguous,  then  there  is  no  need  to   And  third,  death  has  been  defined  as  the  cessation  of  life.24  Life  
resort  to  the  interpretation  or  construction  of  the  same.   is  not  synonymous  with  civil  personality.  One  need  not  acquire  
Moreover,  Continental  Steel  itself  admitted  that  neither   civil  personality  first  before  he/she  could  die.  Even  a  child  inside  
management  nor  the  Union  sought  to  define  the  pertinent  terms   the  womb  already  has  life.  No  less  than  the  Constitution  
for  bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  during  the   recognizes  the  life  of  the  unborn  from  conception,25  that  the  
negotiation  of  the  CBA.   State  must  protect  equally  with  the  life  of  the  mother.  If  the  
unborn  already  has  life,  then  the  cessation  thereof  even  prior  to  
The  reliance  of  Continental  Steel  on  Articles  40,  41  and  42  of   the  child  being  delivered,  qualifies  as  death.  
the  Civil  Code  for  the  legal  definition  of  death  is  misplaced.  
Article  40  provides  that  a  conceived  child  acquires  personality   Likewise,  the  unborn  child  can  be  considered  a  dependent  
only  when  it  is  born,  and  Article  41  defines  when  a  child  is   under  the  CBA.  As  Continental  Steel  itself  defines,  a  dependent  
considered  born.  Article  42  plainly  states  that  civil  personality  is   is  "one  who  relies  on  another  for  support;;  one  not  able  to  exist  
extinguished  by  death.   or  sustain  oneself  without  the  power  or  aid  of  someone  else."  
Under  said  general  definition,26  even  an  unborn  child  is  a  
First,  the  issue  of  civil  personality  is  not  relevant  herein.  Articles   dependent  of  its  parents.  Hortillano’s  child  could  not  have  
40,  41  and  42  of  the  Civil  Code  on  natural  persons,  must  be   reached  38-­39  weeks  of  its  gestational  life  without  depending  
applied  in  relation  to  Article  37  of  the  same  Code,  the  very  first   upon  its  mother,  Hortillano’s  wife,  for  sustenance.  Additionally,  it  
of  the  general  provisions  on  civil  personality,  which  reads:   is  explicit  in  the  CBA  provisions  in  question  that  
the  dependent  may  be  the  parent,  spouse,  or  child  of  a  married  
Art.  37.  Juridical  capacity,  which  is  the  fitness  to  be  the  subject   employee;;  or  the  parent,  brother,  or  sister  of  a  single  employee.  
of  legal  relations,  is  inherent  in  every  natural  person  and  is  lost   The  CBA  did  not  provide  a  qualification  for  the  child  dependent,  
only  through  death.  Capacity  to  act,  which  is  the  power  to  do   such  that  the  child  must  have  been  born  or  must  have  acquired  
acts  with  legal  effect,  is  acquired  and  may  be  lost.   civil  personality,  as  Continental  Steel  avers.  Without  such  
qualification,  then  child  shall  be  understood  in  its  more  general  
We  need  not  establish  civil  personality  of  the  unborn  child  herein   sense,  which  includes  the  unborn  fetus  in  the  mother’s  womb.  
since  his/her  juridical  capacity  and  capacity  to  act  as  a  person  
are  not  in  issue.  It  is  not  a  question  before  us  whether  the  
The  term  legitimate  merely  addresses  the  dependent  child’s   We  emphasize  that  bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  
status  in  relation  to  his/her  parents.  In  Angeles  v.  Maglaya,27  we   are  granted  to  an  employee  to  give  aid  to,  and  if  possible,  
have  expounded  on  who  is  a  legitimate  child,  viz:   lessen  the  grief  of,  the  said  employee  and  his  family  who  
suffered  the  loss  of  a  loved  one.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the  
A  legitimate  child  is  a  product  of,  and,  therefore,  implies  a  valid   parents’  grief  and  sense  of  loss  arising  from  the  death  of  their  
and  lawful  marriage.  Remove  the  element  of  lawful  union  and   unborn  child,  who,  in  this  case,  had  a  gestational  life  of  38-­39  
there  is  strictly  no  legitimate  filiation  between  parents  and  child.   weeks  but  died  during  delivery,  is  any  less  than  that  of  parents  
Article  164  of  the  Family  Code  cannot  be  more  emphatic  on  the   whose  child  was  born  alive  but  died  subsequently.  
matter:  "Children  conceived  or  born  during  the  marriage  of  the  
parents  are  legitimate."  (Emphasis  ours.)   Being  for  the  benefit  of  the  employee,  CBA  provisions  on  
bereavement  leave  and  other  death  benefits  should  be  
Conversely,  in  Briones  v.  Miguel,28  we  identified  an  illegitimate   interpreted  liberally  to  give  life  to  the  intentions  thereof.  Time  
child  to  be  as  follows:   and  again,  the  Labor  Code  is  specific  in  enunciating  that  in  case  
of  doubt  in  the  interpretation  of  any  law  or  provision  affecting  
The  fine  distinctions  among  the  various  types  of  illegitimate   labor,  such  should  be  interpreted  in  favor  of  labor.29  In  the  same  
children  have  been  eliminated  in  the  Family  Code.  Now,  there   way,  the  CBA  and  CBA  provisions  should  be  interpreted  in  favor  
are  only  two  classes  of  children  -­-­  legitimate  (and  those  who,   of  labor.  In  Marcopper  Mining  v.  National  Labor  Relations  
like  the  legally  adopted,  have  the  rights  of  legitimate  children)   Commission,30  we  pronounced:  
and  illegitimate.  All  children  conceived  and  born  outside  a  valid  
marriage  are  illegitimate,  unless  the  law  itself  gives  them   Finally,  petitioner  misinterprets  the  declaration  of  the  Labor  
legitimate  status.  (Emphasis  ours.)   Arbiter  in  the  assailed  decision  that  "when  the  pendulum  of  
judgment  swings  to  and  fro  and  the  forces  are  equal  on  both  
It  is  apparent  that  according  to  the  Family  Code  and  the  afore-­ sides,  the  same  must  be  stilled  in  favor  of  labor."  While  
cited  jurisprudence,  the  legitimacy  or  illegitimacy  of  a  child   petitioner  acknowledges  that  all  doubts  in  the  interpretation  of  
attaches  upon  his/her  conception.  In  the  present  case,  it  was  not   the  Labor  Code  shall  be  resolved  in  favor  of  labor,  it  insists  that  
disputed  that  Hortillano  and  his  wife  were  validly  married  and   what  is  involved-­here  is  the  amended  CBA  which  is  essentially  a  
that  their  child  was  conceived  during  said  marriage,  hence,   contract  between  private  persons.  What  petitioner  has  lost  sight  
making  said  child  legitimate  upon  her  conception.1avvphi1   of  is  the  avowed  policy  of  the  State,  enshrined  in  our  
Constitution,  to  accord  utmost  protection  and  justice  to  labor,  a  
Also  incontestable  is  the  fact  that  Hortillano  was  able  to  comply   policy,  we  are,  likewise,  sworn  to  uphold.  
with  the  fourth  element  entitling  him  to  death  and  accident  
insurance  under  the  CBA,  i.e.,  presentation  of  the  death   In  Philippine  Telegraph  &  Telephone  Corporation  v.  NLRC  [183  
certificate  of  his  unborn  child.   SCRA  451  (1990)],  we  categorically  stated  that:  

Given  the  existence  of  all  the  requisites  for  bereavement  leave   When  conflicting  interests  of  labor  and  capital  are  to  be  weighed  
and  other  death  benefits  under  the  CBA,  Hortillano’s  claims  for   on  the  scales  of  social  justice,  the  heavier  influence  of  the  latter  
the  same  should  have  been  granted  by  Continental  Steel.   should  be  counter-­balanced  by  sympathy  and  compassion  the  
law  must  accord  the  underprivileged  worker.  
Likewise,  in  Terminal  Facilities  and  Services  Corporation  v.  
NLRC  [199  SCRA  265  (1991)],  we  declared:  

Any  doubt  concerning  the  rights  of  labor  should  be  resolved  in  
its  favor  pursuant  to  the  social  justice  policy.  

IN  VIEW  WHEREOF,  the  Petition  is  DENIED.  The  Decision  

dated  27  February  2008  and  Resolution  dated  9  May  2008  of  
the  Court  of  Appeals  in  CA-­G.R.  SP  No.  101697,  affirming  the  
Resolution  dated  20  November  2007  of  Accredited  Voluntary  
Arbitrator  Atty.  Allan  S.  Montaño,  which  granted  to  Rolando  P.  
Hortillano  bereavement  leave  pay  and  other  death  benefits  in  
the  amounts  of  Four  Thousand  Nine  Hundred  Thirty-­Nine  Pesos  
(₱4,939.00)  and  Eleven  Thousand  Five  Hundred  Fifty  Pesos  
(₱11,550.00),  respectively,  grounded  on  the  death  of  his  unborn  
child,  are  AFFIRMED.  Costs  against  Continental  Steel  
Manufacturing  Corporation.  

SO  ORDERED.