PIL0015 Introduction to Law Chapter 4

Faculty of Law
(FOL)

PIL 0012
Introduction to Law

Foundation in Law

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Chapter 4

CASE LAW TECHNIQUE

CASE LAW TECHNIQUE

What to look for in reading a case?

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In reading a case, find and articulate the following elements:

1- The substantive facts

The substantive facts are the who, what, where and when of the case.

They are the really significant facts that make the case unique.
• The facts are what limit the court’s inquiry.

• The court frames the issues using these facts and its holding will be
limited to these facts.

• The substantive facts are a critical part of the holding.

• Slight differences in the facts can make the difference between a holding
for one party or the other.

• If a robber in a hypothetical case had threatened an old man with a pocket

knife, a butter knife or a plastic knife, would the holding be the same?

2- Issues to be tried / issues of the case

• The trial is framed in terms of legal questions, called issues, which the
court must answer in order to decide a particular case.

3 - Rule (s) or principle (s) of the case

• The rules used by the courts come from both the statutes and previous
cases as discuss in the doctrine of stare decisis .

• Often the rules come from both sources:

i- a statute will provide the basic rule;

ii- which is then explained by the case.

• In either situation, once a court has a case involving the same or similar issue and
similar facts, it must abstract a general rule from that case, and then apply the
general rule to the pending case. (precedent when material fact are similar)

• However, this principle of stare decisis does not apply when the decision was
given per incuriam,(failed to refer previous case) where the court had failed to
take into account relevant legal principles or statute.

The following armed robbery in a hypothetical case illustrates the process:

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A jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery. He has appealed against the
conviction and claims that although ++it may have been robbery, it was not armed
robbery as he was not armed. The Defendant robbed an old woman by threatening her
with a blade knife.

In trying to decide the issue, the court will look into the earlier cases to see what
constitutes being “armed”.

Assume that one obvious precedent involved a defendant who was armed with a
pistol. The defendant in the precedent case put the victim in fear of his life.

The court in the pending case will consider whether a victim could be put in fear
of his life by a robber with a switch blade knife.

• The general rule is used to access the specific facts of the case.

• If the case is a case of first impression(precedent), that is, the first case of its
kind, the lawyers and court may look for similar cases in a different factual
context.

4 – The reasoning of the judge / ratio decidendi

• The reasoning is an important part of the case particularly if the lawyer is asking
the court to draw an analogy from another area of law to decide a case of first
impression.

• The reasoning is useful in order to understand the reason behind the decision and
it can be useful in persuading a later court to decide an analogous case.

5 – Policy

• Although not every opinion will contain policy(prinsip), in many cases the court
will explain how its decision is consistent with public policy.

• This is particularly true when the court is expanding a previous rule, drawing an
analogy from another area of law, or deciding a case of first impression.

• When the law is settled and this type of case is common, the court will rarely
explain the public policy behind its decision.

• Public policy appears particularly in two kind of cases.

i- Courts will explain the public policy behind their decisions when they
want to discourage socially detrimental behaviour.

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ii- Courts will often explain that their holdings are consistent with public
policy when they want to encourage socially desirable behaviour.

• If armed robbery in a previous hypothetical case carries a mandatory sentence

twice that for unarmed robbery, the court might explain that it is expanding the
definition of an unarmed robber to include those with knives as wells as pistols to
discourage the use of knives.

6 – Obiter Dictum

• Dictum meaning clearly extraneous, is a part of the court’s opinion that is

necessary to decide the case.

• Dictum does not carry the weight of a holding.

A holding requires 2 steps:

i- The issue must be fully argued by all sides to the dispute.

ii-The court must consider the issue carefully in the light of the arguments.

• Dictum is not the result of this adversary process.

• When it is unnecessary to the decision of the case, it may not have been either
fully argued by the opposing counsel or fully considered by the court.

• Even if one of the two steps is present, the result is still dictum.

• Sometimes, dictum is easy to find.

• The court may say, if the facts had been ‘x’ instead of ‘y’, we might have held ‘b’,
but because the facts were ‘y’ we hold ‘a’.

• This type of dictum is useful for the attorney with a case with ‘x’ facts, because it
helps the lawyer predict the outcome of his case.

• The more time that has passed between the opinion and his case , however, the
less valuable the dictum becomes.

• The conditions may have changed and the judges who agreed with the dictum
may have retired.

• When a lawyer has no precedent, dictum is helpful in trying to argue the case for
his client.

• Occasionally, the court makes a statement deciding the rights of someone who is
not a party to the case.

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• This statement is also dictum because the views of the absent party were not part
of either the argument or the decision process.

UNDERSTANDING CASE LAW

Parties involve, Name of the courts involve, Name of the judge, Date
(Judgment/filed), Suit No, Catchwords, Head notes, Cases also cited, Cases referred
to, Legislation referred to, Name of the Solicitors firm, Judgment in full (leading
Judgment), Judgment Accordingly, Cur. Adv. Vult. (c.a.v)

E.g:

TAI CHOI YU V GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA & ORS

[1994] 1 MLJ 677

CIVIL APPEAL NO 01-17-93

SUPREME COURT (KOTA KINABALU)

DECIDED-DATE-1: 15 FEBRUARY 1994

ABDUL HAMID OMAR LP, EUSOFF CHIN AND MOHAMED DZAIDDIN SCJJ

CATCHWORDS:
Revenue Law - Income tax - Power of Director General to issue certificate under s
104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 to prevent taxpayer from leaving Malaysia until tax
settled - Whether Director General of Inland Revenue bound to hear taxpayer before
issuing certificate – Income Tax Act 1967 s 104

Revenue Law - Income tax - Power of Director General to issue certificate under s
104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 to prevent taxpayer from leaving Malaysia until tax
settled - Notice of issue of certificate served on taxpayer three years after certificate
issued - Whether certificate was null and void because of delay - Income Tax Act
1967 ss 104(5) & 115

Revenue Law - Income tax - Power of Director General to issue certificate under s
104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 to prevent taxpayer from leaving Malaysia until tax
settled - Whether certificate under s 104(1) could only be issued where taxpayer was
about to leave Malaysia permanently - Income Tax Act 1967 s 104

Words and Phrases - 'Convenient speed' - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 54(2)

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HEADNOTES:
The appellant owed the Inland Revenue Department the sum of RM239,332.64 in
income taxes. On 27 June 1988, the Director General of Inland Revenue ('the DGIR')
issued a certificate under s 104(1) of the Income Tax Act 1967 ('the Act') to the
Director of Immigration requesting the latter to take action to prevent the appellant
from leaving Malaysia until he had settled the tax. The certificate was not enforced
immediately as the appellant was allowed to travel overseas until 20 April 1990. On
that date, the appellant applied for the renewal of his passport and was informed of
the certificate issued by the DGIR.

On 23 April 1991, the appellant commenced an action in the High Court at Miri for a
declaration that the certificate issued by the DGIR to the Director of Immigration was
null and void as it was made contrary to s 104 of the Act, mala fide and against
established principles of natural justice. The appellant argued that the words 'leaving
Malaysia' in s 104(1) of the Act must be interpreted to mean leaving Malaysia
permanently. The application was dismissed in the High Court and the appellant
appealed. The main issue in this appeal was whether the certificate issued by the
DGIR under s 104(1) of the Act was valid because: (i) the DGIR did not give the
appellant the right to be heard before making a decision to issue the certificate; and
(ii) the notice of the issue of the certificate was only served on the appellant on 16
May 1991.

[*678] Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) The words 'leaving Malaysia' used in s 104(1) of the Act are plain and
clear and it was not appropriate to read the word 'permanently' into the
section. The evidence showed that between June 1988 and April 1990, the
appellant travelled extensively overseas and stayed longer in foreign lands
than in Malaysia. In the circumstances, the DGIR was justified in forming the
opinion that the appellant would leave the country without settling his tax.
(2) The DGIR was not required to give notice and hear the appellant under
s 104(1) of the Act before making his decision to issue the certificate. If a
notice to show cause was issued to the appellant, it would only serve as a
warning of the action to be taken against him and afford him the opportunity
to leave the country before the certificate can be issued.
(3) The delay in the service of notice was not fatal so as to render the
certificate null and void. To hold otherwise could only defeat the object and
purpose of s 104 of the Act and create inconvenience in the implementation of
the section. As the certificate was lawfully issued by the DGIR, the
appellant's application failed under s 104(5) of the Act.
(4) 'Convenient speed' means reasonable time within which an act has to be
done, but always having regard to the facts and peculiar circumstances of
each case.

Bahasa Malaysia summary

Perayu berhutang sebanyak RM239,332.64 kepada Jabatan Hasil Dalam Negeri

sebagai cukai pendapatan. Pada 27 Jun 1988, Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri ('PHDN')

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telah mengeluarkan suatu sijil di bawah s 104(1) Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967 ('Akta
itu') kepada Pengarah Imigresen meminta supaya beliau mengambil langkah untuk
menghalang perayu daripada meninggalkan Malaysia sehingga perayu membayar
cukainya. Sijil itu tidak dikuatkuasakan dengan segera kerana perayu telah
dibenarkan mengunjung ke luar negeri sehingga 20 April 1990. Pada tarikh itu,
perayu telah memohon untuk memperbaharui pasportnya dan beliau telah diberitahu
mengenai sijil yang telah dikeluarkan oleh PHDN.

Pada 23 April 1991, perayu telah memulakan suatu tindakan di Mahkamah Tinggi
Miri untuk suatu deklarasi bahawa sijil yang telah dikeluarkan oleh PHDN kepada
Pengarah Imigresen batal dan tidak sah kerana ia dibuat bertentangan dengan s 104
Akta itu, mala fide dan tidak mengikut prinsip keadilan asasi yang mantap. Perayu
berhujah bahawa perkataan 'meninggalkan Malaysia' di dalam s 104(1) Akta itu
mesti ditafsirkan supaya bermakna meninggalkan Malaysia untuk selama-lamanya.
Permohonan itu telah ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dan perayu telah membuat
rayuan. Isu utama di dalam rayuan ini adalah sama ada sijil yang telah dikeluarkan
oleh PHDN di bawah s 104(1) Akta itu sah kerana: (i) PHDN tidak memberi perayu
peluang [*679] untuk didengar sebelum membuat keputusan untuk mengeluarkan
sijil itu; dan (ii) notis tentang pengeluaran sijil itu hanya disampaikan atas perayu
pada 16 May 1991.

Diputuskan, menolak rayuan itu:

(1) Perkataan 'meninggalkan Malaysia' yang digunakan di dalam s 104(1)

Akta itu adalah jelas dan nyata dan tidak sesuai untuk membaca perkataan
'selama-lamanya' ke dalam seksyen itu. Keterangan menunjukkan bahawa di
antara Jun 1988 dan April 1990, perayu sering mengunjung ke luar negara dan
telah tinggal lebih lama di negara asing daripada di Malaysia. Dalam keadaan
ini, PHDN mempunyai justifikasi apabila beliau berpendapat bahawa perayu akan
meninggalkan negara ini tanpa membayar cukainya.

(2) PHDN tidak dikehendaki memberi notis dan mendengar perayu di bawah s
104(1) Akta itu sebelum membuat keputusannya untuk mengeluarkan sijil itu.
Jika suatu notis untuk menunjukkan kausa dikeluarkan kepada perayu, ia hanya
akan memberi suatu amaran tentang tindakan yang akan diambil terhadapnya dan
memberi peluang kepadanya untuk meninggalkan negara ini sebelum sijil itu
boleh dikeluarkan.

(3) Kelengahan menyampaikan notis itu tidak menjadikan sijil itu batal dan
tidak sah. Keputusan sebaliknya akan hanya mengecewakan objektif dan tujuan s
104 Akta itu dan mewujudkan kesulitan dalam pelaksanaan seksyen itu. Oleh
kerana sijil itu telah dikeluarkan secara sah oleh PHDN, permohonan perayu
gagal di bawah s 104(5) Akta itu.

(4) 'Kecepatan yang sesuai' bermakna masa yang munasabah dalam mana
sesuatu tindakan mesti dilakukan, dengan mempertimbangkan fakta dan keadaan
tertentu setiap kes.]

Cases referred to:

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S Kulasingam & Anor v Commissioner of Lands Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ
204

Legislation referred to:

Income Tax Act 1967 ss 104, 115

Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 54(2)

Originating Summons No MR17 of 1991 (High Court, Miri)

Appellant in person.

Abd Karim bin Jalil (Noorbahri bin Baharuddin with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) for
the respondents.

APP FROM: Originating Summons No MR17 of 1991 (High Court, Miri)

LAWYERS: Appellant in person.

Abd Karim bin Jalil (Noorbahri bin Baharuddin with him) (Senior Federal Counsel) for
the respondents. [*680]

JUDGMENT BY: EUSOFF CHIN SCJ(DELIVERING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT)

The High Court at Miri had under s 106 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (hereinafter 'the
Act') adjudged a sum of RM231,016.95 as income tax due and payable by the
appellant to the Director General of Inland Revenue, the second respondent
(hereinafter 'the DGIR'). Subsequently, additional assessment was computed making
the total tax due and payable to be RM246,482.39. The appellant made a few
payments, leaving a sum of RM239,332.64 as still outstanding.

The DGIR, on 27 June 1988, issued a certificate under s 104(1) of the Act to the
Director of Immigration requesting the latter to take action to prevent the
respondent from leaving Malaysia until he had settled the tax. The certificate was not
enforced immediately because the respondent was allowed to travel overseas until
20 April 1990.

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The appellant had a valid passport which was due to expire on 9 September 1990.
Because he often travelled out of Malaysia the pages in his passport had been fully
used up. On 20 April 1990, he applied for the renewal of his passport. On 22 April
1990, upon inquiry made by the appellant on the position of the renewal of his
passport, he was told by an immigration officer at Miri that the DGIR had issued a
certificate under s 104(1) of the Act, whereupon the appellant began negotiating
with officers of the DGIR on the settlement of the unpaid tax. On 29 August 1990,
the appellant agreed to pay RM5,000 per month towards the outstanding tax
provided that he was issued a new passport. The DGIR informed the appellant that
the certificate would be revoked only if the appellant furnished security under s
104(4)(a) of the Act in the form of a bank guarantee for the amount of tax still
outstanding. The revocation of the certificate would remove the obstacle so as to
enable the Immigration Department to consider and issue to the appellant a new
passport. No evidence was adduced to confirm that the appellant had furnished the
required bank guarantee.

It was seven months later, ie on 23 April 1991, that the appellant commenced an
action in the High Court at Miri for a declaration that the certificate issued by the
DGIR to the Director of Immigration dated 27 January 1988 was null and void as it
was made contrary to s 104 of the Act, mala fide and against established principles
of natural justice; and consequently the Director of Immigration should not have
acted on the certificate.

On 6 March 1993, the High Court at Miri dismissed the appellant's application with
costs. Hence this appeal.

Before us, the main issue is whether the certificate issued by the DGIR on 27 June
1988 to the Director of Immigration under s 104(1) of the Act was valid because the
DGIR did not give the appellant the right to be heard, before making a decision to
issue the certificate, and had served a notice of the issue of the certificate to the
appellant very late, on 16 May 1991. For convenience, we quote the relevant
provisions of s 104:

Recovery from persons leaving Malaysia.

(1) The Director General, where he is of the opinion that any person
is about or likely to leave Malaysia without paying --

[*681] (a) all tax payable by him (whether or not due or due and payable);
(b) all sums payable by him under section 103(4), (5) or (5A); and
(c) all debts payable by him under section 107A(2) or 109(2) or
109B(2),
may issue to any Commissioner of Police or Director of
Immigration a certificate containing particulars of the tax, sums
and debts so payable with a request for that person to be
prevented from leaving Malaysia unless and until he pays all the
tax, sums and debts so payable or furnishes security to the
satisfaction of the Director General for their payment.
(2) Subject to any order issued or made under any written law
relating to banishment or immigration, any Commissioner of Police

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or Director of Immigration who receives a request under

subsection (1) in respect of any person shall take or cause to be
taken all such measures (including the use of reasonable force
and the seizure, removal or retention of any certificate of
identity and any passport, exit permit or other travel document
relating to that person) as may be necessary to give effect to it.
(3) The Director General shall cause notice of the issue of a
certificate under subsection (1) to be served personally or by
registered post on the person to whom the certificate relates:
Provided that the non-receipt of the notice by that person shall
not invalidate anything done under this section.
(4) Where a person in respect of whom a certificate has been issued
under subsection (1) –

(a) produces a written statement signed on or after the date of the

certificate by the Director General or an authorized officer to
the effect that all the tax, sums and debts specified in the
certificate have been paid or that security has been furnished
for their payment; or

(b) pays all the tax, sums and debts specified in the certificate to
the officer in charge of a police station or to an immigration
officer,

the statement or the payment, as the case may be, shall be

sufficient authority for allowing that person to leave Malaysia.
(Emphasis added.)

We also quote the contents of the certificate issued by the DGIR to the Director of
Immigration:
Sijil cukai terhutang

(Certificate of tax in default)

di bawah s 104 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967

(under s 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967)

Nama: Tai Choi Yu

No kad pengenalan: K641851

Tarikh lahir: 13 Februari 1947

Saya sahkan di sini bahawa pembayar cukai yang bernama di atas masih
lagi berhutang kepada Jabatan ini sebanyak RM239,332.64 (Ringgit: Dua
ratus tiga puluh sembilan ribu tiga ratus tiga puluh dua dan sen enam
puluh empat sahaja) bagi cukai tahun taksiran 1979 (Tambahan), 1981
(Tambahan), 1982, 1983, 1984 (Tambahan), 1986 dan 1987.

Pada pendapat saya bahawa penama di atas akan atau berkemungkinan

meninggalkan Malaysia tanpa membayar cukai tersebut.

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Menurut s 104 Akta Cukai Pendapatan 1967, saya memohon pihak tuan untuk
mengambil langkah-langkah yang perlu untuk menghalang Encik Tai
[*682] Choi Yu daripada meninggalkan Malaysia sehingga cukai yang
terhutang itu diselesaikan atau memberi satu jaminan yang boleh
memuaskan pihak saya bagi menyelesaikan cukai tersebut.

'Berkhidmat untuk negara'

'Cintailah bahasa kita'

Saya yang menurut perintah

--tt—

(Chew Cheng Tuan)

Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri

Sarawak.

One of the primary functions of the DGIR under the Act is to collect and recover
assessed tax effectively, and to do that, he must employ all the modes of recovery
authorized in Pt VII (ss 103-111) of the Act. Action under s 104 is one of the
authorized modes. It is the requirement of s 103 of the Act that a person pays his
assessed tax on the service of the notice of assessment on him failing which the
DGIR may, besides using all other authorized modes, proceed to recover in court the
assessed tax as a debt due to the Government, and if judgment is obtained, to
execute the judgment.

Under s 104(1) of the Act, the DGIR, if he is of the opinion that a person is about or
likely to leave Malaysia without paying all tax payable by the person, is authorized to
issue a certificate requesting the Director of Immigration to prevent the person from
leaving Malaysia.

The appellant submitted that the words 'leaving Malaysia' in s 104(1) of the Act must
be interpreted to mean leaving Malaysia permanently. We find that the words used in
this section are plain and clear, and we do not think it appropriate to read the word
'permanently' into this section. We are of the view that if that were the intention of
Parliament, such words as 'permanently' or 'with no intention of returning' would
have been inserted after the words 'leave Malaysia' in this section. But was there
justification in the DGIR forming the opinion that the appellant was about or likely to
leave Malaysia? The DGIR cannot read the mind of the appellant, and neither would
the appellant tell the DGIR if he intends to leave Malaysia without settling his tax.
The DGIR would have to base his opinion on information and reports received by
him, and on knowledge gathered or acquired in the course of dealing with the
appellant's tax affairs. The evidence in the appeal record shows that between June
1988 and April 1990, the appellant travelled extensively overseas and stayed longer
in foreign lands than in Malaysia. In the circumstances, we find that the DGIR was

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justified in forming the opinion that the appellant would leave the country without
settling his tax.

The appellant submitted that the DGIR acted against the rule of natural justice. In
other words, the appellant had not been given a notice to show cause why the DGIR
should not issue the certificate. That, we feel is not the intention of the law because
it would defeat the object and purpose of the certificate. If a notice to show cause
was issued to the appellant, it would only serve as a warning of the action about to
be taken against him, and this [*683] would afford him the opportunity to leave
the country before the certificate can be issued.

In S Kulasingam & Anor v Commissioner of Lands Federal Territory & Ors , the
Federal Court, hearing a land acquisition appeal, held that since the Land Acquisition
Act 1960 imposed no obligation on the acquiring authority to afford the land owner
the opportunity to be heard before making a decision to acquire the land, the owner
could not claim the right to be heard under the rules of natural justice. Here too, the
DGIR is not required by s 104(1) to hear the appellant before making his decision.

We are, therefore, of the view that the DGIR is not bound to give notice and hear the
appellant before issuing the certificate.

The last ground raised in the argument before us is whether the DGIR must send the
appellant the notice of the issue of the certificate under s 104(3) of the Act at the
time of or soon after the DGIR issues the certificate to the Director of Immigration.
We note that although the certificate was issued on 27 June 1988, the notice of the
issue of the certificate was given to the appellant only on 16 May 1991. The Director
of Immigration had also not taken immediate action on the certificate to stop the
appellant from travelling overseas until 22 April 1990. But the fact remains that the
appellant knew of the existence of the certificate on 22 April 1990 when he
encountered difficulty in renewing his passport.

Section 104(3) of the Act does not impose any time limit within which the DGIR must
notify the appellant that a certificate had been issued under s 104(1) of the Act. That
being so, generally the provision of s 54(2) of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967
(Consolidated and revised, 1989) would apply. This section states, 'Where no time is
prescribed within which anything shall be done, that thing shall be done with all
convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises.'

What is 'convenient speed' has been held by the courts to mean reasonable time
within which an act has to be done, but always having regard to the facts and
peculiar circumstances of each case.

We have earlier stated that the object of s 104(1) of the Act is to prevent the tax
payer from leaving the country without paying his outstanding tax. It would be futile
if the DGIR were to send to the appellant the notice of the issuance of the certificate
unless the DGIR had information that the Director of Immigration had taken the
necessary action on the certificate. Here the DGIR was aware that the Director of

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Immigration had not taken any action on the certificate because the appellant was
allowed to leave on overseas travels until 22 April 1990. On this date too, the
appellant was told by an immigration officer of the existence of the DGIR's
certificate. Once the appellant knew of the existence of the certificate, the provision
of s 115 of the Act would apply to him. This section states:

(1) Any person who, knowing that a certificate has been issued in
respect of him under section 104, voluntarily leaves or attempts
to leave Malaysia without paying all the tax, sums and debts
specified in the certificate or furnishing security to the
satisfaction of the Director General for the payment thereof
shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable
to a fine not [*684] exceeding one thousand ringgit or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both.
(2) A police officer or immigration officer may arrest without
warrant any person whom he reasonably suspects to be committing
or about to commit an offence under this section.

For the reasons stated, we are of the view that the delay in the service of the notice
on the appellant of the notice under s 104(3) of the Act was not fatal so as to render
the certificate null and void. To hold otherwise would only defeat the object and
purpose of s 104, and create great inconvenience in the implementation of this
section.

Section 104(5) of the Act states:

No legal proceedings shall be instituted or maintained against the

Government, a State Government, a police officer or any other public
officer in respect of anything lawfully done under this section or
section 115(2).

Since we find that the certificate had been lawfully issued by the DGIR, the
appellant's application must fail under s 104(5) of the Act.

We dismiss this appeal with costs to the respondent. We also order that the deposit
of RM500 be paid to the respondents to account of taxed costs.

Appeal dismissed.

4.2 UNDERSTANDING CASE LAW

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1) Name of the case (parties involve)

E.g : Tai Choi Yu v Government of Malaysia & Ors

• The appellant, named first in the title of the report (Tai Choi Yu), while Gov. of
M’sia & Ors was the respondent.

• In civil cases, the names of the parties are usually given, and the case being
pronounced as Tai Choi Yu and Government of Malaysia & Ors.

• In criminal case, for example the lawyers pronounce the case as Public Prosecutor
against Lim Moh Joo.

E.g : PP v Lim Moh Joo

2) Citation of the case

• Where cases are published in paper form the citation will usually contain:

-year of decision.
-the volume number;
-the title of the reports / reporter; and
-page number.

• Cases are cited by the name (s) of the parties followed by the reference of the
publication in which the report of the case appears.

Example:

Name of the parties:

Tai Choy Yu v Government of Malaysia

Year of decision : 1994

Volume : 1

Reporter : MLJ
-The series of the report is always abbreviated. There is a list of common
abbreviations at page 13 of the textbook

Page Number : 677

-Proprietary citation refers to printed pages.

Pinpoint reference

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If you wish to refer to some specific point in a report, you should add the page
reference, and if to something said by a judge in the report then to the judge's name and
page reference:

E.g.:

Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112 at 182 per
Lord Scarman.

3) Suit / Case No

E.g.:

CIVIL APPEAL NO 01-17-93 (93=year of fighting)

4) Name of the courts involve

E.g.: Supreme Court (Kota Kinabalu)

• It will refer to the court in which the case was heard.

• In this case it was the Supreme Court.
• It is vital to know which court heard a case because of the doctrine of precedent.

5) Date (Judgment/filed)

E.g:
Decided date:15 February 1994

• This reflects the decisions’ date delivered by the court.

6) Name of the judge (s)

E.g:
Abdul Hamid Omar, Eusoff Chin and Mohamed Dzaiddin

• This refers to name of the judge (s) who took part in the case.
• This information is used to help evaluate the decision.
• Some judges are known to be very experienced in particular areas of law.
• Their decisions may be given extra weight.

7) Catchwords

E.g:

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PIL0015 Introduction to Law Chapter 4

Revenue Law - Income tax - Power of Director General to issue certificate under
s 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 to prevent taxpayer from leaving Malaysia until tax
settled - Whether Director General of Inland Revenue bound to hear taxpayer before
issuing certificate – Income Tax Act 1967 s 104

• Normally the material is in italics, located on the first page of the report.

• Written by the editor of the report.

• It indicates the subject matter of the case and the issue which it concerned.

7) Head notes & Held

• It is not part of the case proper, and is prepared by the law reporter, not by the
judges.

• It should summaries the case accurately giving references to important parts of the
court’s opinion or judgment and any cases cited.

• Because it is written when the case is reported, the head note may stress or omit
elements of the case which are later thought to be important.

• Therefore, care should be taken when using the head note.

8) Cases referred to

E.g.:
S Kulasingam & Anor v Commissioner of Lands Federal Territory & Ors [1982] 1
MLJ 204

• This refer to a list of all cases referred to by the judges

9) Cases also cited

• Where counsel has cited additional cases to which the judges did not refer to this,
is given in a separate list under the heading “cases also cited.”

10) Legislation referred to

• E.g.:
-Income Tax Act 1967 ss 104, 115
-Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 s 54(2)
• Act / statute which is referred to in this case.

11) Name of the solicitors / firm

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PIL0015 Introduction to Law Chapter 4

• This refers to the names of the counsels who appeared in this case.

12) Judgment in full / leading Judgment

• The substance is to be found in the judgments.

• Every case law raises a question (s) to be answered by the judge (s).

• In civil cases, some of this will be questions / matter of fact.

E.g: It may be necessary to know at what speed a car was travelling when an
accident occurred.

• In practice, the answers to these factual questions are very important.

• Once they have been settled, the legal issues in the case may be simple.

• However, when it comes to the study of law, it is only the legal questions which
matter.

13) Cur.Adv.Vult (Curia Advisari Vult)

• The judgment of the court was delivered not extempore at the end of the hearing
but at a later date.

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