Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
*
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor
child RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, petitioner, vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, respondent.
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* THIRD DIVISION.
517
518
519
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case
No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition
was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and
her son came home to the Philippines.6
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520
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15 Id., at p. 22.
16 Id.
17 Id., at p. 24.
18 Id., at p. 8.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Supra note 7.
522
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation
to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family
Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A.
No. 9262 which “equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligor’s nationality.”24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and
reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
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22 Id., at p. 24.
23 Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in
the preceding article:
(1) The spouses;
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter; and
(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
24 Annex “R” to Petition, Rollo, p. 102.
25 Annex “B” to Petition, id., at p. 25.
523
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the following issues:
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking
cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that the
same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court,
consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances
when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
directly to the Supreme
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26 Id.
27 Rollo, p. 10.
28 G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.
524
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law — the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set
of facts, i.e., whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to
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525
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526
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527
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article 195 of
the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that
the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child (either
before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
enunciated that:
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528
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law
of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law
of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has
not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it
is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court
held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons,
the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is not liable to give support to his
son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed
on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his
child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding
that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not
find appli
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529
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530
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that
respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of
R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give
support to petitioner’s son, to wit:
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49 543 Phil. 275; 514 SCRA 294 (2007).
50 Id., at p. 290; p. 309.
531
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532
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)
(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense,53 which
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52 Rollo, p. 15.
53 In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722; 591 SCRA 178, 198 (2009),
it was held that:
533
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534