Page |1
PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Republic of the Philippines
1
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA
and PRESCILLA, all surnamed
HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR,
namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and
VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-
intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its
Resolution2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar,
Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all
surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon,
Romblon, Branch 71, against private
respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged
therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by
inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of
a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No.
3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon,
Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as
the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M.
Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single,
and which adjudication was known by the
plaintiffs[’] father’s co-heirs;
3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant
constructed his dwelling unit of mixed
materials on the property of the plaintiffs’
father without the knowledge of the herein
plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest;
4. That, demands have been made of the
defendant to vacate the premises but the
latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the
prior consent of their grandmother,
Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable
settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to
the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail,
evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE
ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the
defendant to vacate the property has caused
the plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation,
wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless
nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest,
plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of a lawyer.3
The petitioners prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable
Court that after due process (sic), an order be
issued for the defendant to vacate and
peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property and that defendant be
made to pay plaintiffs:
a. actual damages, as follows:
a.1. transportation expenses in connection
with the projected settlement of the case
amounting to ₱1,500.00 and for the
subsequent attendance to the hearing of this
case at ₱1,500.00 each schedule;
a.2. attorney’s fees in the amount of
₱20,000.00 and ₱500.00 for every court
appearance;
b. moral and exemplary damages in such
amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court
to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and
equitable under the premises.4
The private respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action,
citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that
–
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed
value of the land in dispute;
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify
and/or describe the parcel of land referred to
as the subject-matter of this action;

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
both of which are essential requisites for
determining the jurisdiction of the Court
where the case is filed. In this case, however,
the assessed value of the land in question is
totally absent in the allegations of the
complaint and there is nothing in the relief
prayed for which can be picked-up for
determining the Court’s jurisdiction as
provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can
nevertheless be surmised by reading between
the lines, that the assessed value of the land
in question cannot exceed ₱20,000.00 and, as
such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should
have been filed before said Court rather than
before the RTC. …6
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They
contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the action since the court can take judicial
notice of the market value of the property in
question, which was ₱200.00 per square
meter and considering that the property was
14,797 square meters, more or less, the total
value thereof is ₱3,500,000.00. Besides,
according to the petitioners, the motion to
dismiss was premature and "the proper time
to interpose it is when the [petitioners]
introduced evidence that the land is of such
value."
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an
Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding
that the action was incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the
RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg.
129, as amended.
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the
private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.9 Traversing the material
allegations of the complaint, he contended
that the petitioners had no cause of action
against him since the property in dispute was
the conjugal property of his grandparents, the
spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion
Mazo-Salvador.
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia
Salvador filed their Answer-in-
Intervention10 making common cause with the
private respondent. On her own motion,
however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as
intervenor.11
During trial, the petitioners adduced in
evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing
that in 1991 the property had an assessed
value of ₱5,950.00.12
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On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered
judgment finding in favor of the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is
rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and
peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property; and
Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, the private respondent and
respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador
appealed the decision to the CA, which
rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing
the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the
complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of
the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision is REVERSED, and the case
DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling
in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA declared that the action of the
petitioners was one for the recovery of
ownership and possession of real property.
Absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction
over the action, conformably to Section 3315 of
R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision, which the
appellate court denied.16 Hence, they filed the
instant petition, with the following assignment
of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION
REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE
IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS
ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE
COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN
TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT.17
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether
the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against
the private respondent, who was the
defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has
jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property,
exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said
court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in
their opposition to respondent’s motion to
dismiss, they made mention of the increase in
the assessed value of the land in question in
the amount of ₱3.5 million. Moreover, the
petitioners maintain that their action is also
one for damages exceeding ₱20,000.00, over
which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action
and which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the
type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the
law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
therein.18 The caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon
the answer of the defendant or agreement of
the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of
the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the
petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the
action of the petitioners in the RTC was
an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule
that the action of the petitioners was an accion
publiciana, or one for the recovery of
possession of the real property subject matter
thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit
which has for its object the recovery of
possession over the real property as owner. It
involves recovery of ownership and possession
based on the said ownership. On the other
hand, an accion publiciana is one for the
recovery of possession of the right to possess.
It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year after the
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occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.19
The action of the petitioners filed on
September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They allege that
they are co-owners thereof, and as such,
entitled to its possession, and that the private
respondent, who was the defendant,
constructed his house thereon in 1989
without their knowledge and refused to vacate
the property despite demands for him to do
so. They prayed that the private respondent
vacate the property and restore possession
thereof to them.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on
September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already
in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
…
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand
Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of
such property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides
that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The
Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
…
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of
the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00)
except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action
involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said
property and not the market value thereof. The
assessed value of real property is the fair
market value of the real property multiplied by
the assessment level. It is synonymous to
taxable value.20 The fair market value is the
price at which a property may be sold by a
seller, who is not compelled to sell, and
bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will
show that it does not contain an allegation
stating the assessed value of the property
subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot
take judicial notice of the assessed or market
value of lands.22 Absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the
property, it cannot thus be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’
action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners
adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No.
8590-A, showing that the assessed value of
the property in 1991 was ₱5,950.00. The
petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce
in evidence the tax declaration containing the
assessed value of the property when they filed
their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that
the assessed value of the property in 1991
was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and
not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of
the petitioners since the case involved title to
or possession of real property with an
assessed value of less than ₱20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection,
the CA’s disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for
the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property
in question. For properties in the provinces,
the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value
exceeds ₱20,000, and the MTC, if the value is
₱20,000 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located,
and is contained in the tax declaration. In the
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration
secured and presented by the plaintiffs-
appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made
by them that the property was worth 3.5
million pesos, not to mention that there is
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absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in
the light of the fact that there is an assessed
value. It is the amount in the tax declaration
that should be consulted and no other kind of
value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is
₱5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction
over the territory where the property is
located, and not the court a quo.24
It is elementary that the tax declaration
indicating the assessed value of the property
enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has
been issued by the proper government
agency.25
Unavailing also is the petitioners’
argumentation that since the complaint,
likewise, seeks the recovery of damages
exceeding ₱20,000.00, then the RTC had
original jurisdiction over their actions. Section
33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted
earlier, explicitly excludes from the
determination of the jurisdictional amount the
demand for "interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs." This Court issued Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in
the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and
paragraph 2 thereof states that –
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of
whatever kind" in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of
the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and
solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
…
(8) In all other cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
the above-mentioned items exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to "all
other cases" other than an action involving
title to, or possession of real property in which
the assessed value is the controlling factor in
determining the court’s jurisdiction. The said
damages are merely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the main cause of action for
recovery of possession of real property.26
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
action of the petitioners, all the proceedings
therein, including the decision of the RTC, are
null and void. The complaint should perforce
be dismissed.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga,
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
2 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156360 January 14, 2005
CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA
VASQUEZ GILSANO,respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Cesar Sampayan seeks the
annulment and setting aside of the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43557, to wit:
1. Decision dated May 16, 2002, denying his
petition for review and affirming an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Agusan
del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on
appeal a favorable judgment of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bayugan and
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur in a forcible entry
case thereat commenced against him by
herein private respondents, the brother-and-
sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia
Vasquez-Gilsano; and
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2. Resolution dated November 7,
2002, which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
From the pleadings and memoranda
respectively filed by the parties, the Court
gathers the following factual antecedents:
On July 8, 1992, in the MCTC of Bayugan and
Sibagat, Agusan del Sur, the siblings Crispulo
Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano filed
complaint for forcible entry against Cesar
Sampayan for allegedly having entered and
occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No.
1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon
without their knowledge, consent or authority,
the entry having been supposedly effected
through strategy and stealth.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents), substantially alleged that their
mother Cristita Quita was the owner and
actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after
their mother’s death on January 11, 1984,
they became co-owners pro-indiviso and
lawful possessors of the same lot; that on
June 1, 1992, while they were temporarily
absent from the lot in question, defendant
Cesar Sampayan, through strategy and
stealth, entered the lot and built a house
thereon, to their exclusion; and that, despite
their repeated demands for Sampayan to
vacate the lot and surrender the possession
thereof to them, the latter failed and refused
to do so.
In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied
the material allegations of the complaint and
averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their
mother have ever been in possession of Lot
No. 1959 and that he does not even know
plaintiffs’ identities or their places of
residence. He claimed that he did not enter
the subject lot by stealth or strategy because
he asked and was given permission therefor
by Maria Ybañez, the overseer of the lot’s true
owners, Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado who
were then temporarily residing in Cebu City
for business purposes. In the same answer,
Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs’ claim
has long prescribed for the reason that the lot
in dispute had been possessed and declared
for taxation purposes by the spouses
Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia Balida-Oriol in
1960, and that in 1978, the Oriol spouses sold
one-half (1/2) of the lot to the spouses Mr.
and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado, while the other
half, to the couple Manolito Occida and
Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979. Both
vendees, so Sampayan averred, have actually
possessed the respective portions purchased
by them up to the present. He thus prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
In the ensuing proceedings following the
joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that
they have been in actual possession of Lot No.
1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his
entry thereto, submitted in evidence the
following documents:
1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the
name of Cristita Quita;
2. Certificate of Death showing the date
of death of Cristita Quita on January
11, 1984;
3. Certificate issued by Fermina R.
Labonete, Land Management Officer-III
of CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9,
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur showing that
Lot 1959, PLS-225 is covered by a
Miscellaneous Sales Application of
Cristita Quita;
4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to
the effect that he was the one who gave
the lot in question to Cristita Quita
sometime in 1957 and that since then
the latter had been occupying the lot;
Plaintiffs also filed a Supplemental
Position Paper dated July 13, 1994 for
the purpose of showing that Cristita
Quita is one of the oppositors in
Cadastral Case No. 149. Together with
said position paper, they submitted a
copy of the Answer/Opposition earlier
filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said
cadastral case, Cristita Quita was
claiming Lot 1959, thus her name
appeared in the list of oppositors
therein.
5. The decision in the said Cadastral
Case No. 149 showing that the then
Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the
lots subject of the same cadastral case.
For his part, defendant Sampayan, to prove
the allegations in his answer, offered in
evidence the following:
1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the
name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels
Tax Declaration 8103;
2. Tax Declaration No. GRB-01-930 in
the name of Felicisimo Oriol which
cancels Tax Declaration No. A-11698;
3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of
Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by
Jesus Oriol for and in behalf of the
spouses Felicisimo Oriol and Concordia
Page |6
Balida-Oriol, conveying the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the
couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
Sambale-Occida who possessed the
one-half (1/2) portion and introduced
improvements thereon, such as coconut
and caimito trees;
4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of
Portion of Land, executed by the
spouses Oriol in favor of the same
couple Manolito Occida and Juliana
Sambale-Occida, to further strengthen
the transfer of possession and whatever
possessory rights the Oriols had in the
lot in question;
5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land
executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol
with the conformity of Teodosio
Mosquito (another claimant), to prove
that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was
sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio
Terrado whose overseer allowed
Sampayan to enter and occupy the
premises;
6. Protest filed with the CENRO,
Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana
Sambale-Occida against the
Miscellaneous Sales Application of
Cristita Quita;
7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting
to the fact that she is residing in Lot
No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in
question, since 1960 up to the present.
In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed
that neither Cristita Quita, much less
the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot
No. 1959. She claimed that it was the
Occida couple who possessed said lot
and introduced improvements thereon;
and
8. Affidavit of Juliana Occida and Maria
Ybañez to show the impossibility of
plaintiffs’ possession of the same lot.
Meanwhile, on March 21, 1996, while the case
was pending with the MCTC, the presiding
judge thereof personally conducted an ocular
inspection of the contested lot in the presence
of the parties and/or their counsels. Among
those found in the area during the inspection
are: the house of defendant Sampayan; the
dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon;
and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay,
husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of
Sampayan’s witnesses.
Based on his ocular findings, the judge
concluded that the improvements he saw in

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
the premises could never have been
introduced by the plaintiffs nor by their
mother Cristita Quita but by the vendees of
the same lot. Reproduced by petitioner Jose
Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in
the Memorandum he subsequently filed with
this Court, the MCTC judge’s findings and
observations during the ocular inspection,
about which the herein private respondents
took no exception whatsoever, are hereunder
quoted, as follows:
"Noted inside the land are the house of the
defendant, Cesar Sampayan, of Peter Siscon,
which appears to be dilapidated, and part of
the house of Macario Noynay which
encroached to the land in question. Planted on
the land are five (5) coconut trees, fruit
bearing, three (3) not fruit bearing coconut
trees, and three (3) star apple or caimito trees.
Defendant Sampayan admitted that he started
occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted
by the parties during the ocular inspection
that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was
bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr.
and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol.
The findings in the ocular inspection have
confirmed the allegation of the defendant
that his predecessors-in-interest have
introduced improvements by planting
caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on
the land in question.
Nothing can be seen on the land that
plaintiffs had once upon a time been in
possession of the land. The allegation that
Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest
of the plaintiffs had been in possession of
the said property since 1957, openly,
exclusively, continuously, adversely and in
the concept of an owner is a naked claim,
unsupported by any evidence.
Clearly, from the appearance of the
improvements introduced by the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendant, it is
showed that they have been in possession of
the land for more than one (1) year. Hence,
the action of the plaintiffs, if any, is accion
publiciana or plenaria de
possession"1 (Emphasis supplied).
In time, the MCTC rendered judgment
dismissing the compliant "for lack of merit".
Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan del Sur,
which appeal was raffled to Branch VII
thereof. In a decision dated December 5, 1996,
said court reversed that of the MCTC, taking
note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among
the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149 and
Page |7
that she filed a Miscellaneous Sales
Application over the lot. On the basis of such
finding, the RTC concluded that it was Cristita
Quita, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
private respondents, who was in actual prior
physical possession of Lot No. 1959.
Unable to accept the RTC judgment,
Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 43557.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of
Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision
dated May 16, 2002,2denied Sampayan’s
petition. His motion for reconsideration having
been similarly denied by that court in
its Resolution of November 7,
2002,3 Sampayan is now with us via the
present recourse, it being his submissions -
"I.
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT OF BAYUGAN, AGUSAN DEL
SUR, HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
CONSIDERING THAT DURING THE HEARING
THEREOF IT WAS FOUND OUT BY THE SAID
MUNICIPAL COURT THAT ACCION
PUBLICIANA OR PLENARIA DE POSESION,
AND NOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER
ACTION;
II.
THAT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN
PRIOR ACTUAL POSSESSION IS
CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
AND CONSIDERING THAT THE POSSESSION
TO BE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT,
CONSIST (SIC) IN THE EXERCISE OF
DOMINIUM OVER IT, SUCH AS FENCING,
CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE
ACTS OF EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND
CONTROL – FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE - IS
CONTRARY TO LAW".4
In the main, petitioner maintains that based
on the pieces of evidence on record, he had
sufficiently proven his prior physical
possession of the subject lot. Upon this
premise, he argues that private respondents’
complaint for forcible entry has no leg to stand
on, adding that the proper remedy available to
the latter is accion publiciana or plenaria de
posesion which falls under the original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
As we see it, the arguments put forward by the
petitioner crystallize to one pivotal question:
will the complaint for forcible entry in this
case prosper? To resolve this, however, we
must first determine as to who between the
herein parties was in prior actual physical
possession of the subject lot at the time the
complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we
have said in Gaza vs. Lim 5 ,
"xxx In an action for forcible entry, the
plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the land or building and that he
was deprived thereof by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. xxx"
We emphasize, absence of prior physical
possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry
case warrants the dismissal of his
complaint.1a\^/phi1.net
Undoubtedly, the issue of prior physical
possession is one of fact, and settled is the
rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally embark on a re-
examination of the evidence adduced by the
parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits
of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA ,6 we wrote:
"[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is
not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties' during
the trial of the case considering that the
findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the Court. However, the Court had
recognized several exceptions to this rule, to
wit: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered,
Page |8
would justify a different
conclusion."l^vvphi1.net
To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are
present in this case.
However, before delving into the question of
who as between the petitioner and private
respondents had prior physical possession of
the subject lot, we deem it best to first resolve
the issue of whether or not the MCTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed in this
case, an issue also raised by the petitioner.
Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that
private respondents’ proper remedy is accion
publiciana or plenaria de posesion, and not
forcible entry, petitioner would deny the
MCTC’s jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner is in error.
In Sarmiento vs. CA7 , we held:
"[t]o give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the
land, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings
the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must
appear on the face of the complaint. x x x"
Clear it is from the above that for the MCTC to
acquire jurisdiction over a forcible entry case,
it is enough that the complaint avers the
jurisdictional facts, i.e. that the plaintiff had
prior physical possession and that he was
deprived thereof by the defendant through
force, intimidation, threats, strategy and
stealth.8 The complaint in this case makes
such an averment. Hence, the irrelevant
circumstance that the evidence adduced
during the hearing rendered improper an
action for forcible entry is of no moment and
cannot deprive the MCTC of its jurisdiction
over the case. The MCTC continues to have
that jurisdiction.
We shall now address the more decisive
question of prior physical possession.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence at
hand, we find for the petitioner.
To begin with, we are at once confronted by
the uncontested findings of the MCTC judge
himself during his ocular inspection of the
premises in dispute that what he saw thereat
"confirmed the allegations of the defendant

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
[now petitioner Sampayan] that his
predecessors-in-interest have introduced
improvements by planting caimito trees,
coconut trees, and others on the land in
question", adding that "[N]othing can be seen
on the land that plaintiff had once upon a
time been in possession of the land", and
categorically stating that "[T]he allegation that
Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of
the plaintiffs had been in possession of the
said property since 1957, openly, exclusively,
continuously, adversely and in the concept of
an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by
any evidence".1awphi1.nét
Then, too, there is the sworn affidavit of
Dionesia Noynay to the effect that she had
been residing since 1960 onward on Lot No.
1957, the lot adjacent to Lot No. 1959, and
that neither the private respondents nor their
mother had ever possessed Lot No. 1959.
Coming as it does from an immediate
neighbor, Dionesia’s statement commands
great weight and respect. Incidentally, the
MCTC judge himself found during the ocular
inspection that a portion of the house of
Macario Noynay, husband of Dionesia,
protruded on Lot No. 1959.
We note that in the herein assailed decision,
the Court of Appeals attached much
significance to the fact that private
respondents’ mother Cristita Quita was an
oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We rule
and so hold that the mother’s being an
oppositor in said cadastral case does not, by
itself, establish prior physical possession
because not all oppositors in cadastral cases
are actual possessors of the lots or lands
subject thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED and the Decision and Resolution,
respectively dated May 16, 2002 and
November 7, 2002, of the Court of Appeals
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez,
and Corona, Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
3 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137013 May 6, 2005
RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY
AYON, respondents.
DECISION
Page |9
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution2 dated
December 11, 1998 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996,
Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal
detainer against spouses Tony and Mercy
Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
3506-B-96.
In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is
the registered owner of three lots situated at
Lanzona Subdivision, Matina, Davao City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 108174, 108175, and 108176.
Respondent spouses are the registered owners
of an adjacent parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this
property built a building which straddled both
the lots of the herein parties. Respondents
have been using the building as a warehouse.
Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that
in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he
informed respondents that the building
occupies a portion of his land. However, he
allowed them to continue using the building.
But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of
his lot, hence, he demanded that respondents
demolish and remove the part of the building
encroaching his property and turn over to him
their possession. But they refused. Instead,
they continued occupying the contested
portion and even made improvements on the
building. The dispute was then referred to
the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on
March 27, 1996, a certification to file action
was issued.
In their answer, respondents sought a
dismissal of this case on the ground that the
court has no jurisdiction over it since there is
no lessor-lessee relationship between the
parties. Respondents denied they were
occupying petitioner's property by mere
tolerance, claiming they own the contested
portion and have been occupying the same
long before petitioner acquired his lots in
1985.
On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its
Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
defendants ordering the latter, their
successors-in-interest and other
persons acting in their behalf to vacate
the portion of the subject properties
and peacefully surrender possession
thereof to plaintiff as well as
dismantle/remove the structures found
thereon.
Defendants are further ordered to pay
reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the encroached area in
the amount of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) a month beginning
September 1996 and the subsequent
months thereafter until premises are
vacated; to pay attorney's fees of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."3
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated
February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-
97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment.4 The
RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that
respondents' occupation of the contested
portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when
petitioner needed the same, he has the right to
eject them through court action.
Respondents then elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals through a petition for review.
In its Decision dated October 5, 1988 now
being challenged by petitioner, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioner's proper remedy
should have been an accion publiciana before
the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer,
thus:
"In this case, petitioners were already in
possession of the premises in question
at the time private respondent bought
three (3) lots at the Lanzona
Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which
is occupied by a building being used by
the former as a bodega. Apart from
private respondent's bare claim, no
evidence was alluded to show that
petitioners' possession was tolerated by
(his) predecessor-in-interest. The fact
that respondent might have tolerated
petitioners' possession is not decisive.
What matters for purposes of
determining the proper cause of action
is the nature of petitioners' possession
from its inception. And in this regard,
the Court notes that the complaint
itself merely alleges that defendants-
petitioners have been 'occupying a
portion of the above properties of the
plaintiff for the past several years by
P a g e | 10
virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.'
Nowhere is it alleged that his
predecessor likewise tolerated
petitioners' possession of the premises.
x x x.
Consequently, x x x, respondent should
present his claim before the Regional
Trial Court in an accion publiciana and
not before the Municipal Trial Court in
a summary proceeding of unlawful
detainer.
WHEREFORE, the decision under
review is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
unlawful detainer is ordered
DISMISSED."5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated December 11, 1998.
Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals
the following errors:
"I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN
DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON
THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER
SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM
BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.
II
THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS
AND JURISPRUDENCE."
The sole issue here is whether the Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error of law in
holding that petitioner's complaint is within
the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.
Petitioner contends that it is not necessary
that he has prior physical possession of the
questioned property before he could file an
action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that
he tolerated respondents' occupancy of the
portion in controversy until he needed it. After
his demand that they vacate, their continued
possession became illegal. Hence, his action
for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is
proper.
Respondents, in their comment, insisted that
they have been in possession of the disputed
property even before petitioner purchased the

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot
claim that they were occupying the property
by mere tolerance because they were ahead in
time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.
It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of
a court over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations of the complaint and cannot
be made to depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.6 This rule is no different in an
action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.7 All actions for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer shall be filed with the
proper Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, which actions shall
include not only the plea for restoration of
possession but also all claims for damages
and costs arising therefrom.8 The said courts
are not divested of jurisdiction over such
cases even if the defendants therein raises the
question of ownership over the litigated
property in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership.9
Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and
unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, reads:
"Section 1. Who may institute
proceedings, and when. – Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
may, at any time within one (1) year
after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution
of such possession, together with
damages and costs."
Under the above provision, there are two
entirely distinct and different causes of action,
to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which is an
action to recover possession of a property from
P a g e | 11
the defendant whose occupation thereof is
illegal from the beginning as he acquired
possession by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful
detainer, which is an action for recovery of
possession from defendant whose possession
of the property was inceptively lawful by virtue
of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he
continued his possession despite the
termination of his right thereunder.10
Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in
Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within
the competence of the MTCC. His pertinent
allegations in the complaint read:
"4. That defendants (spouses) have
constructed an extension of their
residential house as well as other
structures and have been occupying a
portion of the above PROPERTIES of
the plaintiff for the past several
years by virtue of the tolerance of the
plaintiff since at the time he has no
need of the property;
5. That plaintiff needed the property
in the early part of 1996 and made
demands to the defendants to vacate
and turn over the premises as well as
the removal (of) their structures
found inside the PROPERTIES of
plaintiff; that without any justifiable
reasons, defendants refused to
vacate the portion of the
PROPERTIES occupied by them to
the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff.
6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to
the Office of the Barangay Captain of
Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a
possible settlement sometime in the
latter part of February 1996.
The barangay case reached
the Pangkat but no settlement was had.
Thereafter, a 'Certification To File
Action' dated March 27, 1996 was
issued x x x;
x x x."11 (underscoring ours)
Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint
clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer.
We find no error in the MTCC assuming
jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A
complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if
it alleges that the withholding of the
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful
without necessarily employing the terminology
of the law.12 Here, there is an allegation in
petitioner's complaint that respondents

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
occupancy on the portion of his property is by
virtue of his tolerance. Petitioner's cause of
action for unlawful detainer springs from
respondents' failure to vacate the questioned
premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.
Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November
6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
It bears stressing that possession by tolerance
is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful when the possessor by tolerance
refuses to vacate upon demand made by the
owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of
Appeals13 is applicable in this case: "A person
who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, is necessarily bound
by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 12, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in
Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the
Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in
Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-
Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
4 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150755 June 28, 2005
RENE GANILA,* EDUARDO DUMADA-OG,
SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE PASTRANA,
LOURDES GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA,
SERAFIN GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO,
CONRADO GANILA, VIVENCIO ALVIOR,
EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO
VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA, ADELINA
GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR.,
ENRIQUE GANILA, ABRAHAM TANONG,
EMILIO ALFARAS, JR., BAPTIST
CHRISTIAN LEARNING
CENTER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIOLETA C.
HERRERA, respondents.
DECISION
P a g e | 12
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari are the D E C I S I O
N1 dated March 30, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58191, and
its Resolution2 dated October 18, 2001
denying the motion for reconsideration. The
assailed decision denied the petition to set
aside the Resolution3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras,
Branch 65, affirming the Order of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for the
19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel of
land.
The facts are as follows:
On March 19, 1997, private respondent
Violeta Herrera filed 21
ejectment Complaints4 before the 16th MCTC,
Jordan-Buenavista-Nueva Valencia, Jordan,
Guimaras. Private respondent alleged that she
owns Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of
Jordan, Guimaras, with an area of 43,210
square meters; that she inherited the lot from
her parents; and that she only tolerated
petitioners to construct residential houses or
other improvements on certain portions of the
lot without rental. Sometime in September or
October 1996, private respondent demanded
that the petitioners vacate the lot and remove
their houses and other improvements thereon.
Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by
way of assistance to them. After
the barangay conciliation failed, private
respondent filed the complaints.
In their Answers,5 eight6 of the petitioners
claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a
shoreline which they developed when they
constructed their respective houses. Another
eight7 maintained that their houses stood on
Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan,
Guimaras. The other three8 asserted that Lot
1227 is a social forest area.
At the preliminary conference, the parties
agreed to designate two geodetic engineers as
commissioners of the MCTC to conduct a
relocation survey of Lot 1227 and to identify
who among the petitioners have houses within
the lot.9
The commissioners reported that: (1) the
house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil
Case No. 288-J, is almost outside Lot 1227;
(2) the house of Ludovico Amatorio, defendant
in Civil Case No. 289-J, diagonally traversed
the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19
petitioners are inside Lot 1227.10
Eight months after herein petitioners’ failure
to comment on the manifestation of private

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
respondent to terminate the preliminary
conference, the MCTC terminated the
preliminary conference.11 Thereafter,
petitioners’ counsel Atty. Nelia Jesusa L.
Gonzales failed to file her clients’ position
papers and affidavits, even after they sought a
30-day extension to file the same.12
Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
whereby each of the twenty-one (21)
defendants are hereby ordered:
1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral
Survey of Jordan, Guimaras;
2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (₱200.00)
per month from October, 1996 as
compensation for the use of the
property until the same is vacated; and
3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos
(₱2,000.00) as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at
Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J, 0272-J,
0273-J, 0274-J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J,
0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J, 0281-J, 0282-J,
0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J, 0287-J,
0291-J and 0292-J are hereby affirmed.
The decision of the court below in Civil Cases
Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are set aside. Civil
Cases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the
better right of private respondent to possess
Lot 1227. Private respondent’s position paper,
affidavit and tax declaration supported her
allegations. In addition, the commissioners’
report and sketch plan showed that indeed
petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other
hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners
failed to present evidence which would show
that they are entitled to possess the lot.
Based on the sketch plan, the RTC dismissed
the cases against Gabasa and Amatorio since
their houses occupy only a small area of Lot
1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio
P a g e | 13
believed in good faith that the whole area they
occupied was part of the seashore.
The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate
the lot, filed a joint petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied
the petition. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration and filed an amended petition.
The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the
factual findings and conclusions arrived at by
the trial courts and denied the amended
petition for lack of merit.15 It also denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for
review, alleging that:
The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due
respect and deference, committed a reversible
error in the interpretation/application of the
law in the instant case and in the appreciation
of the facts and evidence presented. The Court
of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when
it denied and dismissed the petition filed by
the petitioners.16
After considering the parties’ submissions, we
find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err
in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the
cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the
MCTC’s judgment? (3) Did the CA err in
denying the petition for review filed by the 19
petitioners ordered to be ejected?
Petitioners insist that private respondent
should have filed an action to
recover possession de jure, not a mere
complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One,
they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more
than 30 years in the concept of owners. And
two, there was no withholding of possession
since private respondent was not in prior
possession of the lot.
Private respondent states in her Comment
before us that the allegations in
her Complaints make out a clear case of
unlawful detainer which is cognizable by the
MCTC. We are in agreement with her stance.
There was no error in the choice of the
complainant’s remedy, a matter left to her
determination as the suitor. And the
complaint itself is defined by the allegations
therein, not the allegations of the defendants.
At the outset, we note that petitioners
question the MCTC’s jurisdiction yet they
admit in their preliminary statement that
the Complaints filed are indeed for unlawful
detainer, and that the only issue to be
determined is mere physical possession
(possession de facto) and not juridical

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
possession (possession de jure), much less
ownership.17
While petitioners assert that this case involves
only deprivation of possession, they confuse
the remedy of an action for forcible entry with
that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful
detainer, prior physical possession by the
plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that
plaintiff has a better right of possession.
Actual, prior physical possession of a property
by a party is indispensable only in forcible
entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful
possession of the property but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon
termination or expiration of his right to
possess.18 Thus, the fact that petitioners are
in possession of the lot does not automatically
entitle them to remain in possession. And the
issue of prior lawful possession by the
defendants does not arise at all in a suit for
unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful
possession by virtue of contract or other
reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible
entry where defendants, by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical
possessor of possession. Here there is no
evidence to show that petitioners entered the
lot by any of these acts.
If only to stress the fundamental principles
related to present controversy, jurisdiction
over unlawful detainer suits is vested in
municipal trial courts.19 And in ejectment
cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the allegations of the
complaint.20
In this case for ejectment, private
respondent’s allegations sufficiently present a
case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1)
she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated
petitioners to construct their houses thereon;
(3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4)
petitioners refused to heed her demand to
vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed
within one year from the date of her demand.
The cause of action for unlawful detainer
between the parties springs from the failure of
petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful
demand of the private respondent. When they
refused to vacate the lot after her demand,
petitioners’ continued possession became
unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against
respondent, to put it simply, is not without
sufficient basis.
Petitioners’ contention that private respondent
should have filed an action to
recover possession de jure with the RTC is not
supported by law or jurisprudence. The
P a g e | 14
distinction between a summary action of
ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land is
settled in our jurisprudence.
What really distinguishes an action for
unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first
is limited to the question of possession de
facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion
interdictal) together with forcible entry are the
two forms of an ejectment suit that may be
filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary
action to recover the right of possession
and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to
recover ownership which includes recovery of
possession, make up the three kinds of
actions to judicially recover possession.21
It is not up to defendants, now petitioners
herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the
private respondent, what her initial recourse
should be. Her choice of an action for
ejectment against so-called squatters is well
within her rights.
Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of
Appeals,22 and argue that the MCTC’s decision
was without jurisdictional or legal basis
because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary
conference order. They assert that the 10-day
period to file position papers and affidavits
only starts after the parties had received a
preliminary conference order. They insist they
were denied due process when the MCTC
decided the cases based merely on private
respondent’s Complaints and affidavit,
without considering their Answers.
For her part, private respondent maintains
that there was substantial compliance with
the rules in the MCTC’s conduct of the
preliminary conference, hence there was no
violation of due process nor disregard of its
proper jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ present contention was first raised
only in their appeal to the RTC. Raising it
before the appellate tribunal is barred by
estoppel.23 They should have raised it in the
proceedings before the MCTC. In our view,
this issue is a mere afterthought, when the
MCTC decided against them. Basic rules of
fair play, justice and due process require that
as a rule an issue cannot be raised by the
petitioners for the first time on appeal.24
Besides, petitioners did not question initially
the MCTC’s Order dated February 19, 1999,
when they moved for an extension of time to

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
file their position papers and affidavits. They
wanted another 30 days on top of the 30 days
set by the MCTC, which strictly should have
been 10 days only. In this regard, petitioners
could not claim that they were denied
sufficient time to file their position papers and
affidavits before the trial court. Further, they
cannot validly invoke our ruling25 in Bayubay,
for in that case there was no order at all
terminating the preliminary conference and
requiring the parties to submit position papers
and affidavits.
We note with dismay petitioners’ insistence
that we order the MCTC "to conduct the
requisite preliminary conference." The
summary character of ejectment suits will be
disregarded if we allow petitioners to further
delay this case by allowing a second
preliminary conference. Ejectment by way of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings, designed to provide an
expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or the right to possession over the
property involved. It is a timely procedure
designed to remedy the delay in the resolution
of such cases.26
Lastly, petitioners aver that private
respondent failed to prove her allegation of
ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a
tax declaration which is not an evidence of
ownership. They also claim that their
possession of the lot was not and could not be
by mere tolerance. However, this is a factual
matter best left to the trial courts.
What we have now is sufficient evidence
showing that private respondent has a better
right to possess Lot 1227. The commissioners’
report and sketch plan show that the 19
petitioners occupy the lot, which corroborate
private respondent’s allegation and disprove
petitioners’ defense that Lot 1227 is a
shoreline; or that Lot 1227 is a social forest
area. While not a conclusive evidence of
ownership, private respondent’s tax
declaration constitutes proof that she has a
claim of title over the lot. It has been held
that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
P a g e | 15
property and announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute
needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership.27
The lower courts did not err in adjudicating
the issue of possession. Mere absence of title
over the lot is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an
ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court
has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the
ejectment cases below. The policy behind
ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the
peace and criminal disorder, and to compel
the party out of possession to respect and
resort to the law alone to obtain what she
claims is hers. The party deprived of
possession must not take the law into his or
her own hands.28For their part, herein
petitioners could not be barred from defending
themselves before the court adequately, as a
matter of law and right.
However, petitioners in their defense should
show that they are entitled to possess Lot
1227. If they had any evidence to prove their
defenses, they should have presented it to the
MCTC with their position papers and
affidavits. But they ignored the court’s order
and missed the given opportunity to have their
defenses heard, the very essence of due
process.29 Their allegations were not only
unsubstantiated but were also disproved by
the plaintiff’s evidence.
In sum, we find no reversible error much less
any grave abuse of discretion committed by
the Court of Appeals. A person who occupies
the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand,
failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him.30 His status
is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the
owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to
be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.31
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its
Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
5 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 165177 : August 25, 2005]
LILIA V. PERALTA-
LABRADOR, Petitioners, v. SILVERIO
BUGARIN, substituted by his widow,
CONSOLACION BUGARIN,1 Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Challenged in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari is the March 12, 2004
decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 57475, which affirmed with
modification the January 26, 2000
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No.
RTC-1590-I, which in turn affirmed the
decision4 dated May 16, 1999 of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Felipe, Zambales, in
Civil Case No. 328, and its September 6, 2004
resolution5 denying reconsideration thereof.
On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V.
Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership," docketed as Civil
Case No. 328, with the MTC of San Felipe,
Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400
sq. m. located at Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay
Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having
purchased the same in 1976 from spouses
Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was
issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid
the taxes due thereon.6
In 1990, the Department of Public Works and
Highways constructed a road which traversed
Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating
108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioner's lot, for
which she was issued Tax Declaration No. 02-
2460R in 1991.7
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio
Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108
sq. m. lot and refused to vacate the same
despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on
January 18, 1996, she instituted a complaint
for recovery of possession and ownership
against respondent.
In his Answer with
Counterclaims,8 respondent contended that
the area claimed by petitioner is included in
the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011;
and that he has been in continuous
P a g e | 16
possession and occupation thereof since 1955.
In his Amended Answer with
Counterclaim,9 however, respondent failed to
allege that the questioned lot is covered by the
OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that
he planted fruit bearing trees in the property.
Respondent further pleaded the defenses of
lack of cause of action and prescription.
On May 16, 1999, the court a quo ruled in
favor of respondent declaring him as the
owner of the controverted lot on the basis of
the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was
dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove
prior physical possession and ownership
thereof. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
considered and for failure on the part of the
plaintiff to establish the preponderance of
evidence of prior actual physical possession
and present title over the lot in her favor, let
the instant case be ordered DISMISSED, and
the defendant be awarded the rightful
possession and ownership of the same and the
plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS as
reasonable Attorney's fee and FIVE
THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS as
appearance fee plus costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC affirmed the assailed
decision,11 hence petitioner filed a Petition for
Review before the Court of Appeals which was
however denied for insufficiency of evidence to
prove ownership or prior actual physical
possession. The appellate court deleted the
monetary awards in favor of respondent as
well as the declaration of the MTC that
respondent is the owner of the questioned lot
on the ground that the OCT No. P-13011,
relied upon by said court was not formally
offered in evidence, hence, cannot be
considered by the court. The decretal portion
thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
discussion, the instant petition is hereby
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated January 26, 2000, in Civil Case No. RTC
1590 I of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and Decision dated
May 16, 1999, in Civil Case No. 328 of the
Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales
are MODIFIED by deleting the declaration of
ownership as to the disputed 108 square
meters and the monetary award in favor of
respondent Silverio Bugarin. However, the
dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied. Hence the instant
petition.
Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings,
and when. - - a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, - may
at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with the damages and
costs. (Emphasis supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
In Lopez v. David Jr.,13 it was held that an
action for forcible entry is a quieting process
and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in
pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in
the MTCs when it improperly assumed
jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession had
exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one
year period, the suit must be commenced in
the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for
recovery of the right to possess. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It also refers to an
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty independently of title. Likewise, the
case may be instituted before the same court
as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action
to recover ownership as well as possession.14
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations of the
complaint. Thus, in ascertaining whether or
not the action falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are to be examined.15
In the instant case, petitioner's complaint
alleges that:
2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of
land denominated as Cadastral lot No. 2650,
San Felipe Cadastre, situated at sitio
Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San
Felipe, Zambales which she bought in 1976
from Spouses Artemio Pronto and Angela
Merano when she was still a widow, with the
following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad,
P a g e | 17
East, Antonio Cueva, South, Juan Borja, and
West, Old Provincial Road, containing an area
of 108 square meters, declared under Tax
Declaration No. 002-1860R and assessed at
P1,120.00;
3. That plaintiff has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse as well
as notorious possession of the said lot and
in the concept of an owner since she
[acquired] it in 1976 until the time when
defendant took possession forcibly, two
years ago;
4. That in or before 1990 the land was
traversed by a new National Highway and the
land was segregated from a bigger portion of
the land, the western portion is now the land
in question and since the new provincial road
which traversed the whole land of the plaintiff,
the old highway which is west of Lot 2650
shall belong to the plaintiff in compensation of
the portion of her lot traversed by the new
highway, said old highway is also taken by
defendant unlawfully;16
It is clear that petitioner's averment make out
a case for forcible entry because she alleged
prior physical possession of the subject lot
way back in 1976, and the forcible entry
thereon by respondent. Considering her
allegation that the unlawful possession of
respondent occurred two years17 prior to the
filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996,
the cause of action for forcible entry has
prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case. Petitioner's complaint
therefore should have been filed with the
proper RTC.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject
matter cannot be waived by the parties or
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
express consent.18 Hence, the failure of
respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of
cause of action and prescription stated in his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not
vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
On this point, the Court held in Bongato v.
Malvar19 that:
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is
a quieting process, and that the restrictive
time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of such process. Indeed, the
one-year period within which to bring an
action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth,
then the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the party

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either
an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action
to recover the right of possession; or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear
that the cause of action for forcible entry filed
by respondents had already prescribed when
they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July
10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be
the owner of the land, possession thereof
cannot be wrested through a summary action
for ejectment of petitioner, who had been
occupying it for more than one (1) year.
Respondents should have presented their suit
before the RTC in an accion publiciana or
an accionreivindicatoria, not before the MTCC
in summary proceedings for forcible entry.
Their cause of action for forcible entry had
prescribed already, and the MTCC had no
more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
...
Further, a court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence
or even express consent. A party may assail
the jurisdiction of the court over the action at
any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of
a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, even if an answer has been
belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v.
Natino[.]
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the complaint should
still be dismissed because petitioner failed to
prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is
part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Petitioner
admitted that she has never seen the
Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales, and
relied only on the Survey Notification
Card20 from the Bureau of Lands,21 with a
sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card,
however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot
subject of this case. Neither did petitioner
cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650
after the construction of a new road to prove
that the segregated portion on the western
side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio qui
dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove.22 Failing to discharge
this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is
proper.
In the same vein, ownership of the lot in
question cannot be awarded to respondent
considering that OCT No. P-13011,23 and the
Survey Plan24 were not formally offered in
evidence. While the issue of ownership may be
P a g e | 18
passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole
purpose of determining the nature of
possession,25 no evidence conclusively show
that the lot in question is covered by said OCT
No. P-13011 or any other title of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe,
Zambales, the January 26, 2000 decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Iba,
Zambales, and the March 12, 2004 decision of
the Court of Appeals, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint
in Civil Case No. 328 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
6 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and
JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH
ONG, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
In a Decision1 dated 6 January 1998, the
Former First Division of the Court of Appeals
overturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition
for review prays for the reversal of the
aforesaid Court of Appeals’ Decision.
The case originated from a complaint for
ejectment filed by petitioners against
respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 2376,
before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In
the complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of
their ownership of three (3) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners
likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth
Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs.
On 26 January 1995, Atty. Joseph M. Baduel,
representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty,
wrote respondents informing them of its intent
to use the lots and asking them to vacate
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
letter. But respondents refused to vacate,
thereby unlawfully withholding possession of
said lots, so petitioners alleged.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King
and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the
lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty
through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In
turn, it appears that Mandaue Prime Estate
Realty had acquired the properties from the
respondents through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed
of sale and the transfers of title consequential
thereto were subsequently sought to be
annulled by respondents in a complaint filed
on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC
against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty.2 Per
record, this case is still pending resolution.
Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment
case on 24 April 1996, with the decision
ordering respondents to vacate the premises
in question and to peacefully turn over
possession thereof to petitioners.
On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March
1997 a judgment affirming the MTC’s decision
in its entirety.
On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of
appeal. However, on the following day, they
filed a motion for reconsideration.
On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued
an Order which concurrently gave due course
to respondents’ notice of appeal filed on 8 May
1997; denied their motion for reconsideration
dated 9 May 1997,3 and granted petitioners’
motion for immediate execution pending
appeal.
In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed
with the Court of Appeals and treated as
a Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said
case as there was no contract between the
parties, express or implied, as would qualify
the same as one for unlawful detainer. Thus,
the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were
set aside.
Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The principal issues raised before this
Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has
already become final and executory at the time
the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether
the allegations in the complaint constitute a
case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable
by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as
registered owners, are entitled to the
possession of the subject premises.
We resolve the first argument to be without
merit.
P a g e | 19
The following sequence of events is
undisputed:
(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the
questioned decision affirming the judgment of
the MTC.
(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a
copy of the aforementioned decision.
(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice
of Appeal with the RTC.
(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise
with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue
issued an Order denying respondents’ Motion
for Reconsideration.
(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a
copy of the aforementioned 23 June
1997 Order.
(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with
the Court of Appeals their motion for an
additional period of ten (10) days within which
to file their Petition for Review.
(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with
the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.
Petitioners assert that the Petition for
Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day
period for appeal. They theorize that the
period started running on 28 April 1995, the
date of receipt of the RTC decision, and ended
on 13 May 1997. According to them, this
reglementary period could not have been
interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of
the Motion for Reconsideration because of the
filing one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal.
This Notice of Appealdated 8 May 1997, albeit
the wrong mode of appeal, expressly
manifested their intention to file a petition for
review to either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.4
Petitioners further argue that respondents,
after having filed the Notice of Appeal which
was given due course by the RTC, cannot take
an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion
for Reconsideration. Such filing, therefore, did
not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which
started running from the date of receipt of the
RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on
13 May 1997.
Respondents, in their Comment,5 submit that
the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May
1997 was improper, and as such did not
produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
the Motion for Reconsideration immediately on
the following day cured this defect. The RTC
refused to subscribe respondents’ position. It
justified the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that the
respondents had already filed a Notice of
Appeal. The Orderdated 23 June 1997 stated:
On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari
filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.
Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997
is a Motion for Reconsideration.
Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier
which the court hereby approves, the Motion
for Reconsideration is DENIED.
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending
Appeal being meritorious, is
GRANTED.6 (Emphasis in the original.)
Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals
passed no comment on this point when it took
cognizance of respondents’ position and
reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily
mean that the RTC was correct when it
declared that the Motion for
Reconsideration was barred by the filing of
the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous
the latter mode was?
Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable
in this case. Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. --
A party desiring to appeal from a decision of
the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
paying at the same time to the clerk of said
court the corresponding docket and other
lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the
petition. The petition shall be filed and served
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial
of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the
payment of the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs
before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for
the most compelling reason and in no case to
exceed fifteen (15) days.
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed
with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
P a g e | 20
petitioners should have filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals and not
a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we
consider this to have been remedied by the
timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section
3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the
withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter
of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief.
Applying this rule contextually, the filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed
as an effective withdrawal of the
defective Notice of Appeal.
Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by
the Motion for Reconsideration and started to
run again from the receipt of the order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
A Motion for Additional Time to File the
Petition was likewise filed with the Court of
Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request
for additional period, it is clear that
respondents filed their Petition for Review on
time.
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De
la Cruz7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it
cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a
motion for reconsideration. The factual
circumstances in the two cases are different.
De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by
criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court provides that the proper mode
of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a
notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed
perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.
In the case at bar, a petition for review before
the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of
appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the
filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is
considered as if no appeal was interposed.
Now on the second and more important issue
raised by petitioners: whether
the Complaint satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements for a case of unlawful detainer
properly cognizable by the MTC.
The MTC considered itself as having
jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and
disposed of the same in favor of petitioners.
Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts
and found the complaint to be one not for
unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that
petitioners were deprived of possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth;
and that there is no contract, express or

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
implied, between the parties as would qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
The complaint for unlawful detainer contained
the following material allegations:
....
3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2,
which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-
A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No.
86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of
the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, all
situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of
said Transfer Certificate of Titles are hereto
attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C"
respectively and made an integral part hereof;
4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the
previous registered owner of said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of
said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her
husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have
been living in the house constructed on said
lots;
6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the
undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a
letter informing them or their intent to use
said lots and demanded of them to vacate said
lots within 30 days from receipt of said letter.
Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex
"D" and made an integral part thereof;
7. That despite demand to vacate, the
defendants have refused and still refuse to
vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding
possession of said lots from plaintiffs and
depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots;
8. That in unlawfully withholding the
possession of said lots from the plaintiffs,
plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of
unearned rentals in the amount of ₱10,000.00
a month
. . . .8
Well-settled is the rule that what determines
the nature of an action as well as which court
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.9
Respondents contend that the complaint did
not allege that petitioners’ possession was
originally lawful but had ceased to be so due
P a g e | 21
to the expiration of the right to possess by
virtue of any express or implied contract.
The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals
on the presence of a contract as a requisite to
qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer
contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing
on the matter.
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals,10 it was
held that the allegation in the complaint that
there was unlawful withholding of possession
is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful
detainer. It is equally settled that in an action
for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law.11
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has
been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
having no other source than a contract,
express or implied, and which later expired as
a right and is being withheld by
defendant.12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of
Appeals,13 we held that a simple allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession from plaintiff is sufficient.
Based on this premise, the allegation in
the Complaint that:
. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants
have refused and still refuse to vacate said
lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession
of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving
plaintiffs of the use of their lots;14
is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful
detainer case.
In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged
that they are the registered owners of the lots
covered by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and
36468. By their implied tolerance, they have
allowed respondents, the former owners of the
properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless,
they eventually sent a letter to respondents
asking that the latter vacate the said lots.
Respondents refused, thereby depriving
petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly,
the complaint establishes the basic elements
of an unlawful detainer case, certainly
sufficient for the purpose of vesting
jurisdiction over it in the MTC.
Respondents would like to capitalize on the
requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo
dela Paz v. Panis.15 But the citation is a mere
reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 7016 of the Rules of

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Court. The case doesid not provide for rigid
standards in the drafting of the ejectment
complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v.
Diaz17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus:
. . . The principle underlying the brevity and
simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases rests upon
considerations of public policy. Cases of
forcible entry and detainer are summary in
nature, for they involve perturbation of social
order which must be restored as promptly as
possible and, accordingly, technicalities or
details of procedure should be carefully
avoided.18
Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of
the incidents of the pending case involving the
annulment of deed of sale and title over said
property. Petitioners know better than to
question this in an ejectment proceeding,
which brings us to the nature of the action in
this case.
Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the
MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being
an accion reivindicatoriaaccording to them, on
the ground that petitioners were constantly
claiming ownership over the lands in the guise
of filing an action for ejectment. In
their Comment,19 respondents maintain that
they occupy the subject lots as the legal
owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are
seeking recovery of possession under a claim
of ownership which is tantamount to recovery
of possession based on alleged title to the
lands, and therefore is within the original
jurisdiction of the RTC, so respondents
conclude.
This contention is not tenable.
The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is
the recovery of ownership of real property.
This differs from accion publiciana where the
issue is the better right of possession or
possession de jure, and accion
interdictal where the issue is material
possession or possession de facto. In an action
for unlawful detainer, the question of
possession is primordial while the issue of
ownership is generally unessential.20
Neither the allegation in petitioners’ complaint
for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised
by respondents sufficiently convert this case
into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond
the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners
did not institute the complaint for ejectment
as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership
of the properties. The acknowledgment in their
pleadings of the fact of prior ownership by
respondents does not constitute a recognition
P a g e | 22
of respondents’ present ownership. This is
meant only to establish one of the necessary
elements for a case of unlawful detainer,
specifically the unlawful withholding of
possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings,
only sought to recover physical possession of
the subject property. The mere fact that they
claim ownership over the parcels of land as
well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to
try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a
defense to the complaint for ejectment, the
conclusion would be the same for mere
assertion of ownership by the defendant in an
ejectment case will not therefore oust the
municipal court of its summary
jurisdiction.21 This Court in Ganadin
v. Ramos22 stated that if what is prayed for is
ejectment or recovery of possession, it does
not matter if ownership is claimed by either
party. Therefore, the pending actions for
declaration of nullity of deed of sale and
Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of
title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate
the ejectment case.
In Drilon v. Gaurana,23 this Court ruled that
the filing of an action for reconveyance of title
over the same property or for annulment of
the deed of sale over the land does not divest
the MTC of its jurisdiction to try the forcible
entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the
rationale being that, while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter in the
forcible entry case and the suit for annulment
of title and/or reconveyance, the rights
asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
same.24
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court held
that the fact that respondents had previously
filed a separate action for the reformation of a
deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de
retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same
Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to
frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment
afforded by law to the plaintiff. Consequently,
an adjudication made in an ejectment
proceeding regarding the issue of ownership
should be regarded as merely provisional and,
therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the
land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
consequence of the nature of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases where the only
issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de
jure.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson
v. Gutierrez26 when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is
only the initial determination of ownership
over the lot in dispute, for the purpose of
settling the issue of possession, although the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked
thereto. As such, the lower court's
adjudication of ownership in the ejectment
case is merely provisional, and our affirmance
of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not
bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property, if and
when such action is brought seasonably
before the proper forum.
The long settled rule is that the issue of
ownership cannot be subject of a collateral
attack.
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court had
the occasion to clarify this:
. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled, except in a
direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity
of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for
that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners
have the right to claim ownership over the
property is beyond the power of the court a
quo to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer.28
With the conclusion of the second issue in
favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss
the third assignment of error which is related
to the second issue.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6
January 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the Decision dated 24
April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
P a g e | 23
SECOND DIVISION
7
G.R. No. 127382 August 17, 2004
DR. JESUS SERIÑA and ENRIQUETA
SERIÑA (deceased), represented by DR.
JESUS SERIÑA, JR., ANTONIO SERIÑA,
VIOLETA SERIÑA TAN, REYNALDO SERIÑA
and EMMANUEL SERIÑA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTOR CABALLERO, TEODORO DONELA,
OLIVER DONELA, COURT OF APPEALS, and
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 20, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated August 23, 1996, affirming the
dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title,
recovery of possession, and damages by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis
Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, in Civil Case
No. 8716.
The Antecedents
On August 11, 1982, Dr. Jesus Seriña and his
wife, Enriqueta Seriña filed a Complaint for
quieting of title, recovery of possession, and
damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondents Victor Caballero and his tenants,
Teodoro Donela and Oliver Donela. When Dr.
Seriña died on August 6, 1983, he was
substituted by his children, petitioners Jesus,
Jr., Antonio, Violeta, Reynaldo and
Emmanuel.2
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that
they are the absolute owners and have been in
actual and constructive possession for thirty-
five (35) years of a parcel of land described as
follows:
Lot No. 3533-A, Cad-237, Cagayan
Cadastre
Tax Declaration No. 02161
Location - Mantadiao, Opol,
Misamis Oriental

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Area - 2.5000 has.
Boundaries:
North - Alejo Seriña
South - T. Sabornido
East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero3
The petitioners averred that sometime in
March 1982, they discovered that respondent
Caballero was claiming ownership over the
said land and offering it for sale or mortgage
to third parties. They also discovered that the
respondents Donelas were occupying the land
as tenants and caretakers of the land. 4
The petitioners claimed that their father, Dr.
Seriña, bought the land from Lucia Vda. de
Marbella who inherited it from her father,
Ramon Neri.5 They presented a Deed of
Sale6 dated August 23, 1947 showing that Dr.
Seriña bought 5 hectares of ricefield, bounded
on the North by Raymundo Seriña, on the
East by Teofilo Saburnido, on the South by
Obdelio Caballero, on the West by Obdullo
Caballero, from Lucia Vda. de Marbella. Dr.
Seriña was issued Tax Declaration No. 4029
allegedly for the said property. As indicated in
the tax declaration and subsequent tax
declarations issued in the name of Dr. Seriña,
they were issued for Cadastral Lot No. 3533
and covered a 2.5-hectare ricefield with the
same boundary owners as those in the
complaint.7 The petitioners also averred that
they regularly paid taxes thereon since 1947
up to the present.8
In his answer, respondent Caballero alleged
that he was the lawful owner, and had been in
actual physical possession of the disputed
land since time immemorial. He averred that
the disputed land is part of Cadastral Lot No.
3533, C-7 of the Cagayan Cadastre and
originally owned by his grandfather,
Eustaquio Caballero.9
The respondents averred that Eustaquio
Caballero declared the entire parcel of land for
tax purposes even before the war. Tax
Declaration No. 2442 was issued in lieu of the
records that were destroyed during the war.
This tax declaration indicated that the
119,490 square-meter parcel of land was
located at Pontacon, Iponan, Cagayan de Oro
City, bounded on North by Rustico Dablio, on
the East by J. Seriña and T. Saburnido, on the
South by Victor Obsioma, and on the West by
Victorino Caballero.10
P a g e | 24
Emiliana Ibarat, respondent Caballero’s sister,
testified that when Eustaquio Caballero died
in 1944, the land was divided among his three
children, Vicenta, Benita and Victorino, the
father of respondent Caballero. Lot A, with an
area of 39,625 square meters, was given to
Victorino, which was later inherited by the
respondent. Lot B, with an area of 71, 450
square meters, was given to Benita; and Lot C,
with only 7,938 square meters was given to
Vicenta. Lots B and C were, thereafter, sold to
one Gaga Yasay. Because of the trouble
between the petitioners and the respondents,
Yasay agreed to buy only a portion of Lot A.11
The land was surveyed during the trial and it
was determined that it now consisted of only
23,373 square meters,12and not 25,000
square meters as claimed by the petitioners.
Gliceria Legaspi, respondent Caballero’s other
sister, also testified that the disputed land
was now bounded on the North by Seriña and
Nangcas, on the East by Teofilo Saburnido, on
the South by Gaga Yasay, and on the West by
Nangcas.13
The RTC rendered judgment14 on January 21,
1992, dismissing the complaint, and
upholding the right of the respondents over
the land. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendant
Victor Caballero and against the
plaintiffs herein, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the
complaint with costs.
2. Ordering the defendant Victor
Caballero as the absolute and lawful
owner and possessor of the land in
question.
3. Ordering the plaintiffs, their heirs,
lawyers, servants or privies not to
disturb or molest the possession and
ownership of Victor Caballero over the
land in question.
4. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay to
defendant Victor Caballero, jointly and
severally the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) pesos for expenses of
litigation, and THREE THOUSAND
(P3,000.00) pesos for and as attorney's
fees having been compelled to retain
the services of counsel to protect his
interest herein.
SO ORDERED.15

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
The trial court ruled that it was not clearly
shown that the land bought by Dr. Seriña
from Lucia Vda. de Marbella was the same
land owned by Victor Caballero, and that the
petitioners failed to show that Lucia Vda. de
Marbella bought the land from Eustaquio
Caballero, the original owner and cadastral
claimant of the land. It also noted that the
deed of sale between Lucia Vda. de Marbella
and Dr. Seriña showed that the land had an
area of 5 hectares, whereas, the petitioners
only claimed 2.5 hectares. Furthermore, the
boundaries of the land stated in the complaint
did not coincide with what was stated in the
Deed of Sale, or in Tax Declaration No. 2442
in the name of Eustaquio Caballero. The trial
court ruled that the petitioners failed to
explain these discrepancies, and that there
was no showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442
was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 4029 in
the name of Dr. Seriña. The trial court
interpreted this to mean that Eustaquio
Caballero's right as owner of the land
remained.
Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed the case
to the CA, which rendered a
Decision16 affirming in toto the decision of the
RTC. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on September 30, 1996.17 The
CA denied the motion.18
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioners assign the following errors:
1. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO
UPHOLD THE HONORABLE RTC ON
THE ISSUE THAT THE ALLEGED
IDENTITY OF THE LAND IN
LITIGATION IS UNESTABLISHED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES-LITIGANTS.
2. THAT IT IS ERROR FOR THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO
FAIL TO APPRECIATE THE 35-YEAR
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS.19
The issues in this petition are, therefore, the
following: (1) whether the petitioners were able
to establish the identity of the land being
claimed by them; and (2) whether acquisitive
prescription should be appreciated in favor of
the petitioners.
The Ruling of the Court
The first issue deals clearly with a question of
fact which is beyond the province of this Court
in a petition for review on certiorari. Well-
P a g e | 25
entrenched is the rule that the Court's
jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited
to reviewing or revising errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court. Factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
on the parties and not reviewable by this
Court—and they carry even more weight when
the Court of Appeals affirms the factual
findings of the trial court.20 The exceptions to
this rule are the following:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.21
We find no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the CA. None of the aforementioned
exceptions is present in this case. The CA was
correct in concluding that the petitioners
failed to establish that the parcel of land in
the possession of the respondents is the same
as that subject of their complaint.
The CA noted that the land subject of the
complaint has boundaries different from the
land in possession of the respondents. In fact,
the land described in the complaint appears to
be different from the land described in the
Deed of Sale which the petitioners invoke as
the basis of their ownership.
First. The petitioners alleged in their
complaint that the boundaries of their
property are as follows:
North - Alejo Seriña
South - T. Sabornido

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
East - A. Seriña & T. Sabornido
West - F. Caballero22
On the other hand, the Deed of Sale provides
that the property sold to them has the
following boundaries:
North - Raymundo Seriña
South - Obdullo Caballero
East - Teofilo Saburnido
West - Obdullo Caballero23
Second. The complaint24 of the petitioners
states that the property they are claiming has
an area of 2.5 hectares. On the other hand,
the Deed of Sale25 provides that the subject
property has an area of 5 hectares.
Third. The complaint alleged that the property
is located in "Mantadiao, Opol, Misamis
Oriental,"26 while the Deed of Sale shows that
the property purchased is located in
"Puntakon, Igpit, Cagayan Or. Misamis."27
We agree with the CA that there was no
showing that Tax Declaration No. 2442 in the
name of Eustaquio Caballero was cancelled.
Absent any specific statement therein to that
effect, it cannot be presumed that Tax
Declaration No. 4029 in the name of Dr.
Seriña cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2442.
Moreover, the land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 2442 is different from that covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4029 for the following
reasons:
The boundary owners of the land as indicated
in Tax Declaration No. 2442 differ from those
stated in Tax Declaration No. 4029. The
boundary owners as indicated in Tax
Declaration No. 2442 are as follows:
North - Rustico Dablio
South -Victor Obsioma
East - J. Seriña & T. Saburnido
West - Victorino Caballero28
Under Tax Declaration No. 4029, on the other
hand, the boundary owners are as follows:
North - Alejo Seriña
South - Teofilo Saburnido
P a g e | 26
East - A. Seriña [and] T. Saburnido
West - Eustaquio Caballero29
Moreover, Tax Declaration No. 2442 covers an
area of 119,490 square meters30 while Tax
Declaration No. 4029 covers only 25,000
square meters or 2.5 hectares.31
The petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale
and Tax Declaration No. 4029 should not be
compared to Tax Declaration No. 2442 and the
Technical Description of Cadastral Lot No.
3533 because the former refers only to a
portion of the area referred to by the
latter.32 While the petitioners are correct on
this point, such mistake would still not justify
a different conclusion. The fact remains that
the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by the petitioners did not prove the
identity of the land being claimed. The
petitioners did not present evidence to prove
that the land registered in the name of
Eustaquio Caballero was sold to Lucia Vda. de
Marbella or her predecessor-in-interest from
whom they purchased the land subject of their
complaint.
The failure to establish the identity of the land
is obviously fatal to the petitioners’ case.
In Beo vs. Court of Appeals,33 a case which
also involves an action for possession and
quieting of title, the Court had the occasion to
state:
…[B]ecause petitioners failed to explain
the discrepancy or present other
evidence to prove with certainty the
location and area of the land they seek
to recover, respondent court correctly
applied the invariable rule that a
person who claims ownership of real
property is duty-bound to clearly
identify the land being claimed, in
accordance with the title on which
he anchors his right of ownership.
When the record does not show that the
land subject matter of the action for
recovery of possession has been exactly
determined, such action cannot
prosper, as in the case of petitioners. In
sum, proof of ownership coupled
with identity of the land is the basic
rule.
Corollarily, the rule is likewise well-
settled that in order that an action
for recovery of possession may
prosper, it is indispensable that he
who brings the action fully proves
not only his ownership but also the
identity of the property claimed, by
describing the location, area and

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
boundaries thereof. As the appellate
court succinctly stated, he who claims
to have a better right to the property
must clearly show that the land
possessed by the other party is the very
land that belongs to him.34
On the second issue, the CA ruled that
inasmuch as the petitioners failed to establish
that the parcel of land in possession of the
respondents is the same as the subject of their
complaint, their claim of acquisitive
prescription is clearly untenable.
The petitioners argue that they would not
have regularly paid taxes on the land since
1947 had they not believed that they owned
the same.35 The respondents, for their part,
aver that the petitioners were only able to
prove seven (7) years of actual possession of
the land through cultivation by their tenants.
They argue that such seven-year period of
cultivation cannot be considered in the
petitioners’ favor, since the witness who
testified on this fact did not personally know
the boundaries of the land cultivated, or
whether it was the same land bought by Dr.
Seriña. The respondents contend that
acquisitive prescription applies only when
there is no dispute as to the identity of the
property.36
We agree with the respondents. Since the
property has not been clearly identified by the
petitioners, their claim of acquisitive
prescription cannot be considered. Insufficient
identification of the portion of land claimed in
absolute ownership cannot ripen into
ownership. Possession as a means of
acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction.37
Assuming, however, that the disputed land
has been clearly identified, acquisitive
prescription will still not lie in favor of the
petitioners because they were not able to
prove that they have been in possession of the
property for the requisite number of years.
Prescription requires public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of an owner for ten
years, in case the possession is in good faith
and with just title.38
Aside from the testimony of Leonardo
Vacalares that certain tenants of the
petitioners cultivated the land for a total of
seven years, the petitioners did not present
any other evidence to show that they have
been in actual possession of the property for
at least ten years.
P a g e | 27
The petitioners’ argument that the payment of
taxes on the property since May 31, 1948
constitutes proof of their possession of the
subject land for thirty-five years is untenable.
Tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership. At most,
they constitute mere prima facie proof of
ownership of the property for which taxes
have been paid. In the absence of actual,
public and adverse possession, the declaration
of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.39
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairman, Austria-Martinez, Tinga,
and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
8
G.R. No. L-22006 July 28, 1975
BASILIO PEREZ and PETRA
MONTALBO, petitioners,
vs.
NICOLAS MENDOZA, MARGARITA
MACALALAD and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Pedro T. Panganiban for petitioners.
Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for respondents.
MUNOZ PALMA, J.:
Civil Case 689 of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas was an action to quiet title over a
piece of land filed on March 20, 1959, by
spouses Basilio Perez and Petra Montalbo with
spouses Nicolas Mendoza and Margarita
Macalalad as defendants. According to the
complaint, the land in controversy is located
in barrio Dagatan, municipality of Taysan,
Batangas, with an area of approximately
4,765 sq. meters, declared for taxation
purposes in the name of the "Heirs of
Estanislao Montalbo", and is "bounded on the
north by a school site, on the east by Calixto
Flores, on the south by a creek, and on the
west by a creek and the land of Gregorio
Mendoza." On the basis of evidence adduced
by the parties, the trial court then presided by
Hon. Lorenzo Relova rendered judgment on
February 19, 1962, dismissing the complaint

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
and declaring the spouses Mendoza "to have a
better right to the property in question."1
Spouses Perez elevated the Relova decision to
the Court of Appeals which, however,
affirmed in toto the findings of the court a quo,
and declared that "upon the evidence it has
been shown by a great preponderance that the
land in question belongs to the defendants."2
The case is now before Us on a petition
for certiorari filed by spouses Perez.
The findings of fact both of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals may be briefly
summarized as follows:
The litigated parcel of land was originally part
of a bigger tract owned by Estanislao
Montalbo. When Estanislao died in 1918, his
properties passed on to his children Petra,
Felisa, and Pedro all surnamed Montalbo, and
because Pedro died single the two women
remained as the only heirs. By mutual
agreement Petra and Felisa divided between
themselves the lands of their father and the
parcel of which the litigated land was a part
was assigned to Felisa. Sometime in 1922
Felisa exchanged the above-mentioned parcel
with a land belonging to her aunt. Andrea
Montalbo, a sister of her father. The reason for
the exchange was that Andrea wanted to
donate a piece of land to the municipality for
use as a school site and the land of Felisa was
what the municipality preferred as it was
adjacent to other properties of the
municipality. (Exh. 5 for defendants Mendoza)
Upon her acquisition of Felisa's
aforementioned land, Andrea donated to the
municipality the northern portion thereof
which constituted almost one-half of the entire
parcel, and since then that portion was
declared for taxation purposes by the
municipality together with its adjoining
properties (Exhs. 6, 6-A, 6-B).1äwphï1.ñët In
1927 the remainder of the lot was given by
Andrea Montalbo to her daughter Margarita
Macalalad on the occasion of her marriage to
Nicolas Mendoza, and from the time of their
marriage the couple possessed the said
property. That donation was confirmed
subsequently in a public instrument dated
August 15, 1951 (Exh. 2 for the Mendozas).
Nicolas Mendoza sought to transfer the tax
declaration of the property to his name and of
his wife and for that purpose he submitted a
deed of exchange of property dated January
14, 1922, allegedly executed by Felisa
Montalbo and Andrea Montalbo in the
presence of the municipal secretary Rafael
Manahan (Exh. 5). When Basilio Perez came to
know about the supposed deed of exchange,
he had it investigated and upon discovering
P a g e | 28
that the signature of Rafael Manahan
appearing on the document was forged, he
filed a criminal complaint before the Fiscal's
office which led to an accusation for
falsification of private document against
Andrea Montalbo and Nicolas Mendoza. Only
Nicolas Mendoza was arraigned and tried and
was convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, but on appeal he was acquitted by
the Court of Appeals for insufficiency of
evidence to show that he participated in
affixing the signature of Rafael Manahan or
that he was aware of the falsity of the
document in question when he presented it to
the tax assessor's office.3 Notwithstanding the
forged signature of Rafael Manahan on the
document Exhibit 5, there is sufficient
evidence to prove that an exchange of property
did in fact occur in 1922 between Andrea and
Felisa Montalbo, and that Felisa's land passed
on to Andrea who in turn gave part of it to the
municipality and part to her daughter,
Margarita; hence, the decision in favor of the
spouses Mendoza.
On the other hand, petitioners contend that
the disputed property was inherited by Petra
and Felisa Montalbo from their father
Estanislao who died in 1918 and since that
date the two sisters were in possession of said
land. In 1934 a deed of partition of the various
properties of Estanislao was executed between
Petra and the heirs of Felisa, and the land in
question was divided equally, between them;
among those who signed as witnesses to that
agreement was Andrea Montalbo(Exh. D for
petitioners). In 1952 Felisa's husband, Jose
Ortega, and children sold their one-half share
to spouses Petra Montalbo and Basilio Perez,
now petitioners, but the deed of sale was lost
a year after. Sometime in 1946 petitioners
leased the property to the Mendozas and when
the lease expired in 1951 they demanded for
the return of the land but the Mendozas
refused and so petitioners had to file an
ejectment suit before the justice of the peace
court of Taysan which was still pending at the
time of the trial of the civil case in 1960. (tsn.
witness Basilio Perez, December 15, 1960, pp.
16-34)
For not giving credit to the foregoing evidence,
petitioners now assail the adverse decision of
respondent court on four assigned errors.
1. Petitioners contend that respondent court
erred in considering the criminal case for
falsification res adjudicata on the matter of
ownership of the land in litigation when the
"question of ownership was not actually and
directly in issue in the criminal case and the
latter was not the proper vehicle for the
determination of the ownership of the land."
(p. 9, petitioners brief) Petitioners refer to

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
portions in the decision of respondent
court, viz:
The land in question, together
with that portion that was
acquired by the municipality of
Taysan, the identity of which is
admitted by the parties, belonged
to Felisa Montalbo, as held in the
decision of the Court of Appeals,
thus — "The said parcel of land
previously belonged to Felisa
Montalbo (married to Jose
Ortega), who inherited it from
her deceased father, the
aforecited Estanislao Montalbo;",
and the land in question was
donated propter nuptias by
Andrea Montalbo to Margarita
Macalalad and Nicolas Mendoza,
the defendants, (Margarita
Macalalad is the daughter of
Andrea Montalbo) on the
occasion of their marriage on
February 27, 1927, as found and
held in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, thus — "and this land
was acquired by the donor
(Andrea Montalbo) by means of a
barter with her own parcel of
land planted with bamboos and
mango trees"
Upon the basis of the findings of
fact and conclusion arrived at in
the decision of the Court of
Appeals, it clearly appears that
although the document of
exchange of the lands was found
to be falsified, nevertheless the
Court found upon the facts as
demonstrated by the evidence
that the land in question
"previously belonged to Felisa
Montalbo (married to Jose
Ortega), who inherited it from
her deceased father, the
aforesaid Estanislao Montalbo
..."; that said land was
donated propter nuptias by
Andrea Montalbo to the
defendants on the occasion of
their marriage on February 27,
1927; and that "this land was
acquired by the donor by means
of a barter with her own parcel of
land planted with bamboos and
mango trees". From the context of
the decision the natural and
logical inference is that factually
the exchange of the lands had
been consummated.... (pp. 6-7,
CA decision at pp. 20-21, rollo;
P a g e | 29
emphasis supplied to indicate
disputed statements)
Undoubtedly, there is merit to the contention
of petitioners that the pronouncements or
findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals
in the criminal case concerning the possession
and ownership of the land now in litigation in
the civil case, do not constitute the law on the
matter and cannot be taken or adopted as a
basis for deciding the question of ownership of
said land in this civil case. Since there is no
identity of parties in the two cases — the
petitioners here not being parties in the
criminal case — and the object or subject
matter in the criminal prosecution is different,
the latter being concerned with the guilt or
innocence of accused Nicolas Mendoza for
falsification of private document, it follows
that the judgment in the criminal action
cannot be used as evidence in the civil case
where the issue is ownership of a piece of
land. It is the rule that the plea of res
judicata generally cannot be interposed except
where the parties, facts, and questions are
the
same,4 hence, the judgment in a criminal case
cannot be pleaded as res judicata in a civil
action.5
But whatever error was committed by
respondent court in this regard, the same is
not sufficient to nullify the appealed decision.
Analyzing the decision of respondent court.
We see that the latter made its own appraisal
and evaluation of the evidence existing in the
record relative to the possession and
ownership of the land in question. Thus it said
that the conclusions arrived at by the Court of
Appeals in the criminal case to wit(1) that
there was an exchange of lands consummated
between Andrea and Felisa and (2) that the
exchanged land was later donated by Andrea
to her daughter Margarita in 1927, "can
hardly be doubted if we take account of the
undisputed fact that the defendants have been
in possession of the land since 1927, and the
plaintiffs (meaning spouses Perez) have not
attempted to disturb defendants' possession of
the land until 1952 when said plaintiffs filed
an action of unlawful detainer against the
defendants." (p. 7 of appealed decision at p.
21, SC rollo; emphasis supplied) Continuing,
respondent court expounded:
Contrary to the allegation in the
complaint — "That plaintiffs were
in possession of the land prior
and up to January, 1946, when
the same was leased to the
defendants ...", and the
testimony of Basilio Perez to the

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
same tenor, the evidence has
conclusively shown that the
defendants have been in
continuous possession of the land
since 1927 to the present time,
and they have built a house on
the land in 1928 where they have
resided and lived to the present,
as testified to by the defendant
Mendoza, ....
The plaintiffs have contended,
however, with the support of the
testimony of Basilio Perez, that
the possession of the defendants
since 1946 was that of a mere
lessee of the land. On this
matter, the trial court said, "the
records do not show any
documentary evidence to support
such contention. Nor is any
document, say receipts of
payment of rentals presented to
bolster their theory. On the
contrary their averment has been
strongly denied by the
defendants and the records show
that it was only in 1952 that a
civil action was instituted by the
plaintiffs against the defendants
in the Justice of the Peace Court
of Taysan, Batangas, for detainer
and damages", and said
allegation of possession of the
defendants as lessees of the land
"is not supported by positive and
convincing evidence". We find no
reason to disagree with the
foregoing findings of fact and
conclusion of the trial court
because the same is supported by
the preponderance of evidence,
and the plaintiffs have not
pointed to us any fact of
significance or influence which
have been disregarded by the
court, other than the testimony
of Basilio Perez who testified
about the supposed contract of
lease. (pp. 21-22, 23, ibid.;
emphasis supplied)
Digging further into the evidence of herein
petitioners, respondent court found for itself
that the agreement of partition dated May 27,
1934, Exhibit D, is not incontrovertible proof
that in 1934 the litigated property belonged in
common to Petra and the heirs of Felisa
Montalbo both of whom may have been guided
by the fact that the property was still declared
for taxation purposes in the name of
Estanislao Montalbo, and that the document
of partition "did not overcome the evidence on
record that Andrea Montalbo became the
P a g e | 30
owner of the land, and that since 1927 the
defendants have been in continuous
possession of the land, openly, adversely and
in the concept of owners thereby acquiring
ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription." (p. 10 of CA decision at p. 24,
SC rollo)
Independently therefore of the
pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in
the criminal case, respondent court examined
the evidence in this civil case and made its
own findings of fact on the basis of which it
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
We could have stopped here and resolved this
petition under well-entrenched precepts in
Philippine jurisprudence that findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are as a rule
conclusive and binding upon this
Court;6 nonetheless, to set our mind at rest
that the conclusions of respondent court were
not grounded on speculation, surmises or
conjectures,7 We went over the evidence before
Us.
Certain salient facts strongly support the
claim of respondents Mendoza over the
property in dispute:
First, the northern boundary of the land in
controversy is undisputably a school site
which originally was part of a bigger tract
belonging to Estanislao Montalbo. This is
admitted by petitioner Basilio Perez who to a
question propounded by his counsel, Atty.
Panganiban, declared:
Mr. Panganiban:
(Counsel of
petitioners)
Q. According to
these tax
declarations which
you said covers the
land in question,
the boundaries on
the north, school
site; on the east,
land of Calixto
Flores; on the
south, estero; and
on the west, estero
and Gregoria
Mendoza, why is it
that there is a
discrepancy?
A. Because from
the whole parcel of
land a portion was
taken for the school

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
site, and that which
remains now is the
land in question,
sir. (tsn December
15, 1960, pp. 22-
23)
No explanation however was offered by Perez
as to how that portion became a school site.
On the other hand, there is evidence of
respondent Mendoza that because Andrea
Montalbo wanted to donate a piece of land to
be used as a school site and the municipality
preferred the location of the land inherited by
Felisa from her father, the two women
exchanged lands after which Andrea gave one-
half of the property to the municipality while
the remaining portion which is the land now
in litigation was donated propter nuptias to
her daughter Margarita way back in 1927. (tsn
October 24, 1961, pp. 14-18) This donation of
Andrea was not disproved by any evidence of
petitioners. On the part of respondents
Mendoza, their documentary evidence,
Exhibits 6, 6-A and 6-B, show that the
municipality of Taysan declared the donated
property in its name as early as July, 1925,
which supports respondents' claim that the
exchange of properties between Andrea and
Felisa Montalbo took place sometime in 1922.
Second, the provincial authorities authorities
dealt with the Mendozas for the widening of
the provincial road which traverses the land in
question. Nicolas Mendoza testified that the
land covered by the complaint actually
consists of two lots which he described in his
sketch, Exhibit 1, with letters "A" and "B"
respectively, separated by a provincial road
leading to the municipality of Lobo; that lot
"A" which is the bigger parcel is the one
donated to his wife, Margarita, by Andrea
Montalbo on the occasion of their marriage in
1927 (Exh. 2); while lot "B" was bought from
Donata Mendoza in 1951 as shown by the
deed of sale, Exhibit 7; that sometime in
1937-38, the province widened the provincial
road traversing the two lots, and he and his
wife were approached by the provincial
authorities more particularly, Engineer
Ramirez, for them to give without
compensation from lot "A" a stretch of land of
one meter in width to widen said road, and
they agreed. At that time Donata Mendoza still
owned lot "B" and she was also asked to give
part of her land for the road but she was paid
for the value of the plants destroyed in the
process.(tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 32-34) For
his part, petitioner Perez admitted during the
cross-examination conducted by the opposite
counsel, Atty. Julio Enriquez, that the
provincial authorities did not deal with him at
all during the widening of that particular road.
(tsn September 25, 1961, p. 34) This is of
P a g e | 31
marked significance, because if it were true as
claimed by petitioners that they were in
possession of the property since the death of
Estanislao Montalbo in 1918 or even after the
deed of partition in 1934, they would have
been the persons approached by the
authorities for the widening of the road. The
fact that the Mendozas were the ones who
gave away part of the land for the widening of
the Lobo road shows that they were in
possession of the property and were living
there at the time.
Third, respondents Mendoza have been in
possession of the property since 1927 in
concept of owners thereof. We have the
testimony of respondent Nicolas Mendoza that
after the land was donated to his wife in 1927
they built a house on it and lived there
continuously, witness referring particularly to
what he described as lot "A" in his sketch
Exhibit 1. (tsn October 24, 1961, pp. 7, .30-
31) Respondent's testimony was found both by
the trial and appellate courts credible because
(1) petitioner Basilio Perez himself admitted
during cross-examination that even before the
last world war the Mendozas had constructed
a house on the land in litigation (tsn
September 25, 1971, pp. 37-39; see Exh. E-3)
which admission disproves the allegation in
the complaint and Perez' testimony that it was
only in 1946 when the Mendozas occupied the
property as lessees; (2) the testimony of
Nicolas Mendoza was corroborated by witness
Adriano Gonzales, a retired justice of the
peace of Taysan, Batangas, who declared that
he knew the Mendozas since 1937 and he saw
them living on the land in question and they
have not changed residence at all since he had
known them (tsn December 6, 1961, pp. 5-6);
and (3) the respondents Mendoza were the
ones who were living on the property and not
the petitioners at the time the provincial
government in 1937 widened the Lobo road
which crosses said land.
The court a quo and the respondent appellate
court did not err when they upheld the claim
of ownership of the Mendozas principally on
the ground that the latter were in actual
possession of the property since 1927 and
were sought to be dispossessed by petitioners
herein only in 1952 when an ejectment suit
was filed against them.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the
thing possessed and to the possessor goes the
presumption that he holds the thing under a
claim of ownership.8 Article 433 of the Civil
Code provides that "(A)ctual possession under
claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery
of the property." In Chan vs. Court of Appeals,

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
et al., L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737,
this Court upheld the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the litigated property belonged to
the private respondents therein based on their
possession of the property, not only because
such findings of fact of the appellate court are
conclusive and binding on this Court but
because the conclusion is in accordance with
Articles 433 and 531 of the Civil Code. 9
As we have here conflicting claims of
possession by the parties over the land in
controversy and because the fact of
possession cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in
cases of co-possession, the present possessor
is to be preferred pursuant to Article 538 of
the Civil Code which We quote:
Possession as a fact cannot be
recognized at the same time in
two different personalities except
in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession,
the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two
possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the
possession are the same, the one
who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of
its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings." 10
The pretension of petitioners that the
possession of the Mendozas is that of a mere
lessee was not believed by the trial judge and
the appellate court not only because of the
absence of any written or oral evidence on the
matter other than the bare testimony of
petitioner Basilio Perez, but also due to the
circumstances present in the case which We
indicated and enumerated at pages 7 to 9 of
this decision. In fine, it is a fact that the
Mendozas are presently in possession of the
property and the presumption of ownership in
their favor has not been successfully rebutted
by evidence that they are mere lessees of the
land in their possession as claimed by
petitioners.
2. In their second assigned error, petitioners
contend that respondent court should not
have given weight to the evidence of
respondent Mendoza because the latter's
Exhibit 5 was proven to be a falsified
document.
To recall, Exhibit 5 is the alleged deed of
exchange or barter of lands between Andrea
P a g e | 32
and Felisa Montalbo dated January 14, 1922.
On this point, petitioners overlook the fact
that Exhibit 5 was made the basis of a
criminal accusation of falsification of private
document solely on the allegation that the
signature of Rafael Manahan, the person
before whom the parties to the document
allegedly appeared, was not his. There was no
finding in that criminal case as per decision
rendered therein that the barter or exchange
of lands between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo
did not in effect take place. On the contrary,
what appears in said decision offered by
petitioners as their Exhibit J are the following
findings of the Court of Appeals, viz: that the
land donated by Andrea Montalbo to her
daughter Margarita Macalalad "was acquired
by the donor by means of a barter with her
own parcel of land planted with bamboos and
mango trees"; that while it is true that
because of this presentation of the falsified
document appellant (now respondent Nicolas
Mendoza) was able to secure the declaration of
the property donated in his name, no criminal
liability should be imposed upon him in the
absence of any evidence that he presented
said exhibit with the knowledge that it was
forged "especially if we take into consideration
the fact that he and his wife were and are still
in possession of the land donated since 1927";
that in fact, the color and appearance of the
document in question show that it is not a
new document but an old one thus confirming
Mendoza's theory that it was executed in or
about the year 1922 as appearing in the
document or five years before his marriage.
(pp. 1, 5, 6 of Exh. J, folder of exhibits) Thus,
if the document Exhibit 5 was held to be
forged, it was simply because the municipal
secretary, Rafael Manahan, did not sign it and
not for any other reason. What is material and
relevant to the civil case is that both the trial
court and respondent appellate court found
for a fact that there was an exchange of lands
between Andrea and Felisa Montalbo on the
basis of evidence other than the disputed
Exhibit 5. As to what the evidence is, has been
discussed above.
Petitioners cite Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil.
728 where this Court stated inter alia that the
introduction of a forged instrument by a
witness renders the testimony of the latter
practically worthless. That statement however
is not applicable to the situation before Us
because in Gonzalez the particular document
or receipt referred to was found to be entirely
false as to its contents, handwriting, and
signature, whereas here all that was found to
be false is the signature of a witnessing
official.
3. The last argument of petitioners is the
object of the third assigned error. It is

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
contended that the appellate court erred in
not giving effect to the deed of partition,
Exhibit D, notwithstanding the fact that the
name of Andrea Montalbo appears in the
document as one of the witnesses thereto.
Exhibit D appears to be a document dated
May 27, 1934, wherein certain properties
allegedly belonging to Estanislao Montalbo
were divided between Petra Montalbo and Jose
Ortega, husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo.
Petitioner Basilio Perez declared that one of
the parcels of land mentioned in the document
is the land now in litigation which is
particularly marked as Exhibit D-1. He also
testified that Exhibit D was signed by him and
his wife, Petra Montalbo, by Jose Ortega,
husband of deceased Felisa Montalbo, and
thumbmarked by the latter's children all in
his presence. (tsn December 15,1960, pp. 19-
24) Surprisingly, however, Basilio Perez did
not at all mention during the course of his
testimony that the old woman, Andrea
Montalbo, signed the deed of partition as a
witness. We have gone over the transcript of
Basilio Perez' declaration on direct and cross-
examination (tsn December 15, 1960, pp. 15-
34; September 25, 1961, pp. 3-40) and at no
instance did he ever state that Andrea
Montalbo was present during the preparation
of the document, that she read or knew the
contents thereof which by the way consists of
six handwritten pages, and that she signed
her name on the document. It was incumbent
upon petitioners to identify the signature of
Andrea Montalbo on the document if her
signature was truly there. As a matter of fact,
examining the document Exhibit D We
entertain doubts whether the name referred to
by petitioners is "Andrea Montalbo", for, as
written, it also can read "Maria Montalbo". At
any rate, whatever is the import of said deed
of partition, the same binds only the parties
thereto but does not affect third persons such
as Andrea Montalbo or the herein Mendozas in
the absence of proof that they participated in
one way or another in the preparation and
execution of thedocument. As it is, Andrea
Montalbo was a stranger to that deed of
partition and any recital therein concerning
the property under litigation cannot be used
as evidence to prejudice her and her
successors-in-interest or place her in estoppel
as to her claims over the property. Res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet. A
transaction between two parties ought not to
operate to the prejudice of a third person or
stranger. 11
4. In the fourth assignment of error,
petitioners claim that the appellate court
should have rendered a decision in their favor.
That both the trial court and respondent
appellate court have correctly evaluated the
P a g e | 33
evidence, has been clearly demonstrated by
Us.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE ABOVE
CONSIDERATIONS, We find no reversible
error in the decision under review and We
AFFIRM the same with costs against
petitioners.
So Ordered. G.R. No. 101929 January 6,
1993
9
BENJAMIN DIZON, ZACARIAS DIZON,
AFRICA DIZON, PERFECTO DIZON,
CARMEN DIZON (Heirs of Paula Galang),
JULIA GALANG, CONSOLACION TABORA,
ABELARDO TABORA, CECILIA TABORA,
AVELINA TABORA, TRINIDAD TABORA,
REMEDIOS TABORA, VIRGINIA TABORA,
DELFIN TABORA, PENINA TABORA,
FRANCISCO TABORA, CIPRIANA GALANG,
RUFINO DELOS SANTOS, PEPITO DELOS
SANTOS (Heirs of Donata Vergara), ARNEO
VERGARA, BENIGNO VERGARA, JOSE
VERGARA, SCION VERGARA, DEMETRIA
VERGARA (all heirs of Dionisio
Galang), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUREO REYES,
AURELIO SAMIA, ALFONSO SAMIA,
POTENCIANO GALANG, LEONCIA GARCIA,
BIENVENIDO TAPNIO, LYDIA BALINGIT
VDA. DE GARCIA, BENEDICTO GARCIA,
ROMULADO GARCIA, AMY GARCIA,
ALEXANDER GARCIA, LUDIVINA GARCIA,
MONTANO GUEVARRA, CORAZON LAMPA,
RUDY LAMPA, EDUARDO LAMPA,
ILLUMINADA GUEVARRA, CARMELITA
MASANQUE VDA. DE GARCIA, MA.
CONCEPCION AQUINO VDA. DE
GUEVARRA, HONZAI GUEVARRA, RODA
REBECCA GUEVARRA, RUTH GUEVARRA,
minors represented by their mother Ma.
Concepcion Vda. de Guevarra, PRIMITIVA
GUEVARRA, JOSIAS N. GARCIA, LUCITA M.
GARCIA, VICTOR M. GARCIA, LUTERO M.
GARCIA, SAMSON M. GARCIA,
FELIXBERTO M. GARCIA, JR.,
HERMENIGILDA GARCIA, CONSTANCIO
GARCIA, REYNALDO GARCIA, AGAPITA
GARCIA, ERNESTO GARCIA, NORICO
GARCIA, PACIFICO GARCIA, NORMANDO
GARCIA, ARTURO GARCIA, ESTELLA
GARCIA, DIOSDADO GARCIA (representing
LEONCIA GARCIA), GREGORIA MENDOZA,
ELEUTERIA BAUTISTA, PEDRO ATIENZA,
BENITA SAMANIEGO, NENE SAMANIEGO
(representing FLAVIANA GALANG), LETICIA
REYES, MANUEL REYES (representing
MARCIANA GALANG), CARMEN ROQUE
VDA. DE DIMABUYU, PORFIRIO R.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
DIMABUYU, CARMEN R. DIMABUYU,
CARIDAD R. DIMABUYU, PEDRO R.
DIMABUYU, MARCOS DIMABUYU
(representing GERTRUDES
GALANG), respondents.
Heminio Z. Canlas for petitioners.
Lagunzad, Juan, Rubin & Cabaron Law Office
for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari,
petitioners seek to nullify the decision ** of
the Court of Appeals, dated 29 April 1991, in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 14312, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed
judgment is hereby REVERSED;
and the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the estate of the
deceased Dionisio Galang (Exh.
"D"), in so far as it relates to Lots
3548 and 3562 the Bacolor
Cadastre, and Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 182670-
R and 182671-R issued by virtue
thereof are hereby declared null
and void.
Conformably, the Register of
Deeds concerned is hereby
ordered to cancel the said titles;
and subject Lots 3548 and 3562
are hereby adjudicated to the
heirs of the deceased co-owners
to be partitioned among them as
follows:
a. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Marciana Galang;
b. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Dionisio Galang;
c. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Flaviana Galang;
d. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Gertrudes Galang;
e. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Potenciana Galang;
f. one-sixth to the Heirs of
Leoncia Galang.
Costs against defendants-
appellees.
P a g e | 34
SO ORDERED. 1
It appears that on 21 August 1984, Aureo
Reyes, et al. (hereafter "respondents") filed an
amended complaint before the Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6752, for the annulment of a
deed of extra-judicial settlement and partition
of the estate of Dionisio Galang, claiming to
have been deprived thereby of their shares, as
co-owners, in Lot Nos. 3548 and 3562 Bacolor
cadastre, and that OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102,
issued in the name of Dionisio Galang,
covering said lots, are fraudulent and should
therefore be annulled and cancelled.
The facts of the case, as culled from the Court
of Appeals decision, are as follows:
The spouses Hilario Galang and Martina
Laxamana owned two (2) lots located in San
Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor,
Province of Pampanga. They had six (6)
children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana,
Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes.
The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged
the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles. It is
alleged by the respondents that Dionisio
Galang redeemed these lots in his own name,
despite the fact that part of the funds used for
the redemption came from his sisters.2 A
cadastral survey involving the two (2) lots was
conducted, and on 19 May 1919, the Court of
First Instance ordered the issuance in
Cadastral Case No. 14, of OCT Nos. 9010 (for
lot 3548) and 9102 (for lot 3562) in the name
solely of Dionisio Galang ( hereafter Galang).
Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's
sisters, claim that Galang and his five (5)
sisters had partitioned the subject lots on 27
June 1920, as embodied in an unnotarized
affidavit executed by Galang (Exh. "C"). As a
consequence thereof, Galang's sisters
constructed their houses on Lot 3548. The
structures passed on from generation to
generation, with each of Galang's sisters and
their descendants enjoying the benefits
therefrom. No one questioned or disturbed
them until the petitioners (heirs of Galang),
informed them that the lots in question were
titled in Galang's name and had been
partitioned, on the basis of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition (Exh. "D"), into three (3)
equal parts corresponding to his (Galang's)
three (3) children; that petitioners had
succeeded in subdividing the lots and in
obtaining titles thereto in their name (TCT
Nos. 182670-R and 182671-R) despite their
(respondents') earlier demands for an
extrajudicial settlement of their dispute.

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
the cadastral case which culminated in the
issuance of the original certificates of title over
the subject lots in the sole name of Galang,
was a proceeding in rem, thus binding on the
whole world; that when original certificates of
title (OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102) were issued on
9 January 1922 to Galang, respondents did
not raise any objection until March 1983
when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
6752, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) years.
The trial court3 upheld Galang's titles over the
lots which, as aforestated, had been issued as
early as 1922 in his name. The trial court
further held that respondents' action had long
prescribed, having been filed only on 24
March 1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61)
long years from the issuance of said titles. The
court also noted respondents' failure to
establish their relationship to Galang's five (5)
sisters, premising their claim solely on an
unsubstantiated assertion that they are
descendants of the deceased Galang
sisters.4 The presence or construction of the
houses on Lot No. 3548 was also not
considered as evidence in respondents' favor,
since no proof was submitted establishing
respondents' right to occupy the place. The
documentary evidence (Exh. "C" and "C-1")
allegedly showing co-ownership among
Dionisio and his co-heirs, was likewise ignored
by the trial court as this did not specifically
refer to the disputed Lots 3548 and 3562.
On appeal by the respondents, respondent
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by
upholding respondents' rights. It focused on
two (2) issues.
Thus —
Are the properties in question
owned in common by the
predecessors-in-interest of
appellants and appellees? And
has appellants' present action for
partition prescribed?5
The appellate court declared that co-
ownership existed between respondents'
predecessors-in-interest and those of
petitioners, on the basis of Galang's affidavit
which, although unnotarized, was nonetheless
an ancient document, pursuant to Sec. 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, since it was
executed on 27 June 1920. As such, proof of
its due execution and authentication could be
dispensed with, according to the appellate
court.
Hence, this recourse in turn by the
petitioners.
P a g e | 35
We find the petition impressed with merit.
It is a fact that Dionisio Galang's ownership
over the disputed lots (3548 and 3562) had
been judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in
Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. No. 51, which
is a proceeding in rem and hence binding "on
the whole world." OCT No. 1056 (9010) and
OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a consequence,
issued on 9 January 1922. None of Galang's
co-heirs objected to or protested their
issuance. These titles became indefeasible and
incontrovertible. Then it was only after sixty-
one (61) years or on 24 March 1983 that the
descendants of Galang's co-heirs asserted co-
ownership claims over the subject lots.
It is true that Galang executed an affidavit,
unnotarized at that, on 27 June 1920 which
states in part as follows (per English
translation [Exh.
"C-1"]):6
That on this date, I have received
from all my sisters and nephews
who are my co-heirs, namely
Potenciana Galang, Flaviana
Galang, Gertrudes Galang, who
are my sisters, and Silverio
Garcia and Hilarion Samia, in
their own names and for their
brothers and sisters who are also
co-heirs, the sum of ONE
HUNDRED AND SIX PESOS
(P106.00), Philippine Currency,
as complete payment for the
discharge of the land we co-
inherited, which is the one we
partitioned this date also, which
was mortgaged to the Angeles
family.7
However, as can be gleaned from the
foregoing, there is no reference to Lot Nos.
3548 and 3562. Said affidavit is not therefore
a sufficient basis or support for what is
alleged by respondents as a partition among
Dionisio and his now deceased sisters. It does
not, as correctly stated by the trial court,
amount to anything insofar as the two (2) lots
involved in this case are concerned:
Even their presentation of the
document purportedly executed
by Dionisio Galang on June 27,
1910 (Exh. "C" and "C-1") where
the latter acknowledges that he
and his co-heirs named therein
as co-owners of a certain
property which they had
mortgaged to a certain family
surnamed Angeles does not
amount to anything for nothing

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
in this document shows that it
pertains to the two lots involved
herein. It merely referred to a
certain "land" which Dionisio
Galang and his co-heirs "co-
inherited" and partitioned
without any indication as to
which property is being referred
to.8
We likewise agree with the trial court that in
the absence of definite proof establishing
respondents' link/relationship to their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang
sisters, they do not have any cause of action,
and the suit for partition must necessarily fall.
The trial court aptly observed:
. . . the plaintiffs thru their
witnesses Bienvenido Tapnio,
Marcos Dimabuyu, Pedro
Atienza, and Carmelita Galang,
tried to prove that all the
plaintiffs herein are heirs and
direct descendants, respectively,
of Marciana Galang, Potenciana
Galang, Flaviana Galang,
Leoncia Galang and Gertrudes
Galang who, in their lifetime,
together with their late brother
Dionisio Galang, are the co-
owners of these two lots, namely,
Lots Nos. 3548 and 3562.
Lamentably, all that was proved
in the process by the plaintiffs
thru these witnesses despite
several proddings and
suggestions made by the court
toward this end was that each of
these plaintiffs are just related to
one another in varying degrees of
relationship. They failed to
establish their connection or
relationship with any of these
five sisters save for their
unfounded averment that they
are indeed descendants and
heirs of these deceased
individuals.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court dated 3 October 1986 in Civil Case
No. 6752 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
P a g e | 36
10
G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod,
Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez,
Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito
Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro
Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan,
province of the same name, filed a written
complaint against Higino Meneses, alleging
that they each owned and possessed farm
lands, situated in the places known as
Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named
Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a
fish-pond and a strip of land situated in
Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side,
and the River Taliptip on the other; that from
time immemorial, and consequently for more
than twenty years before 1901, there existed
and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the
plaintiffs a statutory easement permitting the
flow of water over the said land in Paraanan,
which easement the said plaintiffs enjoyed
until the year 1901 and consisted in that the
water collected upon their lands and in the
Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into
the Taliptip River. From that year however, the
defendant, without any right or reason,
converted the land in Paraanan into a
fishpond and by means of a dam and a
bamboo net, prevented the free passage of the
water through said place into the Taliptip
River, that in consequence the lands of the
plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the
stagnant waters, there being no outlet except
through the land in Paraanan; that their
plantation were destroyed, causing the loss
and damages to the extent of about P1,000,
which loss and damage will continue if the
obstructions to the flow of the water are
allowed to remain, preventing its passage
through said land and injuring the rice
plantations of the plaintiffs. They therefore
asked that judgment be entered against the
defendant, declaring that the said tract of land
in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water from the property
of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to
the issuing of a preliminary injunction, the
defendant be ordered to remove and destroy
the obstructions that impede the passage of
the waters through Paraanan, and that in

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
future, and forever, he abstain from closing in
any manner the aforesaid tract of land; that,
upon judgment being entered, the said
injunction be declared to be final and that the
defendant be sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs
an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in the
proceedings; that they be granted any other
and further equitable or proper remedy in
accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
In view of the demurrer interposed by the
plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant, the
latter, on the 29th of August, 1904, filed an
amended answer, denying each and everyone
of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged
that no statutory easement existed nor could
exist in favor of the lands described in the
complaint, permitting the waters to flow over
the fish pond that he, together with his
brothers, owned in the sitio of Bambang, the
area and boundaries of which were stated by
him, and which he and his brothers had
inherited from their deceased mother.
Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been
surveyed by a land surveyor in September,
1881, he also denied that he had occupied or
converted any land in the barrio of Bambang
into a fishpond; therefore, and to sentence the
plaintiffs to pay the costs and corresponding
damages.
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to
the suit, the court, on the 13th of March,
1907, entered judgment declaring that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their
favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove
the dam placed on the east of the Paraanan
passage on the side of the Taliptip River
opposite the old dam in the barrio of
Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy
the obstacles to the free passage of the waters
through the strip of land in Paraanan; to
abstain in future, and forever, from
obstructing or closing in any manner the
course of the waters through the said strip of
land. The request that the defendant be
sentenced to pay an indemnity was denied,
and no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment
and furthermore asked for a new trial which
was denied and also excepted to, and, upon
approval of the bill of exceptions, the question
was submitted to this court.
Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his
amended answer, it appears to have been
clearly proven in this case that the lands
owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio,
as well as the small adjoining lake, named
Calalaran, are located in places relatively
higher than the sitio called Paraanan where
P a g e | 37
the land and fish pond of the defendant are
situated, and which border on the Taliptip
River; that during the rainy season the rain
water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs,
and which flows toward the small Calalaran
Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the
Taliptip River other than through the low land
of Paraanan: that the border line between
Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed
from time immemorial a dam, constructed by
the community for the purpose of preventing
the salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high
tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran,
passing through the lowlands of Paraanan;
but when rainfall was abundant, one of the
residents was designated in his turn by the
lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the
sluice gate in order to let out the water that
flooded the rice fields, through the land of
Paraanan to the above-mentioned river, that
since 1901, the defendant constructed
another dam along the boundary of this
fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding the
outlet of the waters that flood the fields of
Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the
growing crops.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an
easement is charge imposed upon one estate
for the benefit of another estate belonging to a
different owner, and the realty in favor of
which the easement is established is called
the dominant estate, and the one charged with
it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are
subject to the easement of receiving and giving
passage to the waters proceeding from the
higher lands and the lake of Calalaran; this
easement was not constituted by agreement
between the interested parties; it is of a
statutory nature, and the law had imposed it
for the common public utility in view of the
difference in the altitude of the lands in the
barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters
which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower
estates construct works preventing this
easement, nor the one of the higher
estate works increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and
conditions of the easements of waters

PROPERTY CASES: OWNERSHIP
to which this section refers shall be
governed by the special law relating
thereto in everything not provided for in
this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of
August 3, 1866, article 111 of which, treating
of natural easements relating to waters,
provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are
subject to receive the waters that flow
naturally, without the work of man,
from the higher lands together with the
stone or earth which they carry with
them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not
erect works that will impede or prevent such
an easement or charge, constituted and
imposed by the law upon his estate for the
benefit of the higher lands belonging to
different owners; neither can the latter do
anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above
referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no
right to construct the works, nor the dam
which blocks the passage, through his lands
and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the
waters which flood the higher lands of the
plaintiffs; and having done so, to the
detriment of the easement charged on his
estate, he has violated the law which protects
and guarantees the respective rights and
regulates the duties of the owners of the fields
in Calalaran and Paraanan.
It is true that article 388 of said code
authorizes every owner to enclose his estate
by means of walls, ditches fences or any other
device, but his right is limited by the easement
imposed upon his estate.
The defendant Meneses might have
constructed the works necessary to make and
maintain a fish pond within his own land, but
he was always under the strict and necessary
obligation to respect the statutory easement of
waters charged upon his property, and had no
right to close the passage and outlet of the
waters flowing from the lands of the plaintiffs
and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip
River. He could not lawfully injure the owners
of the dominant estates by obstructing the
outlet to the Taliptip River of the waters
flooding the upper lands belonging to the
plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the
plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in
Calalaran, in addition to the old dike between
the lake of said place and the low lands in
P a g e | 38
Paraanan, to have another made by the
defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining
the said river, for the purpose of preventing
the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding,
at high tide, not only the lowlands in
Paraanan but also the higher ones of
Calalaran and its lake, since the plaintiffs can
not prevent the defendant from protecting his
lands against the influx of salt water; but the
defendant could never be permitted to
obstruct the flow of the waters through his
lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy
rains, when the high lands in Calalaran and
the lake in said place are flooded, thereby
impairing the right of the owners of the
dominant estates.
For the above reasons, and accepting the
findings of the court below in the judgment
appealed from in so far as they agree with the
terms of this decision, we must and do hereby
declare that the defendant, Higino Meneses,
as the owner of the servient estate, is obliged
to give passage to and allow the flow of the
waters descending from the Calalaran Lake
and from the land of the plaintiffs through his
lands in Paraanan for their discharge into the
Taliptip River; and he is hereby ordered to
remove any obstacle that may obstruct the
free passage of the waters whenever there may
be either a small or large volume of running
water through his lands in the sitio of
Paraanan for their discharge into the Taliptip
River; and in future to abstain from impeding,
in any manner, the flow of the waters coming
from the higher lands. The judgment appealed
from is affirmed, in so far as it agrees with
decision, and reversed in other respects, with
the costs of this instance against the
appellants. So ordered.
Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.