Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
PART 3 CASES
I.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October
13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient
in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted
in a political crisis.
HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court,
on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
2. SARMIENTO VS MISON
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting
further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that - qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute
witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the
Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national
economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently,
we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands.
4. Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by
their parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at
the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent)
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that
continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of
the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies.聽
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
RULING:
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative
duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to
a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds
it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights.
FACTS:
Petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other
accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He obtained the
clearance applied for. The clearance had all the required signatures and
bore a certification that petitioner was “cleared from money, property
and/or other accountabilities by this Commission”. Petitioner argues
that notwithstanding the clearances previously issued (by COA), and
respondent Chairman’s certification that petitioner had been cleared of
money and property accountability, respondent Chairman still refuses
to release the remaining half of his retirement benefits — a purely
ministerial act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement
benefits is valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition was granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent
Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner’s retirement benefits in full and
his monthly pensions.
RATIO:
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the
Auditor General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission
of Elections), the benefits granted by said law to the Auditor General
and the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Elections shall
not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution. Likewise, under
Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended, the benefits granted
thereunder “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment,
garnishment, levy or other processes.”
Well settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in
favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree’s
sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his
livelihood.
III.
Under Section 173 of the National Internal Revenue Code, the persons
primarily liable for the payment of DSTare the persons (1) making; (2)
signing; (3) issuing; (4) accepting; or (5) transferring the taxable
documents,instruments or papers. Should these parties be exempted
from paying tax, the other party who is not exemptwould then be liable.
In this case, petitioner Philacor is engaged in the business of retail
financing. Throughretail financing, a prospective buyer of home
appliance may purchase an appliance on installment byexecuting a
unilateral promissory note in favor of the appliance dealer, and the
same promissory note isassigned by the appliance dealer to Philacor.
Thus, under this arrangement, Philacor did not make, sign,
issue,accept or transfer the promissory notes. It is the buyer of the
appliances who made, signed and issued thedocuments subject to tax
while it is the appliance dealer who transferred these documents to
Philacor which
likewise indisputably received or “accepted” them. A
cceptance, however, is an act that is not even applicableto promissory
notes, but only to bills of exchange. Under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the act ofacceptance refers solely to bills of exchange. In a ruling
adopted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as early as
1995, “acceptance” has been defined as having reference to incoming
foreign bills of exchange which are
accepted in the Philippines by the drawees thereof, and not as referring
to the common usage of the word asin receiving. Thus, a party
to a taxable transaction who “accepts” any documents or instruments
in the plain
and ordinary meaning does not become primarily liable for the tax.
2. CIR vs Guerrero
FACTS:1.
The estate, as claimed, was entitled to the same rights and privileges as
Filipino citizensoperating public utilities including privileges in the
matter of taxation.5.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed.6.
The matter was brought to the Court of Tax Appeals and ordered the
petitioner to refundto the respondent the sum of P2,441.93.7.
ISSUE:1.
DECISION:1.
No. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is reversed and the case is
remanded to it,to grant respondent Administrator the opportunity of
proving whether the estate couldclaim the benefits of Section 142 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, allowing refundto citizens of
foreign countries on a showing of reciprocity. With costs.
HELD
NO.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred twenty
(120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in
support of the application within which to decide on the administrative
claim.Counting 120 days from 26 March 2002, the CIR had until 24
July 2002 within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for an input
VAT refund attributable to the its zero-rated sales for the period April to
September 2000.On the other hand, the CIR had until 26 October 2002
within which to decide on petitioner’s claim for refund filed on 28 June
2002, or for the period covering October to December 2000.
In this case, the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July
2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120-day
waiting period. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a dismissal,
inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the CTA. In accordance
with the ruling in San Roque and considering that petitioner’s judicial
claim was filed on 24 July 2002, when the 120+30 day mandatory
periods were already in the law and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not
yet been issued, petitioner does not have an excuse for not observing
the 120+ 30 day period. Failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory
120-day period is fatal to its claim and rendered the CT A devoid of
jurisdiction over the judicial claim.
Issue: Whether the accused were guilty of 5 counts of estafa and illegal
recruitment, and be charged of the penalty of life imprisonment.
Ruling:
The Court affirms the modification of the CA, except for the penalty on
the 5 counts of estafa.
The Court agrees with the lower court that the accused were guilty of
illegal recruitment by a syndicate with the penalty of life imprisonment.
The accused were convicted separately also for 5 counts of estafa.
V.
1. Hipe vs COMELEC
The Facts
The Issue
Our Ruling
In the case at bar, petitioner Hipe asserted the negative fact, that
is, that no copy of the written ruling of the MBOC was sent to him or his
counsel. Thus, petitioner Hipe has the burden of proof to show that he
was not furnished with a copy of the written ruling of the MBOC, which
he was able to successfully prove in the instant case. Be that as it may,
it then becomes incumbent upon respondent Vicencio to prove
otherwise. This is because the burden of evidence is shifted if the party
upon whom it is lodged was able to adduce preponderant evidence to
prove its claim.[22]
Petitioner Hipe claims that no proof was presented nor was there
any showing that the seven election returns in question were
defective.[25] Such contention is not persuasive.
The COMELEC, after a judicious evaluation of the documents on
record, upheld the findings of the MBOC to exclude the subject election
returns on the basis of the affidavits of the members of the Board of
Election Inspectors. What exactly these documents and evidence are
upon which the COMELEC based its resolution, and how they have
been appreciated in respect of their sufficiency, are beyond this Courts
scrutiny.[26] The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no
evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the
framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELECcreated and
explicitly made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher
than statutory administrative organs.[27] The factual finding of the
COMELEC is, therefore, binding on the Court. As found by the
COMELEC En Banc:
FACTS:
4. Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been
members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several
years; and
It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the
grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory
provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization
is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC
would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a
petition to disqualify a candidate "for lack of qualifications or
possessing some grounds for disqualification."
Another red flag for the COMELEC to dismiss Olandrias petition is the
fact that Amora claims to personally know the notary public, Atty.
Granada, before whom his COC was sworn. In this regard, the
dissenting opinion of Commissioner Larrazabal aptly disposes of the
core issue. He said that accordind to the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice:
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of
the instrument or document.
VI.
FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc
Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an accident insurance
policy "against death or disability caused by accidental means"
January 1, 1957: For the celebration of the New Year, the
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. sponsored a boxing contest for general
entertainment wherein Eduardo, a non-professional boxer
participated
In the course of his bout with another non-professional boxer of
the same height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by
his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing
Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring
He was brought to the Baguio General Hospital the following
day. He died due to hemorrhage, intracranial.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named
beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed a claim with the
insurance company
The Capital Insurance and Surety co., inc denied stating that the
death caused by his participation in a boxing contest was not
accidental
RTC: favored Simon
ISSUE: W/N the cause of death was accident
HELD:YES.
Eduardo slipped, which was unintentional
The terms "accident" and "accidental"
as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any
technical meaning and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation
happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen
event that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation
event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected
where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of
the insured's voluntary act, or if something unforeseen occurs in the
doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the protection of policies insuring against death or injury from
accident
while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is
voluntary, the injury was sustained when he slid, giving occasion to
the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw him to the ropes
of the ring is not
The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of external
injuries does not make any injuries received in the course of the
game not accidental
In boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as
basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result. If,
therefore, it ever does, the injury or death can only be accidental or
produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occurred
in this case
Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its
coverage —
(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging
in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing
of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.
Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing
contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance
contract
FACTS:
Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned four bodegas which
he insured with Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd (Law Union)
since 1937 and the lose made payable to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as mortgage of the hemp and crops, to the extent of its
interest
July 21, 1940 morning: fire broke out in bodegas 1,2 and 4 which
lasted for almost a week.
Qua Chee Gan informed Law Union by telegram
Law Union rejected alleging that it was a fraudulent claim that
the fire had been deliberately caused by the insured or by other
persons in connivance with him
Que Chee Gan, with his brother, Qua Chee Pao, and some
employees of his, were indicted and tried in 1940 for the crime of
arson but was subsequently acquitted
During the pendency of the suit, Que Chee Gan paid PNB
Law Union states that ff. assignment of errors:
1. memo of warranty requires 11 hydrants instead of 2
2. violation of hemp warranty against storage of gasoline
since it prohibits oils
3. fire was due to fraud
4. burned bodegas could not possibly have contained the
quantities of copra and hemp stated in the fire claims
ISSUE: W/N Qua Chee Gan should be allowed to claim.
VII.
1. Benjamin Co vs Republic
Facts:
Petitioner was born in Abram and his parents are both Chinese. He
owes his allegiance to theNationalistGovernment of China. He is
married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated inthe
Catholic Church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as
the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from theAbram Valley
College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued,
both schools beingrecognized by the government. He has a child two
months old. He has never been accused of any crimeinvolving moral
turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a
member of any subversiveorganization. He does not believe in, nor
practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad.
Hemingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of
government and stated that if his petition is grantedhe would serve the
government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant
dealing in the buyand sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in
Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a workingcapital of P10,
000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He
contributes to civic andcharitable organizations like the Jaycees,
Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of
theFilipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time.
Issue: trial court on the ground that it erred in finding that petitioner
has all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in the law.
Held: There is merit in this claim. Indeed, the scope of the word law in
ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution
which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the
principles underlying our constitution. Thus, our constitution
expressly declares as one of its fundamental policies that the
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, that the
defense of the State is the prime duty of the government, that the duty
and right of the parents to rear their children for civic efficiency shall
receive the support of the State, and that the promotion of social justice
shall be its main concern. In so stating that he believes merely in our
laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our
constitution which are referred to in the law.
Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in which he is living. It is
contended that petitioner has also failed to comply with this legal
requirement for he failed to show that he has complied with his
obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration
as required by the Alien Registration Act. He has, therefore, failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation
with our government.
RICHARD VELASCO
, petitioner-appellant
v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
,
oppositor-appellee.
G. R. No. L-14214May 25, 1960
FACTS:
- This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First
Instance of Manila which, after trial, was denied forfailure of petitioner
to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has appealed.- Petitioner
was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco
and Miguela Tiu who becamenaturalized citizens in 1956.- He
alleges that since his birth in Manila on May 12, 1932 he continuously
resided in the Philippines, particularly at1441 Magdalena St., Manila;-
that he finished his elementary education at the Francisco Balagtas
Elementary School, and his highschool at the Arellano University;- that
he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where he
graduated in dentistry in 1954;that he is a citizen of the Republic of
China in Formosa;- that he has not followed the citizenship of his father
when the latter became naturalized as he was thenalready 23 years
old;- that he is single, although he is engaged to be married to a Filipino
girl by the name of Noemi Eugenio;- that he is at present employed at
the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly salary
ofP150.00; that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with
a salary of P2,400.00 per annum, evenif his father was only an agent of
Elizalde and Co.;- that he knows how to speak and write English and
Tagalog; he is a Catholic by faith; and he has neverbeen convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude;- that he does not believe in
polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of
men'sideas;- that he does not own any real property although he
allegedly has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 atthe Republic
Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern
University, P2,000.00shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines,
and P1,000.00 in cash;- that he is not suffering from any contagious
disease;- that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos;- that he has
shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos;
and that he desires tobecome a Filipino citizen because he considered
the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as hiscountrymen.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
[
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
against appellant,]
1.
No
, he is not qualified to become a Filipino citizen.The trial court
found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the
documentary evidence submittedin support thereof, namely, Richard
Velasco, Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua Velasco, and that
whilepetitioner states in his petition that his full name is Richard
Velasco, the signature thereon is Richard C. Velasco. Again, the
court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses states that the
affiants personally know and areacquainted with Richard Velasco while
the documentary evidence shows that his name is Richard
Chua Velasco. Onthe other hand, petitioner testified that he
has no
alias
nor other names
and has always been knows as RichardVelasco.
No evidence was submitted to prove that they
are one and the same person
.
The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character
witness, is the prospective mother-in-law ofpetitioner, and such as
her testimony is biased
. It also found that she and her companion witness Santiago
Marianowere also the character witnesses of brother of petitioner in
his petition for naturalization,
a circumstance which inits opinion indicates that petitioner has
a limited circle of Filipino friends
. The court
finally found that thepresent income of petitioner is only P150.00
a month which, considering the present high cost of living andthe
low purchasing power of our peso,
is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet
the requirement of the law
.
Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at
the Wilson Drug Store
only
on February, 1957with a salary of P150.00 a month, or
barely a month
before he filed the instant petition, and
that said store is partlyowned by his mother who has one-fifth
capital investment therein.
This leads one to believe that petitioner'semployment, even if true,
is but a convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family
in order to showa token compliance with the requirement of the
law that to become a Filipino citizen one must a lucrativeincome
or occupation.
Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
and strictly construed in favor of the government andagainst the
applicant" (Co Quing y Reyes
vs
. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are constrained to hold that the trial
courtdid not err in denying the petition for naturalization.
Held:
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against
petitioner-appellee.The lower court erred in not finding that the
petitioner appellee has failed to complywith all the requisites
prescribed by the law to acquire Philippine citizenship. Court ofFirst
Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and granting the
petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that
said petition was publish in the Official Gazette onlyonce, instead of
three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act
473.Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the
publication of the noticeof hearing should be made for three consecutive
weeks and as the Official Gazette isnow being published monthly, and
not weekly as it was before, petitioner cannotactually comply with law.
While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannotactually
be published for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is
no lesstrue that said notice may be published three times consecutively,
although not weekly, inthe Official Gazette, and because the true
intent of the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is
our considered opinion that in the instant case the
single publication of the notice of hearing in question is not a
sufficient compliance with law."The grant of citizenship is only a
mere privilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the
applicant is essential.
VIII.
1. hEIRS OF jUGALBOT VS CA
Held:
In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa by
the DAR. Neitherdid the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of
its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of
constitutional due process andshould be deemed arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical and tainted with grave abuse ofdiscretion. Secondly, there
is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas
Jugalbot or the petitioners personally cultivated the property under
question orthat there was sharing of harvests, except for their
self-serving statements. Without theessential elements of consent
and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between
the petitioner and the private respondents
Doctrine:
Held:
The trial court denied the petition on the ground that the first page of the
will does notbear the thumbmark of the testatrix
. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside forthe reason that,
although the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of
thetestatrix, the same however expresses her true intention to give the
property to herwhose claims remains undisputed.
She wishes to emphasize that
no one has filed anyopposition
to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear
thethumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her
thumbmark and both pageswere signed by the three testimonial
witnesses
. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is
unopposed, the three testimonial witnesses testified andmanifested to
the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of
thedeceased.This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to
the express provision of thelaw. Thus,
Section 618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign
thewill and each and every page thereof in the presence of the
witnesses
, and that the
latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence
of the testator
and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in
the attestation clause