Cases for Intestate

1. Rodriguez vs Ravilan 17 PHL 63

[G.R. No. L-5343. September 16, 1910]
2. Suarez vs CA
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992]
3. Santillon vs Miranda 14 SCRA 563
[G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965]
CLARO SANTILLON vs. PERFECTA MIRANDA
4. Diaz vs Pamuti [GR L-66574, June 17, 1987]
ANSELMA DIAZ vs. IAC and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN
5. LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998]
6. Salao vs Salao 70 SCRA 65
[G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976]
7. Padia vs Ugarte 5 PHL 176
[G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905]

Cases for Intestate

1. Rodriguez vs Ravilan 17 PHL 63
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-5343. September 16, 1910. ]

CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, administrator, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. LUISA

RAVILAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Martin M. Levering, for Appellant.

Rodriguez & Del Rosario, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. PARTITION; OWNERSHIP; PARTIES. — In an action for the partition of property held

in common, it is assumed that the parties by whom it is prosecuted are all coowners or
coproprietors of the property to be divided, as he who claims or demands the partition of
property of common ownership must necessarily have the status of coproprietor of the
undivided property.

2. ID.; ID.; OWNERSHIP NOT TO BE TRIED IN PARTITION. — In such an action for

partition the question of common ownership is not to be argued, nor the fact as to whether
the interested parties are or are not the owners of the property in question, but only as t
how, and in what manner, and in what proportion the said property of common ownership
shall be distributed among the interested parties by order of the court.

3. ID; OWNERS ONLY CAN MAINTAIN ACTION FOR PARTITION. — He who has not
the status of coowner, or shall not previously have proven that he has such status, is not
entitled to prosecute an action for the partition of property.

4. ID.; RULES OF INHERITANCE; EFFECT OF PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS. — A civil

partnership contract executed between several brothers or relatives, relating to the use
and enjoyment of property held in common, can not affect the hereditary rights of the
relatives of a deceased partner, nor alter the order of inheritance prescribed by law.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On November 29, 1904, Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son,
Nicolas Mendoza, filed a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against Luisa Ravillan, the guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and
Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The complaint recites, among other things, that many years
ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and,
as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana, Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and
Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them divided among themselves he
said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and several carabaos, the
legal portions which pertained to four of them, Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro,
remained undivided, and these latter continued to possess, in associated in business
separately from their other coheirs.

The property of the said four children, which remained undivided, consists of one parcel
of agricultural land in the pueblo of Mandaue, of an area such as is usually sown with a
ganta of seed corn, bounded on the north by property of Damasa Manalili, on the south
by that of Telesfora Barte, on the east by that of Maria Mendoza, and on the west by that
of Feliciana Barte; another parcel of agricultural land in the barrio of Banilad of the same
pueblo, of an area usually covered in sowing a ganta and a half of seed corn, bounded
on the north by the street that leads to Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio
Cortes, and on the east and west by that of Dionisio Cortes and Lucio Ceniza,
respectively; another parcel of land, situated in the same barrio and of an area required
for the sowing of 2 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north by the street leading to
Talamban, on the south by the land of Dionisio Cortes, on the east by an alley, and on
the west by the property of Marcelo Oano.

That the said brothers and sisters purchased, out of the profits obtained from these lands,
other lands, to wit, a parcel of land in the barrio of Libog and pueblo of Bogo, of an area
usually sown with 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west
by property of Hermenegildo Pelayo, Feliciano Cortes, Domingo Nunez, and Feliciano
Cortes, respectively; another parcel in the same barrio, of an area sufficient for 3 gantas
of seed corn, bounded on the north by the property of Benito Cabajug, on the south by
the lands of Mariano Cabajug, on the east by those of Amadeo Elore, and on the west by
that of Mariano Mendoza; another parcel in the same barrio, of sufficient area for 10
gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and west by the lands of Ciriaco
Dajuna, Crisanto Zurra, Feliciano Cortes, and Mariano Fontanosa; another parcel in the
same barrio, of an area ordinarily sown with 3 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north,
south, east, and west by the lands of Benito Cabajug, Monico Pajuga, Marianoa Cabajug,
and Mariano Fontanosa, respectively; another parcel in the said barrio, bounded on the
north, south, east, and west by lands of Damiano Pelagio and Crisanto Zurra; another
parcel of an area sown by 4 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east, and
west by lands of Mariano Cabajug, Anacleto Lambojon, Ciriaco Dajuna, and Anacleto
Lambojon, respectively; another parcel, situated in the barrio of Tabayho of the aforesaid
pueblo, of an area sown by 14 gantas of seed corn, bounded on the north, south, east
and west by lands of Maximino Fernan, Domingo Fontanosa, Vicente Odian, and Meliton
Mendoza; another parcel in the barrio of Cadaohan of the pueblo of Tabugon, bounded
on the north, south, east, and west by lands of Santiago Ortelano, a creek, and lands of
Jose Arfon and Santiago Ortelano, respectively; and another parcel in the barrio of
Dughoy, Tabugon, of an area sown with 25 gantas of seed, bounded on the north, south,
east, and west by property of Feliciano Cortes, Felix Manalili, Santiago Ortelano, and
Donato Mendoza; eleven plow carabaos, three carabao cows with four calves, and four
head of cattle, acquired by the community; a mortgage credit of 130 pesos against
Laureano Solianoa secured by a mortgage on his land in the barrio of Bagacay of the
pueblo of Bogo, and three carabaos.

That the business of the said four brothers and sisters was, by common accord,
administered by one of them, Espiridion Barte, and, when he died, the three survivors
remained united in their interests and the undivided property was administered, until
December, 1901, by Pedro Barte, who at his death left four heirs, the said Maximina,
Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, represented by their mother, Luisa Ravilan, the wife and
widow of Pedro Barte and the defendant in this suit; that the said property, as aforestated,
was administered by Espiridon Barte, in common accord with the others, and, he having
died without leaving heirs, by force of law the pat that pertained to him passed to his
brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of the said
Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their
partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during
the latter’s administration, Matea Barte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza,
represented by his father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte,
Jorgia Barte and Donato Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas, decided upon the
distribution of the property mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan,
the guardian of the heirs of Pedro Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition,
on the pretext that, as the administratrix of that property, she had to pay debts of the
deceased.

That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having
been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself, the latter was requested to present
the accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and that she continued in the
possession and to enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or
intervention of the plaintiffs; that Jorgia Barte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of Matea Barte,
and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were
then entitled to the property in question, which should be divided among them in three
equal parts, one to be allotted to Jorgia Barte, another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other
to the heirs of Pedro Barte.

The demand further recites that the plaintiffs desire that a division be made and therefore
pray that a partition of the property, both real and personal, be decreed and also of the
profits that may have accrued thereto during the time that it was in the possession of and
usufruct enjoyed by the defendant, in accordance with the respective rights of the parties,
and that, in case that the distribution can not be made without detriment to such rights,
the property be ordered sold and the proceeds divided among the parties. The plaintiffs
requested also that the costs of the suit be assessed against the defendant.

A demurrer to the complaint was interposed, although the record does not show how it
was decided. The defendants in their answer denied all the allegations of the amended
complaint.

The case came to trial and, the testimony having been adduced by both parties, the
exhibits being attached to the record, the judge, in view of the conclusions reached
therefrom and on the date of November 4, 1907, rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs, by ordering the partition of the property mentioned, in the manner and portions
expressed in the judgment, and decreeing that such partition must be made in
accordance with sections 185 to 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with respect to the
real property, and that the five carabaos should be distributed in three equal allotments
in the manner determined for the real property. The costs were charged to the plaintiffs
and assessed against the divisible property.

Counsel for the defendant excepted to this judgment and prayed for its annulment and a
new trial. The motion was overruled, to which exception was taken, and the appellant duly
presented his bill of exceptions, which was approved and forwarded to this court.

A demand is made in the complaint for the partition of the common property held
undividedly by four brothers and sisters who formed a partnership for the use and
enjoyment of the same.
In relating the origin of a part of the property of the four brothers and sisters joined in
partnership, the plaintiffs stated that their deceased parents, Javier Barte and Eulalia
Seno, left at their death nine children, above mentioned, and property consisting of
carabaos, a credit, and lands situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and that, their property
having been divided among their nine children, that portion thereof which corresponded
to the brothers and sisters Espiridion, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro remained undivided and
its owners, associated together, continued undivided and its owners, associated together,
continued to enjoy it and manage it in common, separately from their other brothers and
sisters.

Although it be decided that it was not necessary to prove that the said nine brothers and
sisters were unquestionably the children of the deceased Javier Barte and Eulalia, and
are therefore their only heirs, it should at least have been shown that a lawful partition
was made among their nine children, of the property left by both spouses at their death,
and that the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Mandaue, and said to be
possessed by the said four brothers and sisters associated together, were awarded to the
same. Such a partition, were it made, should appear in an authentic document, which
was not exhibited with the complaint, since article 1068 of the civil Code provides "A
division legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
which may have been awarded to him."cralaw virtua1aw library

Even though titles of ownership of the said property were not exhibited, if it had been
shown that the Mandaue lands had been awarded by partition to the fourth brothers and
sisters aforementioned, there would have been prima facie proof that they were and
certainly are the owners thereof.

Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate
with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition
thereof in the manner hereinafter prescribed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition
shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s title and contain an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and name each tenant in
common, coparcener, or other person interested therein, as defendants."cralaw
virtua1aw library

So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a
coproprietor or coowner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and
notwithstanding the fact that Jorgia Barte and the son of Matea Barte, through his
representative, aver that they are the coowners of the said Mandaue lands and of others
situated in the municipalities of Bogo and Tabogon, they have not proved their averment
by titles which establish the common ownership alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs
is insufficient, since the defendant party, representing the four daughters of the deceased
Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the complaint.
It is true that the defendant Luisa Ravilan stated in her sworn testimony that, as the
guardian of her children, she had an interest in the lands situated in Mandaue and that
the parcels of land situated in Tabogon did not belong to her, nor to her deceased
husband, Pedro Barte; but she positively affirmed that the seven parcels of land situated
in Bogo were acquired by her said husband during his lifetime and during his marriage
with her, and she exhibited five documents, one of them the original of a possessory
information, as titles proving the ownership of her said husband.

Against the averment of the plaintiffs appears that of the defendant in the name of her
four daughters, the heirs if Pedro Barte, and while the plaintiff party exhibited no title of
ownership whatever, not even of the lands situated in the pueblo of Bogo and which the
defendant affirmed were acquired by her deceased husband, Pedro Barte, during his
lifetime, it is an indisputable fact that the latter’s widow, who in her own behalf and in the
name of her four daughters claims the exclusive ownership of the lands in Bogo, is at the
present time in possession thereof, and moreover showed documents which prove the
acquisition of some of them. The testimony of the defendant to the effect that she only
had a share in the lands of Mandaue, but not in those situated in Tabogon, is worthy of
serious consideration, although she positively affirmed that those situated in Tabogon, is
worthy of serious consideration, although she positively affirmed that those situated in
Bogo belonged to her husband and to herself. As she is in possession of these lands,
and as the record of the trial shows no proof that they belonged to the joint association or
partnership existing between the said four brothers and sisters, there are no legal
provisions that would support the issuance of the issuance of an order for the partition of
the said lands in Bogo, of which the widow of their alleged former owner is now in
possession.

In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are
all coowners or coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of
common ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what
manner, and in what proportion the said property of common ownership shall be
distributed among the interested parties by order of court.

Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the
hereditary succession of the deceased Espiridion Barte, who it is said left no legitimate
descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who
may have survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his deceased
brother or sister, that is, his nephews and nieces per stripes, are entitled to share in his
inheritance, according to the provisions of articles 946. 947, 948 of the Civil Code, the
last cited of which prescribes: "Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers
of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stripes,"
representing their respective fathers or mothers, brothers or sisters of the deceased.

The record does not show whether Jorgia Barte left any legitimate heir at her death, and
if she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.

It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the fourth brothers and sisters
can not affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased
predecessor in interest nor alter the order prescribed by law for testate or intestate
successions. (Arts. 744, 763, 806, 808, 913, 946, Civil Code.)

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment
appealed from, to declare, and we do hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be
denied, and to absolve, as we do hereby absolve, the defendant Luisa Ravilan from the
complaint, without special finding as to costs.

2. Suarez vs CA GR 94918
[G.R. No. 94918. September 2, 1992.]

DANILO I. SUAREZ, EUFROCINA SUAREZ-ANDRES, MARCELO I. SUAREZ, JR.,

EVELYN SUAREZ-DE LEON and REGINIO I. SUAREZ, Petitioners, v. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, VALENTE RAYMUNDO, VIOLETA RAYMUNDO, MA. CONCEPCION
VITO and VIRGINIA BANTA, Respondents.

Villareal Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Nelson Loyola for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; LEGITIME; PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF

THE CHILDREN, DIFFERENT AND ADVERSE FROM THEIR MOTHER. — The legitime
of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of each child. The proprietary interest of
petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of
their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother
but through their own right as children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are
not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the auction sale to protect their
own interest.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

The ultimate issue before Us is whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all
the five (5) parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of
petitioner’s deceased father. Marcelo Suarez, whose estate has not been partitioned or
liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold en masse to private
respondents to satisfy the personal judgment debt of Teofista Suarez, the surviving
spouse of Marcelo Suarez, mother of herein petitioners.chanrobles law library

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has lot been
liquidated or partitioned. In 1977, petitioners’ widowed mother and Rizal Realty
Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and for damages,
and were ordered by Branch 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (now Branch
151, RTC of Pasig) to pay, jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate
principal amount of about P70,000 as damages. 1

The judgment against petitioner’s mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become
final and executory, five (5) valuable parcel of land in Pasig, Metro Manila, (worth to be
millions then) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the private
respondents as the highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents
were then issued a certificate of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1,
1983.

On June 21, 1984 before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a
reinvindicatory action 2 against private respondents and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal,
thereafter docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and
the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of property. Therein, they alleged,
among others, that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot
be held liable therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners,
can neither be levied nor sold on execution.

On July 31, 1984, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal issued to private respondents a final deed
of sale 3 over the properties.

On October 22, 1984, Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed with Branch 151
a Motion for Reconsideration 4 of the Order dated October 10, 1984, claiming that the
parcels of land are co-owned by them and further informing the Court the filing and
pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case No. 51203), which motion
however, was denied.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On February 25, 1985, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining private
respondents from transferring to third parties the levied parcels of land based on the
finding that the auctioned lands are co-owned by petitioners.

On March 1, 1985, private respondent Valente Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203
a Motion to Dismiss for failure on the part of the petitioners to prosecute, however, such
motion was later denied by Branch 155, Regional Trial Court, Pasig.

On December 1985, Raymundo filed in Civil Case No. 51203 an Ex-Parte Motion to
Dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. This was granted by Branch 155 through an
Order dated May 29, 1986, notwithstanding petitioner’s pending motion for the issuance
of alias summons to be served upon the other defendants in the said case. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was later denied.

On October 10, 1984, RTC Branch 151 issued in Civil Case Nos. 21736-21739 an Order
directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots
subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon;
and to surrender to private respondents the owner’s duplicate copy of the torrens title and
other pertinent documents.

Teofista Suarez then filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to annul
the Orders of Branch 151 dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986 issued in Civil
Case Nos. 21736-21739.

On December 4, 1986 petitioners filed with Branch 155 a Motion for reconsideration of
the Order 5 dated September 24, 1986. In an Order dated June 10, 1987, 6 Branch 155
lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias
summons.chanrobles law library : red

Respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
February 25, 1985, 7 May 19, 1989 8 and February 26, 1990 9 issued in Civil Case No.
51203 and further ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203. The
appellate court rendered its decision on July 27, 1990, 10 the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the questioned orders
dated February 25, 1985, May 19, 1989 and February 26, 1990 issued in Civil Case No.
51203 are hereby annulled, further respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case
No. 51203." 11

Hence, this appeal.

Even without touching on the incidents and issues raised by both petitioner and private
respondents and the developments subsequent to the filing of the complaint, We cannot
but notice the glaring error committed by the trial court.

It would be useless to discuss the procedural issue on the validity of the execution and
the manner of publicly selling en masse the subject properties for auction. To start with,
only one-half of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale.

The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the
institution of the case.

"The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."cralaw virtua1aw library
Article 888 further provides:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

"The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate
children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 892 par. 2 likewise provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall
be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
descendants."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, from the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse is equal to the legitime of
each child.

The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from
and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not
because of their mother but through their own right as children of their deceased father.
Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interest.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1990 as well as its
Resolution of August 28, 1990 are hereby REVERSED and set aside; and Civil Case No.
51203 is reinstated only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to
annul the sale with regard to said portion.chanrobles law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

3. Santillan vs Miran 14 SCRA 563

G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO

SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-
appellees.

Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro
Santillon.

On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.

About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration.
Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses
Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties
enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda
claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two
documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated
in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate
was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration
was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better
qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was
appointed administratrix of the estate.

On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project
of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.

On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the
conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided
as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance,
while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and ordered

that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving
spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining
ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after
deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. ... .

From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of
law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the
order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone
assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?

The First Issue: — It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.

Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the
Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the estate
to which such person is entitled."

The Second Issue: — Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of
the New Civil Code which provides that:

If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .

As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites
Art. 996 which provides:

If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.

Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent
that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession,
whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.

Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession
involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction,
the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."

Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being
the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his
father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of
the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they
concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse
are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.

Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least,
his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the
Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that under
this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the estate
in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:

One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the
other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or
descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be understood
to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)

The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a)
Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child";
consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get
1/2 in intestate.

A. Children. — It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the

singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of
the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child"
is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children"
will not include "child" in the following articles:

ART. 887. — The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .

ART. 888. — The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-
half of the hereditary estate ... .

ART. 896. — Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth of
the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).

In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only
legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear,
because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of "children,"
not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning should be given
to Art. 996.

B. Unfairness of Art. 996. — Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the
widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets
one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.

On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half — if the testator so wishes. So, the
law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her
only child shall get more than his or her survivor).

Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow
or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the
second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general
rule applicable to both situations.

The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain — and this we are not called
upon to discuss — but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to
enforce.

The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.

4. Diaz vs Pamuti GR 66574

SECOND DIVISION

June 17, 1987

G.R. No. L-66574

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all

surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA guardian of
FEDERICO SANTERO, et al.,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance
of Cavite in Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding
letters of Administration be issued in her favor and that she be appointed as special
Administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses
Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of
their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero
in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four
minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9,
1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero.

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
intestate Estate of Pablo Santero;

b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the
Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero;

c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an
Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

d) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was
allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by
Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and
Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or
intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation
of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by
Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from
further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero
and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3
After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated
November 1, 1980, Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court
in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision 4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court
on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the trial court) the dispositive portion of
which reads —

WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and
law applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining
the Orders of December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere
in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero.

Costs against the oppositors-appellees.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was

denied by the same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the
present petition for Review with the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of

petitioners grandchildren Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or
natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and prefering a niece, who is a collateral
relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural
grandchildren Santero to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to
the intestate estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art.
982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the

grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or
relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of the petitioners' grandchildren
Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a
niece and therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
excludes the natural children of her son Pablo Santero, who are her
direct descendants and/or grand children;

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the
applicable provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9,
1976 which are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.
The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
and the issue here is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate
children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of
representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti
Vda, de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings
that Art. 990 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that
said provision of the New Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and
recognizes the right of representation (Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied illegitimate children the right to
represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that
Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which expressly
grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero)
in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti)." 5

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the
intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo
Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as
follows:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the
oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon
by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of
the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,
because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil
Code is changed by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the
Reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support
from other civilists, to wit:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed
that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently
adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its
own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998)
our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do
so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of
the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate
issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art. 992 must
be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and
998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-
vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976,
Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows
that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate
heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not
commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the
intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling
that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are
final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his
order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled
to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of
the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently,
Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were
never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal.
Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the
power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the
lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution.
The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a
quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become
final and executory, hence null and void. "

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 118449 February 11, 1998

LAURO G. VIZCONDE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City, and
RAMON G. NICOLAS, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two
children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings
of spouses Rafael Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and
Salud are Antonio Nicolas; Ramon Nicolas; Teresita Nicolas de Leon,
and Ricardo Nicolas, an incompetent. Antonio predeceased his parents and is now
survived by his widow, Zenaida, and their four children.

On May 22, 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land with an area of 10,110
sq. m. located at Valenzuela, Bulacan (hereafter Valenzuela property) covered by TCT
No. (T-36734) 13206 for One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P135,000.00),
evidenced by a "Lubusang Bilihan ng Bahagi ng Lupa na Nasasakupan ng Titulo TCT
No. T-36734".1 In view thereof, TCT No. V-554 covering the Valenzuela property was
issued to Estrellita. 2 On March 30, 1990, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela property to
Amelia Lim and Maria Natividad Balictar Chiu for Three Million, Four Hundred Five
Thousand, Six Hundred Twelve Pesos (P3,405,612.00).3 In June of the same year,
Estrellita bought from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements
situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property) using
a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Valenzuela property. The remaining amount
of the proceeds was used in buying a car while the balance was deposited in a
bank.
The following year an unfortunate event in petitioner's life occurred. Estrellita and
her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an incident
popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation
conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her
daughters.4 Accordingly, Carmela, Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded
Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and Jennifer, petitioner was
left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into an
"Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde
With Waiver of Shares", 5 with Rafael and Salud, Estrellita's parents. The extra-
judicial settlement provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her
two daughters between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud. The properties
include bank deposits, a car and the Parañaque property. The total value of the
deposits deducting the funeral and other related expenses in the burial of Estrellita,
Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).6 The
settlement gave fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the bank deposits of
Estrellita and her daughters to Rafael, except Savings Account No. 104-111211-0
under the name of Jennifer which involves a token amount. The other fifty percent
(50%) was allotted to petitioner. The Parañaque property and the car and were also
given to petitioner with Rafael and Salud waiving all their "claims, rights, ownership
and participation as heirs" 7 in the said properties.

On November 18, 1992, Rafael died. To settle Rafael's estate, Teresita instituted an
intestate estate proceeding8 docketed as Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, with Branch 120 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City listing as heirs Salud, Ramon,
Ricardo, and the wife (Zenaida) and children of Antonio. Teresita prayed to be
appointed Special Administratrix of Rafael's estate. Additionally, she sought to be
appointed as guardian ad litem of Salud, now senile, and Ricardo, her incompetent
brother Herein private respondent Ramon filed an opposition9 dated March 24,
1993, praying to be appointed instead as Salud and Ricardo's guardian. Barely
three weeks passed, Ramon filed another opposition 10 alleging, among others,
that Estrellita was given the Valenzuela property by Rafael which she sold for not
less than Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) before her gruesome murder. Ramon
pleaded for the court's intervention "to determine the legality and validity of the
intervivos distribution made by deceased Rafael to his children," 11 Estrellita
included. On May 12, 1993, Ramon filed his own petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
C-1699, entitled "In The Matter Of The Guardianship Of Salud G. Nicolas and
Ricardo G. Nicolas" and averred that their legitime should come from the collation
of all the properties distributed to his children by Rafael during his
lifetime. 12 Ramon stated that herein petitioner is one of Rafael's children "by right
of representation as the widower of deceased legitimate daughter of Estrellita." 13

In a consolidated Order, dated November 9, 1993, the RTC appointed Ramon as the
guardian of Salud and Ricardo while Teresita, in turn, was appointed as the Special
Administratrix of Rafael's estate. The court's Order did not include petitioner in the
slate of Rafael's heirs. 14 Neither was the Parañaque property listed in its list of
properties to be included in the estate. 15 Subsequently, the RTC in an Order dated
January 5, 1994, removed Ramon as Salud and Ricardo's guardian for Selling his
ward's property without the court's knowledge and permission. 16

Sometime on January 13, 1994, the RTC released an Order giving petitioner "ten
(10) days . . . within which to file any appropriate petition or motion related to the
pending petition insofar as the case is concerned and to file any opposition to any
pending motion that has been filed by both the counsels for Ramon Nicolas and
Teresita de Leon." In response, petitioner filed a Manifestation, dated January 19,
1994, stressing that he was neither a compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael
and he has no interest to participate in the proceedings. The RTC noted said
Manifestation in its Order dated February 2, 1994. 17 Despite the Manifestation,
Ramon, through a motion dated February 14, 1994, moved to include petitioner in
the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as
the car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be
collated. 18 Acting on Ramon's motion, the trial court on March 10, 1994 granted the
same in an Order which pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

On the Motion To Include Lauro G. Vizconde In Intestate proceedings

in instant case and considering the comment on his Manifestation, the
same is hereby granted.19

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which Ramon
opposed. 20 On August 12, 1994, the RTC rendered an Order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

The centerpoint of oppositor-applicant's argument is that spouses

Vizconde were then financially incapable of having purchased or
acquired for a valuable consideration the property at Valenzuela from
the deceased Rafael Nicolas. Admittedly, the spouses Vizconde were
then living with the deceased Rafael Nicolas in the latter's ancestral
home. In fact, as the argument further goes, said spouses were
dependent for support on the deceased Rafael Nicolas. And, Lauro
Vizconde left for the United States in, de-facto separation, from the
family for sometime and returned to the Philippines only after the
occurrence of violent deaths of Estrellita and her two daughters.

To dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financially

incapable to buy the property from the late Rafael Nicolas, Lauro
Vizconde claims that they have been engaged in business venture
such as taxi business, canteen concessions and garment
 manufacturing. However, no competent evidence has been submitted
to indubitably support the business undertakings adverted to.

In fine, there is no sufficient evidence to show that the acquisition of

the property from Rafael Nicolas was for a valuable consideration.

Accordingly, the transfer of the property at Valenzuela in favor of

Estrellita by her father was gratuitous and the subject property in
Parañaque which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said
transfer of the property by the deceased Rafael Nicolas in favor of
Estrellita, is subject to collation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED. 21 (Emphasis added)

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with respondent Court
of Appeals. In its decision of December 14, 1994, respondent Court of
Appeals 22 denied the petition stressing that the RTC correctly adjudicated
the question on the title of the Valenzuela property as "the jurisdiction of the
probate court extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate of the
deceased (Cf.: Sec. 1, Rule 90, Revised Rules of Court)." 23 Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari. Finding prima
facie merit, the Court on December 4, 1995, gave due course to the petition
and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The core issue hinges on the validity of the probate court's Order, which
respondent Court of Appeals sustained, nullifying the transfer of the Valenzuela
property from Rafael to Estrellita and declaring the Parañaque property as subject
to collation.

The appeal is well taken.

Basic principles of collation need to be emphasized at the outset. Article 1061 of

the Civil Code speaks of collation. It states:

Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other

compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title,
in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who
intervene in the division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common
mass, the property which they received from him, so that the division may be made
according to law and the will of the testator. 24 Collation is only required of
compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property
or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent. 25 The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far
as possible for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in
interest making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him
something in advance on account of his share in the estate, and that the
predecessor's will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any expression
to the contrary. 26 Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property
donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it was
donated, 27 the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveys
ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration
or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 28

The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation. We find that the probate
court, as well as respondent Court of Appeals, committed reversible errors.

First: The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate
estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's
compulsory heirs. Article 887 of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their

legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and ascendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal

fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by

those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes

mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
 With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown
to be a creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. 29 As
such, petitioner may not be dragged into the intestate estate proceeding.
Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene as he has no personality
or interest in the said proceeding, 30 which petitioner correctly argued in his
manifestation. 31

Second: As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or
ownership of a property which may or may not be included in the estate
proceedings. 32 Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. 33 In the case at bench, however,
we note that the probate court went beyond the scope of its jurisdiction when it
proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between
Rafael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the subject property between the
concerned parties was gratuitous. The interpretation of the deed and the true intent
of the contracting parties, as well as the presence or absence of consideration, are
matters outside the probate court's jurisdiction. These issues should be ventilated
in an appropriate action. We reiterate:

. . . we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which takes

cognizance of testate or intestate proceedings has power and
jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included
therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased,
although such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and
without prejudice to the right of the interested parties, in a proper
action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of
the right or credit.34

Third: The order of the probate court subjecting the Parañaque property to
collation is premature. Records indicate that the intestate estate proceedings is
still in its initiatory stage. We find nothing herein to indicate that the legitime of any
of Rafael's heirs has been impaired to warrant collation. We thus advert to our
ruling in Udarbe v. Jurado, 59 Phil. 11, 13-14, to wit:

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable. In accordance

with the provisions of article 1035 35 of the Civil Code, it was the duty
of the plaintiffs to allege and prove that the donations received by the
defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and prejudiced the
legitime or hereditary portion to which they are entitled. In the absence
of evidence to that effect, the collation sought is untenable for lack of
ground or basis therefor.

Fourth: Even on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the
probate court, nonetheless, made a reversible error in ordering collation of the
Parañaque property. We note that what was transferred to Estrellita, by way of deed
of sale, is the Valenzuela property. The Parañaque property which Estrellita
acquired by using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not
become collationable simply by reason thereof. Indeed, collation of the Parañaque
property has no statutory basis. 36 The order of the probate court presupposes that
the Parañaque property was gratuitously conveyed by Rafael to Estrellita. Records
indicate, however, that the Parañaque property was conveyed for and in
consideration of P900,000.00, 37 by Premier Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. Rafael, the
decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the
present owner of the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the
probate court's order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted for the
obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner
who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands, collation of the
Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs
which fact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover,
Rafael, in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any "claims, rights,
ownership and participation as heir" 38 in the Parañaque property.

Fifth: Finally, it is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether or not the
Valenzuela property may be brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed,
died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount
more than the value of the Valenzuela property. 39 Hence, even assuming that the
Valenzuela property may be collated collation may not be allowed as the value of
the Valenzuela property has long been returned to the estate of Rafael. Therefore,
any determination by the probate court on the matter serves no valid and binding
purpose.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is hereby

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

6. Salao vs Salao 70 SCRA 65

G.R. No. L-26699 March 16, 1976

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO

ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA ALCURIZA, the
latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem, ARTURO
ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the
Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P.
SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA. DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO
DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S.
SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:

This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,

Hermosa, Bataan involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as follows:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao
died in 1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin
Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what, properties formed part of Manuel Salao's

estate, if any. His widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was
administered by her daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May
22, 1919 (Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three
children, Alejandra, Juan and Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit were as follows:

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued
at P8,135.25. In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who was then
already forty-eight years old) was given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469
square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989 square meters and the riceland
with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an aggregate appraised
value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of partition
he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which
was obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio
y Mendoza, ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya
administracion lo ha sido a satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los
mismos". It was expressly stipulated that Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any
accounting of her administration "en consideracion al resultado satisfactorio de sus
gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagodas por ella las contribusiones (pages 2 and 11,
Exh. 21).

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueños absolutos de sus respectivas
propiedadas, y podran inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma como
se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio
her two children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT
No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare
fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot
No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao later became a part of
Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the
fishpond business. Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary
evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in
that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly
inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the
Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of
lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908
as, shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and
Ambrosia Salao secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised
dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the
Calunuran fishpond to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the
deed of sale (Exh19) Ambrosia confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueños
proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December 7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro,
conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an anual canon of P128
(Exh. 19-a).

After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan
sold it under pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of
redemption was also one year (Exh. 20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval
reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a).

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that
the Calunuran fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by
Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao, while the Pinanganacan fishpond (subsequently
acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952 square meters (Exh. 22).

Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao
bought for four thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of
swampland planted to bacawan and nipa with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73
centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinanganacan, Lubao, Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144,
Court of First Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an
application for the registration of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They
alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho terreno por partes iguales y por la
compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-a).

At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for
the applicants. On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that
the heirs of Engracio Santiago had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao.
Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan
Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de su esposa Diega Santiago y Ambrosia
Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e).

On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land.
The decree was issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of
Title No. 472 of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan
Salao and Ambrosia Salao.

That Pinanganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa
cadastre (Exh. 23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His
nephew, Valentin Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to
the death certificate (Exh. A. However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years
old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28,
1934 between his two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza
(Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from
his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.

If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with
a total area of 145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and
uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention
of such interest was made in the extrajudicial partition of his estate in 1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece,
plaintiff Benita Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832
square meters (Exit. L). As donee Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the
children of her sister, Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in
trust by Ambrosia as the share of Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that
she thought of filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was
allegedly held in trust and which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago
(Juani).
On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before
Ambrosia Salao's death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-
five years old when she died), she donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two
fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) At that time she was living
with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the the other half of the said fishponds,
having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) The deed of denotion included
other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct
over the said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).

The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants'
Record on Appeal).

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January
26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two
fishponds and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita
and Victorina's children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to
P200,000 (Exh. K).

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin
Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his
father Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and
1917, and that he Juani was the donee of Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S.
Salao, Jr. on January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They
amended their complaint on January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the
donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond
as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered
in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens
title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription
and laches. As counter-claims, he asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than P22,000 and reimbursement of
the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the receivership
Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his
widow, Mercedes Pascual and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question
were adjudicated to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the
properties would remain under administration during the pendency of this case (page 181,
Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the trial court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages
dismissed the amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it
made a laborious recital of the testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio
Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo Mangali Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili,
Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio
Cagui Damaso de la Peña, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco Buensuceso, and the
testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio Lingad,
Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented
Regino Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr.,
Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinanganacan (Lewa) lands
were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed
among her heirr after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was administered by
Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her estate was partitioned among
her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled
the plaintiffs and their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously that there was
a co-ownership in 1905 or thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if valentin had a
hand in the conversion into fishponds of the Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have
done so on a salary or profit- sharing basis. It conjectured that Valentin's children and
grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the fishponds
as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.

The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens
titles of Juan and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did
not give credence to the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could
not be trusted and because no strong documentary evidence supported the declarations.
Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust were already dead.

It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S.
Salao, Jr., the donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia
Salao, and would inherit the properties donated to him.

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was
dismissed. The defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages was
dismissed.

The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals.
However, as the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos, the Court of
Appeals elevated the case to this Court in its resolution of Octoter 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No.
30014-R).

Plaintiffs' appeal. — An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index index of the
matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page references" to the contents of
the brief (Sec. 16 [a], Rule 46, 1964 Rules of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of
Court).
The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that
requirement. Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page references
to the record" as required in section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48
of the 1940 Rules of Court.

Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read
section 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in
section 16, they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case
and lighten the burden of the Court.

What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court
is so great that we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an examination
of the voluminous transcript of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one
witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys who desire us to make such examination
have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief it in accordance with our
rules" (Palara vs. Baguisi 38 Phil. 177, 181). As noted in an old case, this Court decides
hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally
considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot
vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 395; See In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
562, 573).

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their

first cause of action they made certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin
Salao had a one-third interest in the two fishponds which were registrered in the names
of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied each and all the allegations"
in paragraphs I to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the qualification that Original
certificates of Title Nos. 185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names
of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s
"positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated in the in the amended
complaint".

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect tin admission of
the allegations in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among
Ambrosia, Juan, AIejandra and Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit
property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common funds were invested the acquisition
of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was verbally adjudicated to
Valentin Salao in the l919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to to register
"said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".

That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 of Rules of Court the
answer should "contain either a specific dinial a statement of matters in accordance of
the cause or causes of action asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule
requires the defendant to "deal specificaly with each material allegation of fact the truth
of wihich he does not admit and, whenever practicable shall set forth the substance of the
matters which he will rely upon to support his denial". "Material averments in the
complaint, other than those as to the amount damage, shall be deemed admitted when
specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth set forth by answer as many
affirmative defenses as he may have. All grounds of defenses as would raise issues of
fact not arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive
defenses" the matters in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which which
supported his denials of paragraphs 4 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action. Obviously,
he did so because he found it impracticable to state pierceneal his own version as to the
acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate
facts contradicting allegations of the first cause of action.

We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
It may be noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific
denial of t the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to plaintiff's cause
of causes of action". On the other hand, "an affirmative defense is an allegation of new
matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or
impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff." Affirmative
defenses include all matters set up "by of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6,
Rules of Court).

The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases are
distinguishable from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic
answer containing the statement that it denied "generally ans specifically each and every
allegation contained in each and every paragraph of the complaint". It did not set forth in
its answer any matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any
matters by way of confession and avoidance. It did not interpose any affirmative defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a
general denial which was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint
and which justified judgment on the pleadings. That is not the situation in this case.

The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue
of whether the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao,
Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action
for reconveyance had already prescribed.

The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S.
Salao, Jr. allegedly violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs'
complaint. They mentioned trust for the first time on page 2 of their appelants' brief.

To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is
necessary to maek some exegesis on the nature of trusts (fideicomosis). Trusts in Anglo-
American jurisprudence were derived from the fideicommissa of the Roman law
(Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla, 46 Phil. 642, 646).
"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to
the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the
word 'trust' is frequently employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which
are not strictly technical trusts" (89 C.J.S. 712).

A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed
as regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the
person for whose benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art.
1440, Civil Code). There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que
trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or choses in action (Pacheco vs.
Arro, 85 Phil. 505).

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441,
Civil Code). "No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be
proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts.
1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient
that a trust is clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981;
Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are
those which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a
trust" (89 C.J.S. 72).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature
of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction
by operation of law as matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the
parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive
trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust. is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or
construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law
and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to
be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of
conveyance (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are found in articles 1448 to
1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28, 1973,
53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Graño 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is -a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising
by operation of law". In a more restricted sense and as contra-distinguished from a
resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly
or impliedly evincing a direct intension to create a trust, but by the construction of equity
in order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise "by agreement or intention,
but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).
Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes" (Art. 1456, Civil Code).

Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will
impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such
a constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the
P. I., 49 Phil. 244).

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there
was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol
evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral
partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin
Salao is legally untenable.

It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in
force when the action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol
evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.

Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or

constructive, regarding the two fishponds?

Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The
trial court's firm conclusion that there was no community of property during the lifetime of
Valentina; Ignacio or before 1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence.
The existence of the alleged co-ownership over the lands supposedly inherited from
Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that the Calunuran fishpond was
held in trust for Valentin Salao.

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable
because the alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. The
plaintiffs alleged in their original complaint that there was a co-ownership
over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their amended complaint, they alleged
that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in Barrio Dampalit,
Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds
owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares, of which
sixteen hectares pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel
Salao's estate.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very
root, of the property now in litigation (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief). But the eleven
hectares were not proven by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in
1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares
of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As noted by the defendants, Manuel
Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints.
The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of
fishponds and ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there were eleven
hectares of land in Barrio Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those
eleven hectares would have been partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen
hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to

Valentin Salao mere by by word of mouth. Incredible because for the partition of
the seventeen hectares of land left by Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de
Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed by the four Salao heirs.
Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among three of
the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed.

The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in
mind that the two fishponds were registered land and "the act of registration" is "the
operative act" that conveys and affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that
any transaction affecting the registered land should be evidenced by a registerable deed.
The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest, the plaintiffs, never bothered
for a period of nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to establish his
supposed interest ox participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence
of such interest.

The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition
for Valentina Ignacio's estate wag notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The plaintiffs assert that
the two fishponds were verbally partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond
was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.

Now in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate, Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25
to Ambrosia Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds
and was the custodian of its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in the
deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate that the amount due from Valentin would just
be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings of the two fishponds. There was
no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows Valentin's participation
in the two fishponds.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain
evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-Peckson,
116 Phil. 1267, 1273).

Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of

proof. — Where a trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony
supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove the right of the alleged
beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust were
shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens
 title, upon vague and inconclusive proof. (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo,
59 Phil. 303).

Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. — In order to

establish a trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as
fully convincing as if the act giving rise to the trust obligation were proven
by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established upon
testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient
hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already
noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is
required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were
regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance,
proof as to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs.
Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered,
the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and
Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the
part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There
was no constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of
Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to
satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond " being
held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by
prescription or laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284;
Quiniano vs. Court of Appeals, L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc.
vs. Navarro, 9, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114
Phil. 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust
in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year (Sec. 40; Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its
reconveyance was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after
the lapse of more than forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their
predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at
all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S.
1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the
claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they
are threatened or invaded". "Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to
the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself." (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil.
435, 440-441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of
the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer n to Pass upon the validity of the donation made
by Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The
plaintiffs have no right and personality to assil that donation.

Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional
rights to Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr.,
her nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when
Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan,
Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the
succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line, representation takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters whether they be of the full or half
blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or
great-gandnephews like the plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde 5 Phil. 176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. — The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs
filed their action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are entitled to damages
because the plaintiffs acted maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000
attorneys fees and litigation expenses and, in addition, moral damages.

We hold that defemdamts' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs
presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954
to 1959. They fought tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in
prosecuting their case. Although their causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet
the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim indicate their sincerity and
good faith.

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common
ancestors, the spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs' action
was based on their honest supposition that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands
in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly inherited from Manuel Salao.
Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs'
action was manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants. An
award for damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and proper.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted
are not the moral damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-
17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra). The instant case is
not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein moral
damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases
mentioned in those articles.

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate; such right is so precious
that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously. (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771. 779).

The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that
attorney's fees may be recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
against the plaintiff" (defendant is a plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case
where the court deems it just and equitable" that attorney's fees should he awarded.

But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there
would be no basis for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729,
May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision
does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs.
Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020, 1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O. G. 6959).

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

7. tadia vs ugarte 5 PHL 176

G.R. No. L-2599 October 27, 1905

CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIA JUANA UGARTE E ITURRALDE, defendant-appellant.

Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez having died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the
deceased.
There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant or descendant
line of succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral
descendant — that is to say, as the legitimate niece of the deceased. Her mother, Maria
Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez, were
children of Manual Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez.

The petition of Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, then the only claimant to the estate, having
been heard in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at
the time, intestate proceedings were instituted, and she was declared, in an order made
on the 31st of January, 1901, without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the
deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez.

In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela
Pavia, claimed one-half of all of the estate of the deceased, Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez,
and asked at the same time that Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, who had been declared
the lawful heir of the deceased — a fact which this new relative did not
deny — be required to render an account of the property of the estate.

The father of the petitioner was in the same collateral degree of succession as Maria
Juana Ugarte e Iturralde. Pablo Linart, the father of Carmen Linart, was the legitimate son
of Maria Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez, another sister of Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez. They,
and Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez are the common trunk from which the three
branches issue.

Carmen Linart does not claim that her father, Pablo, who was of the same degree as
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, should have succeeded Ramon, for the reason that the
latter died first. This, however, was not alleged, mush less proved. What she claims is
that, although she is one degree lower in the line of succession that her aunt, Maria Juana
Iturralde y Gonzalez, yet she is entitled to a share of the estate of the deceased through
her father, Pablo Linart, by representation — that is to say, that even though a grandniece,
she is entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e
Iturralde.lawphil.net

The court below on the 24th of February, 1905, entered judgment declaring that the
petitioner had the same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana Ugarte
e Iturralde, and ordered the latter to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the
same time, from disposing of any part thereof until such accounting had been made and
the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte excepted to the judgment and has brought the
case to this court.

After a consideration of the case, this court finds: (1) That the relative nearest in degree
excludes those more distant, with the exception of the right of representation in proper
cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code); and (2) that the right of representation in the
collateral line shall take place only in favor of children of brothers or sisters whether they
be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).
In the light of the foregoing, the error which the appellant claims was committed in the
court below is very clearly shown. The court below held that the grandniece was entitled
to the same share of the estate that the niece was entitled to, when, as a matter of law,
the right of representation in the collateral line can only take place in favor of the children
of brothers or sisters of the intestate, and the plaintiff in this case is not a daughter of one
of the sisters of the deceased, such as is the appellant, but the daughter of a son of a
sister of the deceased. It would have been quite different had it been shown that her
father, Pablo Linart, had survived the deceased. In that case he would have succeeded
to the estate with his cousin, Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, she, the
plaintiff, might have inherited the portion of the estate corresponding to her father's. It is
not an error to consider that the word "children" in this connection does not include
"grandchildren." There is no precedent in our jurisprudence to warrant such a conclusion.

The decisions of the supreme court of Spain of October 19, 1899, and December 31,
1895, relied upon, are not applicable to this case. Those decisions were rendered in cases
relating to testate and not to intestate successions. In both cases, and in many others
decided by the supreme court of Spain, prior to the operation of the Civil Code, where a
testator had named certain persons as heirs and, they failing, that the property should
pass to their children, it was held that "Grandchildren" were necessarily included in the
word "children," and that in such a case the grandchild does not, properly speaking, inherit
by representation, "for the reason that he must in any event succeed the child in the
natural and regular order," and pointed out in the last decision referred to. And, as is also
pointed out in the first decision, "the fact that it was stated with more or less correctness
in the prayer of the complaint that the action was based upon the right of representation,
is not sufficient to deny to the appellant a right which he had under the terms of the will."
The difference is this, that in the case of a testamentary succession, we must take into
consideration and give force to the intention of the testator when he substitutes the
children for the heirs first named by him. The descendants are ordinarily considered as
included in the term "children," unless they are expressly excluded, whereas in intestate
successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under which it is
evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the
sons and daughters of brothers or sisters.

We, therefore, hold that in an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer relative, the
more distance grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation
does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have
been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle.

For the reasons above stated, we hereby reverse the judgment of the court below, and
declare that Carmen Linart has no right to succeed the deceased with said Maria Juana
Ugarte e Iturralde, who was once declared to be the lawful heir, and who is now in
possession of the estate, as to whom we hereby dissolve the injunction issued from the
Court of First Instance.
After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith,
without special provisions as to the costs of this instance, and let the record be remanded
to the court of First Instance from whence it came for execution of the said judgment. So
ordered.

Read and Compare

1018 and 969
CHAPTER 4
PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSIONS
SECTION 1. - Right of Accretion
Art. 1018. In legal succession the share of the person who repudiates the inheritance
shall always accrue to his co-heirs. (981)

CHAPTER 3
LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SECTION 1. - General Provisions
SUBSECTION 1. - Relationship
Art. 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated by the nearest relative, should there be
one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there be several,
those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the
person or persons repudiating the inheritance. (923)

Computation with Description and Explanation

SECTION 2. - Order of Intestate Succession
SUBSECTION 1. - Descending Direct Line
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to
him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

SUBSECTION 4. - Surviving Spouse

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child. (n)
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are left,
the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be
divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or
widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children the other fourth.
(841a)
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half. (953, 837a)
SUBSECTION 5. - Collateral Relatives
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who
are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall
inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes. (948)
Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
(949)

SECTION 2. - Order of Intestate Succession

SUBSECTION 1. - Descending Direct Line
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages.