appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge
Republic of the Philippines Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 131429 August 4, 1999
OSCAR BERMUDEZ, ARTURO A. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. DAYAON,
petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES, BUDGET SECRETARY
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., JUSTICE SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA,
JR., and ATTY. CONRADO QUIAOIT, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the
post of Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos is
assailed in this petition for review on certiorari on a pure question of law which
prays for the reversal of the Order,1 dated 20 October 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 63) of Tarlac, Tarlac, dismissing the petition for prohibition and/or
injunction and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction/temporary restraining order, instituted by herein petitioners.
The occurrence of a vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac
impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and
respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper
interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee2
of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to have had the support of
then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Legislative District of Tarlac.3 On 30
June 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was appointed by President
Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as
well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that
assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial Prosecutor
claiming that the original copy of Quiaoit's appointment had not yet been
released by the Secretary of Justice.4 Quiaoit, nonetheless, performed the
functions and duties of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office orders
and memoranda, signing resolutions on preliminary investigations, and filing
several informations before the courts. Quiaoit had since been regularly
receiving the salary, RATA and other emoluments of the office.
On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila by
Justice Secretary Guingona. The three met at the Department of Justice and,
following the conference, Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases until 15
October 1997 and to turn-over the contested office to Quiaoit the next
day.1âwphi1.nêt
In his First Indorsement, dated 22 September 1997, for the Chief State
Prosecutor, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo Mariano transmitted the
original copy of Quiaoit's appointment to the Regional State Prosecutor Carlos
de Leon, Region III, at San Fernando, Pampanga. In turn, in his Second
Indorsement, dated 02 October 1997, Regional State Prosecutor de Leon
forwarded to Quiaoit said original copy of his appointment. On the basis of the
transmittal letter of Regional State Prosecutor de Leon, Quiaoit, as directed,
again so assumed office on 16 October 1997. On even date, Bermudez was
detailed at the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor, Region III, in San
Fernando Pampanga.
In the meantime, on 10 October 1997, Bermudez together with his co-petitioners
Arturo Llobrera and Claudio Dayaon, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
and the Fourth Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac, respectively, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and
mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary
restraining order, against herein respondents, challenging the appointment of
Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987. After hearing, the trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution
and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the petition. The
subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a
denial.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The core issue for consideration is whether or not the absence of a
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to
the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit. This question would, in turn,
pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (Book IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that —
All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.
Petitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatorily
requires a prior recommendation of the Secretary of Justice endorsing the
intended appointment citing, by analogy, the case of San Juan vs. CSC 5 where
the Court held:
. . . The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements
and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and
qualifications.
The Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) is expected to synchronize his work with
DBM.6 (Emphasis supplied.)
Insisting on the application of San Juan, petitioners call attention to the tenor of
Executive Order No. 1127 —
Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned. . . . —
that, they claim, can be likened to the aforequoted provision of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. Respondents argue differently.
The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is no hard-and-fast rule in
ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered mandatory
or directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular instance may not
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
necessarily be apt in another8 for each must be determined on the basis of the
specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances attendant to it. More often
than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is firmed up and addressed on a
case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and aim of the law itself is often
resorted to in looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no
consequential rights or liabilities depend on it and no injury can result from
ignoring it, and that the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a
manner other than that prescribed when substantially the same results can be
obtained, then the statute should be regarded merely as directory, rather than as
mandatory, in character.9
An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or
selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.10 The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it
effective.11 Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part
of the appointing authority.12 In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,13 reiterated in Flores vs. Drilon,14 this Court has
held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding
for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . .15
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint.16 In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral
part thereof.
When the Constitution17 or the law18 clothes the President with the power to
appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as
necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be
here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all "executive departments, bureaus
and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or
modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter,19 as
and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the
President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive
department, bureau and office.20 It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the
President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or
altogether ignore their recommendations.21
It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the
phrase "upon recommendation of the Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II,
Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it
is normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon
the party to whom it is made.22 The recommendation is here nothing really more
than advisory in nature.23 The President, being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his
authority.
The doctrine in San Juan, relied upon by petitioners, is tangential. While the
tenor of the legal provision in Executive Order No. 112 has some similarity with
the provision in the 1987 Administrative Code in question, it is to be pointed out,
however, that San Juan,24 in construing the law, has distinctively given stress to
the constitutional mandate on local autonomy; thus:
The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one
Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and
Management and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a
seemingly innocuous position involves the application of a most important
constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the
clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations,
one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
xxx xxx xxx
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously
hoards the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local
governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their
own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.25
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
The Court there has explained that the President merely exercises general
supervision over local government units and local officials,26 hence, in the
appointment of a Provincial Budget Officer, the executive department, through
the Secretary of Budget and Management, indeed had to share the questioned
power with the local government.
In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the
appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself, and
there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents
and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
------------------------------------------
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO
A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P. REYES, Petitioner, vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON,
Respondents.
Isagani M. Jungco, Valeriano S. Peralta, Miguel Famularcano, Jr. and Virgilio E.
Acierto for petitioners.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, 1otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged
in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures
of public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to
the office . . . ." 2Paragraph (d) reads -
 (d) Chairman administrator - The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with
a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio
chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).
Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the
Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees
Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso in par.
(d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position
during his tenure," 3because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective
official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", 4since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed
the Mayor to the subject posts; 5and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus
Election Code, which says:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an
election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new employees, creation
of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. - During
the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty
days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing
officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether
national or local, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new
position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The
Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is
satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the
position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a new
employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided,
however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the
Commission within three days from the date of the appointment.
Any appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be
null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or gives
any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any
government official or employee, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations . . . .
for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts
made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the
prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992
Elections.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227
which states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials
to other government posts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his
tenure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time
with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an
affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or
employee, like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
83815, 6". . . . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He should
be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many
positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency . .
. ."chanrobles virtual law library
Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in
an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents . . . ."
7
chanrobles virtual law library
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is
precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first
par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective
official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no
moment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his office. 8But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of
the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is
that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its
validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise unconstitutional as authority
for its validity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of
multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not
providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in
the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning
agency; 9the Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet;
10
and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council. 11chanrobles virtual law library
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was
not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by
the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their deliberation, thus -
MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Commissioner is saying,
Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is more strict with
respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive
officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other
positions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the
case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where
the law should allow them to hold some other positions.
12
chanrobles virtual law library
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the
second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by
the first paragraph.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, 13where we stated that the prohibition against the
holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as
provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional
duties and functions required by the primary functions of the officials concerned,
who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation
therefor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically
attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor
of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the subject positions
ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and,
instead, "ex officio" would have been used. 14chanrobles virtual law library
Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject
proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed
the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts. Indeed, the
Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had
they considered the SBMA posts as ex
officio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso
was stated, Senator Rene Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee
just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that should foreclose the issue.
It is a legislative choice." 15The Senator took a view that the constitutional
proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped
if Congress attached the SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of
directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view
of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to be
appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex
officio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by
respondents cannot be applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged
proviso since it is not put in issue in the present case. In the same vein, the
argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double
compensation 16would be useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect
the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec.
3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority
of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA,
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some
office or trust," 17or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by the person or
persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge
the duties of the same. 18In his treatise, Philippine Political
Law, 19Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the
selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office."chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., 20"the choice of a
person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment," 21and Mr.
Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive
act involving the exercise of discretion." 22In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
v. Intermediate Appellate Court 23we held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing
power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . . .
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment
involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of
issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the
appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing
power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to
only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the
President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer,
Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when
the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual,
such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to
choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
24
chanrobles virtual law library
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a
presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A.
7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify
for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his
discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment,
sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the
very nature itself of appointment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid
legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one is certainly an encroachment
on his prerogative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from
his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he
may be considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional
Commission is enlightening:
MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the
substitution of the word "term" with
TENURE.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to make
possible for one to resign from his
position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that
prerogative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to accept an executive
position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case that
because of, say, incapacity, he may leave the service, but if he is
prohibited from being appointed within the term for which he was
elected, we may be depriving the government of the needed
expertise of an individual. 25chanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains
ineligible for appointment to another public
office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was,
notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does
not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his ineligibility imposed by
the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not
eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot
be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should
not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where "(n)o Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ."
The difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been
appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective officials
must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of
losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is
therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . .
The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by law that a person
holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to
incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office
(State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v
Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or appointment to the
latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388,
40 ALR 941)." 26"Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding
one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either
generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the
incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the

Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 

second is void (Ala. - State ex rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala
445)." 27chanrobles virtual law library
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City,
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful
officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they
involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office
were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void
because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its
exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public .
. . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll,
38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213;
Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." 28chanrobles virtual law
library
Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which may have been received by
respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be retained by
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other
matters affecting the legality of the questioned proviso as well as the
appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be
discussed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel
which he expressed in the floor deliberations of S.B. 1648, precursor of R.A.
7227, when he articulated -
. . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of
Olongapo City as the Chief Executive of this Authority that we are
creating; (much) as I, myself, would like to because I know the
capacity, integrity, industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon;
(much) as we would like to give him this terrific, burdensome and
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
heavy responsibility, we cannot do it because of the constitutional
prohibition which is very clear. It says: "No elective official shall be
appointed or designated to another position in any capacity."
29
chanrobles virtual law library
For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst
the strife of storms or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves." 30One
of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist
capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by
passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people
with ideas or personalities . . . . Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily
tampered with to suit political expediency, personal ambitions or ill-advised
agitation for change." 31chanrobles virtual law library
Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no
choice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . .
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of
this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman
and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City,
respondent Richard J. Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and
VOID.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by
respondent Gordon, if any, as such Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may
be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him in the exercise
of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby
UPHELD.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this
petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek
to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the
Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo
Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground
that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the
constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the
public service, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide,
setting aside the finer procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper
remedy to test respondent Mison's right to the Office of Commissioner of the
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a standing to bring this
suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the
Commission on Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention.
Comment was required of respondents on said petition. The comment was filed,
followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The parties were also heard in oral
argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a
conflict between two (2) great departments of government, the Executive and
Legislative Departments. It also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear
provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in
Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves.
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want them
construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts,
or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just
quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution; 2
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; 3
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and,
if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the
President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that
only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. But we need not
rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can refer to
historical background as well as to the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of
the framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and fourth groups,
require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Again, in
this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos in Gold Creek
is apropos:
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are
bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and
upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs.
Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is
provided that —
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval
by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
xxx xxx xxx
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Upon the other hand, the 1973 Constitution provides that-
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General
or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of
Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part
of our political history that the power of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that commission, many
times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian
pattern in which it was molded and remolded by successive amendments,
placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check
on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in
the 1973 Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by
requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the
first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion.
The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the
Executive of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission
on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments 7 [Emphasis supplied].
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935
Constitution. When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the
proposed text of Section 16, Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to
make the power of the Commission on Appointments over presidential
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in the 1935
Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Rama: ... May I ask that Commissioner Monsod be recognized
The President: We will call Commissioner Davide later.
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few minutes of our
time to lay the basis for some of the amendments that I would like to propose to
the Committee this morning.
xxx xxx xxx
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and
so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
xxx xxx xxx 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major
changes proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the
exclusion of the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of
appointments made under the second sentence 9 of the section from the same
requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
show the following:
MR. ROMULO: I ask that Commissioner Foz be recognized
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16,
line 26 which is to delete the words "and bureaus," and on line 28 of the same
page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain to MAJOR GENERAL OR
REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner
de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the
same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.
MR. REGALADO: May we have the amendments one by one. The first proposed
amendment is to delete the words "and bureaus" on line 26.
MR. FOZ: That is correct.
MR. REGALADO: For the benefit of the other Commissioners, what would be the
justification of the proponent for such a deletion?
MR. FOZ: The position of bureau director is actually quite low in the executive
department, and to require further confirmation of presidential appointment of
heads of bureaus would subject them to political influence.
MR. REGALADO: The Commissioner's proposed amendment by deletion also
includes regional directors as distinguished from merely staff directors, because
the regional directors have quite a plenitude of powers within the regions as
distinguished from staff directors who only stay in the office.
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the supervisiopn of the staff
bureau directors.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: May I direct a question to Commissioner Foz? The
Commissioner proposed an amendment to delete 'and bureaus on Section 16.
Who will then appoint the bureau directors if it is not the President?
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their appointment shall
no longer be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. MAAMBONG: In other words, it is in line with the same answer of
Commissioner de Castro?
MR. FOZ: Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this clear now? What is the reaction of the Committee?
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee feels that this matter should
be submitted to the body for a vote.
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
MR. REGALADO: We will take the amendments one by one. We will first vote on
the deletion of the phrase 'and bureaus on line 26, such that appointments of
bureau directors no longer need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to delete the phrase 'and bureaus' on
page 7, line 26? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendments is approved.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Foz is recognized
MR. FOZ: Madam President, this is the third proposed amendment on page 7,
line 28. 1 propose to put a period (.) after 'captain' and on line 29, delete 'and all'
and substitute it with HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY.
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, the Committee accepts the proposed
amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers mentioned therein
do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
MR. DAVIDE: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE: So would the proponent accept an amendment to his amendment,
so that after "captain" we insert the following words: AND OTHER OFFICERS
WHOSE APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION?
FR. BERNAS: It is a little vague.
MR. DAVIDE: In other words, there are positions provided for in the Constitution
whose appointments are vested in the President, as a matter of fact like those of
the different constitutional commissions.
FR. BERNAS: That is correct. This list of officials found in Section 16 is not an
exclusive list of those appointments which constitutionally require confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments,
MR. DAVIDE: That is the reason I seek the incorporation of the words I proposed.
FR. BERNAS: Will Commissioner Davide restate his proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE: After 'captain,' add the following: AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE
APPOINTMENTS ARE VESTED IN HIM IN THIS CONSTITUTION.
FR. BERNAS: How about:"AND OTHER OFFICERS WHOSE APPOINTMENTS
REQUIRE CONFIRMATION UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION"?
MR. DAVIDE: Yes, Madam President, that is modified by the Committee.
FR. BERNAS: That will clarify things.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
MR. REGALADO: Just for the record, of course, that excludes those officers
which the Constitution does not require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, like the members of the judiciary and the Ombudsman.
MR. DAVIDE: That is correct. That is very clear from the modification made by
Commissioner Bernas.
THE PRESIDENT: So we have now this proposed amendment of Commissioners
Foz and Davide.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to this proposed amendment of
Commissioners Foz and Davide as accepted by the Committee? (Silence) The
Chair hears none; the amendment, as amended, is approved 10 (Emphasis
supplied).
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers
can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
It is contended by amicus curiae, Senator Neptali Gonzales, that the second
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII reading-
He (the President) shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in
like manner" appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other
words, the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second
sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first
sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not
necessarily supportive of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor
General argues, the word "also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too"
(Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which meanings could,
on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that
the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can
appoint (without such consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the
second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word
"also" as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to
derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by
the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of
appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2)
sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message
conveyed and perceptions established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's
observation that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more so,
because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, there are officers whose appointments require no confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments, even if such officers may be higher in rank,
compared to some officers whose appointments have to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art.
VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank
than a colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular
Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive
intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that,
except as to those officers whose appointments require the consent of the
Commission on Appointments by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec.
16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is inevitable,
if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were
knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed against them. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated
in order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII
where it is clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions
therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor
Commission on Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law,
lower-ranked officers have to be appointed by the President subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if this is so, as to
lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII, abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the
Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in
the heads of the various departments, agencies, commissions, or boards in the
government. No reason however is submitted for the use of the word "alone" in
said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion,
after a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
that the use of the word alone" after the word "President" in said third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It
will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the following provision appears at
the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis
supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the
provision which makes practically all presidential appointments subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule,
presidential appointments to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way of an exception to such rule, to
provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987
Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16,
Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress
may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone,
or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint
officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that,
in the case of lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their
appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of various
departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in the third sentence of
Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last part of
par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in
the light of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy
cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the
position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those
officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded
the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of
Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on 22 June
1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief
and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
(hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with
the rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs
shall be appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by
Presidential Decree No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended, now reads as follows:
Sec. 601. Chief Officials of the Bureau of Customs.-The Bureau of Customs shall
have one chief and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the
Commissioner (hereinafter known as Commissioner) and Deputy Commissioner
of Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with
the rates prescribed by existing law. The Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines
(Emphasis supplied.)
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD
No. 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while
the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorizedby law to make,
such appointment, however, no longer needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison,
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to
the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise
the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and
emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are,
hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 83216. September 4, 1989.]
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES, GLORIA T. ARAGON (M.D.),
LOURDES V. MASTURA, TRINIDAD A. GOMEZ, ADUL DE LEON,
JOSEFINA AZARCON-DELA CRUZ, TRINIDAD M. DOMINGO,
MARIA MAYET T. LEDANO, LOLIT ANTONIO, ET AL., Petitioners,
v. THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND
OFFICES (C.A.), COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
ET AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; SECTORAL
REPRESENTATIVES; APPOINTMENT UNDER SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII
OF THE CONSTITUTION SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS. — In Sarmiento v. Mison, Et. Al.
(156 SCRA 549 [1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in
the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The ruling in Mison
was reiterated in the recent case of Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Sen.
Jovito Salonga, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 86439, promulgated on April 13,
1989). Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison,
supra).
2. ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENTS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT NOT
REQUIRING CONFIRMATION BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.
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— There are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution
which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation
such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of
lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies
(Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been
extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the
Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVE UNACTED
ON BY THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS UNTIL ADJOURNMENT OF
CONGRESS, RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC. — Implicit in the
invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as authority for the
appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the President as
appointing authority that petitioner’s appointment requires confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2, Section 16,
Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant thereto "shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed appointments
of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the President need
not make any reference to the constitutional provisions above-quoted
in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the President in a
letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted petitioner’s
appointment for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Considering that Congress had adjourned without respondent
Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner’s appointment,
said appointment/nomination had become moot and academic pursuant
to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent Commission and "unless
resubmitted shall not again be considered by the Commission."cralaw
virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 198; SCOPE THEREOF. — The
provisions of Executive Order No. 198 do not deal with the manner of
appointment of sectoral representatives. Executive Order No. 198
confines itself to specifying the sectors to be represented, their
number, and the nomination of such sectoral representatives. The
power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains
directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which
is quoted in the second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198.
Petitioner Deles’ appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive
Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and
Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the persons to the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph
confirmation process. (1), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

DECISION 1. Teresita Quintos-Deles — Women

2. Al Ignatius G. Lopez — Youth

BIDIN, J.:
3. Bartolome Arteche — Peasant

This is a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with 4. Rey Magno Teves — Urban Poor.
injunction seeking to compel respondent Commission on Appointments
to allow petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles to perform and discharge her Copies of their appointments are enclosed.
duties as a member of the House of Representatives representing the
Women’s Sector and to restrain respondents from subjecting With best wishes.
petitioner’s appointment to the confirmation process.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph Very truly yours,

The antecedent facts which gave rise to this petition are as (SGD.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Executive Secretary"
On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral
Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral representatives were
paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, also dated April Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However,
6, 1988 (Annex L) the appointment of the said sectoral representatives petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-appointees were
to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of
Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the
"April 6, 1988 Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral
representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission
Hon. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of
the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker
Speaker, House of Representatives Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oathtaking of the four sectoral
representatives.
Quezon City
In view of this development, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
Sir:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library transmitted on April 25, 1988, a letter dated April 11, 1988 of the
President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representatives as
Section 7, of the Constitution, the President has appointed the following follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
 Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter dated April 22, 1988 addressed to
"11 April 1988 Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. (Annex V) appealed to the House of
Representatives alleging, among others, that since "no attempt was
The Honorable made to subject the sectoral representatives ** already sitting to the
confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and
Jovito R. Salonga subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be
discriminatory."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Senate President and
In reply, Speaker Mitra in a letter dated May 2, 1988 (Annex BB)
The Members of the Commission informed petitioner that since "President Corazon C. Aquino has
submitted your appointment to the Commission on Appointments for
on Appointments confirmation in a letter dated April 11, 1988, . . . the Commission on
Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter."cralaw
Congress of the Philippines virtua1aw library

M a n i la On May 10, 1988, petitioner Deles received an invitation dated May 6,

Gentlemen:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, and Article XVIII,
Section 7, of the Constitution, I hereby submit, for confirmation, the
appointments of the following persons as Members of the House of
Representatives representing the sectors indicated opposite their
respective names:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES — Women
AL IGNATIUS G. LOPEZ — Youth
BARTOLOME ARTECHE — Peasant
REY MAGNO TEVES — Urban Poor
1988 to attend a Commission on Appointments Committee Meeting
scheduled for May 12, 1988 for the deliberation of her appointment as
sectoral representative for women (Annex DD). Petitioner sent a reply
dated May 11, 1988 explaining her position and questioning the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment
of sectoral representatives (Annex EE).
In the May 12, 1988 meeting of the Committee of the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired
by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of
petitioner Deles.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that
respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined from subjecting
to confirmation process the petitioner’s appointment as sectoral
representative for the women’s sector and as member of Congress.

An early confirmation of their appointments will be appreciated. Petitions in intervention were likewise filed by Estefania Aldaba Lim, Et.
Al. (Rollo, p. 147); Ma. Iris Melizza, Et. Al. (Rollo, p. 172); Margarita
Very truly yours, Gomez, Et. Al. (Rollo, p. 186); Hernani Panganiban, Et. Al. (Rollo, p.
208); Presentacion Castro, Et. Al. (Rollo, p. 215); Sr. Teresa Dagdag,
(Sgd) Corazon C. Aquino" Et. Al. (Rollo, p. 251); and Civil Liberties Union (Rollo, p. 274).

Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 

Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles contends that her appointment as
Sectoral Representative for Women by the President pursuant to
Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, does not require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify her to take
her seat in the House of Representatives.
The opposite view is taken by the Solicitor General in his Statement of
Position (In lieu of Comment), dated July 15, 1988 (Rollo, p. 206) in
this wise: "In view of the President’s submission of the four sectoral
representatives, the petitioner included, to the Commission on
Appointments by letter dated April 11, 1988, then confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 15, 1988, respondent Commission on Appointments, in
addition to adopting the Statement of Position (in lieu of Comment)
submitted by the Solicitor General, likewise submitted its own
Statement of Position (In lieu of Comment) and further manifested that
(1) the appointment of petitioner Deles was not acted upon by the
Commission on Appointments when Congress went into recess as
required by the Constitution; (2) the case of petitioner Deles for
appointment as sectoral representative to the House of Representatives
has become moot and academic not having been finally acted upon at
the close of the session of Congress pursuant to Sec. 23 of the Rules of
the Commission (Rollo, pp. 233-234) which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 23. Suspension of Consideration of Nomination or
Appointments to be Returned to the President. — Nominations or
appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are
not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be
returned to the President, and unless resubmitted, shall not again be
considered by the Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 31, 1989, the Court after noting the reply filed by the
petitioner and the rejoinder filed by respondents, resolved to give due
course to the petition and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 309). By way of manifestation and
motion dated March 9, 1989 (Rollo, p. 311), the Office of the Solicitor
General adopted its statement of position (in lieu of comment) and
rejoinder as its memorandum. Petitioners and intervenor Civil Liberties
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
Union submitted their memoranda on March 22, 1989 and March 30,
1989, respectively. A supplemental statement of position (in lieu of
memorandum) dated March 31, 1989 was filed by respondent
Commission.cralawnad
The Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from the legislative
districts and those who as provided by law, shall be elected thru a
party-list system. The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of
the total number of representatives or fifty (50) seats. One-half or
twenty-five (25) of the seats allocated to party-list representatives is
reserved for sectoral representatives. The reservation is limited to three
consecutive terms after ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
Section 5 (1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
"(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, the appointment of
sectoral representatives is vested upon the President until otherwise
provided by law, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment
from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for
sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this
Constitution."cralaw virtua1aw library
The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others,
the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." cralawnad
In Sarmiento v. Mison, Et. Al. (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), we construed
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only
appointments to offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said
Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom
Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 
the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will
hereafter refer from time to time, are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are
initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
x x x
(T)he purposive intention and deliberate judgment of the framers of the
1987 Constitution (is) that, except as to those officers whose
appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments
by express mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII,
appointments of other officers are left to the President without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is
inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the
1987 Constitution were knowledgeable of what they were doing and of
the foreseeable effects thereof.
Besides, the power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power
should be strictly construed against them. Such limitations or
qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. But, it is
only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated
that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated
require the consent of the Commission on Appointments."cralaw Petitioner was appointed on April 6, 1988 pursuant to Art. XVIII,
virtua1aw library Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Our ruling in Mison was reiterated in the recent case of Mary
Concepcion Bautista v. Sen. Jovito Salonga, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 86439, "6 April 1988
promulgated on April 13, 1989) wherein the Court held:chanrobles.com
: virtual law library Madam:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"The Mison case was the first major case under the 1987 Constitution Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII,
and in construing Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, . . . this Section 7, of the Constitution, you are hereby appointed MEMBER OF
Court, drawing extensively from the proceedings of the 1986 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Constitutional Commission and the country’s experience under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, held that only those appointments By virtue hereof, you may qualify to said position furnishing this office
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII are to be with copies of your oath of office.
reviewed by the Commission on Appointments, namely, ‘the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and Very truly yours,
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him (Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be
made without the participation of the Commission on Hon. TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES"
Appointments."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Annex "M", Petition, Rollo, p. 108.)
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2,
Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by The invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution as authority
express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is for the appointment of petitioner places said appointment within the
undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of ambit of the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII; hence, subject to
Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the Mison
vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first doctrine. Petitioner’s appointment was furthermore made pursuant to
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are-subject to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 which
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
supra).
"SEC 16. . . .
Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the
Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Congress."cralaw virtua1aw library
Constitution.

Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019 

The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional
authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the
case at bar. The records show that petitioner’s appointment was made
on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to
April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section
16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
Implicit in the invocation of paragraph 2, Section 16, Art. VII as
authority for the appointment of petitioner is, the recognition by the
President as appointing authority that petitioner’s appointment requires
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Under paragraph 2,
Section 16, Art. VII, appointments made by the President pursuant
thereto "shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." If indeed
appointments of sectoral representatives need no confirmation, the
President need not make any reference to the constitutional provisions
above-quoted in appointing the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
President in a letter dated April 11, 1989 had expressly submitted
petitioner’s appointment for confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Considering that Congress had adjourned without
respondent Commission on Appointments having acted on petitioner’s
appointment, said appointment/nomination had become moot and
academic pursuant to Section 23 of the Rules of respondent
Commission and "unless resubmitted shall not again be considered by
the Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library
The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains
directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which
is quoted in the second "Whereas" clause of Executive Order No. 198.
Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require
the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the
first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the
point, petitioner Deles’ appointment was issued not by virtue of
Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16,
paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require
submission to the confirmation process.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petitioners further contend that nowhere in the Constitution nor in

Executive Order No. 198 is mention made of the need for petitioner’s
appointment to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. Executive Order No. 198 promulgated on June 18, 1987
before the convening of Congress, is denominated: "Providing for the
Manner of Nomination and Appointment of Sectoral Representatives to
the House of Representatives." We agree with the submission of
respondent Commission that the provisions of Executive Order No. 198
do not deal with the manner of appointment of sectoral
representatives. Executive Order No. 198 confines itself to specifying
the sectors to be represented, their number, and the nomination of
such sectoral representatives.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Const 1 -Patrici Armend 2019