SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133530 October 25, 2004

DONATO S. SUYAT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42820 dismissing the petition
for certiorari of the petitioner and affirming Administrative Order (AO) No. 95 of the President of the Philippines, effectively dismissing
petitioner Donato S. Suyat, Jr., as 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, for grave misconduct.

As culled by the Court of Appeals (CA) from the records, this case stemmed from the following antecedents:

It appears that on May 23, 1993, a robbery incident took place at the residential house of Atty. Reynaldo V. Bautista located at
Block 25, Lot 25, Phase 80, Sardony Street, Pasig Greenpark Village, Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal, and allegedly
committed by Randy Torres, Nelson Torres, Marlon Bonson, and Bernardo Bautista (Rollo, pp. 70, 90, 121).

After the timely arrest of the above suspects, Cainta Police authorities filed before Inquest Prosecutor Nestor V. Gapusan a
criminal complaint for robbery with force upon things against Randy Torres, Nelson Torres, Marlon Bonson, and Bernardo
Bautista. At the inquest proper, Bernardo Bautista admitted the sole responsibility for the commission of the aforesaid crime
and exonerated his co-other suspects. But despite this admission by Bernardo Bautista, the preliminary investigation was still
conducted upon recommendation of the said inquest prosecutor, and considering the waiver of detention signed by the
suspects, they were detained in the provincial jail pending the termination of the preliminary investigation (Rollo, pp. 25, 90).

Not satisfied with the above detention, Imelda Torres, mother of suspects Randy and Nelson Torres, and also the aunt of
suspect Marlon Bonson, followed up the case on June 8, 1993 with the Prosecutor’s Office of Rizal. In the process, Imelda
Torres was able to know that Prosecutor Donato S. Suyat, Jr. was the reviewing prosecutor of all inquest cases, so she talked
to Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. who, initially, demanded Imelda Torres the sum of ₱20,000.00 for the dismissal of the case against
the latter’s two (2) sons and nephew. Realizing, however, that this amount is much lower than what was required of Imelda
Torres in the payment of cash bond for every suspect, she decided to bargain the amount until Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. finally
agreed to the sum of ₱15,000.00 to be given in his office the following day on June 9, 1993 at 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon (sic)
(Rollo, pp. 25-26, 50-51, 202).

Upon consultation with her lawyer Atty. Mariano Santiago, Imelda Torres was referred by said counsel to the Anti-Organized
Crime Division of the National Bureau of Investigation for immediate assistance. Thus, the Anti-Organized Crime Division thru
its Chief, Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, ordered Special Agent Mar Panganiban to form a team for the purpose of entrapping
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. (id., pp. 26, 51, 72, 202).

On June 9, 1993, at about 3:00 in the afternoon, Imelda Torres, with her daughter Mildred Torres, went to the office of
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. Since the dismissal papers were still being typed at that time, Imelda Torres and her daughter Mildred
waited until 5:00 in the afternoon on which occasion Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. handed over to the former the resolution (Annex "9;"
id., p. 124) dismissing the robbery case in favor of Imelda’s two (2) sons and nephew. However, despite suggestion of
Imelda’s daughter, Mildred Torres, that the ₱15,000.00 would be given instead on the following day of June 10, 1993 because
of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.’s promise to give on the same day the release papers of Randy and Nelson Torres and Marlon
Bonson from their detention, such arrangement was to no avail as Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. vehemently refused and countered
that he needed the money that time very badly so he had already prepared the dismissal papers for the said three suspects.
Hence, Imelda Torres handed to Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. the envelope containing the ₱15,000.00, all in one thousand
denomination (id., pp. 83-86), and, thereafter, Imelda Torres and her daughter Mildred left the office with her (Imelda) bag
under her armpit (Rollo, pp. 51, 203).
 As the foregoing was considered the pre-arranged signal to the NBI agents, the team of NBI Agent Mar Panganiban
immediately entered the office of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. who, at that time, was with a male companion who turned out to be his
son Junior. From the introduction of the NBI agents, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. put down the envelope he was holding and kept his
hand on his pocket. When Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. was asked to count the money in the envelope, he refused until the time he
was forced to count the said money by himself. Since there was only ₱9,000.00 in the envelope, the NBI agents decided to
search Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.’s son Junior and they found the folded ₱6,000.00 from Junior’s pocket. To relieve his son from
any liability, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. told NBI Agent Panganiban to spare his son from any involvement in this entrapment since
the money came from him anyway. Accordingly, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. was brought to the NBI for forensic chemistry
examination under which he was found positive, and despite the additional evidence produced by the NBI in relation to the
entrapment activity, Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. still opted to remain silent (Rollo, pp. 27, 204).

In view of the foregoing, Rosalina A. Espina, in her capacity as Supervising Agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, filed
with the Department of Justice an unnumbered administrative complaint accusing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the
course of official duties in violation of Anti-Graft laws and Section 46, paragraphs b(4) and b(9) of Executive Order No. 292 of
the Administrative Code of 1987. By way of relief, Rosalina A. Espina prayed for the dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from
the government service after due hearing of the case (id., pp. 70-71).

Finding that there was prima facie case of grave misconduct and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or any valuable thing
in the course of official duties against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr., Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department of Justice issued a
formal charge against Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. for the said administrative charge (Rollo, p. 93) as well as memorandum placing
him under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days effective from receipt thereof and while the case was under formal
investigation of State Prosecutor Leah T. Armamento (id., p. 94).

From the several hearings of the case, and in the light of the contending parties’ evidences as well as counter-affidavit and
memorandum submitted by Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. (id., pp. 4, 95-111, 162-191), Secretary Franklin M. Drilon of the Department
of Justice recommended to the then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. of the Office of the President the immediate
dismissal of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law (Rollo, pp. 50-54).

In response, then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. issued a memorandum stating his concurrence with the
recommendation of Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, and recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos the approval of the proposed
Administrative Order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law
(id., pp. 55-56).

On November 26, 1993, the Office of the President of the Philippines thru then Executive Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
issued the first questioned order dismissing Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. from the government service with forfeiture of all benefits
under the law as earlier adverted to.

Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. filed his first motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 34-49) which was denied, this time, by new Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his second questioned order dated February 16, 1996 (id., p. 31). Not contended (sic),
Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. still filed his second motion for reconsideration (id., pp. 65-69), but the same was, likewise, finally denied
by Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in his third questioned order dated November 7, 1996 (id., p. 32).

Hence, the instant petition interposed by Prosecutor Suyat, Jr. alleging that the Office of the President thru Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders because (a) the first questioned
order is not supported by the evidence on record and is tainted with gross error of law and irregularities prejudicial to the
interest of Prosecutor Suyat, Jr.; and (b) the second and third questioned orders violates (sic) the prevailing doctrine
concerning pro forma motions for reconsideration.2

As stated earlier, the appellate court dismissed the petition for review of the petitioner holding, inter alia, as follows:

Firstly, the instant petition should be dismissed outright inasmuch as petitioner adopted an erroneous remedy in pursuing his
cause in the instant administrative case before this Court. It is explicitly provided under Section 1 of Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995 that a final order by any quasi-judicial agency shall be appealable to this
Court by way of petition for review. This provision is now even substantially incorporated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the
present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure effective last July 1, 1997. It is unrebutted on record that petitioner Suyat, Jr. received
the third questioned order on December 2, 1996 so he had still up to December 17, 1996 to elevate his administrative case
before this Court by way of petition for review. Instead, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari to this Court on
December 17, 1996, specifically within the reglementary period of appeal, despite the availability of the said procedural
remedy under the aforesaid rules.

The impropriety of the instant petition for certiorari is also evident considering that the assigned issues by petitioner involve
factual issues and/or evidentiary matters which are not reviewable by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Petitioner must
realize that the petition for certiorari is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other
purpose (GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244, 253; Garcia, Jr. vs. Ranada, Jr., 166 SCRA 9, 16-17; Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Incorporated vs. Galuaran and Pilares Construction Co., 118 SCRA 664, 667-668, among the cases).
 Secondly, even if this Court were to consider the instant petition as the proper petition for review in the interest of justice, the
same must still fail because petitioner was undisputably liable for grave misconduct given the clear evidence imputed against
him.3

Finally, We find the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision on the right to remain silent immaterial given the apparent
quantum of proof established for the administrative liability of petitioner for grave misconduct. We concur with the valid observation of
the Solicitor General on this matter which We believe are in keeping with the law and jurisprudence, thus:

"Pertinently, petitioner assailed as erroneous the finding that his silence and refusal to give any statement during the NBI
investigation pointed to the conclusion that his defense was a mere afterthought, arguing that it was well within his right to
remain silent.

This is untenable.

The right of a person under custodial investigation to remain silent is primarily intended to protect said person from being force
d to make a confession or to give incriminating statements against himself. Undoubtedly, however, there is nothing incriminatin
g in petitioner’s claim that he was framed up: on the contrary, it is favorable to petitioner as it tends to exonerate him. In other
words, instead of choosing to remain silent and refusing to give any statement, petitioner should have seized the NBI investiga
tion as an opportunity to denounce the alleged frame up incident. But he did not, although as a public prosecutor, he knew ver
y well that such prompt action would have made his defense more sound and convincing. Petitioner only has himself to blame
if his belated claim or defense was found implausible.

Evidently, petitioner cannot validly invoke the right to remain silent to justify what, under the circumstances, constitutes an inva
lid and incredible defense." (Emphasis supplied)

(Comment of the Solicitor General, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 213-215)4

The petitioner now assails the decision of the CA, contending that:

1. The findings of fact and the Decision are erroneous because they are not supported by the evidence on record, an issue of
law;

2. The Decision would render useless counter-affidavits filed by respondents in administrative and criminal cases;

3. The Decision would compel persons under custodial investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation or other police
agencies not to remain silent;

4. The Decision ignored petitioner’s allegations regarding irregularities which attended the issuance of Administrative Order
No. 95, Series of 1993.5

The petition is denied.

Administrative Order No. 95 of the President Had Become Final and Executory When the Petitioner Filed His Petition For
Certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

In his petition at bar, the petitioner did not assail the ruling of the CA that his petition for certiorari in the said court was an inappropriate
remedy. The petitioner is, thus, bound by the ruling of the CA.

The records show that the petitioner received a copy of AO No. 95 dismissing him from the government service on December 14, 1993.
He had fifteen days from the said date within which to file a motion for reconsideration of the order. The petitioner filed a timely motion
for reconsideration of the order which the President denied in an Order dated February 16, 1996. The petitioner received a copy of the
same on February 28, 1996. Instead of filing a petition for review of the said orders with the CA, the petitioner filed a second motion for
reconsideration which the President denied in an Order dated November 7, 1996. Cited therein was Section 7 of AO No. 18, Series of
1987, which prohibits the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of the final order or decision of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.6 Thus, the filing by the petitioner of a second motion for reconsideration of AO No. 95, being a prohibited pleading, did not
suspend the period to appeal the February 28, 1996 Order to the CA via a petition for review. Indubitably then, when the petitioner filed
his petition for certiorari with the CA after the President denied his second motion for reconsideration, AO No. 95 of the President had
become final and executory, beyond the jurisdiction of the CA to alter, modify, or reverse. 7

The Petition for Certiorari Filed in the Court of Appeals Not A Substitute for the Lost Remedy of Appeal
We are convinced that the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the said Rules because he realized that the period within which to file the said petition for review had lapsed, and that
AO No. 95 of the President had become final and executory. By filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petitioner sought to nullify the said order via an independent action, in lieu of his lost right of appeal. But case law is that the existence
and the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari. These two remedies are
mutually exclusive.8

The Errors Ascribed to the Office of the President Are Errors of Judgment and Not Errors of Jurisdiction

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to
stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of judgment of the trial court are
to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal by and of error or via a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment.9 An error of
judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. Error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.10 Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court or quasi-judicial body in its
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law. 11 As long as
the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 12

In this case, the petitioner alleged in his petition for certiorari that AO No. 95 of the President was not supported by the evidence on
record; that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted its operations with undue interest and enthusiasm; and that the Office
of the President failed to appreciate the defenses he invoked, such as the violation by the NBI of his right to remain silent and the right
against self-incrimination. The petitioner complained that the President even used his invocation of his constitutional rights as evidence
against him. However, these errors ascribed by the petitioner to the CA and the President of the Philippines are mere errors of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.

The Issues Raised in the Petition At Bar Are Factual

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, the reason being that the
Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the Court to calibrate the evidence of the parties. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 13 Moreover,
findings of facts of questions of law, in addition to questions of facts of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies of the government, if based on
substantial evidence and particularly when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the Court unless grave abuse is shown amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.14 The petitioner failed to preponderantly establish such abuse on the part of the CA. The records show
that the Secretary of Justice calibrated the evidence on record and ruled against the petitioner. The President of the Philippines
reviewed the records and the evidence anew, and affirmed the findings and rulings of the Secretary of Justice. The CA again reviewed
the records and the evidence, and affirmed the rulings of the Secretary of Justice and the President of the Philippines. Even if the
Secretary of Justice, the Office of the President of the Philippines, and the CA erred in appreciating against the petitioner the results of
the Forensic Chemistry examination conducted by the NBI, there is more than ample evidence on record to support the finding that the
petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L- 24548 October 27, 1983

WENCESLAO VlNZONS TAN, THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respondents-appelllees,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, APOLONIO RIVERA, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND N ATURAL RESOURCES
JOSE Y. FELICIANO, respon dents-appellees,RAVAGO COMMERCIAL CO., JORGE LAO HAPPICK and ATANACIO
MALLARI, intervenors,

Camito V Pelianco Jr. for petitioner-appellant.

Solicitor General for respondent Director.

Estelito P. Mendoza for respondent Ravago Comm'l Co.

Anacleto Badoy for respondent Atanacio Mallari.

Mariano de Joya, Jr. for respondent Jorge Lao Happick, Jr.

MAKASIAR, J:

This is an appeal from the order dated January 20, 1965 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, in Civil Case No.
56813, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (p. 2. rec.), which dismissed the petition
of petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan on the ground that it does not state a sufficient cause of action, and upon the
respondents-appellees' (Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and the Director of Forestry) motion to dismiss (p. 28, rec.).

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No. 2087, advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land
situated in Olongapo, Zambales, provided tenders were received on or before May 22, 1961 (p. 15, CFI rec.). This public forest land,
consisting of 6,420 hectares, is located within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was
turned over by the United States Government to the Philippine Government (P. 99, CFI rec.).

On May 5, 1961, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan submitted his application in due form after paying the necessary fees and
posting tile required bond therefor. Nine other applicants submitted their offers before the deadline (p. 29, rec.).

Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be awarded to the
most qualified bidder. On June 7, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued a directive to the Director of the Bureau of Forestry,
which read as follows:

It is desired that the area formerly covered by the Naval Reservation be made a forest reserve for watershed
purposes. Prepare and submit immediately a draft of a proclamation establishing the said area as a watershed forest
reserve for Olongapo, Zambales. It is also desired that the bids received by the Bureau of Forestry for the issuance of
the timber license in the area during the public bidding conducted last May 22, 1961 be rejected in order that the area
may be reserved as above stated. ...

(SGD.) CARLOS P.
GARCIA

(pp. 98, CFI rec.).

On August 3, 1961, Secretary Cesar M. Fortich of Agriculture and Natural Resources sustained the findings and re comendations of the
Director of Forestry who concluded that "it would be beneficial to the public interest if the area is made available for exploitation under
certain conditions," and

We quote:
 Respectfully forwarded to the honorable, the Executive Secretary Malacanang. Manila inviting particular attention to
the comment and recommendation of the Director of Forestry in the proceeding in indorsement in which this Of fice
fully concurs.

The observations of responsible forest officials are most revealing of their zeal to promote forest conservation and
watershed protection especially in Olongapo, Zambales area. In convincing fashion, they have demonstrated that to
declare the forest area involved as a forest reserve ratify than open it for timber exploitation under license and
regulation would do more harm than of to the public interest. To convert the area into a forest reserve without an
adequate forest protection force, would make of it a 'Free Zone and Logging Paradise,' to the ever 'Problem Loggers'
of Dinalupihan, Bataan . . . an open target of timber smugglers, kaingineros and other forms of forest vandals and
despoilers. On the other hand, to award the area, as planned, to a reputable and responsible licensee who shall
conduct logging operations therein under the selective logging method and who shall be obliged to employ a
sufficient number of forest guards to patrol and protect the forest consecration and watershed protection.

Worthy of mention is the fact that the Bureau of Forestry had already conducted a public bidding to determine the
most qualified bidder to whom the area advertised should be awarded. Needless to stress, the decision of the
Director of Forestry to dispose of the area thusly was arrived at after much thought and deliberation and after having
been convinced that to do so would not adversely affect the watershed in that sector. The result of the bidding only
have to be announced. To be sure, some of the participating bidders like Mr. Edgardo Pascual, went to much
expense in the hope of winning a virgin forest concession. To suddenly make a turn about of this decision without
strong justifiable grounds, would cause the Bureau of Forestry and this Office no end of embarrassment.

In view of the foregoing, it is earnestly urged that the Director of Forestry be allowed to proceed with the
announcement of the results of the bidding for the subject forest area (p. 13, CFI rec.).

The Office of the President in its 4th Indorsement dated February 2, 1962, signed by Atty. Juan Cancio, Acting Legal Officer,
"respectfully returned to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources for appropriate action," the
papers subject of Forestry Notice No. 2087 which was referred to the Bureau of Forestry for decision (p. 14, CFI rec.).

Finally, of the ten persons who submitted proposed the area was awarded to herein petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, on
April 15, 1963 by the Bureau of Forestry (p. 17, CFI rec.). Against this award, bidders Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao
Happick filed motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Director of Forestry on December 6, 1963.

On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon — who succeeded Secretary Cesar M.
Fortich in office — issued General Memorandum Order No. 46, series of 1963, pertinent portions of which state:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: ... ... ...

(D)elegation of authority to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses.

1. ... ... ...

2. The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (be the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not
exceeding 5,000 hectares each;

3. This Order shall take effect immediately (p. 267, CFI rec.).

Thereafter, Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, replacing secretary Benjamin M.
Gozon. Upon assumption of office he Immediately promulgate on December 19, 19b3 General memorandum Order No. 60, revoking
the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry, under General Memorandum order No. 46, to grant ordinary timber licenses, which
order took effect on the same day, December 19, 1963. Pertinent portions of the said Order read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

SUBJECT: Revocation of General Memorandum Order No 46 dated May 30, 1963 —

1. In order to acquaint the undersigned with the volume and Nature of the work of the Department, the authority
delegated to the Director of forestry under General Memorandum Order No. 46, dated May 30, 1963, to grant (a) new
ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension
of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares each is hereby revoked. Until further notice, the
 issuance of' new licenses , including amendments thereto, shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.

2. This Order shall take effect immediately and all other previous orders, directives, circulars, memoranda, rules and
regulations inconsistent with this Order are hereby revoked (p. 268, CFl rec.; Emphasis supplied).

On the same date that the above-quoted memorandum took effect, December 19, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW)
dated April 22, 1963, in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office
of the Director of Forestry (p. 30, CFI rec.; p. 77, rec.). It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as
required by Order No. 60 aforequoted.

On February 12, 1964, Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be
considered by tile Natural Resources praying that, pending resolution of the appeal filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge
Lao Happick from the order of the Director of Forestry denying their motion for reconsideration, OTI No. 20-'64 in the name of
Wenceslao V. Tan be cancelled or revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing
forestry laws, rules and regulations.

On March 9, 1964, acting on the said representation made by Ravago Commercial Company, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 issued in the name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, as
having been issued by the Director of Forestry without authority, and is therefore void ab initio. The dispositive portion of said order
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office is of the opinion and so holds that O.T. License No. 20-'64 in the
name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan should be, as hereby it is, REVOKED AND DECLARED without force and effect
whatsoever from the issuance thereof.

The Director of Forestry is hereby directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, if there be any,
in the area in question and shall see to it that the appellee shall not introduce any further improvements thereon
pending the disposition of the appeals filed by Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge lao Happick in this case" (pp.
30-31, CFI rec.).

Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion
in an Order dated March 25, 1964, wherein this paragraph appears:

In this connection, it has been observed by the Acting Director of Forestry in his 2nd indorsement of February 12,
1964, that the area in question composes of water basin overlooking Olongapo, including the proposed Olongapo
watershed Reservation; and that the United States as well as the Bureau of Forestry has earmarked this entire
watershed for a watershed pilot forest for experiment treatment Concerning erosion and water conservation and flood
control in relation to wise utilization of the forest, denudation, shifting cultivation, increase or decrease of crop harvest
of agricultural areas influenced by the watershed, etc. .... (pp. 3839, CFI rec.; p. 78, rec.).

On April 11, 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, acting on the separate appeals filed by Jorge Lao Happick and
Ravago Commercial Company, from the order of the Director of Forestry dated April 15, 1963, awarding to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan the
area under Notive No. 2087, and rejecting the proposals of the other applicants covering the same area, promulgated an order
commenting that in view of the observations of the Director of Forestry just quoted, "to grant the area in question to any of the parties
herein, would undoubtedly adversely affect public interest which is paramount to private interests," and concluding that, "for this reason,
this Office is of the opinion and so holds, that without the necessity of discussing the appeals of the herein appellants, the said appeals
should be, as hereby they are, dismissed and this case is considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned" (p. 78, rec.).

On April 18, 1964, on the basis of the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
petitioner-appellant filed the instant case before tile court a quo (Court of First Instance, Manila), Special Civil Action No. 56813, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary prohibitory injunction (pp. 1-12, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant claims
that the respondents-appellees "unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying
petitioner-appellant of the equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law,
and in effect, by impairing the obligation of contracts" (P. 6, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant prayed for judgment making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents- appellees; declaring the orders of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated March 9, March 25, and April 11, 1964, as well as all his acts and those of the Director of Forestry implementing said
orders, and all the proceedings in connection therewith, null and void, unlawful and of no force and effect; ordering the Director of
Forestry to renew OTI No. 20-'64 upon expiration, and sentencing the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner-appellant
the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.000) by way of pecuniary damage, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
by way of moral and exemplary damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000-00) as attorney's fees and costs. The respondents-
appellees separately filed oppositions to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, Ravago Commercial Company, Jorge Lao,
Happick and Atanacio Mallari, presented petitions for intervention which were granted, and they too opposed the writ.
The Director of Forestry in his motion to dismiss dated April 24, 1964, alleges the following grounds: (1) that the court has no
jurisdiction; (2) that the respondents may not be sued without their consent; (3) that the petitioner has not exhausted all available
administrative remedies; (4) that the petition does not state a cause of action; and (5) that purely administrative and discretionary
functions of administrative officials may not be interfered with by the courts. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources joined
the motion to dismiss when in his answer of May 18, 1964, he avers the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) that the court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; (2) that the petitioner has no cause of action; (3) that
venue is improperly laid; (4) that the State is immune from suit without its consent; (5) that the court has no power to interfere in purely
administrative functions; and (6) that the cancellation of petitioner's license was dictated by public policy (pp. 172-177, rec.). Intervenors
also filed their respective answers in intervention with special and affirmative defenses (pp. 78-79, rec.). A hearing was held on the
petition for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, wherein evidence was submitted by all the parties including the intervenors,
and extensive discussion was held both orally and in writing.

After the said hearing, on January 20, 1965, the court a quo, from the evidence received, resolved not only the question on the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction but also the motion to dismiss, declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of
action, and dismissed the same accordingly. To justify such action, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, stated that "the
court feels that the evidence presented and the extensive discussion on the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction should also be taken into consideration in resolving not only this question but also the motion to dismiss, because
there is no reason to believe that the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). His motion for
reconsideration having been denied (p. 488, CFI rec.), petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzons Tan appealed directly to this Court.

Petitioner-appellant now comes before this Court, claiming that the trial court erred in:

(1) holding that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action: and

(2) dismissing the petition [p.27,rec. ].

He argues that the sole issue in the present case is, whether or not the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action (p. 31,
rec.). Petitioner-appellant, in his brief, presented a lengthy discussion on the definition of the term cause of action wherein he
contended that the three essential elements thereon, — namely, the legal right of the plaintiff, the correlative obligation of the
defendants and the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right — are satisfied in the averments of this petition (pp. 31-32,
rec.). He invoked the rule that when the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be
determined only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters aliunde He
further invoked the rule that in a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of cause of action, the facts alleged in the complaint are
deemed hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the motion (pp. 32-33, rec.).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner-appellant's contentions are untenable. As already observed, this case was
presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss for failure of the petition to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Rule
16 [g], Revised Rules of Court), on the ground that the timber license relied upon by the petitioner- appellant in his petition was issued
by the Director of Forestry without authority and is therefore void ab initio. This motion supplanted the general demurrer in an action at
law and, as a rule admits, for the purpose of the motion, ail facts which are well pleaded however while the court must accept as true all
well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit allegations of which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply
to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the
pleadings to be unfounded (Vol. 1, Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., p. 505, citing cases).

It must be noted that there was a hearing held in the instant case wherein answers were interposed and evidence introduced. In the
course of the hearing, petitioner-appellant had the opportunity to introduce evidence in support of tile allegations iii his petition, which he
readily availed of. Consequently, he is estopped from invoking the rule that to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion
to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. If there were no hearing held, as in the case of Cohen vs. U.S.
CCA Minn 1942,129 F. 2d 733), "where the case was presented to District Court upon a motion to dismiss because of alleged failure of
complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and no answer was interposed and no evidence introduced, the only facts
which the court could properly consider in passing upon the motion were those facts appearing in the complaint, supplemented be such
facts as the court judicially knew.

In Llanto vs. Ali Dimaporo, et al. (16 SCRA 601, March 31, 1966), this Court, thru Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, held that the trial court
can properly dismiss a complaint on a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action even without a hearing, by taking into
consideration the discussion in said motion and the opposition thereto. Pertinent portion of said decision is hereby quoted:

Respondents moved to dismiss. Ground therefor is lack of cause of action. The Court below granted the motion,
dismissed the petition. The motion to reconsider failed. Offshoot is this appeal.

1. The threshold questions are these: Was the dismissal order issued without any hearing on the
motion to dismiss? Is it void?
 WE go to the record. The motion to dismiss was filed on February 1, 1961 and set for hearing on February 10
following. On February 8, 1961 petitioner's counsel telegraphed the court, (r)equest postponement motion dismissal
till written opposition filed.' He did not appear at the scheduled hearing. But on March 4, 1961, he followed up his
wire, with his written opposition to the motion to dismiss. Adverting to the 5-page motion to dismiss and the 6-page
opposition thereto, We find that the arguments pro and con on the question of the board's power to abolish
petitioner's position to discussed the problem said profusely cited authorities. The May 15, 1961 8-page court order
recited at length the said arguments and concluded that petitioner made no case.

One good reason for the statutory requirement of hearing on a motion as to enable the suitors to adduce evidence in
support of their opposing claims. But here the motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of cause of action. Existence of
a cause of action or lack of it is determined be a reference to the facts averred in the challenged pleading. The
question raised in the motion is purely one of law. This legal issue was fully discussed in said motion and the
opposition thereto. In this posture, oral arguments on the motion are reduced to an unnecessary ceremony and
should be overlooked. And, correctly so, because the other intendment of the law in requiring hearing on a motion,
i.e., 'to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to give to the latter time to study and meet the arguments of the
motion,' has been sufficiently met. And then, courts do not exalt form over substance (Emphasis supplied).

Furthermore even if the complaint stated a valid cause of action, a motion to dismiss for- insufficiency of cause of action will be granted
if documentary evidence admitted by stipulation disclosing facts sufficient to defeat the claim enabled the court to go beyond disclosure
in the complaint (LOCALS No. 1470, No. 1469, and No. 1512 of the International Longshoremen's Association vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
6 Fed. Rules Service, p. 107; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Dec. 7, 1952; 131 F. 2d 605). Thus, although the evidence of
the parties were presented on the question of granting or denying petitioner-appellant's application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
the trial court correctly applied said evidence in the resolution of the motion to dismiss. Moreover, in applying said evidence in the
resolution of the motion to dismiss, the trial court, in its order dismissing the petition, pointed out that, "there is no reason to believe that
the parties will change their stand, arguments and evidence" (p. 478, CFI rec.). Petitioner-appellant did not interpose any objection
thereto, nor presented new arguments in his motion for reconsideration (pp. 482-484, CFI rec.). This omission means conformity to said
observation, and a waiver of his right to object, estopping him from raising this question for the first time on appeal. " I question not
raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal" (Matienzo vs. Servidad, Sept. 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 276).

Moreover, petitioner-appellant cannot invoke the rule that, when the ground for asking dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, its sufficiency must be determined only from the allegations in the complaint. "The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of
the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Where the rules are merely secondary in importance are made to override the ends of
justice; the technical rules had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial right of a party, said rigid application cannot be
countenanced" (Vol. 1, Francisco, Civil Procedure, 2 ed., 1973, p. 157, citing cases).

What more can be of greater importance than the interest of the public at large, more particularly the welfare of the inhabitants of
Olongapo City and Zambales province, whose lives and properties are directly and immediately imperilled by forest denudation.

The area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license practically comprises the entire Olongapo watershed (p. 265, CFI rec.). It is of
public knowledge that watersheds serves as a defense against soil erosion and guarantees the steady supply of water. As a matter of
general policy, the Philippine Constitution expressly mandated the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which
includes the country's watershed. Watersheds in the Philippines had been subjected to rampant abusive treatment due to various
unscientific and destructive land use practices. Once lush watersheds were wantonly deforested due to uncontrolled timber cutting by
licensed concessionaries and illegal loggers. This is one reason why, in paragraph 27.of the rules and regulations included in the
ordinary timber license it is stated:

The terms and conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that
this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests so require (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.).

Considering the overriding public interest involved in the instant case, We therefore take judicial notice of the fact that, on April 30,
1964, the area covered by petitioner-appellant's timber license has been established as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve by
virtue of Executive Proclamation No. 238 by then President Diosdado Macapagal which in parts read as follows:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1824 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, 1, Diosdado
Macapagal, President of the Philippines do hereby withdraw from entry, sale, or settlement and establish as
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve for watershed, soil protection, and timber production purposes, subject to
private rights, if any there be, under the administration and control of the Director of Forestry, xx the following parcels
of land of the public domain situated in the municipality of Olongapo, province of Zambales, described in the Bureau
of Forestry map No. FR-132, to wit: ... ... (60 O.G. No. 23, 3198).

Petitioner-appellant relies on Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW) for his alleged right over the timber concession in question. He
argues thus: "The facts alleged in the petition show: (1) the legal right of the petitioner to log in the area covered by his timber license;
(2) the legal or corresponding obligation on the part of the respondents to give effect, recognize and respect the very timber license
they issued to the petitioner; and (3) the act of the respondents in arbitrarily revoking the timber license of the petitioner without giving
him his day in court and in preventing him from using and enjoying the timber license issued to him in the regular course of official
business" (p. 32, rec.).

In the light of petitioner-appellant's arguments, it is readily seen that the whole controversy hinges on the validity or invalidity of his
timber license.

WE fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without authority by
then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. WE hereby quote such findings:

In the first place, in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized
to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the
tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420 hectares (Exhs. 2-A and 2-B Ravago, embodied in
Annex B; Exh. B). The petitioner contends that only 1,756 hectares of the said area contain commercial and operable
forest; the authority given to the Director of Forestry to grant a new ordinary timber license of not more than 3,000
hectares does not state that the whole area should be commercial and operable forest. It should be taken into
consideration that the 1,756 hectares containing commercial and operable forest must have been distributed in the
whole area of 6,420 hectares. Besides the license states, 'Please see attached sketch and technical description,'
gives an area of 6,420 hectares and does not state what is the area covered of commmercial and operable forest
(Exh. Ravago Also Annex B of the petition, which was marked as Exhibit B, states:

Under Notice No. 2087, a tract of public forest containing 6,420 hectares located in Olongapo,
Zambales was declared available for timber utilization and development. Pursuant to this Notice,
there were received bid proposals from the following persons: ...

Wherefore, confirming the findings of said Committee, the area described in Notice No. 2087 shall be awarded, as it
is hereby awarded to Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, subject to the following conditions: ... ...

In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority
to grant any license. The license was signed by the Acting Director of Forestry on December 19, 1963, and released
to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 (Exh. RavaGo The authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant a new
ordinary timber license was contained in general memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963. This was revoked
by general memorandum order No. 60, which was promulgated on December 19, 1963. In view thereof, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and said license is therefore
void ab initio (pp. 479480, CFI rec.).

The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date
the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked. But, what is of greatest importance is the date of the release or issuance, and not
the date of the signing of the license. While petitioner-appellant's timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was
released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director
of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any
legal right under such void license. This is evident on the face of his petition as supplemented by its annexes which includes Ordinary
Timber License No. 20-'64 (NEW). Thus, in the case of World Wide Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. vs. Macrohon, et al. (105 Phil. 250,
Feb. 28, 1959), this Court held that if from the face of the complaint, as supplemented by its annexes, plaintiff is not the owner, or
entitled to the properties it claims to have been levied upon and sold at public auction by the defendants and for which it now seeks
indemnity, the said complaint does not give plaintiff any right of action against the defendants. In the same case, this Court further held
that, in acting on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot separate the complaint from its annexes where it clearly appears that the claim
of the plaintiff to be the A owner of the properties in question is predicated on said annexes. Accordingly, petitioner-appellant's petition
must be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.

II

Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no avail as respondents-appellees
have failed, neglected, refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-appellant to continue operation in the area covered by his
timber license. He further alleged that he has neither recourse by way of appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except thru this special civil action, as the last official act of the respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in declaring void the timber license referred to above after denying petitioner-appellant's motion for reconsideration,
is the last administrative act. Petitioner-appellant relies on the case of Demaisip vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (106 Phil. 237, Sept.
24, 1959), wherein it was held that the failure of the plaintiff to appeal from the adverse decision of the Secretary to the President
cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of
the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is
disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. the Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451; p. 7, CFI rec.).

To this We cannot agree. Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private
exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on
appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs. Fuertes (5 SCRA 399, 400, June 29, 1962), held that:

At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of
the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of
the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative
remedies, is untenable.

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.

In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps (22 Phil. 491-92, July 22, 1912), this Court stressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, thus:

When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the
government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. Jao Igco vs. Shuster, 10 Phil.
Rep. 448; Ekiu vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 651; U.S. vs. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161; U.S. vs. Ju Toy 198 U.S. 253; Chill Yow vs.
U.S., 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201). The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can
be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and
some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive
department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department
of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department
are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed
and modified by them" (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate
remedy (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., 54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956). In the case at bar, petitioner- appellant's speedy and
adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the Philippines.

Accordingly, "it is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved n certiorari is jurisdiction, either want of
jurisdiction or excess thereof, and abuse of discretion shall warrant the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the
same is so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law" FS Divinagracia Agro-Commercial Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 191 [April .1,
1981]). The foregoing is on the assumption that there is any irregularity, albeit there is none in the acts or omissions of the respondents-
appellees. certiorari is not a substitute for appeal as held time and again by this Court (People vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465), "it being
a time honored and well known principle that before seeking judicial redress, a party must first exhaust the administrative remedies
available" (Garcia vs. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 944, April 18, 1969).

Moreover, from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources complained of, petitioners had a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy by appealing therefrom to the Chief Executive. In other words, before filing the present action for certiorari in the court
below, they should have availed of this administrative remedy and their failure to do so must be deemed fatal to their case [Calo vs.
Fuertes, et al., G.R. No. L-16537, June 29,1962]. To place petitioners' case beyond the pale of this rule, they must show that their case
falls — which it does not — within the cases where, in accordance with our decisions, the aggrieved party need not exhaust
administrative remedies within his reach in the ordinary course of the law [Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the
U.P., G.R. No. L-17532, March 30, 1963; Mangubat vs. Osmena, G.R. No. L- 12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez,
G. R. No. L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, G.R. No. L-11959, Oct. 31, 1959; Marinduque Iron Mines, etc. vs.
Secretary of Public Works, G.R. No. L-15982, May 31, 1963; Alzate vs. Aldaba, G.R. No. L-14407, Feb. 29, 1960 and Demaisip vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 13000, Sept. 25, 1959] (Ganob vs. Ramas, 27 SCRA 1178, April 28, 1969).

III

Petitioner-appellant not only failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but also failed to note that his action is a suit against the
State which, under the doctrine of State immunity from suit, cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued Kawananakoa
vs. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349; Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152; Sec. 16, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution).

The respondents-appellees, in revoking the petitioner-appellant's timber license, were acting within the scope of their authority.
Petitioner-appellant contends that "this case is not a suit against the State but an application of a sound principle of law whereby
administrative decisions or actuations may be reviewed by the courts as a protection afforded the citizens against oppression" (p. 122,
CFI rec.). But, piercing the shard of his contention, We find that petitioner-appellant's action is just an attempt to circumvent the rule
establishing State exemption from suits. He cannot use that principle of law to profit at the expense and prejudice of the State and its
citizens. The promotion of public welfare and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest of
the State. Accordingly, "the rule establishing State exeraiption from suits may not be circumvented by directing the action against the
officers of the State instead of against the State itself. In such cases the State's immunity may be validly invoked against the action as
long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the State and not merely those of the officer
nominally made party defendant" (SINCO, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 35; Salgado vs. Ramos, 64 Phil. 724; see also Angat River
Irrigation System vs. Angat River Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-10943-44, Dec. 28, 1957, 102 Phil. 789, 800-802; Mobil PhiL vs. Customs
Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120, 1121-1125; Bureau of Printing vs. Bureau of Printing Employees' Association, 1 SCRA 340, 341,
343).

Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State,
representatives of the sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. A private individual cannot issue a timber license.

Consequently, a favorable judgment for the petitioner-appellant would result in the government losing a substantial part of its timber
resources. This being the case, petitioner-appellant's action cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.

IV

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license.
As pointed out earlier, paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and
conditions of this license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire
at an earlier date, when public interests so require" (Exh. D, p. 22, CFI rec.). A timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this ceise

"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal,
state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation" (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin 54 O.G. 7576). In the case of Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal (56 Phil. 123), it was
held that:

A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be
deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when public interests so require.

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power
(Surigao Electric Co., Inc. vs. Municipality of Surigao, 24 SCRA 898, Aug. 30, 1968). The State has inherent power enabling it to
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety, and welfare of society (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, Oct. 24,1970).

As provided in the aforecited provision, timber licenses are subject to the authority of the Director of Forestry. The utilization and
disposition of forest resources is directly under the control and supervision of the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section 1831 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that forest products shall be cut, gathered and removed from any forest only upon license
from the Director of Forestry, it is no less true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of Forestry is subject to the control of the
Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (See. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code), who, therefore, may impose
reasonable regulations in the exercise of the powers of the subordinate officer" (Director of Forestry vs. Benedicto, 104 SCRA 309, May
5, 1981). The power of control of the Department Head over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts
of subordinate officials (Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 30 SCRA 134, Oct. 31, 1969;
Montano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 144, 147-148). Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There being supporting evidence, the
revocation of petitioner-appellant's timber license was a wise exercise of the power of the respondent- appellee (Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources) and therefore, valid.

Thus, "this Court had rigorously adhered to the principle of conserving forest resources, as corollary to which the alleged right to them
of private individuals or entities was meticulously inquired into and more often than not rejected. We do so again" (Director of Forestry
vs. Benedicto, supra). WE reiterate Our fidelity to the basic policy of conserving the national patrimony as ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY .AFFIRMED IN TOTO. COSTS
AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLANT.

SO ORDERED,
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16537 June 29, 1962

FRANCISCO C. CALO, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents-appellees.

Calo, Calo and Calo for petitioner-appellant.

Ismael B. Sanchez and Jalandoni and Jamir for respondent-appellee Delfin C. Fuertes.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.

PADILLA, J.:chanrobles virtual law library

In Bureau of Lands Claim No. 224 (N), Lot No. 143-A, Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo,
claimant-contestant, vs. H.A. No. 86871 (E-40476) Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands
rendered on 12 April 1956 an opinion denying a dismissing former's claim and contest against the Homestead
Application No. 86871 (E-40476) of Delfin C. Fuertes, was ordering him to vacate the premises within sixty days from
receipt of a copy of the opinion, and stating that upon finality thereof homestead patent would be issued to Delfin C.
Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands on 25 January 1957, Francisco C.
Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, docketed as DANR case No. 1549. On 28
February 1958 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources modified the opinion of the Director of Lands -

. . . in the sense that Delfin C. Fuertes should reimburse Francisco C. Calo of the difference between the value of the
improvements the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by
him therefrom within thirty (30) days from advice by the Director of Lands who is hereby directed to determine the
aforementioned difference within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.

Still dissatisfied with the above opinion, Francisco C. Calo asked the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to
reconsider it but the latter denied a reconsideration thereof. Hence, on 1 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo appealed to
the President of the Philippines (Annex A Answer, p. 54, rec. of case No. 55), but on 8 August 1958 he withdrew it
before the President of the Philippines could act thereon (Annex A to memorandum of the petitioner, p. 64, rec. of
case No. 55).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 22 August 1958 Francisco C. Calo filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined; that if a bond be needed for the purpose he was willing to
file it; that after hearing the injunction be made final and permanent; that the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes pay him
P18,000 as damages and attorney's fees and costs of the suit; that he be declared the owner entitled to possess the
parcel of land subject of the litigation; and for any other just and equitable relief (special civil case No.
55).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On 24 December 1958 the respondent Delfin C. Fuertes filed an answer and, on 27 December 1958, an amended
answer to the petition; on 29 December 1958 and 3 January 1959 the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Director of Lands, respectively, filed their answers. After a preliminary hearing as provided
for in section 5, Rule 8, of the Rules of Court, on 31 July 1959 the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of
which is -

WHEREFORE, for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative
remedies available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses
the herein petition with costs against petitioner.

The petitioner appealed, but as only a question of law is raised, the Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This appeal has not been perfected within the reglementary period, as provided for in section 17, Rule 41, for
although the notice of appeal was filed on 31 August 1959 (p. 77, record of case No. 55) or on the 13th day from the
receipt of case No. 55) the appeal bond was filed on 18 September 1959 (p. 78, record of case No. 55) or on the 31st
day after notice of judgment. This is enough to dispose of the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of
the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of
the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands he had exhausted all the administrative
remedies, is untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto.
Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last step he should take in an administrative
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court lies only when
"there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar,
appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner.1chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner-appellant.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Endnotes:

1Diego vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 54 OFF. Gaz. 956.

 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO
D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:

The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries in front of the Department
of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church
leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers cause.

The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision1 of the Office of the President (OP), issued through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four
(144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution2 on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution
modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and
ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?

The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and set aside the Win-Win
Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from
implementing the said Resolution.

Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the Win-Win Resolution issued by the
Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject matter, which had already become final and
executory?

The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as follows:

1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 143713 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.

2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and
Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.

3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire
144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.4cräläwvirtualibräry

4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition
with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject
land until further orders.5cräläwvirtualibräry
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May 21,
1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct
summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the
summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject
property.

6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR Regional
Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR
Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto;
and (c) directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until
further orders.6cräläwvirtualibräry

7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of petitioner
NQSRMDC.7cräläwvirtualibräry

8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich,
passed Resolution No. 6,8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of
the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.

9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent portions of
which we quote:

Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in
Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity
to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.

Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of five percent (5%)
of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition.

On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11
December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association).

Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint Committee Report
submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1
February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by
NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to have the following components:

1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education;
Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum,
Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;

2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn products;
rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food
delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and
prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir
needing about 67 hectares;

3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo
estimated to cover 33 hectares; and

4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing
project covering an area of 20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and
Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by
the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional
Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive
Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and
Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon,
thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion
as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by
the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will provide more economic
benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be
generated by the projects to be put up x x x.

On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan Elementary School on 18
March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of
the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the project.

Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary
Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order
denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead,
placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified
beneficiaries on the following grounds:

1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;

2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);

3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;

4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference to Memo
Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.

A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was
denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995).9cräläwvirtualibräry

10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the property.10cräläwvirtualibräry

11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed11 the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for
the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.

12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction,12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.

13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao, after
conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum13 to the President favorably endorsing the
project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the
province for the conversion of the land.

14. Also, in a memorandum14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary
of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to
industrial/institutional use with a request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the
land in question.

15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution15 ordering the parties to
observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR,
through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the
applications of farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the
petition.16cräläwvirtualibräry

16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a
Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent
portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was
based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with
merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities
for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the
municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there
are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility it maybe
appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the
area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the
lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several
years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.

On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing
policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was
declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992.
Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject
property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with
Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering
petitioners land.

On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed substantially to
the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and
another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have
not received just compensation up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries
hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already
stated.

Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes
be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of
their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no
room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their
local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the favorable
recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994
of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.17cräläwvirtualibräry

17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.

18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4)
hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School. 18cräläwvirtualibräry

When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that the title over
the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT
No. T-5026419 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-
beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-353620 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.

19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint21 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and
injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 199722 and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or
wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order24 was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs
motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order
further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.

21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the President.

22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged
farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC
case.

23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in
Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-
beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P.
Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set
aside.25cräläwvirtualibräry

24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance within the
framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary
Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem. 26cräläwvirtualibräry

25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing the so-called Win/Win
Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four
(44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of
Agriculture.

2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found
to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with
RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the
highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other
concerned government agencies are directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the
area, valuation of the property and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-
beneficiaries.

3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine who
among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just
compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other
lands previously surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.

5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of
Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.

We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without ruling on the
propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.

SO ORDERED.27cräläwvirtualibräry

A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 199728 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition
for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel,
claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform
beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed 30 by the
petitioners.

In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was
prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda
Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely
political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been
declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.31Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction
when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997.32 They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari
because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 33 They never filed a
motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a
futile exercise to seek a reconsideration .34cräläwvirtualibräry

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed outright on the
following grounds:

(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals in
accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win Resolution before filing the
present petition; and

(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the motion for intervention
filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.

Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw
a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.35 On the other hand,
an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.36 This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions,38 including the Office of the President,39 may be taken to the Court of Appeals
by filing a verified petition for review40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution,41 whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.42cräläwvirtualibräry

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the
present petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal 43 and was issued with grave
abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction44 when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other
words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by
an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of
Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxx.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of the lower court or
quasi-judicial body is wholly void.45cräläwvirtualibräry

The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified
petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of
the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court
or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari,46 prohibition47 and mandamus.48 But the jurisdiction of these three
(3) courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the
Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et.
al.,49 through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of
First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although
prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,51 Torres vs.
Arranz,52 Bercero vs. De Guzman,53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.54 As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.

Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice55 and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as
correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by
the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void
and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time
and money.

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:56cräläwvirtualibräry

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case."

As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is
not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity,57 as will be taken up later.

With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition for certiorari,
prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97)
with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.

We disagree.

The rule is that:

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this
case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no
jurisdiction (citations omitted).

The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid down in the 1986
case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as
follows:

There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.'58cräläwvirtualibräry

It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for determining
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show
that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the
nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject
property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the
DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and
void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3)
without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from the said two
cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7,
1997, which resolution was issued long after the previous two cases were instituted.

The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-
beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in
their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said
document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other
words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 59 Undoubtedly,
movants interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier, null and void.
Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.

Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can still be substantially
modified by the Win-Win Resolution.

We rule in the negative.

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in
Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:

SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special
laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a
motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final
and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its
jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President
has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to
be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be
filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said
motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably
filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President
in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.

In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.60 we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long become final and
executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their
finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v.
Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers
and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v.
Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must
reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and
for all.61 This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has
attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a 1918
case,63 is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.64cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued
by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave
To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
Syllabi/Synopsis

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999]

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP), Petitioner, v. PERLITA

BATHAN-VELASCO, Officer in Charge, Bureau of Labor Relations, ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR
BETTER SSS (ACCESS), SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
prayer for temporary restraining order, filed by Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA), seeking to
annul and set aside the Order of the Bureau of Labor Relations1 dismissing the election protests or motions to annul
the certification elections among the rank and file SSS employees.

On September 28, 1989, respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better Social Security System (ACCESS) filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees of respondent Social Security System (SSS).

On August 24, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered a certification election to be conducted among the rank
and file employees of the Social Security System in its main office and regional branches.

Petitioner Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) was one of the contending parties in
the certification election, with respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) as the other
party.

On October 11, 1991, the certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378 votes, SSSEA obtaining
1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes.2cräläwvirtualibräry

On October 16, 1991, SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or motion to annul the
certification Election. Director Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in an Order dated March 20, 1992, denied the
protest and/or motion.

On September 29, 1992, SSSEA filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the SSS
Regional Office After October 11, 1991.

On November 18, 1992, respondent Velasco denied the Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections
in the Regional Offices After October 11, 1991, declared ACCESS the winner in the certification election, and certified
ACCESS as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose
of negotiating an agreement with the latter.3cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 25, 1993, respondent Velasco denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. 4 The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. 5 This rule would not only give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary
and premature resort to courts.6cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations to the
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies, a
premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.

Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public respondent. Petitioner
argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because of the pendency of a formal charge of a
company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with the bureau of Labor Relations.8 Petitioner further contends
that no certification election was held in the regional offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in
incomplete certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner of the
election.

Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.9 Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.10cräläwvirtualibräry

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.