Torts and damages Case digests part I

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

Facts: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk.
He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company. Every day, he comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he
works and he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him to ride the trains free of
charge.

One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack
of watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward
possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.

Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the city of Manila where
an examination was made and his arm was amputated.

He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages
from the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge
concluded that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless,
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company,
and the plaintiff appealed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that the breach was due
to the negligence of their servant.
2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.

Held:

(1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due
to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the
selection and control of the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above
stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily
follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that
each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, and the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at
all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their
selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising
ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression,
that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.

(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent
to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The Company’s platform was constructed upon a level higher than
that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot
where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of
cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.

Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by
no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have
been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.

Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
mind with regard either to the length of the step, which he was required to take, or the character of
the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Daywalt vs. La Corporacion De Los Padres Agustinos Recoletos

Facts:
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo
W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They agreed that a deed should be executed
as soon as Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens
title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property
measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she
became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so
large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for
specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt.
Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp.,
w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also
Torts and damages Case digests part I

happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and
ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence of
other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her
from conveying the entire tract.
Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced
Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land inquestion and to
withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalt’s claim for damages against the Recoletos was for
the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because of the interference of
the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property
and its conversion into a sugar mill.
Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt?
Held: No, it is not liable.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively
liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he
intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to
consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia
cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too
remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt, neither
can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the
contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in
the contract.
Rakes vs. Atlantic

Facts: The plaintiff Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard
near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The
defendant Atlantic, has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car
or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At
a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated
at about the knee.

In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its
part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully
build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the
roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to
repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was
pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not
walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees
moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction
given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of
the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car.

Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes.

Held: While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed
in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to all
the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that
the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being
made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger
contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and
the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the event giving occasion
for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the
act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element
of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of
the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction
with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.

PSBA vs. CA

Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). His parents
filed a suit in the RTC of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At
the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were
elements from outside the school.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

PSBA sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are being sued under Art 2180 of
the Civil, the complaint lacks a cause of action because they, as an academic institution, were
beyond the ambit of the rule . The courts denied the motion.

ISSUE: Is the PSBA liable under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code?

HELD: Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of
in loco parentis. Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted
by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils
or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable. However, it does not necessarily follow that
PSBA is exculpated from liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. The
school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other
hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules
and regulations.

Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows
that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise
only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented the Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there
obtains a contract. Jurisprudence indicates that should the act which breaches a contract be done
in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, there is no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in In the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes
material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the
school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.

As the proceedings have yet to commence, only the trial court can make a determination of material
facts.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Air France vs. Carrascoso

Facts:

Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a ‘first class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in ‘first class’, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a ‘white man’ who, the Manager alleged had a better right to the
seat. When asked to vacate his ‘first class’ seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendant’s Manager
that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they
found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the ‘white man’
and plaintiff reluctantly gave his ‘first class’ seat in the plane.

Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome.
The CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascos’s plane ticket.

Issue: WON Carrascoso’s action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of bad
faith, entitling him to the award of damages.

Held: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the
Bangkok-Teheran leg. The said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok.

The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendant’s Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of
threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane
to give the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, a ‘white man’ whom he (defendant’s manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant
has not proved that this ‘white man’ had any ‘better right’ to occupy the ‘first class’ seat that the
plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class ticket was issued.

The responsibility of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner’s manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

“ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So
it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Thus, “Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger’s check, it was a breach of contract
and tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her,
that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection; though the language
used was not insulting and she was not ejected. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is
“contractual both in origin and nature” the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort”. And in
another case, “Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when the conductor came to collect his fare,
tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that
as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using insulting
language to him, as by calling him a lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held
the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.

Petitioner’s contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscoso’s
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.

Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample
to power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have “acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner”. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this
legal precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.

Andamo vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of Respondent Corporation, water paths and contrivances (including an artificial
lake) were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land; caused a young
man to drown; damaged petitioners' crops and plants; washed away costly fences; endangered the
lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons; and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction.

Issue: Whether or not a corporation, which has built water paths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be
held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Held: A careful examination of the complaint shows that the action is one under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Clearly, the waterpaths and contrivances built by Respondent Corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between
the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action, if
proven, constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.

Dulay v. CA

Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay
occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.

The widow of Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against the employer and the security guard
and prayed to be awarded actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. She alleges that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligence as Torzuela, their employee:

“Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury, while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury.”

SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid
cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the
scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent
(dolo), the civil liability therefore is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which
states:

"ARTICLE 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable."
Torts and damages Case digests part I

1. However, petitioner contends further that Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall govern and
that it is independent from the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code.

2. That the act of Torzuela is actionable under Article 33 of the New Civil Code:

"ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Issue: Whether or not the civil action is founded on quasi-delict and should the employer be held
jointly liable for damages. Whether or not physical injuries include consummated homicide for
Article 33 to apply in the case

Held: Yes to both issues. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional.

Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA. However, the term "physical
injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno
v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide

Custodio vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment in Interior P. Burgos St. Taguig, Metro
Manila. There were tenants occupying the apartment at the time of purchase. Taking P. Burgos St.
as the point of reference, on the left side going to Mabasa’s apartment, the row of houses are as
follows: That of Custodio, then of Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is that of Morato
and a septic tank. The first passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St. is through these houses.
The second passageway goes through the septic tank, with a width of less than 1 meter.

Sometime later, one of the apartment’s tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises and saw
that the Santoses built an adobe fence, making the first passageway narrower. Morato also built an
adobe fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. Then the remaining tenants
vacated the area. Santos claimed that she built the fence because of an incident involving her
daughter and a passing bicycle. She also mentioned that some drunk tenants would bang their
doors and windows.

The RTC granted a right of way and damages in favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA
modified it, ordering an award of damages to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way and
award of damages in the SC.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Issue: Whether or Not the award of damages is proper.

Held: Firstly, the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of way, because
they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become final. As to the award of damages, the
CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio, and damage
resulting to Mabasa. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause
of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach
or wrong. In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing in favor of Mabasa.
The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enjoyment of one’s property in a general
and ordinary manner. Nobody can complain of being injured here, because the inconvenience
arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.

Elcano vs. Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the
occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and, under laws effective at the time, also legally married.
Reginald is still living and receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was
acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.”

Issues:
(1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the present civil action for damages?
(2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?

Held:

1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish his liability arising
from quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required in the criminal case differs from that
required in a civil suit. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient.

The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil Code provides that
“Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.”

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also criminally
charged, to recover damages on both scores. And assuming awards made in the two cases vary, he
would be entitled only to the bigger award of the two.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

In other words, the extinction of civil liability refers exclusively to the civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability arising from quasidelict is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.

2. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of the minor,
such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father
and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not mean
that he is no longer under the responsibility of his parents.

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore,
Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

However, inasmuch as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case reached the Supreme Court),
it is a matter of equity that the liability of Atty. Hill should be declared merely subsidiary to that
of his son.

Note: In this case, there is no doubt that Reginald killed Elcano. His acquittal is based on “lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake” and not on the non-commission of the acts alleged.

Tamargo vs CA

Facts: A case based on quasi-delict was filed against the natural parents of Adelberto Bundoc, a
minor, who shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which caused her death. Prior to the incident,
Adelberto has been the subject of adoption proceedings filed by Rapisura spouses and after the
incident, the same was granted. In the Bundocs’ answer, they said that the Rapisuras are the ones
who should be liable since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment
a successful petition was filed.

Issue: Who should be liable for the minor’s acts?

Held: Parental authority is not retroactively transferred to the adopting parents especially with
regard to quasi-delicts. The New Civil Code states that the father and the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of the vicarious
liability rests upon the negligence in the obligation to supervise and control the minor, and since
the ones exercising parental authority and had physical custody pending the adoption proceedings
are still the natural parents over the child, they should be the ones liable for any damage caused.

Philippine Rabbit vs. Philippine American

Facts: In the complaint for damages filed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and Pangalangan
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24,
1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the
national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan
Torts and damages Case digests part I

suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus
depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.

The case was dismissed based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in an
action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Do the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise"
(dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code,
formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the
reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage
arose?

Held: No. Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the
context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the
sense of "employer". (manager is different from employer in the sense of article 2180)

Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was
not alleged in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a
business conduit of Balingit. That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be
pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one
and the same civil personality. This issue was not raised in the lower court. The legal issue, which
Philippine Rabbit and Pangalangan can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised in the
lower court and which is within the issues framed by

Filamer vs. IAC

Facts: The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the
decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990, which ruled that Filamer is not liable for the
injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose
acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a
working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He
was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to
take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. Allan Masa turned
over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb,
and viewing that the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. The Pinoy jeep hit Potenciano Kapunan.

Issue: Is Filamer, Funtecha’s employer, liable?

Held: Yes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house,
Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his
enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was
intended by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for
which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond
the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes
of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage.

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner
anchors its defense, was promulgated only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the
provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. It is merely a guide to the enforcement
of the substantive law on labor.

The reliance on said rule is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. There is
evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from
the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a
legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)."

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or
was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden
of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection
of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees
Funtecha and Allan.

Filamer thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by
which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it
the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under
Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the
negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff.

Amadora vs. CA
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Facts: Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its
auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. Daffon was convicted of homicide
thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, a civil action for damages was filed against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.

The Court of Appeals, in reversing the CFI’s decision, found that Article 2180 was not applicable
as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution
of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun
and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents.

Earlier, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol
but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action.
As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo,
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso.

Issues: Does Article 2180 apply only to cases of tort which occur in schools of arts and trades?
When is a student said to be in the “custody” of the school?

Held: The Court held that Article 2180 should apply to all schools regardless of its academic or
non-academic status, since there is no substantial difference between the two insofar as
supervision, advice and insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. This is in line
with the dissenting opinion penned by Justice JBL Reyes in Exconde v. Capuno. The Court cannot
see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis
only of the nature of their respective schools. No plausible reason exists for relaxing that vigilance
simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school
is non-academic. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing
that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable
if the school were non-academic.

Further, following reddendo singgula singulis, in reading the provision, “teachers" should apply
to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word
"apprentices." The latter can be traced from history, back when schools of arts and trades were
engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades
was such, a master, and was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually
even boarded with him and came under his constant control, supervision and influence.

As regards the second issue, the Court held that while the custody requirement does not mean that
the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be
within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence
Torts and damages Case digests part I

of the injury. The student is deemed to be in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not
yet begun or has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises
in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and
even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Ca

Facts: Lydia Geronimo is the proprietress of a school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a group of
parents complained before Geronimo that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and
Sprite that their children bought from her store. Geronimo examined her stock and found that there
were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the
Department of Health Regional Office and was informed that the soda samples she sent were
adulterated.

Because of this, the canteen had to close down due to the big drop in its sales of soft drinks. On
Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. According
to Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on breach of warranty, more particularly Article 1561, the
action should have been brought within six months from the delivery of the goods.

Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and
prescription. It contends that the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising
from the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimo’s
cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed
within six months from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code.
Geronimo claims that the cause of action is based on injury to her right and can be brought within
four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the civil code.

Issue: Has the action prescribed? Can Geronimo’s action based on quasi-delict exist despite the
pre-existing contract of sale?

Held: While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general
rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.

In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands," this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held,
however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view
has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascosa,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from
his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for,
although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature
x x x the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.'''
Torts and damages Case digests part I

Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file the case, reckoned from the time the cause of action
accrued.

Jimenez vs. City of Manila

Facts:
Petitioner Bernardino Jimenez bought bagoong in the Sta. Ana Public Market on a rainy day. It
was flooded by ankle-deep and dirty rainwater. When petitioner turned around, he stepped on a
uncovered drainage opening, causing a 4-inch rusty nail to penetrate his leg. Petitioner fell sick
and was unable to supervise his bus business for a long time. He sued the City of Manila and
Asiatic Integrated Corp. as an administrator of the said public market. The trial court sentenced
the City of Manila and Asiatic Solidarily liable for damages. On appeal, the CA modified and held
that only Asiatic is liable. Hence this petition. HELD – City of Manila liable under article 2189 of
the Civil code.

Issue: Whether the City of Manila is liable for the injuries suffered by the petitioner despite the
contract and the revised Charter of Manila.

Held: YES

The Revised Charter of Manila establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for “damages or injury to the persons or property arising from the failure of city officers”
to enforce the provisions of the said Act, “or any other law or ordinance or from negligence” of
the City “Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions”

On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides that provinces, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for the damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their
control or supervisions.”

The said article constitutes a particular prescription making “provinces, cities and municipalities…
liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason” – specifically –
“of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.” In other words the Revised Charter of Manila refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while article 2189 of the Civil
Code governs liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other public works” in
particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case.

Dingcong vs. Kanaan

Facts: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper floor of house owned by Emilia Saenz, where they
established and managed the Central Hotel. A guest by the name of Francisco Echivarria occupied
Room No. 10 of the hotel for P30. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor the house
Torts and damages Case digests part I

of Saenz and where they established a store named "American Bazaar" dedicated to the buy and
sell of articles and merchandise.

Echivarria, before going to bed, let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing
repairs. A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water, but still
the bucket overflowed. Water seeped through the floor and the merchandise in the bazaar below
got wet and caused damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerable amount in 1941). The Kanaans
brought an action for damages against the managers, the brothers Dingcong, and Echivarria.
During trial one of the Dingcong brothers died, but suit continued against the surviving Dingcong.

Issue: Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages.

Held: Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who, by his negligence in
leaving the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the ground and wet the articles and
merchandise of the Kanaans.

Jose Dingcong, the surviving co-renter and manager of the hotel, had complete possession of the
house, and consequently must also be responsible for the damages caused. As a co-lessee and
manager of the hotel, the Dingcongs have to answer for the damage caused by things that
thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil).

The Dingcongs likewise failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
the damages. They knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, as managers, they should
have presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal
with the problem of the leaks.