PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE VS.

DUQUE Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA

Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of
the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of
society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was
to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and

Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;

Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under
Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:

Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations
to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an

international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when,
by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law.
RAZON VS. TAGITIS
FACTS: The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank
and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy
him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The
receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis
and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did
not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to
simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7,
2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander
Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional
Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-
employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who
likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help
them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not
produce any positive results except the information from persons in the military
who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men. According to reliable information she received, subject Engr.
Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt
of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in
Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an
intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with
another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police
headquarters namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City,
Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame
in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted
all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help from friends and
relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis,
from the illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like
which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights,
except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of
Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the
petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service
of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the
petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete
and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all
claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures
to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons
responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance
of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN)
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The
CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the
intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was
involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of
speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the
part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no
student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he
or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police
theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife,"
on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could
have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all
when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the
CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM
paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the
police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’
abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of
these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ
to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante,
PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents
from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on
the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but
the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended
to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING: The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced
disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law." Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of
the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared.
The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension
House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor
heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the
petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis
disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege,
among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As
in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate
facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of
the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about
Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient
information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to
liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a
cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to
the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for
supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s
direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute
one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts
relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents
is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits
was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to
swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point,
the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first
attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree
of December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy,
was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German security";
they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a
trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited
government officials from providing information about the fate of these
targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two
categories, and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from
1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and
127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820
people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97
were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during
former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while
the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported
cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of
March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of
enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s
administration. The Commission on Human Rights’ records show a total of 636
verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number,
406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced
or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to
November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."We note that although the
writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither
defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the
concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and
enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws.”
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can
provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at
disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt
from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the individual
situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these
senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that
are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance
is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the
whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and
the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the
commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced
disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that
the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced
Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance
cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the
Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State
itself – the party whose involvement is alleged – investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are,
these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance
is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately
deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central
to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven
disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victim’s human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence
is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28
of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay
testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any
criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the
right of cross-examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made
in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity
in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the
haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the
government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent
had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would
not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined
the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the
circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete
case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism
of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted, evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and
government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will
subsist unless this Court acts.

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the
ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to
exercise the extral.'

To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through
hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
MIJARES VS. RANADA
FACTS: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights
abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or
military forces during the Marcos regime, filed with the US District Court, Hawaii,
against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a Final Judgment and an award
of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class with an
award of a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90)
The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement
of the Final Judgment.
Respondent Judge Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order
dismissing the complaint without prejudice. He opined that the subject matter
of the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a
judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of
money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment.
The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid.
Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the
subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an
action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also
point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the
liberal construction ordained by the Rules of Court, particularly the inexpensive
disposition of every action.
The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment has remained unchanged.
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive
upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem
and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed
conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against
the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that there
should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity

ISSUE: What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for
an action to enforce a foreign judgment?

RULING: Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded
that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic table of
Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based
on judgment.

A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign

judgment in this jurisdiction.

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage
among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.
POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC ET. AL
FACTS: In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe
declared that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her
residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from May 24, 2005.
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE
(SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after her marriage to
Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace Poe then became
a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s
deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on February
3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother and
finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired
her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a
new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to
Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her
American passport.
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present
Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-
born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who
is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category
for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born
or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino.
The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as
based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein
though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens.
(That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship
as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by
the UN Convention Law.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural
born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her bioligical parents
cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy
on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and
that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.

On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a vote of 9-6
that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.

ISSUE: Is Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen or something in

between?

HELD: Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal principles from the
1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational
and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical
data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a
virtual certainty.
LANTION VS DOJ

Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with
the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested
for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him
to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on
the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of
the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of
evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US
Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal
prosecution inapplicable.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a
local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles
of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the

information in the documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in

connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to
Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC
FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009,
Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims
of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid
out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: This
Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual
orientation as that which refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance
as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which (3) shocks, defies; or disregardsdecency or morality.
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent
shows.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal,
Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T.
Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman,
breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.
Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations
per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is
elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same
Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious
practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious groups moral
rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-
based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused
by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly
accepted moral norms.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul
the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads
application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of
a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May
2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
ISSUE: Should Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation be granted?
HELD: The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws
of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply
that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals
under different circumstances would similarly fail. The Court disagree with the
OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of
the equal protection clause. It should not single out homosexuals as a separate
class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a
ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under
the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC
made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case."
xxx
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this
Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is
certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting
an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general
application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated
as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be
construed to include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United
Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
to be prohibited under various international agreements.

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is

distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the
public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens
are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and
decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance.
Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law,
the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of
religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying
ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod
over the dissenting minorities.
IBP VS ZAMORA
Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period
only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a
petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and
void and unconstitutional.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines,
the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of
the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach
of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority
belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is
lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military.
Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP,
there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.

Held:

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the
factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing
with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from
the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review
without any qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms,
and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
PEOPPLE VS. LAGMAN AND ZOSA

Facts. Respondents Lagman and de Sosa are charged with violation of the
National Defense Law which establishes compulsory military service. Both
refused to register to military service. Lagman avers he has a father to support,
has no military leanings and does not wish to kill or be killed. Sosa reasons he is
fatherless, and has a mother and an 8 year-old brother to support. Respondents
question the constitutionality of said law.

Issue. Is the National Defense Law unconstitutional?

Held. No. The National Defense Law, insofar as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against Art II, sec 2 (now sec 4) of the Constitution but is,
on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the govt to defend
the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of
the govt excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist
therein. The right of the govt to
IMBONG VS. OCHOA 9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA

FACTS: 10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) RULING:
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came 1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact impediments.
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as 1. The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention. an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in
unconstitutional. fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
ISSUES: adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues: before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal
1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
review over the controversy. decide. In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the
1. Power of Judicial Review maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great
2. Actual Case or Controversy departments of government through the definition and
3. Facial Challenge maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control
between them.” To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
4. Locus Standi only, medium of participation – or instrument of intervention –
of the judiciary in that balancing operation. Lest it be
5. Declaratory Relief misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not
6. One Subject/One Title Rule have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim
of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional: that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
1. Right to Life (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
2. Right to Health
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech case.

4. The Family 2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
6. Due Process
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and
7. Equal Protection that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
8. Involuntary Servitude justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative
 branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.
3. The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US) constitutional
law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s
thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the application of
doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant
with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
4. The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination
is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible
tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Considering that it is the right to life of the mother
and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not
wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
5. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
6. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It is
well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction
of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible
parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth.
2. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him,
“fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is
only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected. This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to
the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized
ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object – it is a living human
being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. Implantation
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who
had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution. It is the Court’s position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
2. A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. These provisions
are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the
contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
 implement these self-executing provisions. In Manila Prince
Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
1. x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of
the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is
why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
–… in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing. . . .
2. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated
to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute.
3. It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the support
of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a
religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, doctrine,
form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should
be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes
the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his
conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The Court is
of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law
violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers
a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
1. The Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
2. The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply
with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down
for being violative of the freedom of religion.
3. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in
relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health
care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails
and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health procedure on
a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
 clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which
the Court cannot allow.
4. The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.
5. Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law
is premature because the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction
that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they
will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and
validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature
nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
6. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Moreover, in
determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes
the distinct necessity to address the needs of the
underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people.
Thus: Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should
be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the
contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to
reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction
abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion and/or
stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health.”
8. The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of
force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however,
reveals that it only encourages private and non- government
reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no
penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide
it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion,
force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made
a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does
not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the
furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest. Consistent
with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should
be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from
this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro
bona or otherwise.
9. The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is
the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood
that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms
that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as
“health products.” Being the country’s premiere and sole
 agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes
“service” and “methods.” From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given
only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific
and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained
in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:

1. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of

the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.

10. A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains

to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled
health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for
the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not
absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local
government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.