INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION V CALLEJA
& charges on common international funds; and
KAPISAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI-ORGANIZED LABOR
ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES AND AGRICULTURE V SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND IRRI
FACTS: An agreement was forged between Philippines and UN for refugees for
the processing of IndioChinese refugees for their resettelement. ICMC was one
of the accredited by the Philippine Government to operate refugee processing. It
is duly registered with UN ECOSOC and enjoys consultative status as an
international organization rendering humanitarian services.
In the case of IRRI, Philippine Government and the Ford and Rockfeller
Foundations signed an Memorandum of Understanding establisihing IRRI
intended to be autonomous, philanthropic, non stock and stock free. It was
initially registered with SEC as a private corporation however by virtue of PD
1620 it was granted the status, prerogatives, privileges and immunities of an
international organization.
The labor organizations of IRRI and ICMC filed for a petition for election
which was however denied because diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE: Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application
of Philippine labor laws valid?
RULING: YES
The term "international organization" is generally used to describe an
organization set up by agreement between two or more states. 4 Under
contemporary international law, such organizations are endowed with some
degree of international legal personality such that they are capable of exercising
specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly as a means for
conducting general international business in which the member states have an
interest.
There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of
international immunities to international organizations. These principles,
contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus:
1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against
control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions
for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically
constituted international bodies in which all the nations concerned are
represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be
accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily
extended to each other by its individual member States. The theory behind all
three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It is not
concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the
elements of functional independence necessary to free international institutions
from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison d'etre for these
immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned.
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly
necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The
objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host
country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the
Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in
accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the
host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to
ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.
ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means
deprives labor of its basic rights, which are guaranteed by our Constitution.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are
disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations provides that
“each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party.” Moreover, pursuant to
Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the Philippine
Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government
is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.Neither are the
employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in
fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee
relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees
and Management (CIEM) wherein “both management and employees were and
still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial
cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”
MANILA PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOCIATION V LAGUIO
FACTS: Series of mass action was undertaken by some 800 public school
teachers to dramatize and highlight the teachers plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon their grievances.
On Sept 17, 1990 (Monday) which was also a regular school day the
800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes. They
were given an order directing all the participants in the mass action to return to
work or face dismissal. The mass action continued for a week hence the Sec of
Education relieved 292 teachers.
Secretary of Education had filed motu proprio administrative
complaints against the teachers who had taken part in the mass actions and
defied the return-to-work order on assorted charges like grave misconduct,
gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, absence without
official leave, etc., and placed them under 90-day preventive suspension. The
respondents were served copies of the charge sheets and given five (5) days to
submit answer or explanation. Later, on October 8, 1990, the respondent
Secretary constituted an investigating committee of four (4) to determine and
take the appropriate course of action on the formal charges and designated the
special prosecutors on detail with the DECS to handle their prosecution during
the formal hearings.
ISSUE: Whether or not any rights of the petitioners under the due process
clause of the Constitution?
RULING: NO. It is not ripe for adjudication.
The underlying issue here is due process; not whether the petitioners
have a right to strike, which it is clear they do not, however justifiable their
reasons, nor whether or not there was in fact such a strike, it being equally
evident from the pleadings that there was, and there being no dispute about
this. What therefore, is brought before the Court is the question of whether or
not any rights of the petitioners under the due process clause of the
Constitution as it applies to administrative proceedings were violated in the
initiation, conduct, or disposition of the investigations complained of.
Indeed, what the petitioners in G.R. No. 95590 proclaim about denial of
due process being their "paramount complaint" ... "central to their prayer for
interlocutory relief'20 could as well be said of the merits of their main cause as
of their plea for a restraining order pendente lite or a preliminary injunction.
There are, however, insuperable obstacles to the Court's taking up that
issue and resolving it in these cases. Said issue is not ripe for adjudication by
this Court in the exercise of its review jurisdiction; and this, for the obvious
reason that it is one of fact. The petitions and subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners allege facts and circumstances which, it is claimed, show denial of
due process, citing as supposedly "representative samples"among others: (a)
that teachers were dismissed on the sole basis of unsworn reports of their
principals and without evidence of their alleged failure to obey the return-to-
work order; (b) that the charge sheets failed to specify the particular charges or
offenses allegedly committed; (c) that some teachers were not furnished sworn
complaints, and others were suspended without any formal charges; (d) that
teachers who attempted to return within a reasonable time after notice of the
return-to-work order were not accepted back; and similar allegations.
It is not for the Court, which is not a trier of facts, as the petitioners who
would now withdraw correctly put it, to make the crucial determination of what
in truth transpired concerning the disputed incidents. Even if that were within
its competence, it would be at best a monumental task. At any rate, the
petitioners cannot-as it seems they have done lump together into what amounts
to a class action hundreds of individual cases, each with its own peculiar set of
facts, and expect a ruling that would justly and correctly resolve each and
everyone of those cases upon little more than general allegations, frontally
disputed as already pointed out, of incidents supposedly "representative" of
each case or group of cases.
This case illustrates the error of precipitate recourse to the Supreme
Court, especially when numerous parties desparately situated as far as the facts
are concerned gather under the umbrella of a common plea, and generalization
of what should be alleged with particularity becomes unavoidable. The
petitioners' obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative proceedings
but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein, see
those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the
Civil Service Commission; or if, pending said proceedings, immediate recourse
to judicial authority was believed necessary because the respondent Secretary
or those acting under him or on his instructions were acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, to apply, not directly to
the Supreme Court, but to the Regional Trial Court, where there would be an
opportunity to prove the relevant facts warranting corrective relief.
Parties-litigant are duty bound to observe the proper order of recourse
through the judicial hierarchy; they by-pass the rungs of the judicial ladder at
the peril of their own causes
ISAE V QUISUMBING
FACTS: On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the motion under consideration.
The motion to cite the School, its Board of Trustees and Superintendent in
contempt of court is premised on two grounds: (1) a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and (2) private respondent School was
deliberately ignoring if not defying the orders of the Court by refusing to pay
backwages to the local hires.
In a Resolution dated November 20, 2000, the Court resolved to deny for lack of
merit the motion of private respondents to certify the case to the Court En Banc
and as well as second motion for reconsideration.In the same Resolution, the
Court required private respondents to comment on the motion of petitioner to
declare them in contempt of court and to direct the Secretary of Labor to
execute judgment.
Prior to the issuance of the Resolution, however, on November 14, 2000, private
respondents had already moved for leave to file an Opposition to petitioner's
motion.On December 26, 2000, private respondents filed their
Comment/Opposition.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the motion to declare
private respondents in contempt.
ISSUE:
RULING:
judgment by successive motions for reconsideration is anathema, being
precluded by the salutary axiom that a party seeking the setting aside of a
judgment, act or proceeding must set out in his motion all the grounds therefor,
and those not so included are deemed waived and cease to be available for
subsequent motions.
For all litigation must come to an end at some point, in accordance with
established rules of procedure and jurisprudence.As a matter of practice and
policy, courts must dispose of every case as promptly as possible; and in
fulfillment of their role in the administration of justice, they should brook no
delay in the termination of cases by stratagems or maneuverings of parties or
their lawyers.
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied upon
have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of
sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.It
means not only that the grounds relied upon are lacking in merit but also that
any other, not so raised, is deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a
subsequent motion or application, whether it be "second motion for
reconsideration" or "motion for clarification" or "plea for due process" or
"prayer for a second look," or "motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgement,'
or "motion to refer case to Court En Banc," etc.
Petitioners also submit that private respondents have refused to pay the local-
hires backwages in alleged defiance of this Court's decision.It does not appear,
however, that a writ of execution has been issued by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Hence, the Contempt charge is premature and lacks factual basis.

It is true that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited

pleading.Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.

A second motion for reconsideration is forbidden except for extraordinarily

persuasive reasons, and only upon express leave first obtained. The propriety or
acceptability of such a second motion for reconsideration is not contingent upon
the averment of "new" grounds to assail the judgment, i.e., grounds other than
those theretofore presented and rejected. Otherwise, attainment of finality of a
judgment might be starved off indefinitely, depending on the party's
ingeniousness or cleverness in conceiving and formulating "additional flaws" or
"newly discovered errors" therein, or thinking up some injury or prejudice to
the rights of the movant for reconsideration. "Piece-meal" impugnation of a
MANILA MINING CORP. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS CHAPTER, SAMUEL G. ZUÑIGA, in his capacity as
President, Petitioners, v. MANILA MINING CORP.
FACTS: Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) is a publicly-listed corporation
engaged in large-scale mining for gold and copper ore. MMC is required by law
to maintain a tailings containment facility to store the waste material generated
by its mining operations. Consequently, MMC constructed several tailings dams
to treat and store its waste materials. One of these dams was Tailings Pond No.
7 (TP No. 7), which was constructed in 1993 and was operated under a permit
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
through its Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) in Butuan City, Agusan
del Norte.
Upon expiration of the tailings permit on 25 July 2001, DENR-EMB did
not issue a permanent permit due to the inability of MMC to secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).nad An essential component of an
ECC is social acceptability or the consent of the residents in the community to
allow TP No. 7 to operate, which MMC failed to obtain. Hence, it was compelled
to temporarily shut down its mining operations, resulting in the temporary lay-
off of more than 400 employees in the mine site.
Complainants challenged the validity of their lay-off on the averment
that MMC was not suffering from business losses. They alleged that MMC did
not want to bargain collectively with the Union, so that instead of submitting
their counterproposal to the CBA, MMC decided to terminate all union officers
and active members. Petitioners questioned the timing of their lay-off, and
alleged that first, there was no showing that cost-cutting measures were taken
by MMC; second, no criteria were employed in choosing which employees to
lay-off; and third, the individuals laid-off were those who signed the attendance
sheet of the union organizational meeting. Petitioners likewise claimed that
they were denied due process because they were not given a 30-day notice
informing them of the lay-off. Neither was the DOLE informed of this lay-off, as
mandated by law. Respondents justified the temporary lay-off as bona fide in
character and a valid management prerogative pending the issuance of the
permit to continuously operate TP No. 7.
ISSUE: WON MMC Committed unfair labor practice?
RULING. NO!
The lay-off is neither illegal nor can it be considered as unfair labor practice.
Despite all efforts exerted by MMC, it did not succeed in obtaining the consent of
the residents of the community where the tailings pond would operate, one of
the conditions imposed by DENR-EMB in granting its application for a
permanent permit. It is precisely MMC's faultless failure to secure a permit
which caused the temporary shutdown of its mining operations. As aptly put by
the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrar
The evidence on record indeed clearly shows that MMC's suspension of its
mining operations was bonafide and the reason for such suspension was
supported by substantial evidence. MMC cannot conduct mining operations
without a tailings disposal system. For this purpose, MMC operates TP No. 7
under a valid permit from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) through its Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB).nad In fact, a "Temporary Authority to Construct and Operate" was
issued on January 25, 2001 in favor of MMC valid for a period of six (6) months
or until July 25, 2001. The NLRC did not dispute MMC's claim that it had timely
filed an application for renewal of its permit to operate TP No. 7 but that the
renewal permit was not immediately released by the DENR-EMB, hence, MMC
was compelled to temporarily shutdown its milling and mining operations.
Here, it is once apparent that the suspension of MMC's mining operations was
not due to its fault nor was it necessitated by financial reasons. Such suspension
was brought about by the non-issuance of a permit for the continued operation
of TP No. 7 without which MMC cannot resume its milling and mining
operations.
Unfair labor practice cannot be imputed to MMC since, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the call of MMC for a suspension of the CBA negotiations cannot be
equated to "refusal to bargain."
ARTICLE 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain
collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an
agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or
questions arising under such agreements [and executing a contract
incorporating such agreements] if requested by either party but such duty does
not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the
employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or fraud, or was oppressive to
labor. The employer must have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy causing social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave
anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the employer and the
employees to bargain collectively with each other, such compulsion does not
include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the
other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation
with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of
agreement. The Union based its contention on the letter request by MMC for the
suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations until it resumes operations.
Verily, it cannot be said that MMC deliberately avoided the negotiation. It
merely sought a suspension and in fact, even expressed its willingness to
negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance on the
suspension of mining operations for the suspension, in turn, of the CBA
negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMC's actuations.

We observe that MMC was forced by the circumstances, hence, it resorted to a

temporary suspension of its mining and milling operations. It is clear that MMC
had no choice. It would be well to reiterate at this juncture that the reason for
such suspension cannot be attributed to DENR-EMB. It is thus, evident, that the
MMC declared temporary suspension of operations to avert further losses.

The decision to suspend operation ultimately lies with the employer, who in its
desire to avert possible financial losses, declares, as here, suspension of
operations.

ARTICLE 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The

employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the
installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses
or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking
unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this
Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of
termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the
worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at
least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year.

Said provision is emphatic that an employee, who was dismissed due to

cessation of business operation, is entitled to the separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. And it is jurisprudential that separation pay should
also be paid to employees even if the closure or cessation of operations is not
due to losses
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., plaintiff-appellant, RULING: NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called “Doctrine of
vs. Substitution”
BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA, defendants- In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved
appellees. was the employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's
interest never entered the picture.
FACTS: Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union ("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all
BENGUET employees in its mines and milling establishment entered into a The "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke
Collective Bargaining Contract, with BENGUET. Pursuant to its very terms, said the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the
CONTRACT became effective for a period of four and a half (4-½) years, or from simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this
June 23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No- that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be
Lockout clause. understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent,
About three years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to
conducted by the Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. UNION obtained more than
50% of the total number of votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the
Industrial Relations, on August 18, 1962, certified UNION as the sole and contention that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically
exclusive collective bargaining agent of all BENGUET employees as regards assumes all the personal undertakings — like the no-strike stipulation here —
rates of pay, wages, hours of work and such other terms and conditions of in the collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When
employment allowed them by law or contract. BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not have validly bound
On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging dispute. also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU
Accordingly, BENGUET and UNION executed the AGREEMENT. was the agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct
As a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by UNION and its members, personalities. To consider UNION contractually bound to the no-strike
BENGUET had to incur expenses for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repair stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim that res inter alios nec
of mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of the mines, value of prodest nec nocet.
explosives, tools and supplies lost and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous
expenses, all amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU
and their respective Presidents to recover said amount in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, on the sole premise that said defendants breached their
undertaking in the existing CONTRACT not to strike during the effectivity thereof .
In answer to BENGUET's complaint, defendants unions and their
respective presidents put up the following defenses: (1) they were not bound by
the CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET;
(2) the strike was due, inter alia, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3)
the strike was lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-
PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
In support of an affirmative answer to the first question, BENGUET
invokes the so-called "Doctrine of Substitution".

ISSUE: Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and
BBWU on June 23, 1959 and effective until December 23, 1963 automatically
bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August 18, 1962, as sole
bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees?
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-
MANILA PAVILION HOTEL CHAPTER, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN
MANILA PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL
CORPORATION, Respondents.
FACTS: A certification election was conducted on June 16, 2006 among the
rank-and-file employees of respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel.
NUHWHRAIN-MPHC, and respondent Holiday Inn Manila Pavillion Hotel Labor
Union (HIMPHLU), referred the case back to Med-Arbiter Ma. Simonette
Calabocal to decide which among those votes would be opened and tallied.
Eleven (11) votes were initially segregated because they were cast
by dismissed employees, albeit the legality of their dismissal was still pending
before the Court of Appeals. Six other votes were segregated because the
employees who cast them were already occupying supervisory positions at the
time of the election. Still five other votes were segregated on the ground that
they were cast by probationary employees and, pursuant to the existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such employees cannot vote. It bears
noting early on, however, that the vote of one Jose Gatbonton (Gatbonton), a
probationary employee, was counted. Med-Arbiter Calabocal ruled for the
opening of 17 out of the 22 segregated votes, specially those cast by the 11
dismissed employees and those cast by the six supposedly supervisory
employees of the Hotel.
Petitioner, which garnered 151 votes, appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment (SOLE), arguing that the votes of the probationary employees
should have been opened considering that probationary employee Gatbonton’s
vote was tallied. And petitioner averred that respondent HIMPHLU, which
garnered 169 votes, should not be immediately certified as the bargaining
agent, as the opening of the 17 segregated ballots would push the number of
valid votes cast to 338 (151 + 169 + 1 + 17), hence, the 169 votes which
HIMPHLU garnered would be one vote short of the majority which would then
become 169.
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), through then Acting Secretary
Luzviminda Padilla, affirmed the Med-Arbiter’s Order. It held that pursuant to
Section 5, Rule IX of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code on
exclusion and inclusion of voters in a certification election, the probationary
employees cannot vote, as at the time the Med-Arbiter issued on August 9, 2005
the Order granting the petition for the conduct of the certification election, the
six probationary employees were not yet hired, hence, they could not vote. With
respect to the votes cast by the 11 dismissed employees, they could be
considered since their dismissal was still pending appeal. SOLE concluded that
the certification of HIMPHLU as the exclusive bargaining agent was proper.
ISSUES: Whether employees on probationary status at the time of the
certification elections should be allowed to vote, and second, whether HIMPHLU
was able to obtain the required majority for it to be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent?
RULING:
The inclusion of Gatbonton’s vote was proper not because it was not questioned
but because probationary employees have the right to vote in a certification
election. The votes of the six other probationary employees should thus also
have been counted.
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This
principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective
bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA
negotiated by the certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit.
Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code
makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in
supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the
employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the
petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit."
HIMPHLU obtained 169 while petitioner received 151 votes. Clearly, HIMPHLU
was not able to obtain a majority vote. The position of both the SOLE and the
appellate court that the opening of the 17 segregated ballots will not materially
affect the outcome of the certification election as for, so they contend, even if
such member were all in favor of petitioner, still, HIMPHLU would win, is thus
untenable.
It bears reiteration that the true importance of ascertaining the number of valid
votes cast is for it to serve as basis for computing the required majority, and not
just to determine which union won the elections. The opening of the segregated
but valid votes has thus become material. To be sure, the conduct of a
certification election has a two-fold objective: to determine the appropriate
bargaining unit and to ascertain the majority representation of the bargaining
representative, if the employees desire to be represented at all by anyone. It is
not simply the determination of who between two or more contending unions
won, but whether it effectively ascertains the will of the members of the
bargaining unit as to whether they want to be represented and which union
they want to represent them.
Having declared that no choice in the certification election conducted obtained
the required majority, it follows that a run-off election must be held to
determine which between HIMPHLU and petitioner should represent the rank-
and-file employees.