TORTS ISSUE: whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
Part 1: Quasi-delicts
I. Concept of Quasi-delict
A. Definition (Art. 2176)
Whoever
By act or omission
Causes damage to another,
There being fault or negligence,
Is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence,
If there is no pre-existing contractual relations between
parties,
Is called QUASI-DELICT
And is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
B. Elements
1. An act or omission constituting of fault or negligence
2. Damage caused by said act or omission
3. Causal relation between the damage and the act or
omission
C. Cases
1. Barredo vs. Garcia (1942)
Petitioner: Fausto Barredo (proprietor/employer of the taxi
driven by Fontanilla)
Respondent: Severino Garcia, Timotea Almario (parents of the
deceased)
FACTS:
Head-on collision between a taxi driven by Pedro Fontanilla and
a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino
Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later.
Criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First,
and was convicted and sentenced
The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
CA: Affirmed sentence of CFI
Respondents brought an action before CFI against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
CFI: awarded damages in favor of Respondents
CA: Modified damages awarded; Found Petitioner guilty as it is
shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law
and speeding violation which appeared in the records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to be public
Petitioners appealed, arguing that: the liability of Fausto Barredo
is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is
only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be
held responsible in the case.
CA: The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is
imposed xxx by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee (not arising from felony)
(art. 1903, CC)
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code (now 2176) as
an employer of Pedro Fontanilla? YES
RULING:
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime.
**DIFFERENTIATE FIRST**
Crimes under the Penal Culpa Aquliana or cuasi-
Code delito under the Civil Code
crimes affect the public only of private concern
interest
the Penal Code punishes or merely repairs the damage
corrects the criminal act
delicts are not as broad as include all acts in which "any
quasi-delicts, because the kind of fault or negligence
former are punished only if intervenes
there is a penal law clearly
covering them
* Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes- Article 1903 of the Civil Code
not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says: "The liability
referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to avoid the damage.'"
- "From this article two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there
instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that presumption is juris tantum and
consequently, may be rebutted.
- It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome, and he is relieved from liability.
- "This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately
on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
**IN THIS CASE**
[Barredo] is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and
directly responsible in damages under article 1903 (now 2180)
in relation to article 1902 (now 2176), of the Civil Code.
1. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence
not punished by law, the legal institution of
culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property through any
degree of negligence would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime. In such a state of
affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito
or culpa aquiliana?
2. to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while
 in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made
responsible in a civil action under articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs
3. to hold that there is only one way to make
defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the
driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first,
would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to
follow a devious and cumbersome method of
obtaining relief. It is a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
similar public conveyances usually do not
have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be
required in all cases to go through this roundabout,
unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
Courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.
* It should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles
calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should
guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and
patrimonial safety of 'others.
DISPOSITIVE: In view of the foregoing, the judgment of, the
Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed.
2. Elcano vs. Hill (1977)
FACTS:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No.
5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the killing
of the son of plaintiffs-appellants Elcano. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because
of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Elcano filed the
complaint for the recovery of damages against Reginald and
his father. The civil case was dismissed on the ground that the
present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
WON the present civil case barred by the acquittal of the
accused the crim case
Held:
No. The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
Ratio: (jurisprudence) barredo case
 The same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code
 In this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction,
he could have been sued for this civil liability arising
from his crime
 If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life
 To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise.
There would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
 ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
 In reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law
 Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law
while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It
results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict
(Code Commission)
3. Cangco vs. Manila Road (1918)
Facts:
 (Plaintiff) Jose Cangco was in the employment of
(defendant) Manila Railroad Company as a clerk
 Plaintiff comes daily by train to the company’s office
where he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company’s train free of
charge.
 On the questioned occasion, plaintiff was on board the
train. On the side of the train where passengers alight,
there is a cement platform which begins to rise. Plaintiff
was about to alight from the train.
 As the train slowed down, another passenger Zuniga,
also an employee of the railroad company, got off the
same car, alighting safely.
 When the train had proceeded a little farther, plaintiff
stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that
his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform where his right arm was badly crushed and
lacerated.
  The accident occurred on a dark night and the railroad b. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot
was lighted dimly. Objects on the platform were difficult where the alighting passenger would place his feet
to discern especially to a person emerging from a on the platform was reduced, thereby decreasing
lighted car. the risk of stepping off.
 Plaintiff filed an action to recover damages from c. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was
defendant company founding his action upon the of cement material, also assured to the passenger
negligence of the servants and employees of a stable and even surface to alight.
defendant in placing the sacks of watermelon upon the d. Plaintiff was possessed of the rigor and agility of
platform young manhood, and it was by no means so risky
 CFI – ruled in favor of defendant which held that for him to get off while the train was yet moving as
although negligence was attributable to the defendant, the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
the plaintiff himself failed to use due caution in alighting person.
from the train.
The place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his
ISSUES: daily custom to get on and off the train at this station.
There could, therefore be no uncertainty in his mind
 Whether or not defendant Manila Railroad is liable for with regard either to the length of the step which he was
damages required to take or the character of the platform where
 Whether or not there was a contributory negligence on he was alighting.
the part of plaintiff
COURT’S DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIABILITY OF
HELD: EMPLOYERS UNDER ARTICLE 2180 AND THEIR
LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
1. Yes. Defendant is liable for damages.
LIABILITY FOR LIABILITY UNDER
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the BREACH OF ARTICLE 2180
train had come to a full stop before alighting, the CONTRACT
particular injury suffered by him could not have Ex contacto (culpa Extra contractual (culpa
occurred. The train was barely moving when plaintiff contractual) aquillana)
alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came Liability is direct and Legal viewpoint is that
to stop within six meters from the place where he immediate employer has a
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains presumptive
responsibility for the
under these conditions every day of the year and
negligence of its
sustain no injury where the company has kept its
servants which can be
platform free from any dangerous obstructions. There rebutted by proof of the
is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered exercise of due care in
any injury in alighting as he did had it not been for their selection and
defendant’s negligent failure to perform its duty to supervision
provide a safe alighting place. Considered as an Substantive and
accident in the independent, which of
The test by which to determine whether the passenger performance of an itself constitutes the
has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight obligation already source of an obligation
from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or existing between persons not
reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an formerly connected by
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition any legal tie
of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger Based upon civil law Based upon the
principle that whoever principle that employer
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
causes damage to is liable for negligent
evidence. This care has been defined to be the care another shall make good acts of its employees
which a man of ordinary prudence would use under the damage caused
similar circumstances to avoid injury. The vinculum exist It is the wrongful or
independently of the negligent act or
2. No contributory negligence on part of plaintiff. breach of the voluntary omission itself which
duty assumed by the creates vinculum juris
It should be noted that plaintiff was ignorant of the fact parties when entering
that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of into the contractual
melon piled on the platform existed. The plaintiff had relation
right to assume, in the absence of circumstance to It is not necessary to Negligence has to be
warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. prove negligence; what proven for the plaintiff’s
The place was dark or dimly lighted. To the question of is needed is to prove the action is based on it
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the existence of a
following circumstances are to be noted: contractual obligation
and that the same has
a. The company’s platform was constructed upon a been broken.
level higher than that of the roadbed.

4. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad Co. (1910)

Facts:
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin
boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of
mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s
office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all
said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises
of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting
caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps,
Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and
then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion
of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to
Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company
left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages
due to the company’s negligence.
Issue:
WN Manila Electric is liable.
Held:
No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally,
or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence
and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been
negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power
plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However,
the causal connection between the company’s negligence and
the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct
acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even,
in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode
the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence
the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15,
more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy
of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of
his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to
the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was
about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had
reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
5. Cinco vs. Canonoy (1979)
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II for the recovery of damages on the account of
a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito (last three being private respondents in this suit).
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver,
Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident.
Plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or
negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the
jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were
sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was
a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered
and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Private respondents contended, among others, that defendant,
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict
At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents
moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3
(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been
commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the
same shall be suspended, in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;
CITY COURT – Ordered suspension of the civil case
Petitioner’s MR – Denied. Elevated matter on certiorari to CFI
CFI:
RESPONDENT JUDGE PRESIDING - City Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
RESPONDENT JUDGE – Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
No grave abuse of discretion on part of City Court.
Petitioner’s MR – Denied by RJ
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE: whether or not there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal
action.
HELD:
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of
Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character
of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is
 governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
(1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
cause by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article
shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may
proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as
specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant. (n)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is
also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34
and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
are independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the c action, may be brought
by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal
action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal
offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance
when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an
independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil
Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes
that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based
on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It
makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one
hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is
plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In
fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to
property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which
holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive
smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."
6. Dulay vs. CA (1995)
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
Dulay vs. CA
Petitioner: MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in
behalf of the minor children - widow of the deceased Napoleon
Dulay
Respondents:
- CA
- SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO.,
INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION – Employers of Torzuela
FACTS:
An altercation between Benigno Torzuela (security guard) and
Atty. Napoleon Dulay resulted to Torzuela killing Atty. Dulay.
Petitioners filed an action for damages before RTC against
Torzuela and the respondents (employers), who were
impleaded on the ground that their negligence for having failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury under
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or an industry.
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action: that Torzuela's
act of shooting Dulay xxx was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefore is governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:
 Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a
felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Thus, the complaint for damages based on negligence
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code cannot lie in this
case since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only
to quasi-offenses (In this case, Torzuela is prosecuted for
homicide = intentional = not quasi-delict)
RTC: Order granting Motion to dismiss and motion for exclusion
as to defendant
Petitioners appealed, arguing that quasi-delicts are not limited
to acts of negligence but also cover acts that are intentional
and voluntary. Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of
shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
CA: Affirmed the order of RTC
ISSUE:
WON the cause of action, which was committed with
deliberate intent, is founded on quasi-delict? YES, quasi-
delict. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.
RULING:
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for
homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon Dulay.
However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on
the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a
quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence.
What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's
cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. An
examination of the complaint in the present case would show
that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invoking their right to
recover damages against the private respondents for their
vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code
to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched
is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed
with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill, this Court
already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, xxx Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent
acts which may be punishable by law.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also
acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore
erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's
complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the
complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part
of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD
and/or SAFEGUARD. This does not operate however, to
establish that the defendants below are liable. xxx whether the
private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and
whether the defendants are actually liable, are questions which
can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party
can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and
defenses.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals as well
as the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated April 13, 1989 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751
is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the
merits. This decision is immediately executory.
7. Garcia vs. Florido (1973)
G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
Garcia vs. Judge Florido
Petitioners: German, Luminosa, and Ester Garcia
Respondents: Judge Florido (CFI),
- PU Car: Marcelino Inesin (owner), Richard Vayson
(driver)
- Passenger Bus: Mactan Transit Co., Inc. (owner),
Pedro Tumala (driver)
FACTS:
Petitioners hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by
Respondent to attend a conference. While the PU car was
negotiating a slight curve on the national highway, said car
collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated
by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro
Tumala. As a result, petitioners sustained various physical
injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and
hospitalization.
Petitioners filed before CFI an action for damages against the
respondents alleging that both were at the time of the accident
violating traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a
fast clip driving their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a
reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross
violation of traffic rules.

Inesin & Vayson: by way of defense, alleged that accident was
due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver
operating at an excessive speed
Respondents Mactan & Tumala: filed Motion to Dismiss  no
cause of action because the Chief of Police instituted a
criminal action for "double serious and less serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence” was charged, and no civil
action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal
case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule
111
Petitioners: filed Opposition  aforesaid action for damages
was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the
respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code but
for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles
2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime
CFI: Sustained Respondent’s arguments  that whether or
not "the action for damages is based on criminal negligence or
civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code there
"should be a showing that the offended party expressly
waived the civil action or reserved his right to institute it
separately"
Petitioners filed MR  Denied
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
MAIN ISSUE:
WON the petitioner enforced the civil liability of the
respondents on quasi-delicts and not under Art. 100 of the
RPC? Yes, it is civil liability on quasi-delicts.
RULING:
From a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the
complaint xxx, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual
action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are
present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of
the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents
violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a
fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner
in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of
the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the
nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa
aquiliana.
The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury
on petitioners.
Certainly, excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear
indication of negligence.
Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court xxx and
the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments
on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially
be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent
act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code.
xxx
OTHER ISSUE: WON petitioners abandoned their right to press
recovery for damages in the criminal case and have opted
instead to recover them in the present civil case? YES, thus the
action for civil liability arising from quasi-delict is separate from
the criminal.
RULING:
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1,
1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177
of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate
and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said
party has reserved his right to institute it separately xxx
Petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less
has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction
or acquittal of said accused. It is, therefore, evident that by the
institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners
have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for
damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover
them in the present civil case. As a result of this action of
petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the
former has ceased to be involved in the criminal action.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are
hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is directed
to proceed with the trial of the case.
8. Andamo vs. IAC (1990)
Facts:
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus contending that
the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case filed against the private respondent Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette, Inc. since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the
owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite
which is adjacent to that of private respondent.
Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and
contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
which allegedly inundated (flooded) and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
Petitioners instituted a criminal action before the RTC against
the respondent’s officers for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently,
petitioners filed another civil case for damages with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same
court.
The trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending
further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the
related criminal case.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss, the trial
court issued the disputed order dismissing the civil case for lack
of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead
of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was anchored
on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court
which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Respondent Appellate Court affirmed the questioned order of
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent corporation can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
Ruling:
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting
the cause of action.
A careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint shows that
the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner
of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM
NON LAEDAS.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person
for damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or
negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers
not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing
provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which
is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...
The assailed decision the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming
the order of dismissal of the RTC is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
9. Tayag vs. Alcantara (1980)
FACTS:
* Petitioners
- filed with the CFI of Tarlac, presided over by the respondent
Judge, a complaint for damages against the private
respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa
y Cunanan.
- alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2,
1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along
MacArthur Highway in Tarlac on his way home, he was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo
Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused
his instantaneous death.
* Private respondents- the hearing was suspended due to
their filing of a motion to suspend the trial, on the ground
that the criminal case against the driver of the bus Romeo
 Villa was still pending in said court.
* Respondent Judge- rendered a decision in the criminal
case, acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of
homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
* Private respondents- filed a motion to dismiss the Civil
Case on the ground that the petitioners have no cause of
action against them, the driver of the bus having been
acquitted in the criminal action.
* Petitioners- opposed the motion alleging that their cause of
action is not based on crime but on quasi delict.
* Respondent Judge- issued an order dismissing the
complaint.
* Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the Civil Case.
RULING:
* The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code
provides as follows: "Art. 31. When the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter."
* The civil action referred to is based on an obligation arising
from other sources, like quasi delict.
* All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are
present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence
on the part of private
respondents;
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the
act or omission; and
(4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties.
* Elcano vs. Hill- the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e), Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused
* The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-delict,
the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of
the crime charged in the Criminal Case is not a bar to the
prosecution of the Civil Case for damages based on quasi-
delict.
* We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the
Civil Case.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be set aside, and
the case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
D. Includes Breaches of Contract in Some Cases
10. Air France vs. Carrascoso (1966)
FACTS:
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdeson March 30,
1958. Air France issued a “first class” round trip ticket
from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, passenger
Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager
of Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat because
a white man had a better right to it. The purser wrote in his
record book “First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and the captain refused to
intervene” which was written in French. Petitioner contends
that damages must be averred that there was fraud and bad
faith in order that claim for damages should set in.
ISSUE:
Whether or not passenger Carrascoso was entitled to
damages.
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad
faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will
or for ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the
Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
"contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the
act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress
of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper. .
 accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent
11. American Express International vs. Cordero (2005) is the true holder of the card. No negligence which breaches the
FACTS: contract can be attributed to the petitioner. The cause of
respondent;s humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to
 Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge talk to petitioners respresentative
card to its customers, which the latter then use to
purchase goods and services at accredited merchants
worldwide, E. Proscription Against Double Recovery (Art. 2177)
 Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent, applied for and was Responsibility for fraud or negligence under the preceding
issued an American Express card wherein Nilda article
manifested her acceptance on the terms of the Is entirely separate and distinct
Agreement. From the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code.
 An extension card was issued to respondent Noel
which he also signed. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
 Respondent with his family went to a three-day For the same act or omission of the defendant.
vacation in Hongkong. They went to Watsons Chemist
Shop and picked up some goods. He handed to the 12. Elcano vs. Hill (Supra)
sales clerk his extension card to pay for the purchases.
 The store manager informed respondent that she had
to confiscate his card and thereafter cut the card in half.
 The incident caused respondent embarrassment and
humiliation.
 It was later on found out that a person in Hongkong
attempted to use a charge card with the same number
as respondents card. That when petitioner’s
representative from Hongkong office wanted to talk to
respondent in order to verify respondent’s identity, the
latter refused.
 Respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioner American International Inc.
 RTC ruled in favor of respondent Cordero and found
that the inexcusable failure of the petitioner to inform
Cordero regarding the incident wherein his card
number was used by another. Court of Appeals
affirmed trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner American International Inc.

was negligent and should be held liable.

HELD:

No. Petitioner was not negligent.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may

arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action
for quasi-delict notwithstanding that there is a subsisting
contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.
When an act constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract
can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the
rules on tort to apply. To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or
negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury
suffered by the plaintiff.

As explained by the respondent himself, he could have

used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that
indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been