Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence Against Women in Peru: an empirical

approach, 2007-2017

Diego Quispe Ortogorin *

Pontifical Catholic University of Peru

Summary

In Peru, 68% of women have been victims of violence by their partner. However, very little is
known about the economic determinants of domestic violence against women. This study aims
to analyze the relationship between gender wage gap and domestic violence in Peru.
Specifically, it seeks to measure the effect of the gender wage gap on the risk of domestic
violence. In this case, the gap is a feature of the labor market that women face at a disadvantage
faced by men. Therefore violence will not be explained only by the characteristics of women
and family; but also by labor market conditions. Close the gender inequalities in the labor
market, besides being a need for justice, lead us to reduce domestic violence.

JEL classification: J16, J31, J23, D13, J780, A12, J12, O12

Keywords: Domestic violence, physical violence, psychological violence, sexual violence,

domestic violence, employment, wage gap, labor market.

* Email: d.quispeo@pucp.edu.pe

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 1. Introduction

In Peru, according to the National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI), 68% of women
have suffered physical, psychological or sexual violence from their partner. This figure is above
the average for Latin America. The physical and emotional damage from this problem are
plentiful and are not limited to women, but also other family members (Bhattacharya, Bedi and
Chhachhi, 2009). An additional effect is the loss of human capital as a result of this violence
that may influence the development of society (Davalos and Santos, 2006). Domestic violence
against women, therefore, is a pressing issue for any society that seeks equality of its citizens
and the expansion of its growth potential problem.

In view of the above, this paper aims to explain domestic violence against women in Peru
through the conditions on the labor market that women face. In particular, it seeks to estimate
the impact of the gender wage gap on domestic violence, understanding this gap as a feature
of the labor market that women face at a disadvantage relative to men. Analysis be performed
for the period 2007-2017 and data from the National Household Survey (ENAHO) and the
Demographic and Family Health (DHS) will be used.

From the theory of family negotiation, an analytical framework on the relationship between
violence and peruvian households income arises. The wage gap between women and men
determine the bargaining power of women, so the levels of violence would decrease if revenues
are similar to or greater than man. It should be noted that the relevant wages are not only
perceived, but also potential wages, ie wages to women who would agree to participate in the
market. Potential wages are of interest because they determine the situation that women would
face if he stopped financially dependent on the couple, hence the importance of using market
conditions reflected in the wage gap.

This paper seeks empirical evidence to support the theory of family negotiations concerning the
gender wage gap. In Latin America, research on the subject is scarce. For the Peruvian case,
literature is even scarcer; most studies for our country not seek to explain the precise
relationship between income and violence, but appear in the general research on the
determinants of domestic violence. The conclusions they reach are heterogeneous and even
contradictory. This would happen because of the problem of reverse causality that is not
addressed by most of the studies; those who do pose possible solutions to endogeneity use
instrumental variables that would not be quite right employees. Therefore, one of the main

2
challenges of this work is to provide a possible solution to this recurring problem in the empirical
literature.

The relevant methodology for the Peruvian case is discussed relating it to their own
characteristics of our society. International literature shows that non-cooperative models are of
greater explanatory power structures in countries where women have a subordinate role to the
man while cooperative models are preferable in developed countries. The approach we
consider most plausible for our purpose is Aizer (2010), who studies the effect of the wage gap
on domestic violence in the case of California. The model presented is a cooperative
generalization originally used by Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997). However, the model used in
this paper make a change, the preference of men violence.

The first step in our estimate is to find the gender wage gap. For this reason, the decomposition
proposed by Ñopo (2008) is used. This is an extension of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
takes advantage pairing methodology for better decomposition of the gender wage gap. The
construction of the gap will be made from the data of the National Household Survey (ENAHO)
because it presents the characteristics of employment and income that does not have the
ENDES. Domestic violence data will be collected from the Demographic and Family Health
(DHS). This survey presents data from physical, sexual and emotional violence, and violence
related characteristics allows the woman, the couple and home.

The rest of the document is presented as follows: In section 2, the theoretical framework
presented including the model used. Section 3 presents previous empirical studies, both
international and domestic. Then, in Section 4, we deal with the stylized facts. Then, in the fifth
section discusses the methodology. Section 6 will provide the characteristics of the database
and the last two sections will deal with the empirical evaluation and conclusions, respectively.

2. Theoretical framework

The World Health Organization (WHO) considers violence as a health problem with serious
consequences for the development of a society. Domestic violence, in particular, is even
greater because it is expected to be at home where people should feel safer (Carrión, 2002)
problem. Violence against women is of global concern because it reduces the ability of the
victim to make contributions to the family, the economy and public life; impairs health, reduces
productivity, reduces the educational capacity, limited social mobility and innovative potential
of women, children and even the same violent partner. In addition, as a public issue, increases
the costs of social services, judicial and health. (United Nations, 2006).

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In Peru, according to INEI, in 2017, 68% of women across the country report being a victim,
ever, of violence from their partner. Therefore, to understand the problem of domestic violence
is urgent to seek policy solutions.

In general, domestic violence against women is expressed in three forms: physical, sexual and
emotional. Actions intended to cause physical pain or injury, whether moderate or severe, are
classified as physical violence. Psychological violence includes any action that is intended to
humiliate, threaten, control and causing moral harm. Regarding sexual violence, this includes
any action that is forced to have sex against their will using blackmail, threats or physical force.
These three forms of violence are not mutually exclusive, they do not tend to happen
simultaneously.

The economy is interested in family behavior because of the need to understand economic
decisions. Concern about domestic violence is quite later and uses the distribution patterns of
wealth and income within the household to explain this problem. To understand the economic
approach to domestic violence, therefore, it is necessary to review how economic models
developed on the family.

Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1981) were the first from the economy, worry about studying
decisions within families. They argued that the behavior of households was equivalent to that
of a representative individual, as there is a consensus process that collects and satisfies the
preferences of all members. It would then be possible to represent the family problem as
maximizing the utility of an individual family function. The theoretical basis of these models
unitary household were very difficult to prove empirically and limited to incorporate issues like
violence.

On the other hand, models of both cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining emerged.
These models themselves were able to explain violence, but result in very different conclusions.
Noncooperative models have greater explanatory trading success in highly unequal societies.
For example, Block and Rao (2002) use asymmetric information and signaling in a model of
non-cooperative negotiation to explain violence in women in India. They conclude that
incentives to stay in the violent relationship by women and men are different, so make
independent decisions. On the other hand, cooperative bargaining models that best fit
developed societies are. The first to apply this form to study domestic violence were Farmer
and Tiefenthaler (1997) where the man had all the bargaining power. Subsequently, Aizer

4
(2010) makes a generalization of this model, but distributing the bargaining power between the
parties.

Aizer (2010) and Pollak (2005) suggest that the increase in wages of women improves their
bargaining power and thus reduce levels of violence. It should be noted that these studies use
potential relative wages (market conditions) and wages earned at the same time as women
who do not work, even without joining the labor market, have the option to do so and thus
improve their position negotiation. Thus, violence would decrease even in the case where
women do not work.

a. Theoretical model

Then a simple model that incorporates trading family violence and shows under what
circumstances a relative increase in income women leads to a decrease in violence develops.
The model is based on proposals Aizer (2010) and Mendoza (2010).

The decision to have a partner for both men and women, depends on maximizing their utility.
Be the usefulness of women 𝑈𝑤 (𝐶𝑤 , 𝑆) that increase in consumption (𝐶𝑀 ) and security (𝑆); and
utility man 𝑈𝑀 (𝐶𝑀 , 𝑉) increases in consumption (𝐶𝐻 ) and violence (𝑉).

In turn violence (𝑉) is conditioned by man's desire to get more services for women (𝜕) and the
degree of sexism (𝛿) which translates into the ability to subdue the couple. So: 𝑉(𝜕, 𝛿).

The power of man is made up of economic power is the ability to generate revenues above
those generated by their partner. If the woman works, this power decreases. Violence curve
assumes the following properties:𝑉𝜕 > 0 𝑦 𝑉𝜕𝜕 > 0. That is, access to more services for women
requires more violence, but increasingly these services will be of lower quality to the point that
women reach a breaking point where you decide to leave the relationship, it will be more
beneficial to undergo the domain of the couple.

From the foregoing, it follows that the likelihood of violence is associated with the ability to
generate income, employment, socio-economic aspects and the possibility of leaving the
relationship. Therefore, the easier and costly for women to be out of the relationship, the more
likely to be integrated into the workforce or increase their economic independence. This is
important to the degree of difficulty that exists in the labor market to enter and compete in the
chauvinistic recital household characteristics are also present in the labor market.

This negotiation model home, hence under certain assumptions (strict concavity) allows an
increase in the relative earnings of a woman leads to a decrease in violence against women.

5
The model developed allows hypothesize that the participation of women in the labor market
allows reducing domestic violence, because it increases their relative earnings relative to men.
Also a greater potential of women outside the household income increases your backup utility
(which depends on the level of sexism in the labor market), it ie its usefulness out of the
relationship, which improves their bargaining power and reduce the violence.

3. Empirical studies
a. International literature

Regarding the pioneering empirical studies can point to Richard Gelles (1976) finds the
relationship between income of women and violence: the likelihood of leaving an abusive
relationship decreases as income women are less. Bowlus and Shannon (2006) use structural
methods in an investigation reaching similar conclusions. However, Farmer and Tiefenthaler
(1997) identify a possible problem of omitted variable bias in the previous investigations.
Therefore, they use panel data that eliminate bias provided that the variables do not change
over time.

More recently, Anna Aizer (2010) used the conditions regarding female labor market (wage
gap) to explain domestic violence in California, United States. As we saw, this implies that
reducing violence can occur even in women who do not work. This paper uses the economic
theory of negotiation and incorporates family violence (physical aggression) to predict the
potential of women determine their relative wages bargaining power and this would determine
the likelihood of becoming a victim of violence. His theory is evaluated by estimating the impact
of the gender wage gap on domestic violence by changes in demand for labor in areas
dominated by women in relation to male-dominated industries. The results show a causal
relationship between relative conditions labor market (gender wage gap) and domestic violence
(medical attention due to physical assault). An additional contribution of the work is solving the
problem of reverse causality, because the gap depends on the market and not the
characteristics of women. However, the work presents a problem of incorporating variable bias
behind the violence. The author acknowledges the problem, but does not address a possible
solution to find that the estimated coefficient of the relevant variable does not change when
included or not the variable behind. An additional contribution of the work is solving the problem
of reverse causality, because the gap depends on the market and not the characteristics of
women. However, the work presents a problem of incorporating variable bias behind the

6
violence. The author acknowledges the problem, but does not address a possible solution to
find that the estimated coefficient of the relevant variable does not change when included or
not the variable behind. An additional contribution of the work is solving the problem of reverse
causality, because the gap depends on the market and not the characteristics of women.
However, the work presents a problem of incorporating variable bias behind the violence. The
author acknowledges the problem, but does not address a possible solution to find that the
estimated coefficient of the relevant variable does not change when included or not the variable
behind.

The relationship between income and domestic violence in Latin America, has not generated
significant literature. However, research Iregui-Bohorquez et al (2015) which relates income
and domestic violence for rural women in Colombia stands out. This paper finds that labor
income in certain sectors, reduces the risk of being a victim of domestic violence.

Ribero and Sanchez (2004) analyze the determinants of domestic violence in Colombia and
estimate their effects on income, labor force participation, education, health and nutrition of
children. Friedemann and Lovatón (2012) found that increased participation of women in
household decisions related to a greater likelihood of domestic violence. On the other hand,
Gafaro and Ibanez (2012) are important result for Colombia, that the effects of women's work
on the probability of abuse is heterogeneous among those that those that have ever been
abused and those who have never been ; work seems to have no importance on the level of
violence in the group of those who have never been victims of violence, but it represents a
mechanism bargaining power in those who had experienced violence before. Another important
job is to Olate, Maffei and Hernando (2011) that found for Chile that there is no clear causality
regarding female labor participation and complaints of domestic violence.

b. National literature

Gonzales de Olarte and Gavilano Llosa (1999) made the first work for Peru, but limited to Lima.
They find that the probability of physical violence increases if the couple is unemployed, lives
with her partner or separate and belonging to a social network of friends. Also they found that
the level of violence in the neighborhood where they live is directly related to family violence,
but not the level of poverty. Regarding psychological violence, they found that the couple is
working increases violence and, unlike physical violence, the poverty level matters. Also made

7
estimates for sexual violence and their findings suggest that this is conditional on poverty,
failure and pregnancy status grows as younger women.

Mendoza (2010) uses the ENDES 2009 to find the determinants of domestic violence against
women and finds that the main ones are that the woman is unemployed or not immersed in the
labor market, which has suffered physical aggression in infancy or childhood and is in a situation
of married or living together. Also using ENDES, Matos and Sulmont (2009) found that violence
is related to indicators of patriarchy and sexism; alcohol is the most important factor.

Mendoza (2017) finds that women in paid employment are more likely to suffer domestic
violence compared to non-employees. Mora (2013) finds that being a witness or victim of
violence in childhood is an important factor to explain marital violence. Gallegos (2012) studies
the armed conflict occurred between 1980 and 2000 found that this event increased the
likelihood that women and work both more likely to be victims of violence within their home.

4. Stylized Facts

The economy domestic violence explains, in part, from dependence on income. This
dependence not only derive from the characteristics of women, but also of gender disadvantage
in access to decent employment and income. This study seeks to provide finding evidence of
this relationship. However, the literature has only studied in Peru, the share of employment of
women but not the impact of labor market characteristics on the likelihood of violence.

Table 1: Stylized facts about labor and domestic violence

Author (year) objective Methodology relevant Result
variable
Lion (2010) Micro support of logit binomial Unemployment Unemployment
family violence of women of women
and find the generates
determinants of more frequent
this. episodes of
violence.
Diaz and Miranda Determinants logit binomial Earn more The
and costs of busy woman participation of
(2010)
domestic and the couple women in
violence employment
increases the
likelihood of
violence
8
 Mendoza (2014) Employment instrumental Paid Gainfully
effect on violence variables employment employed
women are
more likely to
be victims of
violence
Castro and Delgado Find the probit binomial Earns more Higher income
determinants of than the women more
(2014)
domestic couple likely to
violence generate
violence
Source: Self made

Then the evolution of the three types of violence in recent years and its distribution in the
regions of Peru are presented:

Figure 1: Physical Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months,

2007-2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

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 Figure 2: Physical Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months by region,
2007, 2012 and 2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

Figure 3: Sexual Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months,

2007-2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

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 Figure 4: Sexual Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months by region,
2007, 2012 and 2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

Figure 5: Emotional Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months, 2007-2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

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Figure 6: Emotional Domestic violence against women in the last 12 months by region,
2007, 2012 and 2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

In developing countries, women face constraints in access to economic, social and access to
education opportunities; which results in the persistence of differences in the labor market that
face them compared to men (Del Pozo, 2017). In Peru, it is found that the rate of labor
participation of women has been lower than men's and has been constant over the last decade;
about 80% of men of working age participating in the market while only 64% of women do in
2017.1

Concerning unemployment, Peru is characterized by an unemployment rate low and similar

between men and women. In 2017, the unemployment rate for women was 4.34% while in the
case of men was 3.79%. However, the most noticeable difference is in the income they receive
per hour. For better visualization of changes in income, they take logarithms and are presented
in Figure 7. In 2007, women earned per hour, on average, 6.64 and 7.79 soles soles men; It is
a difference of 17%. By 2017, women received 7.85 and 9.57 soles soles men translates into
a difference of 22%. While incomes have risen for both sexes, men's income has grown faster
than women. That is, the initial difference has increased;

1
The rates of activity, employment and unemployment by sex, 2007-2017, are presented in the accompanying 2.3 and 4.

12
 Figure 7: Changes in income (in logarithms) labor per hour, 2007 and 2017
Total

by sex
Women Men

Source: Prepared with data from the ENAHO

13
Chart 8: Wage income between men and women regarding region, 2007, 2012 and 2017

Source: Prepared with data from the ENAHO

5. Methodology

First, the gender wage gap is estimated for each region in each year of study. For this you can
use the wage gap between men and women. However, this gap we call the original is partly
explained by the characteristics of workers and jobs done. Therefore, the breakdown by pairing
proposed by Ñopo (2008) to find the gap unexplained by unexplained features will apply.

After finding the values of this variable, the estimate will be made

a. Gender Wage Gap

The wage gapbetween men and women can be broken down using the matching technique
proposed by Ñopo (2008). The central idea of using this decomposition is that the wage gapcan
only be partially explained by the characteristics of people. There is part of the gap is not
dependent on the worker, but unexplained features such as the structure of the market where
it operates.

The methodology follows 4 steps:

• Step 1: a woman (without replacement) of the sample is selected.

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 • Step 2: all men have the same characteristics as the woman initially selected are
selected.

• Step 3: a synthetic individual whose salary is equal to the average of all selected in
step 2 is constructed men.

• Step 4: observations of both individuals (synthetic man and woman) in the new
sample is placed paired individuals.

• Steps 1 through 4 are repeated until exhausted the original sample of women.

In this way a cuasiexperimento where you can compare similar individuals is achieved.
Synthetic observations contrafactual function as the comparison. Thus, the gap can be divided
into four parts:

∆= ∆H + ∆𝑋 + ∆0 + ∆𝑀

∆𝐻 It is the part of the gap can be explained by differences in characteristics between

men and men matched unmatched.

∆𝑋 It is the part that can be explained by differences in the distribution of the

characteristics of women and men in the common support.

∆𝑀 It is the part of the gap explained by differences in characteristics among women

outside the common support and the common support women.

∆0 It is the unexplained part of the wage gap, that is, the part not due to differences
in the characteristics of women. If there is discrimination between men and women,
this component would capture this problem.

b. The econometric model

Since our goal is to analyze the likelihood of being a victim of violence, Logit Binomial model
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) that takes the following form is used:

𝑌𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖
𝑌𝑖 = 0 𝑠𝑖 𝑌𝑖∗ ≤ 0
{
𝑌𝑖 = 1 𝑠𝑖 𝑌𝑖∗ > 0

15
Where it is assumed 𝑢𝑖 ~𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 and a latent variable that determines whether the woman is
suffering from violence (𝑌𝑖 = 1) or not victim (𝑌𝑖 = 0).

The cumulative logistic function would be:

1 exp(𝑥𝑖 𝛽)
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖 𝛽) = =
1 + exp(−𝑥𝑖 𝛽) 1 + exp(𝑥𝑖 𝛽)

And the marginal effects deriving the probability be calculated with respect to the variable 𝑋𝑗

∂ Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖 ) ∂(1 + exp(−𝑥𝑖 𝛽))−1 exp(𝑥𝑖 𝛽)

= = 𝛽
∂𝑋𝑗𝑖 ∂𝑋𝑗𝑖 (1 + exp(𝑥𝑖 𝛽))2 𝑗

Variables 𝑋𝑗 are those that explain the occurrence of violence and are detailed in paragraph
six.

c. Endogenity

The possibility of reverse causality between violence and gender wage gap is a problem that
must be addressed prior estimates. It is true that violence depletes human capital of the victims,
so their income would be reduced contributing to greater wage gap. However, Aizer (2010)
proposed for this use the wage gap in the market and not the gap in the family, as the potential
earnings of women (represented in the wage gap) does not depend on the characteristics of
women, but of labor market is exogenous to the model.

Therefore, the gap that we included in the model is first controlled by the characteristics of
people and employment by pairing Ñopo (2008). This is how this gap is attributable solely to
the market and therefore exogenously for every woman.

6. Features Database

This study aims to determine the relationship between gender wage gap and domestic violence
against women. Specifically, it seeks to measure the effect of the gender wage gap on the
likelihood of domestic violence. ENAHO and ENDES the years 2007 to 2017 for this purpose
two databases are used.

ENAHO is a probabilistic survey is the type, area, stratified, multistage and independent in each
region and allows inference nationally by natural regions, by area and regional level.
Specifically, the modules 300 and 500. In the latter use the information on employment and
wages be taken, and the module 300 the educational level of the worker will be obtained. This

16
database will be used to estimate the gender wage gap variable for each region in each year
of study, ie 264 have values. The use of ENAHO is done because the ENDES has no variables
to estimate income or wages of people. Thus, the gap can estimate is the regional market each
year.

The variables of violence and other explanatory will be taken from the ENDES which aims to
women of childbearing age population (15 to 49) and has national representation, for
geographical, regional domain and in large cities. It is, probabilistic, cross such areas, stratified
two-stage self-weighted and regional level (rural and urban). In particular, the modules 66
(respondent information), 71 (marriage, fertility, spouse and woman) and 73 (domestic
violence) are used.

The domestic violence module is based on the Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (Strauss et al.,
1996) which is one of the measures most reliable in detecting domestic violence. The
information gathering process ensures the privacy of the interviewee to take place in private
strict.

The three types of violence are studying physical, sexual and emotional, for the ENDES
provides questions for construction. It is noteworthy that do not use psychological violence, but
emotional. The first is aggression through words, libel, slander, yelling, insults, scorn, mockery,
irony, control situations, humiliations, threats and other actions to undermine the self-esteem
of women. This psychological violence is constructed from 9 ENDES questions. However, only
three of these are available on the incidence in the last 12 months. For this reason, only three
are used in the construction of emotional violence. So emotional violence is defined as
aggression by humiliation and threat of harm or leave home.

Then the number of observations which are achieved by gathering databases shown:

Table 2: Number of observations per year and the total

Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Total number of observations
25489 31206 24212 22947 22517 23888 22920 24872 35766 33135 33168 300120
Victims of domestic violence in recent months
physical violence
1985 2555 2033 1765 1674 1703 1565 1703 2719 2379 2268 22349
sexual violence
596 699 528 465 458 471 392 508 644 566 558 5885
emotional violence
2373 2942 2488 2129 2148 2202 1969 2257 3421 3055 2882 27866

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 Victims of domestic violence ever
physical violence
5817 6946 5481 5002 5070 5063 4852 4673 7034 6554 6327 62819
sexual violence
1599 1775 1299 1153 1264 1235 1130 1179 1564 1387 1345 14930
emotional violence
4935 5869 4656 4107 4208 4187 3989 4103 5993 5400 5211 52658
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

The purpose of including eleven years from 2007 to 2017, is to increase the representativeness,
as we will use an aggregate variable regional level, so we need more observations. Another
option would estimate narrower gaps, ie smaller levels as district aggregation. However,
ENAHO does not allow inference beyond the region if you want to study nationwide. Our
database has 300120 women in 24 regions for 11 years. The sample size leads us to rely on
the ability to deal with the problem of aggregation.

Table 3 presents the basic statistics of the variables of violence in our sample. It is observed
that 43.15% of women have experienced some form of domestic violence from their partner.
Our goal is to explain the incidence of violence, thus, violence in the last 12 months will be the
relevant indicator for our study. In the sample, 19.68% have ever suffered some form of violence
in the last 12 months. A breakdown by type of violence, on average, it appears that emotional
violence is the most frequent (19.68%) while sexual violence is the lowest with 3.09%. Physical
violence occurs in 6.47% of women. The coefficients of variation are indicators of the variable
dispersion.

Table 3: Basic statistics on the variables of domestic violence against women

Mean Coefficient of variation Number of victims
Victims of domestic violence in recent months
physical violence 6.47% 3.80 19413
sexual violence 3.09% 5.60 5459
emotional violence 15.39% 2.34 27224
All kinds of violence 19.68% 0.49 34784
Victims of domestic violence ever seen
physical violence 35.22% 1.36 62279
sexual violence 8.31% 3.32 14692
emotional violence 29.98% 1.53 53024
All kinds of violence 43.15% 0.87 76304
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

18
On the side of the explanatory variables have four groups; job characteristics, personal, couple
and home. Table 4 shows the main descriptive statistics of our database for all explanatory
variables used. Of these, the main variable is the gender wage gap estimated from the ENAHO.
He considers this gap as a feature of the local labor market where women live. Therefore, 264
values for the gap will. The detailed estimate of this variable will be explained in the following
sections.

Other variables regarding work if women are working and if the woman earns more than her
partner. Both are binomial variables. The first considers whether the woman is unemployed or
not while the second is an indicator of wage gapwithin the relationship. These two variables are
related, as a woman who does not work earn less than your partner, which is a variable of
interaction between the two add.

The first group of variables (job characteristics) will be the priority for our study analysis. The
remaining three groups of variables are used as covariates, as the literature indicates that they
are also determinants of domestic violence against women.

Table 4: Basic statistics of the explanatory variables

Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Source
Features work
Gap 0.39 0.33 -0.33 4.52 ENAHO
Earn more than their partner 9% 29% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Does not work 36% 48% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Personal characteristics
Age: 15 to 19 years 17% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Age: 20 to 29 years 31% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Age: 30 to 39 29% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Age: 40 to 50 years 22% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Without education 3% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Primary 25% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
High school 45% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Higher 27% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
She lives with her partner 94% 24% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Intergenerational violence 43% 50% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Ethnicity 7% 25% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple 38.21 9.73 15.00 98.00 ENDES
Without education 1% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES

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 Primary 24% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
High school 58% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Higher 17% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Alcohol consumption 76% 43% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Household characteristics
Number of children 1.71 1.78 0.00 15.00 ENDES
Household members 4.97 2.08 1.00 23.00 ENDES
Male head of household 77% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Woman head of household 2.3% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Urban 67% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Rural 33% 0.00 0.00 0.00 ENDES
Poverty 3.4% 47% 0.00 1.00 ENDES
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES and ENAHO

7. Empirical Evaluation

The first step of our empirical evaluation is to estimate the wage gap in each region for each
year of study. Then, with this variable, we estimate the probability of being a victim of violence
by logit regression models with different sets of control variables. With this estimation we can
estimate the marginal effects, ie what the average effect of the variation of the gap on the
probability of being a victim of domestic violence. Finally, an estimate separating women
working in non-working is performed. This exercise will determine whether women outside the
labor market are also conditional on market conditions offered by the region where they live.

a. Estimate of the gender wage gap

Typically it is known to the gender wage gap ratio between the average salaries of women and
men. However, using this relationship would be wrong, because this depends on the
characteristics of men and women. For this study the part of the gap need not be explained by
the characteristics of workers and that may be attributable to the disadvantage of women in the
labor market just for being women. Following the methodology of Ñopo (2008), the gender wage
gap that is not explained by observable characteristics is estimated. For this reason, the
variables that explain the difference in wages are chosen. personal characteristics and
employment characteristics: In Table 5 are two groups of variables.

The following table also provides us with the composition of the sample separated by sex. It
also gives us a first impression of differences in wage income as each feature to be used.
Education is one of the main determinants of the income of people, because it is an indicator
of human capital. Reviewing this variable we found that people without any education earn less

20
than the average wage for women regardless of sex. Revenues are considered hourly labor
prices in Metropolitan Lima 2017. This compares every year and regions.

Table 5: personal and employment characteristics, and salary income relative to men
and women busy, 2007-2017
Wage income relative
Sample Composition (%)
(Average income of women = 100)
Woman Man Woman Man
Personal characteristics
Age
16-24 19.5 19.6 75.4 91.3
25-34 25.2 26.1 107.3 124.7
35-44 26.6 25.9 114.2 141.8
45-54 17.5 16.4 116.8 153.4
55-65 11.1 11.9 98.2 142.3

Education
Any 5.6 1.2 50.7 65.4
Incomplete primary 14.1 9.4 61.7 82.8
Full primary 11.2 11.1 69.2 91.9
Incomplete secondary 12.9 15.6 76.1 100.3
Completed secondary 24.1 31.7 86.4 110.9
Incomplete tertiary 10.4 11.4 111.1 144.6
Complete tertiary 21.7 19.5 177.4 224.7

Experience
Any 34.2 30.0 84.0 108.0
1 to 4 years 31.5 26.0 101.2 133.2
From 5 to 19 years 25.6 29.5 124.1 145.1
From 20 to more 8.6 14.5 141.4 141.4

Urban
Do not 23.8 25.7 62.5 93.5
Yes 76.2 74.3 111.8 142.1

Employment characteristics
Full time
Yes 45.5 29.6 128.2 188.3
Do not 54.5 70.4 87.5 109.7

Small company
Yes 16.1 19.7 173.8 186.3
Do not 83.9 80.3 88.2 115.6

21
 Occupation
Public and corporate executives 13.3 21.4 108.4 125.6
Professionals and intellectuals 12.3 7.7 101.5 150.2
Technicians and assistants 2.6 4.6 202.7 203.1
Office employees 24.4 9.5 100.6 150.3
Services and sellers 4.7 5.4 147.4 153.5
Farmers and fish 4.2 7.9 163.1 171.1
Manufacturing workers 36.2 19.4 72.1 102.2
Specialized operators 1.7 22.6 107.0 103.4
Elementary occupations 0.5 1.6 222.1 166.2

economic sector
Agriculture and fishing 20.6 26.7 60.6 92.9
Mining and Petroleum 0.2 2.2 235.3 227.7
manufactures 9.6 11.2 81.5 123.9
Energy and Construction 0.6 10.4 199.0 135.4
Trade, Restaurant and Transport 38.4 28.1 90.4 113.4
Other services 30.5 21.4 136.8 185.3

Formality
Yes 24.4 29.4 135.2 166.6
Do not 75.6 70.6 81.9 105.1
Source: Prepared with data from the ENAHO

The decomposition was initially performed by adding a variable at a time to observe the
importance of this in the gap. It was found that age is not relevant, and that both education and
experience have significant impact on the gap, but employment characteristics that explain a
greater extent the gap. That is, men and women are not so different personal characteristics,
but differ in the type of employment and occupation they perform. Therefore, it is found that the
wage gap is greater than that observed originally. Annex 5 graphically presents this
decomposition process variable including variable as control.

The results of the decomposition of the original gap with all controls are presented in full in
Appendix 6. For a better visualization of the process in Figure 9. The pay gap originally
observed in green, shown reached its highest peak in 2012 reaching about 33% and since that
time has been reduced to be slightly above 20% in 2017. After performing the decomposition,
the gap scale to higher values reaching its highest value also in 2012 with more than 55%. The
evolution of the gap is not distorted in trend, but raises its value.

22
 Figure 9: Gender wage gap, 2006-20172
60%

50%
Brecha salarial de género

40%

30%

20%

10%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Año

Original +características de la mujer y del empleo

Source: Prepared with data from the ENAHO

With the wage gap attributable solely to the market, you can go to estimate the probability of
being a victim of violence with ENDES.

2
Annex 5 decomposition of the gap shown adding each demographic variable up to the gap corrected for all variables in
Table 5.

23
 b. Descriptive Analysis

Figure 10: Univariate relationship It will make a first assessment of the veracity
between violence and gender pay gap of the relationship between the wage gap and
domestic violence against women in this
section. Therefore we present Figure 10
containing the univariate relationship of the
regional incidence of all three types of violence
with the wage gap.

It is observed that there is a clear positive

relationship for the case of physical violence
and sexual violence. However, the relationship
is more opaque for emotional violence.

From these graphs we can mention that there

is a positive correlation between violence and
the wage gap, at least two of the three types of
violence. That is, in regions with higher market
wage differentials more often domestic
violence against women are presented.

However, this correlation does not ensure that

the gap cause violence. As a second step we
perform tests of means between the victims of
violence and non-victims for each explanatory
variable and for each of the three types of
violence. This will tell us whether the variables
chosen have some relation to the incidence of
violence or are unrelated.

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

and ENAHO

For physical violence (Table 6), those women victims have been exposed to higher gaps and
earn more than their partners; besides working women may be more likely to suffer this type of
violence. The four groups of characteristics seem to have high relationship with the incidence

24
of violence, as the significance in almost all cases is important. Therefore, this is an indicator
that they have chosen well the relevant variables.

Table 6: Test of means between groups of victims and non-victims for physical
domestic violence against women
no victims victims significance
Features work
Gap 0.45 0.46 **
Earn more than their partner 9% 13% ***
Does not work 37% 31% ***
Personal characteristics
Age: 15 to 19 years 22% 19% ***
Age: 20 to 29 years 18% 5% ***
Age: 30 to 39 31% 39% ***
Age: 40 to 50 years 29% 17% ***
Without education 3% 3% ***
Primary 25% 30%
High school 45% 47% ***
Higher 28% 20% ***
She lives with her partner 94% 95% ***
Intergenerational violence 43% 60% ***
Ethnicity 9% 11% ***
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple 37.66 35.52 ***
Without education 1% 1%
Primary 24% 2. 3% *
High school 58% 62% **
Higher 17% 13% ***
Alcohol consumption 76% 87% ***
Household characteristics
Number of children 188% 256% ***
Household members 512% 467% ***
Male head of household 77% 82% ***
Urban 67% 65% ***
Poverty 44% 53% ***
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

The same exercise for sexual violence (Table 7) is carried out and found that the age of the
woman would be important to explain sexual violence, but all other explanatory variables would
indeed be important.

25
Table 7: Test of means between groups of victims and non-victims to sexual domestic
violence against women
no victims victims significance
Features work
Gap 0.45 0.47 ***
Earn more than their partner 13% 14% ***
Does not work 3.4% 26% ***
Characteristics of women
Age: 15 to 19 years 4% 3%
Age: 20 to 29 years 32% 31%
Age: 30 to 39 39% 39%
Age: 40 to 50 years 26% 26%
Without education 4% 5%
Primary 31% 39% ***
High school 41% 41% ***
Higher 25% 15% ***
She lives with her partner 94% 95% *
Intergenerational violence 46% 62% ***
Ethnicity 11% 14% ***
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple 37.02 37.83 ***
Without education 1% 2%
Primary 24% 31% ***
High school 58% 58%
Higher 17% 10% ***
Alcohol consumption 77% 88% ***
Household characteristics
Number of children 2.55 2.99 ***
Household members 4.65 4.81 ***
Male head of household 82% 80% **
Urban 63% 57% ***
Poverty 15% 60% ***
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

Table 8 shows the means tests for emotional violence and its potential explanatory variables.
Living with your partner seems not important for this kind of violence. In addition, the gap loses
significance compared to the other two types of violence. Apparently emotional violence is not
affected by market characteristics contained in the gender wage gap.

26
 Table 8: Test of means between groups of victims and non-victims for emotional
domestic violence against women
no victims victims significance

Gap 0.45 0.46 *

Earn more than their partner 12.9% 13.3% *
does not work 34.4% 29.7% ***

Age: 15 to 19 years 3.5% 3.5% *

Age: 20 to 29 years 31.6% 32.8% ***
Age: 30 to 39 38.9% 39.3% ***
Age: 40 to 50 years 26.0% 24.4% ***
Without education 3.7% 3.0% *
Primary 31.2% 30.8% ***
High school 40.2% 45.0% ***
Higher 24.9% 21.2% ***
She lives with her partner 94.4% 94.5%
intergenerational violence 44.5% 58.4% ***
ethnicity 10.9% 10.0% ***

Age of the couple 37.00 37.31 ***

Without education 1.2% 1.2%
Primary 24.1% 23.6%
High school 57.2% 61.2% **
Higher 17.5% 14.1% ***
Alcohol consumption 75.5% 85.3% ***

Number of children 2.54 2.70 ***

Household members 4.65 4.72 ***
Male head of household 82.0% 79.3% ***
Urban 62.5% 65.9% ***
Poverty 50.2% 51.0% *
Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

In the previous two steps we have found that if there is a correlation between gender wage gap
and incidence of violence (physical and sexual) when compared regions. In addition, the
selected variables appear to be related to physical, sexual violence and, to a lesser extent,
emotional violence. So we can trust that the covariates were chosen correctly.

c. Econometric Results

Then, estimates of logit model for each type of violence occur. All estimates of this section
considered fixed effects per year per region. Estimation without these effects also performed

27
and can be reviewed in Annexes 7, 8 and 9. The importance of including these effects is
significant. Our variable coefficients main (gap) was very small with no fixed effects. With fixed
effects, significance and greater efficiency estimates it was won by correcting errors correlated.

For each type of violence five estimated models are presented. The first model only estimates
a univariate regression the gap. The following four models are incorporating the four groups of
explanatory variables chose. Thus we can analyze whether the effect of the gap is robust or
spurious.

Table 9 presents the results of estimating the probability of women suffer physical domestic
violence. The wage gap has significance at 1% and its magnitude is growing with the
incorporation of covariates. That women earn more than men, it seems, it generates more
violence like work. Therefore, the wage gapwithin the family increase physical violence and the
market gap as well. The fact that women work can generate resistance in men which seek to
exercise greater power through violence.

Table 10 shows the results of the estimation of the likelihood of being the victim of sexual
violence. As we advance in the previous section, the age of women does not appear as
significant. Neither the age of the couple would be relevant. Regarding the wage gap, the
coefficient has increased the magnitude of physical violence, but the significance only reaches
10%. Also that women earn more than men is not relevant. Which he tells us that sexual
violence is not linked significantly to job characteristics mode, but the intergenerational
violence, alcohol consumption of the couple, the poverty level as the head of household is male.

Finally, Table 11 shows the results of the estimation for emotional violence. The wage gap has
increased to physical violence coefficient and is significant at 1%. Women working does
increase the likelihood of becoming a victim, but earn more than the couple is not. Nor is the
age of the couple as living side by side in the same household.

28
 Table 9: Results of logistic regression to domestic violence physical
(one) (two) (3) (4) (5)
Features work
Gap 12.46 ** 12.65 ** 16.56 ** 18.49 *** 22.76 ***
(6109) (6301) (7051) (7073) (7086)
Earn more than their partner 0.957 *** 0.421 *** 0.397 *** 0.392 ***
(0117) (0125) (0125) (0125)
Does not work -0119 *** -0163 *** -0.159 *** -0178 ***
(0.0259) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0303)
Does not work * Earn more -0536 *** -0406 *** -0380 *** -0379 ***
(0119) (0127) (0128) (0128)
Characteristics of women
Age: 15 to 19 years 0.581 *** 0.313 *** 0.530 ***
(0.0483) (0.0588) (0.0613)
Age: 20 to 29 years 0.517 *** 0.302 *** 0.424 ***
(0.0239) (0.0342) (0.0358)
Age: 30 to 39 0.230 *** 0.111 *** 0.171 ***
(0.0229) (0.0265) (0.0271)
Primary -0.0125 -0.0269 .0219
(0.0562) (0.0575) (0.0578)
High school .0580 .0536 0.123 **
(0.0571) (0.0599) (0.0610)
Higher -0340 *** -0236 *** -0.125 *
(0.0591) (0.0632) (0.0652)
She lives with her partner 0.149 *** 0.156 *** 0.233 ***
(0.0406) (0.0410) (0.0450)
Intergenerational violence 0.582 *** 0.567 *** 0.556 ***
(0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0177)
Ethnicity -0330 *** -0342 *** -0269 ***
(0.0370) (0.0375) (0.0385)
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple -0.0116 *** -0.0144 ***
(0.00146) (0.00149)
Primary -0.160 * -0,135
(0.0925) (0.0928)
High school -0205 ** -0175 *
(0.0926) (0.0930)
Higher -0511 *** -0466 ***
(0.0963) (0.0969)
Alcohol consumption 0.714 *** 0.712 ***
(0.0241) (0.0242)
Household characteristics
Number of children 0.0987 ***
(0.00798)
Household members -0.0384 ***
(0.00607)
Male head of household 0.131 ***
(0.0301)
Urban -0403 ***
(0.0263)
Poverty 0.197 ***
(0.0251)
Constant 7900 *** 7977 *** 9751 *** -10.37 *** -12.07 ***
(2551) (2622) (2943) (2953) (2960)
Fixed effects: years and regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

29
 Table 10: Results of logistic regression for sexual domestic violence
(one) (two) (3) (4) (5)
Features work
Gap 21.48 * 19.75 24.18 25.37 * 28.97 *
(1235) (12.72) (14.79) (14.80) (14.82)
Earn more than their partner 0.206 0.394 0399 0.418
(0253) (0256) (0256) (0256)
Does not work -0211 *** -0260 *** -0245 *** -0261 ***
(0.0528) (0.0599) (0.0600) (0.0601)
Does not work * Earn more -0,260 -0,334 -0,335 -0,344
(0257) (0260) (0260) (0260)
Characteristics of women
Age: 15 to 19 years -0239 ** -0,103 0.190
(0105) (0121) (0125)
Age: 20 to 29 years -0177 *** -0.0911 .0861
(0.0445) (0.0623) (0.0657)
Age: 30 to 39 -0.0802 ** -0.0375 .0438
(0.0392) (0.0458) (0.0473)
Primary -0,118 -0.0882 -0.00852
(0.0836) (0.0857) (0.0862)
High school -0336 *** -0231 ** -0.0800
(0.0873) (0.0922) (0.0943)
Higher -0929 *** -0675 *** -0448 ***
(0.0939) (0102) (0106)
She lives with her partner 0.198 ** 0.196 ** 0.299 ***
(0.0815) (0.0819) (0.0909)
Intergenerational violence 0.569 *** 0.550 *** 0.539 ***
(0.0336) (0.0337) (0.0338)
Ethnicity -0288 *** -0306 *** -0291 ***
(0.0623) (0.0632) (0.0649)
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple 0.00569 ** 0.00216
(0.00258) (0.00266)
Primary -0.0315 -0.00978
(0151) (0151)
High school -0,188 -0,123
(0152) (0152)
Higher -0570 *** -0471 ***
(0162) (0163)
Alcohol consumption 0.670 *** 0.662 ***
(0.0463) (0.0464)
Household characteristics
Number of children 0.127 ***
(0.0135)
Household members -0.0120
(0.0114)
Male head of household 0.173 ***
(0.0585)
Urban -0276 ***
(0.0473)
Poverty 0.205 ***
(0.0475)
Constant -12.63 ** -11.85 ** -13.86 ** -15.09 ** -17.10 ***
(5224) (5359) (6276) (6284) (6293)
Fixed effects: years and regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176.840 175.734 147.201 146.941 146.941
Standard errors are given in parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
30
 Table 11: Results of logistic regression for emotional domestic violence
(one) (two) (3) (4) (5)
Features work
Gap 22.06 *** 21.64 *** 2310 *** 24.52 *** 28.78 ***
(5685) (5825) (6481) (6497) (6517)
Earn more than their partner -0.0183 .0669 0.0578 .0602
(0128) (0131) (0132) (0132)
Does not work -0164 *** -0197 *** -0.190 *** -0212 ***
(0.0241) (0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0273)
Does not work * Earn more -0.0814 -0,101 -0.0928 -0.0985
(0130) (0133) (0134) (0134)
Characteristics of women
Age: 15 to 19 years -0177 *** -0.0973 * 0.138 **
(0.0505) (0.0584) (0.0606)
Age: 20 to 29 years 0.0217 0.0653 ** 0.199 ***
(0.0213) (0.0301) (0.0316)
Age: 30 to 39 .0219 0.0423 * 0.0984 ***
(0.0194) (0.0226) (0.0231)
Primary 0.127 ** 0.146 *** 0.206 ***
(0.0517) (0.0529) (0.0533)
High school 0.148 *** 0.202 *** 0.286 ***
(0.0526) (0.0551) (0.0562)
Higher -0210 *** -0.0418 .0839
(0.0541) (0.0579) (0.0597)
She lives with her partner -0.0156 -0.0167 .0631
(0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0391)
Intergenerational violence 0.532 *** 0.516 *** 0.505 ***
(0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0160)
Ethnicity -0391 *** -0397 *** -0320 ***
(0.0349) (0.0354) (0.0364)
Characteristics of the couple
Age of the couple 0.00387 *** 0.00116
(0.00126) (0.00129)
Primary -0260 *** -0238 ***
(0.0807) (0.0811)
High school -0315 *** -0289 ***
(0.0809) (0.0814)
Higher -0608 *** -0568 ***
(0.0842) (0.0848)
Alcohol consumption 0.569 *** 0.566 ***
(0.0208) (0.0209)
Household characteristics
Number of children 0.100 ***
(0.00705)
Household members -0.00878
(0.00544)
Male head of household 0.145 ***
(0.0273)
Urban -0409 ***
(0.0245)
Poverty 0.150 ***
(0.0232)
Constant -11.09 *** -10.85 *** -11.82 *** -12.77 *** -14.62 ***
(2392) (2443) (2720) (2727) (2737)
Fixed effects: years and regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 176.850 175.744 147.202 146.966 146.966
Standard errors are given in parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

31
 d. Marginal Effects
Figure 11: Marginal effects estimated
e. Allowance for unemployed women
The theory put forth predicts that the wage gap would impact even in women who do not
work. Therefore we make the estimate of the likelihood of violence by separating the group of
32
The marginal effects are presented in
Tables 12, 13 and 14 for each type of
violence and for all explanatory variables.
However, our interest is in the impact of the
gender wage gap on violence. Therefore, in
Figure 11 we present only the marginal
effects of the wage gap.
For physical violence, the impact is clear,
especially for the first sections of the gap. A
change of 1% of the pay gap can generate
29.2% variation in the probability of being
the victim of such violence.
The marginal effects in the case of sexual
violence are less clear. Apparently the
effect is not significant. This can happen for
the small incidence of such violence.
Finally, the marginal effects for emotional
violence are much clearer than in the two
previous types of violence. A 1% increase
in the gap may increase, on average, 3.52%
probability of being a victim of emotional
violence.
women working in non-working. Summarized results are shown in Table 15 and Table 16.
The results with all covariates can be reviewed in Annexes 10 and 11.

Table 15: Results of logistic regression for women who work and do not work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
physical violence sexual violence emotional violence
working does not work working does not work working does not work
Features work
Gap 22.29 *** 18.73 ** 23.06 ** 34.66 29.76 *** 18.71 **
(5651) (8096) (11.25) (21.20) (5380) (7720)
Characteristics of women Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Characteristics of the couple Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eph. Fixed: years and regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 93.463 53.494 93.447 52,574 93.463 53.503
Robust standard errors in Parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

Table 16: Marginal effects for women who work and do not work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
physical violence sexual violence emotional violence
working does not work working does not work working does not work
Features work
Gap 2,340 *** 1,728 ** 0.738 ** 0.779 3840 *** 2,040 **
(0594) (0747) (0360) (0477) (0695) (0842)
Observations 93.463 53.494 93.447 52,574 93.463 53.503
Standard errors in Parentheses *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1

The results indicate that the wage gap has an impact on physical violence and emotional
violence for women who do not work. The impact is less than that of women working, but this
indicates that improved equality in the labor market, may induce women to have greater
opportunities to escape violent relationships and integrate the market to become economically
independent. In the case of sexual violence, the wage gap would only impact on women working

Figure 15 shows the marginal effects differentiated by women working and non-working
reinforcing for each type of domestic violence. In the case of physical violence, an increase in
the wage gap by 1% would generate 1.7% higher incidence of this type of violence in women
who do not work. A 1% increase in the wage gap would generate an increase in the incidence
of emotional violence of 2.0% among women in this group. While the evidence is not conclusive
by large margins mistake, the first sections of an increase in the wage gap itself have an impact
on these two types of violence.

33
 Figure 12: Marginal effects estimated for women who work and do not work
Women working Women who do not work

Source: Prepared with data from the ENDES

8. Concluding remarks

This research seeks to explain domestic violence against women from inequalities in the labor
market; in particular, it investigates the effect of gender wage gap on the incidence of violence.
The wage gap is understood as a feature of the labor market that women face at a disadvantage
relative tomen. The analysis was performed for the period 2007-2017 and data from the

34
National Household Survey (ENAHO) and the Demographic and Family Health (DHS) will be
used.

The wage gap between women and men determine the bargaining power of women, so the
levels of violence decrease if revenues are similar to or greater than man, hence the importance
of using market conditions reflected work the wage gap. We found that this gap reduces
violence even in women who do not work. Econometric results indicate that, especially physical
violence is very susceptible to changes in the wage gap.

Therefore violence will not be explained only by the characteristics of women and family; but
also by labor market conditions. Close the gender inequalities in the labor market, besides
being a need for justice, lead us to reduce domestic violence.

35
 9. Bibliographic references

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Aizer, A. (2010). The gender wage gap and domestic violence. The American economic
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Bartik T. (1991) Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
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Bartik Timothy.(1991) Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
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Blanchard O., Katz Lawrence F.(1992) Regional Evolutions. Brookings Papers on Economic
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Bowlus A., Seitz S. (2006) Domestic Violence, Employment and Divorce. International
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