[A.C. No. 5305. March 17, 2003.
] respondent himself; 6
MARCIANO P. BRION, JR., Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent, Atty.
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes Jr. 1 The
decretal portion of our resolution in Atienza reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED. 2
Respondent’s dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered after he was found guilty of Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual disqualification
imposed upon him from assuming any post in government service, including any posts in
government-owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post
at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta
(Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal consultancy agreement, this was
subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Petitioner contends that while both consultancy agreements contained a proviso to the effect
that nothing therein should be construed as establishing an employer-employee relationship
between LWUA and respondent, the inclusion of this proviso was only a ploy to circumvent
our order barring respondent from appointment to a government agency. Petitioner points out
in reality, respondent enjoys the same rights and privileges as a regular employee, to wit: 3
1. Issuance of LWUA properties such as a cellular phone with accessories, as evidenced by
the covering Property Issue Slips with respondent signing as "Accountable Employee" ; 4
2. Official travel to various places in the country as shown by Reports of Authorized Travel
kept by LWUA’s General Services Division 5 and Report of Travel accomplished by
3. Designation as supervising officer over other LWUA employees as brought to light by
written instructions personally signed by respondent; 7
4. Attendance in water district conventions and meetings held in various provinces; 8
5. Membership in several sensitive LWUA committees such as the Prequalification, Bids, and
Awards Committee (PBAC), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Committee, among others, with
receipt of corresponding honoraria as borne out by various Disbursement Vouchers; 9
6. Sitting at meetings of the LWUA Board of Trustees as evidenced by the minutes of such
meetings; 10 and
7. Receipt of Productivity Incentive Bonus in 1999.
Petitioner submits that all of the foregoing constitute deceitful conduct, gross misconduct, and
willful disobedience to a decree of this Court, and show that respondent is unfit to be a
member of the Bar.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In his comment, 11 respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as
well as the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that
under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993,
services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered government
services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Further, says respondent, according to the same Memorandum Circular issued by the
Commission, consultancy contracts do not have to be submitted to the Commission for
approval. With respect to his designation as the 6th Member of the Board of Directors of the
Urdaneta Water District, respondent reasons out that the same is not a "reappointment",
which is prohibited by our ruling in Atienza, as said designation is not an organic appointment
to a LWUA plantilla position. Hence, according to respondent, the CSC need not pass
approval upon his temporary designation.
Respondent also argues that all the members of the Urdaneta Water District Board,
especially the 6th Member, who comes from the LWUA, assumed such functions merely by
virtue of a designation and only in addition to their regular duties. In any event, says
respondent, his designation as 6th Member was revoked in April 2000 and the Special
Consultancy Contract was pre-terminated on April 30, 2000. It has never been renewed since
then. With respect to his use of LWUA properties, respondent admits receiving the cellular
phone unit but insists that he merely borrowed it from one Solomon Badoy, a former LWUA
Board of Trustees Member.
In our Resolution of February 19, 2001, we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found that respondent willfully violated a lawful order of this Court and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year and
fined ten thousand (P10,000) pesos.
There is no question that the LWUA is a government-owned and controlled corporation,
created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198. 12 As such, our ruling in the Atienza case,
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, which categorically prohibits respondent’s appointment to any position
in any government-owned and controlled corporation, clearly encompasses and extends to
LWUA positions.
In the instant case the respondent does not deny the petitioner’s allegations. 13 Instead, he
offers the existence of Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993 (MC No. 27, s. 1993) to
exculpate himself from the charge against him. However, it does not escape our attention that
the very Memorandum Circular that respondent cites before this Court provides that the
duties enumerated in the consultancy contract are mainly advisory in nature. 14
Without belaboring the definition of "advisory," 15 it appears obvious to us that the tasks and
duties that respondent performed pursuant to the consultancy contract cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, be deemed merely advisory in nature.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he issue
written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA
committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondent’s continuous receipt of
honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT
Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on
record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-95 16 refers to payments of honoraria to officials/employees in consideration
of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondent’s acceptance of his 1998 Productivity Incentive Bonus
(PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of the LWUA, 17 which
governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only to "officials" and
"employees" (permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions
of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by
petitioner in his reply, 18 there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual
basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose
appointment is governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and
other Personnel Actions). By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a
contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has
transgressed both letter and spirit of this Court’s decree in Atienza.
The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. 19 That duty in
its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s
disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy
contract. By performing duties and functions of a contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a
consultancy, and receiving compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open
defiance of the Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the
court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench
and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such defiance not only
erodes respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer.
Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of the standards of
moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. His propensity to try to "get away" with
an indiscretion becomes apparent and inexcusable when he entered into a legal
"consultancy" contract with the LWUA. Perhaps realizing its own mistake, LWUA terminated
said contract with respondent, but then proceeded to give him a "special consultancy." This
travesty could not be long hidden from public awareness, hence the instant complaint for
disbarment filed by petitioner. Given the factual circumstances found by Commission on Bar
Discipline, we have no hesitance in accepting the recommendation of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, that respondent be fined and suspended from
the practice of law. The Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 1.01, provides that a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For violating the
Code as well as transgressing his oath as an officer of the court, his suspension for one (1)
year and a fine of ten thousand (P10,000) pesos are in order.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having willfully
violated a lawful order of this Court in our decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No.
MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered to pay a FINE of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to
the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the personal
records of respondent as well as circulated to all courts in the Philippines. This decision is
immediately executory.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's
oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19,
1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his
complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the
Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint.
On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that
respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients,
namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha
Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay
all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty
percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants
and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the
Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation
in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter
into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the
development into a residential subdivision of the land
involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-
1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest
thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at
a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff
of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds
of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
falsified documents purporting to be true copies of
"Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated
August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant
who was his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints
without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the
Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his
pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does
not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November
18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's
answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to
"11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming
that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court,
the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining
that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for
postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of
time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p.
365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a
resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his
report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that
Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the
pendency of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to
the execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document
where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox
copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and
Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the
IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this
case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous
pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with
the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative
complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since
Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All
cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be
transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for
investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases
where the investigation has been substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule
139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of
the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the
Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of
the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall
base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the
investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of
Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General
had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending
cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor
General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself
admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on
November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to
Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General
already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to
the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings
conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present
case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the
referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce
additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due
process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented
no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-
examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which
was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent
one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of
239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in
consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed,
respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil
Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was
acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p.
12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject
properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics
and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v.
Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which
states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the
litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in
litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for
disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer
shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines]
as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of
this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27,
Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent,
having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to
society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property
and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as
well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional
Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship.
Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the
new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for
which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later
rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment
of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the
land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise
Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby,
by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A.
GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights
and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the
improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28;
Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at
the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No.
T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was
executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for
the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was
upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent
claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the
fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public
auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this,
respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no
concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform
the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of
ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land
which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development
agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a
public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project
they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action
against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista—were made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the
letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado
and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other
parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted
that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent
wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter
and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp.
327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely
agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum
as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the
addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original
addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes
willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with
the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados
[Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the
agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]
Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]
CONFORME
Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]
Alfaro T.
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer
may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule
16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance
the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement
between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to
respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to
pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp.
v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially
where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion
Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after
considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The
evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was
with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados
on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the
case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One
of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is
where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts
by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of
harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil
Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while
the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed
by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass
complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution,
the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by
respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending
resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.

Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the
above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated
the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to
assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to
live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm.
Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts
and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious

misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution
be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4921 March 6, 2003
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a Petition for Disbarment filed by Carmelita I. Zaguirre against Atty.
Alfredo Castillo on the ground of Gross Immoral Conduct.
The facts as borne by the records are as follows:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).1 Respondent courted complainant and promised to
marry her while representing himself to be single.2 Soon they had an intimate relationship that
started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997.3 During their affair, respondent was
preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar.4 It was only around the first week of May 1997 that
complainant first learned that respondent was already married when his wife went to her
office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. 5 On September 10, 1997,
respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his.6 On December 9,
1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa.7 By this time however, respondent
had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. 8
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between them
was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single since it was
known in the NBI that he was already married and with children; 9 complainant is almost 10
years older than him and knew beforehand that he is already married; 10 the child borne by
complainant it not his, because the complainant was seeing other men at the time they were
having an affair.11 He admits that he signed the affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but
explains that he only did so to save complainant from embarrassment. Also, he did not know
at the time that complainant was seeing other men.12
After due haring, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of
gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite
suspension from the practice of law.
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
"Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
xxx xxx xxx
"CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."
xxx xxx xxx
"Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
Immoral conduct has been defined as:
"x x x that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference
to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency."13
In his affidavit dated September 10, 1997, duly acknowledged before a notary public, he
declared explicitly:
"1. That I had a relationship with one Carmelita Zaguirre, my officemate;
"2. That as a result of that relationship, she is presently pregnant with my child;
"3. That I hereby voluntarily recognize the child now under (sic) her womb to be my
own;
"4. That I am willing to support the said child henceforth, including his/her personal
and medical needs, education, housing, food, clothing and other necessities for
living, which I will give through his/her mother, Carmelita Zaguirre, until he/she
becomes of legal age and capable to live on his/her own;
"5. That I undertake to sign the birth certificate as an additional proof that he/she is
my child; however, my failure to sign does not negate the recognition and
acknowledgement already done herein;
 "6. That I am executing this affidavit without compulsion on my part and being a
lawyer, I have full knowledge of the consequence of such acknowledgment and
recognition."14
More incriminating is his handwritten letter dated March 12, 1998 which states in part:
"Ayoko ng umabot tayo sa kung saan-saan pa. All your officemates, e.g., Ate Ging,
Glo, Guy and others (say) that I am the look like(sic) of your daughter.
"Here's my bargain. I will help you in supporting your daughter, but I cannot promise
fix amount for monthly support of your daughter. However it shall not be less than
P500 but not more than P1,000."15
In the recent case of Luguid vs. Judge Camano, Jr., the Court in castigating a judge stated
that:
". . . even as an ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of
conduct demanded of members of the profession. Certainly, fathering children by a
woman other than his lawful wife fails to meet these standards."16
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer.17
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on
his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount
to self-stultification.18
This Court has repeatedly held:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards."19
While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with complainant he seeks
understanding from the Court, pointing out that "men by nature are polygamous," 20 and that
what happened between them was "nothing but mutual lust and desire."21 The Court is not
convinced. In fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude of the respondent.
Respondent claims that he did not use any deception to win her affection. Granting arguendo
that complainant entered into a relationship with him knowing full well his marital status, still it
does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is
respondent's fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or
not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held
in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto
because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge
the law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts."22
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take the
bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant for
admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral
character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the
bar.23 This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in the
profession;24 it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law 25 and therefore admission to
the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any
question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because
his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.
The Court held:
"The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only
during good behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained
and declared by judgment of the court after giving him the opportunity to be heard."26
and in Dumadag vs. Lumaya:
"The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required
for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law."27
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now
refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to
support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly.

As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser punishment
could be given.28Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997, he has severed
his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in Mindoro. As of now, the
Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of respondent's effort to mend his ways or
that he recognizes the impact of his offense on the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the
Court deems it more appropriate under the circumstances that indefinite suspension should
be meted out than disbarment. The suspension shall last until such time that respondent is
able to show, to the full satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm
conviction of maintaining moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the
profession.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.29

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo's personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D.
Cordova, with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-complaint
was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required complainant to submit a verified
complaint within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of her long and detailed
complaint against her husband charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a member
of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent was declared in default
for failure to file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same
Order required complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte, on 16
December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of complainant for the resetting of the 16
December 1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989.
The hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more times-first, for 25
February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as
complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed the Commission that she
and her husband had already "reconciled". In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission
required the parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for confirmation and
explanation of the telegraphic message and required them to file a formal motion to dismiss
the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and nothing was
heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before the Commission, the IBP
Board of Governors submitted to this Court its report reprimanding respondent for his acts,
admonishing him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more
severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage,
two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that
year, respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado
lived together in Bislig as husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova
gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in the public market at
Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had an apparent
reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would separate from Fely Holgado and brought
his legitimate family to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his
legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no
longer living with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal home; that respondent
Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the
complinant, compelling complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas
corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita
Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently from complainant, stating
that complainant and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also
agree that the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the
same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member
of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the
bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not
exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary,
that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good
standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras,1 this Court, following the rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession ... of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful
continuance in the practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for disbarment. " 2 It is important to note
that the lack of moral character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good moral
character relating to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel,
the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of a single, 21-year old
teacher who subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son. Because respondent's
conduct in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress to
his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the marriage he had
himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.

In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to continue as a member of the bar
by reason of his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged
in sexual relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son; and to have
maintained for a number of years an adulterous relationship with another woman.

In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of the general public, to the
humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed
or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another
woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live with
them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental institution of marriage
and its elementary obligations before his own daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law
indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his
suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this
Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he
has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
G.R. No. L-28546 July 30, 1975
VENANCIO CASTANEDA and NICETAS HENSON, petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO, LOURDES YU AGO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Quijano and Arroyo for petitioners.
Jose M. Luison for respondents
CASTRO, J.:
The parties in this case, except Lourdes Yu Ago, have been commuting to this Court for more
than a decade.
In 1955 the petitioners Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against
Pastor Ago in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries (civil case
27251). In 1957 judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the
machineries or pay definite sums of money. Ago appealed, and on June 30, 1961 this Court,
in Ago vs. Castañeda, L-14066, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on
August 25, 1961 a writ of execution for the sum of P172,923.87. Ago moved for a stay of
execution but his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago's house and lots located in
Quezon City. The sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on October 25, 1961. Ago
moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. On January
31,1966 this Court, in Ago vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-19718, affirmed the dismissal. Ago
thrice attempted to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution "to save his family house and lot;" his motions were denied, and the
sheriff sold the house and lots on March 9, 1963 to the highest bidders, the petitioners
Castañeda and Henson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the
final deed of sale in favor of the vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
However, on May 2, 1964 Pastor Ago, now joined by his wife, Lourdes Yu Ago, as his co-
plaintiff, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City (civil case Q-7986) to
annul the sheriff's sale on the ground that the obligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment
was rendered against him in the replevin suit was his personal obligation, and that Lourdes
Yu Ago's one-half share in their conjugal residential house and lots which were levied upon
and sold by the sheriff could not legally be reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. They
alleged in their complaint that wife Lourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the
judgment was rendered and the writ of execution was issued only against husband Pastor,
and that wife Lourdes was not a party to her husband's venture in the logging business which
failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership.
The Court of First Instance of Quezon City issued an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction
restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon City, from
registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title
and issuing new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. A
situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to be done, the Quezon
City court countermanded. On November 1, 1965, however, the latter court lifted the
preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the Register of deeds of Quezon City
cancelled the respondents' certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners.
But enforcement of the writ of possession was again thwarted as the Quezon City court again
issued a temporary restraining order which it later lifted but then re-restored. On May 3, 1967
the court finally, and for the third time, lifted the restraining order.
While the battle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was being
fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this
Court under date of May 26, 1966, docketed as L-26116, praying for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the writ of possession. This Court found no merit
in the petition and dismissed it in a minute resolution on June 3, 1966; reconsideration was
denied on July 18, 1966. The respondents then filed on August 2, 1966 a similar petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 37830-R), praying for the same
preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents
then appealed to this Court (L-27140).1äwphï1.ñët We dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution on February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. 39438-R). The said
court gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it
rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of
possession on and ejectment from the one-half share in the properties
involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago dated June 15, 1967 is made
permanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-7986 and
ordering respondent Court to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. Q-7986
on the merits without unnecessary delay. No pronouncement as to costs.
Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed the present
petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
1. We do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co-equal
court can apply in the case at bar. The Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ
of possession, ultimately was not interfered with by its co-equal court, the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court's writ of possession; it is the Court of Appeals
that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
2. Invoking Comilang vs. Buendia, et al.,1 where the wife was a party in one case and the
husband was a party in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the
petitioners would have Lourdes Yu Ago similarly bound by the replevin judgment against her
husband for which their conjugal properties would be answerable. The case invoked is not at
par with the present case. In Comilang the actions were admittedly instituted for the
protection of the common interest of the spouses; in the present case, the Agos deny that
their conjugal partnership benefited from the husband's business venture.
3. Relying upon Omnas vs. Rivera, 67 Phil. 419, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person to half-interest in the property is
adversely determined, the said appellate court assuming that Lourdes Yu Ago was a
"stranger" or a "third-party" to her husband. The assumption is of course obviously wrong, for,
besides living with her husband Pastor, she does not claim ignorance of his business that
failed, of the relevant cases in which he got embroiled, and of the auction sale made by the
sheriff of their conjugal properties. Even then, the ruling in Omnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, but that
the writ of possession being a complement of the writ of execution, a judge with jurisdiction to
issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval between the
judicial sale and the issuance of the writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the
property sold have supervened. The ruling in Omnas is clearly inapplicable in the present
case, for, here, there has been no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest
therein from the time the writ of execution was issued up to the time writ of possession was
issued, and even up to the present.
4. We agree with the trial court (then presided by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego) that it is
much too late in the day for the respondents Agos to raise the question that part of the
property is unleviable because it belongs to Lourdes Yu Ago, considering that (1) a wife is
normally privy to her husband's activities; (2) the levy was made and the properties
advertised for auction sale in 1961; (3) she lives in the very properties in question; (4) her
husband had moved to stop the auction sale; (5) the properties were sold at auction in 1963;
(6) her husband had thrice attempted to obtain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution; (7) the sheriff executed the deed of final sale on April 17,
1964 when Pastor failed to redeem; (8) Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal
properties could be levied upon by his pleas "to save his family house and lot" in his efforts to
prevent execution; and (9) it was only on May 2, 1964 when he and his wife filed the
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale upon the issue that the wife's share in the
properties cannot be levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging
business and not a party to the replevin suit. The spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise
the issue in the various proceedings hereinbefore discussed but did not; laches now
effectively bars them from raising it.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.2
5. The decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
(a) It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one-half
share in the properties involved belonging to Lourdes Yu Ago. This half-share is not in esse,
but is merely an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, constituting neither legal nor equitable
estate, and will ripen into title when only upon liquidation and settlement there appears to be
assets of the community.3 The decision sets at naught the well-settled rule that injunction
does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.4
(b) The decision did not foresee the absurdity, or even the impossibility, of its enforcement.
The Ago spouses admittedly live together in the same house5 which is conjugal property. By
the Manila court's writ of possession Pastor could be ousted from the house, but the decision
under review would prevent the ejectment of Lourdes. Now, which part of the house would be
vacated by Pastor and which part would Lourdes continue to stay in? The absurdity does not
stop here; the decision would actually separate husband and wife, prevent them from living
together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during coverture and before the
dissolution of the conjugal union.
6. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff's
sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the
fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the
petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court
to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried
to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer
of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If
 he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.7
7. In view of the private respondents' propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to
seek justice, and in order to obviate further delay in the disposition of the case below which
might again come up to the appellate courts but only to fail in the end, we have motu
proprio examined the record of civil case Q-7986 (the mother case of the present case). We
find that
(a) the complaint was filed on May 2, 1964 (more than 11 years ago) but trial on the merits
has not even started;
(b) after the defendants Castañedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs
Agos filed a supplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties-defendants;
(c) after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an
amended supplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party-defendant (no
action has yet been taken on this motion);
(d) the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint; and
(e) the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April 20, 1974, grants an extension to
the suspension of time to file answer. (Expediente, p. 815)
We also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and
amended supplemental complaint are all untenable, for the reasons hereunder stated. The
Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of
the spouses Ago despite the fact that the judgment to be satisfied was personal only to
Pastor Ago, and the business venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit,
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The issue here, which is whether or
not the wife's inchoate share in the conjugal property is leviable, is the same issue that we
have already resolved, as barred by laches, in striking down the decision of the Court of
Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which was herein-before
quoted. This ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
Upon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on January 5, 1959 the Castañedas
and the sheriff, pursuant to an alias writ of seizure, seized and took possession of certain
machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P256,000
up to May 5, 1964. This second cause of action fails to state a valid cause of action for it fails
to allege that the order of seizure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff's sale of the conjugal properties was
irregular, illegal and unlawful because the sheriff did not require the Castañeda spouses to
pay or liquidate the sum of P141,750 (the amount for which they bought the properties at the
auction sale) despite the fact that there was annotated at the back of the certificates of title a
mortgage of P75,000 in favor of the Philippine National Bank; moreover, the sheriff sold the
properties for P141,750 despite the pendency of L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the
amount of P99,877.08 out of the judgment value of P172,923.37 in civil case 27251; and
because of said acts, the Agos suffered P174,877.08 in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no obligation to require payment of the
purchase price in the auction sale because "when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and
no third-party claim has been filed, he need not pay the amount of the bid if it does not
exceed the amount of his judgment." (Sec. 23, Rule 39, Rules of Court)
The annotated mortgage in favor of the PNB is the concern of the vendees Castañedas but
did not affect the sheriff's sale; the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the
Agoo.
Case L-19718 where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P99,877.08 out of the amount of the
judgment was dismissed by this Court on January 31, 1966.
This third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover
barred by prior judgment.
The fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered by the Agos on
account of the acts complained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of
action derives its life from the preceding causes of action, which, as shown, are baseless, the
said fourth cause of action must necessarily fail.
The Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the Castañedas aver that the action was unfounded and
as a consequence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not
less than P7,500; that because the Agos obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the
transfer of titles and possession of the properties to the Castañedas, they were unlawfully
deprived of the use of the properties from April 17, 1964, the value of such deprived use
being 20% annually of their actual value; and that the filing of the unfounded action
besmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
The Supplemental Complaint
Upon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their
defendants, taking advantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison. Let a copy of this decision be made a part of the personal file of
and with gross bad faith and evident intent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the Atty. Luison in the custody of the Clerk of Court.
registration of the sheriff's final deed of sale; that, to cause more damage, the defendants
sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in question; that the purchasers
acquired the properties in bad faith; that the defendants mortgaged the two other parcels to
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation while the defendants' lawyer and his wife also
mortgaged the parcels bought by them to the Rizal Commercial Bank; and that the bank also
acted in bad faith.

The second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused by the
defendants' bad faith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.

The Amended Supplemental Complaint

The amendment made pertains to the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint,
which is, the inclusion of a paragraph averring that, still to cause damage and prejudice to the
plaintiffs, Atty. & Mrs. Juan Quijano, in bad faith sold the two parcels of land they had
previously bought to Eloy Ocampo who acquired them also in bad faith, while Venancio
Castañeda and Nicetas Henson in bad faith sold the two other parcels to Juan Quijano (60%)
and Eloy Ocampo (40%) who acquired them in bad faith and with knowledge that the
properties are the subject of a pending litigation.

Discussion on The Causes of Action

of The Supplemental Complaint And
The Amended Supplemental Complaint

Assuming hypothetically as true the allegations in the first cause of action of the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint, the validity of the cause
of action would depend upon the validity of the first cause of action of the original complaint,
for, the Agos would suffer no transgression upon their rights of ownership and possession of
the properties by reason of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Castañedas
and their lawyer if the sheriff's levy and sale are valid. The reverse is also true: if the sheriff's
levy and sale are invalid on the ground that the conjugal properties could not be levied upon,
then the transactions would perhaps prejudice the Agos, but, we have already indicated that
the issue in the first cause of action of the original complaint is barred by laches, and it must
therefore follow that the first cause of action of the supplemental complaint and the amended
supplemental complaint is also barred.

For the same reason, the same holding applies to the remaining cause of action in the
supplemental complaint and the amended supplemental complaint.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-
7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-
filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and independent action. Treble costs are