LEGITIMES of the Municipal Assessor of Las Pias on 30 September 1984 in the name of Benigna

Lopez, et al.4 However, the improvements on the portion of the Property

01. G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003]
denominated as No. 831 San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Pias were separately declared
MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO in the name of Filomena J. Estimo under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145 dated 14
MANONGSONG, Petitioners, v.FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA October 1991.5cräläwvirtualibräry
JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O.
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992,
OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN
alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the
DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ,
Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,7 petitioners prayed for the partition
JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, respondents.
and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its
DECISION prevailing market value, and for damages.

CARPIO, J.: Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon
Guevarras death, her children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died
The Case without offspring, there were only five children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the
five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a
Before this Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of 26 June 1998 and
fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her
the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643.
fathers 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarras
in controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property. children and their offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as
they can remember. The area actually occupied by each respondent family differs,
Antecedent Facts
ranging in size from approximately 25 to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only
Spouses Agatona Guevarra (Guevarra) and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, namely: descendants not occupying any portion of the Property.
(1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and Celestino Ortiz, and
Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters); (3)
Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo (Ortiz family), as well as Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto
Victor Lopez, married to respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the
dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio (Dela Cruz family),
mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and
entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of
Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to respondent Benjamin
Facts and Compromise Agreement8 dated 12 September 1992 (Agreement),
dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all
petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would
surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas;
receive an equal share in the Property. The signatories to the Agreement asked the
and (6) Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
trial court to issue an order of partition to this effect and prayed further that those
(Manongsong).
who have exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have less
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Pias, and those who have none shall get the correct and proper
Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square meters (Property). The portion.9cräläwvirtualibräry
records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez who each occupy
Property is particularly described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-003903 as bounded in
50 square meter portions of the Property and Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the
the north by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and west
Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners claim.
by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was registered with the Office

1
The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro (Navarro), supposedly the
mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarras daughter Enriqueta Lopez
Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 91111 for the year
1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911 described a residential
parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo,
Las Pias, Rizal with the following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra
Street to the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In
addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona Lopez" and
"Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG
LUPA12 (Kasulatan) dated 11 October 1957, the relevant portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
LAS PIAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa na
matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Pias, Rizal, lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong
napagkikilala sa pamamagitan ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL ST., WEST: SAN JOSE
ST.,
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN LIMANGPUNG PISO
(P250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni
ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las
Pias, Rizal, at sa karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng
nasabing halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI, ISINALIN
AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang mga tagapagmana at kahalili,
ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang
walang anomang pasubali. Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng
palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at pagtatangkilik ng nasabing
lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1 June 1994 that
the KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA, between Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and
Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October
1957 and entered in his Notarial Register xxx. 13 The certification further stated that
Atty. Andrada was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the
Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive
prescription against petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches.
The Jumaquio sisters argued that the present action should have been filed years
earlier, either by Vicente Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter
reached legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992 when
Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor
of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence
attacking its validity. The trial court declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted. According to
defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through conveyance by means of a Deed
of Sale executed by their common ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother
Enriqueta, which deed was presented in evidence as Exhs. 4 to 4-A. Plaintiff Milagros
Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in the observance
of the Court, is however duly authenticated by means of a certificate issued by the
RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly notarized public document (Exh. 5). No
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the
documents legality or its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the
property conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been
introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of Justina Navarros
spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at
the time the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her
compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the
estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to her legitime. The
Deed of Sale [Exhs 4 & 4-1(sic)] did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the
heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six
(6) legitimate children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as
described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale should be
declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The compulsory heirs
2
cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases expressly specified by law
like for instance disinheritance for cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision was directed against
the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs
and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana Jumaquio and Felomena J.
Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to above be
immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-Manongsong her lawful share
of 1/5 of the area in square meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the
decision;
2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as compensatory damages for
having deprived the latter the use and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs litigation expenses and attorneys fee in the sum
of P10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis supplied)
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the Jumaquio sisters
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellees brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the
first time a supposed photocopy of the death certificate 16 of Guevarra, which stated
that Guevarras mother was a certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an
affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only
by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years
with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these
documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit
presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these
documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their admission
that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court that
Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject
property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic). Plaintiffs-appellees in their
Reply-Memorandum averred:
As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly admit as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by JUSTINA
NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA GUEVARRA who on the
other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx xxx.
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the parties. Since
this is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows that there should have been
proper document to extinguish this status of co-ownership between the common
owners either by (1) Court action or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx.
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The trial court held:
xxx xxx xxx
With the parties admissions and their conformity to a factual common line of
relationship of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited ascendant Justina
Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein mentioned, however, it must be
noted that the parties failed to amplify who was the husband and the number of
compulsory heirs of Justina Navarro. xxx xxx xxx
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact that Justina
Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original owner of the subject
property.
The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming that the
Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The appellate court reasoned
as follows:
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all
property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coveture
3
is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject
property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her marriage. xxx
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in nature is not
supported by any evidence.
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for
taxation purposes under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the
land is the paraphernal property of Justina Navarro.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees complaint
in so far as defendants-appellants are concerned.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998.19cräläwvirtualibräry
On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate courts decision and
resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for review due to
certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due course to the petition in its
Resolution of 31 January 2000.20
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED
SALE BY ONE JUSTINA NAVARRO;
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS ON THE LAND SHOULD
PREVAIL;
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;
6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE SHARE OF
PETITIONERS.21cräläwvirtualibräry
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were able to prove,
by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong is a co-owner of the
Property and therefore entitled to demand for its partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general, only
questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45. However, where the
factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals conflict, this Court has the
authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the findings of fact of the lower
courts.22 This is precisely the situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general rules of
evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v.
Court of Appeals :23cräläwvirtualibräry
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof,
and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the
course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor,
the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima
facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of preponderance of
evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that
which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of the
Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that Manongsong is a co-
owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance, more specifically, as the heir of her
father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners likewise allege that the Property originally
belonged to Guevarra, and that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest
4
in the Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues, petitioners
had the burden of proof to establish their case by preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also
presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted
petitioners claim of co-ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public
document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail
the authenticity and due execution of a notarized document, the evidence must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 24 Otherwise the authenticity
and due execution of the document should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that
(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the
documents legality or its validity.26cräläwvirtualibräry
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document
and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old,
(2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any
circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the Property
was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio. We do not
agree. The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on
evidence, but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for
the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.28cräläwvirtualibräry
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property
during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160
of the Civil Code to the present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911
showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarros
name.29 This tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied in
the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As
opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for
valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but
merely a substitution of values,30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the
equivalent monetary consideration.
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1)
consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain
in money or its equivalent.31 The presence of these elements is apparent on the face
of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for P250.00.32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents presented by
petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals refusal to give any probative value to the
alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.
Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their appellees brief. Petitioners
could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal
without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer
in evidence these documents before the trial court as required by Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.33 To admit these documents now is contrary to due
process, as it deprives respondents of the opportunity to examine and controvert
them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not controvert
Navarros ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr.s affidavit stated merely
that, although he knew Navarro by name, he was not personally acquainted with
her.34 Guevarras alleged birth certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was
indeed the mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra owned
the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra.
However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals that Navarro was the
mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate court that this constitutes an
impermissible change of theory. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court
below, he cannot change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair
5
to the other party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.35cräläwvirtualibräry
If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further undermine
petitioners case. Absent any hereditary relationship between Guevarra and Navarro,
the Property would not have passed from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the
latters children, including petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis
for petitioners claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the
other hand, this would not undermine respondents position since they anchor their
claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on inheritance from Guevarra.
Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which petitioners failed
to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court holds that petitioners were not
able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarras
estate. There is therefore no legal basis for petitioners complaint for partition of the
Property.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena Jumaquio Estimo
and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
02. G.R. No. 126376 November 20, 2003
SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION JOAQUIN, SPOUSES
JUANITO EDRA and NORA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES RUFINO VALDOZ and EMMA
JOAQUIN, and NATIVIDAD JOAQUIN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN and FELICIANA LANDRITO,
SPOUSES FIDEL JOAQUIN and CONCHITA BERNARDO, SPOUSES TOMAS JOAQUIN
and SOLEDAD ALCORAN, SPOUSES ARTEMIO JOAQUIN and SOCORRO ANGELES,
SPOUSES ALEXANDER MENDOZA and CLARITA JOAQUIN, SPOUSES TELESFORO
CARREON and FELICITAS JOAQUIN, SPOUSES DANILO VALDOZ and FE JOAQUIN, and
SPOUSES GAVINO JOAQUIN and LEA ASIS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 to annul the Decision2 dated 26 June 1996
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41996. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision3 dated 18 February 1993 rendered by Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati ("trial court") in Civil Case No. 89-5174. The trial court dismissed the case
after it found that the parties executed the Deeds of Sale for valid consideration and
that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action against the defendants.
The Facts
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts of the case as follows:
Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property
executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito in favor of
their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates of title issued in their
names, to wit:
1. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-7 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 11 July 1978, in favor of defendant Felicitas Joaquin, for a consideration
of ₱6,000.00 (Exh. "C"), pursuant to which TCT No. [36113/T-172] was issued in her
name (Exh. "C-1");
2. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 7 June 1979, in favor of defendant Clarita Joaquin, for a consideration
of ₱1[2],000.00 (Exh. "D"), pursuant to which TCT No. S-109772 was issued in her
name (Exh. "D-1");
3 Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Fidel Joaquin and Conchita
Bernardo, for a consideration of ₱54,[3]00.00 (Exh. "E"), pursuant to which TCT No.
155329 was issued to them (Exh. "E-1");
4. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-I-2 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256394
executed on 12 May 1988, in favor of defendant spouses Artemio Joaquin and
Socorro Angeles, for a consideration of ₱[54,3]00.00 (Exh. "F"), pursuant to which
TCT No. 155330 was issued to them (Exh. "F-1"); and
6
5. Absolute Sale of Real Property covering Lot 168-C-4 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
256395 executed on 9 September 1988, in favor of Tomas Joaquin, for a
consideration of ₱20,000.00 (Exh. "G"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157203 was issued
in her name (Exh. "G-1").
6. Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot 168-C-1 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-256395
executed on 7 October 1988, in favor of Gavino Joaquin, for a consideration of
₱25,000.00 (Exh. "K"), pursuant to which TCT No. 157779 was issued in his name (Exh.
"K-1").]
In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid deeds of sale and certificates of
title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver:
- XX-
The deeds of sale, Annexes "C," "D," "E," "F," and "G," [and "K"] are simulated as they
are, are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO because –
a) Firstly, there was no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale xxx over the
properties in litis;
b) Secondly, assuming that there was consideration in the sums reflected in the
questioned deeds, the properties are more than three-fold times more valuable than
the measly sums appearing therein;
c) Thirdly, the deeds of sale do not reflect and express the true intent of the parties
(vendors and vendees); and
d) Fourthly, the purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate
conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs
herein) of their legitime.
- XXI -
Necessarily, and as an inevitable consequence, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
36113/T-172, S-109772, 155329, 155330, 157203 [and 157779] issued by the
Registrar of Deeds over the properties in litis xxx are NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Defendants, on the other hand aver (1) that plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
against them as well as the requisite standing and interest to assail their titles over
the properties in litis; (2) that the sales were with sufficient considerations and made
by defendants parents voluntarily, in good faith, and with full knowledge of the
consequences of their deeds of sale; and (3) that the certificates of title were issued
with sufficient factual and legal basis.4 (Emphasis in the original)
The Ruling of the Trial Court
Before the trial, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant
spouses Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis.5 Instead of filing an Answer with their co-
defendants, Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis filed a Motion to Dismiss. 6In granting the
dismissal to Gavino Joaquin and Lea Asis, the trial court noted that "compulsory heirs
have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences
only from the moment of death of the decedent pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines."7
After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the
complaint. The trial court stated:
In the first place, the testimony of the defendants, particularly that of the xxx father
will show that the Deeds of Sale were all executed for valuable consideration. This
assertion must prevail over the negative allegation of plaintiffs.
And then there is the argument that plaintiffs do not have a valid cause of action
against defendants since there can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of
their parents. The court finds this contention tenable. In determining the legitime,
the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered (Art.
908 of the New Civil Code). Hence, the legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as
of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs therefore cannot claim an
impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
All the foregoing considered, this case is DISMISSED.
In order to preserve whatever is left of the ties that should bind families together,
the counterclaim is likewise DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.1âwphi1 The appellate
court ruled:
7
To the mind of the Court, appellants are skirting the real and decisive issue in this
case, which is, whether xxx they have a cause of action against appellees.
Upon this point, there is no question that plaintiffs-appellants, like their defendant
brothers and sisters, are compulsory heirs of defendant spouses, Leonardo Joaquin
and Feliciana Landrito, who are their parents. However, their right to the properties
of their defendant parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only
upon the latter’s death. While still alive, defendant parents are free to dispose of
their properties, provided that such dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Plaintiffs-appellants are definitely not parties to the deeds of sale in question. Neither
do they claim to be creditors of their defendant parents. Consequently, they cannot
be considered as real parties in interest to assail the validity of said deeds either for
gross inadequacy or lack of consideration or for failure to express the true intent of
the parties. In point is the ruling of the Supreme Court in Velarde, et al. vs. Paez, et
al., 101 SCRA 376, thus:
The plaintiffs are not parties to the alleged deed of sale and are not principally or
subsidiarily bound thereby; hence, they have no legal capacity to challenge their
validity.
Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their action on the supposed impairment of their legitime
by the dispositions made by their defendant parents in favor of their defendant
brothers and sisters. But, as correctly held by the court a quo, "the legitime of a
compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs
therefore cannot claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live."
With this posture taken by the Court, consideration of the errors assigned by
plaintiffs-appellants is inconsequential.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Petitioners assign the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE IN
QUESTION HAD NO VALID CONSIDERATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING THAT
THERE WAS A CONSIDERATION, THE SAME IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEEDS OF SALE DO
NOT EXPRESS THE TRUE INTENT OF THE PARTIES.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CONVEYANCE WAS
PART AND PARCEL OF A CONSPIRACY AIMED AT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING THE REST OF
THE CHILDREN OF THE SPOUSES LEONARDO JOAQUIN AND FELICIANA LANDRITO OF
THEIR INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE A
GOOD, SUFFICIENT AND VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.10
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition without merit.
We will discuss petitioners’ legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of
Sale before discussing the issues on the purported lack of consideration and gross
inadequacy of the prices of the Deeds of Sale.
Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of
Sale
Petitioners’ Complaint betrays their motive for filing this case. In their Complaint,
petitioners asserted that the "purported sale of the properties in litis was the result
of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory
heirs (plaintiffs herein) of their legitime." Petitioners’ strategy was to have the Deeds
of Sale declared void so that ownership of the lots would eventually revert to their
respondent parents. If their parents die still owning the lots, petitioners and their
respondent siblings will then co-own their parents’ estate by hereditary succession. 11
It is evident from the records that petitioners are interested in the properties subject
of the Deeds of Sale, but they have failed to show any legal right to the properties.
The trial and appellate courts should have dismissed the action for this reason alone.
An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.12
[T]he question as to "real party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefitted or injured by the judgment, or the ‘party entitled to the avails of the suit.’"
xxx
8
In actions for the annulment of contracts, such as this action, the real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or subsidiarily
or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can
show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract even
though they did not intervene in it (Ibañez v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 22 Phil. 572
[1912]) xxx.
These are parties with "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest…. The
phrase ‘present substantial interest’ more concretely is meant such interest of a party
in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him, under the substantive law, to
recover if the evidence is sufficient, or that he has the legal title to demand and the
defendant will be protected in a payment to or recovery by him."13
Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds of
Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’ properties is
merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still living, the
parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their overzealousness
to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that theoretically, the sale of the
lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their parents’ estate. While the sale
of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent value replaced the lots taken from
the estate.
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for lack of consideration
Petitioners assert that their respondent siblings did not actually pay the prices stated
in the Deeds of Sale to their respondent father. Thus, petitioners ask the court to
declare the Deeds of Sale void.
A contract of sale is not a real contract, but a consensual contract. As a consensual
contract, a contract of sale becomes a binding and valid contract upon the meeting
of the minds as to price. If there is a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the
price, the contract of sale is valid, despite the manner of payment, or even the breach
of that manner of payment. If the real price is not stated in the contract, then the
contract of sale is valid but subject to reformation. If there is no meeting of the minds
of the parties as to the price, because the price stipulated in the contract is simulated,
then the contract is void.14 Article 1471 of the Civil Code states that if the price in a
contract of sale is simulated, the sale is void.
It is not the act of payment of price that determines the validity of a contract of sale.
Payment of the price has nothing to do with the perfection of the contract. Payment
of the price goes into the performance of the contract. Failure to pay the
consideration is different from lack of consideration. The former results in a right to
demand the fulfillment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing valid
contract while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract. 15
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely
simulated. To prove simulation, petitioners presented Emma Joaquin Valdoz’s
testimony stating that their father, respondent Leonardo Joaquin, told her that he
would transfer a lot to her through a deed of sale without need for her payment of
the purchase price.16The trial court did not find the allegation of absolute simulation
of price credible. Petitioners’ failure to prove absolute simulation of price is
magnified by their lack of knowledge of their respondent siblings’ financial capacity
to buy the questioned lots.17 On the other hand, the Deeds of Sale which petitioners
presented as evidence plainly showed the cost of each lot sold. Not only did
respondents’ minds meet as to the purchase price, but the real price was also stated
in the Deeds of Sale. As of the filing of the complaint, respondent siblings have also
fully paid the price to their respondent father.18
Whether the Deeds of Sale are void for gross inadequacy of price
Petitioners ask that assuming that there is consideration, the same is grossly
inadequate as to invalidate the Deeds of Sale.
Articles 1355 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1470 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1470. Gross inadequacy of price does not affect a contract of sale, except as may
indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners failed to prove any of the instances mentioned in Articles 1355 and 1470
of the Civil Code which would invalidate, or even affect, the Deeds of Sale. Indeed,
there is no requirement that the price be equal to the exact value of the subject
matter of sale. All the respondents believed that they received the commutative
value of what they gave. As we stated in Vales v. Villa:19
9
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,
protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul
the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons
who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been
defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome
illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable
judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all they have in the world; but not for
that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation
of the law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before
the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis in the
original)
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive on the parties
and carry greater weight when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial
court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there has been a
showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 20 In the instant case,
the trial court found that the lots were sold for a valid consideration, and that the
defendant children actually paid the purchase price stipulated in their respective
Deeds of Sale. Actual payment of the purchase price by the buyer to the seller is a
factual finding that is now conclusive upon us.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
03. G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V.
Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband
Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The
estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June
16, 1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and
prescribing their respective share of the estate —
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate
in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the
deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with
her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The
trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First — is
a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate
in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
10
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit
by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated,
an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is
an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision
which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the
intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir
of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so
provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply
to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to
Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
(not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis
supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which
is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the
deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate
of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by
the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz —
11
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by
law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the
same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is
not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
04. G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now
the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-
93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter
referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in
their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of
sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner)
received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite
service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
12
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number; 5and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on
June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever
legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits
arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount
of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS
OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE
INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF
VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN
ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in
a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
13
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record
of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have
squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article
40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can
enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed
by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of
these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife
of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147
of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license.
Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
14
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children.
In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants.
In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all
cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by
either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death
benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death
benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the
other half, to the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first
wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil
Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in
dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife
to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule
which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is
the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the
Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is
an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she
could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void.
The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than
to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
15
Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as
to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
05. G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972 CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her
substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias
EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an
order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in
its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that
the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the
pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The
dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the
deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and
to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21
September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together
as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319
Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree
of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S.
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio
alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims
involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior
and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one
Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly
notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal
separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was
filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the
body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for
substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause
of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved
to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of
dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the
present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and answer
thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed
counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He
acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the
order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his
counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute — for the
lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to
be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a
declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
16
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185,
separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance
his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal
(Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can
stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that
action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article
for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition. 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply
if the action involves property rights? . (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is (2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the provisions of article 176;
the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes
otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court
the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona.
may appoint a guardian;
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent
marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the
spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse
spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is
made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933,
332.")4 . From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an
the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse
of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to
as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse
the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the
made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their
deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action
nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable
and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost
or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before
extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to
final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72;
warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134
Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817;

17
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased
to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days,
or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that
survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of
Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed
fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of
decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab
initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot
and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in
continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned
union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action
for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable
under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had
been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive
years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment
became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
06. [G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005] IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of
her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.
On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption, thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the
absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law
as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and
educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the
18
best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court
further holds that the petitioner's care and custody of the child since her birth up to
the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article
35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED."4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted
by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name
as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted
child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3)
the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the
benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia"
(her mother's surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued
use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia
families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and
Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law '
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined
as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience
of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both
of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper nameand (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and
is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the
parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which
regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e.,
whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or
a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
19
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as 'Mrs.'
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word 'Junior' can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name '
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1),
quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's surname shall be
added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
x x x"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom
of adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of
the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father, thus
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife
of the surname and that of the child because the father's surname indicates the
family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the
father's surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the
surname of the mother.
20
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but
that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the
father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa's point is covered by the present Article
364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person
himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile's correct surname is Ponce since the mother's
surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David's
family name is Gutierrez and his mother's surname is David but they all call him
Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect
that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may
use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane
stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames
since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate
children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice
Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they
even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use
of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12(Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the
surname of the adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name.
What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee
to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child '
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 15 It is a juridical
act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to
consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This
was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and
privileges for the adopted.20
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child
of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 21 of the Family
Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination
of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother,
as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom
that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her
mother's surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It
is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
21
biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights
from her natural mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the
house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal
happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle
name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will
also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption '
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be
liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 25 The interests
and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 27
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law."28
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in
the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname "GARCIA"
as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the
decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
07. G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990 JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR
BITANCOR, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO
and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing
relevant laws and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the
petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and
for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido
Nacario along the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines
Sur, figured in an accident with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and
owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident
Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal case
arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement
of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer — Philippine First
Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido Nacario's widow,
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount
she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims,
and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and
the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise
executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of
interest in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
22
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and
13
accident on November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. The petitioners moved for
Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners with the a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was
then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private denied. 15 Hence, this petition.
respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that
through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-
the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount
judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the
of P20,505.00 despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the
funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the
petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
purchase price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The
petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and settled The petition is meritorious.
their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses
prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.
amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the Article 1231 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages, P5,000.00
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
(1) By payment or performance;
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the
defendants (herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred (2) By the loss of the thing due;
heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his
parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents), extinguished any claim against (3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
the defendants (petitioners). 10 (4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the (5) By compensation;
trial court. The appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena
Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was (6) By novation.
instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs,
(Emphasis ours.)
representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly
waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from
the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. the accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether
Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the or not Alicia, the spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is
testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who entitled to it.
bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of
proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11 Anent the Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom
funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the payment to extinguish an obligation should be made.
appellants (the private respondents). This was never contradicted by the appellees Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has
(petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12

Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the
private respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for
23
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child,
successors in interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the
payment. The Civil Code states: petitioners.

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their
legitimate children and decendants;
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

3. The widow or widower;

4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1
and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.

(Emphasis ours.)

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies
without a legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs
with all classes of heirs. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to
Alicia and that they begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-
interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore
acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido and
as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged
from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of
a surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief
and compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private
respondents loaned to Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and
shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are
but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. 16 These money claims are
not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda.
24