Tauniño Jillandro G.

Neri

1.) Pavia vs. Ugarte 5 Phil 176

Facts:

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde
asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased. The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then
the only claimant to the estate, having been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at
the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901, without
prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. In the month of December, 1904,
however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon
Iturralde y Gonzalez, and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared the lawful heir
of the deceased — a fact which this new relative did notdeny — be required to render an account of the property of the estate.

PETITIONER'S CONTENTION:

What she claims is that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana Iturralde y
Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through her father, Pablo Linart, by representation — that
is to say, that even though a grandniece, she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte
y Iturralde.

COURT'S DECISION:

The court below held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to.

Issue:

WON herein petitioner is entitled to represent his father Pablo Linart and is entitled to half of the estate of the deceased.

Ruling:

NO.

The error which the appellant claims was committed in the court below is very clearly shown. The court below
held that the grandniece was entitled to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of
law, the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the
intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but
the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her father,
Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana
Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her
father's. It is not an error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include "grandchildren." There is
no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31, 1895, relied upon, are not
applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In
both cases, and in many others decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a
testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should pass to their children, it was held
that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not,
properly speaking, inherit by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the natural and
regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also pointed out in the first decision, "the fact
that it was stated with more or less correctness in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based upon the right of
representation, is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will." The difference
is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into consideration and give force to the intention of
the testator when he substitutes the children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered

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as included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate successions, reference should
only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do
not obtain beyond the sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate with a niece
in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral
line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have
been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.The court ordered the record be
remanded to the court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the said judgment.

2.) Salao vs. Salao 70 SCRA 65

Table 1. Properties of Valentina Ignacio upon her death on 1914.
(1) One-half interest in a fishpond which she had inherited from her parents,
Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza, and the other half of which was
owned by her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 21,700
(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,418
(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,989 (VALENTIN)
(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,469 (VALENTIN)
(5) Fishpond with an area of one hectare, 12 ares and 5 centares purchased
from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by Valentina Ignacio on November 9,
1895 with a bodega for salt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 11,205
(6) Fishpond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000
(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with a total area of 10,424 square meters,
the other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,217
(8) Riceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,454
(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January

Upon the death of Valentina Ignacio, her heirs, their three children and 1 grandson her property. Prior to Valentina’s
death, her children Ambrosia and Juan Sr. secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their
names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran and they exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion
of their nephew, Valentin Salao. Later, Ambrosia and Juan Sr., acquired that Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became
Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. Said Calunaran and Lewa fish ponds
are the bone of contention in this case.

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's death on
September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso
share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living with Juani's family.
He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr.
(Banli) The deed of denotion included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct
over the said properties during her lifetime.

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951 informed Juan S.
Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he
refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not have any interest in the
two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in
1911 and 1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share.

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in
the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the
annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's
supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

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 Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his father and
aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting
to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has
been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was
substituted by his widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate. In the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal
shares with the condition that the properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this case. The trial
court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the
Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio
existed among her heir after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted
up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

Issues:

Whether or not plaintiffs (Benita and heirs of Victorina) have successional rights over Ambrosia’s share.

Ruling:

Succession: Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to Ambrosia's share.
The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living
in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line,
representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972,
Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs.
Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

3.) Lauro Visconde vs. CA Gr. No. 1188449

CHARACTERS:

PETITIONER LAURO G. VIZCONDE and his wife ESTRELLITA NICOLAS-VIZCONDE had two
children, viz., CARMELA AND JENNIFER.

SPOUSES RAFAEL NICOLAS AND SALUD GONZALES-NICOLAS (parents of Estrellita).

The other children of Rafael and Salud are:

o Antonio Nicolas;

o Ramon Nicolas;

o Teresita Nicolas de Leon;

o Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent; and

o Antonio predeceased his parents and is now survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four
children.

Facts:

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter
Valenzuela property) for P135,000.00, evidenced by a Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupana Nasasakupan ng Titulo
TCT NO. T-36734. On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property for P3,405,612.00. In June of the same
year, Estrellita bought a parcel of land with improvements situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Paranaque (hereafter
Paranaque property) using a portion of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a bank.

The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner’s life occurred. Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela
and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991. Petitioner entered into an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver of Shares, with Rafael and Salud . The extra-judicial settlement provided for the
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division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The
settlement gave 50% of the total amount of the bank deposits of Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Saving
Account No. 104-111211-0 under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other 50% was allotted to
petitioner. The Paranaque property and the car were also given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their claims,
rights, ownership and participation as heirs in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafaels estate, Teresita instituted an intestate estate proceeding
listing as heirs Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be appointed
Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate and sought to be appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and
Ricardo, her incompetent brother. Private respondent Ramon filed an opposition praying to be appointed instead as Salud
and Ricardos guardian. Ramon filed another opposition alleging, among others, that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not less P6,000,000.00 before her gruesome murder. On May
12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition entitled In Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and Ricardo G. Nicolas
and averred that their legitime should come from the collation of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael
during his lifetime. Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafaels children by right of representation as the
widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita.

The RTC appointed Ramon as the Guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the
Special Administratrix of Rafaels estate. The courts Order did not include petitioner in the slate of Rafaels heirs. Neither
was the Paranaque property listed in its list of properties to be included in the estate. Subsequently, the RTC in an Order
dated January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardos guardian for selling his wards property without the courts
knowledge and permission. Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner ten (10) days
to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the pending petition. In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated
January 19, 1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest
to participate in the proceedings. Despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion moved to include petitioner in the
intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Paranaque property, as well as the car and the balance of the proceeds
of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated. Acting on Ramons motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted
the same.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court of Appeals. In its decision respondent
Court of Appeals denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated the question on the title of the Valenzuela
property as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized
powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly sustained the Order of the Probate Court. (NO!)

Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate estate proceeding regarding Rafael’s estate is proper.
(NO!)

Ruling:

No. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. The probate court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals,
committed reversible errors:

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-
in-law of Rafael, is one of Rafael’s compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
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In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The father or mother of illegitimate children of the
three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code. With respect
to Rafael’s estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or
a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or
allowed to intervene as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation.

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or may
not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final decision
in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went beyond the scope
of its jurisdiction when it proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael and
Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the concerned parties was gratuitous. The
interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of
consideration, are matter outside the probate court’s jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated in an appropriate
action

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Paranaque property to collation is premature. Records indicate that
the intestate estate proceedings is still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitimate of any
of Rafael’s heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the probate court, nonetheless, made a
reversible error in ordering collation of the Paranaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of
a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Paranaque property which Estrellita acquired by using the proceeds of
the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed collation of the
Paranaque property has no statutory basis. The order of the probate court presupposes that the Paranaque property was
gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records indicate, however, that the Paranaque property was conveyed for
and in consideration of P900,000.00,[37] by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the decedent, has no participation
therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the Paranaque property is not one of Rafael’s
heirs. Thus, the probate courts order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged
with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael’s estate. As it stands,
collation of the Paranaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties gratuitously given
by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the
Paraaque property. Moreover, Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heir[38] in the Paranaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela property may be brought to
collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an
amount more than the value of the Valenzuela property. [39] Hence, even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be
collated collation may not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael. Therefore, any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding purpose.

The content of the Order: The centerpoint of oppositor-applicants argument is that spouses Vizconde were then
financially incapable of having purchased or acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from the
deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the
latters ancestral home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased
Rafael Nicolas. And LauroVizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the family for some time and
returned to the Philippines only after the occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially incapable to buy the property from the late
Rafael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture such as taxi business, canteen
concessions and garment manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted to indubitably support
the business undertakings adverted to. In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of the property
from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration. Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of
Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in Paranaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of
the said transfer of property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of Estrellita, is subject to collation.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

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 4.) Diaz vs. Pamuti Gr. No. 66574
Facts:

The respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in Sp.
Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona PamutiVda. De Santero," praying
among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed
as special Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together
with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died
during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. deSantero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda.
De Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to
wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti
Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:
a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;
b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;
c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona
Pamuti Vda. De Santero;
d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero.

Issue:

Whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child
of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero.

Who are the legal heirs of Simona PamutiVda. deSantero — her niece FelisaPamutiJardin or her grandchildren (the
natural children of Pablo Santero)

Ruling:

Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero, who is
the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads
as follows: ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child. (943a) Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors
(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother
of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Art. 992, between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
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and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is
in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources
of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of
the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor
natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992,
the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero.

5.) Santillon v. Miranda (1965)

Petitioners: Intestate Estate of Pedro Santillon, Claro Santillon
Respondents: Perfecta Miranda

DOCTRINE: When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

FACTS: son vs mother- after deducting conjugal share, son claims ¾ from the remaining 1/2; while mother
claims ½ of the remaining ½.

1. Pedro Santillon died without a will, leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and one son, Claro.

2. 4 years after Pedro’s death, Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was opposed by his mother
and spouses Benito Miranda and Rosario Corrales.

3. Upon partition, Claro filed a motion to declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties
invoking Art.892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting ½ from the conjugal properties (conjugal
share of Perfecta), the remaining ½ must be divided as follows: ¼ for her and ¾ for him.
a. Perfecta (mother) claimed besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to
another ½ of the remaining half.
4. Court: Perfecta correct.

ISSUE: WON Art. 892 or Art. 996 applies.

RULING + RATIO: Art. 996 applies.

1. Article 996 specifically applies to intestate succession while Art. 892 which is found in the chapter of
testamentary succession, applies to such type of succession.
2. Surviving spouse concurring with a legitimate child entitled to one-half of the intestate estate.
a. When an intestacy occurs, a surviving spouse concurring with only one legitimate child of the
deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Art. 996 of the Civil Code.

DISPOSITION: The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

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 6.) Suarez vs. CA Gr. No. 94918
Principle/Doctrine: The legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary
interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother.
Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own righta as children
of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interests.

Facts:

Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several
valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed
mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages, and
were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch 151, RTC of Pasig) to pay,
jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory,
five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be millions then) were levied and sold on execution
on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private
respondents were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action
2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for
the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they
alleged, among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable
therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners
and registered in the name of petitioner’s deceased father.

Ruling:

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case.
"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Article 888 further
provides: "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the
father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided." Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides: "If there are two
or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants." Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is
equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is
different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their
mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any
way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their own interests.

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 7.) Rodriguez vs. Ravilan 17 Phil 623
Facts:

Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written
amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of their daughters
Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that
many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs,
Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that,
although five of them divided among themselves the said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo
and several carabaos, the legal portions which pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
remained undivided, and these latter continued to possess, in common, the property that fell to their shares, and
were also associated in business separately from their other coheirs.

The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by Espiridion Barte, in common accord with the others,
and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the part that pertained to him passed to his brother Pedro
and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the
said brother and sisters continued their partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator;
that during the latter's administration, Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by
his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the
name of their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902,
to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on the
pretext that, as the administratix of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having been settled, as admitted by
the defendant herself, the latter was requested to present the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and that
she continued in the possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or intervention
of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea Barte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named
Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the property in question, which should be
divided among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the
other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

Issue:

Whether or not partition should be granted.

Ruling:

No. Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate with others,
in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in the manner hereinafter
prescribed." Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition shall set forth
the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of the real estate of which partition
is demanded, and name each tenant in common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as defendants."

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a co-proprietor or co-
owner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son
of Matea Barte, through his representative, aver that they are the co-owners of the said Mandaue lands of others
situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles which establish
the common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party,
representing the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are all co-owners or co-
proprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of common ownership need not be gone into
at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner, and in what proportion the said property of common
ownership shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of court.
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 Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the hereditary succession
of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no legitimate descendants at his death, should be divided among
his eight brothers and sisters who may have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his
deceased brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according
to the provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes: "Should brothers
survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per
stirpes," representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.

The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if she did not, her collateral
relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law. It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by
the four brothers and sisters cannot affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased
predecessor in interest successions. For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be denied

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