G.R. No. 87001 December 4, 1989
33-02-88 dated February 20, 1988, the authorized
LA UNION ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (LUELCO),
represented by its President and Chairman of the Board MANUEL
L. MANGASER, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE BRAULIO D. YARANON, Presiding Judge of RTC-
Branch 30, San Fernando, La Union and NATIONAL
ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION (NEA), respondents. FAR
EAST BANK & TRUST CO. (La Union Branch) as Interpleader.
Roman R. Villalon, Jr. for petitioner LUELCO.
Dulcemarie M. Guerrero-Manikan for interpleader.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
petitioner seeks to annul the decision dated January 13, 1989 and the
order dated February 10, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, La Union in Civil Case No. 4182 and to declare
Presidential Decree No. 269 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1645 unconstitutional.
Civil Case No. 4182 is an action for interpleader filed by the Far East
Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), La Union branch, against the La
Union Electric Cooperative Inc. (LUELCO) and the National
Electrification Administration (NEA) to determine the proper signatories
to checks relating to withdrawals and disbursements of LUELCO
deposits with the said bank. It appears that in LUELCO Board
Resolution No.
signatories are as follows:
RESOLVED TO APPROVE, as it hereby APPROVES, to
revert to the amended Board Policy No. 1 allowing the
General Manager to sign checks and/or disbursements to
a maximum of P5,000 and that any amount beyond this
shall be countersigned by both the President and the
Secretary-Treasurer of the Board and all transactions
should be paid in a single check payment whether it is
more or less than P5,000. 1
The said Resolution was amended by the LUELCO Board under Board
Resolution No. 53-03-88 dated March 20, 1988, which reads:
That all checks and disbursements made in any amount
shall bear both the signatures of the Acting General
Manager and the President of the Board of Directors of
LUELCO effective immediately. 2
However, the NEA in its letter of April 8, 1988 to the LUELCO Board of
Directors amended Board Resolution No. 33-02-88 in this manner —
This refers to your Board Resolution No. 33-02-88
authorizing the General Manager to sign checks of
withdrawals or disbursements to a maximum of
P5,000.00.
Please be informed that such authorization is approved
for the amount of P3,000.00 only for single disbursement
or withdrawal and that any amount beyond this shall be
counter-signed by either the Coop President or
Treasurer. 3
It is alleged in the interpleader that LUELCO through its President and b) that NEA, pursuant to Section 10 of the
Chairman of the Board insists that the bank should follow Board same law, is "empowered to issue orders,
Resolution No. 53-03-88, LUELCO being the owner of the funds rules and regulations . . . in all matters
deposited, while on the other hand the NEA through its project affecting said electric cooperatives and
supervisor and acting general manager in the LUELCO alleges that borrowers, or supervised or controlled
Board Resolution No. 33-02-88 as amended by the NEA should be entities;"
observed as the NEA has taken over LUELCO and that Board
Resolution No. 53-03-88 was disapproved by said general manager c) that NEA is authorized under Section 5
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended by Presidential (a) of the said decree, to designate an
Decree No. 1645, which empowers the NEA to exercise control and acting general manager and/or project
supervision over electric cooperatives and borrowers. The bank supervisor for a cooperative, under certain
through the interpleader thus sought the resolution of these conflicting circumstances, such as when the interest of
claims. the cooperative and the program so
requires, and for such purpose, "to
LUELCO in its amended answer contended that the power granted to prescribe the functions of said Acting
the NEA pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1645 is unconstitutional General Manager and/or Project
as it violates the Bill of Rights, that it is an arbritrary exercise of power, Supervisor, which powers shall not be
is confiscatory in character and violates due process; and that it nullified, altered or diminished by any policy
destroys or infringes the autonomous character of the cooperative. or resolution of the Board of Directors of the
LUELCO also asked for damages because it was compelled to litigate. cooperative concerned;"

On the other hand the NEA alleged:
a) that the management of LUELCO as an
electric cooperative, is "vested in its Board
subject to the supervision and control of
NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all Board
Meetings and deliberations and to approve
all policies and resolutions of the Board;" by
virtue of the provisions of Section 24 of
Presidential Decree No. 269 as amended;
d) that pursuant to its power aforestated,
NEA has taken over the direct control and
supervision of LUELCO and for such
purpose designated Eufemio C. Genovia,
one of its own personnel, on February 5,
1988, as Acting General Manager and
Project Supervisor of the LUELCO with
powers and duties among which was to
"exercise full control and supervision over
the management and operations of
LUELCO including functions to review and
approve/disapprove all board resolutions
and policies and to sign/countersign all
checks, withdrawal slips and other banking
transactions;"
e) that NEA having taken over the direct
control and supervision of LUELCO through
its Acting General Manager/Project
Supervisor, it is the latter, in representation
of NEA who should be considered to
properly represent the cooperative and the
representation in the Petition of the
President and Chairman of the board of the
LUELCO as representing LUELCO is
'misplaced, false and improper';
f) that the said President and Chairman of
the Board of the LUELCO does not have
any lawful and material interest in the
subject matter of the action;
g) that the LUELCO board, upon insistence
of the President and Chairman of the
Board, adopted Board Resolution No. 53-
03- 88 for no other purpose than to render
ineffective the powers of the Acting General
Manager/Project Supervisor and prevent
him from carrying out his program to
rehabilitate the electric cooperative;
h) that Board Resolution No. 53-03-88 has
not been approved by the Acting General
Manager/Project Supervisor of NEA hence
is invalid and of no force and effect; and
i) that Resolution No. 33-02-88 was
approved with amendment by NEA and is
the valid and controlling resolution which
should govern the transactions between
LUELCO and the petitioner bank, instead of
Resolution no. 53-03-88.
A counterclaim for damages arising from the refusal of petitioner to
honor Board Resolution No. 33-02-88 was filed with the Answer. 4
The following facts are undisputed as found by the court a quo —
There is no dispute that the funds deposited with the
petitioner, pertain to the La Union Electric Cooperative,
Inc., LUELCO an electric cooperative organized and
subsisting pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 269, as amended.
It cannot also be disputed that the National Electrification
Administration exercises supervision and control over
electric cooperatives organized pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 269, as amended. NEA is further granted
express authority to designate an acting general
manager and/or project supervisor for any electric
cooperative, and for the purpose, "to prescribe the
functions of said officer, which powers shall not be
nullified, altered or diminished by any policy or resolution
of the Board of Directors of the cooperative concerned"
(Section 5(a) Presidential Decree 269 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1645).
The record indicates that under Board Resolution No. 33-
02-88 dated February 20, 1988, the general manager
 was authorized to sign checks and/or disbursements to a
maximum of P5,000 and that any amount beyond the
same shall be countersigned by both the President and
the Secretary-Treasurer of the Board and all transactions
should be paid in a single check payment whether it is
more or less than P5,000.00 (Annex "B", Petition).
The record further indicates that on March 20, 1988,
Board Resolution No. 53-03-88, was adopted by the
LUELCO Board, pursuant to which "all checks and
disbursements made in any amount should bear both the
signatures of the Acting General Manager and the
President of the Board of Directors, LUELCO effective
immediately" (Annex "A", petition).
It is further established by the record that on April 8,
1988, the NEA through Luis O. Cerrafon, NEA Director
for Cooperatives Development modified Board
Resolution No. 33-02-88, by limiting the authorization to
the amount of P3,000.00 only for single disbursement or
withdrawal and that any amount beyond the same shall
be countersigned by either the Coop President or
Treasurer (Annex "C" Petition).
The Petition itself indicates that Board Resolution No. 53-
03-88 was disapproved by the NEA through its Acting
General Manager/ Project Supervisor in the LUELCO
(petition, par. 6).5
In due course on January 13,1989 a decision was rendered by the
RTC the dispositive portion of which provides —
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered, finding the petitioner bank to be bound
by the communication dated April 8, 1988, of the NEA
Director for Cooperatives Development, to the effect that
the General Manager (Acting General Manager/Project
Supervisor) designated by the National Electrification
Administration is authorized to sign checks of
withdrawals or disbursements only in the amount of
P3,000.00 and beyond which amount the same shall be
countersigned by either the President or Treasurer of the
LUELCO.
The counterclaim and crossclaim are dismissed.
No pronouncement will be made as to costs. 6
Not satisfied therewith, LUELCO filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision which, however, was denied by the trial court for lack of
merit in an order dated February 10, 1989. 7
Hence the herein petition wherein petitioner raises the following issues:
I. Is P.D. 269, as amended by P.D. 1645
violative of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
when it authorized NEA to potentially
cripple the management of LUELCO by its
duly elected Board of Directors and
President Manuel Mangaser by insisting in
a letter dated April 8, 1988 of Luis O.
Cerrafon Director for Cooperative
Development, that every withdrawal of
LUELCO deposits with Far East Bank (La
Union Branch) in the amount of P3,000.00
by respondent Eufemio Genovia alone is
authorized to the exclusion of LUELCO's
President and not jointly with the LUELCO's
President as stated in LUELCO's Board
Resolution No. 53-03-88 dated March 20,
1988, amending the questioned Board
Resolution dated February 20, 1988?
II. Does LUELCO through its Board of
Directors, Chairman and President Manuel
L. Mangaser have the legal personality to
resist the takeover of LUELCO and its bank
deposits by respondent Eufemio Genovia
as an indispensable step in a concerted
plan of said Genovia upon orders of NEA
Administration to destroy the very existence
of a viable electric cooperative as LUELCO
under the pretext of the assertion of powers
not granted by the Philippine Constitution?
III. Is the respondent court (RTC-San
Fernando, La Union, Branch XXX)
unjustified in conveniently rejecting the
constitutional objection to the continued
existence of an oppressive and utterly void
law as P.D. 269, as amended by P.D. 1645,
on its mere pronouncement that LUELCO
through its Chairman and President Manuel
L. Mangaser has no legal standing to raise
constitutional issues involving the said law
in question?
IV. In tearing away LUELCO's resistance to
respondent Eufemio Genovia's dictatorial
take-over by means of LUELCO's own bank
deposits and trust funds, does P.D. 269, as
amended by P.D. 1645, have constitutional
imprimatur to obliterate the autonomous
character of cooperatives declared to be
free of any imposition of any condition that
might affect or infringe their autonomy in all
government loon assistance extended to
them either through original loans or
relending program? 8
The petition is devoid of merit. The Court reproduces with approval the
disquisition of the trial court on the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 269, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1645, to wit
—
The rule is well-settled that the party raising a
constitutional question "... must be able to show direct
injury to or invasion of his constitutional rights arising
from the operation or enforcement of the questioned act
..." (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56. Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 477; cited in Jose P. Laurel on the
Constitution, by J. Enrique M. Fernando, p. 11).
LUELCO itself admits that what has been taken over by
the NEA is the management of the cooperative. Indeed
there is nothing in the record to establish a conclusion
that the designation by the NEA of a project supervisor
and acting general manager for the LUELCO for
purposes of management of the electric cooperative, has
resulted in the takeover by the NEA of the business,
properties, and assets of the cooperative itself.
Takeover of management by the NEA is in effect a
change of management. It cannot however be equated
with a takeover of the business, property, and assets of
the electric cooperative, by the NEA. The ruling made by
the NEA Director for Cooperatives Development, dated
April 8, 1988, which authorizes the General Manager to
sign checks or withdrawals or disbursements only in the
amount of P3,000.00, and beyond which amount the
same shall be countersigned by either the President or
Treasurer of the LUELCO (Annex "C", Petition), indicates
that the LUELCO funds deposited with the petitioner
bank, remain as funds of the LUELCO and have not been
converted into funds of the NEA.
The foregoing considerations lead to no other conclusion
than that the LUELCO has not established by competent
and sufficient proof that the questioned decree as
amended, has caused direct injury to or invasion of its
constitutional rights arising from the operation thereof.
Consequently the attempt to question the validity of P.D.
269 as amended, must fail.
It should be noted further that under the 1986 (sic)
Constitution, cooperatives and similar collective
organizations shall have the right to own, establish, and
operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the
State . . . to intervene when the common good so
demands. (Sec. 6, Article XII, 1986 [sic] Constitution).
LUELCO admits, and the Court will take judicial notice, of
the fact that the State has issued huge amounts of public
funds to support electric cooperatives in line with the
national policy objective of total electrification of the
Philippines on an area coverage basis. It is evident,
considering the requirements of public interest in
safeguarding public funds, that the law-making authority
deemed it wise that "when the interest of the cooperative
and the program so requires", the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), is empowered to designate an
acting general manager and/or project supervisor for an
electric cooperative, with powers and duties which
include control and supervision over the management
and operations of LUELCO, including functions to review
and approve/disapprove all board resolutions and
policies and to sign/countersign all checks, withdrawal
slips and other banking trans actions . . . (Secs. 5(a), 24,
etc., P.D. 269, as amended.)
There is thus reasonable basis for the exercise of control
and supervision by the NEA over all electric cooperatives
including the defendant LUELCO. At any rate, courts " . .
. do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation . . . " (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139,158-159). 9
Moreover, the reason courts will as much as possible avoid the
decision of a constitutional question can be traced to the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper
respect for the acts of the other departments. In line with this policy,
courts indulge the presumption of constitutionality and go by the maxim
that "to doubt is to sustain." The theory is that, as the joint act of the
legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was
finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can
be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided
on other available grounds. 10
As found by the court a quo it is not seriously disputed that the NEA
had taken over the control and supervision of the LUELCO by installing
one of its personnel as acting general manager/project supervisor of
the LUELCO. It is within the power of control and supervision of the
NEA over the LUELCO as an electric cooperative organized and
existing pursuant to Presidential Decree 269 as amended by
Presidential Decree 1645 particulary Section 5(a) thereof In view of the
circumstances which, in the interest of the cooperative and the
program of electrification whereby said Acting General Manager
effectively took over the actual supervision and control of the
management and operation of the LUELCO on February 8, 1988, it
was deemed necessary that the matter of disposal of funds deposited
with the FEBTC should be guided by the NEA ruling of April 8, 1988
authorizing the general manager to sign checks of withdrawals and
disbursement only in the amount of P3,000.00 and beyond which
amount the same shall be counter-signed by either the President or
Treasurer of the LUELCO.
The trial court correctly found that the parties appear to have acted in
utmost good faith in filing their respective pleadings in the case and
consequently the matter of damages was not passed upon.
The Court finds no need to dispose of the other issues in this petition in
the light of the foregoing discussion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 104216 August 20, 1993
TEODORO B. PANGILINAN, petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
Gancayco Law Office and Moncupa, Torio & Malaya Law Offices for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner complains that he has been removed from office without
due process and just cause in disregard of his constitutional security of
tenure. Worse, his removal was made in bad faith, immediately after
his expose of certain anomalies in which superiors were involved.
Teodoro B. Pangilinan joined the government service on July 18, 1966,
when he was appointed agent in the National Bureau of Investigation,
a position for which he had the appropriate civil service eligibility. He
had risen to Supervising Agent when he resigned to accept
appointment as Executive Director of the Land Transportation Office
on July 8, 1987. He assumed office on July 16, 1987.
The petitioner says that from February 19, 1988 to November 30,
1988, he was detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority,
where he served as Assistant General Manager in charge of finance
and administration and also of security and general services.
Upon his return to the LTO, he was designated as Resident
Ombudsman in addition to his regular duties. As such, he discovered,
among other anomalies, irregularities in the purchase of motor vehicle
license plates. The license plates ordered were not reflective as
required by P.D. 98 and B.P. 43. He says he brought this matter to the
attention of Asst. Secretary Manuel Sabalza of the Department of
Transportation and Communications and later of Secretary Pete
Prado. Neither of them took any action.
On September 27, 1991, the petitioner called a press conference
expose what the media later described as "the license plate mess." He
also announced his intention to file graft charges with the Ombudsman
against Prado, Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecañas, also of
the DOTC.
The following day, Secretary Prado relieved Pangilinan as Executive
Director of the LTO and replaced him with Guillermo Maglaya as
officer-in-charge. However, the petitioner continued receiving his salary
(although his allowances were withheld) until December 31, 1991.
When he asked why his pay had been discontinued, he was informed
by Asst. Secretary Juan V. Borra, Jr. that Maglaya had already been
designated as Acting Executive Director of the LTO.
In this petition, Pangilinan prays for reinstatement on the ground that
no charge has been filed or proved against him to justify his removal.
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that Pangilinan was
validly separated because he was appointed to the disputed position in
an acting capacity only. He does not possess the qualifications
prescribed for the office of Executive Director of the LTO, which is a
career executive service position for which only a career executive
service official is eligible. The petitioner is not a career executive
service official. Hence, he could not be, and was not extended a
permanent appointment.
The public respondents cite Sec. 5(1) of P.D. 807 which provides that
membership in the career executive service requires:
(i) that the official must be included in the register of
career executive eligibles; and
(ii) that the official must have been appointed to an
appropriate class in the Career Executive Service.
Respondent Augusto B. Araneta, who was later designated to replace
Maglaya, submitted the following certification from the Executive
Director of the Career Executive Service Board:1
CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the position of Executive Director in
the Land Transportation Office, Department of
Transportation and Communications is classified as a
position belonging to the Career Executive Service
(CES). This is to certify further that per records of the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB), MR.
TEODORO B. PANGILINAN, former Executive Director
of said office is not a CES eligible, and was not appointed
to a rank in the CES.
This certification is issued upon the request of Atty.
Augusto B. Araneta for whatever purpose it may serve.
(Sgd.) ELMOR D. JURIDICO
Executive Director
The respondents also invoke the case of Achacoso
v. Macaraig, 2 where this Court declared:
It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued
only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed." Achacoso did not. At
best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only
as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will
by the appointing authority and "at a moment's notice,"
conformably to established jurisprudence.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career
Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
on its occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place, or, only as an exception
to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The
appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated.
The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official, functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee. The
person named in an acting capacity accepts the position
under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing
authority.
In his reply Pangilinan submits that the Achacoso case is not
applicable because the petitioner therein was, to begin with, not a civil
service eligible. The petitioner say he is, having passed the board
examination for certified public accountants. He also argues that his
appointment must be likened to the provisional appointment under the
old Civil Service Act before it was replaced by P.D. 807. The
provisional appointment enjoyed security of tenure.
Pangilinan adds that even on the assumption that his appointment was
not permanent, his separation must still be for a valid cause because
Article IX-B, Section 2 (3), of the Constitution applies to all officers and
employees in the civil service without distinction.
Invoking the case of Gray v. De Vera,3 Pangilinan likens himself to the
petitioner therein who was summarily relieved when, as the board
secretary of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, he sent
a telegram to the President of the Philippines imputing irregularities to
the directors. His separation also came the following day. Although
Gray was holding a primarily confidential position without any fixed
term, this Court ordered his reinstatement. We held that he had been
denied procedural due process and there was no valid cause for his
removal.
Also cited by the petitioner are Cariño v. ACCFA, 4 Floreza
v. Ongpin 5 and Jocom v. Robredo (not Regalado),6 in all of which
cases the security of tenure of the dismissed employees was upheld.
The petitioner raises a new issue, to wit, that even if he were
considered only an acting appointee, he nevertheless could not be
replaced except by a person possessing the required qualifications, as
required by PD 807. He has produced certifications,7 also from the
Executive Director of the Career Executive Service Board, that neither
Guillermo T. Maglaya nor Augusto B. Araneta is a CES eligible or a
career executive service officer. He also argues, belatedly too, that as
a presidential appointee, he could be replaced only by the President of
the Philippines and not by only the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications.
As required by the Court, the respondents have submitted a
Compliance manifesting that Juan A. Magarro, Jr., the new appointee
to the position of Executive Director of the LTO (replacing Guillermo
Maglaya and Antonio B. Araneta) possesses the prescribed
qualifications for the office.8
They repeat that the applicable case is Achacoso, not Gray. Gray was
extended a permanent appointment whereas Achacoso, like
Pangilinan, could be appointed only in an acting capacity for lack of the
prescribed qualifications for the office.
We must hold for the respondents.
Gray and the other cases cited by the petitioner involved permanent
appointees who therefore had security of tenure. Pangilinan was only
an acting appointee because he did not have the requisite
qualifications; as such, he could not claim security of tenure. This
Court has repeatedly held that this guaranty is available only to
permanent appointees.9 The fact that Pangilinan was qualified for his
initial appointment as agent in the NBI does not mean he was qualified
for all other positions he might later occupy in the civil service. The law
does not prescribe uniform qualifications for all public positions
regardless of nature or degree.
Although Gray was holding a highly confidential position, the Court
regarded his separation as a removal and so applied the constitutional
prohibition against the suspension or dismissal of an officer or member
of the civil service without cause as provided by law. That was rather
loose interpretation of the term "dismissal," which is defined as the
ouster of the incumbent before the expiration of his term. Subsequent
decisions have made it clear that where a person holds his position at
the pleasure of a superior or subject to some supervening event, his
separation from office is not a
removal. 10 It is effected by the will of the superior or by the happening
of the contingency, resulting in another and different mode of
terminating official relations known as expiration of the term.
Chief Justice Concepcion explained the distinction between removal
and expiration of the term in Alajar v. Alba 11thus:
In the case at bar, the term of respondent Alajar as Vice
Mayor of the City of Roxas is not fixed by law. However,
the latter, in effect, vests in the President the power to fix
such term. When in November 1955, petitioner Alba was
designated as Acting Vice-Mayor of said City, the term of
respondent Alba was, thereby, fixed implicitly by the
President, in the exercise of his aforementioned
authority. Thus, the term of office of Alajar expired and
his right to hold office was extinguished, with the same
legal effect as if the term had been fixed by Congress
itself. In other words, Alajar was not removed from office,
for "to remove an officer is to oust him from office before
the expiration of his term" (Manalang v. Quitonano et al.,
50 Off. Gaz., 2515). Alajar merely lost the right to hold
the office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Roxas by expiration
of his term as such.
The petitioner's invocation of the provisional appointment as
comparable to his position is a grasping at straws. The provisional
appointment has long been abolished and has no legal application or
effect in this case. There are now only two kinds of appointment under
the Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Sec. 27. Employment Statues. — Appointment in the
career service shall be permanent or temporary.
(1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the
provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in
pursuance thereof.
(2) Temporary appointment. In the absence of
appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the
public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment,
shall be issued to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed except the appropriate civil service
eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment
shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may
be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.
Strictly speaking, the petitioner's temporary appointment as Executive
Director of the LTO should have ended twelve months after he
assumed office, or on July 16, 1988. From that date, his appointment
had ceased to be valid even if a qualified replacement was not yet
available and consequently had to be discontinued pursuant to the
above-quoted provision. Indeed, even on the assumption that his
appointment could be and had been validly extended beyond the one-
year limit, that extended term was nevertheless validly terminated with
the appointment of his qualified replacement.
The petitioner's contention that he could not be relieved by Secretary
Prado but only by the President of the Philippines is also a shot in the
dark. It has long been settled, and does not require further elaboration
here, that the acts of a Department Secretary, when "performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business" are presumptively the
acts of the President unless "disapproved or reprobated" by him. This
doctrine dates back to 1939, when it was First laid down by Justice
Laurel in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 12 and has been
consistently observed since then. Parenthetically, the petitioner's own
appointment to the disputed position was signed not by President
Corazon C. Aquino but by Executive Secretary Joker P. Arroyo. 13
In view of the foregoing considerations, we hold that Pangilinan has
lost the right to the position of Executive Director of the LTO and so
cannot be reinstated therein.
Shall the Court end here? There is more to be said.
It is not difficult to see that the petitioner was replaced because of his
expose and his threat to bring charges against his superiors. His relief
was clearly an act of punishment if not personal vengeance. This is not
denied. The respondents, while invoking the law to justify his
separation, have made no effort whatsoever to justify their motives.
In Gray, the Court held that the board secretary, while holding a highly
confidential. position, owed his loyalty not to the board but to the
government. In the present case, Pangilinan was not even holding a
similar position. His continued incumbency did not depend upon his
enjoyment of the confidence of his superiors who had no personal
claim to his loyalty. In exposing what he considered the anomalies in
the DOTC, he was, like Gray, manifesting his concern for the
government whose interests he wanted to protect.
It would be a sorry day, indeed, if a civil servant could be summarily
removed from his position for the "sin" of complaining about the
irregularities of his superiors. This would not only impair the integrity of
the civil service but also undermine the campaign to encourage the
public, including those in the civil service, to expose and denounce
venality in government.
Pangilinan's denunciation of the non-reflective license plates we not
the act of a rabble-rouser or a publicity-seeker. The record shows that
he quietly brought the matter to the attention of his superiors, giving
reasons for his misgivings. They took no action. Feeling frustrated, he
sought the attention of the media and told them of his objection to the
non-reflective license plates. He cited the laws that he claimed had
been violated. He narrated his efforts to prevent their violation. He
spoke of the indifference of his superiors. In doing all these, he was
exercising his right as a citizen, and especially as a civil servant, to
denounce official misconduct and improve the public service.
This is not to say, of course, that Pangilinan's charges are valid. The
Court is not prepared to do so at this time because the evidence on
this matter is not before it. For all we know, there is a satisfactory
explanation for the attitude of his superiors; it is possible that it is
Pangilinan who has misinterpreted the law or misread the facts. But
true or not, the charges per se, and standing alone, could not be the
basis of Pangilinan's swift and summary replacement.
Pangilinan was separated the day immediately following his press
conference. The Court sees the action as a retaliation. The public
respondents say they were merely terminating his incumbency in
accordance with existing law. The Court sees that termination as a
punishment.
Under the expanded definition of judicial power in Article VIII, Section
1, of the Constitution, the Court can declare the acts of the public
respondents as tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore
invalid.
But it is not as simple as that. The obstinate fact is that, regardless of
the motives of his superiors, Pangilinan no longer had any right to the
disputed position when he was separated from it in 1991. He ceased to
be entitled to it in 1988 upon the lapse of the maximum period for his
acting appointment. Obviously, he is not entitled to it now. Even if it be
supposed that the public respondents acted maliciously when they
relieved him in 1991, his reinstatement is still not possible under the
law as it now stands.
The petitioner warns that the dismissal of his petition would open the
door to the summary separation of civil servants to the prejudice of the
integrity and independence of the civil service. He claims that "there
are about 2,067 CESO positions in the entire Philippine civil service. Of
this number only 372 or about 18% are occupied by Career Executive
Service eligibles."14 The rest may be summarily separated as acting
appointees and are therefore subject to the whims of their superiors.
He suggests that "a ruling by this Honorable Court that would sustain
the position of petitioner would go a long way toward the upliftment of
the morale of the 'ineligibles.'"
Assuming that the petitioner's statistics are correct, the Court can only
share his trepidation. We can do no more. As judges, we can only
interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom,
cannot repeal or amend it. In the case at bar, we have no power to
give the petitioner the qualifications he does not possess.
Qualifications for public officers are prescribed by the Constitution or
the law, or even by implementing regulations, but not by the decisions
of courts.
The problem posed by the petitioner is a serious threat to the integrity
and independence of the civil service. As demonstrated in this case,
the doctrine announced in Achacoso may be used to muzzle and
punish legitimate complaint and even to persecute "difficult"
subordinates. That doctrine, let it be stressed, is only an interpretation
and application by the Court of the law as enacted by the legislative
and implemented by the executive. That doctrine can change only if
the laws and regulations on which it was based are also changed, not
by this Court but by the political departments.
In Javier v. Commission on Elections, 15 we said:
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal
questions but also the conscience of the government.
The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same.
Indeed they are not, and sadly so for the petitioner. For ironically, the
law he invokes for the protection of his right has instead denied him the
justice he seeks and deserves. This emphasizes, no less sadly, the
fallacy that for every legal wrong there is a judicial remedy. Untrue,
unfortunately. The Court is not a panacea. There are times,
regrettably, when justice is shackled by the law, and even this Court
cannot break the chains.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo Quiason and Vitug, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19748 September 13, 1962
PAULINO J. GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and JUAN SALCEDO, JR., in
his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Science
Development Board, respondents.
Claudio Teehankee and Juan T. David for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
Enrique M. Fernando as amicus curiae.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition filed by petitioner, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, Chairman of
the National Science Development Board created by Republic Act
2067 otherwise known the "Science Act of 1958" against the
respondents Executive Secretary and Juan Salcedo, Jr., the latter in
his capacity as Acting Chairman of the same National Science
Development Board, in the form of quo warranto an prohibition with
preliminary injunction, with prayer that the further preventive
suspension of petitioner beyond the maximum period of 60 days,
provided in Section of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), be
declared illegal and void, and that respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. be
likewise declared guilty of unlawfully holding an exercising the
functions of the office of Chairman of the National Science
Development Board since April 19, 1962 date of the expiration of the
said 60-day period.
Succinctly stated, the pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
Upon the enactment on June 13, 1958 of Republic Act 2067, creating
the National Science Development Board for the avowed purpose of
implementing the declared policy of the State to integrate, coordinate,
promote and intensify scientific and technological research and
development and to foster invention and utilize scientific knowledge as
an effective instrument for the promotion of national progress,
petitioner herein, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, was appointed by the President
of the Philippines, which appointment was duly confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, as the first Chairman of the National
Science Development Board for a fixed term of six years, pursuant to
Section 6 of the Science Act. Accepting such appointment, petitioner
duly qualified, assumed the performance of the functions of the office
on July 15, 1958, and organized and since then built up the Board into
a real effective instrument for scientific advancement that it is today.
As a result of the last national elections held in November, 1961, a
change of administration took place. Shortly thereafter, or on February
9, 1962, after petitioner declined to heed what respondents admit as
the new Assistant Executive Secretary Rodrigo Perez's "friendly
gesture of advising petitioner to resign from his position in order to
avoid the unpleasant consequences of having to face an administrative
action for violation of the Revised Administrative Code on the basis of
evidence then on hand", respondent Executive Secretary required
petitioner in writing to explain charges for alleged electioneering based
on the affidavits of four individuals. On February 15, petitioner
submitted his written explanation denying under oath the said charges
claiming them to be false, malicious and unsubstantial. On the
following day, February 16, respondent Executive Secretary advised
petitioner, by authority of the President, that his explanation was found
unsatisfactory, and immediately ordered his preventive suspension
from office effective upon receipt of the communication. Thus, the
preventive suspension took effect on Monday, February 18, 1962. On
the day previous, or on Sunday, February 17, 1962, the respondent
Juan Salcedo, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Chairman
of the National Science Development Board.
By Administrative Order No. 5 dated February 17, 1962, an
investigating committee was created. On February 23, another charge
of dishonesty in office was filed with the investigating committee
against petitioner. On February 27, the investigating committee
commenced the investigation of the administrative charges and, after
some delays caused by the unpreparedness of the prosecution, the
hearing was indefinitely postponed because of the departure for
abroad, on March 19, 1962, on extended vacation, of one of the
members of the committee (former Justice Ramon San Jose) who,
before his appointment, apprised the President thereof but was
advised he could go as the investigation could be postponed during his
absence.
In view of his indefinite suspension, petitioner, on May 5, 1962, filed
the present petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed
in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already
expired on April 19, 1962, he be reinstated in the service pursuant to
Section 35 of the said Act.
The clear-cut issue, therefore, before us is the effect and scope of the
aforementioned Section 35 of the Civil Service Act, which reads:
Sec 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation. — When the administrative against the officer or
employee under preventive suspension not finally decided by
the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60)
days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the
respondent shall be reinstated in service. If the respondent,
officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his
position with full pay for the period of suspension.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the visions of the above-
quoted section are mandatory Applicable to him, respondents sustain
that the compulsory lifting of the preventive suspension pending
administrative investigation provided in this section, applies only to
officers or employees whose administrative cases are to be decided by
the Commissioner of Civil Service, and that with respect to any officer
appointed by the President, there is no provision of law regulating the
duration of the preventive suspension pending investigation of charges
against such officer, as is the case of petitioner. In other words, it is
respondents' contention that Section 35 of the Civil Service Act does
not apply to officers appointed by the President answering
administrative charges against them.
At the outset, let it be said that Section 35 is a new provision in our
Civil Service Law. In the Revised Administrative Code, in its Article VI
on "Discipline of Persons in Civil Service", we find the same power of
preventive suspension exercisable by the President and the chief of a
bureau or office with the approval of the proper head of department, as
is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no
counterpart in the Administrative Code, of Section 35 of Act 2260
regarding the lifting of preventive suspension pending administrative
investigation. This insertion for the first time in our Civil Service Law of
an express provision limiting the duration of preventive suspension is
significant and timely. It indicates realization by Congress of the evils
of indefinite suspension during investigation, where the respondent
employee is deprived in the meantime of his means of livelihood,
without an opportunity to find work elsewhere, lest he be considered to
have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that it has been truly
said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is
equally true whether the suspended officer or employee is in the
classified or unclassified service, or whether he is a presidential
appointee or not. Having in mind the remedial purpose of the law, is
respondents' contention justifiable that Section 35 of the Civil Service
Act is applicable only to employees whose administrative cases are
submitted to the Commissioner of Civil Service? Except for the
insertion of the clause "is not finally decided by the Commissioner of
Civil Service" (which would presently be discussed), there is nothing in
Section 35 which distinguishes between the preventive suspension of
an officer appointed by the President and the suspension of
subordinate officer or employee undergoing administrative
investigation. Note that the phrase "officer or employee" used in
Section 35, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in
Section 34 when speaking of the preventive suspension ordered by the
chief of a bureau or office. In fact, the last sentence of Section 35
which provides that, "if the respondent officer or employee is
exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay from the
period of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and
employees whether suspended by the President or by the chief of
office or bureau, or investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service,
or by a presidential investigating committee.1awphîl.nèt
The first sentence of Section 35 stating that "when the administrative
case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the
period of 60 days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the
respondent shall be reinstated in the service", merely demonstrates,
we believe, the feeling of Congress that, in line with its policy of
strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the
inroads of partisan political considerations, pursuant to the spirit of the
Constitution, all disciplinary administrative cases should pass through
the impartial scrutiny of the Commissioner of Civil Service, even
though the final decision on the matter may not be his, as an appeal
from such decision of the Commissioner to the Civil Service, Board of
Appeals is expressly authorized by Section 36 of the same law. So
also, it may be conceded without deciding, may the President, in the
exercise of his power of control and supervision over all offices and
departments of the executive branch of the government, revise, review,
or revoke the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service and of the
Civil Service Board of Appeals. But this power has nothing to do with
the preventive suspension, because this power has not intended to be
a penalty. As explained by Senator Francisco A. Rodrigo, sponsor of
the bill which later became the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act
2260), "suspension cannot be more than 60 days — preventive
suspension. Even if the case drags on for six months or a year after 60
days of preventive suspension, the suspended employee is reinstated,"
(Senate Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 69, p. 2001). It may be
noted that Senator Rodrigo did not make any distinction between the
preventive suspension of officers by the President and that by the chief
of office or bureau, and Section 35 as passed did not contain any such
distinction. Neither is such distinction justifiable, for there is no cogent
reason — and none has been suggested — why the protection granted
to subordinate employees is not to be applied to more important public
officers. As this Court has ruled in the case of Severino Unabia v. The
Hon. City Mayor, et al. (53 O.G., No. 1, pp 133-134) —
. . . There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified
service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the
classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the
Civil Service; hence, the same rights and privileges should be
accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so
designated because the nature of their work and qualifications
are not subject to classification, which is not true of those
appointed to the classified service. This can not be a valid
reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted to
the latter.
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the
President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively
suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a
finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of
the Constitution 1 and the Civil Service law. 2 This, it is believed, is not
conducive to the maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil
service, the integrity of which has, in this jurisdiction, received
constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief
Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of
tenure of public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those
officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. But where the
tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of herein petitioner, which
according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be
removed therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of
respondents would be to nullify and render useless such specific
condition imposed by the law itself. If he could be preventively
suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the
administrative charges against him (and under the circumstances, it
would be the President himself who would decide the same at a time
only he can determine) then the provisions of the law both as to the
fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause
would be meaningless. In the guise of a preventive suspension, his
term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed
without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in
violation of the Constitution. This would set at naught the laudable
purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman
of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that
of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the
purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly
scientific and technological nature, beyond extraneous influences, and
of insuring continuity of research and development activities in an
atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment
of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause.
Upon these considerations, there is unanimity of opinion among the
members of this Court that the preventive suspension in the case of
officers, although appointed by the President but with a fixed term and
removable only for cause, cannot be indefinite. To some of the
members, the provisions of Section 35 limiting the duration to 60 days
is applicable to herein petitioner, as, in their view, it evinces a
legislative policy that preventive suspension of a public officer is not
lightly to be resorted to, but only after a previous serious and thorough
scrutiny of the charges and that the prompt and continued hear in
thereof should not be hampered, both in justice to the suspended
officer who is without salary during suspension, and in the interest of
public service to avoid as much as possible the interruption of the
efficient functioning of the office that the suspended official holds.
Other justices, however, are of the opinion that while said period may
not apply strictly to cases of presidential appointees facing
administrative charges to be decided by the President, the preventive
suspension shall nevertheless be limited to a reasonable period, and in
the circumstances of the present case, they too believe that the further
suspension of herein petitioner, who has been under preventive
suspension since February 18, 1962, would no longer be reasonable.
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered holding petitioner Dr.
Paulino J. Garcia entitled to immediate reinstatement to his position as
Chairman of the National Science Development Board, without
prejudice to the final outcome of the investigation of the charges
against him on which no opinion is here expressed. Respondent Juan
Salcedo, Jr. is hereby ordered to immediately vacate and cease to
exercise the functions of the said office and to deliver the same to
herein petitioner Paulino J. Garcia. No costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Dizon
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
I concur in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Barrera, but for the main
reason that in this case there has been a denial of procedural due
process in so far as petitioner Garcia is concerned.
One of the elementary requisites of due process is that a case should
be decided by an impartial tribunal or authority. Willoughby in his
classic on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1709,
enumerates the requisites of due process to be —
 (1) that he shall have had due notice, which may be actual or
constructive, of the institution of the proceedings by which his
legal rights may be affected;
(2) that he shall be given a reasonable opportunity to appear
and defend his rights, including the right himself to testify, to
produce witnesses, and to introduce relevant documents and
other evidence;
(3) that the tribunal in or before which his rights are adjudicated
is so constituted as to give reasonable assurance of his honesty
and impartiality; and
(4) that it is a court of competent jurisdiction.
the letter of Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc to herein petitioner
under date of February 17, 1962, the President, who is to the ultimate
arbiter to decide the administrative case against the petitioner, had
already prejudged the case and made up his mind that the petitioner
had been guilty of electioneering, which is the principal charge against
Garcia. While the evidence was heard and the charges tried by a
committee of former magistrates whose impartiality and sense of
justice are beyond challenge, the fact is that the committee's powers
are purely recommendatory. The last and final word, under the law,
pertains to the President, who may set aside the recommendations of
the investigating committee, and unfortunately the Chief Executive's
words and conduct have evidenced an attitude that is difficult to
reconcile with the open mind, soberness, and restraint to be expected
of an impartial judge.

Indeed, all the other requisites of notice and hearing would be The law of the land, as observed by Webster in Dartmouth College vs.
meaningless if the ultimate decision is to come from a partial and Woodward (4 Wheaton 518), is one that "hears before it condemns;
biased judge. Now, the evidence submitted to this Court, particularly which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial".
the photostatic copies of press reports, marked as Annexes G to K, to
the reply, and which have been neither denied or contradicted, show
that from the very beginning the President has insisted in Dr. Garcia's
vacating his office as Chairman of the National Science Development
Board, alleging at first that the position was of a confidential nature,
and later, when confronted with the fact that the tenure of the office
was fixed by statute, by charging openly and publicly that —

The trouble with this official is that he is an active politician who

openly campaigned in his province for the NP candidates."
(Annex J, Reply to Answer, Philippines Herald, January 29,
1962; quoted in the original).

These statements, which were made without qualification, so far as the

record goes, reveal that even before theformal charges were made in