Pp v.
Mendoz Parish Church in Bocaue, Bulacan and lived in
a, 254 SCRA 18 (1996)
[G.R. No. 113791. February 22, 1996.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. ROLANDO MENDOZA, Accused-
Appellant.
Maria Gina Avila Mendoza, a mother of three
young children, was put to fire in her home in
Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, on 22 November
1989. She suffered extensive second to fourth
degree burns and died of hypostatic pneumonia
and infected fourth degree burns on 30
November 1989. Her husband, Accused-
appellant Rolando Mendoza, was charged with
the crime of parricide in an information filed on
29 June 1990 with Branch 8 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The accusatory
portion thereof read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
That on or about the 22nd day of November,
1989, in the municipality of Sta. Maria, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Rolando Mendoza, armed with a
kerosene gas [sic] and with intent to kill his wife
Maria Gina Mendoza, with whom he was united
in lawful wedlock, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
burn with the kerosene gas he was then
provided, the said Maria Gina Mendoza which
directly caused her death.
Contrary to law. 1
Trial on the merits was had after accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty at his
arraignment. 2
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Paul
Michael Mendoza, a five-year old child of the
victim and the accused-appellant; Jhun Avila,
Teofisto Avila, and Rodora Avila, the victim’s
brother, father, and sister, respectively; and Dr.
Nieto M. Salvador, the Medico-Legal Officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On
its part, the defense presented the accused-
appellant himself and Erlinda Porciuncula, a
childhood friend.
The testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution established the following
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The accused-appellant and the victim were
married on 30 January 1985 at the Sto. Cristo
Balasing, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 3 Their union bore
three children: Paul Michael, the eldest, who was
born on 7 June 1985, 4 John-John, and Paula, the
youngest. 5
In the evening of 22 November 1989, the
accused-appellant and his wife were in their
residence with their children. At around 4:00
a.m. the next morning, relatives of the accused-
appellant went to the house of Jhun Avila (the
victim’s brother) in Wawa, Balagtas, Bulacan,
and informed him that his sister Gina "got
burned." Two hours later, Jhun and his father
Teofisto Avila went to the house of Gina and her
husband, only to discover that the latter were
not there. They found the things inside the
house in disarray; saw a Coke bottle which
smelled of kerosene, hair strands and burned
human flesh in the comfort room; and the
burned clothes of Gina outside the house. They
also noticed that the branches and;eaves of the
atienza tree in front of the house were likewise
somewhat burned. They proceeded to a
neighbor’s house where Paul Michael, John-John,
and Paula were temporarily sheltered. Paul
Michael was sitting in a corner and somewhat
"tulala," while Paula was sleeping. Jhun then
brought the children to his house. 6
As Erlinda Porciuncula informed the Avila
family that Gina had been brought to the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital in Pasay City, Teofisto, Jhun,
and Rodora proceeded there. 7 According to
Jhun, however, they were not able to talk to Gina
that day as she was inside the operating room. It
was only after two days that Jhun was able to
see Gina, who lay "naked with all the hospital
gadget[s] in the mouth and at the head and she
was completely bald and her body was burned."
8 Jhun likewise testified that Gina was unable to
talk to her sister Rodora nor her father Teofisto.
9
Gina died on 30 November 1989. Dr. Noel
Minay, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI,,
conducted the autopsy and determined the
cause of death to be "hypostatic pneumonia;
infected 4th degree burns" ; 10 and in his
Autopsy Report, 11 he entered the following
post-mortem findings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Burns, extensive, second to fourth degree, with
skin grafts, excepting the back of the neck and
head, pelvic area, buttocks, whole of the back,
posterior aspect of the right leg, and lower
anterior third of the leg and foot, left side.
Lungs, with foci of consoliditions at the bases;
transections shows (sic) yellowish mucoid
material in the lower part of the tracheo-
bronchial tree.
Brain and other visceral organs, marked
congestion.
Stomach contains small amount of yellowish
fluid material.
This report also indicated that the cause of
death was "HYPOSTATIC PNEUMONIA;
INFECTED FOURTH DEGREE BURNS."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Dr. Nieto M. Salvador testified on the
certification and autopsy report, in view of Dr.
Minay’s resignation from the NBI sometime
after he examined the cadaver of the victim. 12
In the evening of 30 November 1989, Jhun told
Paul Michael that his mother Gina had died. Paul
Michael then narrated to him what actually
happened to his mother that fateful evening.
Because of these revelations and the findings of
the doctor, Jhun reported the matter to the
police authorities in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 13
Jhun Avila had gone five times to the residence
of Gina and the accused-appellant from 23
November 1989 to 30 November 1989, yet he
did not see the accused-appellant; in fact, the
latter never showed up during the wake nor
burial of Gina. It was only when the accused-
appellant was arrested in the house of a woman
in Longos, Balagtas, Bulacan, 14 that Jhun saw
him for the first time after the incident.
The medical expenses incurred for the
hospitalization of Gina amounted to P88,750.00,
of which, her parents were able to pay only
P18,000.00. For the balance, Teofisto had to sign
a promissory note to be paid on installments. 15
As to how Gina was burned, only five-year old
Paul Michael could testify thereon.
In his testimony during the presentation of the
evidence in chief on 18 February 1991, Paul
Michael declared that one evening inside their
house, his father boxed his mother on her mouth
and then tied her up. However, the witness did
not answer succeeding questions which sought
to elicit what happened thereafter, although he
kept on looking at his father throughout this
period. He later revealed that he saw matches
and kerosene in their house. He likewise
declared that his mother was now in heaven
because she was dead. 16 During his rebuttal
testimony on 12 October 1992, Paul Michael
categorically declared that it was his father who
"burned" his mother. The accused-appellant,
who was drunk at that time, first tied the
victim’s hands behind her back, then "poured
kerosene" on the front of her body and set her
aflame. Paul Michael further declared that his
father tied-up his mother because they
quarreled when his mother wanted him (Paul
Michael) to go with the accused-appellant to the
street corner, but his father refused. Finally,
many times before, his parents quarreled
because his father was always drunk. 17
Pertinent portions of Paul Michael’s testimony
on rebuttal are as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Q When your father Rolando Mendoza testified
on direct examination, he stated that when he
returned to your house in Balasing, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan on November 22, 1989, he saw your
mother was jumping up and down while her
dress was already burning. What can you say
about that?
A It is not true, Sir.
Q Why do you say that it is not true?
A Because it was he who burned my mother, Sir.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
How did he burn your mother?
A At first he tied up my mother, then he poured
kerosine [sic] upon my mother, Sir.
Q What was tied, the hands or the feet of your
mother?
A The hands, Your Honor.
Q How was it tied?
A At the back, Your Honor.
Q Do you know the reason why she was tied up?
A Yes Your Honor. They were quarreling
because my mother wanted me to go with my
father to [sic] street corner.
Q Then what happened next?
A Because of that they quarreled already.
Q What you mean is that your mother was
objecting you to go [sic] with your father?
A My mother wanted me to go with my father
but my father refused me [sic] to go with him,
Your Honor.
Q What would you do at the street corner with
your father?
A She just wanted me to accompany my father.
Q And because of that quarrel, your father tied
the hands of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Then he put kerosine [sic] at the front body
[sic] of your mother?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And after putting kerosine [sic], what did he
do next?
A He lighted it, Your Honor.
Q Was that the first time that you[r] mother and
your father quarreled?
A Many times, Your Honor.
Q What was the cause of their quarrel?
A Because my father was always drunk, Your
Honor.
Q At the time when your mother was tied and
then kerosine [sic] was poured upon her dress,
was your father drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Your father always went out and when he
returned he was always drunk?
A Yes, Your Honor. 18
The defense, of course, had a different story to
tell.
Erlinda Porciuncula, who grew up with the
accused-appellant and was like a sister to him,
testified that at around 8:30 p.m. of 22
November 1989, Rolando Mendoza came to her
house asking for help because his wife burned
herself. Together with the accused-appellant,
she borrowed the owner-type jeep of her
neighbor so they could bring his wife to the
hospital. They proceeded to St. Mary’s Hospital,
but the attending physician advised them to
bring the victim to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH). At the hospital, the staff could
not admit the victim due to the unavailability of
rooms. On the way to the PGH, the victim, who
was lying in the front seat of the jeep, told
Porciuncula that she was fed up with her life and
was entrusting her children to her. They then
went to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital where
the victim was immediately given first aid and
transferred to "the isolated Room No. 328." The
accused-appellant requested the witness to buy
medicine and inform the relatives of the victim
of what had happened, which she acceded to.
She was able to visit the victim three more times
before the victim died on 30 November 1989,
and on two of these occasions, she saw the
accused-appellant at the hospital. 19
Accused-appellant Rolando Mendoza testified
that on 22 November 1989, between 5:00 to
6:00 p.m., three persons who wanted to befriend
him visited him in his house. These three
persons, of whom the accused-appellant could
only name one, brought a bottle of liquor and
had a drinking session with him, which lasted
about an hour or two. As these three persons
were leaving, the accused-appellant offered to
accompany them to the road. After doing so, he
returned home, whereupon he saw his wife
jumping up and down and removing her burning
clothes. He saw a pail of water which he then
used to douse out the flames. At this time, his
wife cursed him and said: "Putang-ina mo,
sawang-sawa na ako sa buhay na ito," and
"Huwag mo akong pakialaman." 20 The accused-
appellant did not mind her, merely proceeded to
remove her dress and cried for help. The
neighbors came over and he entrusted the
children to them. Several others arrived and he
asked one of them who owned a vehicle to help
him bring his wife to the hospital. They were
able to bring her to St. Mary’s Hospital, but since
the hospital did not have a burns specialist, they
were advised to bring the victim to a hospital in
Manila. The driver of the jeep, however, refused
to bring them to Manila as he had neither a
driver’s license nor gas. The accused-appellant
was instead brought to Bocaue, Bulacan, and
there he was able to procure another vehicle
and borrow some money. Eventually, his wife
was brought to the Manila Sanitarium Hospital
after the PGH refused to admit the victim. He
stayed with his wife from the time she was
admitted up to the time she died, and even
bought the needed medicines. He did not attend
her wake nor burial because of the threats his
brother-in-law made. When asked if he knew
why his wife burned herself, he surmised that
she was "aburido" 21 from all their financial
difficulties. 22
In giving full credence to the testimony of
eyewitness Paul Michael, 23 the trial court
observed that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As provided by Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, a person who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known his perception to
others, may be a witness. A four-year old boy
can already speak clearly, can understand things
happening around him, and ready to study, to
read and to write. For families who can afford, a
four-year old child is already sent to the nursery
to begin his/her studies. An intelligent boy is
undoubtedly the best observer to be found. He is
little influenced by the suggestion of others and
describes objects and occurrences as he has
really seen them (Pp. v. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9). Paul
Michael was five months over four years when
the incident happened. He could perceive things
happening around him. This was the reason why
when his grandfather and an uncle found him in
the house of a neighbor, he was in a state of
shock, or at least dumbfounded (tulala). Because
he knew the implication of what had happened
to his mother. He knew that the burning of his
mother might cause her death. If, indeed, he
could not yet perceive things, such happening
would pass unnoticed and without impact on
him. Unless a child’s testimony is punctured
with serious inconsistencies as to lead one to
believe that he was coached, if he can perceive
and make known his perception, he is
considered a competent witness (Pp. v. Cidro, Et
Al., 56 O.G. 3547).
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a]
witness, the only thing substantial he testified
on was that his father boxed his mother in the
mouth and tied her. On further questions, he
refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed
the reason for such adamant attitude of the
witness. His father, the accused, was directly in
his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child
could speak no more. The second time the
witness was presented, the private prosecutor
covered the child from the accused. The Court
likewise directed the accused to sit farther away
thereby placing the accused out of the direct
sight of the witness. As a result, the child was
able to testify freely and extensively without
hesitation. 24
The trial court rejected the version of the
accused-appellant, stating that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Accused Rolando Mendoza made the defense
that his wife Maria Gina Avila-Mendoza burned
herself. He, however, lost courage when Gina
died. After Gina’s death, he left the hospital and
never returned. He failed to visit her during the
wake and even during the burial. He was forced
to come out only when arrested in a house of a
woman in Longos, Balagtas, Bulacan. Against
such behaviour of his may be applied an
interpretation of flight in criminal law — that
flight of the accused is an evidence of guilt and a
guilty conscience (U.S. v. Alegado, 25 Phil. 310).
Accused gave as a reason for his failure to attend
the wake and burial of his wife the threat of his
brother-in-law to kill him if anything would
happen to Gina. It is said that the wicked flee
even when no man pursueth, whereas the
righteous are as brave as a lion (U.S. v. Sarikala,
37 Phil. 486). If, indeed, Accused was not guilty
and nothing bothered his conscience, he would
be brave as a lion to meet his brother-in-law and
face any and all consequences. In the same way
that if his conscience is clear, no threat, real or
imaginary, in the whole world would prevent
him from staying by the side of his wife during
her last moments on earth. The fact that he went
into hiding, ashamed or fearful of the death of
his wife is an indication of his guilt. Further, the
burning in the dress and body of Gina gives
support to the claim of the prosecution that she
was burned. Paul Michael testified that the
hands of his mother were tied at the back. Jhun
Avila testified that the branches and leaves of
the atienza tree were burned. They tend to show
that Gina was tied at the back, placed near the
trunk of a tree and burned. Being tied, only the
front portion of her body would naturally be
burned. The tendency of one who burns himself
is to burn his whole body and not stay
stationary in one position so that both his front
and back portions of his body would be burned.
In this case, however, only the front portion of
Gina’s dress and body were burned as well as
the branches and leaves of the atienza tree. That
indicates that while the victim was burning, she
remained stationary in the place where she was
tied.25cralaw:red
Accordingly, the trial court convicted the
accused-appellant as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Rolando Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the
parents of the victim Maria Gina Avila-Mendoza
the sum of P88,000.00 representing the amount
of hospital bills of the victim. No cost.
SO ORDERED. 26
In this appeal, the accused-appellant prays for a
reversal of the lower court’s decision,
maintaining that if his evidence is considered in
its entirety, it would show his innocence. The
accused-appellant underscores the fact
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[A]fter November 22, 1989, the date of the
incident, the child Paul Michael Mendoza had
been and remains under the custody and care of
the parents and brothers and sisters of the late
Maria Gina Mendoza, who in full and
unwavering anger, hatred, hostility, resentment,
revenge and spite against the accused, pursued
the charge against the accused and the ones who
brought the child to the court to testify. 27
He thus asks this Court to disregard the
testimony of Paul Michael for being "open to
serious question and consideration" as it was
"often attended [by] unintelligible answers and
punctuated by contrary answers to previously
given answers" ;" [b]esides the child’s tender
age, he suffer[s] from [a] lack or inadequacy of
sense of duty to tell the truth." He further claims
that per the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer,
the victim did not die of burns but of hypostatic
pneumonia. 28
After a thorough examination of the records and
scrutiny of the evidence, we find no merit in this
appeal. The accused-appellant’s seven-page
Brief miserably fails to present convincing
grounds why the challenged decision should be
overturned.
The lower court convicted the accused-appellant
primarily on the basis of the testimony of
eyewitness Paul Michael Mendoza, and it is
obvious that the pith of the present appeal is the
child’s competency to testify and the credibility
of his testimony.
Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses. . . .
With respect to the disqualification of children
to be witnesses, Section 21(b) of the
abovementioned rule reads:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The following persons cannot be
witnesses:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to
render them incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of
relating them truthfully.
It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known his perception
to others and of relating truthfully facts
respecting which he is examined. In the 1913
decision in United States v. Buncad, 29 this
Court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the
common-law precedents upon this point, says:
"But this much may be taken as settled, that no
rule defines any particular age as conclusive of
incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the
particular child is to be investigated." (Wigmore
on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638) 30
While on the same subject, Underhill
declares:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
§ 257. Children on the witness stand. — Under
the common law, competency of a child under
the age of fourteen years to testify must be
shown to the satisfaction of the court. He is
presumptively incompetent, but if he is shown
to be competent it is immaterial how young he
may be when he testifies. He is competent if he
possesses mental capacity and memory
sufficient to enable him to give a reasonable and
intelligible account of the transaction he has
seen, if he understands and has a just
appreciation of the difference between right and
wrong, and comprehends the character,
meaning and obligation of an oath. If the witness
fulfills these requirements, it is immaterial as
bearing upon his competency that he is unable
to define the oath or to define testimony. In the
wise discretion of the court, a child four, five, six
and for such ages as seven, eight, nine, ten,
eleven, twelve, thirteen or fifteen years of age
may be shown competent to testify. It may not
be said that there is any particular age at which
as a matter of law all children are competent or
incompetent . . . 31
The requirements then of a child’s competency
as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of
communication. 32 And in ascertaining whether
a child is of sufficient intelligence according to
the foregoing requirements, it is settled that the
trial court is called upon to make such
determination. 33 As held in United States v.
Buncad, 34 quoting from Wheeler v. United
States, 35 and reiterated in People v. Raptus 36
and People v. Libungan: 37
The decision of this question rests primarily
with the trial judge, who sees the proposed
witness, notices his manner, his apparent
possession or lack of intelligence, and may
resort to any examination which will tend to
disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as
his understanding of the obligations of an oath.
As many of these matters cannot be
photographed into the record, the decision of
the trial judge will not be disturbed on review
unless from that which is preserved it is clear
that it was erroneous. 38
The trial court has adjudged Paul Michael
competent to testify. We agree. A close and
careful examination of the testimony of Paul
Michael shows that at the time he testified, he
could be deemed a child of above average
intelligence, i.e., capable of giving responsive
answers to the questions asked of him by the
trial judge, as well as recalling events and
relating them to such recollections. The initial
hesitancy of Paul Michael to name his father as
the author of the crime was sufficiently
explained by the trial court as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The first time Paul Michael was presented as [a]
witness, the only thing substantial he testified
on was that his father boxed his mother in the
mouth and tied her. On further questions, he
refused to answer anymore. The Court noticed
the reason for such adamant attitude of the
witness. His father, the accused, was directly in
his sight and whenever their eyes met, the child
could speak no more. The second time the
witness was presented, the private prosecutor
covered the child from the accused. The Court
likewise directed the accused to sit farther away
thereby placing the accused out of the direct
sight of the witness. As a result, the child was
able to testify freely and extensively without
hesitation. 39
We defer to such observation and explanation.
Indeed, there are certain matters that aid the
trial court in assessing the credibility of a
witness which are not available to the appellate
court, such as emphasis, gesture, and the
inflection of the voice of the witness. The trial
court had the distinct opportunity to make such
observations and to avail of such aids while Paul
Michael was on the witness stand, 40 thusly, we
find no reason to disregard the assessment
made by the trial court.
The accused-appellant’s contention that Paul
Michael’s testimony could have been influenced
by the relatives of Gina, who were full of
"unwavering anger, hatred, hostility,
resentment, revenge," more so since the child
had been in their custody since after 22
November 1989, is unacceptable. The charge is
nothing but unmitigated speculation as not a
shred of evidence was offered in support
thereof. Not even the rigorous cross-
examination Paul Michael underwent dented the
probative force of his testimony; on the
contrary, it merely added strength thereto as it
elicited nothing less than the boy’s adherence to
truth.
We realize how extremely painful it was for Paul
Michael to reveal that it was his father who
burned his mother. He knew that such a
revelation could send his father to jail and thus
brand him a son of a killer or a convict. If he did,
nevertheless, it was to expose the truth and give
justice to his mother who met an excruciatingly
painful death. Verily, "from the mouths of
children we get the truth." 41
Neither are we persuaded by the accused-
appellant’s claim that the cause of death of his
wife was hypostatic pneumonia and not due to
the burns she sustained. Such a claim borders on
misrepresentation, for as earlier shown, both
the Autopsy Report (Exhibit "H-1") and the
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination (Exhibit
"H") indicated the cause of death to be
"hypostatic pneumonia; infected fourth degree
burns." Moreover, as testified to by Dr. Nieto
Salvador, the proximate cause of the hypostatic
pneumonia was Gina’s recumbent position due
to the fourth degree burns she suffered.
Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What could have caused hypostatic pneumonia?
A The victim was recumbent because of her
intensive infections in front of her body and
therefore she was always lying down which
could have caused the hypostatic pneumonia.
Q What you mean [is] it [was] because of the
fourth degree burns the victim sustained in
front that’s why she was always lying down and
unable to change her position?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Do you mean that hypostatic pneumonia can
be acquire[d] by merely always lying down?
A Yes, Your Honor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Being in accordance with the facts
and the law, the challenged decision of Branch 8
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in
Criminal Case No. 1414-M-90 is AFFIRMED,
subject to the above modification on the
additional award of P50,000.00, as civil
indemnity, to the heirs of the victim, Gina Avila
Mendoza.

Q Is that the only cause? Costs against the Accused-Appellant.

A That’s why it is called hypostatic because SO ORDERED.

hypostatic means that the assumed position of
the patient is recumbent and the recumbent
position of the patient would greatly affect the
fluids in the lungs as it can’t flow down.

x x x

Q Would you say that hypostatic pneumonia

may also be caused by fourth degree burns?

A Yes, Sir. 42

It goes without saying that an accused is liable

for all the consequences of his felonious act. 43

Finally, the accused-appellant was never seen

after the death of his wife — neither during her
wake nor at her burial. His whereabouts were
unknown. He did not even bother to visit his
children or inform them where to find him in
case they needed him, knowing all too well that
he was the only parent left them. In short, he
was even afraid to see his children; he could not
trust them. In a manner of speaking, he was
afraid of his own shadow. All his protestations of
innocence are thus belied by his flight as
indicative of guilt on his part, or of his guilty
mind. It has been said that the wicked man flees
though no man pursueth, but the righteous are
as bold as a lion. 44 The explanation proffered
for his flight is lame and feeble, moreover, he
offered no credible proof that indeed the family
of his wife had threatened him bodily harm.

The trial court correctly appreciated in favor of

the accused-appellant the mitigating
circumstance of intoxication. The accused-
appellant committed the felony in question in a
state of intoxication and there was no sufficient
proof that it was habitual nor subsequent to the
plan to commit the felony. 45 It failed, however,
to award civil indemnity to the children of the
victim. Conformably with current case law, they
should be awarded the sum of P50,000.00.
Pp v. Baid, 336 SCRA 656 (2000)
G.R. No. 129667 July 31, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ERIC BAID Y OMINTA, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City,
finding accused-appellant Eric Baid y Ominta
guilty of the crime of rape against Nieva Garcia y
Saban, a mental patient, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant,
based on the complaint filed by the
offended woman and her mother, alleged -
That on or about the 22nd day of December
1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to
wit: by then and there [willfully], unlawfully and
feloniously undressing one NIEVA GARCIA y
SABAN, a mental patient suffering [from]
schizophrenia and put himself on top of her, and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the
undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a
plea of not guilty, whereupon trial of the case on
the merits proceeded.
The prosecution presented three witnesses,
namely, the complainant, Dr. Herminigilda
Salangad, the complainant's attending
psychiatrist, and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the
medico-legal officer who examined the
complainant.
Complainant is a 27-year old single woman, who
was diagnosed as having suffered from
schizophrenia since 1988. In December 1996,
she was confined at the Holy Spirit Clinic in
Cubao, Quezon City because of a relapse of her
mental condition.3 On the other hand, accused-
appellant was a nurse-aide of said clinic.
On December 22, 1996, at around 3 a.m.,
accused-appellant sneaked into the patients'
room. He woke the complainant up and offered
her a cigarette, at the same time touching her
foot. Complainant took the cigarette. As she
smoked it, accused-appellant caressed her.
Apparently, she was aroused, because she
afterward removed her pants. It turned out she
was not wearing any underwear. Accused-
appellant also removed his pants and the two
had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they
transferred under the bed and continued their
sexual intercourse. Complainant said she felt
accused-appellant had an orgasm. A female
patient who had been awakened tried to
separate the two, and, as she failed to do so, she
went out to call the two nurses on duty. The
nurses responded but, when they arrived,
accused-appellant had left, while complainant
had already put on her pants.4
Complainant was brought later during the day
before Dr. Emmanuel Reyes for medico-legal
examination. She told him what happened. Dr.
Reyes reduced her narration of the incident into
writing5 and then gave her a physical
examination. His report stated:6
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, and coherent female subject.
Breasts are hemispherical with pale brown
areola and nipples from which secretions could
be pressed. Abdomen is flabby and soft.
GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia
majora are full, convex and coaptated with the
pale brown labia minora presenting in between.
On separating the same disclosed an abraided
posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy-type
hymen with deep healed lacerations at 3, 6 and
9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice offers
moderate resistance to the introduction of the
examining finger and the virgin-sized speculum.
Vaginal canal is wide with flattened rugosities.
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of application of any
form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative
for gram negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.
Dr. Reyes said the fresh abrasion, located at 6
o'clock posterior of the complainant's genitalia,
could have been recently caused by a hard blunt
object, such as an erect penis during sexual
intercourse, or by the insertion of a finger. Dr.
Reyes found that complainant was suffering
from mental illness and that she had lapses in
the course of her interview.7
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He
stated that he had been a nurse-aide of the Holy
Spirit Clinic since September 18, 1995. His job
was to watch the patients, especially when they
become violent. He also fetched them from their
homes. He admitted that he knew the
complainant but claimed he did not know the
reason for her confinement. He denied the
allegations against him. He testified that, on the
date and time referred to by the complainant, he
was asleep in the nurse-aide quarters located
about ten meters from the room where
complainant was staying. He admitted, however,
that to go to the patients' room, he did not have
to pass by the nurses' station. He said he knew
that, at the time in question, there were two
nurses on duty and ten patients in the room. He
described the patients' room as having an area
of about eight by five square meters with
wooden beds arranged one foot apart from each
other.8
Accused-appellant was questioned by the trial
court. He testified that on December 22, 1996,
he was on duty from 4 p.m. to 12 midnight. He
was a stay-in nurse-aide of the clinic. He stated
that the clinic consisted of two floors and five
rooms. The room where complainant and the
other patients were staying and his quarters
were both on the ground floor of the building.
He admitted that the clinic was for the mentally
ill and that, as a nurse-aide, he was supposed to
know the status of every patient and his job was
to watch them and pacify them whenever they
become violent. He said he was very well
acquainted with the behavior of the patients
considering the length of time he had been
working in the clinic. He claimed, however, that
he did not specifically know from what ailment
complainant was suffering, but only that she
was undergoing treatment because of mental
deficiency.9
On cross-examination, accused-appellant
admitted that he knew it was prohibited to give
cigarettes to patients. He further admitted that,
as a nurse-aide, he could enter the patients'
room anytime to check their condition and see
to it that the lights were turned off when they
were not needed. He further stated that he was
not investigated by the police when he was
invited to their headquarters.10
On June 20, 1997, the trial court rendered its
decision,11 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Eric Baid y Ominta GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
defined in and penalized by Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act
7659, and hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
accused is further ordered to indemnify the
victim Nieva Garcia y Saban the amount of
P50,000.00, as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court
erred in convicting him of rape.12
Complainant is suffering from schizophrenia, a
psychotic disorder of unknown etiology,
characterized by disturbance in thinking
involving a distortion of the usual logical
relations between ideas, a separation between
the intellect and the emotions so that the
patient's feelings and his or her manifestations
seem inappropriate to his or her life situation,
and a reduced tolerance for the stress of
interpersonal relations so that the patient
retreats from social intercourse into his or her
own fantasy life and commonly into delusions
and hallucinations, and may, when untreated or
unsuccessfully treated, go on to marked
deterioration or regression in his or her
behavior though often unaccompanied by
further intellectual loss.13 The following are the
symptoms of schizophrenia:
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or
more) of the following, each present for
a significant portion of time during a 1-
month period (or less if successfully
treated):
(1) delusions
(2) hallucinations
 (3) disorganized speech (e.g.,
frequent derailment or
incoherence)
(4) grossly disorganized or
catatonic behavior
(5) negative symptoms, i.e.,
affective flattening, alogia, or
avolition
Note: Only one criterion A symptom is
required if delusions are bizarre or
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping
up a running commentary on the
person's behavior or thoughts, or two
or more voices conversing with each
other.
B. Social/occupational dysfunction: For a
significant portion of the time since the
onset of the disturbance, one or more
major areas of functioning such as
work, interpersonal relations, or self-
care are markedly below the level
achieved prior to the onset (or when
the onset is in childhood or
adolescence, failure to achieve expected
level of interpersonal, academic, or
occupational achievement).
C. Duration: Continuous signs of the
disturbance persist for at least 6
months. This 6-month period must
include at least 1 month of symptoms
(or less if successfully treated) that
meet criterion A (i.e., active-phase
symptoms) and may include periods of
prodromal or residual symptoms.
During these prodromal or residual
periods, the signs of the disturbance
may be manifested by only negative
symptoms or two or more symptoms
listed in criterion A present in an
attentuated form (e.g., odd beliefs,
unusual perceptual experiences).
D. Schizoaffective and mood disorder
exclusion: Schizoaffective disorder and
mood disorder with features have been
ruled out because either (1) no major
depressive, manic, or mixed episodes
have occurred concurrently with the
active-phase symptoms; or (2) if mood
symptoms, their total duration has been
brief relative to the duration of the
active and residual periods.
E. Substance/general medical condition
exclusion: The disturbance is not due to
the direct physiological effects of a
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical
condition.
F. Relationship to a pervasive
developmental disorder: If there is a
history of autistic disorder or another
pervasive developmental disorder, the
additional diagnosis of schizophrenia is
made only if prominent delusions or
hallucinations are also present for at
least a month (or less if successfully
treated).14
Schizophrenia is classified into five subtypes,
namely, paranoid, disorganized (hebephrenic),
catatonic, undifferentiated, and residual.15
Dr. Herminigilda Salangad, the complainant's
attending psychiatrist and consultant at the
Medical Center in Muntinlupa, the Perpetual
Help Medical Center, the Philippine National
Police, and the Holy Spirit Clinic, was presented
as an expert witness. According to her,
complainant was, at the time of the incident,
suffering from an undifferentiated type of
schizophrenia, described as having the
characteristic symptoms of schizophrenia but
does not fit the profile for paranoid,
disorganized, or catatonic schizophrenia. Dr.
Salangad stated that complainant seemed to
shift from one type of schizophrenia to another.
Complainant was catatonic when she first
treated her, a situation where the patient shows
waxy flexibility (e.g., when a limb is
repositioned, that limb remains in that position
for a prolonged period of time as if the patient is
made of wax), mutism or agitation, and the
patient mimics words and actions during
examination. Later, complainant became
paranoid, i.e., suspicious, hostile and aggressive.
She also manifested a behavior where she
mumbled and smiled to herself.16
It is contended that as complainant is a
schizophrenic, her testimony should not have
been given credence by the trial court. It is
argued that: (1) there were serious
inconsistencies between her sworn statement
and her testimony in court; (2) the prosecution
failed to present witnesses to corroborate her
testimony; (3) complainant failed to identify
accused-appellant; (4) the results of the medico-
legal examination were negative for
spermatozoa; (5) the healed lacerations showed
that complainant had sexual intercourse seven
days before the alleged incident; and (6) the
probability was that her allegations of rape were
merely a product of her fantasy.17
We disagree.
Notwithstanding her mental illness,
complainant showed that she was qualified to be
a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was
capable of making known her perceptions to
others.18 Her testimony indicates that she could
understand questions particularly relating to
the incident and could give responsive answers
to them. Thus she testified:
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q Miss Nieva Garcia, are you still confined at the
Holy Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles St., Cubao, Quezon
City?
A Not anymore, sir.
Q On December 22, 1996, do you know whether
you are at the Holy Spirit Clinic, Los Angeles St.,
Cubao, Quezon City?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why were you there, Miss Witness?
A My mother asked me if I want to be confined
at the Holy Spirit Clinic and I chose to be
confined at the Holy Spirit because during that
time, I was then taking my medicine.
Q At around three o'clock in the morning of
December 22, 1996, do you know where were
you?
A Yes, I was lying on the bed inside the Holy
Spirit Clinic.
Q And while lying on the bed, inside the Holy
Spirit Clinic, do you know what happened then,
Miss Witness?
A At that time, there was a person shorter than
the person (witness pointing to the person
dressed in yellow t-shirt whose name when
asked, answered the name Eric Baid) and that
person is smaller than the person inside the
courtroom was disturbing "kinakalabit" another
person inside the room.
Q And what happened after that first man
entered the room at the Holy Spirit Clinic?
A The girl was trying to avoid the other person
because at that time, the accused Eric Baid was
entering the room.
Q And what happened after Eric Baid entered
the room?
A When Eric Baid entered the room as if he
knew me already and he asked me, "Nieva, gusto
mo ng sigarilyo?", at the same time, Eric Baid
was touching my foot.
ATTY. VENTURANZA:
I would just want to manifest that the witness
while testifying, she was smiling.
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q And after he asked you whether you like a
stick of cigarette and touched your foot, what
happened next, Madam Witness?
A I said yes.
Q And what happened next after you said yes, I
liked cigarette?
A After that, he caressed me.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q How did he caress you?
A He went on top of me.
COURT: (to the prosecutor)
Go ahead.
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q How about the other man who entered earlier,
what happened him?
A The smaller person went in and out of our
room twice, the first time that he went, he
touched the other woman beside me on the foot
but the woman resisted and shouted. After that,
the second time, the other man went inside the
room, he touched the other woman but the
woman shouted and that smaller one went
outside of the room.
Q When Eric Baid placed himself on top of you,
where was that other man?
A He was no longer there.
….
PROSECUTION: (to the witness)
Q When Eric Baid was already on top of you, do
you know if the small man entered again your
room?
A No, sir.
Q And then, what happened when Eric Baid
placed himself on top of you?
A I agreed.
Q Agreed to what?
A I agreed to the sex.
Q You mean to say that you and Eric Baid has
sexual intercourse while on top of your bed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what happened during the sexual
intercourse while both of you were on top of the
bed?
A Somebody was awakened and told me, "Hoy,
asawa mo ba iyan? Kinukubabawan ka." and I
answered no.
Q And was Eric Baid, was he able to
consummate that sexual intercourse, Miss
Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And more or less, how long did the sexual
intercourse last, Miss Witness?
A Around three to five minutes.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Why, was he able to insert his private organ
into your private organ?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What did he do when he was able to insert his
private organ into your private organ?
A As if his orgasm suddenly appeared.
Q Do you understand when you say as if his
orgasm suddenly appeared?
A They are like what they call, your Honor, as if
"naiputok".
Q And what did he do when according to you
"naiputok"?
A As if it was okay for him.
Q You were wearing an underwear?
A None, your Honor.
Q You were actually naked?
A I was wearing pants but I have no panty.
Q But who removed your pants?
A I was the one, your Honor.
Q What about Eric Baid, what was he wearing?
A He was also wearing pants.
Q Who removed the pants of Eric Baid?
A He was the one.19
When complainant was questioned on cross and
redirect examination, she explained how she
was able to identify accused-appellant, to wit:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q You said a while ago that when the sex affair
happened it was dark so all throughout you did
not see the face of the accused?
A During that time it was dark but the latter part
when he opened the light, I saw his face, sir.
Q When the light was opened, he was about to
leave the room?
A About to leave, sir.
Q He was already facing the door?
A Yes, Sir. Q And before this incident of December 22,
1996, were there any other occasion that he had
Q And you were at his back left inside the room? any sexual intercourse with you?

A No, Sir. A None, sir.

Q Where were you then? Q And you often saw him as attendant in that
clinic?
A I was just inside the room in my bed not at his
back, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q You were already on your bed when he was Q And when you said that room was dark, is it
about to leave the room? totally dark or was it only a little dark?

A Yes, Sir. A Little light, sir. It was a little bit dark and a
little bit light. (medyo may ilaw)
Q At that time that sex affair transpired between
you and the accused, you did not even know his Q So the time that you had sexual intercourse
name? with the accused at that time, you can identify
the face of this person?
A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q You were only told later on about this person?
COURT: (to the witness)
A Yes, Sir.
Q You said that medyo may ilaw, where was the
ATTY. SALATANDRE: (to the Court) light emanating at about 3:00 in the morning?

That will be all, Your Honor. A From the window outside, the room can be
illuminated through the window, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q So when the light came from outside, was the
source from the moon, from the bulb of the
Any redirect? Meralco post or from another light coming from
another building or house?
PROSECUTION:
A It is the light actually coming from the ceiling
Yes, your Honor. of the building of the clinic which was outside
the window, Your Honor.20
COURT:
Though she may have exhibited emotions
Go ahead. inconsistent with that of a rape victim
("inappropriate affect") during her testimony,
PROSECUTION: such as by smiling when answering questions,
her behavior was such as could be expected
Q You said that you were only able to identify from a person suffering from schizophrenia.
the accused when he put on the lights, when he Otherwise, complainant was candid,
was about to leave the room, how far were you straightforward, and coherent.
from the accused?
Furthermore, aside from the testimony of Dr.
A This distance, sir. (parties stipulated a Salangad on complainant's consciousness and
distance of four meters, more or less) memory,21 it is established that schizophrenic
persons do not suffer from a clouding of
consciousness and gross deficits of memory.22 It
Q You said that you saw his face at that time?
has long been settled that a person should not

A Yes, sir.
be disqualified on the basis of mental handicap
alone.23
With regard to the alleged inconsistencies
between complainant's sworn statement24 and
her testimony as to the number of times she and
accused-appellant had sexual intercourse and
where they did the same, an examination of the
evidence for the prosecution, particularly
complainant's sworn statement and her
interview with the examining medico-legal
officer, shows that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her in different positions at
various places in the same room. When
complainant testified, she stated that, aside from
the fact that accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her on her bed, he made her
transfer later under the bed. Be that as it may,
complainant has consistently established in all
of her statements that he had sexual intercourse
with her on her bed. Whether or not he had sex
with her near the window and while facing him
is of no moment and does not negate the finding
of rape. Whatever may be the inconsistencies in
her testimony, they are minor and
inconsequential. They show that complainant's
testimony was unrehearsed, and rather than
diminish the probative value of her testimony,
they reinforce it.25
In the case at bar, the rape of complainant
occurred in a room where other patients were
sleeping. This circumstance, it is argued, is
antithetical to the possibility of the commission
of rape. As this Court has repeatedly said, lust is
no respecter of time and place and the crime of
rape can be consummated even when the
malefactor and the victim are not alone.26
The plausibility of an allegation of rape does not
depend on the number of witnesses presented
during the trial, so much so that, if the
testimonies so far presented clearly and credibly
established the commission of the crime,
corroborative evidence would only be a mere
surplusage.27 In this case, the trial court gave
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on the basis of which it adjudged
accused-appellant guilty. In the absence of bias,
partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the presiding judge, his findings as to
their credibility are entitled to utmost respect as
he had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor on the witness stand.28
Nor does the absence of spermatozoa in the
genitalia of complainant destroy the finding of
rape since ejaculation is never an element
thereof.29 What consummates the felony is the
contact of the penis of the perpetrator, however
slight, to the vagina of his victim without her
consent.30 Neither is it required that lacerations
be found in the victim's hymen. We have held
that a medical examination is not a requisite for
a rape charge to prosper as long as the victim
categorically and consistently declares that she
has been defiled.31 In this case, aside from
complainant's positive testimony, the medical
examination of the complainant showed an
abrasion on her labia minora, indicating that she
had recent sexual intercourse.32 That the deep
healed lacerations found on the complainant's
genitalia may have been caused seven days prior
to December 22, 1996 is immaterial and
irrelevant considering that she is a non-virgin.
Accused-appellant also claims that complainant
could have been hallucinating in alleging that
she had sexual intercourse with him on
December 22, 1996. In answer, suffice it to say
that complainant was steadfast and consistent in
stating that she was raped by accused-appellant.
She maintained her allegation of rape when she
was physically examined by the medico-legal
officer, when she made her statement to the
police and again when she testified in court.33
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's
finding of lack of consent on the part of the
complainant to the sexual act. As the facts show,
complainant herself admitted that she agreed to
have sex with him after he gave her a stick of
cigarette. However, it should be stressed that
complainant was in no position to give her
consent. As Dr. Salangad said in her testimony:
COURT:
Q If you claim that the private complainant is
suffering from this kind of illness, schizophrenia,
and manifests behavior to the effect that she can
not be active during lucid intervals now if she is
suffering from this kind or mental state, can she
give an intelligent consent considering that the
private complainant is already above 20 years of
age?
A In her case, I would say no, Your Honor.
Q I will rephrase my question. Because when I
asked to give an intelligent consent, you might
be referring to acts that are very important to
her like, for example, "do you want to eat?" of
course, she will give an intelligent consent. "Do
you want to sleep?" of course, she will give an
intelligent consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But things that would destroy her honor or
reputation like for example having sex with her,
can she give an intelligent consent?
A No, Your Honor.
Q In other words, she would not know the
consequences of her consenting to such a
proposal to have sex?
A Yes, Your Honor.
....
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
Q She can not give an intelligent consent to sex,
your patient?
A Yes, sir.
Q Meaning she will just agree?
A She has said so when I asked her. She was just
offered a cigarette.
Q Meaning if she opens her legs, she does not
understand what she was doing?
A She probably knew what she was doing but
when we say an intelligent consent, she has
weighed the pros and cons on an action and its
future significance and also based on the
upbringing, sir.
Q That she was on top of the bed, then the
accused allegedly opened the zipper of his pants
and pulled down the pants up to his knees and
placed himself on top of the patient and tried to
insert his organ to her organ and the girl said
she agreed to it because she likes it, does it
mean all those things that transpired she does
not know or understand what was happening?
A She knew what was happening but there is a
difference in her judgment, in her discernment.
A child can be asked to lie down and knows that
somebody was on top of him or her and that is
the thing of being aware. But the judgment of
the consent itself, the significance, the effect, we
all know that a normal person does not do these
unless he or she contemplates it.
Q I just do not know if I am correct, my
interpretation about what you are saying is that
physically they are doing that, meaning the
organ of the accused was inserted into the organ
of the patient allegedly but the girl did not resist,
the girl did not comment whatsoever because
she did not understand what is happening?
COURT:
No, she did not say that she did not understand
what was happening, she can not discern.
A Let me give you a little information. In the
psychological state of mentally ill patients, the
basic instinct of a person is very prominent.
They respond, they eat and they can have sex,
that is normal and they are just responding on
the level of their basic instinct. When you are a
mature person or a normal person and you have
attained maturity and clearness of mind, you
now, of course, try to put things into their
proper perspective, socially and morally, that is
where upbringing and education come in. I
would say that the patient's case, she is more
responding in an instinctual level without the
use of intellect.34
Accused-appellant questions in this appeal the
qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert
witness. However, he cannot do this now as he
did not raise any objection to Dr. Salangad's
qualifications in the trial court. On the contrary,
he even cross-examined her on the matters on
which she testified. In accordance with Rule
132, §36, objections not timely raised are
deemed waived.
The fact that Dr. Salangad was hired by the
family of complainant to give expert testimony
as a psychiatrist did not by that fact alone make
her a biased witness and her testimony
unworthy of consideration. As has been said:
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The
relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of
the trial court to decide, considering the ability
and character of the witness, his actions upon
the witness stand, the weight and process of the
reasoning by which he has supported his
opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for
whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid
witness, the relative opportunities for study and
observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which deserve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts
and circumstances in the case and when
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am.
Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the credibility
of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable
in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.35
It has not been shown in this case that the trial
court abused its discretion in appreciating the
testimony of Dr. Salangad so as to justify setting
aside its findings.
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. -
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following
circumstances.
(1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
....
To warrant a conviction for rape under
paragraph (2) of Art. 335, a woman need not be
proven as completely insane or deprived of
reason.1âwphi1 The phrase "deprived of
reason" has been construed to include those
suffering from mental abnormality or deficiency
or some form of mental retardation, those who
are feebleminded although coherent.36
That the complainant was suffering from
schizophrenia at the time of the rape is shown
by the fact that she was in the clinic precisely
because of such illness and by her behavior at
the trial, during which she would smile for no
reason at all while answering the questions.
Though she may not have totally lost her
memory, it was shown that she was suffering
from an impairment of judgment, which made
her incapable of giving, an intelligent consent to
the sexual act. It has been held that where the
rape victim is feeble-minded, the force required
by the statute is the sexual act itself.37
Even assuming then that the complainant
consented to have sexual intercourse with
accused-appellant, the copulation would fall
under the third paragraph of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code in view of the fact that
complainant was mentally ill. Sexual intercourse
with an insane, deranged, or mentally deficient,
feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure
and simple.38
At any rate, complainant said in her sworn
statement that she was afraid of accused-
appellant because of the nature of his job as a
nurse-aid. Thus she stated:
28. Tanong : Ikaw ba ay natatakot kay Eric?
Sagot : Kaunti lang, dahil sa trabaho niya.39
As Dr. Salangad explained:
ATTY. SALATANDRE:
….
Q Meaning that when she was asked on page 2
"Tanong 27 Q - Ikaw ba ay tinakot o sinaktan ni
Eric? S - Hindi naman po." This is her own
answer, nobody threatened her at that time?
A Yes, sir, but may I add. There was no direct
threat but in her situation she was brought
there for confinement and treatment and for
safekeeping. She is in a situation wherein the
attendants and the nurses are all authorities
around her, who dictate what to do. I believe
that there was some kind of threat or force in
that level, although there was no direct threat in
the action.
COURT:
Q In the mind of Nieva Garcia, who were those
that might be threatening to her?
A The accused somehow had made the threat.
Because in their daily activity, the attendants
and nurses dictate the things to do, they follow,
they are bosses in the clinic, they are in that kind
of situation always, Your Honor.
Q That explains your presence during the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
investigation? Court, Branch 95, Quezon City is AFFIRMED
with the modification that, in addition to the
A To assist her in order that she is not afraid and award of ₱50,000.00 for moral damages made
in response to earlier question of counsel if the by the trial court, complainant should be
patient was directly threatened or intimidated indemnified in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
during the act, I am giving you a
general situation in an institution, in this kind of SO ORDERED.
institution. Sometimes they are restrained if
they go out of line, they are ones who restrain
them, the attendants and the nurses do these,
Your Honor.40

As already stated, accused-appellant invoked

alibi in his defense. He claimed that, at the time
of the incident, he was in his quarters at the
Holy Spirit Clinic sleeping. For the defense of
alibi to be believed, the following requisites
must be met: (a) his presence at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the offense must
be proven; and (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime.41

Accused-appellant's testimony itself

demonstrates the untenability of his alibi. First,
his declaration that he was in another room of
the clinic is uncorroborated. Second, the room in
which he said he was sleeping at that time of the
incident was only a few meters away from the
patients' room where complainant was
confined. Third, he admitted that, as a nurse-
aide, he was allowed to enter the patients' room
anytime for purposes of checking on the
patients. Above all, his alibi cannot be given
credence because complainant has pointed to
him as the culprit of the rape. In cases in which
the accused-appellant was identified by the
victim herself who harbored no ill motive
against him, the defense of alibi was rejected.42

The trial court correctly awarded moral

damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in
accordance with our recent rulings that moral
damages may be awarded in rape cases without
any need of proof of moral suffering. However,
in addition, civil indemnity in the amount of
₱50,000.00 should have been awarded the
complainant consistent with the ruling that
rape victims are entitled to such an award
without need of proof except the fact of the
commission of the offense.43 On the other hand,
the plea of the prosecution that the indemnity
should be raised to ₱75,000.00 cannot be
granted because such amount is awarded only in
cases of qualified rape. In this case, there were
no qualifying circumstances raising the penalty
to death.44
Pp v. Hayag, 101 SCRA 67 (1980)
G.R. No. L-38635 November 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
DANIEL HAYAG, accused-appellant.
Daniel Hayag appealed from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte,
Tagum Branch VIII, convicting him of rape,
sentencing him to "imprisonment for the rest of
his natural life" and ordering him to pay to
Esperanza Ranga ten thousand pesos as moral
damages (Criminal Case No. 1210).
Issue is the trustworthiness of the interpreter's
verbalization of deaf-mute's sign language. — In
this alleged rape of Esperanza, 32, a farm girl
and a deaf-mute, the case has been simplified by
the admission of the accused, Hayag, 50, a
married man with eight children, who finished
grade six, that he had sexual intercourse with
Esperanza nine times between 1970 and
December 4, 1972 in the town of Carmen, Davao
del Norte.
The ultimate issue is whether Virginia Ranga 26,
a public school teacher, a college graduate and
the victim's sister, correctly and credibly
interpreted and verbalized the sign language of
Esperanza as meaning that Hayag raped
Esperanza on October 26, 1972 or whether
credence should be given to Hayag's story that
the sexual intercourse on that occasion, as on
other occasions, was voluntary.
Attached to the complaint for rape was a
certificate from the Davao General Hospital that
on December 7, 1972 Esperanza was examined
and found to be "positive for pregnancy" (Exh. C
or 10). However, the record does not show
whether she gave birth. There was no medical
examination of Esperanza immediately after the
rape allegedly perpetrated on October 26, 1972.
The prosecution labored under the handicap
that it could prove the alleged rape only through
the sign language of the victim, Esperanza. The
victim's sister, Virginia, who has communicated
with her since childhood by means of sign
language, was the sole available witness who
could make known to her the questions on
direct and cross-examination and could
articulate her alleged answers for the record.
Because there was no means of checking the
correctness and veracity of Virginia's
interpretation and because she herself believed
that Esperanza was raped by Hayag, it is not
surprising that the defense counsel vehemently
objected to Virginia's role as interpreter. The
defense regarded her as biased and as lacking
the cold neutrality of a third person acting as
interpreter.
As Esperanza did not study in the school for
deaf-mutes and as there was no instructor in
that school available as an interpreter the trial
court had no choice but to use Virginia as the
medium for communicating with Esperanza.
Was she a reliable interpreter? That is the
intriguing question in this case.
This Court in two cases convicted an accused of
having raped a deaf-mute but in those cases an
instructor in the school for deaf-mutes acted as
an interpreter and the conviction was not based
solely on the evidence given by the victim. In the
instant case, the judgment of conviction was
based exclusively on the story of Esperanza that
she was raped, a story made known through her
sister, Virginia, who signed the complaint for
rape.
In People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539, the accused
was charged with having raped his fifteen-year-
old step-daughter, a deaf-mute The trial was
held in the house, called "Country Home;" where
the accused brought the girl. She testified in sign
language which was interpreted by a teacher in
the school for deaf-mutes. The accused was
convicted on the basis of such testimony.
In People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281, the accussed
was also charged with having raped a fourteen-
year-old deaf-mute. She testified with the
assistance of an instructor in the school for deaf-
mutes. Her testimony was corroborated by her
seven-year-old sister who was present when the
outrage was committed.
Seven days after the alleged rape, the victim,
Rufina Barbuco, submitted to a medical
examination. The doctor introjudo su especulum
en la parte genital de ella y dicha Rufina sintio'
dolor por la introduccion de dicho instrumento".
The accused was convicted of rape.
But in People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, a homicide
case, the testimony of a deaf-mute, an alleged
eyewitness, as interpreted by a teacher from the
school for deaf-mutes, who did not teach the
witness (the latter never having studied in such
school) was not given credence. (See People vs.
Nava, CA 40 O.G. 4327 and People vs. Tejano,
CA-G.R. No. 21954-R, May 25, 1959, 7 Velayo's
Digest 724. As to a deaf-mute convicted of
robbery, see People vs. Nazario, 97 Phil. 990.)
Rules regarding communication with a deaf-
mute. — At the outset, it is relevant to state the
jurisprudential rules for verbalizing the
perceptions of a deaf-mute.
'Although in ancient times the rule was
otherwise, deaf-mutes are now generally
accepted as competent witnesses. In any given
case a showing must be made that the witness
has a system of communication, and if he has
and he is otherwise competent, his testimony
will be received" (81 Am. Jur. 2nd 116).
The modern rule is to the effect that
deaf and dumb persons are not
incompetent as witnesses merely
because they are deaf and dumb if they
are able to communicate the facts by a
method which their infirmity leaves
available to them, and are of sufficient
mental capacity to observe the matters
as to which they will testify and to
appreciate the obligation of an oath; but
where the person is not so educated as
it is possible to make him understand
the questions which are put to him he is
not competent (97 C.J.S. 454).
The method to be employed in eliciting
the testimony of a deaf-mute should be
that which is best suited to attain the
desired end, the particular method of
examination resting largely in the
discretion of the trial court. Thus, a deaf
and dumb witness may be examined by
means of written questions to which he
gives written answers, or he may be
examined through the medium of an
interpreter who communicates with the
witness by means of signs. The
qualifications of a particular person to
act as an interpreter for a deaf-mute
rests largely in the discretion of the trial
court (98 C.J.S. 25).
The other statements of the procedure for
taking the sign-language of a deaf-mute are
quoted below:
The modern and generally accepted
rule is to the effect that deaf-mutes are
competent witnesses where they have
sufficient knowledge to understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath and
comprehend the facts as to which they
wish to speak, and are capable of
communicating their Ideas with respect
thereto (Annotation, 9 ALR 482).
If deaf-mutes have sufficient
understanding to comprehend facts
about which they undertake to speak,
and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath, they may give evidence by signs,
or through an interpreter or in writing,
and such testimony, through an
interpreter, is not hearsay (Bugg vs.
Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480).
It has been said that a court has the
inherent power to elicit testimony from
a competent deaf-mute by whatsoever
means necessary to the end to be
obtained, and that the manner in which
the examination of a deaf-mute should
be conducted is a matter to be regulated
and controlled by the trial court in its
discretion.
However, it has also been said that the
best method should be adopted. And
there is authority to the effect that the
method adopted will not be reviewed
by an appellate court in the absence of a
showing that the complaining party was
in some way injured by reason of the
particular method adopted.
In fact it has been said that, in the
absence of a showing as to what
constituted the best method of taking a
deaf-mute's testimony, it will be
presumed on appeal that the trial court
adopted the best method.
As is stated in the authorities approved
in Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9
ALR 480, the general rule is that deaf-
mutes who are competent to testify may
give evidence by signs, or through an
interpreter, or in writing.
More specifically it has been held that a
deaf-mute who can read and write may
testify through that medium. Thus,
in Ritchey vs. People (1896), 23 Colo
314, 47 Pac. 272, a deaf-mute was
examined by submitting to him written
questions, to which he replied in
 writing, which questions and answers
were then read to the jury.
And the general rule is that the
evidence of a deaf-mute who can be
communicated with by signs may be
taken through an interpreter who
understands such signs and can
interpret them to the court.
And it has been held that it is
permissible to take the testimony of a
deaf-mute through an interpreter by
signs notwithstanding the evidence
could have been written. At least where
there is no showing that the
interpretation by signs is not the better
method.
And especially where it appears that the
witness is capable of relating the facts
"correctly" by signs, but, while able to
read and write, can only communicate
Ideas imperfectly' by writing. And it is
not necessary that the witness be able
to read and write. However, it has been
said that it would seem to be better in
the case of a deaf and dumb witness
who can read and write to conduct his
examination in writing.
With respect to the conducting of the
examination of a deaf-mute itself, it has
been held that the allowing of leading
questions is in the discretion of the
court. This discretion was said to arise
out of the fact that 'there is always more
or less difficulty in eliciting testimony'
where the witness is a deaf-mute
(Annotation, 9 ALR 482-484).
Procedure followed by the lower court in
qualifying Virginia Ranga as an interpreter of her
sister's sign language. — How to communicate
with the victim, Esperanza, was the problem of
the municipal judge during the preliminary
examination. Esperanza knows how to sign her
name and to read and write figures. That was all.
The complaint for rape, filed in the municipal
court on December 26, 1972, was signed by
Esperanza. Her sister Virginia certified under
oath that she translated, interpreted and
explained the contents of the complaint
"faithfully and truthfully through sign language"
to Esperanza (p. 1, Record).
At the preliminary examination, the municipal
judge tested the capacity of Virginia to
communicate with Esperanza. Virginia admitted
that there were deficiencies in her mode of
communication with Esperanza. Virginia
testified:
17. Q: (by municipal judge). How
adequate is the communication
between Esperanza Ranga and you? —
A: Not too much but I think only a few
things which she wish to convey which I
do not understand.
18. Q: Would you ten me one or two of
these few things which you don't
understand? — A: Those things which
are very deep like for example
those invisible words.
19. Q: What do you mean by invisible
words? — A: For example, the meaning
of the word 'truth' whereby I could not
expect to her in one sign only the
meaning of the word 'truth' but I could
only explain that through other signs.
20. Q: These signs that you employ in
communicating between you and
Esperanza Ranga, are these
conventional signs or the 'Deaf and
Dumb signs? — A: No, sir.
21. Q: What then are the signs? — A:
Just like the actions.
22. Q: In other words, you just contrived
or improvised the signs? — A: Yes, sir.
23. Q: For how long a time have both of
you been at this means of
communications? — A: Since my birth.
24. Q: You mean that when you were
born you ready communicate with each
other? — A: Not exactly but when I
already teamed to talk and she could
not understand.
25. Q: Do you still employ the same
improvised signs in communicating
with your older sister? — A: Yes, sir.
26. Q: Have you ever revised or modify
these so-called improvised signs? — A:
No, sir.
 27. Q: You have improvised along the
way, have you? — A: Yes, sir.
28. Q: Suppose you wanted to convey to
your older sister the meaning of: 'She
better dress up because you are going
to bring her to the Court'. How would
you communicate with your sister?
A: (The witness demonstrated by
raising her two hands from the head
then downward which would imply
putting on the dress; her right hand
placed over the nose which means
'good or beautiful' and touch her older
sister (Esperanza) on her shoulder and
pointing towards her and touching both
of them with the same hand gesturing
towards the road and a sign indicating a
roof which implies the Municipal Hall.)
The Court is of the opinion that witness may adequately
communicate with her older sister Esperanza Ranga
through their improvised sign language. In view thereof,
this Court hereby commissions Virginia Ranga to act as
an interpreter for her sister, Esperanza Ranga, in this
preliminary examination (pp. 15-16, Record).
The municipal judge then asked Virginia to take
an oath as an interpreter. After taking the oath,
the judge instructed Virginia to ask Esperanza
whether the latter understood the meaning of
an oath. Esperanza replied by signs that she
would tell the truth.
According to the sign language of Esperanza, as
interpreted by Virginia, the alleged rape was
committed in this manner:
While she (Esperanza) was she was pulled away
from the road and then she resisted and (was)
dragged until she was kicked on her leg
whereby she stumbled down. The one (Hayag)
who pulled her boxed her on her breast and on
the legs and then she lost consciousness and
then when she lost consciousness, she did not
know what happened.
When she regained consciousness, she
found out that she was raped by the
man who pulled her (pp. 16-17,
Record).
Esperanza Identified the man who raped her as
a person with a mole between his eyes just
below his forehead. She pointed to Hayag as the
rapist. Hayag and his counsel were present at
the preliminary examination.
The rape was not reported because Hayag told
Esperanza that she would be killed if she
divulged the rape to anybody (p. 18, Record).
Hayag waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. The case was elevated
to the Court of First Instance where the
provincial fiscal filed an information for rape
dated February 12, 1973.
The trial court tested Virginia's capacity to
communicate with Esperanza in sign language
improvised by the two sisters, a
procedure opposed by defense counsel, as may
be seen from the following transcript:
Private prosecutor: ... since the
complainant, your Honor, is a deaf-
mute, we wig present her sister as an
interpreter, and we will qualify the
sister to act as an interpreter. ...
Defense counsel: ... we object to the
competency (of Virginia) on the ground
that this witness is not an expert
witness to interpret the language of a
deaf-mute. She would not be competent
as to the sign to be conveyed to her, and
finally it would be prejudicial and
biased, your Honor. ...
I believe, your Honor, that this case is so
serious as it involves the liberty of the
accused, and if we will be hasty in
proceeding ... even granting that the
witness can be able to perceive and
communicate, there is no definite
provision in the Rules of Court that a
sister could be qualified as an
interpreter to a deaf-mute. ...
Court: ... the Court win allow her (the
sister) to be an interpreter in the case
as long as she can be qualified to
interpret the signs of her sister.
Defense counsel ... And granting that the
sister will be allowed to translate and
interpret in behalf of the offended
party, how will we be so sure that the
sister will convey the same translation as
the offended party wanted to convey to
her? ...
Private prosecutor: Good faith is
presumed, your Honor please. Bad faith
is not presumed. ...
Court: Well, anyway, those are recorded
already and in case of an appeal, those
can be taken up because those will
appear in the transcript of the
stenographic notes, all the objections
that you have raised insofar as allowing
the sister of the offended party to
interpret her sign language.
Defense counsel: ... we will submit a
memorandum to that effect that the
sister is the interpreter in this case, she
being not competent and expert
witness.
Court: Well, she is not presented here as
an expert witness. She is just being used
now as an interpreter, and you are
objecting to that?
Defense counsel: ... We are really
seriously objecting.
Court: ... the appellate court will be
guided by the stenographic transcript
whether you made your observation
and your objection in time before a
person is allowed to be an interpreter in
a case like this.
After Virginia had taken her oath and testified
that she and Esperanza had been
communicating by means of sign language since
childhood, she was directed to ask Esperanza's
name.
Virginia made a sign to Esperanza to sign her
name. Esperanza wrote on a piece of paper
"Esperanza Ranga May 3, 1972 " (17-18 tsn June
11, 1973).
When the trial judge directed Virginia to ask
Esperanza why she was in court, Esperanza
moved her head sidewise and placed a finger on
her lips. She was not able to answer that
question in sign language because, as the private
prosecutor himself admitted, it is difficult to
formulate a "why" question in sign language
(17-19, 23 tsn).
The fiscal noted that Esperanza could
answer "what where and when" questions but it
would be difficult to make her understand a
"why" question because "there were certain
questions that she cannot easily understand" (26-
27 tsn). The following portion of the transcript
is a sample of how Virginia communicated with
Esperanza on direct examination:
Q. Alright. Tell her (Esperanza) to
demonstrate to kick her right leg? — A.
Yes,sir. (Witness-interpreter's sister
doing the same.)

We cannot also ask say a teacher in
(the) school for deaf-mutes to be an
interpreter here because, probably, if
that deaf-mute did not go to the school
for deaf-mutes, she would not know the
sign language of the teacher.
So, probably, this is my personal
observation, that they should adapt
themselves to the circumstances of the
situation. Now, since their sister is
dumb and cannot hear, and because
they were living together, they have to
devise a way by which they could
communicate (with) each other, and,
probably, not the same sign language in
the school for deaf and dumb persons.
So, in the interest of justice, the Court
will allow the sister to interpret the
testimony of the offended party. (4-11
tsn June 11, 1973).
Q. Tell her to repulse or fight back an
opponent when she is attacked? — A.
Yes, sir. (The sister doing the same.)
Q. Let us be specific. Does your sister
know how to look (up) a date in the
calendar? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You taught her. — A. She has an Idea.
Q. Alright. Do you have ... a calendar? —
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you tell your sister to point to
figure 7? — A. Yes, sir. (Witness-
interpreter translating the same to her
sister in sign language and the sister
likewise pointed to figure 7.)
Q Tell her to point to No. 23. — A. Yes,
sir. (Witness-interpreter translating the
same to the sister and the sister
pointing also to No. 23.)
Q What about the month appearing in
that calendar, can she read? What is
that month there appearing there in
that calendar for 1973, in her sign
language? ... — A. She cannot read.
Q But she can read the days or the
number? — A. Yes, sir.
Q Can she point to No. 18? (Witness-
interpreter translating the same to the
sister, and the sister pointing also to No.
18.)
Q Alright. Now, how would she
communicate the month of a year. What
month is she referring when she refers
to a date, for example. How will she
communicate that with you? — A. She
will use the calendar, sir.
Q But she cannot read the month in the
calendar, she said already. Is it not? —
A. She can understand, and at least she
can point.
Q Alright.Will you tell your sister to see
in that calendar the month of July? — A.
We still need to write the month, sir.
Q You give her a piece of paper and
write there July. Then let her locate it
there in the calendar. — A. Yes, sir.
(Witness-interpreter doing the same
and the sister located the month of
July.)
Q Now, tell her to locate the month of
November. — A. Yes, sir. (The sister
locating the same )
Q Will you tell her whether she knows
the days in the week, like Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday like that? — A.
Yes, sir. I think she knows.
Q And what are the days in the week?
Ask her. — A. She does not know, sir.
Q Do you know what day is today? Ask
her. — A. Yes, sir. (Witness-interpreter
translating the question to the sister,
and she pointed to June 11 in the 1973
Calendar.)
Q Now, can you point therein the
calendar any day? — A. (The sister
pointed to Tuesday after the question
was properly translated to her by the
witness-interpreter.) "Court: Make it of
record that she pointed to Tuesday.
Q by Court: Do you know what day is
today? (Witness pointing to June 11 in
the 1973 calendar.) — A: (by Witness-
interpreter): She does not know, your
Honor.
Q by Court: Do you know what is today?
— (Witness pointing to June 11 in the
1973 calendar.)
Court: I think she can adequately
communicate, perhaps not to our
satisfaction. Alright, ... (To the Witness-
Interpreter Virginia): Do you swear to
interpret faithfully and to the best of
your knowledge the questions to your
sister and the answers that she gives to
the questions? — Witness-Interpreter:
Yes, your Honor.
Court: Alright. (To private prosecutor
)Your first witness
Private prosecutor: Our first witness is
the complainant herself, your Honor.
Court: Put her on the stand. (30-37 tsn.)
The oath was then administered to Esperanza.
How it was administered is not shown in the
record. It should be recalled that Virginia
testified that "invisible words" like truth cannot
be made known in sign language to Esperanza.
When Esperanza was asked as to her age, she
write on a piece of paper "May 3, 1983 32" (39
tsn June 11, 1973).
Testimony of Esperanza as verbalized by her
sister Virginia. — Esperanza resided in Carmen
and worked in the ricefield of her brother
Dencio She used to walk from her house to the
ricefield which was quite far. Upon being asked,
Esperanza pointed to the figure "26" in the
calendar. She worked in the ricefield on October
26, 1972 up to the time in the afternoon when
the sun was in a certain position which, as
calculated by the court, meant that it was
approximately three o'clock.
She was on her way home alone. She sketched
the road leading to the highway which was
taken by her and the scene of the alleged rape
(Exh. A or 2). When she reached a grassy spot
along the road, her left hand was pulled by a
man with a mole between his eyebrows whom
Esperanza Identified as Hayag who was in court.
Hayag pulled her to the grassy bush. (At this
point, defense counsel manifested that
Esperanza did not make any sign that she was
pulled to the grassy bush and that it was
Virginia, the interpreter, who supplied that
allegation, 47 tsn).
Esperanza resisted but Hayag kicked her in the
right leg and she stumbled. Hayag choked her
while she was prostrate on the ground. Asked if
she was boxed, Esperanza replied that Hayag
boxed her on the chest while he was standing. At
this point, Esperanza went down the witness
stand and demonstrated how she resisted.
Hayag removed her short pants and kissed her
and then, as stated by the interpreter, she was
raped. Asked the leading question of whether
she was unconscious when she was raped, she
replied in the affirmative and added that she
regained consciousness after she was raped. Her
pants were on her side on the ground. There
was blood in her private part. She pushed aside
Hayag.
Hayag stood up and told Esperanza not to tell
anybody what happened or else he would kill
her. Hayag picked up her pants and threw them
over her body and left. She put on her pants and
went home crying. She was still crying when she
arrived home but she did not disclose to her
mother the alleged rape because of the threat
made by Hayag.
Esperanza indicated in the sketch the spot
where she was raped on October 26, 1972,
Identified as Exhibit A-2 or 2-A (63 tsn).
According to Esperanza. on December 4, 1972
she encountered Hayag in the same place but
she avoided him by passing near the central
school and going to the house of her sister-in-
law, as indicated in the sketch, Exhibit A. She
arrived home at eight o'clock in the evening and
reported the rape incident to her mother.
Hayag's story. — To support his defense that his
sexual intercourse with Esperanza was
voluntarily consummated and was not
accomplished through force or against her will,
he testified that he and Esperanza, whom he had
known for more than fifteen years, loved each
other. They were neighbors in the town of
Carmen. Hayag's daughter Ester is married to
Antonio, a brother of Esperanza.
Their liaison allegedly started one morning in
December, 1970 when Esperanza appeared at
the foot of the stairs of his house and made a
sign that she wanted to drink water. Hayag
signalled her to go upstairs. He was absent from
work on that day.
He went to the kitchen where Esperanza
followed him. After she had drunk water, she
made a sign by pointing to herself and to Hayag
and placing her two fingers side by side or
juxtaposing them. Hayag said that by means of
that sign Esperanza wanted to convey that she
and Hayag were sweethearts. Hayag nodded to
show his assent to Esperanza's offer of love.
Hayag said that thereafter Esperanza embraced
him and they kissed each other. After the
embrace, Esperanza disengaged herself and
formed a circle with her left thumb and index
finger and inserted into the circle the fingers of
her right hand, repeatedly making a push-and-
pull movement. That signal meant that she
wanted sexual intercourse. In answer to that
signal, Hayag nodded.
Esperanza took off her panties and because the
kitchen floor 'was dirty Hayag indicated to her
that they would have sexual congress on the
table which was clean. 'They performed the
sexual intercourse on the table and reached the
climax in about five minutes.
After they went down from the table, they
embraced and kissed and Esperanza allegedly
made a sign that they should repeat the sexual
act. At that juncture, Florita Hayag's daughter,
barged in and saw them. They separated.
Four days later, Esperanza met Hayag at about
six-thirty in the morning at the crossing or
intersection of the highway going to Tagum and
the road going to Tibal-og in the vicinity of the
bridge and the chapel. There was a grassy spot
in that place (Exh. 9 and A). There, they had
sexual intercourse for about five minutes.
In the meantime, Florita reported to her mother,
Adoracion, that she had seen Hayag and
Esperanza in a compromising situation. Hayag
and his wife quarrelled. Mrs. Hayag and her
three daughters left the conjugal abode and took
refuge in her mother's house in Maco. Hayag
was able to persuade his wife to return to their
house after he had promised not to have
anything more to do with Esperanza.
For more than a year, Hayag lived up to his
promise. Then, in the morning of May 12, 1972,
Hayag met Esperanza on the highway while he
was waiting for transportation to take him to his
work as a foreman (capataz) of the Bureau of
Public Highways in Mawab Nabunturan.
On that occasion, Esperanza allegedly made a
sign to him that they should have sexual
intercourse, pointing to him the grassy spot
where they had done it before. Hayag made a
counter-sign to convey to Esperanza the
message that they should have sexual
intercourse after he had cleared a spot amidst
the dense talahib grass.
It took Hayag three days to prepare the place of
assignation (See photographs, Exh. 5 to 8). On
May 15, 1973 he and Esperanza allegedly had
sexual intercourse in the spot which he had
cleared. Thereafter, they had six other acts of
sexual intercourse in that place. A white plastic
raincoat allegedly belonging to Esperanza was
used to cover the ground (Exh. 4).
Hayag specified that he had carnal intercourse
with Esperanza on September 2 and 23, October
20 and 26, November 4 and December 4, 1972.
Esperanza allegedly advised Hayag to remember
the dates because she might become pregnant.
The last three acts of sexual intercourse took
place in the afternoon after Hayag had come
from work and while Esperanza was on her way
home from the farm (13-14 tsn October 26,
1972).
After each sexual intercourse, Esperanza would
take Hayag's ball pen and write the date on the
palm of his hand. Hayag himself did not make
any record of the dates of the sexual intercourse.
He committed them to memory
In the afternoon of December 4, 1972, after
Hayag and Esperanza had sexual intercourse in
their usual trysting place (Exh. 5 to 8), they were
seen in that vicinity by Jose Santillan, a close
friend of Hayag, and by Esteban Ranga, the uncle
of Esperanza, who appeared to be angry and
who held her and brought her home.
Two days later, or on December 6, Hayag was
arrested by Patrolmen Rolando Yambao and
Samuel Casuga because Esperanza's mother and
uncle had charged him with rape.
Hayag's daughter Florita and his wife Adoracion
corroborated his testimony as to the quarrel
between him and his wife when she learned that
he had an affair with Esperanza.
Florita testified that Esperanza cried when she
learned that Hayag was in prison and in sign
language she allegedly made it known that she
had voluntary sexual intercourse with Hayag
and that, to prove that she loved Hayag, she
(Esperanza) gave to Florita the plastic raincoat
already mentioned (Exh. 4).
Jose Santillan, a farmer, a friend of Hayag and a
neighbor of the Ranga family, testified that as a
Peeping Tom or voyeur, he witnessed the sexual
intercourse between Hayag and Esperanza in
the afternoon of December 4, 1972 in the grassy
spot mentioned by Hayag in his testimony.
The trial court reacted in disbelief of Hayag's
story. It branded Hayag's version as unusual and
bizarre. It concluded that Hayag took advantage
of the physical defect of Esperanza and that he
was under the illusion that because she is a
deaf-mute she would not be able to
communicate the outrage perpetrated against
her.
Ruling. — Hayag's counsel de oficio contends in
this appeal that the trial court erred in basing
the judgment of conviction on the testimony of
Esperanza in sign language as verbalized by her
sister, an alleged biased interpreter.
We have conscientiously examined the record.
Our conclusion is that the prosecution failed to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. The culpability of Hayag
cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated
story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister
and mother. That story in itself is not clear,
convincing, positive and free from suspicion. It
is not impeccable and does not ring true
throughout (People vs. Ariarte 60, Phil. 326).
Lack of tenacious resistance on the part of
Esperanza Ranga, her delay in reporting the
alleged rape to her mother and the absence of an
immediate medical examination of her private
organ are circumstances creating reasonable
doubt as to the commission of the rape.
From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her
sister, it is at once evident that Esperanza did
not offer much resistance to the alleged sexual
assault made by Hayag. She did not suffer any
physical injuries. Her dress was not torn. She did
not attempt to free herself from the clutches of
Hayag.
This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped
by a strong and robust adult. This is a case of a
thirty-two-year-old farm girl who was allegedly
forced to have carnal intercourse by a fifty-year-
old man. Her story does not contain details as to
how she repelled Hayag's attempts to ravish her.
And that story was not recounted by her directly
in her own words but was made known by
means of sign language which was interpreted
by her sister. The trustworthiness of that
interpretation is doubtful.
The defense objected to such interpretation. The
probability of error or fabrication in such a case
is very manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-
Real, that is a dangerous procedure for
ascertaining the truth especially in a case where
the liberty of an accused is at stake (People vs.
Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, 390). The court and the
accused have no means of checking the accuracy
of the verbalization made by the interpreter
who is herself interested in sending the accused
to prison.
It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman
without the help of confederates or without
terrifying her with a deadly weapon. If she
makes a vigorous resistance, the likelihood is
that the lascivious desire of her assailant would
be foiled.
The resistance would, as in this case, be more
effective in an open field where there are more
chances of eluding the assailant or frustrating
his advances. The rape committed by a man
without the assistance of other persons is
possible but is a rare case. (2 Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, 1975 Ed., 588; People vs. Barbo,
L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459, 467.)
Then, there is the fact that although the alleged
rape took place on October 26, 1972, it was only
forty days later, or on December 4, that
Esperanza confided to her mother (by means of
signs, of course) that she was supposedly raped.
Her story was not corroborated.
The uncorroborated testimony of the offended
woman may be sufficient under certain
circumstances to warrant a conviction for rape.
Yet, "from the very nature of the charge and the
ease with which it may be made and the
difficulty which surrounds the accused in
disproving it where the point at issue is as to
whether the cohabitation was had with or
without the use of force or threats, it is
imperative that such testimony should be
scrutinized with the greatest caution." (Carson,
J., in U.S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268.)
In all such cases the conduct of the
woman immediately following the
alleged assault is of the utmost
importance as tending to establish the
truth or falsity of the charge. Indeed it
may well be doubted whether a
conviction of the offense of rape should
ever be sustained upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the
woman unless the court is satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that her
conduct at the time when the alleged
rape was committed and immediately
thereafter was such as might be
reasonably expected from her under all
the circumstances of the case. (U.S. vs.
Flores, pp. 268-269.)
Moreover, the case for the prosecution was
irreparably impaired by the inconsistencies
committed by the complainant's mother, Mrs.
Ranga. She first swore that according to her
interpretation of Esperanza's sign language five
rapes were admitted on different dates.
Then, she rectified her first affidavit and swore
in a second affidavit and during the preliminary
examination that only one rape was committed.
(Exh. 1 and 3.)
On the witness stand, she declared that the rape
was committed on December 4, 1972 but on
cross-examination she declared that her
daughter was abused on October 26,
1972. Contrary to the prosecution's theory, Mrs.
Ranga testified that Hayag did not do anything
to Esperanza on December 4, 1972 (56 and 65
tsn August 6, 1972).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment of
conviction is reversed and set aside. On the
ground of reasonable doubt or the insufficiency
of the prosecution's evidence, defendant Daniel
Hayag is acquitted of the charge of rape. Costs de
oficio.
Pp v. Castaneda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979)
G.R. No. L-46306 February 27, 1979
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIANO C. CASTAÑEDA, JR., as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Branch III, and BENJAMIN F.
MANALOTO, respondents.
On the basis of the complaint 1 of his wife,
Victoria M. Manaloto, herein private respondent
Benjamin Manaloto was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga, presided by
respondent Judge, Hon. Mariano C. Castaneda Jr.,
with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document committed, according to the
Information, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of May,
1975, in the Municipality of San
Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-
named a BENJAMIN F. MANALOTO,
with deliberate intent to commit
falsification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
counterfeit, imitate and forge the
signature of his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto in a deed of sale executed by
said accused wherein he sold a house
and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership of said spouse in favor of
Ponciano Lacsamana under Doc. No.
1957, Page No. 72, Book No. LVII, Series
of 1975, notarized by Notary Public
Abraham Pa. Gorospe, thereby making
it appear that his spouse Victoria M.
Manaloto gave her marital consent to
said sale when in fact and in truth she
did not. 2
At the trial, the prosecution called the
complaint-wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness,
invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
Of Court which provides:
SEC. 20. Disqualification by reason of
interest or relationship — The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in
which they are interested, directly or
indirectly as herein enumerated.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A husband can not be examined for
or at his wife without her consent; nor a
wife for or against her husband without
his consent, except in a civil case by one
against the other or in a criminal case
for a crime committed by one against
the other.
The prosecution opposed said motion to
disquality on the ground that the case falls
under the exception to the rule, contending that
it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other." Notwithstanding such
opposition, respondent Judge granted the
motion, disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from
testifying for or against her husband, in an order
dated March 31, 1977. A motion for
reconsideration petition was filed but was
denied by respondent Judge in an order dated
May 19, 1977.
Hence, this petition for certiorari file by the
office of the Provincial Fiscal, on behalf of the
People of the Philippines, seeking set aside the
aforesaid order of the respondent Judge and
praying that a preliminary injunction or a
ternporary restraining order be issued by this
Court enjoining said judge from further
proceeding with the trial of aforesaid Criminal
Case No. 1011.
On June 20, 1977, this Court resolved — (a) to
issue a temporary restraining order, and (b) to
require the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the petitioner. 3 The Office of the
Solicitor General filed its Notice of Appearance
on June 27, 1977, 4 and its Memorandum in
support of the Petition on August 30, 1977. 5 The
respondents filed their Memorandum on
September 5, 1977. 6 Whereupon, the case was
considered submitted for decision. 7
From the foregoing factual and procedural
antecedents emerges the sole issues
determinative of the instant petition, to wit:
Whether or not the criminal case for
Falsification of Public Document filed against
herein private respondent Benjamin F. Manaloto
— who allegedly forged the signature of his
wife, Victoria M. Manaloto, in a deed of sale,
thereby making it appear that the latter gave her
marital consent to the sale of a house and lot
belonging to their conjugal partnership when in
fact and in truth she did not — may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime
committed by a husband against his wife and,
therefore, an exception to the rule on marital
disqualification.
We sustain petitioner's stand that the case is an
exception to the marital disqualification rule, as
a criminal case for a crime committed by the
accused-husband against the witness-wife.
1. The act complained of as constituting the
crime of Falsification of Public Document is the
forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in
a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein
that said wife consented to the sale of a house
and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership
when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be
noted that had the sale of the said house and lot,
and the signing of the wife's name by her
husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been
charged against said husband Clearly, therefore,
it is the husband's breach of his wife's
confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust
which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal
which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal
case with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. To rule, therefore, that such criminal
case is not one for a crime committed by one
spouse against the other is to advance a
conclusion which completely disregards the
factual antecedents of the instant case.
2. This is not the first time that the issue of
whether a specific offense may be classified as a
crime committed by one spouse against the
other is presented to this Court for resolution.
Thus, in the case of Ordoño v. Daquigan, 8 this
Court, through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, set
up the criterion to be followed in resolving the
issue, stating that:
We think that the correct rule, which may be
adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down
in Cargill v. State, 35 ALR, 133, 220, Pac 64,26
OkL 314, wherein the court said:
The rule that the injury must amount to
a physical wrong upon the is too
narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic within the exception is too
broad. The better rule is that, WHEN AN
OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR
DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE
CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES
WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against
the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed (by)
one against the other.
Applying the foregoing criterion in said case
of Ordoño v. Daquigan this Court held that the
rape committed by the husband of the witness-
wife against their daughter was a crime
committed by the husband against his wife.
Although the victim of the crime committed by
the accused in that can was not his wife but their
daughter, this Court, nevertheless, applied the
exception for the reason that said criminal act
"Positively undermine(d) the connubial
relationship. 9
With more reason must the exception apply to
the instant case where the victim of the crime
and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third
person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable
that the act comp of had the effect of directly
and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This
is apparent not only in the act Of the wife in
personally lodging her complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent
efforts 10 in connection with the instant petition,
which seeks to set aside the order disqualified
her from testifying against her husband. Taken
collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife
underacore the fact that the martial and
domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved said
nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, as We have occasion to
point out in previous decisions, "identity of
interests disappears and the consequent danger
of perjury based on that Identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidence of private life which the law aims at
protecting will be nothing but Ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home. 11 Thus, there is no reason to
apply the martial disqualification rule.
3. Finally, overriding considerations of public
policy demand that the wife should not be
disqualified from testifying against her husband
in the instant case. For, as aptly observed by the
Solicitor General," (t)o espouse the contrary
view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a
husband committing as many falsifications
against his wife as he could conjure, seeking
shelter in the anti-marital privilege as a license
to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with
unabashed and complete impunity.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order of
the lower court dated March 31, 1977,
disqualifying Victoria Manaloto from testifying
for or against her husband, Benjamin Manaloto,
in Criminal Case No. 1011, as well as the order
dated May 19, 1977, denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order issued by this
Court is hereby lifted and the respondent Judge
is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of
the case, allowing Victoria Manaloto to testify
against her husband.
Pp v. Francisco, 78 Phil 694 (1947)
G.R. No. L-568 July 16, 1947
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JUAN FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant.
Convicted of the crime of parricide by the Court
of First Instance of Mindoro, Juan Francisco
appeals to this Court and asks us to reverse the
decision of the trial court and to acquit him of
the crime charged.
On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been
previously arrested on charges of robbery, was
being held as detention prisoner in the
municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that
date he requested permission from the chief of
police, and he was allowed to go with Sergeant
Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard
him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant
allowed the prisoner to see his wife who was at
the time in a room of said house, while said
sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After
a few moments, Pimentel heard the scream of a
woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's
wife running out of the room and holding her
right breast which was bleeding. Still moments
later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with
his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on
his breast. Pimentel also found defendant to
have a wound in his belly while his child had a
wound in the back. Pimentel found the child
dead.
The prosecution, in recommending the
imposition of the capital penalty upon the
accused, relies mainly on: (1) the affidavit,
Exhibit C (translation, Exhibit C-1), which is a
virtual confession of the accused; (2) Exhibit D,
which is the record made by the justice of the
peace of Mansalay of the arraignment of the
defendant upon which the latter entered a plea
of guilty; and (3) the rebuttal testimony of
Emilia Taladtad, wife of the appellant.
Exhibit C is an affidavit signed and sworn to by
the appellant before the justice of the peace of
Mansalay on March 5, 1945,. Exhibit C-1 is its
English translation. In said affidavit appellant
declares that: "I asked permission from the chief
of police so that I may be able to raise my bond
and to indicate to me the house of one Guillermo
Gervasio, a policeman, and I was consented and
the sergeant of police accompanied me to my
house; that upon arriving at the house, Sgt.
Pacifico Pimentel allowed me to go up in order
that I may be able to talk to my wife and the
sergeant of police awaited me in the stairs of the
house; when I was in the house, I remembered
what my uncle told me to the effect that he
would order someone to kill me because I am a
shame and a dishonor to our family and
suddenly I lost my sense and I thought to myself
that if someone would kill me it would be more
preferable for me to kill myself; when I looked at
the bed I saw a scissor near my wife and
unconsciously I picked up the said scissor and
immediately stabbed my wife whereupon I
looked for my child on the bed and stabbed him;
I killed my son Romeo Francisco whose age is
more or less two years and after that I stabbed
myself; after stabbing myself, I heard a shot and
the sergeant of police asked me if I would
surrender to him or not; I replied him "yes" then
I lost my consciousness."
Sergeant of Police Pimentel, whose veracity we
find in the evidence no reason to doubt, declared
(p. 6, t.s.n., Lunar) that the accused confessed to
him that because he was already tired or
disgusted with his life "on account of the
accusation of his father-in-law" against him, he
wanted to wipe out his family by stabbing his
wife, his son and himself, and killing the three of
them. The same witness also stated (p. 9, ibid.)
that the accused confessed to him that he
stabbed his wife, his child and himself because
he was ashamed, as his father-in-law told him
that he should rather die than live in shame for
having dishonored the family of his wife.
The voluntariness and spontaniety of the
confession contained in Exhibit C was testified
to by the justice of the peace of Mansalay and
police sergeant Pimentel, one Sebastian
Punzalan, and the chief of police Alfredo Iwahi;
that said justice of the peace had previously read
the contents of the same affidavit to the accused
and that the accused signed without any
intimidation having been exerted in the
presence of said justice of the peace; that the
accused signed voluntarily in the session hall of
the justice of the peace court in Barrio Paclasan
(pp. 26-27, ibid.) Pimentel testified, upon the
same point, that no force was exerted upon
appellant to state what is contained in the
affidavit; that he had not maltreated or boxed
the accused as pretended by the latter; that the
contents of the exhibit were read to the accused;
that he did not threatened the accused to shoot
the latter if he would not swear to Exhibit C
before the justice of the peace, as declared by
said accused (pp. 25-26, ibid.) In this connection
we note from the testimony of the accused
himself that on the way to the house of the
justice of the peace after the incident, he was
being helped by the chief of police Iwahi when,
according to him, Sergeant Pimentel told him
that he was going to swear to the contents of
Exhibit C and that if he would not do so Pimentel
would shoot him (p. 17, ibid.); that (the same
accused assured the court) Iwahi treated him
well (t.s.n., p. 20, ibid.); and really from the
entire testimony of this accused the good
treatment accorded him by Chief of Police Iwahi
is clearly discernible. He was under preventive
detention in the house of Iwahi and it was Iwahi
who suggested or told him, after he had killed
and dressed the former's pig, that he bring a kilo
of the meat to his (appellant's) wife (p. 13, ibid.)
It was also Iwahi who allowed him to go to his
house on the same occasion for the purposes of
the procurement of his bail (p. 13, ibid.).
Under these circumstances, besides the
complete absence of proof of any reason or
motive why Pimentel should so threaten the
accused, we find the accused's version
incredible. On page 16 of the same transcript,
answering a question by the Court of First
Instance, the accused testified that he
understands English and the translation Exhibit
C-1 of the affidavit Exhibit C is in that language.
Other indications of appellant's lack of
trustworthiness are: While on page 14 of said
transcript he testified that he was the only one
who went to the house of his wife because
Pimentel, according to him, remained in the
house of Roberto Magramo, on page 13 he
declared that he was accompanied by the
sergeant of police of Mansalay, Pacifico Pimentel
to the house of his wife and that the chief of
police ordered Pimentel to so accompany him.
Contradicting the same pretension of his having
gone alone to his wife's house is his own
testimony on page 17 of the transcript wherein
he assured affirmatively the question of his own
counsel whether Pimentel was the policeman
who was with him to guard him on the occasion
of his going to his wife's house; and really, while
he imputed upon his wife the wounding of their
child, who died as a consequence thereof, he
admitted that he did not tell this to the justice of
the peace of Mansalay (p. 18, ibid.), and the
reason he assigned for this passive conduct on
his part to the effect that he was afraid of
Pimentel (p. 19, ibid.) is patently unacceptable,
for no motive whatsoever has been established
to make us believe that the accused had reasons
to be so afraid of Pimentel. Appellant's
testimony to the effect that Pacifico Pimentel
was testifying against him because Pimentel
"being my guard that time he might be held
responsible for allowing me to go alone" (p.
17, ibid.) is absolutely without merit. This
testimony clearly reveals a desire to show that
because Pimentel allowed the accused to go up
the house while the former stayed at the foot of
the stairs, said Pimentel would be responsible
for what had happened unless the accused was
the one who killed the child and wounded his
wife rather than the wife having accidentally
wounded the child and killed him and been
stabbed by the accused, who also stabbed
himself. As we said a moment ago, we do not
give any merit to this purpose in testifying
against the accused to relieve himself of all
responsibility for what had happened, it would
have been more conducive to this result if
Pimentel had testified that it was not the
accused, whom he had allowed to go upstairs
unguarded, who was guilty, but his wife, of the
wounding of the child, and that the accused
wounded his wife only as the result of the
obfuscation produced by the child's death. And
the fact that Pimentel gave the version which
might place no small blame on him for allowing
the accused to go up the house alone, gives
special weight to his testimony.
This case, as developed by the evidence for the
prosecution, which has not been destroyed nor
enervated by that of the defense, presents a
truly strange happening. But the fact of the
commission of the crime of parricide appears to
us to have been established beyond reasonable
doubt. As to the reasons impelling the
commission of the act, the case is a strange one
and admittedly not common. But while it is not
necessary even to prove motive in case the
commission of the crime is established as
required by law (U.S. vs. Ricafor, 1 Phil., 173;
U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil., 561; U.S. vs. Reyes, 18
Phil., 495; U.S. vs. Balmori and Apostol, 18 Phil.,
578), here we have a case of a crime proven
beyond reasonable doubt, not absolutely
without a proven motive, but with proof of a
motive testified to by the accused himself in his
confession, strange though it be. But at times
"truth is stranger than fiction," and it so happens
here. The law must be applied to the facts.
We have scanned and searched the evidence and
the record diligently for facts and circumstances
which might sufficiently establish insanity or
any allied defense, but we have failed to find
them.
As we construe the evidence, we believe that
Exhibit C contains the truth, as narrated by the
accused himself who, at the time of making it,
must have been moved only by the
determination of a repentant father and
husband to acknowledge his guilt for facts
which, though perhaps done under
circumstances productive of a diminution of the
exercise of will-power, fell short of depriving the
offender of consciousness of his acts. We will
have occasion to further consider this aspect of
the case later.
Exhibit C was signed and sworn to by appellant
the day following the fatal event. Presumably, on
making this confession appellant had not yet
had time to reflect upon the consequences of
such a confession to himself — egoism was not
yet allowed to operate against the promptings of
his conscience. But when on February 23, 1946
— almost one year after — this man testified in
his own defense in the Court of First Instance, he
already had had ample opportunity to reflect
upon those consequences. And what happened?
As in similar cases, he repudiated his confession,
and alleged torture and violence to have been
exerted upon his person and his mind in order,
so he now pretends, to extract it from him. As
we find the confession to have been given
voluntarily, we feel justified in concluding that
its subsequent repudiation by the accused
almost a year after must have been due to his
fear of its consequences to himself, which he not
improbably thought might cost him his own life.
It was the struggle between the noble and the
ignoble in the man, and the latter, aided by
instinct of self-preservation, won.
Defense counsel attacks the value of Exhibit C as
evidence of guilt for the reason that the
statements contained therein were not, counsel
contends, given spontaneously but through use
of violence and intimidation. He also questions
the admissibility of Exhibit D on the ground that
it has not been properly identified; and, with
more vigor and stronger emphasis, he impugns
the admissibility of the testimony of appellant's
wife, invoking the provision of section 26 (d) of
Rule 123 prohibiting the wife and the husband
from testifying for or against each other.
As to Exhibit C, this document was sworn to and
subscribed by said accused before the justice of
the peace of Mansalay. This official testified that
he asked the prisoner before the latter signed
said exhibit whether he understood the contents
thereof, and that said latter answered in the
affirmative. The witness further declared that
appellant signed the exhibit voluntarily and that
said appellant said that the said affidavit was his
(p. 10, ibid.). There is a total absence of
evidence, besides the testimony of appellant
himself, to show that his statements contained
in said exhibit were extracted form him by the
use of violence and intimidation. While we are
not unaware of the practice resorted to by some
peace officers of extracting admissions or
confessions from persons accused of crime by
the employment of third-degree methods, in the
present case we fail to find from the evidence
sufficient proof to destroy the categorical
testimony of the justice of the peace that Exhibit
C was signed by appellant voluntarily and with a
full understanding thereof. Furthermore, the
statements of appellant in said Exhibit C were
corroborated by the testimony of his wife on
rebuttal. This leads us to the consideration of
the admissibility of the wife's testimony.
The rule contained in section 265 (d) of Rule
123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the
subject have assigned as reasons therefor the
following: First, identity of interest; second, the
consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy
of the law which deems it necessary to guard the
security and confidences of private life even at
the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and
which rejects such evidence because its
admission would lead to domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and fourth, because where a want
of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile
testimony of the other. This has been said in the
case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 64; 25 Okl. Cr.,
314; 35 A.L.R., 133), thus:
The reasons given by law text-writers
and courts why neither a husband nor
wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by
one against the other have been stated
thus: First, identity of interests; second,
the consequent danger of perjury; third,
the policy of the law which deems it
necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and which rejects such evidence
because its admission would lead to
domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the
other. (70 C.J., 119.)
However, as all other general rules, this one has
its own exceptions, both in civil actions between
the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses
committed by one against the other. Like the
rule itself, the exceptions are backed by sound
reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh
those in support of the general rule. For
instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
At any rate, in the instant case the wife did not
testify in the direct evidence for the prosecution
but under circumstances presently to be stated.
It will be noted that the wife only testified
against her husband after the latter, testifying in
his own defense, imputed upon her the killing of
their son. (p. 15, ibid.) By all rules of justice and
reason this gave the prosecution, which had
theretofore refrained from presenting the wife
as a witness against her husband, the right to do
so, as it did in rebuttal; and the the wife herself
the right to so testify, at least, in self-defense,
not of course, against being subjected to
punishment in that case in which she was not a
defendant but against any or all of various
possible consequences which might flow from
her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution
against her which might be instituted by the
corresponding authorities upon the basis of her
husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral
and social sense, her being believed by those
who heard the testimony orally given, as well as
by those who may read the same, once put in
writing, to be the killer of her infant child. It has
been aptly said that the law of evidence is the
law of common sense. Presuming the husband
who so testified against his wife to be endowed
with common sense, he must be taken to have
expected that the most natural reaction which
the said testimony would give rise to on the part
of the prosecution, as well as of his wife, was to
deny upon rebuttal the new matter which was
involved in the same testimony, namely, the
imputation that it was his wife who killed their
little son. Upon the part of the prosecution,
because he not only limited himself to denying
that he was the killer, but went further and
added what was really a new matter consisting
in the imputation of the crime upon his wife.
And upon the part of the wife, because of the
reasons already set forth above. Hence, in giving
such testimony, the husband must, in all
fairness, be held to have intended all its
aforesaid natural and necessary consequences.
By his said act, the husband — himself
exercising the very right which he would deny
to his wife upon the ground of their marital
relations — must be taken to have waived all
objection to the latter's testimony
upon rebuttal, even considering that such
objection would have been available at the
outset.
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the
all-important role of the State in this case. The
State being interested in laying the truth before
the courts so that the guilty may be punished
and the innocent exonerated, must have the
right to offer the rebutting testimony in
question, even against the objection of the
accused, because it was the latter himself who
gave rise to its necessity. It may be said that the
accused husband thought that he would have
more chances of convincing the court of his
pretended innocence if he pointed to his wife as
having caused the death of their child, instead of
simply denying that he was the author of the
fatal act. To this we would counter by saying
that if he was to be allowed, for his convenience,
to make his choice and thereby impute the act
upon his spouse, justice would be partial and
one-sided if both the State and the wife were to
be absolutely precluded from introducing the
latter's rebutting testimony.
As well-settled as this rule of marital
incompetency itself is the other that it may be
waived.
Waiver of incompetency. — Objections
to the competency of a husband or wife
to testify in a criminal prosecution
against the other may be waived as in
the case of the other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his
or her privilege by calling the other
spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to
cross-examination in the usual manner.
It is well-established that where an
accused introduces his wife as a witness
in his behalf, the state is entitled to
question her as to all matters germane
and pertinent to her testimony on direct
examination. It is also true that
objection to the spouse's competency
must be made when he or she is first
offered as witness, and that the
incompetency may be waived by the
 failure of the accused to make timely
objection to the admission of the
spouse's testimony, although knowing
of such incompetency, and the
testimony admitted, especially if the
accused has assented to the admission,
either expressly or impliedly. Other
courts have held that the witness's
testimony is not admissible even with
the other spouse's consent. Clearly, if
the statute provides that a spouse shall
in no case testify against the other
except in a prosecution for an offense
against the other, the failure of the
accused to object does not enable the
state to use the spouse as a witness. (3
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed.,
section 1205, pp. 2060-2061.)
Wharton, in note 10 at the foot of page 2060 of
the cited volume refers us to section 1149
appearing on page 1988 of the same volume,
dealing with waiver objection to incompetency
of witnesses in general. We transcribe this
section for convenient reference:
Waiver of objection to incompetency. —
A party may waive his objection to the
competency of a witness and permit
him to testify. A party calling an
incompetent witness as his own waives
the incompetency. Also, if, after such
incompetency appears, there is failure
to make timely objection, by a party
having knowledge of the incompetency,
the objection will be deemed waived,
whether it is on the ground of want of
mental capacity or for some other
reason. If the objection could have been
taken during the trial, a new trial will be
refused and the objection will not be
available on writ of error. If, however,
the objection of a party is overruled and
the ruling has been excepted to, the
party may thereafter examine the
witness upon the matters as to which he
was allowed to testify to without
waiving his objections to the witness's
competency. (Ibid., section 1149, p.
1988.)
It will be noted, as was to be expected, that in
the last above-quoted section, the author
mentions certain specific cases where the courts
concerned hold that there was waiver, but for
obvious reasons neither the author nor said
courts have attempted to make an enumeration
of all possible cases of waiver. In the very nature
of things, it would be impossible to make a
priori such a complete enumeration and to say
that it is exclusive. So long as the Legislature
itself does not make its own statutory and
exclusive specification of cases of such waiver —
and we doubt that it ever will — no complete
and exclusive enumeration can, nor should, be
attempted by the courts, for in the absence of
such legislation the cases of waiver will be as
indefinite in number as indefinite are and
always will be the varying and unpredictable
circumstances surrounding each particular case.
To illustrate, Mr. Wharton says above that the
accused waives his or her privilege by calling
the other spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner, the reason
being that the State is entitled to question the
spouse so presented as to all matters germane
and pertinent to the direct testimony. In the
same way, and for a similar reason, when the
herein appellant gave his testimony in question
in his defense, the State had the right to rebut
the new matter contained in that testimony
consisting in the imputation upon his wife of the
death of the little boy. And that rebuttal
evidence, which was rendered necessary
by appellant's own testimony, could be furnished
only by his wife who, as he fully knew,
was alone with him and their son at the precise
place and time of the event. This right to rebut is
secured to the State, no less than to the accused,
by Rule 115, section 3, paragraph (c), the
provision further authorizing the court, in
furtherance of justice, to permit one or the other
party to offer "new additional evidence bearing
upon the main issue in question." So that if the
waiver that we here declare to flow from the
above-mentioned testimony of appellant does
not happen to be among those which were
mentioned in the cases cited by Mr. Wharton,
that is no reason against the existence of said
waiver.
When the husband testified that it was his wife
who caused the death of their son, he could not,
let us repeat, justly expect the State to keep
silent and refrain from rebutting such new
matter in his testimony, through
the only witness available, namely, the wife; nor
could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus
gravely expose her to the danger of criminal
proceedings against her being started by the
authorities upon the strength and basis of said
testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral
and social stigma of being thought, believed, or
even just suspected, to be the killer of her own
offspring. A decent respect and considerate
regard for the feelings of an average mother will
tell us that such a moral and social stigma would
be no less injurious to her than a criminal
punishment. And if the wife should, in such a
case and at such a juncture, be allowed to testify
upon rebuttal, the scope of her testimony should
at least be the same as that of her husband. This
is only simple justice and fairness dictated by
common sense. Since the husband had testified
that it was his wife who caused the death of the
little boy, she should be allowed to say that it
was really her husband who did it. We hold that
it is not necessary, to justify such rebuttal
evidence, and to declare the existence of the
waiver upon which it was based, that the wife be
in jeopardy of punishment in the same case by
reason of such testimony of her accused
husband. The rule of waiver of objection to the
competency of witnesses generally does not
require this prerequisite in the case between
husband and wife. Rather the rule makes the
determination of the question hinge around the
consequences which by common sense, in
justice and in fairness, should be deemed to
have been expected by the spouse who first
testified naturally to flow from his act of giving
that testimony. At any rate, the trial court not
only had the power to allow the State to utilize
the wife as rebuttal witness, but also the
discretion to permit "new additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question." But
even restricting the wife's testimony to merely
contradicting her husband's version that she
was the one who killed their child, there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant was the killer. With the testimony of
both spouses upon the point, instead of that of
the accused alone, let justice take its course.
As to Exhibit D, this document was a part of the
record of the case in the justice of the peace of
court which was expressly presented by the
prosecution as evidence in the Court of First
Instance.
But after all has been said and done, in justice to
the accused, we believe that, whether we are
dealing with a simpleton or an eccentric, or we
have here one of those well-nigh inexplicable
phenomena in human conduct where the judge
finds himself at a loss to discover an adequate
motivation for the proven acts of the accused, —
indulging all reasonable intendments in favor of
appellant, we are of opinion that when he
committed the crime charged against him he
must have been suffering from some illness (of
the body, the mind, the nerves, or the moral
faculty) as is contemplated in paragraph 9 of
article 13 of the Revised Penal Code as a
mitigating circumstance, namely, "such illness of
the offender as would diminish the exercise of
the will-power of the offender without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts."
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
parricide by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63, paragraph 3, of the same code,
provides that when the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, and the
law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be
applied; in this case, in view of the above
indicated circumstance and there being no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
is reclusion perpetua, which was the penalty
correctly applied by the trial court, which
penalty, of course, carries with it the accessory
penalties provided for in article 41 of the said
Code. The accused should also be sentenced to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Romeo
Francisco in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the
costs.
As above modified, the appealed judgment is
affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result. To my mind the evidence
is sufficient to support the judgment of
conviction without taking into consideration the
testimony of the appellant's wife in rebuttal. I
agree with Mr. Justice Feria in his dissent that
she is incompetent to testify against the
appellant, her husband, there being an objection
to her testifying against him.
FERIA, J., dissenting:
Without necessity of discussing the merits of the
case and deciding whether the appellant's
conviction by the Court of First Instance must be
affirmed or reversed, for the majority has
decided to affirm it and it would be useless now
for the undersigned to dissent from or concur in
the conviction of the appellant, we dissent from
the new theory enunciated in the majority
opinion that the appellant's testimony to the
effect that his wife was the one who
unintentionally inflicted the wound which
caused the death of the child, capacitated his
wife to testify as a witness on rebuttal against
her husband, and "constituted a waiver of all
objections to her testimony."
The pertinent portion of the majority decision
reads as follows:
"The reasons given by law text-writers
and courts why neither a husband nor
wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committed by
one against the other have been stated
thus: First, identity of interests, second,
the consequent danger of perjury; third,
the policy of the law which deems it
necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice,
and which rejects such evidence
because its admission would lead to
domestic disunion and unhappiness;
and fourth, because, where a want of
domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse
through the hostile testimony of the
other. (70 C.J., 119)"
However, as all other general rules, this
one has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in
criminal cases for offenses committed
by one against the other. Like the rule
itself, the exceptions are backed by
sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the
general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so
strained that there is no more harmony
to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the
reason based upon such harmony and
tranquility fails. In such case identity of
interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on
that identity is non-existent. Likewise,
in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law
aims at protecting will be nothing but
ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy
home."
The new theory of the majority is evidently
untenable for it is predicated upon the incorrect
premise or assumption that the
abovementioned reasons or grounds of the
incapacity of one of the spouses to testify
against the other in a proceeding in which the
latter is a party, are also applicable to testimony
of one spouse against the other who is not a
party to the cause which it is offered or given, as
in the present case. This premise or assumption
is incorrect, for said reasons do not apply to the
latter case. Were it applicable, the law would
have also disqualified one spouse to give
testimony which in any way disparages or
disfavor the other although the latter is not a
party to the cause; but the law does not so. The
prohibition contained in section 26 (d) of Rule
123 only relates to cases in which the testimony
of a spouse is offered for or against the other in
a proceeding to which the latter is a party
(U.S. vs. Concepcion, 31 Phil., 182;
People vs. Natividad, 70 Phil., 315). And the
reason is obvious. Although the testimony of the
husband against his wife who is not a party to
the case is admissible; yet, as said testimony can
not be used as evidence against the wife in a
civil case or criminal prosecution against her, it
would not effectively strain the marital and
domestic relations; lead to domestic disunion
and unhappiness; disturb the peace, harmony,
and tranquility of the family, and destroy the
identity of interest.
Such testimony, far from producing said results,
might have a different effect. Where one of the
spouses testifies in his defense that the other
spouse, who is not a party to the case, is the one
who committed the crime charged, his
testimony, if believed by the court, would result
in the acquittal and release of the defendant
spouse and enable the accused, if confined in
prison, to join again his spouse, without placing
the latter in danger of being prosecuted and
convicted by his testimony. In the present case,
the testimony of the appellant does not require
any rebuttal by his wife, because, according to
the clear provisions of law, the latter can not
testify against her husband appellant, and the
courts should take into consideration in
determining the probative force of such a
testimony. And it does not call for a denial by the
wife in herself or own defense, because it can
not be used or admitted without her consent as
evidence in a criminal case instituted against her
for her son's death.
Under the new theory of the majority, the
prosecutor of one spouse who, in order to free
himself from liability as defendant in a criminal
case would testify, as the appellant has testified,
that his other spouse who is not a party to the
case is responsible for their child's death, may
take advantage of such testimony to induce that
other spouse to testify in her defense according
to the prosecution, and the latter in so testifying
would naturally accuse the defendant to be the
guilty party in order to save himself or herself
from criminal liability.
Who may give the assurance that the
defendant's wife in the present case did testify
the way she she testified against her husband,
not because her husband is really guilty, but
because she wanted to defend and save herself,
taking into consideration the way the question
were propounded to her by the prosecution and
her answers thereto? The prosecution asked
her: "The accused testified here that you were
the one who inflicted the wound at the back of
Romeo Francisco, is that right?" and she
answered: "No sir he was the one who inflicted
the wound to my son Romeo Francisco." "P. Did
you see him inflict the wound to the child? — R.
Yes sir." (P. 23, st. notes.) Who may dispel from
the mind the doubt that the prosecution in the
court below, believing erroneously, but in good
faith, that the testimony of the appellant in his
defense is admissible against and tended to
make his wife criminally responsible, imparted
such wrong belief to and induced her thereby to
testify imputing the commission of the crime to
her husband although he is not guilty, just to
save herself.
It is plain that if the wife testified against her
husband, it was because the fiscal erroneously
assumed in his interrogatory above quoted that
the appellant later imputed to her the crime
charged, for the testimony of the appellant
quoted below clearly belies the fiscal's
assumption:
P. Please tell the Court what happened
when you sat beside your wife?
Sr. Fiscal: Objection, no basis.
Court: He may answer.
R. When I sat beside my wife and our
son was lying face downward on the
bed I was joking my wife because at the
time I was drunk.
P. What was the relative position of
your son with respect to you and your
wife? — R. I am going to demonstrate
our relative positions, (the accused was
facing his wife and the wife was facing
in the opposite direction and the son
was between them lying face downward
and little bit behind on the bed). I used
to touch her, so she swung her hand
backward towards me, then I stood up
and evaded the blow. Later on I heard
the boy cried.
P. What hand did your wife swing, left
or right hand?-- R. Her right hand.
P. Is this the very scissors when she
swung her arm? — R. Yes, sir.
P. After she swung her arm what
happened? — R. The child cried.
P. Then what happened? — R. When I
stood up our child was already
wounded so I became obfuscated.
P. Then what happened? — R. I got hold
of the scissors that she was holding and
stabbed her and then stabbed myself."
Besides, it is to be borne in mind that the
capacity or incapacity of one of the spouses to
testify against the other is governed by the
statute in force and the Court should construe
the statute such as it is, and not as it should. It is
for the law-making power to evolve new
theories and enact law in accordance therewith.
The provisions of section 26 (c), Rule 123, were
copied from those of section 383 (3) of Act No.
190, as amended, and the latter were in turn
taken from similar provisions of law in force in
the States of the Union, which are based on the
common-law. Under the common-law, husband
and wife are absolutely incompetent against
each other except in a civil case instituted by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other; and
the consent of a spouse can not render the other
spouse competent. But in many states, statutes
were enacted granting exceptions upon the
common-law rule and enabling one of them to
testify against the other with the consent of the
latter in civil case, or the consent of the other or
both in criminal cases. Under such statute, one
spouse who calls the other as a witness thereby
consents that the latter shall testify; and if the
adverse party offers one of the spouses against
the other and the latter does not object, then he
or she is presumed to have consented to it.
In the case of Toskstein vs. Birmmerle (150 Mo.,
491; 131 S.W., 126), it was held that
incompetency of a wife continues as at common-
law where she is not rendered competent under
the provision of the enabling statute. In the case
of Conley vs. State (176 Ark., 654; 3 S.W. [2d],
980), the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that
statutes providing that no person shall be
excluded from testifying in prosecution for
violation of Liquor Act do not change the general
rule that a wife cannot testify against her
husband in a criminal prosecution. And in
another case entitled Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co. vs. Chester P. & Ste. G.R. Co. (171 Mo. App.,
70; 153 S.W., 544), it was held that unless wife
comes within exceptions of the enabling statute
granting exceptions upon the common-law rule
excluding her testimony in an action in which
her husband is interested, the wife can not
testify.
Therefore, inasmuch as our statute on the
matter, or section 26 (d), Rule 123, provides
that a wife cannot be examined for or against
her husband without his consent except in a
criminal case for crime committed by one
against the other, and the appellant in the
present case objected strenuously to the
testimony of her wife against him, her testimony
is inadmissible and can not be taken into
consideration in the decision of the case. We can
not, by any process of reasoning or stretch of
imagination, construe said provision so as to
capacitate a wife to be a witness against her
husband if the latter, in testifying in his own
defense, says that his wife was the one who
accidentally inflicted the fatal wound on their
small child. We can not evolve a new theory,
however reasonable and plausible it may be, and
apply for the first time as if it were the law in the
present case against the appellant. It may be a
good theory or a sufficient reason for amending
the law in order to include it as one of the
exceptions of the rule incapacitating one spouse
to testify against the other; but we can not
legally apply it as a law now against the
appellant, a defendant in a criminal case.
But the majority, not being sure of its stand on
the admissibility of the testimony of the wife
against her husband, further states:
At any rate, in the instant case the wife
did not testify in the direct evidence for
the prosecution but under
circumstances presently to be stated. It
will be noted that the wife only testified
against her husband after the latter,
testifying in his own defense imputed
upon her the killing of their little son.
(P. 15, ibid.) By all rules of justice and
reason this gave the prosecution, which
had theretofore refrained from
presenting the wife as a witness against
her husband, the right to do so, as it did
in rebuttal; and to the wife herself the
right to so testify, at least, in self-
defense,. . .. (P. 704, ante.)
To this we may reply that, in the first place, the
testimony of the wife to the effect that her
husband was the one who inflicted and she saw
him inflict the wound on Romeo Francisco that
caused the death of the latter (pp. 23, 24, st.
notes), is not a rebutting but a new additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue whether
or not the defendant is guilty of the offense
charged. For according to section 3 (c), Rule
115, the prosecution may, after the defendant
has presented evidence in support of his
defense, "offer rebutting testimony, but
rebutting only, unless the court in furtherance of
justice, permit them to offer new additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question." Her testimony would have been in
rebuttal only if she had limited herself to say
that she did not inflict the wound on her son.
And in the second place, to make the testimony
of the wife admissible in rebuttal against the
appellant, would be to amend the provision of
said section 26 (d) of Rule 123 and establish
another exception, that has never been adopted
by the statutes anywhere in the States of the
Union and in this jurisdiction.
And not being sure as to the scope of a rebuttal
testimony, the majority opinion adds the
following:
When the husband testified that it was
his wife who caused the death of their
son, he could not, let us repeat, justly
expect the State to keep silent and
refrain from rebutting such new matter
in his testimony, through the only
witness available, namely, the wife; nor
could he legitimately seal his wife's lips
and thus gravely expose her to the
danger of criminal proceedings against
her being started by the authorities
upon the strength and basis of said
testimony of her husband, or to bear the
moral and social stigma of being
thought, believed, or even just
suspected, to be the killer of her own
offspring. . . . And if the wife should, in
such a case and at such a juncture, be
allowed to testify upon rebuttal, the
scope of her testimony should at least
be the same as that of her husband. This
is only simple justice and fairness
dictated by common sense. Since the
husband had testified that it was his
wife who caused the death of the little
boy, she should be allowed to say that it
was really her husband who did it. . . . At
any rate, the trial court not only had the
power to allow the State to utilize the
 wife as rebuttal witness, but also the
discretion to permit "new additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue in
question." But even restricting the
wife's testimony to merely
contradicting her husband's version
that she was the one who killed their
child, there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant was the
killer.
It is elemental that the scope of a rebuttal is
circumscribed to contradicting or destroying the
evidence of the adverse party tending to prove
new matter in favor of the latter, and can not
extend to disproving directly the main issue in
question, that is, the guilt of the appellant in the
present case. Evidently, the testimony of the
husband that his wife was the one who
unintentionally inflicted the wound which
caused the death of their child, can not gravely
expose her to the danger of criminal proceeding
against her," and "to bear the moral and social
stigma of being thought, believed, or even just
suspected to be the killer of her own offspring;"
because said testimony is not admissible against
his wife in that or in any other cases, and
everybody is presumed to know the law that
incapacitates the wife to testify against her
accused husband and contradict what the latter
may testify against her however false it may be.
The conclusion in the majority decision that, if
not in rebuttal, the court had discretion to
permit the prosecution to present the testimony
of the wife, as additional evidence bearing upon
the main issue in question, is absolutely
untenable, since we have already shown that
such a testimony is inadmissible as evidence,
and this court has already decided in the case
of People vs. Natividad (above cited), squarely
applicable to the present case, that "a wife can
not testify against her husband in a criminal
case in which the latter was charged with having
killed the child of the former."
The matter under discussion is the
incompetency of the wife to testify, directly or in
rebuttal, in the present case against her
husband, and not the guilt or innocence of the
appellant. Hence the last statement in the above
quoted decision of the majority that "even
restricting the wife's testimony as merely
contradicting the husband's version that she
was the one who killed their child, there is other
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant is the killer," is out of place for it has
no bearing on the issue. The conclusion of fact
on which a sentence declaring a defendant guilty
must be positive and not argumentative. And if
the appellant is to be convicted on the strength
of other evidence, aside from the testimony of
the appellant's wife, the decision should express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which the decision convicting the appellant is
based, as required by section 12, Article IX of the
Constitution.
The majority's conclusion that the testimony of
the appellant to the effect that the cause of the
death of their child was the wound
unintentionally inflicted by his wife, constituted
a waiver of all objection to her testimony, is
without any foundation in fact and in law;
because the defendant had strongly and
persistently objected to his wife taking the
witness stand (st. t.s.n., p. 23), and no law, court
or authority, from time immemorial up to the
present, has ever recognized such testimony as a
waiver. The only cases in which the incapacity of
one of the spouses to testify against the other is
considered waived according to law, are those
stated in section 1205, of Wharton on Criminal
Evidence, Vol. 3, 11th ed., quoted in the very
opinion of the majority, which says the
following:
SEC. 1205. Waiver of incompetency. —
Objections to the competency of a
husband or wife to testify in a criminal
prosecution against the other may be
waived as in the case of other witnesses
generally. Thus, the accused waives his
or her privilege by calling the other
spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to
cross-examination in the usual manner.
It is well-established that where an
accused introduces his wife as a witness
in his behalf, the state is entitled to
question her as to all matters germane
and pertinent to her testimony on direct
examination. It is also true that
objection to the spouse's competency
must be made when he or she is first
offered as a witness, and that the
incompetency may be waived by the
failure of the accused to make timely
objection to the admission of the
spouse's testimony, although knowing
of such incompetency, and the
testimony admitted, especially if the
accused has assented to the admission,
either expressly or impliedly.
But the decision, after quoting subsequently The above-mentioned cases of the objection to
section 1149 of the same work, which refers to the competency of one of the spouses to testify
waiver of objection to competency of a witness against the other are the only ones, and no
in general, concludes by saying "It will be noted, writers on evidence nor courts did or could
as was to be expected, that in the last-quoted enumerate or recognize other cases, since no
section, the author mentions certain specific legislative or law making power had so
cases where the courts concerned hold that provided; because what is called waiver is
there was waiver, but for obvious reasons merely or nothing more than the consent of one
neither the author nor the said courts have spouse that the other testify in a case in which
attempted to make an enumeration of all he or she is interested or a party, consent
possible cases of waiver. In the very nature of provided for as exception by law. As the consent
things, it would be impossible to make a may be either express or implied: express when
priori such a complete enumeration and to say the spouse who is a party presents the other
that it is exclusive." The last-quoted section in spouse to testify, and implied when the adverse
the decision reads in its pertinent part as party or the prosecution presents the other
follows: spouse as a witness, and the spouse against
whom the other is to testify does not object; so
SEC. 1149. Waiver of objection to the waiver may also be expressed and implied.
incompetency. — A party may waive his And, therefore, just as there can not be any other
objection to the competency of a way of giving such consent than those above-
witness and permit him to testify. A stated, so there is no other case of waiver under
party calling an incompetent witness as the laws now in force.
his own waives the incompetency. Also,
if, after such incompetency appears, Therefore, this Court must, in the interest of
there is a failure to make timely justice, reject the testimony of the defendant's
objection, by a party having knowledge wife, admitted as rebuttal evidence over the
of the incompetency, the objection will objection of the appellant, and considered by the
be deemed waived, whether it on the majority as corroborative of the defendant's
ground of want of mental capacity or extrajudicial confession Exhibit C, and decide
for some other reason. . . . whether this confession alone is sufficient to
support the appellant's conviction.
The cases of waiver specified by Wharton in
sections 1149 and 1205 of his work on criminal
evidence above-quoted, are the only cases of
waiver of the objection to the competency of one
spouse to testify against the other, as well as of
the objection to the competency of any other
witness to testify. Not only Wharton but all
works on criminal evidence enumerate only
those cases, because there are no other cases
provided for by the statutes or declared by the
courts in their decisions. Authors or writers on
evidence do not generally evolve and formulate
new legal theories but only expound those based
on positive laws as the latter have been
interpreted and construed up-to-date by the
courts. It is to be presumed that during several
centuries in which the rule excluding the
testimony of one spouse in a case in which the
other is interested has been in force, a case
similar to the present must have been arisen,
and it would be too presumptuous to assume
that this Court is the first to find correctly that
the case is one of the exceptions upon said rule.
For the majority can not point out a single
decision in support of the exception which the
majority intends to establish now for the first
time.
Lezama v. Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968)
G.R. No. L-25643 June 27, 1968
JOSE MANUEL LEZAMA and PAQUITA
LEZAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS RODRIGUEZ, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo,
JOSE DINEROS, in his capacity as Receiver of
the LA PAZ ICE PLANT and COLD STORAGE
CO., INC., and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
The issue tendered for resolution in this case is
whether a wife, who is a co-defendant of her
husband in an action, may be examined as a
hostile witness by the adverse party under
section 6 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
without infringing on her marital privilege not
to testify against her husband under section 20
(b) of Rule 130. The trial court, presided by the
respondent Judge Jesus Rodriguez, ruled in the
affirmative and required the wife to appear and
testify. The petitioners sued for certiorari but
the Court of Appeals dismissed their
petition1 and denied their motion for
reconsideration.2 Hence this appeal.3
On July 18, 1960 Jose S. Dineros, acting as
receiver of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage
Co. in Iloilo, together with C.N. Hodges and
Ricardo Gurrea, filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo for the annulment of a
judgment rendered against the La Paz Ice Plant
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in civil
case 39827. Named as defendants were
Marciano C. Roque, in whose favor judgment
was rendered, and the spouses Jose Manuel and
Paquita Lezama. The complaint alleged that,
because of mismanagement by the Lezamas, the
La Paz Ice Plant was placed under the
receivership of Dineros; that during the
pendency of the receivership, Marciano C. Roque
brought an action against the La Paz Ice Plant in
the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
collection of P150,000, which sum he had
supposedly lent to it; that summons was served
not on the receiver but on the spouses Jose
Manuel and Paquita Lezama; and that, through
the collusion of the Lezamas, Roque was able to
obtain judgment by default against the company.
It was claimed that, because the summons was
served on Jose Manuel Lezama instead of on the
receiver, the Court of First Instance of Manila
acquired no jurisdiction over the La Paz Ice
Plant and that, therefore, the decision of that
court was void.1ªvvphi1.nêt
In their answer, the defendant spouses (the
herein petitioners), while admitting that the
company was placed under receivership,
maintained that Jose Manuel Lezama
nevertheless remained president of the La Paz
Ice Plant and that as such he had authority to
receive in behalf of the company the court
summons in civil case 39827. They denied
entering into collusion with Roque and averred
that they did not contest Roque's claim because
they knew it to be a legitimate obligation which
the La Paz Ice Plant had incurred pursuant to a
resolution of its board of directors.
Issues having been joined, the case was
thereupon heard. At the hearing Dineros asked
the court to issue a subpoena to Paquita Lezama
to testify as "a witness summoned by the
plaintiffs in accordance with the Rules of Court."
The request was granted over the objection of
the petitioners who invoked the following
provision of the Rules of Court:
A husband cannot be examined for or
against his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent, except in a civil
case by one against the other, or in a
criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one
against the other.4
This provision deals with two different matters
which rest on different grounds of policy: the
disqualification of husband and wife to testify in
each other's behalf, as well as their privilege not
to testify against each other.5 The fundamental
theory of the common law is said to be that
relationship of the spouses, not their pecuniary
interest, is the basis of the
disqualification.6 Indeed section 20 of Rule 130
is entitled "Disqualification by reason of ...
relationship."
On the other hand, while a shelter of emotional
reasons has been offered7 for the privilege, the
"true explanation [which] is after all the
simplest"8 and which constitutes "the real and
sole strength of the opposition to abolishing the
privilege," is the natural repugnance in every
fair-minded person to compelling a wife or
husband to be the means of the other's
condemnation and to subjecting the culprit to
the humiliation of being condemned by the
words of his intimate life partner.9
Here the request for subpoena indicated that
Paquita Lezama was to do no more than testify
as an adverse party in the case and, indeed, in
the light of the allegations both in the complaint
and in the answer, the request was apparently
one that could reasonably be expected to be
made. Thus, the complaint charged
13. — That in obtaining the judgment
by default in Civil Case No. 39827 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila against
the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold Storage Co.,
Inc. defendants, in gross and evident
bad faith, and in fraudulent conspiracy,
made it appear that the La Paz Ice Plant
& Cold Storage Co., Inc. had obtained a
loan of P150,000.00 from defendant
Marciano C. Roque thru defendant Jose
Manuel Lezama allegedly upon an
authority vested upon defendant Jose
Manuel Lezama by the alleged Board of
Directors of the La Paz Ice Plant & Cold
Storage Co., Inc. allegedly evidenced by
the minutes of the meetings of the
Board of Directors of the said
corporation signed by defendant Jose
Manuel Lezama and attested to by
Benjamin Luis Borja and Paquita B.
Lezama and that defendants spouses
Jose Manuel Lezama and Paquita B.
Lezama had manipulated the books of
the corporation by making it appear
that such fictitious loan was then in
existence.
On the other hand, the answer claimed
13. That the herein defendants
specifically deny all the allegations
contained in paragraph 13 of the
complaint; the truth is, that the herein
defendants have not conspired and
acted in bad faith with the plaintiff
[Marciano C. Roque] in Civil Case No.
39827 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila for the rendition of the said
judgment referred to therein; for the
truth is, that the herein defendants, in
their capacities as President-Manager
and Secretary of the La Paz Ice Plant &
Cold Storage Co., Inc., believing as they
believe that the obligation sought to be
enforced by said civil action being
legitimate and the allegations of the
complaint in said Civil Case No. 39827
of the Court of First Instance of Manila
are true, they did not deem it wise to
contest the same; that the obligation of
P150,000.00 of the La Paz Ice Plant &
Cold Storage Co., Inc., which the
defendant Marciano C. Roque sought to
be enforced in Civil Case No. 39827 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila
was legitimately contracted in
accordance with law; that said
obligation was duly entered in the
books of the corporation and that the
said loan is not fictitious; that the
amount realized therefrom was spent
for the benefit of the said corporation.
Thus, while the petitioners denied the charge
that the loan was fictitious, they did not deny
the allegation that it was Paquita Lezama who,
as secretary of the company, signed the minutes
of the meeting at which Jose Manuel Lezama
was allegedly authorized to negotiate the loan
and that it was she who, likewise as secretary,
made the entry in the books of the corporation.
It was obviously to test the truth of the assertion
that the loan transaction was above board that
Dineros, the company receiver, wanted Paquita
Lezama on the witness stand, not as a spouse
witness "for or against her husband," but rather
as an adverse party in the case.
It is postulated that a party can make, as it were,
such forays into his opponent's position on the
strength of section 6 of Rule 132 which
provides:
Direct examination of unwilling or
hostile witnesses. — A party may
interrogate any unwilling or hostile
witness by leading questions. A party
may call an adverse party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation or of a
partnership or association which is an
adverse party, and interrogate him by
leading questions and contradict and
impeach him in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party and
the witness thus called may be
contradicted and impeached by or on
behalf of the adverse party also, and
may be cross-examined by the adverse
party only upon the subject-matter of
his examination in chief.
The basic issue may therefore be restated thus:
In this case where the wife is a co-defendant in a
suit charging fraud against the spouses, can the
wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party
witness concerning her participation in the
alleged fraud without violating section 20 (b) of
Rule 130?
It is argued that the wife may be so compelled
but her testimony would be receivable only
against her.10 It is even suggested that "each
may testify in his or her own behalf, although
the testimony may inure to the benefit of the
other spouse, or against his or her own interest,
although the testimony may also militate against
the other spouse."11 Upon the other hand, it is
insisted that compelling Paquita Lezama to
testify will transgress section 20(b) of Rule 130,
especially if her testimony will support the
plaintiff's charge.
The complaint charges "fraudulent conspiracy"
on the part of the spouses and one Marciano C.
Roque to make it appear that the La Paz Ice
Plant & Cold Storage Co., Inc. was indebted to
Roque. The wife, Paquita Lezama, is called upon
to testify as an adverse party witness on the
basis of her following participation in the
alleged fraudulent scheme: "that it was Paquita
Lezama who as Secretary of the company signed
the minutes of the meeting during which Manuel
Lezama was allegedly authorized to negotiate
the loan and that it was she who, likewise as
Secretary, made the entry in the books of the
corporation."
Evidently, Paquita Lezama will be asked to
testify on what actually transpired during the
meeting and will be asked questions on the
matter of the veracity or falsity of the entry in
the books of the corporation. Whether her
testimony will turn out to be adverse or
beneficial to her own interest, the inevitable
result would be to pit her against her husband.
The interests of husband and wife in this case
are necessarily interrelated. Testimony adverse
to the wife's own interests would tend to show
the existence of collusive fraud between the
spouses and would then work havoc upon their
common defense that the loan was not fictitious.
There is the possibility, too, that the wife, in
order to soften her own guilt, if guilty she is,
may unwittingly testify in a manner entirely
disparaging to the interests of the husband.
Because of the unexpensive wording of the rule
which provides merely that the wife cannot be
examined "for or against her husband without
his consent," it is further argued that "when
husband and wife are parties to an action, there
is no reason why either may not be examined as
a witness for or against himself or herself
alone," and his or her testimony could operate
only against himself or herself.12
Even if such view were generally acceptable as
an exception to the rule, or even as a separate
doctrine, it would be inapplicable in this case
where the main charge is collusive fraud
between the spouses and a third person, and the
evident purpose of examination of the wife is to
prove that charge.
Indeed, in those jurisdictions which allow one
spouse to be subjected to examination by the
adverse party as a hostile witness when both
spouses are parties to the action, either the
interests of the spouses are separate or
separable, or the spouse offered as a witness is
merely a formal or nominal party.13
The final point urged upon us is that to prevent
one spouse from testifying would encourage
alliance of husband and wife as an instrument of
fraud; for then what better way would there be
to prevent discovery than to make a co-
conspirator in fraud immune to the most
convenient mode of discovery available to the
opposite party? This argument overlooks the
fact that section 6 of Rule 132 is a mere
concession, for the sake of discovery, from the
rule which precludes the husband or the wife
from becoming the means of the other's
condemnation. The said rule of discovery should
therefore not be expanded in meaning or scope
as to allow examination of one's spouse in a
situation where this natural repugnance obtains.
It may not be amiss to state in passing that the
respondent Dineros has not demonstrated that
there is no evidence available to him other than
the Lezamas' testimony to prove the charge
recited in the complaint.1äwphï1.ñët
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions appealed from
are versed, and this case is ordered remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in
accordance with law. No costs.
Goni v. CA, 144 SCRA 222(1986)
G.R. No. L-27434 September 23, 1986
GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE
VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR
P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA,
VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P.
VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA,
SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P.
VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE
ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR
VICENTE, respondents-appellees.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
27800-R entitled, "Gaspar Vicente, Plaintiff-
Appellant, vs. Genaro Goni, et. al., Defendants-
Appellants" as well as from the resolution
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual backdrop is as follows:
The three (3) haciendas known as San
Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria
situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros
Oriental, were originally owned by the
Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas
[TABACALERA]. Sometime in 1949, the late
Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest
of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for
the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he
did not have sufficient funds to pay the price,
Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA,
offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago
Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin
Villegas. Allegedly because TABACALERA did
not agree to the transaction between Villanueva
and Villegas, without a guaranty private
respondent Gaspar Vicente stood as guarantor,
for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. The
guarantee was embodied in a document
denominated as "Escritura de Traspaso de
Cuenta." 1
Either because the amount realized from the
transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still
fell short of the purchase price of the three
haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty
undertaken by private respondent Vicente,
Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the
latter fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00.
This agreement was reduced to writing and
signed by petitioner Genaro Goni as attorney-in-
fact of Villanueva, thus:
En consideracion a la garantia que Don
Gaspar Vicente assume con la Cia. Gral.
de Tabacos de Filipinas por el saldo de
Don Santiago Villegas de P43,539.75
asumido por Don Joaquin Villegas el
que Subscribe Praxedes T. Villanueva se
compromete ceder es venta a Don
Gaspar Vicente los campos nos. 3, 4 y 13
del plano de porcelario de la Hacienda
Dulce Nombre de Maria, en compra
projectada de la Cia. Gral. de Tabacos de
Filipinas. Estas campos representan 6-
90-35 hectares por valor de P13,807.00
que Don Gasper Vicente pagara
directamente a Praxedes T. Villanueva
Bais Central, Octubre 24, 1949.
Fdo. Praxedes T. Villanueva
Por: Fdo Genaro Goñi Apoderado 2
Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised
TABACALERA to debit from his account the
amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the
balance of the purchase price. However, as only
the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed
to complete the purchase price, only the latter
amount was debited from private respondent's
account. The difference was supposedly paid by
private respondent to Villanueva, but as no
receipt evidencing such payment was presented
in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.
It is alleged by petitioners that subsequent to
the execution of the contract/promise to sell,
Villanueva was able to raise funds by selling a
property in Ayungon, Negros Oriental. He thus
went to private respondent Vicente for the
purpose of rescinding the contract/promise to
sell However, as the amount of P12,460.24 had
already been debited from private respondent's
account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely
be leased to private respondent Vicente for a
period of five (5) years starting with crop-year
1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the gross
income, said rent to be deducted from the
money advanced by private respondent and any
balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered
by Vicente together with the lots at the end of
the stipulated period of lease.
On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed
a formal deed of sale covering the three
haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4
and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria
were thereafter registered in the name of
Villanueva under TCT No. T-4780 of the Register
of Deeds of Negros Oriental. The fields were
likewise mortgaged by Villanueva to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), later
transferred to the Philippine National Bank on
December 16, 1955, for a total indebtedness of
P334,400.00.3
Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered
to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-
1950 milling season in January and February,
1950.
On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a
"Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor of
Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the
Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627
square meters, more or less. (Hacienda Sarria).
A supplemental instrument was later executed
by Villanueva in favor of Villegas to include in
the sale of June 17, 1950 the sugar quota of the
land.
On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died.
Intestate proceedings were instituted on
November 24, 1951 before the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental, docketed as
Special Case No. 777. Among the properties
included in the inventory submitted to the court
were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria. Field no. 13 with an area of 1
hectare, 44 ares and 95 centares was listed as
Lot no. 723 of the inventory while fields nos. 3
and 4, with areas of 3 hectares, 75 ares and 60
centares, and 1 hectare, 69 ares and 80 centares,
respectively, were included in Lot no. 257 of the
inventory.
On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate
proceedings were ordered closed and the estate
of the late Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his
heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an
action for recovery of property and damages
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his capacity
as administrator of the intestate estate of
Praxedes Villanueva. In his complaint docketed
as Civil Case No. 2990, private respondent
Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the
Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his
entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to
sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in
his favor on October 24, 1949. He likewise
prayed by way of attorney's fees and other costs
the sum of P2,000.00 and for such other further
relief which the court may deem just and
equitable in the premises. 4
On October 25, 1954, petitioner Goni as
defendant in Civil Case No. 2990, filed an answer
with counterclaim for accounting of the produce
of fields nos. 4 and 13, as well as the surrerder
thereof on June 20, 1955, the end of the fifth
crop-year, plus moral damages in the sum of
P30,000.00 and P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
After an answer to the counter-claim had been
filed, private respondent Vicente amended his
complaint on September 1, 1955, to include a
prayer for damages representing the produce of
field no. 3 from 1949-50 until delivery thereof to
him. An answer with counterclaim to the
amended complaint was duly filed, and on April
25, 1956, private respondent Vicente amended
his complaint anew to include as parties-
defendants the heirs of the late Praxedes
Villanueva.
On July 13, 1957, the parties entered into a
stipulation of facts, agreeing, among others, on
the costs of production and produce of the three
fields in question. The case thereafter proceeded
to trial. Plaintiff presented two (2) witnesses:
then party-plaintiff Gaspar Vicente, himself, who
over the objection of therein defendants
testified on facts occurring before the death of
Praxedes Villanueva, and Epifanio Equio a clerk
of TABACALERA Agency in the Bais Sugar
Central. Defendants presented Genaro Goni, who
testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement.
On December 18, 1959, the trial court rendered
a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to
deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a
formal deed of sale covering fields nos. 3, 4 and
13 in favor of Vicente, to pay the latter actual or
compensatory damages in the amount of P
81,204.48, representing 15% of the total gross
income of field no. 3 for crop-years 1950-51 to
1958-59, and such other amounts as may be due
from said field for the crop years subsequent to
crop-year 1958-59, until the field is delivered to
Vicente, and to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus costs. Therein defendant
Goñi was relieved of any civil liability for
damages, either personally or as administrator
of the estate. 5
Both parties appealed the decision to the then
Court of Appeals; the plaintiff from the portion
awarding damages on a claim that he was
entitled to more, and defendants, from the
entire decision.
On December 15, 1966, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision, affirming that of the
lower court, with the modification that the
amount of damages to be paid by defendant-
heirs to the plaintiff should be the total net
income from field no. 3 from the crop year
1950-51 until said field is finally delivered to the
plaintiff plus interest thereon at the legal rate
per annum.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
but were denied the relief sought in a resolution
dated February 9, 1967. Hence, the present
appeal by certiorari whereby petitioners raise
the following questions of law:
MAY RESPONDENT GASPAR VICENTE
TESTIFY ON MATTERS OF FACT
OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH OF
PRAXEDES T. VILLANUEVA, WHICH
CONSTITUTES A CLAIM OR DEMAND
UPON HIS ESTATE. IN VIOLATION OF
RULE 123, SEC, 26, PAR. (C), NOW RULE
130, SEC. 20 PAR. (A)?
MAY NOT A WRITTEN PROMISE TO
SELL DATED OCTOBER 24,1949 BE
NOVATED INTO A VERBAL
AGREEMENT OF LEASE DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE PROMISSOR, WHOSE
DEATH OCCURRED ON NOVEMBER 12,
1951, BY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SUBSTANTIATED BY COMPETENT
ORAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE?
SHOULD THE PROMISEE IN A PROMISE
TO SELL, WHO PAID P12,460.24
WHICH WAS TO BE ACCOUNTED AND
TO BE CREDITED AS RENTALS AFTER
FIVE (5) YEARS OF LEASE, WHO IN HIS
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT
ALLEGE NOR PROVE DAMAGES,
EXCEPT THE SUM OF P2,000.00 AS
ATTORNEY'S FEES, RECEIVE A
JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P74,056.35 WHICH
CONSISTS OF P37,121.26 PLUS LEGAL
INTEREST FOR THE CROP YEARS 1950-
51 TO 1958-59 AND FOR P3,624.18 TO
P4,374.78 FOR EVERY CROP YEAR
SUBSEQUENT TO 1958-59 PLUS
INTEREST? 7
We find that neither the trial nor appellate court
erred in ruling for the admissibility in evidence
of private respondent Vicente's testimony.
Under ordinary circumstances, private
respondent Vicente 8 would be disqualified by
reason of interest from testifying as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of
Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification
being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130,
commonly known as the Survivorship
Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute,
which provides as follows:
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of
interest or relationship.-The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in
which they are interested, directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated:
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative
of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim
or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound
mind.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard
against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard to the transaction in question on the part
of the surviving party and further to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard
to the opportunity of giving testimony.9 It is
designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff
when death has closed the lips of the party
defendant, in order to remove from the
surviving party the temptation to falsehood and
the possibility of fictitious claims against the
deceased. 10
The case at bar, although instituted against the
heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of
the latter had been distributed to them, remains
within the ambit of the protection. The reason is
that the defendants-heirs are properly the
"representatives" of the deceased, not only
because they succeeded to the decedent's right
by descent or operation of law, but more
importantly because they are so placed in
litigation that they are called on to defend which
they have obtained from the deceased and make
the defense which the deceased might have
made if living, or to establish a claim which
deceased might have been interested to
establish, if living. 11
Such protection, however, was effectively
waived when counsel for petitioners cross-
examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver
occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by
the representative of the estate or when counsel
for the representative cross-examined the
plaintiff as to matters occurring during
deceased's lifetime. 12 It must further be
observed that petitioners presented a
counterclaim against private respondent
Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness
stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the
action for recovery of property and as defendant
in the counterclaim for accounting and
surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as
defendant in the counterclaim, he was not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact
occurring before the death of Praxedes
Villanueva, said action not having been brought
against, but by the estate or representatives of
the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the
adverse party is competent to testify to
transactions or communications with the
deceased or incompetent person which were
made with an agent of such person in cases in
which the agent is still alive and competent to
testify. But the testimony of the adverse party
must be confined to those transactions or
communications which were had with the
agent. 13 The contract/promise to sell under
consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as
attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes
Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances
surrounding the execution of such contract and
therefore could either confirm or deny any
allegations made by private respondent Vicente
with respect to said contract. The inequality or
injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a)
of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer
has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut
the testimony of the other because death has
permanently sealed the former's lips, does not
actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason
that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the
binding effect of the contract/promise to sell.
Thus, while admitting the existence of the said
contract/promise to sell, petitioner Goñi
testified that the same was subsequently
novated into a verbal contract of lease over
fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce
Nombre de Maria.
Novation takes place when the object or
principal condition of an obligation is changed
or altered. 14 In order, however, that an
obligation may be extinguished by another
which substitutes the same, it is imperative that
it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that
the old and the new obligations be on every
point incompatible with each other. 15 "Novation
is never presumed. It must be established that
the old and the new contracts are incompatible
in all points, or that the will to novate appear by
express agreement of the parties or in acts of
equivalent import. 16
The novation of the written contract/promise to
sell into a verbal agreement of lease was clearly
and convincingly proven not only by the
testimony of petitioner Goñi, but likewise by the
acts and conduct of the parties subsequent to
the execution of the contract/promise to sell.
Thus, after the milling season of crop year 1949-
50, only fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to
private respondent Vicente. Fields nos. 3, 4 and
13 were subsequently registered in Villanueva's
name and mortgaged with the RFC. Villanueva
likewise executed a deed of sale covering
Hacienda Sarria in favor of Joaquin Villegas. All
these were known to private respondent
Vicente, yet he did not take any steps toward
asserting and/or protecting his claim over fields
nos. 3, 4 and 13 either by demanding during the
lifetime of Villanueva that the latter execute a
similar document in his favor, or causing notice
of his adverse claim to be annotated on the
certificate of title of said lots. If it were true that
he made demands on Villanueva for the
surrender of field no. 3 as well as the execution
of the corresponding deed of sale, he should
have, upon refusal of the latter to do so,
immediately or within a reasonable time
thereafter, instituted an action for recovery, or
as previously observed, caused his adverse
claim to be annotated on the certificate of title.
Considering that field no. 3, containing an area
of three (3) hectares, 75 ares and 60 centares, is
the biggest among the three lots, an ordinary
prudent man would have taken these steps if he
honestly believed he had any right thereto. Yet,
private respondent Vicente did neither. In fact
such inaction persisted even during the
pendency of the intestate proceedings wherein
he could have readily intervened to seek
exclusion of fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 from the
inventory of properties of the late Praxedes
Villanueva.
The reason given by private respondent Vicente
that field no. 3 was not delivered to him
together with fields nos. 4 and 13 because there
were small sugar cane growing on said field at
that time belonging to TABACALERA, might be
taken as a plausible explanation why he could
not take immediate possession of lot no. 3, but it
certainly could not explain why it took him four
years before instituting an action in court, and
very conveniently, as petitioners noted, after
Villanueva had died and at the time when the
verbal contract of lease was about to expire.
Both the trial and appellate courts chose to
believe in the contract/promise to sell rather
than the lease agreement, simply because the
former had been reduced to writing, while the
latter was merely verbal. It must be observed,
though, that the contract/promise to sell was
signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact of
the late Praxedes Villanueva, an indication, to
our mind, that final arrangements were made by
petitioner Goñi in the absence of Villanueva. It
was therefore natural for private respondent
Vicente to have demanded that the agreement
be in writing to erase any doubt of its binding
effect upon Villanueva. On the other hand, the
verbal lease agreement was negotiated by and
between Villanueva and private respondent
Vicente themselves. Being close friends and
relatives 17 it can be safely assumed that they
did not find it necessary to reduce the same into
writing.
In rejecting petitioners' contention respecting
the verbal lease agreement, the appellate court
put much weight on the failure of petitioners to
demand an accounting of the produce of fields
nos. 4 and 13 from 1950 to 1954, when the
action for recovery of property was filed. Such
failure was satisfactorily explained by
petitioners in their motion for reconsideration
filed before the then Court of Appeals, in this
manner:
... Mr. Genaro Goni is also a farmer by
profession and that there was no need
for him to demand a yearly accounting
of the total production because the
verbal lease agreement was for a term
of 5 years. The defendant Mr. Genaro
Goni as a sugar planter has already full
knowledge as to the annual income of
said lots nos. 4 and 13, and since there
was the amount of P12,460.25 to be
liquidated, said defendant never
deemed it wise to demand such a yearly
accounting. It was only after or before
the expiration of the 5 year lease that
said defendant demanded the
accounting from the herein plaintiff
regarding the production of the 2 lots
that were then leased to him.
It is the custom among the sugar
planters in this locality that the Lessee
usually demands an advance amount to
cover the rental for the period of the
lease, and the demand of an accounting
will be only made after the expiration of
the lease period. It was adduced during
the trial that the amount of P12,460.75
was considered as an advance rental of
the 2 lots which was leased to the
Plaintiff, lots nos. 4 and 13; so we
humbly believe that there was no
necessity on the part of defendant Mr.
Genaro Goñi to make a yearly demand
for an accounting for the total
production of 2 parcels leased to the
plaintiff. 18
Petitioners, having clearly and sufficiently
shown that the contract/promise to sell was
subsequently novated into a verbal lease
agreement, it follows that they are entitled to a
favorable decision on their counterclaim.
Discussion of the third issue raised therefore
becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed. The judicial administrator of
the estate of private respondent Gaspar Vicente
and/or his successors-in-interest are hereby
ordered to: a) surrender possession of fields
nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de
Maria to petitioners; b) render an accounting of
the produce of said fields for the period
beginning crop-year 1950-51 until complete
possession thereof shall have been delivered to
petitioners; and c) to pay the corresponding
annual rent for the said fields in an amount
equivalent to 15% of the gross produce of said
fields, for the periods beginning crop-year 1950-
51 until said fields shall have been surrendered
to petitioners, deducting from the amount due
petitioners the sum of P12,460.24 advanced by
private respondent Gaspar Vicente.
Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992)
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased
JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON,
INC., respondents.
The main issue in these consolidated petitions
centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of
stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock
Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and
registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in
the books of the corporation. The then Court of
First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial
Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon,
the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of
the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that
Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of
petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315
is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties
filed separate motions for reconsideration.
Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's
decision reversed and the trial court's decision
affirmed while Vicente Chuidian asked that all
cash and stock dividends and all the pre-
emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of
stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate
court denied both motions. Hence, these
petitions.
The relevant Antecedent facts are as follows:
In his complaint filed on June 29, 1971,
and amended on November 16, 1971,
Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that
defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon,
Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de
Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de
Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de
Razon be ordered to deliver certificates
of stocks representing the
shareholdings of the deceased Juan T.
Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a
prayer for an order to restrain the
defendants from disposing of the said
shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary
attachment v. properties of defendants
having possession of shares of stock
and for receivership of the properties of
defendant corporation . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In their answer filed on June 18, 1973,
defendants alleged that all the shares of
stock in the name of stockholders of
record of the corporation were fully
paid for by defendant, Razon; that said
shares are subject to the agreement
between defendants and incorporators;
that the shares of stock were actually
owned and remained in the possession
of Razon. Appellees also alleged . . . that
neither the late Juan T. Chuidian nor the
appellant had paid any amount
whatsoever for the 1,500 shares of
stock in question . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence of the plaintiff shown that
he is the administrator of the intestate
estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in
Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Sometime in 1962, Enrique Razon
organized the E. Razon, Inc. for the
purpose of bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila. The
incorporators consisted of Enrique
Razon, Enrique Valles, Luisa M. de
Razon, Jose Tuason, Jr., Victor Lim, Jose
F. Castro and Salvador Perez de Tagle.
On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No.
003 for 1,500 shares of stock of
defendant corporation was issued in the
name of Juan T. Chuidian.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of
stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after
him, the plaintiff-appellant, were
elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
Both of them actually served and were
paid compensation as directors of E.
Razon, Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock
was issued on April 1966 up to April
1971, Enrique Razon had not
questioned the ownership by Juan T.
Chuidian of the shares of stock in
question and had not brought any
action to have the certificate of stock
over the said shares cancelled.
The certificate of stock was in the
possession of defendant Razon who
refused to deliver said shares to the
plaintiff, until the same was
surrendered by defendant Razon and
deposited in a safety box in Philippine
Bank of Commerce.
Defendants allege that after organizing
the E. Razon, Inc., Enrique Razon
distributed shares of stock previously
placed in the names of the withdrawing
nominal incorporators to some friends
including Juan T. Chuidian
Stock Certificate No. 003 covering 1,500
shares of stock upon instruction of the
late Chuidian on April 23, 1986 was
personally delivered by Chuidian on
July 1, 1966 to the Corporate Secretary
of Attorney Silverio B. de Leon who was
himself an associate of the Chuidian
Law Office (Exhs. C & 11). Since then,
Enrique Razon was in possession of said
stock certificate even during the
lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the
time the late Chuidian delivered the
said stock certificate to defendant
Razon until the time (sic) of defendant
Razon. By agreement of the parties (sic)
delivered it for deposit with the bank
under the joint custody of the parties as
confirmed by the trial court in its order
of August 7, 1971.
Thus, the 1,500 shares of stook under
Stock Certificate No. 003 were delivered
by the late Chuidian to Enrique because
it was the latter who paid for all the
subscription on the shares of stock in
the defendant corporation and the
understanding was that he (defendant
Razon) was the owner of the said
shares of stock and was to have
possession thereof until such time as he
was paid therefor by the other nominal
incorporators/stockholders (TSN., pp.
4, 8, 10, 24-25, 25-26, 28-31, 31-32, 60,
66-68, July 22, 1980, Exhs. "C", "11",
"13" "14"). (Ro11o — 74306, pp. 66-68)
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon
assails the appellate court's decision on its
alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute
rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. According to him, the "dead man's
statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case.
Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in
the case did not object to his oral testimony
regarding the oral agreement between him and
the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the
ownership of the shares of stock was actually
vested in the petitioner unless the deceased
opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner
was subjected to a rigid cross examination
regarding such testimony.
Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
(Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence)
States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of
interest or relationship — The following
persons cannot testify as to matters in
which they are interested directly or
indirectly, as herein enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted, against an executor or
administrator or other representative of
a deceased person, or against a person
of unsound mind, upon a claim or
demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against such person
of unsound mind, cannot testify as to
any matter of fact accruing before the
death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound
mind." (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
The purpose of the rule has been explained by
this Court in this wise:
The reason for the rule is that if persons
having a claim against the estate of the
deceased or his properties were
allowed to testify as to the supposed
statements made by him (deceased
person), many would be tempted to
falsely impute statements to deceased
persons as the latter can no longer deny
or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting
their properties or rights to false or
unscrupulous claims or demands. The
purpose of the law is to "guard against
the temptation to give false testimony
 in regard to the transaction in question
on the part of the surviving party."
(Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698; Go Chi
Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al., 622 [1955])
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it
contemplates in that it is applicable to a
case against the administrator or its
representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
(See Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698 [1927])
In the instant case, the testimony excluded by
the appellate court is that of the defendant
(petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan
Chuidian, (the father of private respondent
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate
of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in
the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500
shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually
owned by the defendant unless the deceased
Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which
never happened. The case was filed by
the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon,
Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T.
Chuidian.
It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the
petitioner is not within the prohibition of the
rule. The case was not filed against the
administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon
claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private
respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his
transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The
petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-
examination by the private respondent's
counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's
testimony is within the prohibition of Section
20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court of
Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
It is also settled that the court cannot
disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the
rules but has been rendered admissible
by the failure of a party to object
thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent
witness to testify in a civil suit, as well
as the allowance of improper questions
that may be put to him while on the
stand is a matter resting in the
discretion of the litigant. He may assert
his right by timely objection or he may
waive it, expressly or by silence. In any
case the option rests with him.
Once admitted, the testimony is in the
case for what it is worth and the judge
has no power to disregard it for the sole
reason that it could have been excluded,
if it had been objected to, nor to strike it
out on its own motion (Emphasis
supplied). (Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1.)
The issue as to whether or not the petitioner's
testimony is admissible having been settled, we
now proceed to discuss the fundamental issue
on the ownership of the 1,500 shares of stock in
E. Razon, Inc.
E. Razon, Inc. was organized in 1962 by
petitioner Enrique Razon for the purpose of
participating in the bidding for the arrastre
services in South Harbor, Manila. The
incorporators were Enrique Razon, Enrique
Valles, Luisa M. de Razon, Jose Tuazon, Jr., Victor
L. Lim, Jose F. Castro and Salvador Perez de
Tagle. The business, however, did not start
operations until 1966. According to the
petitioner, some of the incorporators withdrew
from the said corporation. The petitioner then
distributed the stocks previously placed in the
names of the withdrawing nominal
incorporators to some friends, among them the
late Juan T. Chuidian to whom he gave 1,500
shares of stock. The shares of stock were
registered in the name of Chuidian only as
nominal stockholder and with the agreement
that the said shares of stock were owned and
held by the petitioner but Chuidian was given
the option to buy the same. In view of this
arrangement, Chuidian in 1966 delivered to the
petitioner the stock certificate covering the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. Since then,
the Petitioner had in his possession the
certificate of stock until the time, he delivered it
for deposit with the Philippine Bank of
Commerce under the parties' joint custody
pursuant to their agreement as embodied in the
trial court's order.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral
testimony as regards the true nature of his
agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the
1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is
sufficient to prove his ownership over the said
1,500 shares of stock.
The petitioner's contention is not correct.
In the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (188 SCRA 492 [1990]) we ruled:
. . . For an effective, transfer of shares of
stock the mode and manner of transfer
as prescribed by law must be followed
(Navea v. Peers Marketing Corp., 74
SCRA 65). As provided under Section 3
of Batas Pambansa Bilang, 68 otherwise
known as the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, shares of stock may be
transferred by delivery to the
transferee of the certificate properly
indorsed. Title may be vested in the
transferee by the delivery of the duly
indorsed certificate of stock (18 C.J.S.
928, cited in Rivera v. Florendo, 144
SCRA 643). However, no transfer shall
be valid, except as between the parties
until the transfer is properly recorded
in the books of the corporation (Sec. 63,
Corporation Code of the Philippines;
Section 35 of the Corporation Law)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the
questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon,
Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in
the books of the corporation. Moreover, the
records show that during his lifetime Chuidian
was ellected member of the Board of Directors
of the corporation which clearly shows that he
was a stockholder of the corporation. (See
Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of
view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was
the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a
case, the petitioner who claims ownership over
the questioned shares of stock must show that
the same were transferred to him by proving
that all the requirements for the effective
transfer of shares of stock in accordance with
the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed
(See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74
SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the
provisions of law.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The
petitioner did not present any by-laws which
could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were
effectively transferred to him. In the absence of
the corporation's by-laws or rules governing
effective transfer of shares of stock, the
provisions of the Corporation Law are made
applicable to the instant case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of
stock certificate to be effective, the certificate
must be properly indorsed and that title to such
certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by
the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of
stock. (Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the
certificate of stock covering the questioned
1,500 shares of stock registered in the name of
the late Juan Chuidian was never indorsed to the
petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the
questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian.
The petitioner's asseveration that he did not
require an indorsement of the certificate of
stock in view of his intimate friendship with the
late Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure
to follow the procedure required by law or the
proper conduct of business even among friends.
To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of
stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an
effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence
supports the appellate court's factual findings
that the shares of stock were given to Juan T.
Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the
legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the
corporation. We give credence to the testimony
of the private respondent that the shares of
stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment
of his legal services to the corporation.
Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this
testimony.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian
insists that the appellate court's decision
declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as
owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon,
Inc. should have included all cash and stock
dividends and all the pre-emptive rights
accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-
emptive rights are all incidents of stock
ownership.
The rights of stockholders are generally
enumerated as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [F]irst, to have a certificate or other
evidence of his status as stockholder
issued to him; second, to vote at
meetings of the corporation; third, to
receive his proportionate share of the
profits of the corporation; and lastly, to
participate proportionately in the
distribution of the corporate assets
upon the dissolution or winding up.
(Purdy's Beach on Private Corporations,
 sec. 554) (Pascual v. Del Saz Orozco, 19
Phil. 82, 87)

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

a) In G.R. No. 74306, the petition is DISMISSED.

The questioned decision and resolution of the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the
Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
the petitioner.

b) In G.R. No. 74315, the petition is GRANTED.

The questioned Resolution insofar as it denied
the petitioner's motion to clarify the dispositive
portion of the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
appellate court is MODIFIED in that all cash and
stock dividends as, well as all pre-emptive rights
that have accrued and attached to the 1,500
shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared
to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.
Pp v. Carlos, 47 Phil 626 (1925)
G.R. No. L-22948 March 17, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTO V. CARLOS, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila finding the
defendant Fausto V. Carlos guilty of the crime of
murder and sentencing him to suffer life
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law and with the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the victim of
the alleged murder, Dr. Pablo G. Sityar, on March
3, 1924, in Mary Chiles Hospital, performed a
surgical operation upon the defendant's wife for
appendicitis and certain other ailments. She
remained in the hospital until the 18th of the
same month, but after her release therefrom she
was required to go several times to the clinic of
Doctor Sityar at No. 40 Escolta, for the purpose
of dressing the wounds caused by the operation.
On these occasions she was accompanied by her
husband, the defendant. The defendant states
that on one of the visits, that of March 20, 1924,
Doctor Sityar sent him out on an errand to buy
some medicine, and that while defendant was
absent on this errand Doctor Sityar outraged the
wife. The defendant further states that his wife
informed him of the outrage shortly after
leaving the clinic. Notwithstanding this it
nevertheless appears that he again went there
on March 28th to consult the deceased about
some lung trouble from which he, the defendant,
was suffering.. He was given some medical
treatment and appears to have made at least one
more visit to the clinic without revealing any
special resentment.
On May 12, 1924, the defendant, suffering from
some stomach trouble, entered the Philippine
General Hospital where he remained until May
18, 1924, and where he was under the care of
two other physicians. While in the hospital her
received a letter (Exhibit 5) from Doctor Sityar
asking the immediate settlement of the account
for the professional services rendered his wife.
Shortly after his release from the hospital the
defendant sought an interview with Doctor
Sityar and went to the latter's office several
times without finding him in. On one of these
occasions he was asked by an employee of the
office, the nurse Cabañera, if he had come to
settle his account, to which the defendant
answered that he did not believe he owed the
doctor anything.
In the afternoon of May 26th the defendant
again went to the office of the deceased and
found him there alone. According to the
evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then,
without any preliminary quarrel between the
two, attacked the deceased with a fan-knife and
stabbed him twice. The deceased made an effort
to escape but the defendant pursued him and
overtaking him in the hall outside the office,
inflicted another wound upon him and as a
consequence if the three wounds he died within
a few minutes. The defendants made his escape
but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at
Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following
day.
The defendant admits that he killed the
deceased but maintains that he did so in self-
defense. He explains that he went to Doctor
Sityar's office to protest against the amount of
the fee charged by the doctor and, in any event,
to ask for an extension of the time of payment;
that during the conversation upon that subject
the deceased insulted him by telling him that
inasmuch as he could not pay the amount
demanded he could send his wife to the office as
she was the one treated, and that she could then
talk the matter over with the decease; that this
statement was made in such an insolent and
contemptuous manner that the defendant
became greatly incensed and remembering the
outrage committed upon his wife, he assumed a
threatening attitude and challenged the
deceased to go downstairs with him and there
settle the matter; that the deceased thereupon
took a pocket-knife from the center drawer of
his desk and attacked the defendant,
endeavoring to force him out of the office; that
the defendant, making use of his knowledge of
fencing, succeeded in taking the knife away from
the deceased and blinded by fury stabbed him
first in the right side of the breast and then in
the epigastric region, and fearing that the
deceased might secure some other weapon or
receive assistance from the people in the
adjoining room, he again stabbed him, this time
in the back.
The defendant's testimony as to the struggle
described is in conflict with the evidence
presented by the prosecution. But assuming that
it is true, it is very evident that it fails to
establish a case of self-defense and that, in
reality, the only question here to be determined
is whether the defendant is guilty of murder or
of simple homicide.
The court below found that the crime was
committed with premeditation and therefore
constituted murder. This finding can only be
sustained by taking into consideration Exhibit L,
a letter written to the defendant by his wife and
siezed by the police in searching his effects on
the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924,
two days before the commission of the crime
and shows that the writer feared that the
defendant contemplated resorting to physical
violence in dealing with the deceased.
Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that
the letter was a privileged communication and
therefore not admissible in evidence. The
numerical weight of authority is, however, to the
effect that where a privileged communication
from one spouse to another comes into the
hands of a third party, whether legally or not,
without collusion and voluntary disclosure on
the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is
thereby extinguished and the communication, if
otherwise competent, becomes admissible. (28
R.C.L., 530 and authorities there cited.) Such is
the view of the majority of this court.
Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows:
For documents of communication
coming into the possession of a third
person, a distinction should obtain,
analogous to that already indicated for
a client's communications (ante, par.
2325, 2326); i. e., if they were obtained
from the addressee by voluntary
delivery, they should still be privileged
(for otherwise the privilege could by
collusion be practically nullified for
written communications); but if they
were obtained surreptitiously or
otherwise without the addressee's
consent, the privilege should cease. (5
Wigmore on Evidence, 2nd ed., par.
2339.)
The letter in question was obtained through a
search for which no warrant appears to have
been issued and counsel for the defendant cites
the causes of Boyd and Boyd vs. United States
(116 U.S., 616) and Silverthorne Lumber Co. and
Silverthorne vs. United States (251 U.S., 385) as
authority for the proposition that documents
obtained by illegal searches of the defendant's
effects are not admissible in evidence in a
criminal case. In discussing this point we can do
not better than to quote Professor Wigmore:
The foregoing doctrine (i. e., that the
admissibility of evidence is not affected
by the illegality of the means through
which the party has been enabled to
obtain the evidence) was never doubted
until the appearance of the ill-starred
majority opinion of Boyd vs. United
States, in 1885, which has exercised
unhealthy influence upon subsequent
judicial opinion in many States.
xxx xxx xxx
The progress of this doctrine of Boyd vs.
United States was as follows: (a) The
Boyd Case remained unquestioned in its
own Court for twenty years; meantime
receiving frequent disfavor in the State
Courts (ante, par. 2183). (b) Then in
Adams vs. New York, in 1904, it was
virtually repudiated in the Federal
Supreme Court, and the orthodox
precedents recorded in the State courts
(ante, par. 2183) were expressly
approved. (c) Next, after another
twenty years, in 1914 — moved this
time, not by erroneous history, but by
misplaced sentimentality — the Federal
Supreme Court, in Weeks vs. United
States, reverted to the original
doctrine of the Boyd Case, but with a
condition, viz., that the illegality of the
search and seizure should first have
been directly litigated and established
by a motion, made before trial, for the
return of the things seized; so that, after
such a motion, and then only, the
illegality would be noticed in the main
trial and the evidence thus obtained
would be excluded. ... (4 Wigmore on
Evidence, 2nd ed., par. 2184.)
In the Silverthorne Lumber Co. case the United
States Supreme Court adhered to its decision in
the Weeks Case. The doctrine laid down in these
cases has been followed by some of the State
courts but has been severely criticized and does
not appear to have been generally accepted. But
assuming, without deciding, that it prevails in
this jurisdiction it is, nevertheless, under the
decisions in the Weeks and Silverthorne cases,
inapplicable to the present case. Here the
illegality of the search and seizure was not
"directly litigated and established by a motion,
made before trial, for the return of the things
seized."
The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded
for reasons not discussed in the briefs. The
letter was written by the wife of the defendant
and if she had testified at the trial the letter
might have been admissible to impeach her
testimony, but she was not put on the witness-
stand and the letter was therefore not offered
for that purpose. If the defendant either by
answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to
the statements contained in the letter it might
also have been admissible, but such is not the
case here; the fact that he had the letter in his
possession is no indication of acquiescence or
assent on his part. The letter is therefore
nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in
evidence violates the constitutional right of the
defendant in a criminal case to be confronted
with the witnesses for the prosecution and have
the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an
ordinary communication and one originally
privileged.
The question is radically different from that of
the admissibility of testimony of a third party as
to a conversation between a husband and wife
overheard by the witness. Testimony of that
character is admissible on the ground that it
relates to a conversation in which both spouses
took part and on the further ground that where
the defendant has the opportunity to answer a
statement made to him by his spouse and fails to
do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot
apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter.
The Attorney-General in support of the contrary
view quotes Wigmore, as follows:
. . . Express communication is always a
proper mode of evidencing knowledge
or belief. Communication to
a husband or wife is always receivable
to show probable knowledge by the
other (except where they are living
apart or are not in good terms),
because, while it is not certain that the
one will tell the other, and while the
probability is less upon some subjects
than upon others, still there is always
some probability, — which is all that
can be fairly asked for admissibility. ...
(1 Wigmore, id., par. 261.)
This may possibly be good law, though Wigmore
cites no authority in support of his assertion, but
as far as we can see it has little or nothing to do
with the present case.
As we have already intimated, if Exhibit L is
excluded, there is in our opinion not sufficient
evidence in the record to show that the crime
was premeditated.
The prosecution maintains that the crime was
committed with alevosia. This contention is
based principally on the fact that one of the
wounds received by the deceased showed a
downward direction indicating that the
deceased was sitting down when the wound was
inflicted. We do not think this fact is sufficient
proof. The direction of the wound would depend
largely upon the manner in which the knife was
held.
For the reasons stated we find the defendant
guilty of simple homicide, without aggravating
or extenuating circumstances.
The sentence appealed from is therefore
modified by reducing the penalty to fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, with the corresponding accessory
penalties and with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Searate Opinions
VILLAMOR, J., dissenting:
His Honor, the judge who tried this case, inserts
in his decision the testimony of the witness
Lucio Javillonar as follows:
The witness, Lucio Javillonar, testified
that he went to the office of the
deceased some minutes before six
o'clock in that evening in order to take
him, as had previously been agreed
upon between them, so that they might
retire together to Pasig, Rizal, where
they resided then; that having noticed
that the deceased was busy in his office,
talking with a man about accounts,
instead of entering, he stayed at the
waiting room, walking from one end to
another, while waiting for that man to
go out; that in view of the pitch of the
voice in which the conversation was
held between the deceased and his
visitor, and what he had heard, though
 little as it was, of said conversation, he
believes that there was not, nor could
there have been, any change of hard
words, dispute or discussion of any
kind; that shortly thereafter, he saw the
screen of the door of the deceased's
office suddenly open, and the deceased
rush out stained with blood, and
followed closely by the accused who
then brandished a steel arm in the right
hand; that upon seeing the deceased
and overtaking him, leaning upon one of
the screens of the door of a tailor shop a
few feet from his office, slightly inclined
to the right, with the arms lowered and
about to fall to the floor, the accused
stabbed him on the right side of the
chest, thereby inflicting a wound on the
right nipple; and that then the accused
descended the staircase to escape away,
at the same time that the deceased was
falling to the ground and was being
taken by him with the assistance of
other persons from said place to
a lancape (a sofa) where he died a few
minutes later, unable to say a word.
consummated with alevosia, such circumstance
may be taken into consideration as a qualifying
factor in the offense of murder." I admit that
none of the witnesses who testified in this case
has seen the beginning of the aggression; but it
positively appears from the testimony of the
said witness Lucio Javillonar that,
notwithstanding that the deceased was already
wounded and about to fall to the floor, he struck
him with another mortal blow with the weapon
he was carrying, which shows that the accused
consummated the crime with treachery.
For the foregoing, I am of opinion that the
judgment appealed from must be affirmed,
considering the act committed as murder, with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and in
this sense I dissent from the majority opinion.

In deciding the question as to whether the act

committed is murder, with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, as claimed by the
Attorney-General, the trial judge says that the
principal ground of the prosecution for holding
that the commission of the crime was attended
by the qualifying circumstance of treachery is a
mere inference from the testimony of Lucio
Javillonar, and that the nature of the wounds
found on the epigastric region of the deceased
and his back do not mean anything, because
they could have been inflicted while the
deceased was standing, seated or inclined.

A careful consideration of the testimony of Lucio

Javillonar, as set out in the judgment appealed
from, will show that, according to said
eyewitness, the deceased was with his arms
lowered and about to fall to the floor when the
accused stabbed him on the right side of the
chest with the weapon he was carrying, thereby
inflicting a wound on the right nipple, and that,
according to the doctor who examined the
wounds, anyone of them could have caused the
death of the deceased. These being the facts
proven, I am of opinion that application must be
made here of the doctrine laid down by this
court in the case of United States vs. Baluyot (40
Phil., 385), wherein it was held that "Even
though a deadly attack may be begun under
conditions not exhibiting the feature of alevosia,
yet if the assault is continued and the crime
U.S. v. Antipolo, 37 Phil 726 (1918)
G.R. No. L-13109 March 6, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, defendant-appellant.
The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Batangas,
charged with the murder of one Fortunato Dinal.
The trial court convicted him of homicide and
from that decision he was appealed. One of the
errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the
trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow
of the man whom the appellant is accused of
having murdered, to testify as a witness on
behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged
dying declarations. The witness was called to
the stand and having stated that she is the
widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked: "On what
occasion did your husband die?" To this
question the fiscal objected upon the following
ground:
I object to the testimony of this witness.
She has just testified that she is the
widow of the deceased, Fortunato Dinal,
and that being so I believe that she is
not competent to testify under the rules
and procedure in either civil or criminal
cases, unless it be with the consent of
her husband, and as he is dead and
cannot grant that permission, it follows
that this witness is disqualified from
testifying in this case in which her
husband is the injured party.
Counsel for defendant insisted that the witness
was competent, arguing that the disqualification
which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates
only to cases in which a husband or wife of one
of the parties to a proceeding is called to testify;
that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal
case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the
witness having been dissolved by the death of
her husband, she is no longer his wife, and
therefore not subject to any disqualification
arising from the status of marriage.
These propositions were rejected by the trial
judge, and the objection of the fiscal as to the
testimony of the woman Ezpeleta was sustained.
To this objection counsel took exception and
made an offer to prove by the excluded witness
the facts which he expected to establish by her
testimony. Concerning these facts it is sufficient
at this time to say that some of them would be
both material and relevant, to such a degree that
if proven to the satisfaction of the court, they
might have lead to the acquittal of the accused,
as they purported to relate to the dying
declarations of the deceased, concerning the
cause of his death, the general purport being
that his injuries were due to fall and not to the
acts imputed to the accused.
Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900)
reads as follows:
Except with the consent of both, or
except in cases of crime committed by
one against the other, neither husband
nor wife shall be a competent witness
for or against the other in a criminal
action or proceeding to which one or
both shall be parties.
The reasons for this rule are thus stated in
Underhill's work on Criminal Evidence (second
edition) on page 346:
At common law, neither a husband nor
a wife was a competent witness for or
against the other in any judicial
proceedings, civil or criminal, to which
the other was a party. . . . If either were
recognized as a competent witness
against the other who was accused of
crime, . . . a very serious injury would be
done to the harmony and happiness of
husband and wife and the confidence
which should exist between them.
In Greenleaf's classical work on evidence, in
section 337 [vol. I], the author says, in stating
the reasons for the rule at common law:
The great object of the rule is to secure
domestic happiness by placing the
protecting seal of the law upon all
confidential communications between
husband and wife; and whatever has
come to the knowledge of either by
means of the hallowed confidence
which that relation inspires, cannot be
afterwards divulged in testimony even
though the other party be no longer
living.
This case does not fall with the text of the
statute or the reason upon which it is based. The
purpose of section 58 is to protect accused
persons against statements made in the
confidence engendered by the marital relation,
and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such
confidential communications might have been
made from the obligation of revealing them to
the prejudice of the other spouse. Obviously,
when a person at the point of death as a result of
injuries he has suffered makes a statement
regarding the manner in which he received
those injuries, the communication so made is in
no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a
communication is made for the express purpose
that it may be communicated after the death of
the declarant to the authorities concerned in
inquiring into the cause of his death.
The same theory as that upon which section 58
of General Orders No. 58 is based, underlies
section 383, paragraph 3 of Act No. 190, which
reads as follows:
A husband cannot be examined for or
against his wife without her consent;
nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent; nor can either,
during the marriage or afterwards, be,
without the consent of the other,
examined as to any communication
made by one to the other during the
marriage; but this exception does not
apply to a civil action or proceeding by
one against the other, or to a criminal
action or proceeding for a crime
committed by one against the other.
The only doubt which can arise from a reading
of this provision relates to the meaning of the
words "during the marriage or afterwards," and
this doubt can arise only by a consideration of
this phrase separately from the rest of the
paragraph. Construed as a whole it is evident
that it relates only to cases in which the
testimony of a spouse is offered for or against
the other in a proceeding to which the other is a
party. The use of the word "afterwards" in the
phrase "during the marriage or afterwards" was
intended to cover cases in which a marriage has
been dissolved otherwise than by death of one
of the spouses — as, for instance, by decree of
annulment or divorce.
The declarations of a deceased person while in
anticipation of certain impending death,
concerning the circumstances leading up to the
death, are admissible in a prosecution of the
person charged with killing the declarant. (U. S.
vs. Gil, 13 Phil., Rep., 530.) Such dying
declarations are admissible in favor of the
defendant as well as against him. (Mattox vs. U.
S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in
several jurisdictions in the United States that the
widow of the deceased may testify regarding his
dying declarations. In the case of the State vs.
Ryan (30 La. Ann., 1176), cited by appellant in
his brief, the court said:
The next bill is as to the competency of
the widow of the deceased to prove his
dying declarations. We see no possible
reason for excluding her . . . after the
husband's death she is no longer his
wife, and the rules of evidence, as
between husbands and wives, are no
longer applicable.
In the case of Arnett vs. Commonwealth (114
Ky., 593, 596), the testimony of the widow of the
deceased as to his dying declarations made to
her was objected to upon the express ground
that under the terms of the Kentucky Code, "the
wife was incompetent to testify even after the
cessation of the marriage relation, to any
communication made by her by her husband
during the marriage."
This contention was rejected, the court saying:
On grounds of public policy the wife can
not testify against her husband as to
what came to her from him
confidentially or by reason of the
marriage relation, but this rule does not
apply to a dying communication made
by the husband to the wife on the trial
of the one who killed him. The
declaration of the deceased made in
extremes in such cases is a thing to be
proven, and this proof may be made by
any competent witness who heard the
statement. The wife may testify for the
state in cases of this character as to any
other fact known to her. . . . It can not be
contended that the dying declaration
testified to by the witness was a
confidential communication made to
her; on the contrary, it was evidently
made in the furtherance of justice for
the express purpose that it should be
testified to in the prosecution of the
defendant.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court
below erred in excluding the testimony of the
witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of
such exclusion, the accused was deprived of one
of his essential rights. That being the case, a new
trial must be granted.
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court
below is hereby set aside and a new trial is
granted at which the testimony of the witness
Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, together with
any additional evidence which may be offered
on the part of the prosecution or the defense. At
the new trial granted the accused, the testimony
taken at the former hearing shall be considered.
The costs of this appeal shall be de officio. So
ordered.
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil 163 (1915)
UY CHICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE UNION
LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET
AL., Defendants-Appellees.
An appeal from a judgment dismissing the
complaint upon the merits, with costs.
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of
two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods
destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of
the plaintiff died in 1897, at which time he was
conducting a business under his own name, Uy
Layco. The plaintiff and his brother took over
the business and continued it under the same
name, "Uy Layco." Sometime before the date of
the fire, the plaintiff purchased his brother’s
interest in the business and continued to carry
on the business under the father’s name. At the
time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted
and subsequent thereto the creditors petitioned
for the appointment of an administrator of the
estate of the plaintiff’s father. During the course
of these proceedings, the plaintiff’s attorney
surrendered the policies of insurance to the
administrator of the estate, who compromised
with the insurance company for one-half their
face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into
court and is now being held by the sheriff. The
plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that
the policies and goods insured belong to him
and not to the estate of his deceased father and
alleges that he is not bound by the compromise
effected by the administrator of his father’s
estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to
show that the plaintiff had agreed to the
compromise settlement of the policies, and for
that purpose introduced evidence showing that
the plaintiff’s attorney had surrendered the
policies to the administrator with the
understanding that such a compromise was to
be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the
witness stand, if he had any objection to his
attorney’s testifying concerning the surrender of
the policies, to which he replied in the negative.
The attorney was then called for that purpose.
Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally
withdrew the waiver previously given by the
plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the
attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument on
the proposition that a waiver of the client’s
privilege may be withdrawn at any time before
acted upon, and cite in support thereof Ross v.
Great Northern Ry. Co. (101 Minn., 122; 111 N.
W., 951). The case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. v.
Cripe & Co. (142 Ky., 810), also appears to
sustain their contention. But a preliminary
question suggests itself, Was the testimony in
question privileged?
Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must
strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and
preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be
permitted in any court, without the consent of
his client, given in open court, to testify to any
facts imparted to him by his client in
professional consultation, or for the purpose of
obtaining advice upon legal matters." (Sec. 31,
Act No. 190.)
A similar provision is inserted in section 383,
No. 4. of the same Act. It will be noted that the
evidence in question concerned the dealings of
the plaintiff’s attorney with a third person. Of
the very essence of the veil of secrecy which
surrounds communications made between
attorney and client, is that such communications
are not intended for the information of third
persons or to be acted upon by them, but for the
purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It
is evident that a communication made by a
client to his attorney for the express purpose of
its being communicated to a third person is
essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully
carried out his instructions by delivering the
communication to the third person for whom it
was intended and the latter acts upon it, it
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified
in a legal sense as a privileged communication
between the attorney and his client. It is plain
that such a communication, after reaching the
party for whom it was intended at least, is a
communication between the client and a third
person, and that the attorney simply occupies
the role of intermediary or agent. We quote
from but one case among the many which may
be found upon the point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The proposition advanced by the respondent
and adopted by the trial court, that one, after
fully authorizing his attorney, as his agent, to
enter into contract with a third party, and after
such authority has been executed and relied on,
may effectively nullify his own and his duly
authorized agent’s act by closing the attorney’s
mouth as to the giving of such authority, is most
startling. A perilous facility of fraud and wrong,
both upon the attorney and the third party,
would result. The attorney who, on his client’s
authority, contracts in his behalf, pledges his
reputation and integrity that he binds his client.
The third party may well rely on the assurance
of a reputable lawyer that he has authority in
fact, though such assurance be given only by
implication from the doing of the act itself. It is
with gratification, therefore, that we find
overwhelming weight of authority, against the
position assumed by the court below, both in
states where the privilege protecting
communications with attorneys is still regulated
by the common law and in those where it is
controlled by statute, as in Wisconsin." (Koeber
v. Sommers, 108 Wis., 497; 52 L. R. A., 512.)

Other cases wherein the objection to such

evidence on the ground of privilege has been
overruled are: Henderson v. Terry (62 Tex.,
281); Shove v. Martin (85 Minn., 29); In re Elliott
(73 Kan., 151); Collins v. Hoffman (62 Wash.,
278); Gerhardt v. Tucker (187 Mo., 46). These
cases cover a variety of communications made
by an attorney in behalf of his client to third
persons. And cases wherein evidence of the
attorney as to compromises entered into by him
on behalf of his client were allowed to be proved
by the attorney’s testimony are not wanting.
(Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash., 24; Koeber v.
Sommers, supra.)

It is manifest that the objection to the testimony

of the plaintiff’s attorney as to his authority to
compromise was properly overruled. The
testimony was to the effect that when the
attorney delivered the policies to the
administrator, he understood that there was a
compromise to be effected, and that when he
informed the plaintiff of the surrender of the
policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no
objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to
show that the plaintiff acquiesced in the
compromise settlement of the policies. Having
agreed to the compromise, he cannot now
disavow it and maintain an action for the
recovery of their face value.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment

appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co., 46
Phil 938 (1924)
JAMES D. BARTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL
CO., Defendant-Appellant.
This action was instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila by James D.
Barton, to recover of the Leyte Asphalt &
Mineral Oil Co., Ltd., as damages for breach of
contract, the sum of $318,563.30, United States
currency, and further to secure a judicial
pronouncement to the effect that the plaintiff is
entitled to an extension of the terms of the sales
agencies specified in the contract Exhibit A. The
defendant answered with a general denial, and
the cause was heard upon the proof, both
documentary and oral, after which the trial
judge entered a judgment absolving the
defendant corporation from four of the six
causes of action set forth in the complain and
giving judgment for the plaintiff to recover of
said defendant, upon the first and fourth causes
of action, the sum of $202,500, United States
currency, equivalent to P405,000, Philippine
currency, with legal interest from June 2, 1921,
and with costs. From this judgment the
defendant company appealed.
The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States,
resident in the City of Manila, while the
defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands with its principal
office in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu,
Philippine Islands. Said company appears to be
the owner of a valuable deposit of bituminous
limestone and other asphalt products, located
on the Island of Leyte and known as the Lucio
mine. On April 21,1920, one William Anderson,
as president and general manager of the
defendant company, addressed a letter Exhibit
B, to the plaintiff Barton, authorizing the latter
to sell the products of the Lucio mine in the
Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter.
In the third cause of action stated in the
complaint the plaintiff alleges that during the
life of the agency indicated in Exhibit B, he
rendered services to the defendant company in
the way of advertising and demonstrating the
products of the defendant and expended large
sums of money in visiting various parts of the
world for the purpose of carrying on said
advertising and demonstrations, in shipping to
various parts of the world samples of the
products of the defendant, and in otherwise
carrying on advertising work. For these services
and expenditures the plaintiff sought, in said
third cause of action, to recover the sum of
$16,563.80, United States currency. The court,
however, absolved the defendant from all
liability on this cause of action and the plaintiff
did not appeal, with the result that we are not
now concerned with this phase of the case.
Besides, the authority contained in said Exhibit
B was admitted superseded by the authority
expressed in a later letter, Exhibit A, dated
October 1, 1920. This document bears the
approval of the board of directors of the
defendant company and was formally accepted
by the plaintiff. As it supplies the principle basis
of the action, it will be quoted in its entirety.
"(Exhibit A)
"Cebu, Cebu, P. I.,
"October 1, 1920.
"JAMES D. BARTON, Esq.,
"Cebu Hotel City.
"DEAR SIR: — You are hereby given the sole and
exclusive sales agency for our bituminous
limestone and other asphalt, Ltd., until May first,
1922, in the following territory:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Australia Saigon Java
New Zealand India China
Tasmania Sumatra Hongkong
"Siam and the Straits Settlements, also in the
United States of America until May 1, 1921.
"As regards bituminous limestone mined from
the Lucio property . No orders for less than one
thousand (1,000) tons will be accepted except
under special agreement with us. All orders for
said products are to be billed to you as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Per ton
In 1,000 ton lots P15
In 2,000 ton lots 14
In 5,000 ton lots 12
In 10,000 ton lots 10
with the understanding, however, that, should
the sales in the above territory equal or exceed
ten thousand (10,000) tons in the year ending
October 1, 1921, then in that event the price of
all shipments made during the above period
shall be ten pesos (P10) per ton, and any sum
charged to any of your customers or buyers in
the aforesaid territory in excess of ten pesos
(P10) per ton, shall be rebated to you. Said
rebate to be due and payable when the gross
sales have equaled or exceeded ten thousand
(10,000) tons in the twelve months period as
hereinbefore described. Rebates on lesser sales
to apply as per above price list.
"You are to have full authority to sell said
product of the sum Lucio mine for any sum you
see fit in excess of the prices quoted above and
such excess in price shall be your extra and
additional profit and commission. Should we
make any collections in excess of the prices
quoted, we agree to remit same to you within
ten (10) days of the date of such collections or
payments.
"All contracts taken with municipal
governments will be subject to inspection before
shipping, by any authorized representative of
such governments at whatever price may be
contracted for by you and we agree to accept
such contracts subject to draft attached to bill of
lading in full payment of such shipment.
"It is understood that the purchasers of the
products of the Lucio mine are to pay freight
from the mine carriers to destination and are to
be responsible for all freight, insurance and
other charges, providing said shipment has been
accepted by their inspectors.
"All contracts taken with responsible firms are
to be under the same conditions as with
municipal governments.
"All contracts will be subject to delays caused by
the acts of God, over which the parties hereto
have no control.
"It is understood and agreed that we agree to
load all ships, steamers, boats or other carriers
promptly and without delay and load not less
than 1,000 tons each twenty-four hours after
March 1, 1921, unless we so notify you
specifically prior to that date what we are
prepared to load at that rate, and it is also
stipulated that we shall not be required to ship
orders of 5,000 tons except on 30 days notice
and 10,000 tons except on 60 days notice.
"If your sales in the United States reach five
thousand tons on or before May 1, 1921, you are
to have sole rights for this territory also for one
year additional and should your sales in the
second year reach or exceed ten thousand tons
you are to have the option to renew the
agreement for this territory on the same terms
for an additional two years.
"Should your sales equal or exceed ten thousand
(10,000) tons in the year ending October 1,
1921, or twenty thousand (20,000) tons by May
1, 1922, then this contract is to be continued
automatically for an additional three years
ending April 30, 1925, under the same terms
and conditions as above stipulated.
"The products of the other mines can be sold by
you in the aforesaid territories under the same
terms and conditions as the products of the
Lucio mine; scale of prices to be mutually agreed
upon between us.
"LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO.,LTD.
"By (Sgd.) WM. ANDERSON
"President
(Sgd. "W.C.A. PALMER
"Secretary
"Approved by Board of Directors,
"October 1, 1920.
(Sgd.) "WM. ANDERSON
"President
"Accepted.
(Sgd.) "JAMES D. BARTON
"Witness D. G. McVean
Upon careful perusal of the fourth paragraph
from the end of this letter it is apparent that
some negative word has been inadvertently
omitted before "prepared" so that the full
expression should be "unless we should notify
you specifically prior to that we are unprepared
to load at that rate," or "not prepared to load at
that rate."cralaw virtua1aw library
Very soon after the aforesaid contract became
effective, the plaintiff requested the defendant
company to give him a similar selling agency for
Japan. To this request the defendant company,
through its president, Wm. Anderson, replied,
under date of November 27,1920, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In your request for Japanese agency, will say,
that we are willing to give you, the same
commission on all sales made by you in Japan,
on the same basis as your Australian sales, but
we do not feel like giving you a regular agency
for Japan until you can make some large sized
sales there, because some other people have
given us assurances that they can handle our
Japanese sales, therefore we have decided to
leave this agency open for a time."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Meanwhile the plaintiff had embarked for San
Francisco and upon arriving at that port he
entered into an agreement with Ludvigsen &
McCurdy, of that city, whereby said firm was
constituted a subagent and given the sole selling
rights for the bituminous limestone products of
the defendant company for the period of one
year from November 11,1920, on terms stated
in the letter Exhibit K. The territory assigned to
Ludvigsen & McCurdy included San Francisco
and all territory in California north of said city.
Upon an earlier voyage during the same year to
Australia, the plaintiff had already made an
agreement with Frank B. Smith, of Sydney,
whereby the latter was to act as the plaintiff’s
sales agent for bituminous limestone mined at
the defendant’s quarry in Leyte, until February
12, 1921. Later the same agreement was
extended for the period of one year from
January 1, 1921. (Exhibit Q.)
On February 5, 1921, Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of
San Francisco, addressed a letter to the plaintiff,
then in San Francisco, advising him that he
might enter an order for six thousand tons of
bituminous limestone to be loaded at Leyte not
later than May 5, 1921, upon terms stated in the
letter Exhibit G. Upon this letter the plaintiff
immediately indorsed his acceptance.
The plaintiff them returned to Manila; and on
March 2, 1929, Anderson wrote to him from
Cebu, to the effect that the company was behind
with construction and was not then able to
handle big contracts. (Exhibit FF.) On March 12,
Anderson was in Manila and the two had an
interview in the Manila Hotel, in the course of
which the plaintiff informed Anderson of the San
Francisco order. Anderson thereupon said that,
owing to lack of capita, adequate facilities had
not been provide by the company for filling
large orders and suggested that the plaintiff had
better hold up in the matter of taking orders.
The plaintiff expressed surprise at this and told
Anderson that he had not only the San Francisco
order (which he says he exhibited to Anderson)
but other orders for large quantities of
bituminuos limestone to be shipped to Australia
and Shanghai. In another interview on the same
day Anderson definitely informed the plaintiff
that the contracts which he claimed to have
procured would not be filled.
Three days later the plaintiff addressed a letter
(Exhibit Y) to the defendant company in Cebu, in
which he notified the company to prepared to
ship five thousand tons of bituminuos limestone
to John Chapman Co., San Francisco, loading to
commence on May 1, and to proceed at the rate
of one thousand tons per day of each twenty-
four hours, weather permitting.
On March 5, 1921, Frank B. Smith, of Sydney,
had cabled the plaintiff an order for five
thousand tons of bituminuos limestone; and in
his letter of March 15 to the defendant, the
plaintiff advised the defendant company to be
prepared to ship another five thousand tons of
bituminuos limestone, on or about may 6, 1921,
in addition to the intended consignment for San
Francisco. the name Henry E. White was
indicated as the name of the person through
whom this contract had been made and it was
stated that the consignee would be named later,
no destination for the shipment being given. The
plaintiff explains that the name white, as used in
this letter, was based on an inference which he
had erroneously drawn from the cable sent by
Frank B. Smith, and his intention was to have
the second shipment consigned to Australia in
response to Smith’s order.
It will be noted in connection with this letter of
the plaintiff, of March 15, 1921, that no mention
was made of the names of the person, or firm,
for whom the shipments were really intended.
The obvious explanation that occurs in
connection with this is that the plaintiff did not
then care to reveal the fact that the two orders
had originated from his own subagents in San
Francisco and Sydney.
To the plaintiff’s letter of March 15, the assistant
manager of the defendant company replied on
March 25, 1921, acknowledging the receipt of an
order for five thousand tons of bituminous
limestone to be consigned to John Chapman Co.,
of San Francisco, and the further amount of five
thousand tons of the same material to be
consigned to Henry E. White; and it was stated
that "no orders can be entertained unless cash
has been actually deposited with either the
International Banking Corporation or the
Chartered bank of India, Australia and China,
Cebu." (Exhibit Z.)
To this letter the plaintiff in turn replied from
Manila, under date of March 29,1921,
questioning the right of the defendant to insist
upon a cash deposit in Cebu prior to the filling of
the orders. In conclusion the plaintiff gave
orders for shipment to Australia of five
thousand tons, or more, about May 22, 1921,
and ten thousand tons, or more, about June 1,
1921. In conclusion the plaintiff said "I have
arranged for deposits to be made on these
additional shipments if you will signify your
ability to fulfill these orders on the dates
mentioned." No name was mentioned as the
purchaser, or purchasers, of these intended
Australian consignments.
Soon after writing the letter last above-
mentioned, the plaintiff embarked for China and
Japan. With his activities in China we are not
here concerned, but we note that in Tokyo,
Japan, he came in contact with one H. Hiwatari,
who appears to have been a suitable person for
handling bituminous limestone for construction
work in Japan. In the letter Exhibit X, Hiwatari
speaks of himself as if he had been appointed
exclusive sales agent for the plaintiff in Japan,
but no document expressly appointing him such
is in evidence.
While the plaintiff was Tokyo he procured the
letter Exhibit W, addressed to himself, to be
signed by Hiwatari. This letter, edited by the
plaintiff himself, contains an order for one
thousand tons of bituminous limestone from the
quarries of the defendant company, to be
delivered as soon after July 1, 1921, as possible.
In this letter Hiwatari states, "on receipt of the
cable from you, notifying me of date you will be
ready to ship, and also tonnage rate, i will agree
to transfer through the Bank of Taiwan, of
Tokyo, to the Asia Banking Corporation, of
Manila, P. I., the entire payment of $16,000 gold,
to be subject to your order on delivery of
documents covering bill of lading of shipment,
the customs report of weight, and prepaid
export tax receipt. I will arrange in advance a
confirmed or irrevocable letter of credit for the
above amount so that payment can be ordered
by cable, in reply to your cable advising shipping
date."cralaw virtua1aw library
In a later letter, Exhibit X, of May 16,1921,
Hiwatari informs the plaintiff that he had shown
the contract, signed by himself, to the
submanager of the Taiwan Bank who had given
it as his opinion that he would be able to issue,
upon request of Hiwatari, a credit note for the
contracted amount, but he added that the
submanager was not personally able to place his
approval on the contract as that was a matter
beyond his authority. Accordingly Hiwatari
advised that he was intending to make further
arrangements when the manager of the bank
should return from Formosa.
In the letter of May 5, 1921, containing
Hiwatari’s order for one thousand tons of
bituminous limestone, it was stated that if the
material should prove satisfactory after being
thoroughly tested by the Paving Department of
the City of Tokyo, he would contract with the
plaintiff for a minimum quantity of ten thousand
additional tons, to be used within a year from
September 1, 1921, and that in this event the
contract was to be automatically extended for an
additional four years. The contents of the letter
of May 5 seems to have been conveyed, though
imperfectly, by the plaintiff to his attorney, Mr.
Frank B. Ingersoll, of Manila; and on May
17,1921, Ingersoll addressed a note to the
defendant company in Cebu in which he stated
that he had been requested by the plaintiff to
notify the defendant that the plaintiff had
accepted an order from Hiwatari , of Tokyo,
approved by the Bank of Taiwan, for a minimum
for a period of five years, the first shipment of
one thousand tons to be made as early after July
1 as possible. It will be noted that this
communication did not truly reflect the contents
of Hiwatari’s letter, which called unconditionally
for only one thousand tons, the taking of the
remainder being contingent upon future
eventualities.
It will be noted that the only written
communications between the plaintiff and the
defendant company in which the former gave
notice of having any orders for the sale of
bituminous limestone are the four letters
Exhibits Y, AA, BB, and II. In the first of these
letters, dated March 15,1921, the plaintiff
advises the defendant company to be prepared
to ship five thousand tons of bituminous
limestone, to be consigned to John Chapman Co.,
of San Francisco to be loaded by May 5, and a
further consignment of five thousand tons,
through a contract with Henry E. White,
consignees to be named later. In the letter
Exhibit BB dated May 17, 1921, the plaintiff of
an order from Hiwatari, of Tokyo, approved by
the Bank of Taiwan, for a minimum of ten
thousand tons annually for a period of five
years, first shipment of a thousand tons to be as
early after July 1 as possible. In the letter Exhibit
II the plaintiff gives notice of an "additional" (?)
order from H.E. White, Sydney, for two lots of
bituminous limestone of five thousand tons
each, one for shipment not later than June 30,
1921, and the other by July 20,1921. In the same
letter the plaintiff reports for the first time an
order for five thousand tons from F.B. Smith, to
be shipped to Brisbane, Australia, by June 30,
and a similar amount within thirty days later.
After the suit was brought, the plaintiff filed an
amendment to his complaint in which he set out,
in tabulated form, the orders which he claims to
have received and upon which his letters of
notification to the defendant company were
based. In this amended answer the name of
Ludvigsen & McCurdy appears for the first time;
and the name of Frank B. Smith, of Sydney, is
used for the first time as the source of the
intended consignments of May 1, May 22, and
June 1. We note, furthermore, that the letters,
Exhibits G, L, M, and W, containing the orders
from Ludvigsen & McCurdy, Frank B, Smith and
H. Hiwatari were at no time submitted for
inspection to any officer of the defendant
company, except possibly the Exhibit G, which
the plaintiff claims to have shown to Anderson
in Manila on March 12, 1921.
The different items comprising the award which
the trial judge gave in favor of the plaintiff are
all based upon the orders given by Ludvigsen &
McCurdy (Exhibit G), by Frank B. Smith (Exhibits
L and M), and by Hiwatari in Exhibit W; and the
appeal does not involve an order which came
from Shanghai, China. We therefore now
address ourselves to the question whether or
not the orders contained in Exhibits G, L, M, and
W, in connection with the subsequent
notification thereof given by the plaintiff to the
defendant, are sufficient to support the
judgment rendered by the trial court.
The transaction indicated in the orders from
Ludvigsen & McCurdy and from Frank B. Smith
must, in our opinion, be at once excluded from
consideration as emanating from persons who
had been constituted mere agents of the
plaintiff. The San Francisco order and the
Australian orders are the same in legal effect as
if they were orders signed by the plaintiff and
drawn upon himself; and it cannot be pretended
that those orders represent sales to bona fide
purchasers found by the plaintiff. The original
contract by which the plaintiff was appointed
sales agent for a limited period of time in
Australia and the United States contemplated
that he should find reliable and solvent buyers
who should be prepared to obligate themselves
to take the quantity of bituminous limestone
contracted for upon terms consistent with the
contract. These conditions were not met by the
taking of these orders from the plaintiff’s own
subagents, which was as if the plaintiff had
bought for himself the commodity which he was
authorized to sell to others. Article 267 of the
Code of Commerce declares that no agent shall
purchase for himself or for another that which
he has been ordered to sell. The law has placed
its ban upon a broker’s purchasing from his
principal unless the latter with full knowledge of
all the facts and circumstances acquiesces in
such course; and even then the broker’s action
must be characterized by the utmost good faith.
A sale made by a broker to himself without the
consent of the principal is ineffectual whether
the broker has been guilty of fraudulent conduct
or not. (4 R. C. L., 276-277.) We think, therefore,
that the position of the defendant company is
indubitably sound in so far as it rests upon the
contention that the plaintiff has not in fact found
any bona fide purchasers ready and able to take
the commodity contracted for upon terms
compatible with the contract which is the basis
of the action.
It will be observed that the contract set out at
the beginning of this opinion contains
provisions under which the period of the
contract might be extended. That privilege was
probably considered a highly important incident
of the contract; and it will be seen that the sale
of five thousand tons which the plaintiff
reported for shipment to San Francisco was
precisely adjusted to the purpose of the
extension of the contract for the United States
for the period of an additional year; and the
sales reported for shipment to Australia were
likewise adjusted to the requirements for the
extension of the contract in that territory. Given
the circumstances surrounding these contracts
as they were reported to the defendant
company and the concealment by the plaintiff of
the names of the authors of the orders, — who
after all were merely the plaintiff’s subagents, —
the officers of the defendant company might
justly have entertained the suspicion that the
real and only person behind those contracts was
the plaintiff himself. Such at least turns out to
have been the case.
Much energy has been expended in the briefs
upon this appeal over the contention whether
the defendant was justified in laying down the
condition mentioned in the letter of March 26,
1921, to the effect that no order would be
entertained unless cash should be deposited
with either the International Banking
Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China, in Cebu. In this connection
the plaintiff points to the stipulation of the
contract which provides that contracts with
responsible parties are to be accepted "subject
to draft attached to bill of lading in full payment
of such shipment." What passed between the
parties upon this point appears to have the
character of mere diplomatic parrying, as the
plaintiff had no contract from any responsible
purchaser other than his own subagents and the
defendant company could not probably have
filled the contracts even if they had been backed
by the Bank of England.
Upon inspection of the plaintiff’s letters
(Exhibits Y and AA), there will be found ample
assurance that deposits for the amount of each
shipment would be made with a bank in Manila
provided the defendant would indicate its
ability to fill the orders; but these assurances
rested upon no other basis than the financial
responsibility of the plaintiff himself, and this
circumstance doubtless did not escape the
discernment of the defendant’s officers.
With respect to the order from H. Hiwatari, we
observe that while he intimates that he had been
promised the exclusive agency under the
plaintiff for Japan, nevertheless it does not
affirmatively appear that he had been in fact
appointed to be such at the time he signed the
order Exhibit W at the request of the plaintiff. It
may be assumed, therefore, that he was at that
time a stranger to the contract of agency. It
clearly appears, however, that he did not expect
to purchase the thousand tons of bituminous
limestone referred to in his order without
banking assistance; and although the
submanager of the Bank of Taiwan had said
something encouraging in respect to the matter,
nevertheless that official had refrained from
giving his approval to the order Exhibit W. It is
therefore not shown affirmatively that this
order proceeds from a responsible source.
The first assignment of error in the appellant’s
brief is directed to the action of the trial judge in
refusing to admit Exhibits 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10,
offered by the defendant, and in admitting
Exhibit E, offered by the plaintiff. The Exhibit 2
is a letter dated June 25, 1921, or more than
three weeks after the action was instituted, in
which the defendant’s assistant general
manager undertakes to reply to the plaintiff’s
letter of March 29 preceding. It was evidently
intended as an argumentative presentation of
the plaintiff’s point of view in the litigation then
pending, and its probative value is so slight,
even if admissible at all, that there was no error
on the part of the trial court in excluding it.
Exhibits 7, 8, 9 and 10 comprise correspondence
which passed between the parties by mail or
telegraph during the first part of the year 1921.
The subject-matter of this correspondence
relates to efforts that were being made by
Anderson to dispose of the controlling interest
in the defendant corporation, and Exhibit 9 in
particular contains an offer from the plaintiff,
representing certain associates, to buy out
Anderson’s interest for a fixed sum. While these
exhibits perhaps shed some light upon the
relations of the parties during the time this
controversy was brewing, the bearing of the
matter upon the litigation before us is too
remote to exert any definitive influence on the
case. The trial court was not in error in our
opinion in excluding these documents.
Exhibit E is a letter from Anderson to the
plaintiff, dated April 21, 1920, in which
information is given concerning the property of
the defendant company. It is stated in this letter
that the output of the Lucio mine (quarry)
during the coming year would probably be at
the rate of about five tons for twenty-four hours,
with the equipment then on hand, but that with
the installation of a model cable-way which was
under contemplation, the company would be
able to handle two thousand tons in twenty-four
hours. We see no legitimate reason for rejecting
this document, although of slight probative
value; and the error imputed to the court in
admitting the same was not committed.
Exhibit 14, which was offered in evidence by the
defendant, consists of a carbon copy of a letter
dated June 13, 1921, written by the plaintiff to
his attorney, Frank B. Ingersoll, Esq., of Manila,
and in which plaintiff states, among other things,
that his profits from the San Francisco contract
would have been at the rate of eighty-five cents
(gold) per ton. The authenticity of this document
is admitted, and when it was offered in evidence
by the attorney for the defendant the counsel for
the plaintiff announced that he had no objection
to the introduction of this carbon copy in
evidence if counsel for the defendant would
explain where this copy was secured. Upon this
the attorney for the defendant informed the
court that he received the letter from the former
attorneys of the defendant without explanation
of the manner in which the document had come
into their possession. Upon this the attorney for
the plaintiff made this announcement: "We
hereby give notice at this time that unless such
an explanation is made, explaining fully how this
carbon copy came into the possession of the
defendant company, or any one representing it,
we propose to object to its admission on the
ground that it is a confidential communication
between client and lawyer." No further
information was then given by the attorney for
the defendant as to the manner in which the
letter had come to his hands and the trial judge
thereupon excluded the document, on the
ground that it was a privileged communication
between client and attorney.
We are of the opinion that this ruling was
erroneous; for even supposing that the letter
was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client,
this privilege was lost when the letter came to
the hands of the adverse party. And it makes no
difference how the adversary acquired
possession. The law protects the client from the
effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney
in the confidence of the legal relation, but when
such a document, containing admissions of the
client, comes to the hand of a third party, and
reaches the adversary, it is admissible in
evidence. In this connection Mr. Wigmore says:
"The law provides subjective freedom for the
client by assuring him of exemption from its
processes of disclosure against himself or the
attorney or their agents of communication. This
much, but not a whit more, is necessary for the
maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of
preserving secrecy of communication are
entirely in the client’s hands, and since the
privilege is derogation from the general
testimonial duty and should be strictly
construed, it would be improper to extend its
prohibition to third persons who obtain
knowledge of the communications. One who
overhears the communications, whether with or
without the client’s knowledge, is not within the
protection of the privilege. The same rule ought
to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or
obtains possession of a document in original or
copy." (5 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., sec.
2326.)
Although the precedents are somewhat
confusing, the better doctrine is to the effect that
when papers are offered in evidence a court will
take no notice of how they were obtained,
whether legally or illegally, properly or
improperly; nor will it from a collateral issue to
try that question. (10 R. C. L., 931; 1 Greenl.
Evid., sec. 254a; State v. Mathers, 15 L. R. A., 268;
Gross v. State, 33 L. R. A., [N. S. ], 477, note.)
Our conclusion upon the entire record is that the
judgment appealed from must be reversed; and
the defendant will be absolved from the
complaint. It is so ordered, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Ostrand, Johns,
and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
An intensive scrutiny of every phase of this case
leads me to the conclusion that the trial judge
was correct in his findings of fact and in his
decision. Without encumbering the case with a
long and tedious dissent, I shall endeavor to
explain my point of view as briefly and clearly as
possible.
A decision must be reached on the record as it is
and not on a record as we would like to have it.
The plaintiff and the defendant deliberately
entered into a contract, the basis of this action.
The plaintiff, proceeding pursuant to this
contract, spent considerable effort and used
considerable money to advance the interests of
the defendant and to secure orders for its
products. These orders were submitted to the
president of the defendant company personally
and alter formally by writing. Prior to the
institution of the suit, the only objection of the
defendant was that the money should be
deposited with either the International Banking
Corporation or the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China at Cebu, a stipulation not
found in the contract.
A reasonable deduction, therefore, is that the
plaintiff presented orders under circumstances
which were a substantial compliance with the
terms of the contract with the defendant, and
which insured to the defendant payment for its
deliveries according to the price agreed upon,
and that as the defendant has breached its
contract, it must respond in damages.
The current running through the majority
opinion is that the orders emanated from
subagents of the plaintiff, and that no bona fide
purchasers were ready and able to take the
commodity contracted for upon terms
compatible with the contract. The answer is, in
the first place, that the contract nowhere
prohibits the plaintiff to secure subagents. The
answer is, in the second place, that the orders
were so phrased as to make the persons making
them personally responsible. The Ludvigsen &
McCurdy order from San Francisco begins: "You
can enter our order for 6,000 tons of bituminous
limestone as per sample submitted, at $10 gold
per ton, f. o. b., island of Leyte, subject to the
following terms and conditions: . . ." (Exhibit G).
The Smith order from Australia contains the
following: "It is therefore with great pleasure I
confirm the booking of the following orders, to
be shipped at least within a week of respective
dates: . . ." (Exhibit L). The Japan order starts
with the following sentence: "You can enter my
order for 1,000 tons of 1,000 kilos each of
bituminous limestone from the quarries of the
Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co. . . ." (Exhibit
W.)
But the main point of the plaintiff which the
majority decision misses entirely centers on the
proposition that the orders were communicated
by the plaintiff to the defendant, and that the
only objection the defendant had related to the
manner of payment. To emphasize this thought
again, let me quote the reply of the defendant to
the plaintiff when the defendant acknowledged
receipt of the orders placed by the plaintiff. The
letter reads: "In reply to same have to advise
you that no orders can be entertained unless
cash has been actually deposited with either the
International Banking Corporation or the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China,
Cebu." (Exhibit Y.) Prior to the filing of suit, the
defendant company never at any time raised any
question as to whether the customers secured
by plaintiff were "responsible firms" within the
meaning of the contract, and never secured any
information whatsoever as to their financial
standing. Consequently, defendant is now
estopped by its conduct from raising new
objections for rejection of the orders. (Mechem
on Agency, section 2441.)
acquired possession of the document, and that a
court will take no notice of how it was obtained,
is destructive of the attorney’s privilege and
constitutes an obstacle to attempts at friendly
compromise. In the case of Uy Chico v. Union
Life Assurance Society ([1915], 29 Phil., 163), it
was held that communications made by a client
to his attorney for the purpose of being
communicated to others are not privileged if
they have been so communicated. But here,
there is no intimation that Exhibit 14 was sent
by the client to the lawyer for the purpose of
being communicated to others. The Supreme
Court of Georgia in the case of Southern Railway
Co. v. White ([1899], 108 Ga., 201), held that
statements in a letter to a party’s attorney
handed by the latter to the opponent’s attorney,
are confidential communications and must be
excluded.
Briefly, the decision of the majority appears to
me to be defective in the following particulars:
(1) It sets aside without good reason the fair
findings of fact as made by the trial court and
substitutes therefor other findings not
warranted by the proof; (2) it fails to stress
plaintiff’s main argument, and (3) it lays down
uncalled for rules which undermine the
inviolability of a client’s communications to his
attorney.
Accordingly, I dissent and vote for an affirmance
of the judgment.

The majority decision incidentally takes up for

consideration assignments of error 1 and 2
having to do with either the admission or the
rejection by the trial court of certain exhibits.
Having in mind that the Court reverses the court
a quo on the facts, what is said relative to these
two assignments is absolutely unnecessary for a
judgment, and even as obiter dicta, contains
unfortunate expressions. Exhibit 14, for
example, is a letter addressed by the plaintiff to
his lawyer and probably merely shown to the
counsel of the defendant during negotiations to
seek a compromise. Whether that exhibit be
considered improperly rejected or not would
not change the result one iota.

The rule now announced by the Court that it

makes no difference how the adversary
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122
(1996)
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN
and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
These case touch the very cornerstone of every
State's judicial system, upon which the workings
of the contentious and adversarial system in the
Philippine legal process are based — the
sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer
relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and
advocate is also what makes the law profession
a unique position of trust and confidence, which
distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and
strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to
the confidentiality that proceeds from the
performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the
institution of the Complaint on July 31, 1987
before the Sandiganbayan by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the
named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33 (Civil
Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the
Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are
herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were
then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law
Firm). ACCRA Law Firm performed legal
services for its clients, which included, among
others, the organization and acquisition of
business associations and/or organizations,
with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or
simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of
the law firm delivered to its client documents
which substantiate the client's equity
holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in
blank representing the shares registered in the
client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course
of their dealings with their clients, the members
of the law firm acquire information relative to
the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the
ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted
in the organization and acquisition of the
companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, and
in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA
lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the
said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion
to Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as party-
defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its
exclusion of private respondent Roco as party-
defendant on his undertaking that he will reveal
the identity of the principal/s for whom he acted
as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33.4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended
Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
Edgardo J. Angara, Jose C. Concepcion,
Teodoro Regala, Avelino V. Cruz,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U. Escueta,
Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and
Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed conspired and
confederated with each other in setting
up, through the use of the coconut levy
 funds, the financial and corporate
framework and structures that led to
the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM,
COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more
than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition
of San Miguel Corporation shares and
its institutionalization through
presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. Through insidious means
and machinations, ACCRA, being the
wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA
Investments Corporation, became the
holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the
total outstanding capital stock of UCPB
as of 31 March 1987. This ranks ACCRA
Investments Corporation number 44
among the top 100 biggest stockholders
of UCPB which has approximately
1,400,000 shareholders. On the other
hand, corporate books show the name
Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of
February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended
Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged
that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers'
participation in the acts with which
their codefendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering
professional and legal services to
clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose
C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Rogelio A. Vinluan and Eduardo U.
Escueta, became holders of shares of
stock in the corporations listed under
their respective names in Annex "A" of
the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders
only and, as such, they do not claim any
proprietary interest in the said shares
of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V.
Cruz was one of the incorporators in
1976 of Mermaid Marketing
Corporation, which was organized for
legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the
expanded Amended Complaint.
However, he has long ago transferred
any material interest therein and
therefore denies that the "shares"
appearing in his name in Annex "A" of
the expanded Amended Complaint are
his assets.6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated
from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer
denying the allegations in the complaint
implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed
their "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated
October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion that
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same
treatment to them (exclusion as parties-
defendants) as accorded private respondent
Roco.8 The Counter-Motion for dropping
petitioners from the complaint was duly set for
hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with
the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the
following conditions precedent for the exclusion
of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the
identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds
of assignments petitioners executed in favor of
its client covering their respective
shareholdings.9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented
supposed proof to substantiate compliance by
private respondent Roco of the conditions
precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a)
Letter to respondent PCGG of the counsel of
respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989 reiterating
a previous request for reinvestigation by the
PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit dated
March 8, 1989 executed by private respondent
Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in
(a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and
Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21, 1988
to the respondent PCGG in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the
evidence of the PCGG against Roco in its
Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings,
private respondent Roco did not refute
petitioners' contention that he did actually not
reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG
Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
identity of the client for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned,
denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG
Case No. 33, for their refusal to comply with the
conditions required by respondent PCGG. It
held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e.
their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or
not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the
consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for
which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant
Roco has demonstrated his agency and
that Roco has apparently identified his
principal, which revelation could show
the lack of cause against him. This in
turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise
its power both under the rules of
Agency and under Section 5 of E.O. No.
14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic
v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the
ACCRA lawyers the same conditions
availed of by Roco; full disclosure in
exchange for exclusion from these
proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT
dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA
lawyers have preferred not to make the
disclosures required by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore,
begrudge the PCGG for keeping them as
party defendants. In the same vein, they
cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded
the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated
October 8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA
lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G.
Hayudini for the same treatment by the
PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of
the above resolution but the same was denied
by the respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the
ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 105938, invoking the
following grounds:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in subjecting
petitioners ACCRA lawyers who
undisputably acted as lawyers in
serving as nominee-stockholders, to the
strict application of the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not considering petitioners ACCRA
lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly
situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no
evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to
reveal, the identities of the
client(s) for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco
had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a
substantial distinction as would
make the classification
reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan
sanctioned favoritism and
undue preference in favor of
Mr. Roco in violation of the
equal protection clause.
III
 The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their
client(s) and the other information
requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of
this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity
of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures
required by the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers'
alleged client(s) but extend to
other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in
not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds
and with due consideration to the
constitutional right of petitioners
ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection
of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his
own motion for reconsideration of the March 18,
1991 resolution which was denied by
respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a
separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 108113, assailing respondent
Sandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the
same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R. No.
105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of
respondent Roco as party-defendant in PCGG
Case No. 33 grants him a favorable treatment, on
the pretext of his alleged undertaking to divulge
the identity of his client, giving him an
advantage over them who are in the same
footing as partners in the ACCRA law firm.
Petitioners further argue that even granting that
such an undertaking has been assumed by
private respondent Roco, they are prohibited
from revealing the identity of their principal
under their sworn mandate and fiduciary duty
as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during
such lawyer-client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes
petitioners' contention, alleging that the
revelation of the identity of the client is not
within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents
it required (deeds of assignment) protected,
because they are evidence of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates
that respondent PCGG acted correctly in
excluding him as party-defendant because he
"(Roco) has not filed an Answer. PCGG had
therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case No. 0033
as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to
identify his principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with
merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were
impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to
force them to disclose the identity of their
clients. Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after
petitioners but the "bigger fish" as they say in
street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the
PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners
— the names of their clients in exchange for
exclusion from the complaint. The statement of
the Sandiganbayan in its questioned resolution
dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic
stance of not revealing the identity of
the client for whom they have acted, i.e,
their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their
clients, considerations of whether or
not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA
lawyers exists cannot even begin to be
debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences
of their acts until they have begun to
establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of
the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for
which they have been impleaded by the
PCGG as defendants herein. (Emphasis
ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of
the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled
"Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential
Commission on Good Government" respondent
PCGG, through counsel Mario Ongkiko,
manifested at the hearing on December 5, 1991
that the PCGG wanted to establish through the
ACCRA that their "so called client is Mr. Eduardo
Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco
who furnished all the monies to those
subscription payments in corporations included
in Annex "A" of the Third Amended Complaint;
that the ACCRA lawyers executed deeds of trust
and deeds of assignment, some in the name of
particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I
propose to establish through these
ACCRA lawyers that, one, their so-called
client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.
Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco
who furnished all the monies to these
subscription payments of these
corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these
lawyers executed deeds of trust, some
in the name of a particular person, some
in blank. Now, these blank deeds are
important to our claim that some of the
shares are actually being held by the
nominees for the late President Marcos.
Fourth, they also executed deeds of
assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees.
Again, this is important to our claim
that some of the shares are for Mr.
Conjuangco and some are for Mr.
Marcos. Fifth, that most of thes e
corporations are really just paper
corporations. Why do we say that? One:
There are no really fixed sets of officers,
no fixed sets of directors at the time of
incorporation and even up to 1986,
which is the crucial year. And not only
that, they have no permits from the
municipal authorities in Makati. Next,
actually all their addresses now are care
of Villareal Law Office. They really have
no address on records. These are some
of the principal things that we would
ask of these nominees stockholders, as
they called themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely
standing in for their clients as defendants in the
complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted
solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as
lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion
as co-defendants in the complaint is merely
being used as leverage to compel them to name
their clients and consequently to enable the
PCGG to nail these clients. Such being the case,
respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as
against petitioners and should exclude them
from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is
premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio
conductio operarum (contract of lease of
services) where one person lets his services and
another hires them without reference to the
object of which the services are to be performed,
wherein lawyers' services may be compensated
by honorarium or for
hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency)
wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives
up all that he gained by the contract to the
person who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-
client relationship is more than that of the
principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
agent or servant, because he possesses special
powers of trust and confidence reposed on him
by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent
as the judge of the court, thus his powers are
entirely different from and superior to those of
an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an attorney also
occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-
judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the
Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice
of courses of action to be taken favorable to his
client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client
relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties that breathe life into it, among those, the
fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good
faith, 22 that is required by reason of necessity
and public interest 23 based on the hypothesis
that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a
lawyer to his client that distinguishes
him from any other professional in
society. This conception is entrenched
and embodies centuries of established
 and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton
v. Ford,26 the U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations
of life involving a higher trust and
confidence than that of attorney and
client, or generally speaking, one more
honorably and faithfully discharged;
few more anxiously guarded by the law,
or governed by the sterner principles of
morality and justice; and it is the duty of
the court to administer them in a
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful
and industrious, to see that confidence
thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of
the party bestowing it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from
the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901.
Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal
any communication made by the client to him or
his advice given thereon in the course of
professional employment." 28 Passed on into
various provisions of the Rules of Court, the
attorney-client privilege, as currently worded
provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, can an
attorney's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent
of the client and his employer,
concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such
capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e)
to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection
with his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and
approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from
him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him
from the full discharge of his duty. In
the judicial forum the client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne
in mind that the great trust of the
lawyer is to be performed within and
not without the bounds of the law. The
office of attorney does not permit, much
less does it demand of him for any
client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. He must obey his
own conscience and not that of his
client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in
lawyer-client relationships are many and serve
several constitutional and policy concerns. In
the constitutional sphere, the privilege gives
flesh to one of the most sacrosanct rights
available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a
client were made to choose between legal
representation without effective communication
and disclosure and legal representation with all
his secrets revealed then he might be compelled,
in some instances, to either opt to stay away
from the judicial system or to lose the right to
counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or
if it amounts to self incrimination, then the flow
of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory. The
threat this represents against another
sacrosanct individual right, the right to be
presumed innocent is at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one
seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would
otherwise be circumscribed by limited
information engendered by a fear of disclosure.
An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely
dependent upon the degree of confidence which
exists between lawyer and client which in turn
requires a situation which encourages a
dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow of
information. It necessarily follows that in order
to attain effective representation, the lawyer
must invoke the privilege not as a matter of
option but as a matter of duty and professional
responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this
duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the
name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.
Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, the answer must be in the
affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity
should not be shrouded in mystery 30 Under this
premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as
well as in the United States is that a lawyer may
not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are
well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the
client whose privileged information is sought to
be protected is flesh and blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after
the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does
not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to
the subject matter of the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that
the opposing party should, as a general rule,
know his adversary. "A party suing or sued is
entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against
unknown forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the
general rule is however qualified by some
important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very
activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court
reversed a lower court order requiring a lawyer
to divulge the name of her client on the ground
that the subject matter of the relationship was
so closely related to the issue of the client's
identity that the privilege actually attached to
both. In Enzor, the unidentified client, an
election official, informed his attorney in
confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a
bribe to that end. In her testimony, the attorney
revealed that she had advised her client to count
the votes correctly, but averred that she could
not remember whether her client had been, in
fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt
for her refusal to reveal his client's identity
before a grand jury. Reversing the lower court's
contempt orders, the state supreme court held
that under the circumstances of the case, and
under the exceptions described above, even the
name of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same
exception, i.e. that client identity is privileged in
those instances where a strong probability
exists that the disclosure of the client's identity
would implicate the client in the very criminal
activity for which the lawyer's legal advice was
obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury
proceedings inquiring into the activities of the
"Sandino Gang," a gang involved in the illegal
importation of drugs in the United States. The
respondents, law partners, represented key
witnesses and suspects including the leader of
the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in
November of 1973, the IRS issued summons to
Hodge and Zweig, requiring them to produce
documents and information regarding payment
received by Sandino on behalf of any other
person, and vice versa. The lawyers refused to
divulge the names. The Ninth Circuit of the
United States Court of Appeals, upholding non-
disclosure under the facts and circumstances of
the case, held:
 A client's identity and the nature of that
client's fee arrangements may be
privileged where the person invoking
the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of
such information would implicate that
client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in
Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a
matter of California law, the rule also
reflects federal law. Appellants contend
that the Baird exception applies to this
case.
The Baird exception is entirely
consonant with the principal policy
behind the attorney-client privilege. "In
order to promote freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients,
the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors must
be removed; hence, the law must
prohibit such disclosure except on the
client's consent." 8 J.
Wigmore, supra sec. 2291, at 545. In
furtherance of this policy, the client's
identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases,
protected as confidential
communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to
civil liability; his identity is privileged. For
instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances
of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation,37 prompted the New York Supreme
Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect that
he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered
injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned
by respondent corporation, collided with a
second taxicab, whose owner was unknown.
Plaintiff brought action both against defendant
corporation and the owner of the second cab,
identified in the information only as John Doe. It
turned out that when the attorney of defendant
corporation appeared on preliminary
examination, the fact was somehow revealed
that the lawyer came to know the name of the
owner of the second cab when a man, a client of
the insurance company, prior to the institution
of legal action, came to him and reported that he
was involved in a car accident. It was apparent
under the circumstances that the man was the
owner of the second cab. The state supreme
court held that the reports were clearly made to
the lawyer in his professional capacity. The
court said:
That his employment came about
through the fact that the insurance
company had hired him to defend its
policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney is such cases is clearly the
attorney for the policyholder when the
policyholder goes to him to report an
occurrence contemplating that it would
be used in an action or claim against
him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to
his counsel, for the purpose of
professional advice or assistance, are
privileged, whether they relate to a suit
pending or contemplated, or to any
other matter proper for such advice or
aid; . . . And whenever the
communication made, relates to a
matter so connected with the
employment as attorney or counsel as
to afford presumption that it was the
ground of the address by the client, then
it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address
of the owner of the second cab came to
the attorney in this case as a
confidential communication. His client
is not seeking to use the courts, and his
address cannot be disclosed on that
theory, nor is the present action
pending against him as service of the
summons on him has not been effected.
The objections on which the court
reserved decision are sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining
Company,40 the lawyer involved was required by
a lower court to disclose whether he
represented certain clients in a certain
transaction. The purpose of the court's request
was to determine whether the unnamed persons
as interested parties were connected with the
purchase of properties involved in the action.
The lawyer refused and brought the question to
the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's
refusal to divulge the names of his clients the
court held:
 If it can compel the witness to state, as
directed by the order appealed from,
that he represented certain persons in
the purchase or sale of these mines, it
has made progress in establishing by
such evidence their version of the
litigation. As already suggested, such
testimony by the witness would compel
him to disclose not only that he was
attorney for certain people, but that, as
the result of communications made to
him in the course of such employment
as such attorney, he knew that they
were interested in certain transactions.
We feel sure that under such conditions
no case has ever gone to the length of
compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only
his retainer, but the nature of the
transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the
basis of a suit against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no
case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would
furnish the only link that would form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual
of a crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by
the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be
taken to place the undisclosed taxpayers in a
favorable position in case criminal charges were
brought against them by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of
previous years were probably incorrect and the
taxes understated. The clients themselves were
unsure about whether or not they violated tax
laws and sought advice from Baird on the
hypothetical possibility that they had. No
investigation was then being undertaken by the
IRS of the taxpayers. Subsequently, the attorney
of the taxpayers delivered to Baird the sum of
$12, 706.85, which had been previously
assessed as the tax due, and another amount of
money representing his fee for the advice given.
Baird then sent a check for $12,706.85 to the IRS
in Baltimore, Maryland, with a note explaining
the payment, but without naming his clients.
The IRS demanded that Baird identify the
lawyers, accountants, and other clients involved.
Baird refused on the ground that he did not
know their names, and declined to name the
attorney and accountants because this
constituted privileged communication. A
petition was filed for the enforcement of the IRS
summons. For Baird's repeated refusal to name
his clients he was found guilty of civil contempt.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names
of clients who employed him to pay sums of
money to the government voluntarily in
settlement of undetermined income taxes,
unsued on, and with no government audit or
investigation into that client's income tax
liability pending. The court emphasized the
exception that a client's name is privileged when
so much has been revealed concerning the legal
services rendered that the disclosure of the
client's identity exposes him to possible
investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it
squarely within that exception to the
general rule. Here money was received
by the government, paid by persons
who thereby admitted they had not paid
a sufficient amount in income taxes
some one or more years in the past. The
names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose — to
ascertain which taxpayers think they
were delinquent, so that it may check
the records for that one year or several
years. The voluntary nature of the
payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more taxes or interest or
penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a
feeling of guilt for nonpayment of taxes,
though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link
that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly the payment
and the feeling of guilt are the reasons
the attorney here involved was
employed — to advise his clients what,
under the circumstances, should be
done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there
exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the
privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the
attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended
to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation
would otherwise result in disclosure of the
entire transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information
relating to the identity of a client may fall within
the ambit of the privilege when the client's name
itself has an independent significance, such that
disclosure would then reveal client
confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least
two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would
lead to establish said client's connection with
the very fact in issue of the case, which is
privileged information, because the privilege, as
stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the
substance (without which there would be not
attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense
and the legal advice or legal service sought was
duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less
than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-
prosecution should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its
clients;
(b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in
favor of their clients covering their
respective shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we
can readily deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as
lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners
gave their professional advice in the form of,
among others, the aforementioned deeds of
assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the
aforestated documents was part and parcel of
petitioners' legal service to their clients. More
important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients
would implicate them in the very activity for
which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the
alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the
aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception,
revelation of the client's name would obviously
provide the necessary link for the prosecution to
build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is
the link, in the words of Baird, "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary
to convict the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between
a case where a client takes on the services of an
attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice
about how to go around the law for the purpose
of committing illegal activities and a case where
a client thinks he might have previously
committed something illegal and consults his
attorney about it. The first case clearly does not
fall within the privilege because the same
cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The
second case falls within the exception because
whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name
cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure
leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the
prosecution, which might lead to possible action
against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished,
because the privilege cannot be invoked or used
as a shield for an illegal act, as in the first
example; while the prosecution may not have a
case against the client in the second example
and cannot use the attorney client relationship
to build up a case against the latter. The reason
for the first rule is that it is not within the
professional character of a lawyer to give advice
on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for
the second has been stated in the cases above
discussed and are founded on the same policy
grounds for which the attorney-client privilege,
in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the
appellate court therein stated that "under such
conditions no case has ever yet gone to the
length of compelling an attorney, at the instance
of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his
retainer, but the nature of the transactions to
which it related, when such information could
be made the basis of a suit against his
client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney
in the course of any personal employment,
relating to the subject thereof, and which may
be supposed to be drawn out in consequence of
the relation in which the parties stand to each
other, are under the seal of confidence and
entitled to protection as privileged
communications."50 Where the communicated
information, which clearly falls within the
privilege, would suggest possible criminal
activity but there would be not much in the
information known to the prosecution which
would sustain a charge except that revealing the
name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would
substantiate the prosecution's suspicions, then
the client's identity is so inextricably linked to
the subject matter itself that it falls within the
protection. The Baird exception, applicable to
the instant case, is consonant with the principal
policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the
purpose of promoting freedom of consultation
of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been
sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What
these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the
exploitation of the general rule in what may
amount to a fishing expedition by the
prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of
information available to the prosecutor which
do not depend on utilizing a defendant's counsel
as a convenient and readily available source of
information in the building of a case against the
latter. Compelling disclosure of the client's name
in circumstances such as the one which exists in
the case at bench amounts to sanctioning fishing
expeditions by lazy prosecutors and litigants
which we cannot and will not countenance.
When the nature of the transaction would be
revealed by disclosure of an attorney's retainer,
such retainer is obviously protected by the
privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner attorneys
in the instant case owe their client(s) a duty and
an obligation not to disclose the latter's identity
which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections
ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the
prosecution has a case against their clients, the
latter's case should be built upon evidence
painstakingly gathered by them from their own
sources and not from compelled testimony
requiring them to reveal the name of their
clients, information which unavoidably reveals
much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal. The logical nexus
between name and nature of transaction is so
intimate in this case the it would be difficult to
simply dissociate one from the other. In this
sense, the name is as much "communication" as
information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A
lawyer cannot reveal such communication
without exposing himself to charges of violating
a principle which forms the bulwark of the
entire attorney-client relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a
lawyer and his client therefore imposes a strict
liability for negligence on the former. The ethical
duties owing to the client, including
confidentiality, loyalty, competence, diligence as
well as the responsibility to keep clients
informed and protect their rights to make
decisions have been zealously sustained.
In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected
the plea of the petitioner law firm that it
breached its fiduciary duty to its client by
helping the latter's former agent in closing a
deal for the agent's benefit only after its client
hesitated in proceeding with the transaction,
thus causing no harm to its client. The Court
instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary
relationship in any context comprise a special
breed of cases that often loosen normally
stringent requirements of causation and
damages, and found in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy,
Denney, Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of
lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a
contingent fee lawyer was fired shortly before
the end of completion of his work, and sought
payment quantum meruit of work done. The
court, however, found that the lawyer was fired
for cause after he sought to pressure his client
into signing a new fee agreement while
settlement negotiations were at a critical stage.
While the client found a new lawyer during
the interregnum, events forced the client to
settle for less than what was originally offered.
Reiterating the principle of fiduciary duty of
lawyers to clients in Meinhard
v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice
Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior," the US Court
found that the lawyer involved was fired for
cause, thus deserved no attorney's fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the
protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is
evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but
extends even after the termination of the
relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by
lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law,
which the lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the
words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 58 ". . . is an
exacting goddess, demanding of her votaries in
intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no
less, is not prepared to accept respondents'
position without denigrating the noble
profession that is lawyering, so extolled by
Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly
pursued. But what other gives such
scope to realize the spontaneous energy
of one's soul? In what other does one
plunge so deep in the stream of life —
so share its passions its battles, its
despair, its triumphs, both as witness
and actor? . . . But that is not all. What a
subject is this in which we are united —
this abstraction called the Law, wherein
as in a magic mirror, we see reflected,
not only in our lives, but the lives of all
men that have been. When I think on
this majestic theme my eyes dazzle. If
we are to speak of the law as our
mistress, we who are here know that
she is a mistress only to be won with
sustained and lonely passion — only to
be won by straining all the faculties by
which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners'
right not to reveal the identity of their clients
under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing
to their clients, because the facts of the instant
case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to
the rule that the client's name is not privileged
information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
lawyer-client confidential privilege under the
circumstances obtaining here does not cover the
identity of the client, then it would expose the
lawyers themselves to possible litigation by
their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in the exercise
of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033
alleged that the defendants therein,
including herein petitioners and
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with
each other in setting up through the use
of coconut levy funds the financial and
corporate framework and structures
that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM and others and that through
insidious means and machinations,
ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of
approximately fifteen million shares
representing roughly 3.3% of the total
capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. The PCGG wanted to establish
through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr.
Cojuangco is their client and it was
Cojuangco who furnished all the monies
to the subscription payment; hence,
petitioners acted as dummies, nominees
and/or agents by allowing themselves,
among others, to be used as instrument
in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, etc.,
which acts constitute gross abuse of
official position and authority, flagrant
breach of public trust, unjust
enrichment, violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of
the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to
reveal the identity of their clients, but
worse, to submit to the PCGG
documents substantiating the client-
lawyer relationship, as well as deeds of
assignment petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their
respective shareholdings, the PCGG
would exact from petitioners a link
"that would inevitably form the chain of
testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last
assignment of error, respondents
alleged that the private respondent was
dropped as party defendant not only
because of his admission that he acted
merely as a nominee but also because of
his undertaking to testify to such facts
and circumstances "as the interest of
truth may require, which includes . . .
the identity of the principal."59
First, as to the bare statement that
private respondent merely acted as a
lawyer and nominee, a statement made
in his out-of-court settlement with the
PCGG, it is sufficient to state that
petitioners have likewise made the
same claim not merely out-of-court but
also in the Answer to plaintiff's
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed
by counsel, claiming that their acts were
made in furtherance of "legitimate
lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated"
in this regard, public respondents must
show that there exist other conditions
and circumstances which would
warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners
in the case at bench in order to evade a
violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend
that the primary consideration behind
their decision to sustain the PCGG's
dropping of private respondent as a
defendant was his promise to disclose
the identities of the clients in question.
However, respondents failed to show —
and absolute nothing exists in the
records of the case at bar — that private
respondent actually revealed the
identity of his client(s) to the PCGG.
Since the undertaking happens to be the
leitmotif of the entire arrangement
between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to
have justified PCGG's special treatment
exempting the private respondent from
prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required
proof of the undertaking more
substantial than a "bare assertion" that
private respondent did indeed comply
with the undertaking. Instead, as
manifested by the PCGG, only three
documents were submitted for the
purpose, two of which were mere
requests for re-investigation and one
simply disclosed certain clients which
petitioners (ACCRA lawyers) were
themselves willing to reveal. These
were clients to whom both petitioners
and private respondent rendered legal
services while all of them were partners
at ACCRA, and were not the clients
which the PCGG wanted disclosed for
the alleged questioned transactions.61
To justify the dropping of the private
respondent from the case or the filing of
the suit in the respondent court without
him, therefore, the PCGG should
conclusively show that Mr. Roco was
treated as species apart from the rest of
the ACCRA lawyers on the basis of a
classification which made substantial
distinctions based on real differences.
No such substantial distinctions exist
from the records of the case at bench, in
violation of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a
guarantee which provides a wall of
protection against uneven application
of status and regulations. In the broader
sense, the guarantee operates against
uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar
circumstances would be accorded the
same treatment. 62 Those who fall
within a particular class ought to be
treated alike not only as to privileges
granted but also as to the liabilities
imposed.
. . . What is required under this
constitutional guarantee is the
uniform operation of legal
norms so that all persons under
similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment
both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. As
was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be
given to every person under
circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be
treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group equally
binding the rest.63
We find that the condition precedent
required by the respondent PCGG of the
petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33
violates the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. The condition
also constitutes a transgression by
respondents Sandiganbayan and PCGG
of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.64 It is grossly unfair to
exempt one similarly situated litigant
from prosecution without allowing the
same exemption to the others.
Moreover, the PCGG's demand not only
touches upon the question of the
identity of their clients but also on
documents related to the suspected
transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the
constitutional right against self-
incrimination. Whichever way one
looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a
free ride at the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the
invocation by petitioners of the
privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this stage of the
proceedings is premature and that they
should wait until they are called to
testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before
they can raise their objections. But
petitioners are not mere witnesses.
They are co-principals in the case for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
They have made their position clear
from the very beginning that they are
not willing to testify and they cannot be
compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-
incrimination and of their fundamental
legal right to maintain inviolate the
privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
Sword of Damocles over petitioners'
heads. It should not be allowed to
continue a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent
PCGG's legal mandate to recover ill-
gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts
which violate the equal protection
guarantee and the right against self-
incrimination and subvert the lawyer-
client confidentiality privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the Resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan (First
Division) promulgated on March 18,
1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala,
Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose
C. Concepcion, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB
Civil Case No. 0033 entitled "Republic of
the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., et al."

It is clear then that the case against

petitioners should never be allowed to
take its full course in the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioners should not
be made to suffer the effects of further
litigation when it is obvious that their
inclusion in the complaint arose from a
privileged attorney-client relationship
and as a means of coercing them to
disclose the identities of their clients.
To allow the case to continue with
respect to them when this Court could
nip the problem in the bud at this early
opportunity would be to sanction an
unjust situation which we should not
here countenance. The case hangs as a
real and palpable threat, a proverbial
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil 919 (1930)
G.R. No. 34098 September 17, 1930
ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
E. P. REVILLA, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, and TEAL MOTOR CO.,
INC., respondents.
This is an original petition for writs of certiorari
and mandamus filed in this court by the Orient
Insurance Company against the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
the Teal Motor Co., Inc. The object of the petition
is to obtain an order requiring the respondent
judge to permit the attorney for the petitioner to
examine a letter (Exhibits 49 and 49-Act) part of
which has been read into the record in the
course of the examination of one of the
witnesses testifying for the plaintiff in the case
of Teal Motor Co., Inc. vs. Orient Insurance
Company, now pending in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, civil case No.
35825, with which, for purposes of trial, have
been consolidated several other cases of similar
character. The cause is now before us for
resolution upon the complaint and answer
interposed by the two respondents.
The respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. is plaintiff in
a civil action instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (civil case No. 35825) for the
purpose of recovering upon two fire insurance
policies issued by the Orient Insurance
Company, aggregating P60,000, upon a stock of
merchandise alleged to be of the value of
P414,513.56, which, with the exception of
salvage valued at about P50,000, was destroyed
by a fire on or about January 6, 1929. In one of
the clauses of the policies sued upon is a
stipulation to the effect that all benefit under the
policy would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the
claim should be rejected by the insurer and
action or suit should not be commenced within
three months after such rejection. In the answer
of the Orient Insurance Company, interposed in
the civil case mentioned, it is alleged, by way of
defense, that the company rejected the claim on
April 15, 1929, that notice of such rejection was
given to the plaintiff by letter on the same day,
and that suit was not instituted on the policy
until August 3, 1929, which was more than three
months after the rejection of the claim.
In a replication to the answer of the defendant,
containing the foregoing and other defenses, the
plaintiff admitted that the adjusters of the
defendant company had, on April 15, 1929,
notified the plaintiff that the Orient Insurance
Company would not pay the claim, basing
refusal upon alleged incendiarism and fraud on
the part of the plaintiff; and by way of
avoidance, it was alleged in the replication that,
after notification of denial of liability by the
insurance company, one E. E. Elser, as
representative of the company, expressly
requested the plaintiff to defer judicial action
until after the following July 31, stating that
three were great possibilities that an
extrajudicial compromise might be arranged in
the matter; and it was further asserted, in the
replication, that the plaintiff had deferred
action, relying upon this request.
It will thus be seen that the reason for the
admitted delay in the institution of the action is
an important issue in the case, or case, now in
course of trial.
It further appears that while case No. 35825 was
in course of trial, as it still is, before the
respondent judge, in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, the witness E. M. Bachrach, president
of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., while being examined
in chief by the attorneys for the plaintiff, and
speaking of the circumstances surrounding the
institution of the action, said that he had
reported certain conversations to plaintiff's
attorneys, and he added: "I waited for about a
week longer and not having heard anything
about it, in the meantime, on the 13th of July, I
received a letter from our attorneys, Guevara,
Francisco & Recto, urging me to file these cases."
The attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance
Company, thereupon interposed, saying: "I ask
that the witness be required to produce the
letter referred to from Mr. Guevara, or else his
answer be stricken out. (To the witness) Have
you got the letter there?" The witness replied
that he had the letter with him and that he had
no objection to show that part of the letter in
which Guevara urged him to proceed with the
cases. Upon being asked about the other part of
the letter, the witness said that the other part
contained private matter, "between the attorney
and ourselves," meaning between the Teal
Motor Co., Inc., and its attorneys. Thereupon the
attorney for the defendant, Orient Insurance
Company, said he would like to see the letter,
inquiring as to its date. The witness replied that
it bore date of July 13, 1929; and upon the court
inquiring whether the witness had any objection
to the reading of the letter by the attorney for
the defendant, the witness replied that he
wished to consult with his attorney. Upon this
the attorney for the adversary party, the Orient
Insurance Company, suggested that he would
like to have the letter marked without his
reading it, and it was accordingly marked as
Exhibit 49. The attorney then said: "In view of
the production of the letter, I withdraw the
objection to the statement of the witness as to
its contents," and he added: "I now ask the
permission of the court to read the letter for my
information." The court thereupon inquired of
the attorney for the Teal Motor Co., Inc., whether
he had any objection, and the attorney observed
that he would have no objection to the
disclosing of that part of the letter which
referred exactly to the point of the urging of the
filing of the complaints, and he added:
"Unfortunately, the other part of the letter being
a communication between a client and attorney,
I don't think, if your Honor please, it can be
disclosed without the consent of both."
In the course of the colloquy which thereupon
unsued between the attorney for the plaintiff
and the attorney for the defendant, it was stated
by the attorney for the plaintiff that only a part
of the letter had anything to do with the urging
of the presentation of the complaints in the
cases to which the witness had testified, and
that the other part of the letter referred to the
contract of fees, or retaining of the services of
plaintiff's attorneys in connection with said
cases, a matter, so the attorney suggested,
entirely distinct from the urging of the
presentation of the cases. The attorney for the
defendant thereupon insisted before the court
that, inasmuch as all the letter refers to the case
then in court, the entire document should be
exhibited, in conformity with the rule that when
part of a document is offered in evidence, the
entire document must be presented.
Upon this the respondent judge ruled as follows:
"Objection of the counsel for the plaintiff and the
witness, Mr. Barchrach, to the showing or
reading of the whole letter in the record is
sustained, and it is ordered that only that part of
the letter which has been referred to by Mr.
Bachrach in his testimony be read and
transcribed into the record." To this ruling the
attorney for the defendant excepted and the
respondent judge then said: "Let that part of the
letter pointed out by Mr. Bachrach be
transcribed in the record;" whereupon the
following part of the letter was read out in court
and incorporated in the transcript.
July 13, 1929
DEAR SIR: As you know, your attorney
Mr. Basilio Francisco has turned over to
us, prior to his departure, all the papers
in connection with the insurance claim
of the Teal Motor Co., Inc., on destroyed
or burned merchandise, and everything
is now ready for filing of the
corresponding complaints in the Court
of First Instance.
When the matter above quoted had been thus
read into the record, the attorney for the
defendant made the following observation: "In
view of the fact that counsel for the plaintiff has
just now read into the record and presented as
evidence a part of the letter of July 13, I now
request that the entire letter be produced." This
request was overruled by the court, and the
attorney for the defendant excepted. After
further discussion, upon the suggestion of the
attorney for the defendant and by agreement of
the counsel for both parties, the second page of
the letter was marked 49-A by the clerk court.
The incident was renewed when it came at turn
of the attorney for the defendant to cross-
examine the same witness E. M. Bachrach, when
the attorney for the defendant, having
ascertained from the witness that he still had
the letter in his possession, and that he had not
answered it in writing, formally offered the
letter in evidence. The attorney for the plaintiff
again objected, on the ground that the letter was
of a privileged nature and that it was the
personal property of the witness. Thereupon the
court, receiving the letter in hand from the
witness, observed that he had already ruled
upon it, and after further discussion, the court
sustained the objection of the attorney for the
plaintiff and refused to admit in evidence so
much of the letter as had not already been read
into the record. The attorney for the defendant
again excepted.
At a later stage of the trial the attorney
interposed a formal motion for reconsideration
of the ruling of the court in refusing to admit the
letter in evidence, or the part of it not already
incorporated in the record. The court, however,
adhered to its original ruling, and the attorney
for the defendant excepted. Another incident
that might be noted, though not alleged as a
ground of relief in the petition before us, but set
forth in the answer of the respondents, is that
the attorney for the defendant procured a
subpoena duces tecum to be issued by the clerk
of court requiring the attorneys for the plaintiff
to produce in court certain papers including the
letter which gave rise to the present
controversy. The court, on motion of the
attorneys for the plaintiff, quashed said
subpoena.
The essential character of this incident, which
we have perhaps narrated with unnecessary
prolixity, is readily discernible. A witness for the
plaintiff made an oral statement as to the
substance of part of a letter which had been
received by the plaintiff from its attorney, and
when the fact was revealed that the
communication had been made by letter, the
attorney for the defendant requested that the
witness be required to produce the letter in
court, and if not, that his answer should be
stricken out. This in legal effect was a demand
for the production of "the best evidence," it
being a well-known rule of law that a witness
cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to
the contents of a paper writing which can be
produced in court. In response to this request
that portion of the letter to which the witness
had supposedly referred was read into the
record.
The respondent judge appears to have
considered that the excerpt from the letter thus
incorporated in the record was either proof of
the defendant, its production having been
demanded by defendant's counsel, or that at
least the legal responsibility for the
incorporation of said excerpt into the record
was attributable to the defendant. We are
unable to accept this view. The incorporation of
this excerpt from the letter was a necessary
support of the oral statement which the witness
had made, and if this basis for such statement
had not been laid by the incorporation of the
excerpt into the record, the oral statement of the
witness concerning the tenor of the letter should
properly have been stricken out. But instead of
withdrawing the oral statement of the witness
concerning the nature of the written
communication, the witness produced the letter
and the part of it already quoted was read into
the record. The excerpt in question must
therefore be considered as proof submitted by
the plaintiff; and there can be no question that,
part of the letter having been introduced in
behalf of the plaintiff, the whole of the letter
could properly be examined by the other party,
in accordance with the express provision of
section 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It was stated in the court by the attorney for the
plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other
portions of the letter in proof, that the other
parts were privileged, because they related to
the terms of employment between attorney and
client, or to the fee to be paid to the attorney.
With respect to this point it is difficult to see
how a contract for fees could be considered
privileged. Irrelevant it might, under certain
circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged.
Of course contracts between attorneys and
clients are inherently personal and private
matters, but they are a constant subject of
litigation, and contracts relating to fees are
essentially not of privileged nature. Privilege
primarily refers to communications from client
to attorney, an idea which of course includes
communications from attorney to client relative
to privileged matters.
But, even supposing that the matter contained in
the letter and withheld from the inspection of
the adversary was originally of a privileged
nature, the privilege was waived by the
introduction in evidence of part of the letter.
The provision in section 283 of the Code of Civil
Procedure making the whole of a declaration,
conversation, or writing admissible when part
has been given in evidence by one party, makes
no exception as to privileged matter; and the
jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize
any exception. Practically every feature of the
question now under consideration was involved
in the case of Western Union Tel.
Co. vs. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55),
which in 1885 came before Wallace, J., a
distinguished jurist presiding in the Federal
Circuit Court of the Southern District of New
York. The substance of the case is well stated in
the note to Kelly vs. Cummens (20 Am. & Eng.
Ann. Cases, 1283, 1287), from which we quote
as follows:
In Western Union Tel. Co. vs. Baltimore,
etc., Tel. Co. (26 Fed., 55), it appeared
that upon a motion in the cause, which
was in equity for a preliminary
injunction, one of the questions
involved was whether a reissued patent
upon which the suit was founded was
obtained for the legitimate purpose of
correcting mistake or inadvertence in
the specification and claims of the
original, or whether it was obtained
merely for the purpose of expanding the
claims of the original in order to
subordinate to the reissue certain
improvements or inventions made by
others after the grant of the original
patent and before the application for
the reissue. To fortify its theory of the
true reasons for obtaining the reissue,
the complainant upon that motion
embodied in affidavits extracts from
communications made by a patent
expert and attorney in the office of the
solicitor general of the complainant, to
the president and the vice-president of
the complainant, when the subject of
applying for a reissue was under
consideration by the officers of the
complainant, and while the proceedings
for a reissue were pending. After the
cause had proceeded to the taking of
proofs for final hearing the defendant
sought to introduce in evidence the
original communications, extracts from
which were used by the complainant
upon the motion for an injunction, on
the ground that the parts of the
communication which were not
disclosed had an important bearing
upon the history of the application for a
reissue, and indicated that it was not
made for any legitimate purpose. The
complainant resisted the efforts of the
defendant to have the original
communications admitted, on the
ground that they were privileged as
made to its officers by its attorney, but
it was held that the defendant was
entitled to introduce them in evidence,
the court saying: "The question, then, is
whether the complainant can shelter
itself behind its privilege to insist upon
the privacy of the communications
between its attorney and its other
officers as confidential communications,
when it has itself produced fragmentary
part of them, and sought to use them as
a weapon against the defendant to
obtain the stringent remedy of a
preliminary injunction. Assuming that
the communications addressed to the
president and vice-president of the
complainant by Mr. Buckingham were
communications made to the
complainant by its attorney, and as such
privileged at the option of the
complainant, it was competent for the
complainant to waive its privilege. It
would hardly be contended that the
complainant could introduce extracts
from these communications as evidence
in its own behalf for the purpose of a
final hearing, and yet withhold the
other parts if their production were
required by the defendant. A party
cannot waive such a privilege partially.
He cannot remove the seal of secrecy
from so much of the privileged
communications as makes for his
advantage, and insist that it shall not be
removed as to so much as makes to the
advantage of his adversary, or may
neutralize the effect of such as has been
introduced. Upon the principle it would
seem that it cannot be material at what
stage of the proceedings in a suit a party
waives his right to maintain the secrecy
of privileged communication. All the
proceedings in the cause are
constituent parts of the controversy,
and it is not obvious how any
distinction can obtain as to the effect of
waiver when made by a party for the
purpose of obtaining temporary relief
and when made by him to obtain final
relief."
From the foregoing decision and other cases
contained in the note referred to, we are led to
the conclusion that the attorney for the
defendant in the court below was entitled to
examine the whole of the letter (Exhibit 49 and
49-A), with a view to the introduction in
evidence of such parts thereof as may be
relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent
judge was in error in refusing to permit the
inspection of the letter by said attorney.
It is suggested in the argument for the
respondents that the question of the
admissibility in evidence of the parts of the
letter not already read into the record was
prematurely raised, and that the attorney for the
defendant should have waited until it became
his turn to present evidence in chief, when, as is
supposed, the question could have been
properly raised. We are of the opinion, however,
that if the attorney for the defendant had a right
to examine the letter, it should have been
produced when he asked for it on the cross-
examination of the witness who had the letter in
his possession. Besides, in the lengthy
discussions between court and attorneys,
occuring at different times, there was not the
slightest suggestion from the court that the
parts of the letter which were held inadmissible
would be admitted at any time. Furthermore,
the action of the court in quashing the subpoena
duces tecum for the production of the letter
shows that the court meant to rule that the
letter could not be inspected at all by the
attorney for the defendant.
Objection is also here made by the attorney for
the respondents to the use of the writ
of mandamus for the purpose of correcting the
error which is supposed to have been
committed. The situation presented is, however,
one where the herein petitioner has no other
remedy. The letter which the petitioner seeks to
examine has been ruled inadmissible, as to the
parts not introduced in evidence by the
defendant in the court below, and the
respondent judge had not permitted the
document to become a part of the record in such
a way that the petitioner could take advantage
of the error upon appeal to this court. It is idle to
discuss whether other remedy would be speedy
or adequate when there is no remedy at all. This
court is loath, of course, to interfere in course of
the trial of a case in a Court of First Instance, as
such interference might frequently prolong
unduly the litigation in that court. But this case
has been pending before the respondent judge
for a considerable period of time, and
undoubtedly the probatory period will be
necessarily extended much longer. Under these
circumstances, the action of this court in
entertaining the present application will either
be conductive to the speedy determination of
case, or at least will not appreciably extend the
proceedings.

It goes without saying that the subject matter of

the contention is of a nature which makes the
use of the writ of mandamus appropriate, since
the right from the exercise of which the
petitioner is excluded is one to which it is
entitled under the law and the duty to be
performed is one pertaining to the respondent
judge in his official capacity.

From what has been said it follows that the writ

of mandamus prayed for will be granted, and the
respondent judge is directed to permit the
attorney for the defendant (petitioner here) to
inspect the letter (Exhibit 49 and 49-A) with a
view to the introduction in evidence of such
parts thereof as may be relevant to the issues
made by the pleadings in civil case No. 35825
and other cases which have been consolidated
with it for trial. So ordered, with costs against
the respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc.
Pp v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO
V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
Through the special civil action for certiorari at
bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
promulgated on December 22, 1993, which
denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of
respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as
a state witness, and its resolution of March 7,
1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of
its preceding disposition.1
The records show that during the dates material
to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk
of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-
Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province, and is at present
a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a
practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present
recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime
in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free
patent over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the
Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His
application was approved and, pursuant to a
free patent granted to him, an original certificate
of title was issued in his favor for that lot which
is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
action2 for the cancellation of respondent
Paredes' patent and certificate of title since the
land had been designated and reserved as a
school site in the aforementioned subdivision
survey. The trial court rendered
judgment3 nullifying said patent and title after
finding that respondent Paredes had obtained
the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application.
Pertinently, respondent Sansaet served as
counsel of Paredes in that civil case.4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the
trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of
the Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information
for perjury5 was filed against respondent
Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.6 On
November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was,
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of
Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on
the ground inter alia of prescription, hence the
proceedings were terminated.7 In this criminal
case, respondent Paredes was likewise
represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter
haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his
former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
officials to favorably act on his application for
free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. For the
third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes'
counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution8 recommending the criminal
prosecution of respondent Paredes. Atty.
Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-
respondent, moved for reconsideration and,
because of its legal significance in this case, we
quote some of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged
already by the complainants before the
Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail
on detention in 1984 under the same
set of facts and the same evidence . . .
but said case after arraignment, was
ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of
Justice. Copy of the dismissal
order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department
of Justice are hereto attached for ready
reference; thus the filing of this case
will be a case of double jeopardy for
respondent herein . . . 9 (Emphasis
supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes
with a violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to
quash filed by the defense was later granted in
respondent court's resolution of August 1,
1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a
taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft
charges against respondent Paredes, sent a
letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed
that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his
herein co-respondents, simulated and certified
as true copies certain documents purporting to
be a notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985,
and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge. 13 These falsified
documents were annexed to respondent
Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the
Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft
charge against him, in order to support his
contention that the same would constitute
double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his
letter a certification that no notice of
arraignment was ever received by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a
certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño
that said perjury case in his court did not reach
the arraignment stage since action thereon was
suspended pending the review of the case by the
Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-
affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded
and repudiated the submissions he had made in
his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of
Explanations and Rectifications, 15 respondent
Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have
the graft case under preliminary investigation
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by
making it appear that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been
arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were
later filed by respondent Sansaet in the
preliminary investigation were prepared and
falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the
house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the
scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the
instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for
his discharge as a government witness in the
consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor
was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their
agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24,
1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of
falsification charges against all the herein
private respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this
evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult
to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in
the absence of deliberate intent to
conspire, would be unwittingly induced
by another to commit a crime. As
counsel for the accused in those
criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control
over the case theory and the evidence
which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession
of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle
of privileged communication between
the lawyer and his client which may be
objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that
resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any
further controversy, he decided to file separate
informations for falsification of public
documents against each of the herein
respondents. Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each
of which named one of the three private
respondents here as the accused therein, were
filed in the graft court. However, the same were
consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the
People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was
submitted that all the requisites therefor,
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent
Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was
that, except for the eyewitness testimony of
respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct
evidence to prove the confabulated falsification
of documents by respondents Honrada and
Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other
private respondents in their opposition to the
prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the
desired discharge on this ratiocination:
 From the evidence adduced, the
opposition was able to establish that
client and lawyer relationship existed
between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the
period alleged in the information. In
view of such relationship, the facts
surrounding the case, and other
confidential matter must have been
disclosed by accused Paredes, as client,
to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his
professional capacity. Therefore, the
testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts
surrounding the offense charged in the
information is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been
likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated
to this Court by the prosecution in an original
action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of
the petition at bar actually turns are therefore
(1) whether or not the projected testimony of
respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness,
is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and
(2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he
is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps
criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan
ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship
which existed between herein respondents
Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant
periods, the facts surrounding the case and
other confidential matters must have been
disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to
respondent Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly,
it found "no reason to discuss it further since
Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without
the latter's consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The
attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these
cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of both
respondents therein constitute an exception to
the rule. For a clearer understanding of that
evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some
distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a
confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos.
17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected
since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his
counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet
was called to witness the preparation of the
falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada
was as eloquent a communication, if not more,
than verbal statements being made to him by
Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such
falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary
rule on this point has always referred to "any
communication," without distinction or
qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our
present evidential rule was taken, there is no
particular mode by which a confidential
communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal
or written communications made by the client
to his attorney but extends as well to
information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire
process, considering their past and existing
relations as counsel and client and, further, in
view of the purpose for which such falsified
documents were prepared, no word at all passed
between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject
matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this
conclusion is the undisputed fact that said
documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in
behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation
of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also,
the acts and words of the parties during the
period when the documents were being falsified
were necessarily confidential since Paredes
would not have invited Sansaet to his house and
allowed him to witness the same except under
conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of
Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the
criminal act for which the latter stands charged,
a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be
committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is
admitted that the announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within
the confidences which his attorney is bound to
respect. Respondent court appears, however, to
believe that in the instant case it is dealing with
a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set
to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents
Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which
is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is
true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to
be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily
committed in the past. But for the application of
the attorney-client privilege, however, the
period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client
to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime
intended to be committed in the future. In other
words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice
with respect to a crime that the former has
theretofore committed, he is given the
protection of a virtual confessional seal which
the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be
broken by the attorney without the client's
consent. The same privileged confidentiality,
however, does not attach with regard to a crime
which a client intends to commit thereafter or in
the future and for purposes of which he seeks
the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed, made
by a party who committed it, to an attorney,
consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the
unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and
client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and
client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to
be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Parades at the
time he and Honrada, either with the active or
passive participation of Sansaet, were about to
falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the
documents which were later filed in the
Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the
criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by
Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
reference to the crime of falsification which had
not yet been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his present
co-respondents, later committed. Having been
made for purposes of a future offense, those
communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a
conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada
concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is
well settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out
to the Court that the "prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will
not be permitted under the guise of privilege,
and every communication made to an attorney
by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy
or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only
lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose
at once in the interest of justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for
respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of
privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of
the objection thereto of his conspiring client,
would be one of the worst travesties in the rules
of evidence and practice in the noble profession
of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to
the consequential inquiry as to whether
respondent Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps
criminis, for discharge from the criminal
prosecution in order to testify for the State.
Parenthetically, respondent court, having
arrived at a contrary conclusion on the
preceding issue, did not pass upon this second
aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution
which are now submitted for our resolution in
the petition at bar. We shall, however, first
dispose likewise of some ancillary questions
requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did
not fully pass upon the query as to whether or
not respondent Sansaet was qualified to be a
state witness need not prevent this Court from
resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner.
Where the determinative facts and evidence
have been submitted to this Court such that it is
in a position to finally resolve the dispute, it will
be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and
the expeditious administration thereof to
resolve the case on the merits, instead of
remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the
three private respondents here stand charged in
three separate informations. It will be recalled
that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman recommended the filing of criminal
charges for falsification of public documents
against all the respondents herein. That
resolution was affirmed but, reportedly in order
to obviate further controversy, one information
was filed against each of the three respondents
here, resulting in three informations for the
same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently
explained away during the deliberations in this
case by the following discussion thereof by Mr.
Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment
exists to block Sansaet's discharge as
state witness, he can, nevertheless, be
discharged even if indicted under a
separate information. I suppose the
three cases were consolidated for joint
trial since they were all raffled to the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules
of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of
cases arising from the same incident or
series of incidents, or involving
common questions of law and fact.
Accordingly, for all legal intents and
purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused
and he could be discharged as state
witness. It is of no moment that he was
charged separately from his co-accused.
While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure uses the
word jointly, which was absent in the
old provision, the consolidated and joint
trial has the effect of making the three
accused co-accused or joint defendants,
especially considering that they are
charged for the same offense. In
criminal law, persons indicted for the
same offense and tried together are
called joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice
Francisco along the same vein, there having
been a consolidation of the three cases, the
several actions lost their separate identities and
became a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered, the same as if the
different causes of action involved had originally
been joined in a single action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules
referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more
persons are charged with the commission of a
certain offense" was too broad and indefinite;
hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the
identity of the charge and the fact that the
accused are all together charged therewith
substantially in the same manner in point of
commission and time. The word "joint" means
"common to two or more," as "involving the
united activity of two or more," or "done or
produced by two or more working together," or
"shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it
been intended that all the accused should
always be indicted in one and the same
information, the Rules could have said so with
facility, but it did not so require in consideration
of the circumstances obtaining in the present
case and the problems that may arise from
amending the information. After all, the purpose
of the Rule can be achieved by consolidation of
the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a
conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the
rule is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is
the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed
on all members of the conspiracy. Now, one of
the requirements for a state witness is that he
"does not appear to be the most guilty." 31 not
that he must be the least guilty 32 as is so often
erroneously framed or submitted. The query
would then be whether an accused who was
held guilty by reason of membership in a
conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find
this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was
the real mastermind. It is believable
that he persuaded the others to rob
Paterno, not to kill him for a promised
fee. Although he did not actually
commit any of the stabbings, it was a
mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state
witness. All the perpetrators of the
offense, including him, were bound in a
conspiracy that made them equally
guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et
al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others
in three separate informations for multiple
murder were discharged and used as state
witnesses against their confederates.
Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-conspirators was
discharged from the information charging him
and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial
court found that he was not the most guilty as,
being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily
convinced by his two co-accused to open the
account with the bank and which led to the
commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of
respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just
as guilty as his co-accused, and should not be
discharged as he did not appear to be not the
most guilty, is untenable. In other words, the
Court took into account the gravity or nature of
the acts committed by the accused to be
discharged compared to those of his co-accused,
and not merely the fact that in law the same or
equal penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed
but not explicity articulated found expression
in People vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in
extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar
Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the
discharge of a co-accused to become a state
witness. He argues that no accused in a
conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and
utilized as a state witness, for not one of them
could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be
the most guilty. Appellant asserts that since
accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy,
he is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For,
despite the presentation of four (4) other
witnesses, none of them could positively identify
the accused except Bermudez who was one of
those who pulled the highway heist which
resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and
other valuables, but even the life of Capt.
Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no
other direct evidence was available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.
Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was,
substantially corroborated in its material points
as indicated by the trial court in its well-
reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to
be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he
was only invited to a drinking party without
having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage
a highway robbery. But even assuming that he
later became part of the conspiracy, he does not
appear to be the most guilty. What the law
prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free
while his co-accused who are less guilty will be
sent to jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the
highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and
not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one
may be considered least guilty if We take into
account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no
evidence that he has at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the
observations of the Solicitor
General that the rule on the
discharge of an accused to be
utilized as state witness clearly
looks at his actual and
individual participation in the
commission of the crime, which
may or may not have been
perpetrated in conspiracy with
the other accused. Since
Bermudez was not individually
responsible for the killing
committed on the occasion of
the robbery except by reason of
conspiracy, it cannot be said
then that Bermudez appears to
be the most guilty. Hence, his
discharge to be a witness for
the government is clearly
warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be
imposed upon conspirators found guilty
of a criminal offense is based on the
concurrence of criminal intent in their
minds and translated into concerted
physical action although of varying acts
or degrees of depravity. Since the
Revised Penal Code is based on the
classical school of thought, it is the
identity of the mens rea which is
considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants
the imposition of the same penalty on
the consequential theory that the act of
one is thereby the act of all.
 Also, this is an affair of substantive law
which should not be equated with the
procedural rule on the discharge of
particeps criminis. This adjective device
is based on other considerations, such
as the need for giving immunity to one
of them in order that not all shall
escape, and the judicial experience that
the candid admission of an accused
regarding his participation is a guaranty
that he will testify truthfully. For those
reasons, the Rules provide for certain
qualifying criteria which, again, are
based on judicial experience distilled
into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds,
that the other requisites for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness are
present and should have been favorably
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative
eyewitness to the actual commission of the
falsification charged in the criminal cases
pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of
establishing the guilt of the two other co-
respondents who steadfastly deny the charge
and stoutly protest their innocence. There is
thus no other direct evidence available for the
prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose
discharge is sought precisely for that purpose.
Said respondent has indicated his conformity
thereto and has, for the purposes required by
the Rules, detailed the substance of his
projected testimony in his Affidavit of
Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated
on its material points by reputable witnesses,
identified in the basic petition with a digest of
their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge
Ciriaco C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial
Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio,
private complainant who initiated the criminal
cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto
Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in
the resolution asking their Provincial Governor
to file the appropriate case against respondent
Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained
the certification of non-arraignment from Judge
Ariño.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not
appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this
respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the
Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that
he be allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule
that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution
may propose but it is for the trial court, in the
exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the
merits of the proposal and make the
corresponding disposition. It must be
emphasized, however, that such discretion
should have been exercised, and the disposition
taken on a holistic view of all the facts and
issues herein discussed, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent
Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second
Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
anticlimactic Manifestation and
Comment 38 dated June 14, 1995, as required by
this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994,
the chairman and new members
thereof 39 declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of
December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994
upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution
are based, was penned by Associate
Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and
Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved
had been already discussed and passed
upon by the Second Division in the
aforesaid Resolution, however, after
going over the arguments submitted by
the Solicitor-General and re-assessing
Our position on the matter, We
respectfully beg leave of the Honorable
Supreme Court to manifest that We are
amenable to setting aside the
questioned Resolutions and to grant the
prosecution's motion to discharge
accused Generoso Sansaet as state
 witness, upon authority of the
Honorable Supreme Court for the
issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from
notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is

hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged
resolutions and ORDERING that the present
reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be
allowed and given due course by respondent
Sandiganbayan.
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992)
[G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992.]
NELLY LIM, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO, as
Presiding Judge of RTC-Rosales, Pangasinan,
Branch 53, and JUAN SIM, Respondents
This petition brings into focus the rule on the
confidentiality of the physician-patient
relationship. Petitioner urges this Court to strike
down as being violative thereof the resolution of
public respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 16991 denying due course to a petition to
annul the order of the trial court allowing a
Psychiatrist of the National Mental Hospital to
testify as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.
The parties are in agreement as to the following
facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully
married to each other.
On 25 November 1987, private respondent filed
with Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pangasinan a petition for annulment of
such marriage on the ground that petitioner has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness
called schizophrenia "before, during and after
the marriage and until the present." After the
issues were joined and the pre-trial was
terminated, trial on the merits ensued. Private
respondent presented three (3) witnesses
before taking the witness stand himself to testify
on his own behalf. On 11 January 1989, private
respondent’s counsel announced that he would
present as his next witness the Chief of the
Female Services of the National Mental Hospital,
Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who
specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel forthwith
orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum requiring Dr. Acampado to testify
on 25 January 1989. Petitioner’s counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the
testimony sought to be elicited from the witness
is privileged since the latter had examined the
petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia. Over such opposition, the
subpoena was issued on 12 January
1989.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On 24 January 1989, petitioner’s counsel filed an
urgent omnibus motion to quash the subpoena
and suspend the proceedings pending resolution
of the motion.
Before Dr. Acampado took the witness stand on
25 January 1989, the court heard this urgent
motion. Movant argued that having seen and
examined the petitioner in a professional
capacity, Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying
under the rule on the confidentiality of a
physician-patient relationship. Counsel for
private respondent contended, however, that Dr.
Acampado would be presented as an expert
witness and would not testify on any
information acquired while attending to the
petitioner in a professional capacity. The trial
court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion
and allowed the witness to testify. Dr. Acampado
thus took the witness stand, was qualified by
counsel for private respondent as an expert
witness and was asked hypothetical questions
related to her field of expertise. She neither
revealed the illness she examined and treated
the petitioner for nor disclosed the results of her
examination and the medicines she had
prescribed.
Since petitioner’s counsel insisted that the
ruling of the court on the motion be reduced to
writing, respondent Judge issued the following
Order on the same date:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In his omnibus motion filed with the Court only
yesterday, January 24, 1989, petitioner seeks to
prevent Dr. Lydia Acampado from testifying
because she saw and examined respondent
Nelly Lim in her professional capacity perforce
her testimony is covered by the privileged (sic)
communication rule.
Petitioner contends that Dr. Acampado is being
presented as an expert witness and that she will
not testify on any information she acquired in
(sic) attending to Nelly Lim in her professional
capacity.
Based on the foregoing manifestation of counsel
for petitioner, the Court denied the respondent’s
motion and forthwith allowed Dr. Acampado to
testify. However, the Court advised counsel for
respondent to interpose his objection once it
becomes apparent that the testimony sought to
be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule.
On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered
routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an
expert in psychiatry; she was asked to render an
opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are
stelazine tablets applied to; she was asked to
render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical facts
respecting certain behaviours of a person; and
finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly
Lim but she never revealed what illness she
examined and treated her (sic); nor (sic) the
result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic)
the medicines she prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the omnibus motion dated
January 19, 1989 is hereby DENIED." 1
On 3 March 1989, petitioner filed with the
public respondent Court of Appeals a petition 2
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed therein
as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16991, to annul the aforesaid
order of respondent Judge on the ground that
the same was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and
to prohibit him from proceeding with the
reception of Dr. Acampado’s
testimony.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On 18 September 1989, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a resolution 3 denying due course
to the petition on the ground that "the petitioner
failed in establishing the confidential nature of
the testimony given by or obtained from Dr.
Acampado when she testified on January 25,
1989." Hence, the respondent Judge committed
no grave abuse of discretion. In support thereof,
the respondent Court discussed the conditions
which would render as inadmissible testimonial
evidence between a physician and his patient
under paragraph (c), Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court and made the following
findings:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The present suit is a civil case for annulment of
marriage and the person whose testimony is
sought to be stopped as a privileged
communication is a physician, who was
summoned by the patient in her professional
capacity for curative remedy or treatment. The
divergence in views is whether the information
given by the physician in her testimony in open
court on January 25, 1989 was a privileged
communication. We are of the opinion that they
do not fall within the realm of a privileged
communication because the information were
(sic) not obtained from the patient while
attending her in her professional capacity and
neither were (sic) the information necessary to
enable the physician to prescribe or give
treatment to the patient Nelly Lim. And neither
does the information obtained from the
physician tend to blacken the character of the
patient or bring disgrace to her or invite
reproach. Dr. Acampado is a Medical Specialist II
and in-charge (sic) of the Female Service of the
National Center for Mental Health a fellow of the
Philippine Psychiatrist Association and a
Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatrists. She was summoned to testify as an
expert witness and not as an attending
physician of petitioner.
After a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr.
Acampado’s testimony, We find no declaration
that touched (sic) or disclosed any information
which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly
Lim, during the period she attended her patient
in a professional capacity. Although she testified
that she examined and interviewed the patient,
she did not disclose anything she obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and
treatment of her patient. Given a set of facts and
asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado
rendered an opinion regarding the history and
behaviour of the fictitious character in the
hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer
and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained
from attending the (sic) patient. A physician is
not disqualified to testify as an expert
concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such
patient and make answer solely on facts related
in (sic) the hypothetical question. (Butler v.
Role, 242 Pac. 436; Supreme Court of Arizona
Jan. 7, 1926). Expert testimony of a physician
based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause
of illness of a person whom he has attended is
not privileged, provided the physician does not
give testimony tending to disclose confidential
information related to him in his professional
capacity while attending to the patient. (Crago v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 98 NW 354, see Jones on
Evidence, Vol. 3, p. 843, 3rd Ed.).
The rule on privilege (sic) communication in the
relation of physician and patient proceeds from
the fundamental assumption that the
communication to deserve protection must be
confidential in their origin. Confidentiality is not
to be blindly implied from the mere relation of
physician and patient. It might be implied
according to circumstances of each case, taking
into consideration the nature of the ailment and
the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of
the privilege has the burden of establishing in
each instance all the facts necessary to create
the privilege, including the confidential nature
of the information given." 4
Her motion to reconsider the resolution having
been denied, petitioner took this recourse under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In her view, the
respondent Court of Appeals "seriously erred"
:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
 "I.
. . . in not finding that all the essential elements
of the rule on physician-patient privileged
communication under Section 21, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court (Section 24, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence) exist in the case at
bar.
II.
. . . in believing that Dr. Acampado ‘was
summoned as an expert witness and not as an
attending physician of petitioner.’
III.
. . . in concluding that Dr. Acampado made ‘no
declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any
information which she has acquired from her
patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she
attended her patient in a professional capacity.’
IV.
. . . in declaring that ‘the petitioner failed in
establishing the confidential nature of the
testimony given by or obtained from Dr.
Acampado.’" 5
We gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda 6 after the private respondent filed
his Comment 7 and the petitioner submitted her
reply 8 thereto. The parties subsequently filed
their separate Memoranda.
The petition is devoid of any merit. Respondent
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
in its challenged resolution.
The law in point is paragraph (c), Section 24 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. — The following
persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x is made to the physician’s testimony. 13
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined
as to any advice or treatment given by him or
any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional
capacity, which information was necessary to
enable him to act in that capacity, and which
would blacken the reputation of the
patient." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
This is a reproduction of paragraph (c), Section
21, Rule 130 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
with two (2) modifications, namely: (a) the
inclusion of the phrase "advice or treatment
given by him," and (b) substitution of the word
reputation for the word character. Said Section
21 in turn is a reproduction of paragraph (f),
Section 26, Rule 123 of the 1940 Rules of Court
with a modification consisting in the change of
the phrase "which would tend to blacken" in the
latter to "would blacken." 9 Verily, these
changes affected the meaning of the provision.
Under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was sufficient
if the information would tend to blacken the
character of the patient. In the 1964 Rules of
Court, a stricter requirement was imposed; it
was imperative that the information would
blacken such character. With the advent of the
Revised Rules on Evidence on 1 July 1989, the
rule was relaxed once more by the substitution
of the word character with the word reputation.
There is a distinction between these two
concepts." ‘Character’ is what a man is, and
‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what
people say he is.’Character’ depends on
attributes possessed, and ‘reputation’ on
attributes which others believe one to possess.
The former signifies reality and the latter
merely what is accepted to be reality at
present." 10
This rule on the physician-patient privilege is
intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the
physician of all facts, circumstances and
symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and
publication on the witness stand, to the end that
the physician may form a correct opinion, and
be enabled safely and efficaciously to treat his
patient. 11 It rests in public policy and is for the
general interest of the community. 12
Since the object of the privilege is to protect the
patient, it may be waived if no timely objection
In order that the privilege may be successfully
claimed, the following requisites must
concur:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is
claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while
he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him
to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if
disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient." 14
These requisites conform with the four (4)
fundamental conditions necessary for the
establishment of a privilege against the
disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The communications must originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion
of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by
the disclosure of the communications must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation." 15
The physician may be considered to be acting in
his professional capacity when he attends to the
patient for curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would
have been made to the physician to enable him
"safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. 16 It is to be
emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the
communication that is privileged. The mere fact
of making a communication, as well as the date
of a consultation and the number of
consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated
is not stated." 17
One who claims this privilege must prove the
presence of these aforementioned requisites. 18
Our careful evaluation of the submitted
pleadings leads Us to no other course of action
but to agree with the respondent Court’s
observation that the petitioner failed to
discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr.
Acampado was presented and qualified as an
expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, she did not disclose anything obtained
in the course of her examination, interview and
treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts
and conditions alleged in the hypothetical
problem did not refer to and had no bearing on
whatever information or findings the doctor
obtained while attending to the patient. There is,
as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s
answers to the questions propounded to her
relating to the hypothetical problem were
influenced by the information obtained from the
petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion
excluded whatever information or knowledge
she had about the petitioner which was acquired
by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness,
her testimony before the trial court cannot then
be excluded. The rule on this point is
summarized as follows:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
"The predominating view, with some scant
authority otherwise, is that the statutory
physician-patient privilege, though duly
claimed, is not violated by permitting a
physician to give expert opinion testimony in
response to a strictly hypothetical question in a
lawsuit involving the physical mental condition
of a patient whom he has attended
professionally, where his opinion is based
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal
professional knowledge he may have concerning
such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the
physician-patient privilege where it is asserted
in such a case, the physician must base his
opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in
the question, excluding from consideration his
personal knowledge of the patient acquired
through the physician and patient relationship.
If he cannot or does not exclude from
consideration his personal professional
knowledge of the patient’s condition he should
not be permitted to testify as to his expert
opinion." 19
Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s
testimony that the petitioner was never
interviewed alone. Said interviews were always
conducted in the presence of a third party,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you
interview?
A I interviewed the husband first, then the
father and after having the history, I interviewed
the patient, Nelly.
Q How many times did Juan Sim and Nelly Lim
go to your office?
A Now, the two (2) of them came three (3)
times. As I have stated before, once in the month
of April of 1987 and two (2) times for the month
of June 1987, and after that, since July of 1987, it
was the father of Nelly, Dr. Lim, who was
bringing Nelly to me until November of 1987.
Q Now, Dr. Lim is a fellow physician?
A Yes, I understand.
Q Was there anything that he told you when he
visited with you in a clinic?
A I would say that there was none. Even if I
asked information about Nelly, I could not get
anything from Dr. Lim.
Q Now, when Dr. Lim and his daughter went to
your clinic, was there any doctor who was also
present during that interview?
A No, sir, I don’t remember any." 20
There is authority to the effect that information
elicited during consultation with a physician in
the presence of third parties removes such
information from the mantle of the
privilege:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Some courts have held that the casual presence
of a third person destroys the confidential
nature of the communication between doctor
and patient and thus destroys the privilege, and
that under such circumstances the doctor may
testify. Other courts have reached a contrary
result." 21
Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping
claim — that" (T)he information given by Dr.
Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic)
reproach to petitioner by falsely making it
appear in the eyes of the trial court and the
public that the latter was suffering from a
mental disturbance called schizophrenia —
which caused, and continues to cause,
irreparable injury to the name and reputation of
petitioner and her family," 22 — which is based
on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete
was offered to show that indeed, the
information obtained from Dr. Acampado would
blacken the former’s "character" (or
"reputation"). Dr. Acampado never disclosed
any information obtained from the petitioner
regarding the latter’s ailment and the treatment
recommended therefor.chanrobles.com : virtual
law library
Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the
petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr.
Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the
witness was to testify, the petitioner makes no
claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel
had objected to any question asked of the
witness on the ground that it elicited an answer
that would violate the privilege, despite the trial
court’s advise that said counsel may interpose
his objection to the testimony "once it becomes
apparent that the testimony, sought to be
elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule." The particular portions of
the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr.
Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition 23
and Memorandum, 24 and in the private
respondent’s Memorandum, 25 do not at all
show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.
Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to
a waiver thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994)
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN,
JR., respondents.
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is
being presented in evidence before the trial
court in a petition for annulment of marriage
grounded on psychological incapacity. The
witness testifying on the report is the husband
who initiated the annulment proceedings, not
the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz
Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on
privileged communication between physician
and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from
disclosing the contents of the report. After
failing to convince the trial court and the
appellate court, she is now before us on a
petition for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz
Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de
Paul Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union
produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl
Wilhelm and Alexandra. Their blessings
notwithstanding, the relationship between the
couple developed into a stormy one. In 1971,
Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing
purportedly in an effort to ease the marital
strain. The effort however proved futile. In
1973, they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the
confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz
prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr.,
and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978,
presenting the report among others, he obtained
a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila
nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on
the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent
at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On
10 July 1979, the decree was confirmed and
pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for
the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz
before the trial court. 3 In his petition, he cited
the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as
"either unfounded or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the
witness stand and tried to testify on the
contents of the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the
ground that it violated the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
expressing her "continuing objection" to any
evidence, oral or documentary, "that would
thwart the physician-patient privileged
communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted
a Statement for the Record asserting among
others that "there is no factual or legal basis
whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their
marriage, such ground being completely false,
fabricated and merely an afterthought." 6 Before
leaving for Spain where she has since resided
after their separation, Ma. Paz also authorized
and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit
and pursue her counterclaim even during her
absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz'
motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and
afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz'
Statement for the Record. 8
On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order
admitting the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling that —
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the
objection and to sustain the Opposition
to the respondent's Motion; first,
because the very issue in this case is
whether or not the respondent had
been suffering from psychological
incapacity; and secondly, when the said
psychiatric report was referred to in the
complaint, the respondent did not
object thereto on the ground of the
supposed privileged communication
between patient and physician. What
was raised by the respondent was that
the said psychiatric report was
irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the
interest of justice and for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent as
alleged in the petition was suffering
 from psychological incapacity, the said
psychiatric report is very material and
may be testified to by petitioner (Edgar
Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the
part of the respondent to dispute the
said report or to cross-examination first
the petitioner and later the psychiatrist
who prepared the same if the latter will
be presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the
Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991,
and directed that the Statement for the Record
filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
her counsel was likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to
respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
promulgated 30 October 1992, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On
5 February 1993, the motion to reconsider the
dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation
and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric
report and prays for the admission of her
Statement for the Record to form part of the
records of the case. She argues that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of
Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in
attending to a patient in a professional capacity,
"WITH MORE REASON should be third person
(like respondent-husband in this particular
instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and
patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician
which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and privileged relation with a
patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the
prohibition is —
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and
confidential disclosure by a patient to
his physician of all facts, circumstances
and symptoms, untrammeled by
apprehension of their subsequent and
enforced disclosure and publication on
the witness stand, to the end that the
physician may form a correct opinion,
and be enabled safely and efficaciously
to treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to
testify on the contents of the psychiatric
evaluation report "will set a very bad and
dangerous precedent because it abets
circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving
the sanctity, security and confidence to the
relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her
thesis is that what cannot be done directly
should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the
Record simply reiterates under oath what she
asserted in her Answer, which she failed to
verify as she had already left for Spain when her
Answer was filed. She maintains that her
"Statement for the Record is a plain and simple
pleading and is not as it has never been intended
to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence,
there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to
expunge it from the records.
Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however
contends that "the rules are very explicit: the
prohibition applies only to a physician. Thus . . .
the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable
to the case at bar where the person sought to be
barred from testifying on the privileged
communication is the husband and not the
physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according
to him, the Rules sanction his testimony
considering that a husband may testify against
his wife in a civil case filed by one against the
other.
Besides, private respondent submits that
privileged communication may be waived by the
person entitled thereto, and this petitioner
expressly did when she gave her unconditional
consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation
report when it was presented to the Tribunal
Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into
account among others in deciding the case and
declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also
gave her implied consent when she failed to
specifically object to the admissibility of the
report in her Answer where she merely
described the evaluation report as "either
unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to
interpose a timely objection at the earliest
opportunity to the evidence presented on
privileged matters may be construed as an
implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record
filed by petitioner, private respondent posits
that this in reality is an amendment of her
Answer and thus should comply with pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court, hence, its
exclusion from the records for failure to comply
with the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the
privileged nature of the communication
between physician and patient, as well as the
reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed,
statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to
inspire confidence in the patient and encourage
him to make a full disclosure to his physician of
his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently,
this prevents the physician from making public
information that will result in humiliation,
embarrassment, or disgrace to the
patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured
with the knowledge that the law recognizes the
communication as confidential, and guards
against the possibility of his feelings being
shocked or his reputation tarnished by their
subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient
privilege creates a zone of privacy, intended to
preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed,
certain types of information communicated in
the context of the physician-patient relationship
fall within the constitutionally protected zone of
privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in
keeping his mental health records
confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is founded
upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial
behavior may be prevented by encouraging
those in need of treatment for emotional
problems to secure the services of a
psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is
however misplaced. Lim v. Court of
Appeals 22 clearly lays down the requisites in
order that the privilege may be successfully
invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil
case; (b) the person against whom the privilege
is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person
acquired the information while he was attending
to the patient in his professional capacity; (d)
the information was necessary to enable him to
act in that capacity; and, (e) the information was
confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to
testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not
fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can
his testimony be considered a circumvention of
the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the
physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.
Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in
objecting to the testimony of private respondent
on the ground that it was privileged. In his
Manifestation before the trial court dated 10
May 1991, he invoked the rule on privileged
communications but never questioned the
testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For,
in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his
right to make such objection and, consequently,
the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial
to merit the full attention of this Court. The
allegations contained in the Statement for the
Records are but refutations of private
respondent's declarations which may be denied
or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the
petition for annulment. Three years have
already lapsed and private respondent herein,
as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to
conclude his testimony thereat. We thus enjoin
the trial judge and the parties' respective
counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving
the main action, and avoid any and all
stratagems that may further delay this case. If all
lawyers are allowed to appeal every perceived
indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and
include in their appeals depthless issues, there
will be no end to litigations, and the docket of
appellate courts will forever be clogged with
inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should
exercise prudence in appealing lower court
rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not
to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is
no point in unreasonably delaying the resolution
of the petition and prolonging the agony of the
wedded couple who after coming out from a
storm still have the right to a renewed blissful
life either alone or in the company of each
other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.