A.M. No.
2697 April 19, 1991 Finally, the complainant averred that the respondent's second wife, Norma O.
ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CIPRIANO A. TAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos instituted on November 20, 1984 these
disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan for alleged
gross misconduct.
Specifically, the complainant who was then Acting Director of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance under the Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian
Reform, charged the respondent with having committed acts of immorality,
falsification, and bigamy.
In the said complaint, Atty. Santos stated that the respondent, while
employed as Trial Attorney IV, with the Judicial Cases Division under the
aforesaid Department, maintained amorous relationship with a married clerk,
a certain Norma O. Pihid (nee Olea), who was then directly under him.
Eventually, the respondent got married to Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981
before the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, purportedly in an
attempt to cover up their illicit relations.1
The complainant, moreover, alleged that the respondent falsified his
marriage contract with Norma O. Pihid by deliberately misrepresenting
himself as single, thus, deceiving the said mayor into solemnizing the said
marriage.2In the information sheet, however, prepared and filed by the
respondent prior to his employment, he clearly stated therein that he was
married to one Emilia Benito Tan and had begotten eight (8) children with the
latter.3
Consequently, the complainant likewise charged the respondent with bigamy
since it appears from the records of the Local Civil Registrar that he had
previously contracted marriage with the said Emilia A. Benito on January 6,
1941. The complainant asserted that the said marriage continued to be valid
and binding between the said contracting parties when the respondent
entered into a subsequent manage with Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981.4
Pihid, gave birth to a child by the respondent on November 21, 1981 at the
Children's Medical Center in Quezon City, as evidenced by the birth
certificate of the said child indicating his name to be Noel Olea Tan.5
On January 9, 1985, the Court acting on the said complaint for disbarment
required the respondent to submit his Answer.
The respondent in an Answer dated February 28, 1985, denied having
married Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 and having fathered a child by the
name of Noel Olea Tan, although he admitted being married to Emilia A.
Benito.6
As regards the charges of bigamy and falsification of official documents, the
respondent argued that the same were issues that were properly the subject
of a criminal case filed by the complainant against him which was pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, and therefore
raised a prejudicial question in the present controversy.7
Anent the charge of maintaining amorous relationship with Norma O. Pihid,
the respondent contended that the same charge had been previously
resolved in an Order dated October 1, 1982 issued by the Minister (now
Secretary) of the Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform. In the said
order, the allegation of immorality which was originally the content of an
anonymous letter-complaint was dismissed for being devoid of merit.
The respondent, in turn, suggested that the real and actual motive behind the
said complaint was traceable to the strong resentment harbored by the
complainant against the former whose services as Chief Trial Attorney of the
said Ministry (now Department) was extended even beyond his retirement
age at the request of the then Minister (now Secretary) Conrado F. Estrella.
The respondent contended that he and the complainant did not see eye to
eye with respect to the handling and prosecution of agrarian cases.8
By way of a counter-complaint, the respondent charged the complainant with
acts unbecoming of a lawyer and a member of the Philippine Bar such as
obtaining and utilizing confidential documents without the necessary
authorization, introducing a falsified document as evidence in a court
proceeding, and executing an affidavit-complaint containing false statements.
The respondent further assailed the complainant for filing the said complaint
based on inadmissible and unfounded charges.9
On March 25, 1985, the Court resolved to refer the said complaint to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation submitted by the Solicitor General on
February 23, 1990, in part, states:
xxx xxx xxx
A thorough review of the record of the case duly heard before the
Office of the Solicitor General in several protracted hearings, reveals
the existence of a ground for disbarment against respondent.
Aside from claiming that the documents presented by complainant
were allegedly unauthenticated, hearsay, self-serving, and his
defense of alibi at the time of the marriage on April 27, 1981,
respondent has miserably failed in refuting the same and at the same
time presenting strong evidence to convince the Solicitor General of
the falsity of the charges against him.
On April 27, 1981 respondent claims that he was attending a
government case at the then CFI of Caloocan City (Exh. 9-A, rec.)
while his alleged second wife was at the Court of Appeals on official
business (Exhs. 6 & 11 A, rec.).
There are serious doubts in entertaining the aforesaid defense.
A glance at the daily time records (Exhs. 9-A and 11-A, rec.) reveals
that both entries of respondent and Norma Olea were indicated on
the line covering April 26, 1981; secondly, penmanship of the alleged
entries for April 27, 1981 are the same; thirdly, the indicated time in's
of respondent and Norma Olea were the same, i.e., 8:01 a.m.;
fourthly, probability that they were together is high because they were
both out of the office.
Assuming, arguendo, respondent's alibi that they were married in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, it was highly probable and possible for both to
proceed to Meycauayan, Bulacan on April 27, 1981 since the places
where they were allegedly then is [sic] not impossibly far from
Meycauayan Bulacan.
Respondent even failed to specify the alleged government case he
was attending at the CFI of Caloocan either by mentioning the title of
the case or by presenting other evidence aside from his self-serving
testimony.
With respect to the Birth Certificate (Exh. A) of respondent's alleged
son, the former has not made a categorical denial that Noel Olea Tan
is NOT his son. He only argues that the birth certificate is not
authentic. Evidence for complainant, however, shows that Exhibit A-5
was presented to show the authenticity of the Birth Certificate
contrary to respondent's claim (pls. see Certification dated July 24,
1985 found at the back of the Birth Certificate). Likewise, respondent
has not made any categorical denial of his amorous relationship with
Norma Olea despite the existence of his first marriage with Emilia
Benito Tan.
For immorality to be a ground for disbarment, it must be so gross,
e.g., it is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree
(Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 [1975]).
The circumstances of the case definitely has put respondent's moral
character in doubt despite non-conviction of the criminal case for
bigamy against respondent. The reputation of a lawyer must be such
that he be of good moral character during the continuance of his
practice and the exercise of the privilege.
The findings are clear and convincing that respondent entered into a
second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage and that
he begot a child with the second woman. Definitely, such factual
findings have put serious doubt on respondent's moral character.
Respondent's main defense of alibi is rather too weak a reason that
he did not engage in an immoral act. As earlier said, respondent has
neither categorically denied that Norma Olea is his wife nor Noel Olea
Tan is his son with Norma.
It appears, however, that respondent has retired from government
service on March 27, 1983. He was sixty-five (65) years old on
September 16, 1982 (Exh. 13, rec.), and therefore, e. the time of the
rendition of this report, respondent is now seventy two (72) years old.
Considering that respondent has retired and is in the twilight of his
life, disbarment would be too harsh a penalty to impose on
respondent. Suspension from the practice of law would be proper for
humanitarian reasons if respondent is still actively engaged in
practice.
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is respectfully SO ORDERED.
recommended that respondent be adjudged guilty of immoral
conduct, unbecoming of a lawyer, and accordingly impose the penalty
of one (1) year suspension from the active practice of law.10

We agree with the said findings of the Solicitor General including his
favorable and compassionate consideration of the advanced age of the
respondent. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

Whatever the alleged motives of the complainant are, the respondent has
failed to controvert and refute the charges made by the former. Even granting
arguendo that the complainant was not well-motivated in instituting these
disbarment proceedings, the same does not exculpate him from any liability
resulting from his grossly immoral conduct.

As regards the respondent's counter-complaint, the Solicitor General in

compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 1, 1990, submitted his
Supplemental Report and Recommendation on November 22, 1990, and
found that the charges against the complainant for acts unbecoming a
member of the Philippine Bar were all unsubstantiated. We agree with his
findings and recommendation on this regard which state:

No misconduct has been committed by Atty. Santos contrary to Atty.

Tan's accusations which will warrant disciplinary action.1âwphi1 If at
all, Atty. Tan's charges were merely in defense of the charges against
him (immorality) which the Solicitor General has found to be
supported by the evidence. (cf.: Report and Recommendation dated
February 23, 1990, pp. 46-52, Records-Adm. Cases)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, it is respectfully

recommended that Atty. Tan's counter-complaint against Atty. Santos
be DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated.11

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan guilty of immoral

conduct in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the active practice of law for a period of one (1) year. The
counter-complaint against complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the respondent and
copies thereof furnished to all courts.

Adm. Case No. 481 February 28, 1969
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDING AGAINST ARTURO P. LOPEZ.
VIRGINIA C. ALMIREZ assisted by her father, AGAPITO
ALMIREZ complainants,
vs.
ARTURO P. LOPEZ, respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Respondent Arturo P. Lopez is sought to be disbarred upon the ground of
immorality. Complainant Virginia C. Almirez, assisted by her father Agapito
Almirez, charges him with having succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her, under promise of marriage, which he failed and refused to fulfill, despite
a child begotten in consequence thereof.
In his answer, respondent denied having ever had or solicited any sexual
relation with the complainant, but affirmed that they had agreed to be married
as soon as he became financially stable; that he could not carry out his part
of the agreement having discovered, on April 4, 1961, that complainant was
pregnant by another man; and that she filed the present charges out of spite
for him, in view of his refusal to marry her.
Upon investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, to whom the matter
was referred, the latter submitted his report finding respondent guilty as
charged, and then filed the corresponding complaint for his disbarment.
In his answer thereto, respondent reiterated, in effect, the allegations and
defenses made and set up in his previous answer. He, moreover, averred
that, while the matter was being investigated in the Office of the Solicitor
General, complainant had filed an affidavit stating that he (respondent) is not
the father of her child and a motion withdrawing her complaint.
Respondent having, moreover, expressed the wish to introduce additional
evidence, the Court dated its Legal Officer-Investigator for the reception
thereof, after which the latter submitted his report concurring in the findings
of the Solicitor General, although recommending merely the suspension of
respondent herein. After furnishing him with a copy of this report, the case
was set for hearing, at which a representative of the Solicitor General and
counsel for respondent appeared and were given a period to file their
respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The record shows that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1957
and has been engaged in the practice of law in Manila. After meeting the
complainant then about 23 years of age — in Mauban, Quezon — of which
their families are residents — sometime in December, 1958, respondent
courted her by correspondence. Presently, they became sweethearts.
Complainant having come to Manila in November, 1960 and operated therein
a store, in partnership with others, respondent used to visit her. Although he
had told the complainant, as early as May 1960, of his intent to marry her, it
was understood that the wedding would take place upon consummation of a
given deal in which he expected to make a big amount of money. From
November, 1960 to April, 1961, they had carnal knowledge of each other,
several times, in various hotels in Manila, particularly the Palo Alto Hotel, the
Springfield Hotel, and the Shanghai Hotel. On December 31, 1960,
complainant informed respondent that her menstruation was overdue,
whereupon he caused her to be examined by a lady physician, who found
that she was in the family way. Thereupon, he gave her some pills, to be
taken three (3) times a day, for the alleged purpose of hastening the flow of
her menstruation. Then, he called her up, day and night, to inquire about her
menses and, when the same did not eventually come, he urged her to see
another lady doctor, who could perform an abortion. Complainant was averse
thereto, but, respondent was so insistent that she went to the clinic of said
physician. The operation was not performed, however, for neither the latter
nor complainant were agreeable thereto. On August 22, 1961, complainant
gave birth to a baby boy, Francisco Arnold, at the Maternity and Children's
Hospital in Manila.
Prior thereto, or late in February, 1961, their respective applications for a
marriage license were filed and their marriage license was issued on March
13, but, the wedding, scheduled for March 18, 1961, did not take place,
owing to the absence of the Mayor who was to solemnize it. On April 6, 1961,
complainant learned, from her sister-in-law, that respondent had confided to
the latter his unwillingness to marry her (complainant). When, soon
thereafter, complainant asked him for his reason therefor, respondent blamed
her for refusing to undergo an abortion. Thereupon, or on April 18, 1961, she
filed the complaint herein.
It further appears that on September 25, 1962, while this case was pending
in the Office of the Solicitor General a motion signed by the complainant,
withdrawing her complaint, was filed with said office. The reason given was
that the complaint was "a result of serious misunderstanding" and had been
filed "in the heat of anger" and that it would be unjustified to proceed further
on account of complainant's belief in his innocence. This motion was,
however, withdrawn by her, on November 25, 1963, for the reason that
respondent had secured her signature thereto upon the assurance that he
would thereupon marry her and that he did not only fail to do so, but, also,
married another woman. In fact, respondent and one Evelyn Orense were
married in January, 1963.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have us believe that complainant
had freely and voluntarily signed her aforesaid motion to withdraw her
complaint. In fact, he added, she made the affidavit, Exhibit 34, stating that
he is not the father of her child. In rebuttal, complainant testified, however,
that she signed said motion and a blank sheet of paper, which is now the
affidavit Exhibit 34, he having convinced her that they would be married soon
thereafter.lawphi1.nêt
He, likewise, tried to prove, through his testimony that it was complainant
who asked him to take her nightclubbing in Manila, which he did; that it was
she who asked him, at the Bayside Nightclub, on December 31, 1960, to
marry her; that she reiterated this request in January, 1961, for fear that her
father may call her back to Mauban; that she having brought up the same
subject in February, 1961, they signed the necessary applications late in
February, 1961, and got the corresponding marriage license sometime later,
although the wedding, scheduled for March 18, had to be postponed
indefinitely because of the absence of the officer, who was to solemnize it;
that after a drinking spree in Manila, in the evening of April 4, 1961, he felt it
would be unwise for him to drive his car home to Quezon City, in view of
which he decided to spend the night at the Shanghai Hotel; that while there,
he remembered having an appointment with complainant, whom he,
accordingly, called by telephone to apologize to her and informed her of his
condition and whereabouts; that soon later, complainant arrived
unexpectedly at the hotel and asked permission to sleep with him there,
stating that she had quarreled with her sister-in-law; that after switching off
the light and undressing herself, complainant started massaging his head, for
he had a slight headache; that as complainant kissed him, he noticed that
she was pregnant and told her so; that after saying that she merely had a
stomach ache, complainant eventually confessed that another man had
abused her; that angered by this revelation, respondent dressed up and
prepared to step out, but, before he left the hotel, she asked his forgiveness
and promised to behave thereafter; that she went to his office, the next day,
but he refused to talk to her; that as she insisted upon talking with him
privately, they went to an ice cream parlor where she begged him to marry
her and save her honor, suggesting that their marriage would be in name
only and that they need not live together, if he did not want to; that
complainant even said that her father 1 would give P5,000 if he married her,
but he rejected the offer and volunteered to prosecute the man responsible
for her condition, if she would identify him; and that, when respondent still
refused to marry her, complainant threatened to bring disbarment
proceedings against him.
Upon a review of the record, we agree with the solicitor, who first
investigated this case, and the Legal Officer-Investigator, before whom
additional evidence were introduced, that respondent's version is unworthy of
credence. Indeed, despite the averments in his answers to the effect that he
had never solicited or had carnal relations with the complainant, his very
testimony shows that they had met in a hotel room under conditions attesting
to a condition of intimacy clearly revealing past extra-marital relations
between them. Then, too, respondent's promise to marry complainant has
been, not only admitted by him, but, also, bolstered up by their applications
for a marriage license and the marriage license actually secured by them.
The breach of such promise on his part is thus patent. What is more, when
her pregnancy was confirmed by a physician, respondent firstly persuaded
the complainant to take some pills for the avowed purpose of hastening the
flow of her "menstruation", and, eventually, urged her to have an abortion, to
which she did not agree. Worse still, when this case was pending in the office
of the Solicitor General, respondent prevailed upon her to sign a motion
withdrawing her complaint, under the false allegation that he is innocent of
the charges preferred against him, as well as to sign a blank sheet of paper
— which now appears to be her aforementioned affidavit Exhibit 34 under —
promise to thereupon marry her, without the slightest intention to keep it,
because, instead he married another woman soon later.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arturo P. Lopez is hereby found guilty of gross
immoral conduct rendering him unfit to continue a member of the Bar, 2 for
which reason he is hereby barred from the practice of law, and his name
ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys. It is so ordered.

A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
SANTA PANGAN, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite
respondent Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on
September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative
case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for
postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's allegations
that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No.
35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case
is one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila."
Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before
said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had
a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is
"Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen
Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of
"Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with
truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe
the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a
case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the
facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to deception or
permits his client to do so." 2
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the
name by which he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos -
respondent in effect resorted to deception. The demonstrated lack of candor
in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration in
this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is
severely REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act
may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law.
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the
Investigator of this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to
terminate it as soon as possible. The request of complainant to appear in the
afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is
hereby granted.
SO ORDERED

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the

"Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is
the official record containing the names and signatures of those who are
authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other
than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no
falsehood". As an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable
obligations of "truthfulness, candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and
frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage. This
has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining
the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead
of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of
gross immorality.
Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University
(Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar,
then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several
times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would
not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that
when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas,
had her undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant
as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special
defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of
the Southwestern University, the Chairman of
the Board of which was respondent Jose B.
Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject
which prompted her to approach respondent in
the latter's house who assured her that she
would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33,
tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed
(p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told
her that she should go with him to Manila,
otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects
(pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and
complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A")
for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport,
they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the
Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three
days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June
6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they
dined at a Spanish restaurant at San
Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three
hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve
o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal
knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next
morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155
& 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires
of respondent because for her, she would
sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in
her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told
respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy
because she missed her menstruation (p. 76,
tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
 10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto
(an instructor in the college of medicine) that
respondent wanted that an abortion be
performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7,
1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of
respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her
boarding house on the pretext that she would
be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn,
July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she
was given an injection and an inhalation mask
was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90,
tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and
when she woke up, an abortion had already
been performed upon her and she was weak,
bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-
91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-
40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a
man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of
the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975;
Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant,
testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-
sacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is
summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar
stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children; respondent never came to Manila
except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov.
24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime
the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24,
1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated
that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador
Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male
companions at the hotel but he did not see any
woman companion of respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the
Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the
hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn,
Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).
The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by
the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the
allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by
reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of
Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 1973-1974
because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the
defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted
by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to
prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of
complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled
to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent
that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects
and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50,
tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the
College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe
him.
 It has been established also that complainant was brought by
respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days
where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the
threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she
would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-
6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during
the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and
Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept
with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their
testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned
during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent
on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador
Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and
children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however,
are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's)
testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo,
pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both
testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated
the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then
recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a
period of not less than three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the
premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would
render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion
praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the
bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with
the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of
the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the
Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his
culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-
serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the
records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act
complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of
complainant herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel
and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any
evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal
proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he
really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to
satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued
membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high
and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA
439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough
that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he
still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity,
which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United
States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to
the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always
expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the
easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and
expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to
help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State
the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA
439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to
blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that
respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p.
47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April
18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already
elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a
three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as
a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been
suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and
academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent
reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly.
complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in
the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual
intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of
respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not
accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of
medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to
believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel
for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the
respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and
in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming
purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession
as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character.
Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon
admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification
necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and
learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court
had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify
the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of
a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married
lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re
Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college
of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to
Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she
would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 )
on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on
September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at
Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu
Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose
Recoletos College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused
to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino
stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following
month. They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in
March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her
boarding house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had
sexual congress. When Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused
his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said
that she was in love with another man and that she had a child with still
another man. Segundino remarked that even if that be the case, he did not
mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling
his acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He
continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He
sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she
and Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's
parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until
after he had passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate
preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his
love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time
and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He
was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4,
1973 in the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973
for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April
25, 1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also
attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her
lover. Segundino told her that they could not get married for lack of money.
She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see
Segundino who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there
only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had
married Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when
she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her
because she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the
assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical
treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that
he is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly
promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral
defamation and had already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his
promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He
is required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have
been filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs.
Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what
is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The
rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of
six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct
was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with
the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend
on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and
the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex
toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or
crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may
tempt a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533,
535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the
following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill,
although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child
in consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and
during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow
of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which
she did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481,
February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they
were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after
such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child
(Cabrera vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil.
768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta
vs. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar
by living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant,
and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil.
450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to
lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress
with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual
intercourse because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to
give Puno money upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno,
Administrative Case No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he
was single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life
till the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the
altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or
in death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my
life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).

(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations
for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her
husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and
begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This
case is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where
lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H.
Soberano before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent
sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters
making reference to their trysts in hotels.

On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing

and vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm
conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and
the respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with
impudicity.

According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of

her long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for
disbarment against Villanueva.

This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not
so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs.
Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA
667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case
No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).

Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the
complaint for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1856 October 28, 1983
SALVACION E. MARCAYDA, complainant,
vs.
JUSTINIANO P. NAZ, respondent.
R. G. Tansinsin for complainant.
Justiniano P. Naz in his own behalf.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a revival of the immorality charge against respondent Justiniano P.
Naz. Salvacion E. Marcayda in a handwritten letter filed in this Court on April
19, 1977 asked that Naz's oath-taking as a member of the bar (after having
flunked twice) be withheld pending negotiations for the support of his alleged
child begotten with Salvacion.
Naz in his answer of April 27, 1977 denied the paternity of the child. He
alleged that the complaint was pure harassment and blackmail. He said that
Salvacion could have filed an administrative complaint with the Department
of Education and Culture since he was employed in the Legaspi branch of
that Office but she never filed any such complaint.
Accompanying his answer was an affidavit wherein Naz requested that,
because clearance could not be given him to take the oath on April 29,
1977 due to Salvacion's complaint, he be allowed to take the oath but his
signing of the Roll of attorneys be deferred pending resolution of Salvacion's
complaint.
On the following day, April 28, 1977, Naz and Salvacion, both 47, natives of
Camalig Albay, executed in Manila a notarized agreement before lawyer
Braulio R. G. Tansinsin wherein Naz admitted that he had an affair with
Salvacion in 1964 as a result of which a boy named Rey E. Marcayda was
born on January 8, 1965, (should be March 8, 1965, as shown in Exhibit 2).
Naz was a married man. Salvacion was married to Primo Marcayda who died
of tuberculosis on July 5, 1965 (Exh. 1).
Naz in that agreement bound himself to pay Salvacion for Rey's support (1)
back support of P2,000 on or before December 25, 1977 and another P2,000
on or before December 25, 1978 and (2) P100 or its dollar equivalent in
advance within the first five days of every month, starting May, 1977 until
Rey reached the age of twenty-one.
Because of that public instrument admitting paternity and the promise to
support the adulterous child, Salvacion on that same date, April 28, 1977,
withdrew her complaint filed in this Court to withhold the oath-taking of Naz
on the ground of immorality.
The withdrawal document was also executed before Notary Tansinsin. It is
document No. 628 of his notarial book while the document of
acknowledgment and support is No. 629.
The result of these last minute maneuvers was this Court's resolution of April
28, 1977 allowing Naz to take his oath by reason of Salvacion's withdrawal of
her complaint (SBC-582). He took his oath on April 29, 1977 But Naz did not
live up to his promise to give support.
In a verified complaint dated December 23, 1977 Salvacion asked for the
reopening of the administrative case. She alleged that she withdrew the
complaint so that Naz would have a higher salary and would be in a better
position to support Rey. He is now an incumbent legal officer of Region V of
the Ministry of Education and Culture in Legaspi City, with an annual salary
of P17,724.
She testified that after Rey's birth Naz gave her forty pesos a month for six
months. After she withdrew her complaint, Naz gave her one hundred pesos
for May, 1977. As already stated, he did not comply with his commitment in
the notarial agreement of support which was the basis of the withdrawal of
the immorality complaint against him.
Naz in his comment on the complaint and in his testimony in the Solicitor
General's office declared that Rey was not his son. Rey's 1965 birth
certificate shows that he was born in wedlock to Salvacion and her husband,
Primo (Exh. 21). He alleged that he was "coerced" to sign the agreement of
support. The complaint was like "an Armalite trained on the head of the
respondent".
We hold that, as noted by the Solicitor General, Naz is not guilty of gross
immorality. He should not be disbarred because he had admitted the
paternity of Rey in a public document and agreed to support him. This
circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and scandalous. (Arciga
vs. Maniwang, Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14,1981, 106 SCRA 591).

The agreement of support was the basis of the withdrawal of the 1917
complaint against him. The eleventh-hour withdrawal paved the way for his
oath-taking. He cannot be allowed to repudiate that public document of the
ground of supposed coercion.

Respondent Naz's stand of not giving any value to that public document
shows a certain unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble
profession. It is tantamount to self stultification. His attitude is highly
censurable. He wants to make a mockery of the proceedings in this Court by
making it appear that he lied brazenly about the filiation of Rey Marcayda just
to facilitate his admission to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood.

The remedy of complainant Marcayda is a civil action for support on the

basis of the agreement of support which is irrevocably binding on Naz. She
could also file an administrative complaint against him with the Ministry of
Education and Culture which could require him to give support to the child,
Rey (See Sec. 36, Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807).

WHEREFORE, respondent Naz is severely reprimanded for his attempt to

nullify the notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation he had
admitted. A copy of this resolution should be attached to his record in the Bar
Confidant's office.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a

notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even
while he himself then as now is married.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

He should be disbarred for immorality and his brazen repudiation of a

notarial deed wherein he committed adultery with a married woman even
while he himself then as now is married.