ATTY.
EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-
Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente
(Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for
Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel
for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-
2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or
Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa
signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana
further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as
Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his
paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue
misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did
not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No.
9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa
no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her
separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the
MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that
Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez
(Ortalez), Busmente’s staff, alleging Macasieb’s failure to endorse
pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD
noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit and
that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb
withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente’s office in November
2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of
Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in
November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only due
to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s
allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD
gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to
submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the
time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of
law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No.
XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the
period of Busmente’s suspension to six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from
the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with
standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were
not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution
No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants
his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation
as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court
further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney,
appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as
a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to
permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to
make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal
or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a
member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating
counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente
indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in
2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of
law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente’s
staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb
resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent
Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to
Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa’s
practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil
Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC.
Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that
Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case
No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela
Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmente’s
claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the
files in Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-
271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the
Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures
submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person.
The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the
questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however,
showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente, including
the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of
Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a
letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters
dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed
property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his
signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No.
9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his
office to inquire about its status. Busmente’s allegation contradicted the
Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating
that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of
the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza
Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the
case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA
in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA
ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature
in the notices or other court records as our legal counsel the
same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith
that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so
since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling some cases
of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did
not sign any pleading which she filed in court in connection with
our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the
court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for
and in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the
reason that the following elements of the offense are not present,
to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false;
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the
integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA
ROSA we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and
allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been
unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we
just presumed that she has legal qualifications to represent
us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE
allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in
short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal
counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give
legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this
Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
 QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of
Court - BRANCH 81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION
FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008
of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of
the Court Administrator, which query the latter referred to the Court for
consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court
discovered that the query was beyond pure policy interpretation and
referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter
that required concrete action on the factual situation presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a
limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and
those already separated from government employment for a period of
one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their
profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. ' In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
xxx
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in
the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the
office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an
incumbent engage in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same
does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-
incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last
paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying
the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent
like myself - who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation -
cannot?"1
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court
VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she
resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and
within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted
provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as
private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the
private practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict
or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from
government service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private
practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a
period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from government
employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to
remove the exercise of clout, influence or privity to insider information,
which the incumbent public employee may use in the private practice of
his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since
she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of
Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage in the private
practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her
appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her
former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P.
Perez made the following observations when the matter was referred to
him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-
honored principle of public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof
provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees,
among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and
(c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement
under professionalism that "[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or
peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any
transaction between the retired government employee and his former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral
ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may
be.2 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to
refer this case to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.3 The OCAT took the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as
a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly,
there is a misreading of that provision of law.4 and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after
the phrase "provided that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying
the phrase "engage in the private practice of their profession" should be
prefatory sentence that public officials "during their incumbency shall not"
be disregarded. However, read in its entirety, "such practice" may only
refer to practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception
to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term "law" was
intended by the legislature to include "a memorandum or a circular or an
administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."
xxx
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent
public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which
is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the
constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI
of the Constitution'
xxx
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time
public service so that in case of conflict between personal and public
interest, the latter should take precedence over the former.5 [Footnotes
omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5,
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel - the rule that deals
with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which
limits such outside employment to one that "does not require the practice
of law."6 The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where
they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule
6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs
the conduct of lawyers in the government service.7
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued
an En BancResolution dated November 11, 2008 directing the Court
Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of
profession during employment and within one year from resignation,
retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise
required the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty.
Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court
and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a
report on his verification.8
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R.
Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported the following
appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. v.
Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April
10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal v. Zosimo Malasa,
et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor v. Jose J. Mayor,
on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; andcralawlibrary
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank v. Sps.
Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as
counsel for the defendants.
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11,
2008 EnBanc Resolution and she filed a Manifestation (received by the
Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11,
2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of
Branch 81 records. As well, she informed the Court that she had
previously taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above
query:
1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC
Manila, which had been dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008
(Annex D) - a recourse taken when undersigned was still a private
practitioner;
2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of
Manila, which had been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on
December 4, 2008 (Annex B) - a recourse taken when undersigned was
already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after
she took her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis
supplied]
She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above
cases "so that eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest
the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that
R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an
express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private practice of
undersigned's law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand
not containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigned's
practice of profession, before the same court, as a public prosecutor -
within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?"
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not
merely with the task of determining how the Court will respond to the
query, both with respect to the substance and form (as the Court does
not give interpretative opinions9 but can issue circulars and regulations
relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts10 and in the
exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and personnel
thereof11 ), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same
subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a
circular on the subject of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the
Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the present administrative matter a
finished task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports
the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffe's admitted appearance, before the very same branch she
served and immediately after her resignation, is a violation that we
cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away from under the
cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for declaratory relief,
whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our level. We
note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty.
Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases.
The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any
way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any
resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of
appearing before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of
the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both
of which were dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this
Court for resolution. The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila,
was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the "court declined to exercise
the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision
that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the
uncertainty or controversy."12 The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, was dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the
dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on December 4,
2008.13Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from
ruling on Atty. Buffe's actions, as no actual court case other than the
present administrative case, is now actually pending on the issue she
raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffe's recourse to this Court
and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a
favorable answer to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance
in our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe's
actions relates to possible objections on procedural due process
grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to
explain why she should not be penalized for her appearance before
Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence of
due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is
the lack of the opportunity to be heard.14 The records of this case show
that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She
was notified, and she even responded to our November 11, 2008
directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on
Atty. Buffe's appearances before Branch 81; she expressly manifested
that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her legal
positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this
Court; first, in her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her
Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs to deter us
from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her
previous Branch within a year from her resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits
them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first,
the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and
second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her
official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after
the public official or employee's resignation, retirement, or separation
from public office, except for the private practice of profession under
subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-
year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year
prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office the
public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public
office is a public trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or
imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a former
government official or employee and his or her former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance
and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to
serve the public.15
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A.
No. 6713 is not the only prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. The latter
provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that an
incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to
his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it
complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices
law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working
hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court
personnel's duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law;
Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as
professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court
personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while performing
officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive
branch of government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme
Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or
where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the
Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside employment.
[Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted
Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a practice
of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside
employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we
defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.17 Under both
provisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the
part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly use confidential
information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity
with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to
incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713
continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffe's situation
falls under Section 7.
Atty. Buffe's Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe's
admission that she immediately engaged in private practice of law within
the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and
only objects to its application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair
that she cannot practice before her old office - Branch 81 - for a year
immediately after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in
matters where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as
counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She believes that
Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public officials
and employees as against those already separated from government
employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she
interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of
court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained above, that
the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and
employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this
general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of
exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law
allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current
duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above,
no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession,
as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so. Under both the
general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe's basic premise is
misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the
practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and
without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court's limitation is that she
cannot practice her profession within one year before the office where he
or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned, retired or
separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent
official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because
the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with
and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all,
save only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and
only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis again
disproves Atty. Buffe's basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe's approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her
awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its violation because of
the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first
violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position
by referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her
who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately
engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels
before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again
we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe's part and, to our mind, only
emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty.
Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
xxx
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must
be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an
evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)'s
unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does
not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is
broad enough to include it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the
part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within
the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful conduct.19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this
quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer's oath and
thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited
period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7
states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis
supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the
footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to replicate - the former
court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court
they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal
profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law.20 By her
irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and
in lawyers.21 Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent
attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query,
which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief,
all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope
perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause.
These are acts whose implications do not promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.22
Considering Atty. Buffe's ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the
principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively
liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.23 In several cases, the Court has disciplined
lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where
the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of
their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need
of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor
on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to
public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of
several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed
their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial
fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.25 The Court
held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination
of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into
the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,27 that no
evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined
for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re:
Wenceslao Laureta28 where we punished a lawyer for grave professional
misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order for
contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that
due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to
the person to be disciplined.29
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and
punished for contempt for his slurs regarding the Court's alleged
partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in
a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the
respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the
Court through the media and even acknowledged the correctness of his
degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority
of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called
upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting
application of the contempt power.31
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against
and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court
from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the
errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we
stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard
on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed
before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended
from his office as an attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for
breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.33
Judiciary should regard and observe the prohibition against the practice
of law with the office that they used to work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-
Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission
of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffe's record as a member of the Bar.

In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save SO ORDERED.
OCAT's observation that Atty Buffe's letter-query may really reflect a
misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the practice of
the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of
the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as
practice of the legal profession soon after one's separation from the
service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring
the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this
practice to continue.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the

simultaneous use of various fora in expressing her misgivings about the
perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged a
query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her
successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these
fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion through their
possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not
strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has
done is something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor
because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary
that it could have spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that
cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because of the OCAT's
observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the
prohibition after separation from the service.

Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine
of P10,000.00, together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating
her transgression and committing other acts of professional
misconduct.35This penalty reflects as well the Court's sentiments on how
seriously the retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the
 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, v. EDWIN L.
RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the
requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession.
Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of
legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the
morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even
if he passes the bar examinations.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant
Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine
International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of
the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and
grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a
lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed
with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection
to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as
"counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,"
and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a
municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant
accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy
to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to
take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific
assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that
"he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or
represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent
claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was
allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the
Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that
the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment
and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the
MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant
alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment)
reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated
mainly by political vendetta."cralaw virtua1aw library
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as
counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC
proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also
believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to
deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law
which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for
Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the
records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in
Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph
of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the" (U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T.
BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
"authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before
the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also
"retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001,
Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and
the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on
14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for
Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath.
Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court elucidated
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) . . .
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or
skill.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared
in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without
license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well
that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent
has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a
privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by
passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can
be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the
person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized
practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon
Relox, vice mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your
acceptance." 10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation
effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not support the
charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence
shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his
counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran,

Jr. v. Abad, 6 a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken
his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of
court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under
Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does
not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or
administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY.
PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been
previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not
deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following
lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the
Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc
dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of
Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission
Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official
Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the
amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No.
8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the
year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as
shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then
Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included
the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office
as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request
dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26,
1979, while waiting for my turn to take my Oath as a
member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath
by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that
Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants
to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased)
to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief
Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for
which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further
suspended. *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
Answer with a Prayer that the Honorable Supreme Court
determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the
Honorable Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to
determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I
received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980
informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting
together with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-
1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on
July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased)
Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for
the striking of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a Member
in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other
assessments to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No.
110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise
respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown
by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No.
4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also included the name
of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of
officers and directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further
enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981,
Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein
respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with
the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying
the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent
be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
 9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the
Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and
other assessment for which the undersigned paid as
shown by Official Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt
No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax

Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official Receipt No.
3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership

in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as a
Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the
Quezon City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has

narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the
right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of

court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred

(P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from
payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine
Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in,
the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He
maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he
was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia:
that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law;
that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as
he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board
of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of
imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to
defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the
IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there
is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination
and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could
have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated,
thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged
that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals
for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is
questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in
the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal
protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that
compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an
inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He
adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues
would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law.
Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive
in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-
1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?cralawlibrary
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support
of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar8 - which power required members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration
of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the
power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the
slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of
the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment
of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could
have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay
abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under
inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In
the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to
pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal
would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence
infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we
do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a

privilege burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP

dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed
by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of
law.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL
A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by
petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree
of Bachelor of Laws in 19791and passed the same year’s bar
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw
library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar
examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar
Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.6cralaw
virtualaw library
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files,
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that
he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed
at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.7cral
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated
that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was
not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the
mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of
the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its
urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.”9cralawry
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for
his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory
conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained
that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the
instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical
transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character
when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to
petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant
petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you
say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s
gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and
anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17which is more than what we can
say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of
the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner
strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession,
and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law
Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw
library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member
of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand
the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all
liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from
the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil
motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he
had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so.26 When, in
spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s
assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is
in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing
of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears
quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from
making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge
pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of
law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at
the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9
have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As
Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the
practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him
in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before
he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is
hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNEDthat doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
 ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO
PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners, v. BENEDICTO M.
BALAJADIA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio
Tan, Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent
Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case
against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance
due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from
respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office
address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City."2However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence,
petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest
mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared
the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino's
complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the
same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 o'clock
in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same date but
which occurred at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Respondent insists that
the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o'clock parking incident
correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room
B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."7 However, the
complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o'clock parking incident, which is
the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a
practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino's secretary copied verbatim
paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino's complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was
inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in
Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building,
Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of
Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino's secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting
the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent
alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed
that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with
respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he
had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made
liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful statements in the
complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino's
secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect
contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. -
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by
the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by
assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority
constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt
and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and
authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that
intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.11

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent's claim

that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was
a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The
affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to
the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent's complaint-
affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a

practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf
of his client;12 appearing before court hearings as an
attorney;13 manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite
being previously denied admission to the bar;14 or deliberately attempting
to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars
with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent

acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently,
he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of
intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent's

deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such
without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to

be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. PUBLICO, petitioner.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Three Petitions for the reinstatement of Juan T. Publico in the Roll of
Attorneys, have been filed: (1) by Juan T. Publico himself dated May 28,
1979; 2) by the President and twelve members of the faculty of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Manila, where Juan
T. Publico is also a faculty member, filed on June 1, 1979; and 3) by the
San Page 723 Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila
through its President, Vice-President and Directors on April 23, 1979.
The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the
Bar Examination in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination. His
uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel opposed the petition alleging that his nephew
is not a person of good moral character for having misrepresented,
sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was
eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by utilizing the
school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico when, in
actual fact, petitioner had not completed Grade VI of his elementary
schooling, much less, First and Second Year High School. When
required to file a formal Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an
administrative case against his nephew for falsification of school records
or credentials.
In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar Examination, passed
it, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
The administrative case was referred to the Court's Legal Officer-
Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., for investigation and report. On
September 10, 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel moved to drop the complaint on
the ground that his witnesses had turned hostile. The Motion was denied,
however, as the complainant's witnesses had already testified. Upon the
termination of the hearing, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted a
Report with the following findings and recommendation:
To recapitulate, respondent Juan Tapel Publico (son of
Francisco Publico) studied at Buhi Elementary School,
Bato, Catanduanes, until Grade VI, but finished only
Grade V in said school, because on February 1, 1950, or
before the end of the school year 1949-1950, he left said
school and came to Manila. Once in Manila, he enrolled in
Third Year high school at the University of Manila.
Required by the school authorities to submit his school
records for Grade VI elementary and First and Second
Year high school, he sent for the records of his cousin
Juan Marino Publico (son of Gabriel Publico).
For all the foregoing, we find and so hold that respondent
falsified his school records, by making it appear that he
had finished or completed Grade VI elementary and First
and Second Year high school, when in truth and in fact he
had not, thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and
6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require
completion by a bar examinee or candidate of the
prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law
school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
Wherefore, the undersigned Investigators hereby
recommend that respondent's name be stricken from the
Rollo of Attorneys.
In this Court's Resolution of February 23, 1962, the name of Juan T.
Publico was stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico
filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for
had he been informed, nor did he have any knowledge of the Resolution
of the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys until March 1969, when after taking his oath of office as
Municipal Judge of Gigmoto, Catanduanes, he was advised to inquire
into the outcome of the disbarment case against him; that he was
shocked and humiliated upon learning of the said Resolution; that he
resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and
transferred to Manila. He then prayed that the Court allow his
reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct from the
time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous
awards, resolutions and/'or commendations he received, which were
incorporated in the Petition, and particularly, for the sake of his children.
The Court denied the Petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
claiming that he had been sufficiently punished already, but again this
was denied by the Court for lack of merit.
On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second Petition for
Reinstatement stating that the Complaint for disbarment against him had
been withdrawn by the complainant, but that the Legal Officer-
Investigator proceeded with the hearing ex parte; that he was unable to
cross-examine the witnesses against him as he was unaware of the ex-
parte proceedings until he was informed by the Legal Officer-Investigator
about the same; that he had suffered so much already and to let him
suffer perpetual disqualification would not be in consonance with the
program of the New Society. He prayed that his name be reinstated in
the Roll of Attorneys, or that the case be reopened so that he could
cross-examine the witnesses against him and clear himself of the
charges. This Court denied his Petition in its Resolution of April 23, 1974.
On November 17, 1975, Juan T. Publico wrote to the Chief Justice
imploring his assistance that he may be given another opportunity to
enjoy the privileges of a lawyer, and requesting that a hearing be held
where he could personally plead for his reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys. Again, this Court denied the aforesaid letter-petition.
Petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement on July 8, 1976 stating
that he had remained a person of good moral character and had an
exemplary social standing in the community where he resides, as shown
by his election to various positions in different associations: as peace
officer of Barangay 593, Zone 58 of the City of Manila (Annex A of the
petition), President of the Stallholders and Vendors Association of
Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta. Mesa, Inc. (Annex B), re-elected President of
the Altura Elementary School General Parents-Teachers Association
(Annex C), and re-elected President of the San Miguel (Catanduanes)
Civic Association in Metro Manila (Annex D). He also alleged that his
moral character and integrity had remained irreproachable, that he had
been more than sufficiently punished and had been undergoing economic
difficulties because of his disbarment. In its Resolution of August 3, 1976,
this Court denied the Petition with finality.
For consideration now is petitioner's fifth plea for reinstatement filed on
June 1, 1979 in addition to a letter-petition addressed to Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando dated November 3, 1979. In his Petition, Juan T.
Publico avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila was
through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied
him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in
spite of his demonstrations; that the misrepresentation committed about
his academic records was not his own fault alone, but was precipitated by
his uncle, who as member of the faculty of the Catanduanes Institute had
access to the records of the school; that being merely sixteen years of
age, he could not be expected to act with discernment as he was still
under the influence of his uncle, who later on caused his disbarment; that
he had conducted himself in a manner befitting a member of the bar; that
he had striven to serve the people and the government as shown by the
positions he held as Municipal Attorney of San Miguel, Catanduanes,
Deputy Register of Deed of Catanduanes, Election Registrar of the
Commission on Elections, and Editorial Assistant in the Editorial Staff of
the defunct House of Representatives, and presently as faculty member
of the Polytechnic university of the Philippines, a State University.
Additionally, petitioner submitted evidence purporting to show his honesty
and integrity and other manifestations of his good moral character,
particularly, the Resolution dated March 30, 1979 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Catanduanes Chapter (Annex A); the Resolution dated
April 16, 1979 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Catanduanes
(Annex B); the letter of the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T.
Tatel addressed to the late Chief Justice Castro dated April 17, 1979
(Annex B-1), all attesting to his good character and standing in the
community and his capability as a lawyer. Further submitted are
certifications issued by the different government offices Court of First
Instance of Catanduanes (Annex C); Catanduanes Integrated National
Police Command (Annex F should be D); Office of the Provincial Fiscal at
Virac, Catanduanes (Annex F), and First Municipal Circuit Court, Bato-
San Miguel, Bato, Catanduanes (Annex E), certifying that petitioner has
not been accused nor convicted of any crime.
The petition filed by the President and Faculty of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines reiterated the same circumstances as those
stated by Juan T. Publico in his own Petition and further professed that
Atty. Publico is a competent and proficient teacher; that his moral
integrity and honesty are beyond reproach; that to require him to comply
with what he missed in the steps of the educational ladder would be
meaningless and without any value as it is not intended to benefit him nor
the system of education; and that non-formal education has already been
recognized and given its equivalence in the scheme of formal education.
The petition also mentioned the names of some great men who had been
school dropouts, but who did not let this fact deter them from attaining
success in their respective fields.
The petition filed by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in
Metro Manila is substantially of the same tenor and added that petitioner
was re-elected President of that Association for four years from 1972 to
1975 inclusive.
No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.

The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows:

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a

great extent in the sound discretion of the court, The court
action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not
it decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an
attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that
he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper
person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge
for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to
the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5
Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443). 1

Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981, shall have elapsed
since petitioner was barred from exercising his profession. Cognizant that
the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the indicative principle, 2 we find
that the evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials
presented on his behalf, as listed heretofore, his good conduct and
honorable dealings subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement
in civic, educational, and religious organizations, render him fit to be
restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has been
sufficiently punished and disciplined. 3

WHEREFORE, petitioner Juan T. Publico is hereby ordered reinstated in

the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 PATRICIA FIGUEROA, Complainant, v. SIMEON BARRANCO,
JR., Respondent.
Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
Jose Remi S. Maranon for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in
1971, against respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar
candidate in the 1970 Bar examination, praying thereto that herein
respondent be denied admission to the legal profession. In her petition,
complainant averred that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that
a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent failed to
fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
Hence, complainant charged him of gross immorality.
The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the
legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with the
complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute gross immoral conduct. To
justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral but grossly immoral. Additionally, even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.
Henceforth, the Court hereby dismissed the instant petition and herein
respondent should be allowed to take his lawyer’s oath.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS;
GROSS IMMORALITY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath because of
charges of gross immorality by complainant. Respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart who claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. These facts
do not constitute gross immorality warranting permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. Engaging in premarital sexual
relations and promising to marry suggests a doubtful moral character but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
be grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to
be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless
act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were
townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays. Her
trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that
respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. In February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing
complainant’s failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking
to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in
failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on
the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.
2 Respondent’s third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court’s
Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent repeated
his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length
of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his
oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period
of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon
payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when
the Court, in response to complainant’s opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the
permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does
not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.
7chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that
she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to
see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son
in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily
led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and
perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a
woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming
that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two years
of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.