1. Noveras v.
v. Noveras shall not, therefore, be allowed thus to rest their cause of action to recover the lands sold, upon
2. Adolfo v. Adolfo
- Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed a Petition for judicial separation of property against his
estranged wife. during the marriage, they acquired through conjugal funds, real properties but
later on the parties separated due to irreconcilable differences. Since reunion was no longer
feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly
refused and denied petitioner's co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her
paraphernal property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them
proved unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances
and pursuant to Article 135 (6) of the Family Code. Petitioner thus prayed that judgment be
rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal property.
- Respondent contended that she is the sole owner of the property, thus, making it her
paraphernal property inherited from her mother and that she alone took the initiative to
support the family and found ways to take care of the daily needs of their child. that petitioner
subsequently abandoned them but later on returned to Cebu City seeking reconciliation with
respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in 1987 they once more separated; that
thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner.
- in a separate civil case, Respondent sold the property to her brother, her brother mortgaged
it to DBP, foreclosed and DBP sold it to the Garcias and the Garcias sold it to respondent with
new TCT. Respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons but refused to partition
even Gingoyons paid the taxes and selling expenses. That when the sale to the Gingoyons was
made, the subject property constituted conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner; when
the Garcias executed the deed of sale, the subject property became a conjugal asset; since
petitioner did not sign the deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time
and knew nothing about the sale, the sale was null and void
. RTC nullified the DOS. Meanwhile during the pre-trial of the Civil Case, respondent failed to
file her answer. Then RTC found that it’s a conjugal property and dismissed the case.
Respondent appealed to CA. Decision was reversed and set aside. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence, the present Petition was
filed on April 30, 2012
Issue: whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent
Ruling: Paraphernal. Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that subject
property is a conjugal property does not have any basis, hence, does not have any merit at all.
On the contrary, it is sufficiently proven that the aforesaid lot was a paraphernal property as
the latter even admitted that she inherited the same from her mother although she claimed it
as a conjugal property based on the TCT's attached to her answer. Thus, with the development
in the separate Civil Case brought upon by its final and executory decision, petitioner's case is
left with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property to be divided between the parties,
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
3. De Luna v. Linatoc
CONFIRMATION, RATIFICATION AND RECOGNITION DISTINGUISHED; AUTHORITY OF WIFE TO
SELL PROPERTY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. — A careful analysis of Exhibit I reveals that
the same is neither a confirmation nor a ratification of the sales made by the wife, but is what
Spanish jurists call a "reconocimiento" or recognition. Confirmation tends to cure a vice of
nullity, and ratification is for the purpose of giving authority to a person who previously acted
in the name of another without authority. Recognition, on the other hand, is merely to cure a
defect of proof. In recognition, there is no vice to be remedied, such as fraud, violence or
mistake, so the case is distinguished from confirmation. In recognition, the person acting on
behalf of another is duly authorized to do so, so the situation is different from ratification. The
instant case is one of recognition because the husband was not trying to cleanse the sales of all
taint, such as fraud, violence or mistake, nor was it his purpose to confer authority to his wife,
because he stated in Exhibit I: "when my wife sold said lands to J. L. she did so with my
knowledge and consent." Exhibit I merely made it appear in a deed that at the time the sales
were made by the wife, she did so ith his knowledge and consent. Thus the requirement in the
statute of frauds that in a sale of real property the authority of the agent should be in writing,
has been complied with. Therefore, she was only acting as his agent.
ILLEGALITY OF PARTITION BETWEEN SPOUSES MADE DURING MARRIAGE. — However, as such
agent, the wife could not sell her portions of those lands in the name of her husband, because
the partition was illegal and void, as it was made during the marriage and there was no judicial
order authorizing separation of property between the husband and the wife (art. 1432, Civil
Code). Consequently, the character of these portions of lands as conjugal partnership property
was never changed. The wife could, therefore, sell and did sell, as agent of the husband, these
portions as part of the conjugal partnership assets. And the wife may bind the conjugal
partnership with the consent of the husband, according to article 1416 of the Civil Code.
(P-wife (no name provided eh, si Agustin lang meron) sold a portion of their conjugal property
to R. The parcel of land was the husband’s portion of the conjugal property. The wife, with the
know ledge and consent of the husband, sold the lot to R as evidenced by the deed of sale and
the deed of recognition wherein the husband recognized and reiterated his acquiescence to the
sale (Art 1416- A conjugal property can be sold by one spouse if the other spouse consents). Such
sale was prohibited by Art 1432 because partitioning the conjugal property during marriage can
only be done if there was a judicial separation of property, or else it would be illegal and void.
The sale can onl be valid if the land was sold under the name of the conjugal partnership and
not of the husband only. The Ps assail the validity of the sale to R, claiming that they do not know
of such prohibition
ISSUE: W/N the sale may be validly annulled by the spouses? - NO
RULING: The fact that the petitioners did not know the prohibition against partition of the
conjugal partnership property during marriage (art. 1432, Civil Code) is not a valid reason why
they should ask for the annulment of the sales made. To repudiate the sales in question,
petitioners are setting up their own wrongful act of partitioning their conjugal property, which
violated article 1432 of the Civil Code. The prohibition in said article affects public policy, as it is
designed to protect creditors of the conjugal partnership and other third persons. Petitioners
the illegality of the partition which they attempted to make. Otherwise, they would profit by
their own unlawful act.)
4. Maquilan v. Maquilan
Petitioner and respondent are spouses who had a blissful marriage when petitioner discovered
that the respondent was having illicit affair, which prompted petitioner to file a case of adultery
against respondent and paramour, they were later sentenced to imprisonment. Thereafter,
respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, the spouses entered into a compromise
agreement. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This
motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court
of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. ***
repudiation-rejection of a proposal or idea***
ISSUE: WON the respondent is disqualified in acquiring her share in the conjugal property
because of her crime of adultery?
The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil
Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward,
of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code.
The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualifiation from the right of
suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall
suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry
the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
5. Toda v. CA
Benigno and Rose were married and were blessed with 2 children, due to differences and the
alleged infidelity of Benigno, Rose filed a petition for the termination of conjugal partnerships
for alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno. After the
hearings, the parties in order to avoid further disagreeable proceedings, filed a joint petition for
judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership. This petition which was signed by the
parties, embodied a compromise agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in
the conjugal partnership and dismissing with prejudice the Civil Cases. The said petition and
compromise were approved by the trial court. The said agreement failed to fully subserve the
intended amicable settlement of all the disputes of the spouses. Instead, as lamented by the
counsel of one of them, the compromise agreement which was designed to terminate a
litigation spawned two new petitions, with each party initiating one against the other. Thus,
illustrative of the saying that a solution which creates another problem is no solution, the
contradictory interpretations placed by the parties on some provisions of the agreement
resulted in appeals to respondent court and, eventually, the present recourse to us. Thereafter,
several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: When does the compromise agreement became effective?
The award of cash dividends basically depends on the date of effectivity of the compromise
agreement as this will determine whether the same is conjugal property or separate property
of the spouses. The court agrees with the holding of the CA agreement became effective only
on the date when it was approved by the trial court and not on when it was signed by the
parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, "(i)n the absence of an express declaration in the
manage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place save in virtue of a judicial order." Hence, the separation of property is not effected
by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the
court approving the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without
which it is void. Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal
partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of Benigno and Rose Marie should be considered
dissolved only on June 9, 1981 when the trial court approved their joint petition for voluntary
dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
6. Belcodero v. CA
Alayo married Juliana, with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In
1946, he left the conjugal home, and he started to live with Josefa with whom he later begot
one child, Josephine. In 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis. In the deed,
he indicated his civil status as, "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the common-law wife. In a letter,
dated 06 October 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter
to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefina R. Bosing." The final deed of sale was
executed and a few days later a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of "Josefa
R. Bosing, . . . married to Alayo Bosing, . . ." On 6 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his
prior marriage with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years
later, Josefa executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in question, which
was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and deceased Alayo. In this deed, Josefa's
supposed 1/2 interest as surviving spouse of Alayo, as well as her one-fourth 1/4 interest as
heir, was conveyed to Josephine for a P10,000.00 consideration, thereby completing for herself,
along with her (1/4) interest as the surviving child of Alayo, a full "ownership" of the property.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana (deceased Alayo's real widow) and her three legitimate children
filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of the property and was later affirmed by
the CA.
ISSUE: won the property is a conjugal property of Josefa and Alayo?
The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife
Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), "all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This presumption has not been
convincingly rebutted. It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was
titled in the name of Josefa at Alayo's request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner.
The property unquestionably was acquired by Alayo. Alayo's letter the estate company merely
authorized the latter to have the title to the property transferred to her name.
(**The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the property by
the beneficiaries thereof is 10 years (Art 1144, Civil Code). Ordinarily, that period starts from the
establishment of the implied trust being the day when the cause of action would be considered
to have accrued (Ar 1150, Civil Code). Unfortunately for Josefa and Josephine, however, the
property involved in this case is a realty titled under the Torrens System. The prescriptive period
is thus to be counted from the time the transaction affecting the property is registered with the
corresponding issuance of a new certificate of title. Between the time Transfer Certificate of Title
and the filing of the action for the reconveyance of the property with the court a quo barely a
period of 6 years and 4 months had elapsed. The case has accordingly been initiated seasonably.
***The four-year prescriptive period, mentioned in passing by the petitioners, would have had
some value and relevance had the private respondents or their predecessor in interest been
parties to the extrajudicial partition and sale. In that event, the latter's action could only then be
predicated on a vitiation of consent 4 where the applicable statutory limitation would be four
years.)
7. Valdez v. RTC -606
Antoni and Consuelo were married and later had 5 kids. In 1991, Antonio sought the declaration
of nullity of the marriage, the RTC rendered judgement and declared the marriage null and void
on the ground psychological incapacity and ordered the liquidation of their common properties
as defined by Art 147 of the Family Code and to comply with the provisions of Art 50, 51, & 52
of the Family Code. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that
the FC did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”. The court explained that the property, including the family home acquired during
their marriage, are presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and the property
would be owned by them in equal shares and the liquidation and partition of property would
be governed by the regime of co-ownership6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not
apply since it refers to the procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129
also does not apply because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute community
of property7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON ART 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of the conjugal properties?
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during
the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man
and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together
as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership. When the common-law spouses suffer from a
legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband
and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal.
8. Carino v. Carino -614
9. Mercado-Fehr v. Fehr
After two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with
him. During the time they lived together, they purchased a Condominium Suite on installment.
They got married in 1985. In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and
Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal properties. The properties were divided into three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and
1/3 for the children. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite because it was
declared to have been the exclusive property of Bruno, acquired prior his marriage. Elna filed
a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the
Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio. However, the court reminded
Elna of the previous agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds from the sale
thereof proportionately among them. It also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the
Suite 204. Elna filed special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
The CA in its Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the suite is an exclusive property of Bruno?
The Court gives more credence to petitioner's submission that Suite was acquired during the
parties' cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should
be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage
is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to
the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. Article 147 applies in this case because
(1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All these elements are present
in the case at bar. The disputed property was purchased at the time when petitioner and
respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property
of petitioner and respondent. The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement
of the common properties of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to voidable
marriages and to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code.
10. Joaquino v. Reyes
Lourdes and Rodolfo begot 4 children during their marriage. In the course of the said marriage,
Rodolfo had illicit relations with Milagros(p) whom he also had 3 children. Rodolfo and Milagros
decided to buy a jouse and lot which was executed in the name of Milagros. Lourdes alleged
that the funds used to purchase the property were conjugal funds. Rodolfo also put into custody
some of the couple’s conjugal properties under the care of his paramour, this includes his
earnings and retirement benefits. Lourdesprayed that the properties be declared conjugal and
that Milagros surrenders the possession thereof. Milagros contends that she purchased the
properties in her exclusive capacity and that she had no knowledge of Rodolfo’s 1 st marriage.
ISSUE: WON the properties are conjugal and does the petitioner have the right of co –
ownership? (Yes and NO, respectively)
Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and
lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial
separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and
wife. "(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of
them; (3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the
common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse." Moreover, under Article 160
of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife
exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG. For the rebuttable presumption to arise,
however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the
marriage.
Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a woman who are
living together but are not legally married. Prevailing jurisprudence holds, though, that for
Article 144 to apply, the couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage. It has been held
that the Article is inapplicable to common-law relations amounting to adultery or concubinage,
as in this case. The reason therefor is the absurdity of creating a co-ownership in cases in which
there exists a prior conjugal partnership between the man and his lawful wife. In default of
Article 144 of the Civil Code, Article 148 of the Family Code has been applied. Thus, when a
common-law couple have a legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them
— through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry — shall be owned by
them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo
and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. More important, they
have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the
property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were
conjugal funds under the Civil Code. In contrast, petitioner has failed to substantiate either of
her claims — that she was financially capable of buying the house and lot, or that she actually
contributed to the payments therefor.
11. Atienza v. de Castro
Lupo Atienza hired the services of respondent Yolanda.In the course of time, the relationship
between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a married man, he and
Yolanda eventually lived together. However, their relationship turned sour until they parted
ways.On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the
judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements. Lupo alleged that the
subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife,
hence the property is co-owned by them. Lupo averred that the property in question was
acquired by Yolanda using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the
seller in Yolanda's name without his knowledge and consent. In her answer, Yolanda denied
Lupo's allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two Million Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought
it thru her own savings and earnings. RTC ordered that the property be partitioned in equal
shares between the spouses.
ISSUE: WON the property is the exclusive property of Yolanda?
Petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation
with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code,under this regime, “only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions” Proof of actual contribution is required. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property
or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares
shall be presumed to be equal. Petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is
without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the
purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as
evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere
say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden
of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence. There can clearly be no co-
ownership when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds
used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman, she presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial
dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank
transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the
subject property.
12. Fransisco v. MIWCC
Josefina and Eduardo were married; he was then the vice president in a private corporation. In
1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina covering
two parcels of residential land with a house thereon. The Register of Deeds annotated at the
dorsal portion of the said titles an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared
that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the
house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he
had over the property. In 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of
Reach Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from MIWCC but failed to pay
for the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against
Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriff issued a notice of levy on
execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount
due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2 parcels
of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property. Josefina filed a complaint for
damages against MIWCC and the sheriff. Before she could commence presenting her evidence,
Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque on the ground
that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one
Carmelita Carpio. The RTC declared the marriage null and void for being bigamous.
ISSUE: WON the properties were paraphernal and cannot be held liable for Eduardo’s
obligations?
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds before
her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence on
record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the
petitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her
marriage to Eduardo. It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At
that age, it is doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties
as she claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later
claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a
desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment
creditor. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates
such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has
actually contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union
the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
13. Dino v. Dino
On 14 January 1998, Petitioner and Respondent were married. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed
an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected
upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United
States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the
petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition
for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior
Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent
married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The trial court granted the petition on the ground that
respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. RTC declared that the “A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties'
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.”
ISSUE: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution
of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Supreme Court ruled that, except when the void marriages refers to the subsequent void
marriage under Art 40, all 0ther judicially declared void marriages, such as Psychological
incapacity, do not have to wait for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the dissolved co-
ownership under Art 147 before a Decree of Nullity of Marriage is issued. Section 19(1) of the
Rules on Nullity of Marriage provides that “if the cour renders a decision granting the petition,
it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued
by the court only after compliance with Art, 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.”The Supreme Court agree with
petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule does not apply
to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
14. Agapay v. Palang
Miguel married Carlina in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their
only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for good in 1972, he refused to
live with Carlina. In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage
with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A house
and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. 1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The
parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their
only child, Herminia. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s
complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and
the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower
court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: WON the agricultural land, the house and the lot be awarded in favor of Erlinda?
While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void
because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the
latter's de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares. Erlinda failed to persuade that she contributed money to buy the
subject riceland thus we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
With respect to the house and lot, the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to
Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it
was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under
Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of
those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
15. Saguid v. CA
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband, when
she met and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid. In 1996, the couple decided to separate
and end up their 9-year cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and
Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she be
declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00,
representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the parties?
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the
former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships, where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances
of the same married man. Under this regime, ". . . only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . . ." Proof of actual
contribution is required. In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and the
personal properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony
did she specify the extent of her contribution. Both parties claim that the money used to
purchase the disputed personal properties came partly from their joint account. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148
of the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties' respective contribution,
their share shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued
at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the petitioner. Hence,
their share therein is equivalent to onehalf, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
16. Borromeo v. Descallar
Jambrich, Austrian, fell in love with respondent and acquired their own house and lots. when
the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration it was refused on the ground that
Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain thus is name
was erased but his signature remained on the document. However, their relationship did not
last long and they found new love. Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged on engaged
in the real estate business. Jambrich bought an engine and some accessories for his boat from
petioner, for which he became indebted to the latter. To pay his debt, he sold some of his
properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in his favor. However, when
the petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that the said land was
registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property.
ISSUE: WON Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and may not transfer and assign
any rights and favor of the petitioner?
The SC affirmed the sale by the Austrian of the property registered under the name of the
Filipina wife to a third person by ruling that mere registration of the title under the name of the
Filipina spouse does not confer upon her absolute ownership against convincing evidence that
the property was financed exclusively by the Austrian. The rule on co-ownership applies to a
man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In this case,
respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In an
adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of
the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do
not apply. In this case, respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties as she and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich. It is settled that
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The
mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner.
 17. PAFL v. Yanagisawa
Respondent Eiji, Japanese, and Evelyn, Filipina, contracted marriage. On 1995, Evelyn purchased
a 152 square-meter townhouse unit. In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed
a Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of
a Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all
of the properties registered in her name. At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her
lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the
pendency of the case, thus rendering Eiji’s application and motion moot. In March 1997, Evelyn
obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from PAFIN. To secure the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of PAFIN over the townhouse unit. Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage was dissolved
and ordered the liquidation of their registered properties, including the townhouse unit, with
its proceeds to be divided between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or
dissolve its Order on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the properties
registered in her name. Eiji learned of the REM, deeming the mortgage as a violation of the
Makati RTC’s Order, Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM (annulment of mortgage
case) against Evelyn and PAFIN. Evelyn asserted that she paid for the property with her own
funds and that she has exclusive ownership thereof.

ISSUE: WON the property solely in the name of the wife is paraphernal or conjugal?

The CA did not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns the Parañaque
townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said
question and should not have been interfered with by the Parañaque RTC. The CA only clarified
that it was improper for the Parañaque RTC to have reviewed the ruling of a co-equal court.
Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Parañaque RTC to rule on the ownership
issue because it was essential for the determination of the validity of the REM. The Court
disagrees. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not claim ownership of the Parañaque
townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment.
Instead, Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyn’s commitment not to dispose of or encumber the
property, and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791. It was Evelyn and
PAFIN that raised Eiji’s incapacity to own real property as their defense to the suit. They
maintained that Eiji, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not
consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this argument is beside the point and is not a
proper defense to the right asserted by Eiji. This defense does not negate Eiji’s right to rely on
the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who deal with the
registered property, to the annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing
the complaint based on this defense. Petitioner did not question the rest of
the appellate court’s ruling, which held that Evelyn and PAFIN executed the REM in complete
disregard and violation of the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and the annotation on
TCT No. 99791. It did not dispute the legal effect of the October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyn’s
capacity to encumber the Parañaque townhouse unit nor the CA’s finding that petitioner is a
mortgagee in bad faith. The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyn’s commitment not to
dispose of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the disposition or
encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing
injunction order are voidable as to the party enjoined and third parties who are not in good
faith. The party, in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek
the annulment of the offending actions.

18. Ventura v Spouses Abuda

Socorro and Esteban were married, although Socorro and Esteban never had children, both had
children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline, and Socorro had a
son, who was the father of Edilberto, the petitioner. Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior
subsisting marriage to Crispin when she married Esteban. This marriage was not annulled, and
Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro's marriage to Esteban. Esteban's prior marriage was
dissolved by his wife's death. In 1986, Esteban purchased a portion of lot while the remaining
portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her father's behalf in 1970. On 1997,
Esteban sold the properties to Evangeline and her husband. Esteban and Socorro passed away.
In 2000, Leonora, the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto, represented by
Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto
alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Esteban's signature on the deeds
of sale was forged. Respondents argued that because of Socorro's prior marriage to Crispin, her
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right
or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

ISSUE: WON Edilberto is entitled to the sold propertyies by virtue of Socorro’s marriage to
Estban?

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-
owned the property. The evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over
the Vitas property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after
the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system merely confirms,
and does not vest title. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was
acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the
purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on
behalf of her father. Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under the name of
Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.