OPLE VS.

TORRES
G.R. No. 127685
July 23, 1998

Facts: On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued A.O. No. 308 providing for a
national computerized identification system with the objective of providing the Filipino citizens and
foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities. It was published in four newspapers of
general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. Senator Blas Ople , the petitioner,
immediately filed a case pursuing to declare such action unconstitutional, claiming that A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate and that the implementation of A.O. No. 308
insidiously lays the groundwork for a system which will violate the right to privacy as enshrined in
the Bill of Rights.

Issue:
Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
RULING:

YES.” It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified
purposes.The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may
also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded.They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.”

Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.

CHAVEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 162777
August 31, 2004
Before filing his candidacy, the petitioner was contracted to be the model of
certain brands by which he appeared on billboards. On December 30, 2003, petitioner filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. However, on January 6, 2004, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 6520 which contained Section 32. This particular section states that all propaganda
materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the
picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing
the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station,
print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules;
otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have
conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
petitioner asked the COMELEC that he be exempted from the application of Section 32, considering
that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia
for premature campaigning under the rules. The COMELEC answered petitioners request by issuing
another letter, dated February 27, 2004, wherein it ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the
billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner Chavez urges the Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is
allegedly a gross violation of the non-impairment clause, an invalid exercise of police power, in the
nature of an ex-post facto law, contrary to the Fair Elections Act and invalid due to overbreadth.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is an invalid exercise of police power

HELD:
Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is not an invalid exercise of police power. To determine
if there is a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful subject and lawful means. A close
examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature
campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation
between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other,
by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their
resources and popularity.
The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and
poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign
war chests. This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency in a country
which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution between the economic
elite and the rest of society, and by the prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling
below the poverty line.
The petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is declared valid and
constitutional.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. V. JAC LINER, INC.
452 SCRA 174

FACTS:
City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 were enacted with the objective of easing the traffic congestion said
to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within
the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct,
finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. On the other hand , City Ordinance 1778 removes all the impermanent terminals in the City of
Lucena the right to operate. Because of this, the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within
Lucena are prohibited except the operations of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The RTC of
Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid exercise of police power whereas City Ordinance 1778
was declared as null and void for being invalid. The petitioner via petition for review, wanted the
wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the city ordinance

HELD:

No. The City of Lucena has not properly exercised its police power when it enacted the city ordinance.
In order that the City of Lucena be considered as having properly exercised its police power, the
ordinance enacted must have a lawful subject and a lawful means . In the present case, the objective of
the ordinance is to ease the traffic congestion in the city which obviously involves public interest.
Therefore, the first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is present. However the means
employed to achieve its professed objectives were oppressive upon individuals because it goes beyond
what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problems. Moreover, since the compulsory use of the
terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate courts.

The petition is denied.

.
City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio
G.R. No. 118127

FACTS:
The respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) built and opened Victoria Court in
Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
hotel. On March 30, 1993, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance prohibiting the
establishment businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the
inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance
prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs,
day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given
three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert
said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently. Because of this , the respondent filed a petition with the lower court, praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared
invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police
power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed
Decision (in favour of respondent) The case was elevated to SC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the ordinance meet the valid exercise of police power
2. Whether or not the modality employed constitutes unlawful taking
3. Whether or not the ordinance violates the equal protection clause

HELD:
1. The ordinance did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the
exercise of police power there must be a lawful subject and lawful means. The objective of the
ordinance was to promote and protect the social and moral values of the community. The
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the
ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the
community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the
spread of sexual disease in Manila.

2. The method employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive as it significantly deprives the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
ordinance prevents running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs
owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert
said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be
recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative
of the private property rights of individuals.

3. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and
 responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so
as to give undue favor to some. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By
definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other
services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic
for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.