ANGARA V.

ELECTORAL COMMISSION
63 Phil. 189
FACTS: In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner
was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath
in office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this
with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission.
ISSUES: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy; and
Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the
protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.
HELD: The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority
of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than
the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power
of trying impeachments. The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” In view of the
deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua.
The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

Vasco v. CA
89 SCRA 762
FACT: This case is about the trial court's jurisdiction to execute pending appeal a judgment for support. Reynaldo
Vasco (24) and Lolita Vasco (22) are the illegitimate children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes. The Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City ordered Antonio to pay them the sum of P200 as monthly allowance for
support, and 500 as attorney's fees. Antonio Vasco appealed to the Court of Appeals and two months after the approval
of the record on appeal, Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco filed a motion for the execution of the said judgment pending
appeal. The lower court granted the motion and CA upheld that order of execution pending appeal in the "interests of
substantial justice" and on the theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens patriae and that if
the said order is erroneous, the error is only an error of judgment and is not a grave abuse of discretion or an act in
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to issue an order for execution pending appeal.
HELD: Contrary to the impression of the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s error is not merely an error of judgment. It
is clear that the trial court acted without jurisdiction. Hence, certiorari lies to annul its order of execution pending
appeal.
We should not forget that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice.
Justice has to be administered according to the rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice or whimsicality.
As to the doctrine of parens patriae (father of his country), its relevancy to this case is doubtful because the recipients
of the support granted by the lower court are no longer minors. The doctrine refers to the inherent power and authority
of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris. Under that doctrine, the state
has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under disability. Thus, the state is considered the parens patriae
of minors.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue an order for execution
pending appeal and, therefore, the order is null and void.
Decision of the Court of Appeals and the lower court’s order and writ of execution reversed and set aside.

COA v Link Worth

581 SCRA 501
FATCS:
On July 14, 2004, the Commission on Audit's Bids and Awards Committee (COA-BAC) conducted a bidding for various
information communication technology equipment. Link Worth and Audio Visual were among the bidders who have
“passed” the technical specifications for the equipment. COA was alleged to have committed grave abuse of discretion
in awarding the bid contract to Audio Visual even though it didn’t pass some of the bid specifications provided by COA,
that the bidding rules and regulations were violated and that it allowed subjectivity to come into play when it allowed
end-users to participate in the decision-making process contrary to R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act, which seeks to eliminate subjectivity in award of government contracts.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not COA exercise grave abuse of discretion in awarding the bid contract to Audio Visual
2) Whether or not COA, in the exercise of its proprietary functions, be sued without its consent.
HELD:
Except only in cases in which alternative methods of procurement are allowed, all government procurement shall be
done by competitive bidding. Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed by the principles of
transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and accountability. This is initiated by the BAC, which advertises the Invitation
to Bid for contracts under competitive bidding in order to ensure the widest possible dissemination thereof. It does not
give occasion for the procuring entity to arbitrarily exercise its discretion and brush aside the very requirements it
specified as vital components of the goods it bids out.
An essential element of a publicly bidded contract is that all bidders must be on equal footing. Not simply in terms of
application of the procedural rules and regulations imposed by the relevant government agency, but more importantly,
on the contract bidded upon. Each bidder must be able to bid on the same thing.
COA is an unincorporated government agency which does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own. Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued
without its consent. Assuming that the contract it entered into with Audio Visual can be taken as an implied consent to
be sued, and further that incidental reliefs such as damages may be awarded in certiorari proceedings, Link Worth did
not appeal the Court of Appeals' Decision deleting the award of damages against COA. Consequently, Link Worth is
bound by the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals, including the deletion of the award of
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.
It is remarkably ironic that COA, the constitutional watchdog, signed its imprimatur to a transaction which resulted
from an irreparably flawed bidding process. The Commission, in this case, has displayed a lamentable disregard of its
mandate as the sentinel of government resources. The nullification of the award of the contract to Audio Visual and
the mutual restitution directed by the Court of Appeals are both appropriate consequences. It is, however, paramount
that COA be reminded of its most important role, seemingly forgotten in this case, in the promotion of transparency
and accountability in public financial transactions.

REPUBLIC v HIDALGO
534 SCRA 619
FACTS: Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale,
reconveyance and/or recovery of ownership and possession of property against the Republic of the Philippines in the
RTC of Manila. It is also known as the Arlegui Residence which housed two Philippine presidents and which now holds
the Office of the Press Secretary and the News Information Bureau. The case was initially dismissed by the presiding
Judge of the Manila RTC (Branch 35) on the ground of state immunity. The case was re-raffled to the Manila RTC
(Branch 37), with respondent Vicente A. Hidalgo as presiding Judge. In an Order, Judge Hidalgo declared the Republic
in default for failure of Solicitor Gabriel Francisco Ramirez, the handling solicitor, to file the required answer within the
period prayed for in his motion for extension. It is contended that the respondent Judge violated the Constitution and
the fundamental rule that government funds are exempt from execution or garnishment when he caused the issuance
of the writ of execution against the Republic.

ISSUES: WON Republic of the Phil. can invoke immunity from suit.

HELD: The Trial court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond the claim made in the complaint or
beyond that proved by the evidence. For the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, petitioner Republic is ordered
to pay private respondent the reasonable amount of ₱20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same
and the possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6% per annum on the
total amount due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay
private respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the premises. The decision of Trial
Court to issue the private respondent a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED.

The assailed trial court’s issuance of the writ of execution against government funds to satisfy its money judgment was
nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy such judgments. A judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the
plaintiff’s claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they cannot be enforced by processes of law. However,
private respondent is in the twilight of her life, being now over 90 years of age. Any delay in the implementation of this
disposition would be a bitter cut. It behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards
paying private respondent what is due her.

City of Caloocan v. Hon. Allarde

GR 107271 [Sept 10, 2003]

Facts. In a suit questioning the legality of the abolition by the Caloocan City Mayor of the position of Asst. City
Administrator, among others, petitioner City of Caloocan (the City) was ordered, among others, to pay respondent
Santiago (who was then the Asst. City Administrator) her back salaries and other emoluments. Judgment lapsed into
finality. The City only made partial payment. Respondent RTC Judge Allarde issued a writ of execution for the payment
of the balance due Santiago. Subsequently, the City Council passed an ordinance which included the remaining claim
of Santiago. With the City Mayor refusing to sign the check representing the payment due Santiago, the funds of the
City with PNB were garnished and Santiago was finally settled in full. The City assails the legality of the garnishment
arguing that public funds are beyond the reach of garnishment even with the appropriation passed by the City Council
where the Mayor has not authorized its release.

ISSUE. Are the funds of the City exempt from garnishment?

HELD. No. The rule on the immunity of public funds from seizure or garnishment does not apply where the funds
sought to be levied under execution are already allocated by law specifically for the satisfaction of the money judgment
against the government. In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes. In the
case at bar, the City Council has already approved and passed an ordinance allocating for Santiago’s claims.

Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals

GR 89898-99, 190 SCRA 206 [Oct 1, 1990]

Facts. An expropriation proceeding was initiated by the Municipality of Makati (the Municipality). After due hearing,
judgment was rendered ordering the Municipality to pay the just compensation. A writ of execution was issued, and a
notice of garnishment accordingly served upon PNB. The Municipality filed a motion to lift said garnishment but was
denied. The Municipality now alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB. It opened the
first account exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property. However, this first account had a balance
insufficient to pay the entire just compensation adjudged. On the other hand, the Municipality opened the second
account for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal govt. The Municipality does not oppose the
garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds in its first PNB account, but it contends that the funds from the
second account, which were also garnished to cover the balance, are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law.
Issue. Are the funds of the Municipality in the second PNB account exempt from garnishment?
Held. Yes. The funds deposited in the second PNB account are public funds of the municipal govt. Well-settled is the
rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. The properties
of a municipality which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money
judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing
that the Municipal Council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount
corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the
public funds of the Municipality deposited in the second account.
Tañada v. Cuenco
No. L-10520, 103 Phil 1051 [Feb 28, 1957]

Facts. Pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) was an election protest filed by members of the Citizens
Party (CP) who lost to members of the Nacionalista Party (NP). The Senate was at the time composed of 23 members
of the NP and 1 of the CP — petitioner Sen. Tañada. When the SET was being organized, Sen. Tañada, in behalf of the
CP, nominated himself alone. Sen. Primicias, a member of the NP, then nominated “not on behalf of the [NP] but on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate” Sens. Delgado and respondent Cuenco “to complete the membership
of the Tribunal”. This he claims is the mandate of the Constitution which reads: “xxx Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court xxx and the remaining six shall be
Members of the [House] who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. xxx.”51 Over the objection
of Sen. Tañada, Sens. Delgado and Cuenco were chosen to sit in the SET. Sen. Tañada now contests them in Court.
Respondents aver, among others, that the SC has no jurisdiction on the matter as the issue is a political question and
not judicial.
Issue. Is the issue a political question beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry?
Held. No. The issue at bar is not a political question for the Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in
the choice of members of the SET. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly
within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
We have not only jurisdiction, but also the duty to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.
***The question is said to be political when it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political
capacity. It is judicial when it is a matter that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular
officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. In short, the term “political question” connotes a question
of policy; that is, it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or Executive
branch of the Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. (Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051). On the issue on whether the election of Sens. Delgado and Cuenco is
valid, the Court ruled in the negative. It was held that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution in prescribing
the manner for organizing the Electoral Tribunals is to prevent the majority party from ever controlling the Electoral
Tribunals, and that the structure thereof be founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties with the Justices of the SC to insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests. Thus, the
party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than 3 members thereof to the SET,
and the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other
3 Senators. The Senate may not elect, as members of the SET, those who have not been nominated by the political
parties specified in the Constitution; hence, the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make
such nomination.

Sanidad v. COMELEC
No. L-44640, 73 SCA 333 [Oct 12, 1976]

Facts. In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a referendum plebiscite two questions:
“(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?;
“(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? xxx”
Petitioners now seek to declare void the presidential decrees which submitted the aforementioned issues to the people
in a plebiscite referendum. They aver that the incumbent President has no constitutional grant of constituent power to
propose amendments to the Constitution; consequently, the referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now seek
to enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.
Issues. (1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the assailed presidential decrees political or
justiciable? (2) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people? (3) Is the submission
to the people of the proposed amendments sufficient and proper?
Held. (1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending in this case is in the form of a delegated and hence
a limited power so that the SC is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged
within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the
case at bar,] what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but the Constitutional authority of the President to
perform such acts or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the Judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
2) Yes. In abnormal times,the separation of powers may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
xxx. The power of the State in crisis xxx must be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations
so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in times of
martial law is now a conceded valid act. There is, thus, no reason why the President cannot discharge validly the
function of the Int. Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct to its gross legislative
power. For the President to decline to undertake the amending process, in the absence of the Int. Assembly, would
leave a governmental machinery at a stalemate, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis govt “to end the crises and
restore normal times”.
(3) Yes. Three weeks (period from the issuance of presidential decrees to referendum-plebiscite) is not too short for
free debates and discussions. The questions are not new. They are issues of the day. All that the 1973 Constitution
provides is that the plebiscite “xxx shall be held not later than 3 months after approval of such amendment

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 72915

FACTS:
Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883, calling a special election for President and Vice-President on
February 7, 1986. The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was "irrevocably
vacating the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as Pres. by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation." The principal ground for the challenge
to the validity of the statute was that the conditional resignation of the President did not create a vacancy required by
Article VII, Sec. 9 which authorized the calling of a special election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on that said special
election.

HELD
1. After deliberating, 7 Justices voted to dismiss. On the other hand, 5 Justices voted to declare the statute
unconstitutional. In accordance with Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, of the view that as there were less
than ten votes for declaring BP 883 unconstitutional.
2. On the second issue, it turned out to be a political question. It can only be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity at the scheduled election.
Thus, it is outside the ambit of the courts.
The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to the give the
incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.

LOCAL AUTONOMY Art II, Sec 25.

The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an “imperium in
imperio”. Local govts can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation. It can only mean a measure
of decentralization of the function of govt.
Basco v. PAGCOR
GR 91649, 197 SCRA 52 [May 14, 1991

Facts. PAGCOR, under PD 1869, is exempt from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as
fees, charges or levies or whatever nature xxx”. Basco et al. now seeks to annul PAGCOR alleging, among others, that
it intrudes into the local govt’s (in the case at bar, the City of Manila) right to impose local taxes and license fees,
contravening therefore with the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Issue. Is the tax exemption granted to PAGCOR a violation of the principle of autonomy of local govts?
Held. No. The contention is without merit. Only the National Govt has the power to issue “licenses or permits” for the
operation of gambling. The local govts have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Govt such as PAGCOR.
Otherwise, its operation might be subject to control by a mere local govt; consequently, mere creatures of the State
can defeat National policies. This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Govt over local govt,. The
principle of local autonomy does not make imperium in imperio; it can only mean a measure of decentralization of the
function of govt. Art X of the Constitution provides that each local govt unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes xxx subject to such xxx limitation as the Congress may provide Therefore, the
exemption clause founded in PD 1869 remains an exception to the herein referred power vested in the local govt units.

TESTS OF DELEGATION A law must have a sufficient standard to guide the exercise of the delegated legislative
power. A law delegating legislative power must be complete. Nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate.

People v. Vera
No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [Nov 16, 1937]

Facts. Respondent Unjieng was convicted. Under the Probation Act (Act No. 4221), he later applied for probation.
Judge Vera granted the probation. Petitioners filed this action to the end that Unjieng may be forthwith committed to
prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction. Petitioners aver, among others, that said Act is
unconstitutional as it is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards. The challenged provision thereof
reads: “[t]his Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the
salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals x x x”
Issue. Does the Probation Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Held. Yes. Act No. 4221 is thereby unconstitutional and void. The effectivity of the Act was made to depend upon an
act to be done by the provincial boards, that is, the appropriating of funds for the salary of the probation officer. But
the Act does not xxx fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of this discretionary
power. What is granted is a “roving commission” xxx. It thus leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the Act
upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. This is a virtual
surrender of legislative power to them.
Dumlao v. COMELEC
No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392 [Jan 22, 1980]

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or
municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any
person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in
any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of
such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should
be declared null and void
Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
Held:
No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the requisites of a
judicial inquiry, which are:
1) There must be an actual case or controversy;
2)The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4) The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the provision. His question is posed merely in
the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan has been
charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. They have
no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, but the
institution of a taxpayer’s suit per se is no assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this
particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent. In regards to the
unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another
class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the
provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it
should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.

Osmeña v. Orbos
GR 99886, 220 SCRA 703 [Mar 31, 1993]

Facts. By PD 1956, a special account in the general fund designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was
created. The OPSF was designed to minimize frequent price changes by reimbursing oil companies for the cost increases
brought about by exchange rate adjustments and increases in the world market price of oil. Subsequently, by EO 1024,
the OPSF was reclassified into a “trust liability account” and was ordered released from the National Treasury to the
Ministry of Energy. The same EO also authorized the investment of the fund in govt securities, with the earnings from
such accruing to the fund. As the OPSF is now in a balance deficit, the Energy Regulatory Board issued an order
approving the increase in pump prices of petroleum products. Petitioner avers that the reclassification is a violation of
Sec 29(3), Art VI of the Constitution as it authorized the monies collected for the OPSF to be channeled to another
govt objective and not maintained in a special account in the general fund. He maintains the monies collected for the
OPSF must be treated as a “special fund” and not a “trust account”

Issue. Is the “trust liability account” violative of Sec 29(3), Art VI of the Constitution?
Held. No. Petitioner’s averment is premised on the view that the powers granted to the ERB partake of the nature of
the taxation power of the State. It assumes that the OPSF is a form of revenue measure drawing from a special tax to
be expended for a special purpose. This is not quite correct. It is right to say that the stabilization fees collected are in
the nature of a tax. The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute
them State funds. However, the tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory
purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of [oil prices].
The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain
from the fact that it is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a “trust
liability account,” the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the Commission on Audit. The
Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a “special fund.”

Tablarin v. Gutierrez
No. L-78164, 152 SCRA 730 [Jul 31, 1987]

Facts. Petitioners Tablarin et al. sought admission into schools of medicine for SY 1987-1988. However, they either did
not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical
Education thereby rendering them unqualified/disqualified for admission to medical school under RA 2382 (Medical Act
of 1959). Petitioners contest the constitutionality of said RA as amended averring, among others, that it unduly
delegated legislative power to the Board of Medical Education.
Issue. Is the Medical Act of 1959 an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Held. No. The necessary standards are set forth in Sec 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the standardization and regulation
of medical education” and xxx the body of the statute itself. These considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation principle. Petition dismissed.

**** The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine
some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend. The completeness
test and sufficient standard test must be applied concurrently, not alternatively. [In delegating legislative power to
another branch of the govt by law,] it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law : (a) be complete in itself—it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate—and (b) x x x fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable—to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569)

Agustin v. Edu
No. L-49112, 88 SCRA 195 [Feb 2, 1979]

Facts. In the interest of safety on all streets and highways, Pres. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 229,
directing, among others, all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles to have at all times in their motor vehicles at
least 1 pair of early warning device (EWD). Petitioner Agustin after setting forth that he “is the owner of a Volkswagen
Beetle Car xxx already properly equipped xxx with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an EWD
xxx” allege that said LOI is unconstitutional as it is an invalid exercise of police power. He asserts it is contrary to the
precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who
could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device to the specified set of EWDs. He insists it is arbitrary
and unconscionable to the motoring public, and illegal and immoral because they will make manufacturers and dealers
instant millionaires at the expense of car owners.
Issue. Is the said LOI unconstitutional?
Held. No. While the Court found none of the constitutional defects alleged against the LOI, it still exerted effort in
making the following observation: “The conclusion reached by this Court xxx is reinforced by [the] consideration that
[this] petition itself quoted the whereas clauses of the assailed LOI: ‘[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions
to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on
Road Signs and Signal and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was
ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D.No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices, xxx.’ It cannot be disputed then that [the Incorporation clause] in the
Constitution possesses relevance xxx. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda36 stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality.”

****** Pacta sunt servanda. Literally means “agreements must be kept.” A basic principle in civil and international law
that the pact is binding upon the parties and must be fulfilled by themin good faith. (Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195)
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET. AL.
GR NO.125183, September 29, 1997

Facts: On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila. After
resettling hundreds of squatter families occupying the land covered by the proclamation, the Municipality of San Juan
started to develop its government center. On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987,
former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No. 1716 by excluding from its
operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government center sites purposes but actually occupied for
residential purposes. On June 1, 1998, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for restraining order against
the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either
removing or demolishing the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied have
been awarded to them by Proclamation No 164. The regional trial court dismissed the petition and the appeal before
the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. This decision became final. Disregarding the ruling of the court, private
respondent hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question, submitting the
same to respondent DENR in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164. To prevent
DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association. The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality but
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, hence, the present recourse.

Issues: Is proclamation No. 164 a valid exercise of legislative power? More specifically, is Proclamation No. 164 a valid
legislation?

Held: Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. Notwithstanding the fact that the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon the issue of res judicata, there, exists a more basic reason for
setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to the fundamental and gross error in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 164. Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand Marcos in the due exercise
of legislative power vested upon him. Being a valid act of legislation, said Proclamation may only be amended by an
equally valid act of legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the so-called
bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under a revolutionary
government. On March 24, 1986, she issued Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative power under the
Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was already solely
in Congress. The Supreme Court holds that the issuance of Proclamation No 164 was an invalid exercise of legislative
power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared void. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby set aside. Public respondent DENR is hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing Proclamation No. 164

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NEDA

(GR No. 167798, 4/19/06)
Facts: In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all government
agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems. The purposes
of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure
compatibility and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the
executive branch of the government and PGMA has authority to issue such order.

Issue: WON issuance of E.0. 420 constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions. NO.
1) The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also
mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the
exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President’s constitutional power of control is
self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several
laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and
in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not
usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s constitutional
power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President
did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as
well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities
covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government
and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal
data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far
less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card.
EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as
part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own
ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section
3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number which is needed for cross-
verification to ensure integrity and reliability of identification.

Conference of Maritime Agencies, Inc. vs. POEA

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino
manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and
in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05 which increases the compensation and benefits
of the POEA Standard Employment Contract to Seafarers specifically death benefits will now equivalent to $50,000 and
an additional $7,000 for each child under 21 but not exceeding four children.

Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; and only Congress can.

ISSUE: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power.
HELD: Yes. Under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, The State shall afford full protection to labor, local
and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of legislative
power had been, as correctly contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.

The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to
provide the required direct and efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected
from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may
constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations
that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
prescribed by the law.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous Memorandum
Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices"
prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no longer be disputed.

Telephone Workers Union vs. Minister of Labor

108 SCRA 757
Political Law – Delegation of Power

In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine
Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to
Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation
of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to
whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also
effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the
entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford
protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot
be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.”

MMDA vs Garin
GR No. 130230
April 15, 2005

FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking
illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his
preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary
injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC
rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver’s license
without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.

ISSUE: Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license
in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?

RULING: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a
public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of
the same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.” It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, People’s
Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are
administrative in nature.