Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share
REVOLUTIONARY KIND OF EXPROPRIATION
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. HON. SECRETARY
“In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who
blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his 11th labor. The two wrestled
mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to
resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules’ increasing amazement.
Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules
that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as
long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth.
Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air
beyond the reach of the sustaining soul, and crushed him to
death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without
whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.”
SC: However, we do not deal here with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an
ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State
from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. The expropriation before us affects all
private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention
limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is
intended for the benefit not only of a particular community
or of a small segment of the population but of the entire
Filipino nation, from all levels of our society. Its purpose
does not cover only the whole territory of this country but
goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice
of the present generation of Filipinos.
II. RA No. 3844 THE CODE OF AGRARIAN REFORMS (as
amended)
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY August 8, 1963
ABOLITION OF SHARED TENANCY
Section 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy - Agricultural
share tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be
contrary to public policy and shall be abolished: Provided, That
existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and
effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime
by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the
agricultural year when the National Land Reform Council
proclaims that all the government machineries and agencies in
that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this
Code are operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter
period or the tenant sooner exercise his option to elect the
leasehold system: Provided, further, That in order not to
jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops
covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a
separate proclamation that adequate provisions, such as the
organization of cooperatives, marketing agreements, or other
similar workable arrangements, have been made to insure
efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization
of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops:
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tenancy contract has ceased to be operative by virtue of this
Code, or where such a tenancy contract has been entered into
in violation of the provisions of this Code and is, therefore, null
and void, and the tenant continues in possession of the land for
cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold
relationship under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice
to the right of the landowner and the former tenant to enter into
any other lawful contract in relation to the land formerly under
tenancy contract, as long as in the interim the security of tenure
of the former tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as provided in this
Code, is not impaired: Provided, finally, That if a lawful leasehold
tenancy contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of this
Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom shall continue
to subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
SECURITY OF TENURE
Section 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation - The
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on
the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure
on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
GROUNDS TO EXTINGUISH
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation
- The agricultural leasehold relation established under this
Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be
served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to
succeed to the lessee, in the event of death or
permanent incapacity of the lessee.
Corderias vs. Chioco
FACTS : The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-
hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva Ecija (the farm). As tiller of the
farm, petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a Certificate
of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.
In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco who was a former
Governor of Nueva Ecija threatened to kill petitioner if he did
not leave the farm. His standing crops (corn and vegetables)
and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life, petitioner,
together with his family, left the farm.
In 1993 upon learning Chioco’s death, petitioner and his
family reestablished themselves on the farm. On March 9,
19959 petitioner filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija
a petition against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his
possession and cultivation of the farm be respected; that the
corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them
be executed; that he be awarded actual damages for the
destruction of his house, his standing crops, unrealized
harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorney’s fee and costs of
litigation. The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1572-
NNE-95.
Respondent moved to dismissed the petition, contending that
petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed under Section 3813
of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844, as amended, since the alleged
dispossession took place in 1980 but the Petition was filed
only in 1995, or beyond the statutory three-year period for
filing such claims. Petitioner filed an opposition arguing that
his tenure/tillage should be deemed uninterrupted since his
departure was due to threats made by Chioco’s henchmen;
thus, the three-year prescriptive period should not be applied
to his case.
PARAD: he PARAD dismissed the petition on the ground of
prescription. Corderias appealed to the DARAB.
DARAB: The DARAB set aside the decision of the PARAD, and:
1. Ordered Chioco to respect and maintain the peace
possession and cultivation of Corderias
2. To reimburse Corderias of the money equivalent
representing Corderias unrealized harvest from
1980-1993 ISSUE
ISSUE: Whether or not Corderias abandoned the landholding.
RULING: No. Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural
leasehold relation shall be extinguished only under any of the
following three circumstances, to wit:
(1) abandonment of the landholding without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) voluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, written notice of which shall be
served three months in advance; or
(3) absence of the persons under Section 9 to succeed
the lessee
None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular, petitioner
cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be
recalled that Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property
through threats and intimidation. His house was bulldozed
and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980
and returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’sdeath.
Two years after, or in 1995, he filed the instant Petition.
Cuderias v Chioco:
Chioco was a politician and owner of agri land, Cuderias was
a legitimate tenant. There was forcible ejectment of cuderias
from property through force and intimidation, the house was
bulldozed and the crops were destroyed. When cuderias knew
chioco died, he filed case. WON THERE WAS ABANDOMENT.
No, there was none. Defense of heirs of chioco, prescription.
(TN: 3 year prescriptive period in Section 38)
SECTION 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished
by Death or Incapacity of the Parties - In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor
within one month from such death or permanent incapacity,
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from among the following: (a) the surviving spouse; (b) the
eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next
eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of
the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such
choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:
Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails
to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the
priority shall be in accordance with the order herein
established.
GROUNDS TO DISPOSSES
Section 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions -
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the
landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or
school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee
shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in
addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five
and thirty-four, except when the land owned and
leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than
five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year
before ejectment proceedings are filed against him:
Provided, further, That should the landholder not
cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one
year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant
shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by
him because of said dispossessions.
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially
comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless
his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force
majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had
been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven
farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent
improvement thereon is substantially damaged or
destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural
lessee;
 (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease
rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-
payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to
the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of
a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a
ground for dispossession, although the obligation
to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his
landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph
2 of Section twenty-seven.
NON PAYMENT OF RENTAL AS A GROUND TO DISPOSSES
STA. ANA V. SPS. CARPO
Facts:
 Respondent Carpo owns a land 91,337 sqm land in
Sta. Rosa Laguna. 3.5 hectares of which is devoted
for rice and corn production and was tenanted by
Domigo and Adoracion Pastolero. When Domingo
passed away, Adoracion sold their tenancy rights to
petitioner Sta. Ana, which conformity of Leon, for
P72,500.
 After some time, the relationship between the
parties turned sour and the respondents filed an
ejectment case against the respondents due to
Non-payment of lease rentals. Respondents alleged
the parties agreed to increase the rentals from 36
to 45 cavans, and that, if respondents wanted to
repossess the property, they only had to pay
P72,500.00.
 Respondents further averred that despite repeated
demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual
rentals; and that the subject land had been
declared, suitable for commercial and industrial
purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the
Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondents
prayed that petitioner be ejected from the subject
land and be directed to pay P75,016.00 as unpaid
rentals.
 Petitioner denied that there was an agreement to
increase the rental and that they did not refuse to
pay the respondents, stating further that they even
sent out notices advising the respondents to accept;
and that petitioners even deposited the amounts to
Universal Savings Bank. They further claim that
petitioner is a farmer-beneficiary of P.D. 27 and
prayed for outright dismissal of the case
 PARAD ruled that petitioner deliberately failed
defaulted the payment to the respondents. It was
also shown that the petitioners deposited the
amounts in their names and not the respondents.
PARAD also ruled that the defendant is not covered
by P.D. 27 since it needed at least 7 hectares
devoted to palay
 DARAB, however, reversed the ruling of PARAD,
stating that there was no proof that the failure to
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pay the rentals by the petitioner was willful and
deliberate
 The CA once again reversed the ruling to the
DARAB stating that petitioners failed to pay the
rentals. Further, CA held that subject land was not
covered by P.D. 27 since it has become residential,
commercial, and industrial. Thus, it ruled in favor of
the respondents
ISSUE + RULINGS
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had
already become residential, commercial and/or industrial,
thus, excluded from the coverage of our laws on agrarian
reform? Yes.
In the first issue, the court ruled in affirmative. It was held that
the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the
subject land was no longer covered by our agrarian laws
because of the retention rights of the respondents. The CA
likewise acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land
had become non-agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of
1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity map. These rulings
violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially
been lodged in an administrative body of special competence.
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR;
more specifically, DARAB.
CA ruled that the land had ceased being agricultural on the
basis of a mere vicinity map, in open disregard of the Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction, since the issue was within the province
of the Secretary of DAR
2. WON the petitioner deliberately failed to pay her lease
rentals when the same fell due
On the second issue, the SC ruled in the Negative. Under Sec.
37 of R.A. 3844, coupled with the fact that the respondents are
the complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the
existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of the petitioner
as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as
agricultural lessors. However, the respondents failed to
discharge such burden.
Landowner has burden of proof that a ground to dispossess
exists. Respondents failed to discharge such burden. The
agricultural tenant’s failure to pay the lease rentals must be
willful and deliberate in order to warrant his dispossession of
the land that he tills. In this case, there was an intention to pay
on the part of Sta. Ana.
The term deliberate is characterized by or results from slow,
careful, thorough calculation and consideration of effects and
consequences. The term willful is defined as one governed by
will without yielding to reason.
The issue is non-payment of the rentals. You will note there
are different rulings of the DAR. PARAD (Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator) is the provincial adjudicator. The DARAB
is the central office in Manila. So any decision of the PARAD
goes to DARAB and from the DARAB being a quasi-judicial
agency under the rules of Court, goes to CA. Now SC discusses
first about BURDEN OF PROOF.

Note that according to the SC, under Sec. 37, the burden of
proof to show the existence of a cause of ejectment is upon
petitioner land owner. That means we are talking about all the
grounds to dispossess. It is the LO who has the burden to
prove the ground.
SC qualified that non-payment must be willful and deliberate.
That means di lang failure, it could be failure but if there was
negligence on the part of the lessee to pay, that may not be
taken against the lessee because it has to be WILLFUL and
DELIBERATE non-payment.
So according to the court the lessee executed an affidavit that
the LO refused to receive the respective lease rentals and for
another year the lessee wrote two notices to the LO informing
him of the availability of the lease rentals pero wa kuha.a sa
LO. That means there was no willful and deliberate non-
payment of the rentals due
NATIVIDAD V. MARIANO
Facts: Ernesto filed with the PARAD a petition for ejectment
and collection of back lease rentals against the respondents
(tenants).
Ernesto alleged that he purchased the subject property in
a public auction held on July 17, 1988. Immediately after
the purchase, he verbally demanded that the respondents
pay the lease rentals. Despite his repeated demands, the
respondents refused to pay, prompting him to orally
request the respondents to vacate the subject property. He
filed the petition when the respondents refused his
demand to vacate.
SC:
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844 ordains that once the tenancy
relationship is established, a tenant or agricultural lessee is
entitled to security of tenure.
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844 strengthens this right by
providing that the agricultural lessee has the right to
continue the enjoyment and possession of the landholding
and shall not be disturbed in such possession except only
upon court authority in a final and executory judgment, after
due notice and hearing, and only for the specifically
enumerated causes.
In order to protect this right, Section 37 of R.A. No. 3844 rests
the burden of proving the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of the agricultural lessee on the agricultural lessor.
Ernesto’s petition for ejectment against the respondents was
anchored precisely on the latter’s alleged non-payment of
the lease rentals beginning 1988 until 1998 despite his
repeated verbal demands. When confronted with the
respondents’ defense of due payment with supporting
documentary evidence of it, Ernesto countered that their
payments should not be considered as he did not authorize
Corazon and Laureano to receive the payments on his behalf.
These allegations pose to us three essential points that we
need to address. First, whether Ernesto indeed made
demands on the respondents for the payment of the lease
rentals; second, assuming that Ernesto made such
demands, whether the respondents deliberately failed or
continuously refuse to pay the lease rentals; and third,
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whether the lease rentals paid by the respondents to
Corazon and Laureano are valid.
 First point:
o records shows that Ernesto did not present
any evidence, such as the affidavit of the
person or persons present at that time, to
prove that he demanded from the
respondents the payment of the lease
rentals.
o His allegation, absent any supporting evidence,
is nothing more than a hollow claim under
the rule that he who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it as mere allegation is not
evidence. Thus, Ernesto should be deemed
to have made his demand only at the time
he filed the petition for ejectment before the
PARAD. At this point, the respondents were
not yet in delay and could not be deemed to
have failed in the payment of their lease
rentals.
 Second point:
o Non-payment of the lease rentals whenever
they fall due is a ground for the ejectment
of an agricultural lessee under paragraph 6,
Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. In relation to
Section 2 of Presidential Decree
 (P.D.) No. 816, deliberate refusal or continued
refusal to pay the lease rentals by the agricultural
lessee for a period of two (2) years shall, upon
hearing and final judgment, result in the
cancellation of the CLT issued in the agricultural
lessee’s favor.
o The agricultural lessee's failure to pay the lease
rentals, in order to warrant his dispossession of
the landholding, must be willful and deliberate
and must have lasted for at least two (2) years.
The term "deliberate" is characterized by or
results from slow, careful, thorough calculation
and consideration of effects and
consequences, while the term "willful" is
defined, as one governed by will without
yielding to reason or without regard to reason.
Mere failure of an agricultural lessee to pay the
agricultural lessor's share does not necessarily
give the latter the right to eject the former
absent a deliberate intent on the part of the
agricultural lessee to pay.
 GCC’s comments on Natividad:
o PD 816 covers rice and corn
o RA 3844 is silent on the period of non-payment
of rentals
o There is no fact established in case whether the
subject property is rice or corn (although it can
be presumed because of the words “crop year”
and considering that the party has been issued
a CLT)
o Probably, since the petition is via Rule 45 (pure
question of law), the findings of facts by CA
 denying petition are generally binding upon SC;
as a rule, under Rule 45, SC is not a trier of facts
NIEVES V. DULDULAO
Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a piece of agricultural rice
land. Ernesto and Felipe (respondents) are tenants and
cultivators of the subject land who are obligated to each pay
leasehold rentals of 45 cavans of palay for each cropping
season. Claiming that Ernesto and Felipe failed to pay their
leasehold rentals since 1985 which had accumulated to 446.5
and 327 cavans of palay, respectively, petitioner filed a
petition before PARAD seeking the ejectment of respondents
from the subject land for non-payment of rentals.
PARAD ordered the ejectment, affirmed by DARAB but CA
reversed as non-payment was not willful.
SC: While respondents indeed admit that they failed to
pay the full amount of their respective leasehold rentals
as they become due, they claim that their default was on
account of the debilitating effects of calamities like
flashfloods and typhoons.
This latter assertion is a defense provided under the same
provision which, if successfully established, allows the
agricultural lessee to retain possession of his landholding.
The records of this case are, however, bereft of any
showing that the aforestated claim was substantiated by
any evidence tending to prove the same. Keeping in mind
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, the Court cannot therefore lend any
credence to respondents’ fortuitous event defense.
Antonio v. Manahan - SC held that the records showed that
the landowner actually rejected the rentals tendered by the
tenants therein due to their supposed poor quality. This
circumstance was taken by the Court together with the fact
that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for the
rejected rentals through the payments made for the other
years
Roxas v. Cabatuando - SC held that the tenants therein did
not willfully and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold
rentals since they had serious doubts as to the legality of
their contract with respect to their non-sharing in the
coconut produce, which thus prompted them to withhold
their remittances in good faith
In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in this
case never rejected any rental payment duly tendered by
respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Neither was
the legality of their agricultural leasehold contract with the
landowner ever put into issue so as to intimate that they
merely withheld their remittances in good faith. Thus, with
the fortuitous event defense taken out of the equation, and
considering the examples in Antonio and Roxas whereby
the elements of willfulness and deliberateness were not
found to have been established, the Court is impelled to
agree with the DARAB that respondents herein willfully and
deliberately chose not to pay their leasehold rentals to the
landowner when they fell due.
 GCC’s comment on Nieves:
o Who has burden to prove the ground?
Landowner has burden (Natividad v.
Mariano)
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 In the case, non-payment since 1985 up to
filing in 2006 was admitted which is more
that 20 years -
 Natividad instructs that to be “willful”, the non-
payment should have lasted for at least 2 years
citing Sec 2 of PD 816 “deliberate refusal or
continued refusal to pay the lease rentals by the
agricultural lessee for a period of 2 years shall,
upon hearing and final judgment, result in the
cancellation of the CLT issued in the agricultural
lessee’s favor.”
LIABILITIES OF LESSOR IF HE EJECTS TENANT
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION?
 Fine or imprisonment (RTC will
impose, not the adjudicator)
 Damages suffered
 Attorney’s fees
 Remuneration for last income
PERIOD OF REDEMPTION AND PRICE
Section 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption - In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge
of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to
redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration:
Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed:
Provided, further, That where these are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of
redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated
by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within two years from the registration of the sale,
and shall have priority over any other right of legal
redemption.
Po vs. Dampal
FACTS: On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in
Bukidnon with an approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651
hectares, respectively, were mortgaged for P33,000.00 by the
spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-
fact Manuel Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of
Tagoloan, Inc. For failure to pay the obligation, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at public auction to
petitioner who was the highest bidder. The original certificates
of title were subsequently cancelled and TCTs in their stead
were issued in favor of Po, following the spouses Causin’s
failure to redeem the property.
On September 13, 1993, petitioner sold one of the bought lot
to her herein co-petitioner Mutia who was issued new TCT. On
September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-
herein respondent Dampal filed with the Regional Trial Court
a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and Sale. While the civil case was pending or on
June 16, 1997, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioners before the DARAB for Legal Redemption with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. DARAB disallowed the
redemption prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit
he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a
tenant; and that although Dampal was not given notice in
writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed to have
knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment,
hence, there was substantial compliance with the rules.
DARAB Central Office reversed the Adjudicator’s ruling. On
appeal, the appellate court held that petitioners should have
appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43, instead of rule 65,
dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the need for sending him notice in
writing could be dispensed with. (NOTE: Issue is on
prescription on the right of redemption of the lessee)
HELD: In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of
written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR,
is indispensable, particularly in view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act
No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which
mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the
notice in writing upon registration of the sale. Sec. 12 of
Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code
of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise
known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines,
provides:
Sec 12. Lessee’s right of redemption - In case the landholding
is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the
same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That
where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the
area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under
this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days
from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on
all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform
upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over
any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price
shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the
sale. (emphasis supplied)
The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR
thus tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners’
contention that Dampal must be considered to have had
constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of the express
requirement for notice to be in writing.
CASTRO, ET AL V. MENDOZA, SR., ET AL, GR NO. 212778
FACTS: The property is part of a parcel of land with a total
area of 14,827 square meters, originally covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-20427 registered in the name of
Simeon Santos, married to Laura Cruz (original Santos
property). Upon the death of Simeon, his compulsory heirs,
surviving spouse, Laura, and his children, Rosalina, Natividad,
Melencio, Valentin, Jesus, Tirso, and Luis, all surnamed Santos,
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights
and sale on May 16, 1977.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are agricultural tenants of the
original Santos property. From July 1981 when Teddy
substituted his mother Rosalina Castro in the tenancy of the
original Santos property, he has been in its actual possession,
occupation, and cultivation, personally performing all aspects
of production with the aid of labor from the other petitioner
Sebastian and paying the agreed lease rentals.
The controversy started when Jesus (owner-heir) sold his
share in the original Santos property to respondent
Municipality on October 27, 1992. Jesus sold his undivided
6 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
interest therein of 2,132.42 square meters for the amount of
P1.2 Million which the respondent Municipality acquired for
the expansion and construction of the Bustos public market.
Hereafter, we shall refer to the 2,132.42 square meter property
sold by Jesus as the property. As of 1989, the lots surrounding
the first public market in respondent Municipality, including
the original Santos property and the portion sold by Jesus,
have been classified as a commercial area.
On August 22, 1994, after the inauguration of the public
market, petitioners filed their complaint for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession with prayer for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction; Pre-emption and Redemption;
and Damages before the PARAD against respondent
Municipality. In their complaint, petitioners "categorically
manifested their serious intent to exercise their rights of pre-
emption and redemption provided for under Sections 11 and
12, Republic Act No. 3884, as amended.” On August 26, 1994,
petitioners deposited the amount of P2,300.00 as redemption
price for the property.
PARAD, judgment rendered in favor of petitioners and
against defendants Santos and the Municipality of Bustos.
Likewise, petitioners are entitled to exercise the right of
redemption of the property in question.
DARAB modified the decision of the PARAD, directing instead
respondent Municipality to pay disturbance compensation to
petitioners.
The CA affirmed the uniform rulings of the PARAD and the
DARAB that petitioners are tenants of the property who did
not receive notice of its sale by Jesus. The CA reinstated the
PARAD's original ruling.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners may recover possession, and
obtain ownership, of the property.
RULING: Under Section 12 of the RA 3844, the right of
redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the
following requirements: (a) the redemptioner must be an
agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land must have
been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written
notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR;
(c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be
redeemed; and (d) the right of redemption must be exercised
within 180 days from written notice of the sale by the vendee.
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners are bona fide
tenants of the original Santos property. A portion of that land
was sold by an owner-heir, Jesus, to a third party, respondent
Municipality, without any written notice of the sale to
petitioners and the DAR. Albeit petitioners' right of
redemption had long been sustained and upheld, it fell upon
them to comply with the requirements for a valid and effective
exercise of such right. Otherwise stated, the filing of the
complaint should have been coupled with the consignation of
the redemption price to show their willingness and ability to
pay within the prescribed period.
In this regard, we agree with the CA's ruling that petitioners
belatedly tendered payment and effected consignation of the
redemption price of P1.2 million. Notably, petitioners filed on
August 26, 1994 a Motion for Consignation of Reasonable
Redemption Amount of only P2,300.00 for the 2,132.42 square
meters landholding sold by Jesus to respondent Municipality.
The discrepancy between the amounts of P2,300.00 and P1.2
 Million clearly calls to question petitioners' willingness and
ability to pay.
By contrast, petitioners are not registered owners, but
possessors who ought to be in continuous cultivation and
possession of the property. Their belated and ineffective
redemption of the property, coupled with their collection of
rentals from private respondents, speaks volumes of their
acquiescence to the classification and public use of the
property. In fact, petitioners awaited inauguration of the
public market before they filed suit against respondent
Municipality to recover possession of the property. During
construction of the public market for more than a year,
petitioners did not appear to question their dispossession
from the property.
WHEREFORE, The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board in DARAB Case No. 749-Bulacan is directed to compute
the amount of disturbance compensation to be paid
petitioners Teddy Castro and Lauro Sebastian by public
respondent Municipality of Bustos, Bulacan in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. No
costs.
ALBOR V. CA ET AL., GR NO. 196598
Facts:
- Petitioner Editha was a lessee of a riceland in Roxas city,
registered in the name of Rosario Andrada. Editha had been
paying rent to the heirs of Rosario.
- The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Roxas city
invited Editha to his office and there met with the
respondents who informed her that they had purchased the
lots from the heirs of Rosario. No Deed of Sale, however, was
shown to Editha
- Editha was able to obtain from the RTC a document entitled
“Extrajudicial Settlement with Deed of Sale” purportedly
executed by the heirs of Rosario, which adjudicated among
themselves the said property, and afterwards sold the same
to the respondents.
- Asserting she had legal right to redeem the property, Editha
filed a complaint for redemption before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).
- The PARAD found that Editha was not properly notified of
the sale to respondents, and that Editha’s right of
redemption did not prescribe. It nevertheless dismissed her
complaint after finding out that she failed to consign the full
amount of the repurchase price.
- Editha filed and appeal to the DARAB, which then affirmed
the PARAD’s decision in toto.
- Editha then filed before the CA a motion for extension of
time to file a rule 43 petition for review. She prayed for an
additional 15 days.
- Afterwards, Editha decided to engage the services of another
counsel. Editha’s new counsel filed with the CA a notice of
appearance and mover for an extension of 30 days to file the
petition for review.
- The CA dismissed Editha’s petition for review for having been
filed out of time. It ratiocinated that while it may grant the
initial 15 day extension, it was devoid of authority to grant
her second motion of extension.
- Editha filed for and MR which was likewise denied.
- Edita comes before the SC via Rule 65 Petitioner for
certiorari.
7 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Issue:
- WON Editha used the proper mode of appeal
Held:
- No. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of
the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45.
- A SCA under Rule 65 is a limited form of review and is a
remedy of last recourse. It is an independent action that lies
only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
- Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or
mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the
lower court.
- The Resolutions of the CA were final and
appealable judgments. Such resolutions
disposed of Editha’s appeal in a manner that
left nothing more to be done by the CA with
respect to the said appeal. Hence, Editha
should have filed an appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
- Adoption of an improper remedy already
warrants outright dismissal of this petition.
RECLASSIFICATION OF LAND AS GROUND TO
EXTINGUISH LEASEHOLD
 Conversion - the act of changing the current use of
a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR.
 Reclassification - the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan,
subject to the requirements and procedure for land
use conversion.
 Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural
land does not automatically allow a landowner to
change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the
tenants. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.
Crisostomo V. Victoria
Crisostomo is landowner and had contact with Hipolito until
latter’s death; Victoria is allegedly a tenant. Crisostomo filed
an ejectment case at PARAD against Victoria. Victoria claimed
that Hipolito is her uncle and that her possession is with
consent of Crisostomo. Victoria was jot bale to prove that
there was consent because clearly it was Hipolito who filed the
ejectment case. PARAD ruled in favor of Crisostomo and
DARAB upheld; CA reversed holding that Hipolito could
legally allow Victoria to till.
“Sec 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The
agricultural leasehold relation shall be limited to the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil
law lessee, usufructory, or legal possessor, and the person
who personally cultivates the same.”
SC: Proceeding from Section 6 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, the Court of Appeals capitalized on
Hipolito's supposed status as "legal possessor" of the
disputed portion, a status that was deemed to emanate
from his having been the lessee. Thus, the Court of
Appeals concluded that "Hipolito, as the legal possessor,
could legally allow [respondent] to work and till the
landholding"19 thereby making respondent a tenant
whose security of tenure petitioner must now respect.
The Court of Appeals is in error. Hipolito's status as the
acknowledged tenant did not clothe him with the capacity
to designate respondent as a tenant.
This court has settled that tenancy relations cannot be an
expedient artifice for vesting in the tenant rights over the
landholding which far exceed those of the landowner. It
cannot be a means for vesting a tenant with security of
tenure, such that he or she is effectively the landowner.
Even while agrarian reform laws are pieces of social
legislation, landowners are equally entitled to protection.
Velasquez vs. Sps. Cruz
The core of this dispute is the question of whom between the
DARAB and the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS
Sps. Paterno and Rosario Cruz (Sps. Cruz) are the registered
owners of a parcel of land located in Hagonoy, Bulacan, with
an area of 4 hectares and covered by a tax declaration. In
2007, the spouses filed a Complaint for Recover of
Possession with Accounting and Damages against
petitioner Jesus Velasquez (Velasquez). The Sps. Cruz allege
that Velasquez’s Father-in-law, Bernabe Navarro (Navarro)
was a tenant in said lot until April 1985, when Navarro
relinquished his tenancy right by virtue of a Sinumpaang
Salaysay. However, the spouses discovered that Velasquez
had entered the farmland without their knowledge or
consent, and that from 1985 until 2007, he never paid them a
single centavo for the use of the land. The spouses also
alleged that they had leased the farmland to Godofredo
Tosco in 1995, but Velasquez refused to vacate the property.
Meanwhile, Velasquez contends the ff.:
1. That the jurisdiction for the case should have been with
DARAB because the case is an agrarian dispute
2. That he was assisting Navarro in the tilling of the land
since 1975
3. That he continued working on the land after the death
of Navarro
4. His non-payment of rentals was due to the fact that the
land lost its suitability for agrarian production, thus his
non- payment is not a ground for dispossession
5. Since the implementation of the Operation Land
Transfer, he is deemed to be the owner of the subject
land
6. He was identified as a farmer-beneficiary and has been
paying amortizations to the LBP
RTC: Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It also
denied the MR by the spouses Cruz.
8 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
CA: During the pendency of the appeal, Velasquez became
the registered owner of the subject land. But before he
could inform the CA of this development, CA found merit
in favor of the Sps. Cruz, stating that Velasquez failed to
establish tenancy relationship due to lack of consent and
sharing of harvest. Moreover, he is not among those listed
under Sec. 9 of RA 3844 as one of those who are qualified
to be successor- tenants.
ISSUES + RULING
(1) Whom between the DARAB and the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case?
RTC retains jurisdiction over the case.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there
must be a tenancy relationship between the parties
(cross-refer with the jurisdiction of DARAB below).
And in order for tenancy to arise, it is essential to
establish ALL its indispensable elements (refer to
requirements of tenancy relationship). In the case at
bar, there is the absence of the consent, and the
sharing of harvests. The petitioner could not present
evidence that the Sps. Cruz recognized him as a
tenant.
Reading the material allegations of the Complaint,
the decision under review concluded that the case
below was for recovery of possession or an accion
publiciana, a plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time
of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of
possession or defendant's possession had become
illegal, the action will be an accion publiciana
Jurisdiction pertains to the RTC where an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title takes
place.
(2) Was Velasquez entitled to be a successor-tenant of
Navarro?
NO.
Sec. 9 of RA 3844 provides an exclusive
enumeration of those who are qualified to succeed
leasehold rights of a deceased or incapacitated
tenant, to wit:
Section 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties. -
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural
lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural
lessor within one month from such death or
permanent incapacity, from among the following:
1. The surviving spouse
2. The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity
 3. The next eldest descendant or descendants in
the order of their age
Provided, that in case of death or permanent
incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the
agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the
end of the agricultural year.
Provided further, that in the event the agricultural
lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods
herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance
with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal
heirs.
Since Velasquez is only a relative by affinity of Navarro, he
is not qualified to succeed as a tenant.
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE TAN V. POLLESCAS
FACTS:
 Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut
farmland. Esteban Pollescas was the original
tenant of the land. Upon Esteban’s death his son
Enrique succeeded him and was appointed
tenant by the landowners. However, respondent
Reynalda, Esteban’s surviving second spouse,
demanded that the Tans recognize her as
Esteban’s successor.
 Reynalda filed a complaint before DARAB,
questioning the tenancy relationship of Tan and
Enrique. DARAB ruled in favor of Reynalda,
declaring her as the lawful tenant of the Land.
DARAB apportioned the harvests between the
Tans and Reynalda based on the customary
sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner and
1/3 to the tenant.
 Reynalda failed to deliver the 2/3 of the harvest.
Tan heirs demanded the payment thereof, but
Reynalda ignored such demand.
 Tan heirs filed a case for estafa for her failure to
pay and deliver the share.
Petitioner: The agreement was extinguished due to non-
payment of lease (the 2/3 of the harvest).
Respondent: The Tans demand an excessive amount.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
RULED THAT REYNALDA IS OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR
25% OF THE NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3 WHEN THE
SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET PLACED UNDER THE
LEASEHOLD SYSTEM PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657
HELD: YES
In this case, the Tans seek ejectment of Reynalda from the
Land due to non-payment of lease rental. In order for non-
payment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to dispossess
the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the
lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the amount of lease
rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment
of lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the
agricultural lessee of the landholding.
9 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended mandates that not x x x
more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall constitute
the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease
rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount
prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly
dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of
rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan
Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease rental
for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment
of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not enforce
payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There was no
validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the
harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease
rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional lease
rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended. Until
the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda
cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such
amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in the
payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is
impossible to pay an undetermined amount. That Reynalda is
not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic
reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for
non-payment of rental.
RELEVANT NOTES NOT IN POINTERS:
A. LANDS COVERED
1. Tenanted Areas
2. Landed Estates
3. Old Settlements
4. Proposed Settlements
B. WHO ARE THE BENEFICIARIES?
1. Tenant-farmers
2. Agricultural wage-earners or farm workers
3. Settlers including migrant workers
4. Owner-cultivators of less than family-size farms
C. AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD (Secs. 4-38)
 A juridical tie between lessor and lessee
 Abolished shared tenancy. Now leasehold
tenancy.
 “Shared tenancy” as used in this Code means the
relationship which exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land
and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of
production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and
the produce thereof to be divided between the
landholder and the tenant. (RA 3844, Sec. 166)
 Why is it that leasehold relationship was
preferred?
 o Tenurial Security under Agrarian
Land Reform – relationship can
exist even if there is death of the
lessee or lessor, sale, transfer or
conveyance of agricultural land.
 The transferee of the agri land, the vendee is
bound by the leasehold relationship
 Should it be annotated? No. Not necessary. The
law provides for that.
 Leasehold relationship will remain. To protect
the lessee from possible ejectment or
disposition of property.
 Refers to 2 parties
 It is referred as agricultural lessor and
agricultural lessee
 Lease – somebody must pay rental
 Can the lessor eject the tenant?
 Yes, the lessor has the grounds provided by 3844
to eject the tenant. Unless the ground for ejectment
is not enumerated in 3844, the lessee cannot be
ejected.
DISTINTION BETWEEN LEASEHOLD AND SHARED
TENANCY:
1. Leasehold - rent is paid in 3 modes: 1) share in
harvest, 2) money, or 3) both
2. Shared tenancy – rent is paid in form of harvest
REASONS WHY LEASE HOLD WAS INSTITUTIONALIZED
AND SHARED TENANCY WAS ABOLISHED
1.) Security Of Tenure
a. There is continuity of relations, if tenant
dies or becomes permanently incapacited,
there are persons who can succeed him as
provided in Section 9.
b. Right of pre-emption where in case the
lessor plans to sell, it must be offered first to
the lessee. Right of pre-emption is a right of
the farmer. If there is sale without knowledge
of tenant farmer, the transferee shall be
subrogated in the rights of the original lessor.
c. Right of redemption - if there is a sale, the
tenant farmer can redeem
2.) Legality Of Physical Possession
3.) Enjoyment And Management
PARTIES IN AGRICULTURAL LEASHOLD RELATIONS:
Party 1:
• Owner
• Civil law lessee - lease with contract
• Usufructuary - where there is contract of usufruct;
ghe landowner gives another person the right to
use the property
• Legal possessor - examples are trustees,
occupants by tolerance (occupation is legal, you
manifest your ownership and you allow person to
use it in condition that they vacate once you
demand them to vacant, if they dont, occupation
becomes illegal.)
10 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Q: Who can give consent to let someone else
cultivate?
• Owner - yes
• Civil law lessee, usufructuary, legal possessor -
GR if there is prohibition in contract of lease, civil
law lessee cant give consent for others to us
property (e.g. sublease); therefore they must
have consent from owner first before they can
allow someone else to cultivate
Party 2: Person who personally cultivates
III. PD NO. 27 (TENANT EMANCIPATION)
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY October 21, 1972
Now you look at October 21 1972, this is the effective date of
PD 27. Why is that important? Because that is the start of the
coverage of PD 27 with respect to private agri lands. So far as
coverage, that date is important but that is not important in
so far as payment of just compensation is concerned. Take
note ha. Because I'm very sure that when you practice later on,
you will encounter cases, probably landowners who were not
paid just compensation for lands covered under PD 27.
So I said earlier that in coverage, the date Oct 21 1972 is
important but not as to payment of just compensation.
Because the SC said: payment of just compensation--you
don't reckon from the effective date. Why? Unfair man sa
landowner. Imagine noh pila ka ka years wala bayri unya i-
reckon ra diay sa pagstart sa coverage. That should not be the
case. Because the definition of just compensation is the fair
and reasonable market value of the land. So when can we say
it's fair and reasonable? In fact there are cases, although dili
kaayo consistent ang court, cases to the effect that it is in
actual payment of the money to the landowners that should
constitute as just compensation because of the word 'just'.
BENEFICIARIES
■ Bona fide tenant farms of private agri lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn whether
classified as land estate or not.
■ “primarily devoted to rice and corn” means lands
planted to rice and/or corn as the principal crops
as of Oct 21, 1972 and which is under the effective
control and disposition of natural or juridical
persons
■ Note that the Decree does not apply to lands
owned by the government or GOCCs.
■ PD 27 was not repealed by CARL but they
have inconsistencies.
CABRAL V. HEIRS OF ADOLFO, ET AL.,
Lands, these are the excess of the retention and this
will be given to qualify partners, but this are not for free.
Because the government paid these land owners just
compensation and the government will recover the just
compensation paid from the farmer beneficiaries. Now, please
do not also confuse this particular case in the other cases that
we have discuss especially under 3844 because I have been
repeating that there are 2 stages, CLT and PT. Do not think
that if there is an issued EP, there is also compliance of the
requirements. That can be presume because we know that
once there is a government official employee in the
performance of this functions performs or issues
emancipation patent example, that is entitled to a
presumption of regularity. But my point here is this,
emancipation patent just like other titles in land titles and
deeds, can be attacked. Even if there is a principle of
indivisibility of title one year from the time of registration, A
title can be attack. Meaning, somebody may file a petition in
court to nullify the title, and that is what happened here.
Remember, the Adolfos where already issued emancipation
patent but here comes owner of the land (we are talking about
the same land) you have the owner of the land with the title
and there are the Adolfos who were also issued emancipation
patents.
Is it possible that there could be two titles involving the
same land because you have the land owner and the
farmer beneficiaries?
o That is possible, in fact we will learn later involving
sec.16 of CAR, the land owner may not know that
this title is already cancelled and the new title is
issued in name of the government and the
government distributes that to qualified farmer
beneficiaries. That is very possible, because under
AGRA, the surrender of owner’s duplicate copy of
the land title is not a requirement.
What document would ROD required from the
Department of Agrarian Reform, So that the ROD can
cancel the title of the land owner and issue new title in the
name of the Republic of the Ph?
o It’s just one paper, certification from Landbank
that there is money deposited in Landbank in the
name of the land owner. That money represents just
compensation. So why would Cabral want to cancel
the EP’s of Adolfos? Ofcourse he wants that his title
will be the only title involving the land. And since
there are emancipation patents issued, he wants
that cancelled.
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS REQUIRED before any
emancipation patent can be issued:
 APPLICATION (to be filled up by the applicant),
 COPY OF CLT (it is a stage that supposes that there
is already CLtation,
 certification of the land owner and Landbank as
to Payment of the amortization,
 certification that applicant is full pledge member
of the farmers’ cooperative,
 technical description of the land,
11 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
 Official receipts on the real property taxes.
o Who is supposed to pay the real property
taxes? The applicant.
o Where do you pay this? Assessor.
 Certification whether applicant has acquired farm
machinery’s.
All of these are the supporting documents.
Although this was not mentioned by the court, you try to
imagine that this particular instance that if the emancipation
patent or the title is being attacked, the burden of proof lies
upon the person who is the owner of the title.
Who should prove Compliance with the requirements and
why is it that the burden lies upon that person?
o Because that is one of the grounds for the
cancellation. One of the grounds of cancellation is
noncompliance, you are the holder of the title. The
burden lies upon you. What was the conclusion of
the court? No evidence was presented.
Who is supposed to present the evidence? Presentation of
evidence like what?
o The Adolfos. Supporting documents and not only
that there was no CLT issued prior to the
issuance of the EP. Of course, you cannot comply
because the copy of the CLT is one of the
supporting documents to be submitted.
Is it possible to have 2 or more emancipation patent on
the same land?
o That would be possible. But that has to be
determined also by PARAD . But in this particular
case, Cabral is the owner of the title/ordinary title
not EP.
Is it possible that it would be part of the counter claim?
o 2 kinds of counter claims:
Compulsory - it is a counter claim that is related to
a very case involve.
Permissive counterclaim - not directly related to
the case but which can also be pleaded in the said
case.
DELA CRUZ V. DOMINGO Read full text short ra
RETENTION
 PD27 implemented the Operation Land Transfer
Program—covers tenanted rice and corn lands
 The requisites for coverage under the
Operation Land Transfer program are the
following—
o The land must be devoted to rice or corn crops
o There must be a system of share-crop or lease-
 tenancy obtaining therein
o If either is absent, the landowner may apply for
exemption
 PD27 grants each tenant of covered lands a 5 hectare
lot, or in case the lot is irrigated, 3 hectares
constituting the family size farm. However, said law
states: “In all cases, the landowner may retain an area
of not more than seven (7) hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now
cultivate it.”
 Consequently, a landowner may keep his whole
covered land if its aggregate size doesn’t exceed the
retention limit of 7 hectares
 The right to retention is a constitutionally
guaranteed right which is subject to the
qualifications by the legislature
 Landowners who haven’t exercised their retention
rights under PD27 may exercise their retention
rights under RA 6657
IV. RA NO 6657 - COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAW (CARL)
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY June 10, 1988
AGRI ACTIVITY VIS-À-VIS RAISING OF LIVESTOCK
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural
Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by person
whether natural or juridical.
Raising of Livestock - raising of animals for use or for
pleasure.
LUZFARMS V. SEC OF DAR
Facts:
 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business allegedly stands to be adversely

 The right to retention may be exercised over affected by the enforcement of some provisions of
tenanted land despite the issuance of the certificate CARP.
of land transfer to farmer-beneficiaries. What must
 Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A.
be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to
6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
opt to stay on the land chosen to be retained by the
landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of
 Land awards made pursuant to a government’s agrarian
livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
reform program are subject to the exercise of the
landowner who is qualified to the right of retention "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or

 The issuance of emancipation patents or certificates of Agricultural Activity.

land transfers doesn’t absolutely bar the landowner
from retaining the area covered thereby. (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms"

as "private agricultural lands devoted to

SUPPLETORY APPLICATION ON JUST COMPENSATION
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine
• The determination of just compensation should be
based on RA 6657 for lands covered under PD 27. raising . . ."

• PD 27 applies only suppletory. (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to

execute a production-sharing plan.

Scenario: You have a land that was acquired under PD 27. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the
That land was not paid by DAR and Landbank and CARL took
effect what now will govern in the payment of just Department of Agrarian Reform the authority
compensation because the land owner is entitled with just to summarily determine the just
compensation? It is CARL that govern.
compensation to be paid for lands covered by
What is the reason of the court why 6657 is the primary
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
law? The court said, it is in equitable to apply PD 27 and
nothing more. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-

GCC: The reason should be the reasonable mess of the factors sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
under Carl. Why? What is the basis in computing just
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales
compensation under PD 27? Average gross harvest. What
about in Carl? There are several factors: BIR, Zonal valuation, from the production of such lands are
assessed value of the land, market value if the land,
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of
comparable sales in adjacent properties.So for me, the factors
here are reasonable compared to PD27. In fact the the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
improvements of crops, plants is also a factor whereas in PD
other farmworkers in such lands over and
27 that is the only factor.

12 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |

 above the compensation they currently
receive xxx
ISSUE:
1. WON the CARL should include the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
SC:
1. NO. Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are
unconstitutional in so far as they include lands
devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry
within its coverage. The use of land is incidental to
but not the principal factor or consideration of
productivity in this industry. It was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to
include the livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the agrarian reform program of the
government. The intention of the Committee was to
limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus,
Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry, and swine raising” in the definition of
“commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the
State.
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of
the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to
insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and
industrial lands and residential properties because all of
them fall under the general classification of the word
"agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands
are limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and
therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III,
p. 30).
Raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from
crop or tree farming
Industrial, not agricultural activity
Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form
of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures
and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies,
anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells,
elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances
RA 7881 (effective May 1995) - AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, ENTITLED “AN ACT
INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS
IMPLEMETATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
■ Amended Sec. 3 (b) and removed the “raising
of livestock, poultry or fish”
13 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
■ “no land is tilled and no crop is harvested in
livestock and poultry farming”, “livestock and
poultry do not sprout from the land”, “there are
neither tenants nor landlords, only employees”
(DAR PRIMER)
REPUBLIC V. LOPEZ
Facts:
DAR: Lopez lands were excluded from coverage covered
by CARP while the application to exclude Limot lands from
CARP was denied.
CA affirmed DAR.
Issue:
The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the
Lopez and Limot lands of private resp. SNLABC can be
considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are
thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the
Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR
SC:
Lopez lands
MARO found several heads of cattle, carabaos, horses, goats
and pigs, some of which were covered by several certificates
of ownership. There were likewise structures on the Lopez
lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of
two chutes where the livestock were kept during nighttime.
The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the
CARL was positively affirmed by the farm workers and the
overseer who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering
these factual findings and the fact that the lands were in fact
being used for SNLABC’s livestock business even prior to 15
June 1988, the DAR Reg. Director ordered the exemption of
the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great
probative value to the actual, on-site investigation made by
the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Reg. Director. The Court
finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and
exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-
raising.
DAR argued that that the tax declarations covering the
Lopez lands characterized them as agricultural lands and,
thus,detracted from the claim that they were used for
livestock purposes.
The Court has since held that there is no law or
jurisprudence that holds that the land classification
embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor
would proscribe any further inquiry; hence, tax declarations
are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land.
Applying the foregoing principles, the tax declarations of
the Lopez lands as agricultural lands are not conclusive or
final, so as to prevent their exclusion from CARP coverage
as lands devoted to livestock-raising.
Indeed, the MAROs on-site inspection and actual
investigation showing that the Lopez lands were being
used for livestock-grazing are more convincing in the
determination of the nature of those lands.
GCC: DAR used that tax declaration of the Lopez lands. If you
look at the Lopez land, the classification is agricultural and
according to DAR that does not decrop that they were used
for livestock purposes. You have here situation where the tax
dec conflicts with actual use. Tax dec against actual use. The
court said it’s the actual use not to mention that the marrow
being a public officer has the presumption of the regularity
plus the court said there is no law that the land classification
in the tax dec is conclusive. Do you know what is the effect if
you have jurisprudence that tax declaration is conclusive?
People will be going to the assessor to change the
classification. Take note, this opinion of the court does not
mean that you cannot use tax dec. you can use tax dec. but in
application in this case, this tax dec is not conclusive.
HEIRS OF ARCE V DAR
Facts: As early as the 1950s, the Heirs of Ramon Arce, Sr.
(petitioners) were registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Brgy. Macabud, Montalban, Rizal with an area of
76.39 hectares (ha.), covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-442673, 442674, 442675, and 442676 (referred to as
subject lands). The subject lands were utilized as pasture lands
for the petitioners' cattle, i.e., buffaloes, carabaos and goats
(hereinafter referred to as livestock), for milk and dairy
production in the manufacture of Selecta Carabao's Milk and
Ice Cream (now Arce Dairy Ice Cream). The farming method
adopted by the petitioners was known as "feedlot operation"
where the animals were confined and fed on a cut-and-carry
basis or zero grazing.
Sometime in 1998, the Philippine Carabao Center-Department
of Agriculture (PCC-DA) recommended that petitioners'
livestock be transferred to avoid the liver fluke infestation in
the area. In compliance with PCC-DA's recommendation,
petitioners transferred the older and milking livestock, which
are susceptible to infection, to their feedlot facility located in
Novaliches, Quezon City (Novaliches property). The younger
cattle, which are not susceptible to the fluke infection,
remained in the subject lands.
Notwithstanding the transfer of some of their livestock,
petitioners continued to plant and grow napier grass in the
subject lands. The napier grass were then cut, carried and used
as fodder for their livestock which were maintained both in
the subject lands and in the Novaliches property.
On August 6, 2008, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) of Teresa, Rizal issued a Notice of Coverage (NOC)
over the subject lands under the CARP. In response,
petitioners sent a letter dated October 17, 2008 to the PARO
of DAR Region IV-A, seeking to exclude and exempt the
subject lands from the NOC considering that it has been
utilized for livestock raising even before the enactment of the
CARP.
On September 30, 2009, the petitioners filed a Manifestation
to Lift Notice of Coverage with the PARO, which was treated
as a petition and docketed as Case No. A-0400- 0250-09 of
DAR Regional Office IV-A with the PARO. This was anchored
on the ground that petitioners were in the business of
livestock raising, and were using the subject lands as pasture
lands for their buffaloes which produce the carabao milk for
their ice cream products. The petitioners claimed that the NOC
14 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
is contrary to the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides
that livestock farms are not among those described as
agricultural lands subject to land reform.
Based on these findings, DAR Regional Director Antonio G.
Evangelista (RD Evangelista) issued an Order dated December
22, 2009, granting the Petition to Lift Notice of Coverage.
On April 29, 2011, RD Evangelista issued a Certification, stating
that the Order dated December 22, 2009 had become final
and executory, considering that no motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal was filed.
Meanwhile, Joevin M. Ucag (Ucag) of DAR Region IV-A
submitted an Ocular Inspection Report dated May 12, 2011 to
the MARO, stating that "there was no livestock/cattle found in
the area of Macabud, Rodriguez, Rizal".
Subsequently, the Samahan ng mga Magsasakang
Nagkakaisa sa Sitio Calumpit (SAMANACA), through their
leaders, sent letters dated March 2, 2011 and June 14, 2011,
to DAR Secretary Virgilio R. De Los Reyes (Secretary De Los
Reyes), seeking to annul RD Evangelista's Order dated
December 22, 2009. The letters were treated as a Petition to
Annul an Invalid Resolution by the Regional Director.
On November 8, 2011, petitioners filed their Comment and
countered that RD Evangelista's Order dated December 22,
2009 had become final and executory and that the subject
lands were within the retention limit. Thus, they prayed for the
dismissal of SAMANACA's Letters-Petition.
On December 7, 2012, DAR Secretary De Los Reyes issued an
Order, denying petitioners' Petition for Exclusion from CARP
Coverage. The DAR ruled, among others, that while it is true
that the subject lands had been a livestock farm prior to the
CARP's enactment, the petitioners failed to prove that the said
lands are actually, directly, exclusively and continuously used
for livestock activity up to the present. According to the DAR,
there were no longer cattle and livestock facilities within the
subject lands.
Eventually, petitioners filed an Appeal Memorandum with the
Office of the President (OP), which ruled that petitioners'
subject lands were exempted from the coverage of CARP.
The DAR filed a Petition for Review with the CA, which ruled
for DAR.
Ruling:
The subject lands are devoted to livestock raising; thus,
they remain to be exempted from the coverage of the
CARP –
Contrary to the rulings of the DAR and the CA, the subject
lands are exempted from the coverage of the CARP.
The CARP shall cover all public and private agricultural lands,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced.43 Section 3(c) thereof defines
"agricultural land" as land devoted to agricultural activity and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.44
In Luz Farms v. The Honorable Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform,45 the Court declared unconstitutional the
CARL provisions46 that included lands devoted to livestock
under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include
the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of
the government.47 (Emphasis ours)
Reiterating Our ruling in the Luz Farms case, We held in
Natalia Realty and Estate Developers and Investors Corp. Inc.
v. Department of Agrarian Reform Sec. Benjamin T. Leong and
Dir. Wilfredo Leano, DAR REGION IV,48 that industrial,
commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL.
In the same case, We stressed that while Section 4 of R.A. No.
6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private
agricultural lands, the term "agricultural land" does not
include lands classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial.
Guided by the foregoing, lands devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial,
not agricultural, and thus, exempted from agrarian reform.
A thorough review of the records reveals that there is
substantial evidence to show that the entirety of the
petitioners' subject lands were devoted to livestock
production since the 1950s, i.e., even before the enactment of
the CARL on June 15, 1988. No less than the DAR, who has the
competence to determine the status of the land,50
acknowledged this when it held that:
It cannot be denied that the Arce properties [subject lands]
had been a livestock farm. The documentary evidence
presented by the Applicants [petitioners] established the
existence of livestock activity in the landholding prior (sic) the
enactment of the CARL on 15 June 1988, such as Certificates
of Ownership of Large Cattle issued from 1981 to 1988,
Certification from the Philippine Carabao Center attesting that
the Selarce Farm is a cooperator of the Center as early as 1982,
and the Technical Paper published by the Philippine Council
for Agriculture and Resources Research featuring the Arce
Farm in the "Philippines Recommends for Carabao Production
1978." These documents were positively affirmed by DARPO
personnel in their investigation report and recommending for
the exclusion of the said landholdings.
We stress that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of
agricultural lands for non-agricultural purposes after the
effectivity of the CARL.64 Here, there was no showing that the
subject lands which were devoted for livestock raising prior to
the CARL, had been converted to an agricultural land, after its
passage. Thus, the petitioners' subject lands remained to be
non-agricultural, i.e., devoted to livestock raising, and thus,
excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
HOLY TRINITY V. DELA CRUZ
15 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Holy Trinity purchased property from Santiago, which were
classified as agricultural lands. Holy Trinity wanted to develop
the property as residential lands and so, the Sanggunian
Bayan ng Malolos (Municipal government where the land was
located) issued a resolution reclassifying the lots from
agricultural to residential. The Court held that this was an
invalid reclassification, because it was merely done through a
resolution, whereas the Local Government Code requires an
ordinance to reclassify lands.
DOCTRINE
An ordinance is required in order to reclassify agricultural
lands, and such may only be passed after the conduct of
public hearings. A resolution will not suffice as it is a mere
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of the lawmaking
body on a specific matter that is temporary in nature. It is
different from an ordinance in that the latter is a law by itself
and possesses a general and permanent character.
FACTS
1. A parcel of land (the “Dakila” property) in barangay
Dacila, Bulacan is registered to Freddie Santiago.
2. Susana Surio and others used to be tenants of the Dakila
property.
a. The tenants freely and voluntarily relinquished
their tenancy rights in favor of Santiago
through their respective sinumpaang
pahayag, in exchange for financial assistance
and individual homelots to be titled and
distributed in their names.
3. Holy Trinity purchased a portion of the Dakila property
from Santiago. Santiago caused the transfer of the title
to Holy Trinity and he subdivided the Dakila property
into 6 lots.
4. Holy Trinity then developed the property by dumping
filling materials on the topsoil, erected a perimeter fence
and steel gate and later on established its field office on
the property.
5. The Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos passed a Municipal
Resolution No. 16-98 reclassifying four of the six
subdivided lots belonging to the Holy Trinity into
residential lots.
a. The Municipal Planning and Development
Office (MPDO) of Bulacan issued the
Certificate of Eligibility for Conversion,
Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance
in favor of Holy Trinity for its residential
subdivision project on the Dakila property.
6. Holy Trinity purchased another from Santiago another
parcel of land in Bulacan (“Sumapang Matanda”
Property).
7. Later, Silvino Manalad and the alleged heirs of Felix Surio
wrote to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
Bulacan to request an investigation of the sale of the
Dakila property.
a. It was followed by the letter request of the
Chairman of Sumapang Matanda Barangay
Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) to place the
Dakila property within the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to PD
27.
8. DAR Provincial Office of Bulacan filed a petition with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Bulacan to annul the sale of the Dakila property.
9. Ruling of the DAR Regional Office: OIC-Regional
Director in Pampanga granted the letter request of BARC
Chairman.
a. He claimed that the sale of the Dakila
property was a prohibited transaction under
PD 27, Sec. 6 of RA 6657 and DAR Admin.
Order no. 1, Series of 1989;
b. that Holy Trinity was disqualified from
acquiring land under RA 6657 because it is a
corporation.
10. Ruling of the DAR Secretary: Holy Trinity appealed to
Dar Sec. claiming the request for coverage under PD 27
and the filing of the petition for annulment of sale in
DARAB constituted forum shopping.
a. The appeal was denied. The DAR Secretary
held that forum shopping was not committed
because the cause of action in the letter
request and the action for cancellation of the
deed of sale before DARAB were distinct and
separate.
b. DAR Sec. ruled that Dakila property was not
exempt from the coverage of PD 27 and Ra
6657 because Municipal Resolution No. 16-98
did not change or reclassify but merely re-
zoned the Dakila property.
11. Ruling of the Office of the President: OP reversed the
ruling of the DAR Sec.
a. Found that the Dakila Property had ceased to
be suitable for agriculture and had been
reclassified as residential land pursuant to
Mun. Reso. No. 16-98.
b. It shows that the City Assessor of Malolos and
the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan have
considered these lands as residential for
taxation purposes.
12. CA: CA reversed that set aside the decision of the OP.
a. It declared that prior to the effectively of
RA6657 and even after the passage of Mun.
Reso 16-98, the Dakila property was an
agricultural land, that there was no valid
reclassification because Sec. 20 of Ra 7160
and Memo Cir. 54 required an ordinance, not
resolution and the findings of DAR should be
respected.
13. Hence this petition.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WoN the Dakila property was validly reclassified from
agricultural lands to residential lands. NO.
a. Under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991), local governments are vested with the
property to reclassify lands:
i. Section 20. Reclassification of
Lands. – (a) A city or municipality
may, through an ordinance passed
by the sanggunian after
conducting public hearings for
the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands
16 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
and provide for the manner of the
utilization or disposition in the
following case: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible
and sound for agricultural purposes
as determined by DAR or (2) where
the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned.
b. Thus, an ordinance is needed to reclassify
agricultural lands and such may only be
passed after the conduct of public hearings.
c. IN this case, the Sanggunian Bayan ng Malolos
only issued a resolution, which is different
from an ordinance:
i. A resolution is a mere declaration
of the sentiment or opinion of the
lawmaking body on a specific
matter that is temporary in nature.
ii. It is different from an ordinance in
that the latter is a law by itself and
possesses a general and permanent
character.
d. There was also no showing of the requisite
public hearing.
e. Thus in the absence of the valid and complete
reclassification, the Dakila property remained
under the category of an agricultural land.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
“WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SET ASIDE the decision of
the CA; REINSTATES the assailed decision of the OP; DIRECTS
the cancellation of Emancipation patents to the respondent
for being NULL AND VOID AND ORDERS the respondents to
pay the costs of suit.
OTHER NOTES
1. Despite the invalid re-classification, the Dakila
property was not subject to the coverage of RA
6657.
a. For a land to be under the coverage of RA
6657, it must either be primarily devoted
to or be suitable for agriculture.
i. “Agricultural land” is one that
is devoted to agricultural
activity and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
ii. “Agricultural activity”
includes the cultivation of the
soil; including the harvesting
of such farm products and
other farm activities and
practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with
such farming operations done
by persons whether juridical or
natural.
b. These two requisites are needed before
the land can be placed under the
 coverage of RA 6657 (1) land must be
devoted to agricultural activity and (2)
land must not be classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
c. The Dakila property is not devoted to any
agricultural activity, especially
considering that the land was not
conducive to farming by reason of
elevation and insufficient irrigation.
2. It also does not fall under PD 27.
a. For a land to be covered under PD 27, it
must be devoted to rice and corns. There
must be a system of share-crop or lease-
tenancy obtaining therein. If either the
requisite is absent, the land must be
excluded
b. There was also no showing the Dakila
property was devoted for rice or corn
cultivation. Thus Dakila property should
be excluded from the OLT
Resolution is not ordinance therefore it is not a valid evidence.
Is it not enough to present the zoning ordinance do you need
to present proofs or evidences, I submit that there is none. An
ordinance and a certificate from HLURB – that would suffice.
DEFINITION OF AGRI LAND
Sec. 3 (c) “Agricultural land”
“Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.”
Section 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1989 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement
and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or retain,
directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural
land xxx xxx xxx
Agricultural land:
1. land devoted to agricultural activity
2. And not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land.
• Devoted to agricultural activity as defined in RA 6657 and
• Not classified as mineral or forest by DENR and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by HLURB and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for
residential, commercial or industrial use.
GCC: 2 important elements of the definition of agricultural
land. One, it is devoted to agri activity and not classified as
mineral forest commercial industrial. Who classified the land
as mineral or forest? DENR. Who classified the land as
17 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
commercial or industrial? Local Government Unit. This are
just observation. The court did not define the world classified.
But base in the cases that I have read, the word classification
is legislative in nature.
From Atty. Capanas:
 1st element: You have to go back to the definition of
agricultural.
 2nd element:
1st question: Who classifies, then let’s look at the cases.
1. The first classification is in the form of presidential
proclamations.
And in those proclamations, it was Marcos who issued
proclamation.
- But please note if you have read the cases of those
issuances by Marcos are because of his legislative power.
So, I submit Pres. RRD does not have any powers unless
authorize by congress. Meaning PRRD can not classify the
land unless authorize by congress.
2. Second classification is by virtue of a Zoning Ordinance
so you have to go back who can validly enact a zoning
ordinance, and if you look at the cases, it is the
Sangguniang Bayan if it is a municipality or Sangguniang
Panglungsod if it is a city.
- Please take note that approval of PRRD is also a
requirement.
- Process of a Zoning Ordinance
- Zoning ordinance will be crafted by The Department of
Planning in a municipality or city, in our jurisdiction it is
City planning and Designs, this department is tasked to
craft CLUP or Comprehensive Land Use Plan – to be
submitted to city council or municipal council then
becomes zoning ordinance, passed to HLURB for
approval – if approved and requirements have been
complied---- then considered as classification.
 What are to be classified and who classifies?
1. Mineral or Forest – DENR
2. Residential use - LGU or Pres. Proclamation
3. Commercial use - LGU or Pres. Proclamation
4. Industrial - LGU or Presidential Proclamation
Do not be surprised that under the local government code
aside from these classifications, there are other
classifications not stated in AGRA LAW for example Special
classification. Never mind, because it is not under AGRA law
but my point is the LGU has the power to classify the land
as special.
Example:
 Situation 1:
Assuming you are a landowner with 10 hectares agricultural
land before June 15, 1988 and then after that there was a
zoning ordinance enacted by LGU and your land was
classified as residential then approved by HLURB, then here
comes CARP June 15, 1988 –
Is your land an agricultural land?
NO, because even if it may be devoted to agricultural
activity but it was classified as residential, it is not an
agricultural land.
  Situation 2:
Classified as residential – but not ready to put up a house
or subdivision, and If I choose to plant crops in the land.
Will the agricultural activity change the fact that it is not an
agricultural land?
NO, because the requirement is it must be devoted and
must be classified.
But please take note, this situation applies only before June
15, 1988, such that June 15, 1988 onwards I cannot use this
particular ground, why? Because as to June 15, 1988 all
agricultural lands meaning it is devoted and it is not
classified are covered.
 Situation 3:
June 15, 1988 – I have no agricultural land, but I would want
to acquire an agricultural land – after acquisition there is a
zoning ordinance enacted classifying my land as residential.
Can I invoke this ground? NO!
What should I do if I want to change the nature of my land
now which is agricultural land to be consistent with the
classification of LGU?
I need conversion, and it is covered by separate Section,
not sec3c but sec 65, that means I need to go to DAR apply
for conversion and prove to DAR that there is classification
and that this agricultural land is no longer feasible for
agricultural and that I need to convert the nature of this
land from agri to non-agri. The point is even there is a
classification after June 15, 1988, that does not
automatically make your land as non-agricultural, you need
to go to process.
 Summary of the 3 situations:
Agri land – owned before June 15, 1988- then the LGU
passed a Zoning ordinance- classifying the land as
residential – then g enact ang CARP = Automatically, the
land becomes non-agri land
Agri land – owned after June 15, 1988 – then LGU passed a
Zoning ordinance classifying the land as residential =The
land is still an agri land and you need to go to DAR, you
cannot invoke Sec 3c but Sec 65, and present proof that
there was classification = conversion.
LEGAL BASES FOR LGU TO CLASSIFY
1. Sec. 3 of RA 2264 (the old governing Local Government
Code), municipal and/or city officials are specifically
empowered to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations in consultation with the National Planning
Commission.
2. Sec. 215 of RA 7160, (The new LGC) “the city or
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, through
then respective sanggunian, shall have the power to classify
lands as residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial,
mineral, timberland, or special in accordance with their
zoning ordinances.”
From Atty. Capanas: In practice we have agricultural,
commercial, industrial and residential.
18 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
CLUPS AND CLUPPI
DOJ Opinion NO. 44 (1990)
• Clarified that after the effectivity of RA 6657 on June 15,
1988, has been given the authority to approve land
conversion.
CONVERSION V. RECLASSIFICATION
 Conversion is the act of changing the current use of
a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR.
 Reclassification is the act of specifiying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan,
subject to the requirements and procedures for
land use conversion. In view thereof, a
reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow landowner to change its use. He
has to undergo the process of conversion before he
is permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes.
From Atty. Capanas:
 Do not be surprised, this is just my own opinion, when
you normally see the word reclassification when it is
compared from conversion because it is the SC who is
using this reclassification, I don’t know why, when Sec
3c uses the word classify not reclassify.
 CLUPs – Comprehensive Land Use Plan
 CLUPPI – Center for Land Use Policy, Planning and
Implementation
 All applications related to classifications or
reclassifications will be submitted to this center if it is a
unit under DAR.
 What is DOJ Opinion No. 44 issued by Sec. Franklin
Drilon:
The authority of DAR to approve land conversion only starts
on June 15, 1988. Before DAR there is no need for Land
conversion, because in the first place it is not an
agricultural land it is not covered, DAR has no
jurisdiction.
DAR A.O. NO. 4 (2003 RULES ON EXEMPTION)
 Authority of DAR to approve any application on this
starts June 15, 1988
 Requirements: sworn application, copy of title,
certification from HLURB (zoning or classification,
citing zoning ordinance), among others
 Public notice
 Disturbance compensation
Atty C: Before June 15, 1988, you want your land to be
exempted you have to follow the process, there is no
automatic result you have to undergo the process, file an
application, present your title, and prove to DAR that there is
a classification, there is a requirement of public notice.

What is this disturbance compensation?
It means that when there are parties tilling the land and the
land is to be exempted because of the classification, the owner
must pay the farmers disturbance compensation.
CASES
Natalia Realty – PP No. 1637 (1979?): town site
areas/reservation; “they ceased to be agricultural lands upon
approval of reservation.
ARBA vs Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. – PP No. 1637 (1977) Zoning
ordinance by LGU and approval of HLURB (1982): “only land
classifications or reclassifications which occur from June 15,
1988 onwards require conversion clearance from the DAR. “
NHA vs. Allarde: PP No. 843 (1971)
Advincula – Velasquez – zoning ordinance (1981) and HLURB
approval (1981)
DAR vs Berenguer – Res. No. 5 (1981) : HLURB certification
(1999)
Atty C: On DAR vs. Berenguer, Why is it 1999, why is it
considered by the court, in the first place there was no issue
that was raised , but if you would ask me, there is a valid
classification notwithstanding the certification happened only
after June 15, 1988.
Why is it in Natalia, 1979 is question mark, nga pareho ra man,
I submit the court committed an error, because the effective
date is not 1979, it is 1977.
CASES
Jopson vs. Mendez – zoning ordinance (1978) and HLURB
approval (1980)
Heirs of Deleste – Zoning ord. (1975) , HSRC approval by
Imelda Marcos (1978)
Rom. Vs. Roxas & CO.- Zoning Ord (1982) , HSRC approval
(1983)
Davao New Town – 1979 -2000 Comprehensive Development
Plan, HSRC approved the plan (1980) , SP approved the plan
thru zoning ord (1982)
Atty C: You will notice, classification ,approval happen before
June 15, 1988 , so is there a need for DAR to ?issue? of
clearance ? No.
NATALIA REALTY V. DAR
NATALIA seeks to set aside the notice of coverage which DAR
Secretary did not act upon hence recourse to SC; NATALIA
imputed grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for
including underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue that
NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands
19 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential
fiat for the townsite reservation.
1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312
hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San
Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated
as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties
are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.
NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision
Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307
hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the
notice of Coverage.
SC:
The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands."
These lots were intended for residential use.
“they ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the
reservation”
Lands previously converted by government agencies, other
than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
the CARL were outside the coverage of that law.
Ruling not confined solely to agricultural lands located within
townsite reservations, but applied also to real estate
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
the CARL.
CREBA vs. SEC
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS: Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled
Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO
embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled
agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGU
into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec
DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non AgriculturalUses, it covers the
following: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial,
industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes;
(2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity
such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which
is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted
to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized;
and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial,
or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section
20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and
regulations, and are to be converted to such uses. The 2 earlier
AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions
particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies
and calamities. To address the conversion to lands to non
agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval
of land conversion through DAR Memo 88. CREBA claims that
there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such
stoppage
ISSUES: Is DAR's AO unconstitutional?
HELD: RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands
devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil, planting
of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or
fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person
whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands
not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other
non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands
reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988
are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of
conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA
6657 because there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act
No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the
DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded
lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion
authority.
Also, it violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because
it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall
be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that
the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on
local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2,
Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. There is
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law
because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are
not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and
oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on
pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is
discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is
patently biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all
other sectors of society. DISMISSED.
ALANGILAN V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
(What is the meaning of word “reserved”?)
Petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for
Exclusion/Exemption from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) Coverage; DAR denied it saying that the term
“reserved” denotes that it is not yet classified
1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the
subject landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning
20 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
ordinance (1982 Ordinance), which was approved by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission.
May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City
approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive
Zoning and Land Use Ordinance (1994 Ordinance),
reclassifying the landholding as residential-1.
SC: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was
classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and
was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the term reserved for residential does
not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-
agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term
reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use.
It does not denote that the property has already been
reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for
residential is not a land classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988,
the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was
bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had
to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as
residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been
earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims,
then there would have been no necessity for the passage of
the 1994 Ordinance.
Atty C: Look at the year 1982 the municipality of Batangas
classified the land of petitioner as reserved for residential
there was a zoning ordinance, 1994 there was a zoning map
and comprehensive zoning ordinance reclassifying the
landholding as res,. The argument of DAR: this zoning
ordinance do not make the land as residential. Why? Because
according to DAR in the 1982 zoning ordinance the word is
“reserve” appear? , it is merely reserved and that does not
change the nature of the land from agri to non-agri.
SC agreed with DAR, SC ruled that your property is still
agricultural, notwithstanding that there was a zoning
ordinance because it was only reserved on 1982 and it was
reclassified on 1994.
The court also ruled, that the premise is upon effectivity of
DAR the landholding was still agri because according to the
court because there was even a zoning ordinance passed in
1984 reclassifying the land as residential so, if the landholding
has already been classified as a residential on 1982 then there
would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994
ordinance.
In atty’s opinion, with due respect to the SC that is wrong,
because the word reserve was not used in defining agricultural
land in sec 3c and by using the word classification that has
nothing to do with the nature of the land. That has nothing to
do with how the land was used because classification is
prospective in nature. If you are a leader of certain city or
municipality do you want to be passive? Do you want that the
city will adjust where people will live and do business? No, you
want people to follow your what you want for the classification
and zoning, that is prospective. But what is DAR saying here
that since it is merely reserved then the nature of the land is
still agricultural and beside this reserve ruling this conclusion
by the court is based in wrong premise. What is this premise,
that at the time of effectivity the landholding was still an
agricultural, that’s wrong why? Because prior to June 15, 1988
in 1982 there was already a classification. The second ruling of
SC is also wrong with due respect to the court because the
court does not understand the difference between
classification and reclassification, Reclassification,
presupposes that there must be a prior classification.
What’s the purpose of having reclassification?
1. Probably there is a changed planning, probably before the
city said it is better to put the residence of the people here
but now it has changed that would be one.
2. Another is reclassification for the purpose of taxes. Agri to
res increase of tax, then res to commercial, increase, just like
IT park.
3. Now you look at the cases the word reserve was used by
Marcos, nganu man the word reserve was there because
Marcos saw that there would be over population in the
metropolitan of manila so iya gusto nag reserve siya daan
ug area sa kilid sa metropolitan manila, it was sustained and
the court agree that it was reclassification
(But do not listen to atty, unless your opinion is ask, your
answer must be in accordance with the SC ruling)
HEIRS OF DELESTE V. LBP (local zoning ordinance was
approved by now HLURB)
Facts: Subject property: 34.7 hectares, Iligan City
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313,
known as the Zoning Regulation of Iligan City, reclassifying
the subject property as commercial/residential.
Petitioners claimed that the land is outside of coverage
because of ordinance while DAR contended that there is no
evidence that the ordinance was approved by HLURB
Issue: Coverage of subject property under CARP
SC: Accompanying the Certification dated October 8, 1999
issued by Gil R. Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the
City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City, and the
letter dated October 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah,
Regional Officer of the HLURB, is the Certificate of Approval
issued by Imelda Romualdez Marcos, then Minister of Human
Settlements and Chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the
local zoning ordinance was, indeed, approved on September
21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that City
Ordinance No. 1313 enacted by the City of Iligan was
approved by the HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB.
LBP vs. Estate of Araneta
(Relation of PD 27, Proclamation and RA 6657; classification
medium)
Facts:
Large tract of land in Brgy.Mascap, Montalban, Rizal (formerly
Doronilla prop, now Araneta).
21 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation
1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed
Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated
area for townsite purposes, subject to private rights, if any
there be.
Then came the amendatory issuance, Proclamation 1637
dated April 18, 1977, thereby increasing the size of the
reservation, designated as Lungsod Silangan Townsite (LS
Townsite), by 20.312 hectares and revising its technical
description so as to include, within its coverage, other lands in
the municipalities of San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal to
absorb the population overspill in Greater Manila Area, but
again subject to private rights, if any there be.
The discontinuance of the OLT processing was obviously DARs
way of acknowledging the implication of the townsite
proclamation on the agricultural classification of theDoronilla
property. It ought to be emphasized, as a general proposition,
however, that the former agricultural lands of
Doronillasituated as they were within areas duly set aside for
townsite purposes, by virtue particularly of Proclamation
1637were converted for residential use.
Atty C: This case is very peculiar , It involves Doronilla Property
but I don’t think DAR will commit the same mistake, what
happened here, Doronilla property was acquired by DAR
under OLT (operation land transfer) because it was under PD
27. Here comes the proclamation of Marcos, with that
issuances DAR stopped, ghunong nila and ila activities in
relation to OLT, now the owner wanted DAR to proclaim the
land as land agricultural because there were proclamations
issued by Marcos. What was the argument issued by DAR? No,
you cannot do that the land was already covered by OLT.
SC said, DAR you are already estopped , why? Bec the moment
the issuances were made you stopped your activities in
relation to OLT that means you recognize by the issuances
made by marcos.
DAVAO NEW TOWN DEV’T CORP V. SPS SALIGA (Power
of LGU to classify; DAR approval not required)
Lands involved are in Davao City.
Private respondent filed a complaint for injunction,
cancellation of title and damages against petitioner before
PARAD.
Private respondent alleged that they and their parents are
tenants and that the transfer of lands to petitioner is
fraudulent.
Petitioner answered that it is a buyer in good faith and that
the lands were classified to be within an "urban/urbanizing
zone" in the "1979-2000 Comprehensive Land Use Plan for
Davao City" that was duly adopted by the City Council of
Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) (now the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board [HLURB]).
SC: Davao City Council was empowered to enact zoning
resolutions and ordinances per Sec. 3 of RA 2264.
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that this power of the local government units to
reclassify or convert lands to non-agricultural uses is not
subject to the approval of the DAR.
In the subsequent case of Junio v. Secretary Garilao, this Court
clarified, once and for all, that "with respect to areas classified
and identified as zonal areas not for agricultural uses, like
those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of RA 6657
on June 15, 1988, the DAR’s clearance is no longer necessary
for conversion."
Atty C:
Roxas& CO. vs CA (not in pointers) Due process necessary:
whether land is non-agricultural lies with DAR) The SC
declared that it has no power to determine whether the land
is non agricultural, and it is DAR that has that power, so even
if Roxas & Co. has submitted all documents for registration,
The SC did not rule. Rather it passed on the burden upon DAR.
Holy Trinity case (not in pointers): Resolution is not ordinance
therefore it is not a valid evidence. Is it not enough to present
the zoning ordinance do you need to present proofs or
evidences, I submit that there is none. An ordinance and a
certificate from HLURB – that would suffice.
AGRARIAN DISPUTE (SEC 50-A)
Sec 3 (d) - Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.
Atty C: Now, let’s look at the definition of Agra dispute:
 Any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements
(leasehold, tenancy, stewardship) over lands
devoted to agriculture
(you have to look what you have learned in RA
3844?, if there is a case to remove the lessee from
the land that is an agra dispute, if the lessee can not
agree on lease rental, agra dispute, whether this
person is qualified to succeed , agra dispute)
 Any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under CARL and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership
(2nd relating to compensation – intention is just
compensation, connect this with sec 16, DAR is
supposed to offer the owner just compensation if the
owner does not accept, the owner can go to DARAB,
file a case to determine just compensation, if
22 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
landowner is not satisfied with the ruling of DARAB
he can go to RTC, nganu di man CA? Because under
CARP RTC has the exclusive and original jurisdiction
with respect to this, so exclusive man sa RTC,
nganung allowed pa man sa DARAB? Because that is
provided by law and the court explained that the
determination of DARAB of just compensation is
preliminary.
 “tenancy relationship”
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
1. Parties tenants
2. Subject matter is agricultural land
3. Consent of parties
4. Purpose is agricultural production
5. Personal cultivation by tenant
6. Sharing of harvest between parties
Note: All requisites must concur, absence of one
does not make one a tenant. (ONE IS CONNECTED
WITH other or related)
Atty C: Subject matter is agricultural land, you go
back to 2 elements of agri land. Example the davao
new town case : SC said there is no agri land
therefore there is no agra dispute, because one
element is missing.
Used, among others, in:
Atty C: These are the example sections where the word agra
disputes were used.
 “Section 47. Functions of the BARC. — In addition
to those provided in Executive Order No. 229, the
BARC shall have the following functions:
(a) Mediate and conciliate between parties
involved agrarian dispute including matters related to in
an agrarian dispute including matters related to tenurial
and financial arrangements; xxx xxx xxx”
Atty C: BARC – Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, a
committee in a barangay were the function is mediation
and conciliation before an agra dispute will reach DAR
“Section 53. Certification of the BARC. — The DAR
 shall not take cognizance of any agrarian dispute or
controversy unless a certification from the BARC
that the dispute has been submitted to it for
mediation and conciliation without any success of
settlement is presented: xxx xxx xxx”
Atty C: Sec. 53 requires certification coming from
BARC kung naa kay CFA, certificate to file action
then it is also the certification in Agra.
 “Section 54. Certiorari. — Any decision, order,
award or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute
 or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of
this Act xxx xxx xxx”

Atty C: Sec 54 is about certiorari meaning every

decision of DAR regarding agra dispute, it can be
elevated to SC, by virtue of certiorari.

SECTION 50-A

“Section 19. Section 50 of RA 6657, as amended, is

hereby further amended by adding Sec 50-A to
read as follows:

“SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian

Dispute. – No court or prosecutor’s office shall take
cognizance of cases pertaining to the
implementation of the CARP except those provided
under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended. If there is an allegation from any of the
parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one
of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the
case shall be automatically referred by the judge or
the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine
and certify within fifteen (15) days from referral
whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That
from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved
party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred
by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor’s
office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional
trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial Who is expert in AGRA? It is DAR. They are the experts.
court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
Xxx xxx xxx” What will happen if a case that is agrarian in nature is filed in
the prosecutor’s office or the court?
Atty C: I believe you would remember that if there is an
allegation or a case is filed with a tenant farmer before the
court or a city prosecutor’s office, the court or prosecutor has
to refer the matter to DAR, and DAR refers such to PARO. The
The prosecutor/judge shall refer the case to DAR specifically
PARO has to certify within 15 days and return the case to the
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (DOJ Circular No. 40)
judge or prosecutor for the filing of the case. So there is an
who has jurisdiction over the place of the incident if the
admin order, implementing the Circular amendment.
following requisites are present:

1. There is an allegation from any party in the

complaint that the case is agrarian in nature.
2. One can prove that one of the parties is a tenant,
farmworker, farmer, or farmer by presenting the six
essential requisites.
(Chailese Dev. Vs. Dizon)
3. The case pertains to the implementation of the
CARP.

How about if the case is subject of an inquest and the

three (3) requisites stated above are alleged?

The inquest prosecutor shall immediately refer the case

to the PARO and release the respondent for further
preliminary investigation. (DOJ CIRCULAR NO. 40)

What issues should PARO determine upon referral (Sec.

5)?

23 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |

 1. W/N the cause of action of the pending case with
the referring Court or Office of the Public
Prosecutor is agrarian in nature, the jurisdiction of
which is lodged exclusively with the DAR: or,
2. W/N a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DAR is a prejudicial question to the issue pending
with the referring Court of office of the Public
Prosecutor.
NOTE: No other issue may be adjudicated or determined by
PARO.
Paro’s recommendation is final and non-appealable. However,
any party who may disagree with such recommendation has
judicial recourse by submitting one’s position to the referring
Court or of the office of the Public Prosecutor.
Exception: There is an automatic prima facie presumption that
an Agrarian dispute exists or that the case is agrarian in nature
in following instances in sec 8:
24 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Chailese Development vs. Dizon
FACTS
Chailese Development Company Inc. filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against 51 defendants, 8
whom are respondents in this case. It alleged that the
respondents were illegally occupying its landholdings.
In 2001, the DAR Secretary issued a Resolution ordering that
the disputed landholdings be converted for commercial and
light industrial use. Chailese averred that it was unable to
introduce developments because the land was being illegally
occupied.
The respondents on the other hand, raised the following
contentions:
1. The court had no jurisdiction
2. That prior to the transfer of the property to
Chailese, they were tenants of the landholdings
which was then a hacienda devoted to agricultural
production
3. That without their knowledge and consent, the land
was transferred to Chailese, who in order to avoid
coverage of CARL, filed a bogus petition for
conversion.
RTC Denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
RTC-MR (Chailese)
Granted, but ultimately reversed on motion of the
respondents.
Meanwhile, RA 9700 (CARP) took effect. One of the provisions
of RA 9700, Sec. 50-A vests upon the DAR the exclusive
jurisdiction of agrarian disputes. Respondents then filed a
motion to refer the case to DAR, but the RTC denied it because
it took cognizance of the case before the effectivity of RA
9700.
The RTC then ratiocinated that the referral of the case to DAR
would cause further delay in the disposition of the case.
Respondents filed a MR on this, but this was also denied by
the RTC. Respondents then went to CA.
CA : Ordered the referral of the case to DAR, stating that in
this case, there are more than sufficient allegations in the
pleadings of the parties that he case is agrarian in nature and
that the petitioners are bona fide tillers and occupants of the
subject property.
ISSUE + RULING
Whether or not DAR has jurisdiction over the case. DAR has
jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A.
No. 6657, otherwise known as the CARL, which provides:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). x x x.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) was designated to assume the powers and
functions of the DAR with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases, and matters relating to the
implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.
The exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR over agrarian cases was
further amplified by the amendment introduced by Section 19
of R.A. 9700 to Section 50. The provision reads:
Section 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended,
is hereby further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as
follows:
SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. No
court or prosecutor's o ce shall take cognizance of cases
pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those
provided under Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that
the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer,
farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred
by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall
determine and certify within fteen (15) days from referral
whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, that from the
determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have
judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court
and the prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper
regional trial court, and in cases referred by the regional trial
court, the appeal shall be to the Court of Appeals.
In cases where regular courts or quasi-judicial bodies have
competent jurisdiction, agrarian reform bene ciaries or identi
ed bene ciaries and/or their associations shall have legal
standing and interest to intervene concerning their individual
or collective rights and/or interests under the CARP.
The fact of non-registration of such associations with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or Cooperative
Development Authority, or any concerned government
agency shall not be used against them to deny the existence
of their legal standing and interest in a case led before such
courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
In this regard, it must be said that there is no merit in the
contention of petitioner that the amendment introduced by
R.A. No. 9700 cannot be applied retroactively in the case at
bar. Primarily, a cursory reading of the provision readily
reveals that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 merely highlighted
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR to rule on agrarian cases
by adding a clause which mandates the automatic referral of
cases upon the existence of the requisites therein stated.
Simply, R.A. No. 9700 does not deviate but merely reinforced
the jurisdiction of the DAR set forth under Section 50 of R.A.
No. 6657. Moreover, in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary, as the amendment is essentially procedural in nature
25 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
it is deemed to apply to all actions pending and undetermined
at the time of its passage
Thence, having settled that Section 19 of R.A. No. 9700 is
applicable in this controversy, the Court now proceeds with
the examination of such amendment. Based on the said
provision, the judge or prosecutor is obligated to
automatically refer the cases pending before it to the DAR
when the following requisites are present:
a. There is an allegation from any one or both of the parties
that the case is agrarian in nature; and
b. One of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant.
Isidro v. CA
Private resp is owner of land. Sister of private respondent
allowed Isidro to occupy swampy portion subject to condition
to vacate upon demand. Failure to vacate, unlawful detainer
was filed against Isidro. RTC dismissed because land is
agricultural and so agrarian.
SC
Jurisdiction over subject matter determined from allegations
of complaint. Court does not lose jurisdiction by defense of
tenancy relationship and only after hearing that, if tenancy is
shown, the court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Case
involving agri land does not automatically make such case
agrarian. Six requisites were not present. There was no
contract to cultivate and petitioner failed to substantiate claim
that he was paying rent for use of land.
Atty C: The judge dismissed the case of unlawful detainer on
the ground that the land involved was an agricultural land, so
this is an agra dispute, I have no jurisdiction.
SC said that’s wrong. Because the only requisite present was
that the land was an agri land. A case involving an agricultural
land would depend upon the allegations made in the
complaint. However, a case involving agricultural land doesn’t
make such case an agra dispute upon which DARAB has
jurisdiction. To confer jurisdiction to DARAB, the six essential
requisites must be alleged and proven in the complaint.
BEJASA V. CA
FACTS: Candelaria owned two parcels of land, which she
leased to Malabanan. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on
the land and clear it, with all the expenses shouldered by
Malabanan. Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not
give any consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or
a shared harvest
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in favor
of the Bejasas
SC: Court found that there was no tenancy relationship
between the parties. There was no proof that Malabanan and
the
Bejasas shared the harvests. Candelaria never gave her
consent to the Bejasas’ stay on the land . There was no proof
that the Dinglasans gave authority to the Bejasas to be the
tenant of the land in question. Not all the elements of tenancy
were met in this case. There was no proof of sharing in harvest.
While
Bejasa testified, SC said only Bejasa’s word was presented to
prove this. Besides testimony was suspicious because of
inconsistency Bejasa testified that he agreed to deliver 1/5 of
harvest as owner’s share, yet at one time, he also mentioned
that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% for owner. Moreover,
landowners never gave consent, citing Chico vs. CA , 284 534
– “self serving statement are inadequate, proof must be
adhered”. Even assuming that landowner agreed to lease it for
P20,000per year, such agreement did not prove tenancy .
Consideration should be harvest sharing.
Atty C: The Bejasas were the persons who claimed to be
tenants they file a case they want to be confirmed as lessee.
The court said there was no proof.
Candelaria is the owner, malabanan is the lessee. It was
malabanan who hired Bejasa. Very obvious, no consent from
the owner. There was no proof that malabanan and Bejasa
shared the harvest. Candelaria never gave consent to Bejasa.
There was no consent, and so there was no tenancy
relationship. The point is, if there are occupants in the
property claiming to be tenants, the land is agricultural, they
are cultivating, they allege sharing of the harvest, but the
owner proves there was no consent, then the occupants
cannot claim tenancy relationship. The tenants can be ejected.
How do you prove sharing? There has to be a receipt, or any
other similar evidence. Is it possible? No because the receipt
can be used against the owner. Normally, in the absence of
receipt, the evidence of the tenant can be an affidavit because
the proceedings before is submission of position paper. You
attach affidavits. Can you submit your own affidavit if you are
a tenant? Yes, but the court will normally say that it is self-
serving. You have to prove through independent evidence –
affidavits of neighbours or other tenants.
AMUETE v. ANDRES (Issue on Ownership)
Facts: Almuete was in exclusive possession of subject land.
Unknown to Almuete, Andres was awarded homestead patent
due to investigation report that Almuete was unknown and
waived his rights; Andres also represented that Almuete sold
the property to Masiglat for radiophone set and that Masiglat
sold to him for a carabao and P600. Almuete filed an action
for recovery of possession and reconveyance before trial
court. Issue is who between 2 awardees of lot has better right
to property.
SC: This is controversy relating to ownership of farmland so,
beyond the ambit of agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of
landowner and tenant was alleged between petitioners and
respondent. RTC was competent to try the case.
Atty C: The issue is whether there is an agrarian dispute. No.
The issue was about ownership so it is beyond the ambit of
agrarian dispute. There was no juridical tie. There is no tenancy
involved there.
BCDA vs. PARO
FACTS: PARO issued CLOAS in favor of private respondents.
The BCDA questioned the said issuance because the subject
properties were already titled in the name of the Republic.
Furthermore, the said properties were already reserved as part
of a military reservation. Hence, the BCDA alleges that the
CLOAS are null and void.
26 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
ISSUE (in relation to AGRA): W/N there is an agrarian dispute
given the fact that the questioned CLOAS are issued by PARO
RULING: No, there is no agrarian dispute because jurisdiction
is determined by the allegations in the complaint and in the
case at bar, there was no allegation of an agrarian dispute in
the complaint.
Atty C: BCDA is the holder of the title the land that was left by
the US basis? The land is titled in the name of BCDA, the PARO
also said they have the title in the name of the republic of the
phil. Because the property has been acquired. The question
who has the valid title ? That is not an agra dispute.
NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION V. LEONIDA DE LEON
Facts: On August 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint
before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) of Region IV Province of Cavite, praying
that petitioners Salvador R. Lim and/or NICORP Management
and Development
Corporation (NICORP) be ordered to respect her tenancy
rights over a parcel of land located in Barangay Mambog III,
Bacoor, Cavite, registered under TCT No. T72669 in the name
of Leoncia De Leon and Susana De Leon Loppacher (De Leon
sisters), who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in
the suit.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and
cultivator of the land since time immemorial with full
knowledge and consent of the owners, who were her sisters-
in-law; that sometime in 2004, petitioners circulated rumors
that they have purchased the property from the De Leon
sisters; that petitioners ignored respondent's requests to show
proof of their alleged ownership; that on August 12, 2004,
petitioners entered the land and uprooted and destroyed the
rice planted on the land and graded portions of the land with
the use of heavy equipment; that the incident was reported to
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which issued a
Cease and Desist Order but to no avail.
Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to
respect her tenancy rights over the land; restore the land to its
original condition and not to convert the same to non-
agricultural use; that any act of disposition of the land to any
other person be declared null and void because as a tenant,
she allegedly had a right of pre-emption or redemption over
the land.
Petitioner Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the
subject property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). He alleged that respondent is a
septuagenarian who is no longer physically capable of tilling
the land; that the MARO issued a certification that the land
had no registered tenant; that respondent could not be
regarded as a landless tiller under the CARP because she owns
and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which
she acquired through inheritance; that an Affidavit of Non-
Tenancy was executed by the De Leon sisters when they sold
the property to him.
Moreover, Lim claimed that respondent and her family
surreptitiously entered the subject land and planted a few
crops to pass themselves off as cultivators thereof; that
respondent
tried to negotiate with petitioner Lim for the sale of the land
to her, as the latter was interested in entering into a joint
venture with another residential developer, which shows that
respondent has sufficient resources and cannot be a
beneficiary under the CARP; that the land is no longer
classified as agricultural and could not thus be covered by the
CARP. Per certification issued by the Office of the Municipal
Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, the
land is classified as residential pursuant to a Comprehensive
Land Use Plan approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Issue: Whether or not the land is exempted.
SC: In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to
support the appellate court's conclusion that respondent is a
bona fide tenant on the subject property. Respondent failed
to prove the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not
shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy
relationship with respondent who was their sister-in-law; or
that the De Leon sisters received any share in the harvests of
the land from respondent or that the latter delivered a
proportionate share of the harvest to the landowners
pursuant to a tenancy relationship.
The affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters
received a portion of the harvests or that respondent
delivered the same to her sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed
to disclose the circumstances or details of the alleged harvest
sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known
respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time
immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as evidence of
harvest sharing.
That respondent was allowed to cultivate the property without
opposition, does not mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly
recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with
respondent. Occupancy and continued possession of the land
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.
Finally, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not
violate Sections 65 33 and 73 34 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. There
was no illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65 applies
only to lands which were covered by the CARP, i.e., those lands
beyond the five-hectare retention limit allowed to landowners
under the law, which were distributed to farmers beneficiaries.
In the instant case, it was not shown that the subject land was
covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was
made to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at
dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.
Atty C: There was a letter witten by a filipino , the word kasama
was used, the alleged tenants said we were recorded as
kasama it means we were the tenants. The SC said no, that
word can be interpreted in several context.
Note: Who has the burden of proof? The person who alleged
tenancy.
27 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO AND EMER FAJARDO V. ANITA
R. FLORES
Facts: Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in
Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus Fajardo to
cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally
between the two until 1975 when the relationship was
converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order 2 from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office,
Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally
fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo religiously
complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the land,
he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for
his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of
controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter
and sole heir, herein respondent Anita Flores, inherited the
property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo
executed an agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA
MAGKABILANG PANIG." This was followed by another
agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," executed on
July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot
No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to
petitioner. Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the
interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and
Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial
Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. In the Report and
Recommendation dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer
advised the parties to ventilate their claims and counterclaims
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by
herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted by her husband
Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she
alleged that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes,
she inherited a parcel of land consisting of stony land, not
devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted to
agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan; that, sometime in the 1960s, during the lifetime of
Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus Fajardo requested the former to
allow him to work and cultivate that portion of land devoted
to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a
house on the stony part of the land, and that the use and
occupation of the stony part of the land was by mere tolerance
only; and that the land, which was divided equally between
the two parties, excluded the stony portion. In February 1999,
respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed
them of her intention to repossess the stony portion, but
petitioners refused to heed the request.
Issue: Whether or not MTC or the DARAB which has
jurisdiction over the case.
SC: An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner
to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to
agriculture.
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding
tenurial arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans,
which allegedly terminated the tenancy relationship between
the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit
of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian
dispute because the controversy involves the home lot of
petitioners, an incident arising from the landlord-tenant
relationship.
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that
'all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the
landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and
disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of
landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.' This
jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the
relationship of landlord and tenant — at the time of the
dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arises,
precisely from the previous termination of such relationship.
If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the
controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not
said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the
dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord
and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of
Agrarian Relations . . ."
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy
relationship has been terminated by the Kasulatan is of no
moment. As long as the subject matter of the dispute is the
legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute
originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by
the DAR, through the DARAB. The severance of the tenurial
arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of
an agrarian dispute.
ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON V. MERCEDES R. SUSANO
Facts: Pastor M. Samson (Pastor) owned a 1.0138-hectare
parcel of land known as Lot 1108 of the Tala Estate Subdivision
located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Pastor was approached by his friend Macario Susano
(Macario) who asked for permission to occupy a portion of Lot
1108 to build a house for his family. Since Pastor was
godfather to one
of Macario's children, Pastor acceded to Macario's request. to
know of the transaction only after Chan visited the property
sometime in October 1990 accompanied by an employee
from the city government.
Issue: Whether or not there was a tenancy relation between
Pastor Samson and Macario Susano and in binding herein
petitioner.
28 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
SC: We find in favor of petitioners. Applying our
pronouncement in Levardo v. Yatco, we rule that the subject
land cannot be subject to the OLT program of P.D. No. 27 for
two reasons: first, the subject land is less than seven hectares;
and second, respondents failed to show that Pastor owned
other agricultural lands in excess of seven hectares or urban
land from which he derived adequate income, as required by
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474.
Moreover, the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines
on Retention by Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is
explicit:
5.Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less
shall not be covered by Operation Land Transfer. The relation
of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas shall be
leasehold . . .
However, while the disputed landholding which had an
original aggregate area of only 1.0138 hectares is not covered
by the OLT program, the same may still be covered by P.D. No.
27, albeit under its Operation Land Leasehold (OLL) program.
The OLL program placed landowners and tenants of
agricultural land devoted to rice and corn into a leasehold
relationship as of October 21, 1972. But the fact that Macario,
respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was a de jure tenant
must be established.
In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are
unanimous in their conclusion that an implied tenancy
relationship existed between Pastor Samson and Macario
Susano, no specific evidence was cited to support such
conclusion other than their observation that Pastor failed to
protest Macario's possession and cultivation over the subject
land for more than 30 years. Contrary to what is required by
law, however, no independent and concrete evidence were
adduced by respondents to prove that there was indeed
consent and sharing of harvests between Pastor and Macario.
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of
an agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure
tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to
prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of
the landowner. Substantial evidence necessary to establish the
fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of
evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record
adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing
of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be
presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.
Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its
existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by
conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by
the mere congruence of facts but, being a legal relationship,
the mutual will of the parties to that relationship should be
primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that all
the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
The affidavits executed by three of respondents' neighbors are
insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship
between Pastor and Macario.
Atty C:
  Affidavit of a neighbor is not self-serving because it
comes from a third person. However, that does not
necessarily mean that it is sufficient to prove
tenancy.
 To make it sufficient, the affidavit must contain how
it was given and implemented and when and where
it was made coupled with the major requirement
which is PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.
 Ganahan sa court specific.
HEIRS OF FLORENTINO QUILO V. DBP (tenancy not
established)
Petitioners are heirs of Florentino who claimed to be a tenant
of the subject land.
DBP was the mortgagee of the subject land that was
mortgaged by the previous owners (Sps. Oliveros) and sold to
private respondents.
The proceedings started at RARAD with Florentino (later
substituted by his heirs when he died) claiming a right to
redeem for being a tenant.
RARAD and DARAB ruled for the heirs while CA reversed as
tenancy relationship was not established.
Consent:
 There is no evidence that the spouses Oliveros agreed
to enter into a tenancy relationship with Quilo. His
self-serving statement that he was a tenant was not
sufficient to prove consent.
 Proof of consent is needed to establish tenancy
 Independent and concrete evidence is needed to
prove consent of the landowner
 Petitioners have the burden of proving their
affirmative allegation of tenancy
 It is elementary that one who alleges the affirmative of
issue has the burden of proof
 Petitioners in the instant case failed to prove the
elements of consent and sharing of harvests
 Although petitioners presentedthe Affidavits of Obillo
and Bulatao, as well as the DAR Notice of Conference
dated 12 Sept 1975, these documents merely
established that Quilo occupied and cultivated the
land.
 Specifically, the Notice of Conference and the
affidavits only showed that first, Quilo filed a
Complaint against the Sps Oliveros regarding the land
he was cultivating; and second, the affidavits
confirmed merely that Quilo had been planting on the
land. These documents in no way confirm that his
presence on the land was based on a tenancy
relationship that the Sps Oliveros had agreed to.
Atty C: The court was looking for receipts and other evidences.
REYES V. HEIRS OF FLORO (tenancy is not established)
29 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
Petitioner filed with PARAD a Complaint for Pre-Emption and
Redemption, Maintenance of Peaceful Possession,
Occupation and Cultivation with prayer for issuance of
Restraining Order/Injunction against Zenaida Reyes, Sun
Industrial and Heirs of Pablo Floro
Petitioner alleged that the land was formally owned by
Carmen Bautista
Bautista allegedly sold the land to Zenaida as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity.
Before Bautista sold the land, Reyes was allegedly one of her
tenant-lesses.
Issue: Are the parties the true and legitimate landowner and
tenant?
Reyes relies on the certifications from the MARO and Bautista,
the alleged original owner, manifesting that he was a tenant
of the subject land to prove that a tenancy relationship exists.
SC: The MARO certification (“certified as agricultural lessee”)
is merely preliminary and does not bind the courts as
conclusive evidence that Reyes is a lessee who cultivates the
land for purposes of agricultural production. In Bautista v.
Araneta,39 we held that certifications issued by administrative
agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional and not conclusive on the courts.
Reyes failed to submit any proof that he personally cultivated
the land for agricultural production or that he shared the
harvests with the landowner. Reyes only submitted a picture
of a hut erected on the land as an incident to his right to
cultivate the land as a tenant. This is not enough to prove that
a leasehold relationship exists.
The certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value,
without any corroborative evidence. The certification was not
notarized and Bautista was not even presented as a witness.
Similarly, Reyes was not included as a legitimate and properly
registered agricultural tenant in the supposed Deed of
Absolute Sale with Agricultural Tenants Conformity which
Bautista executed in favor of Zenaida.
Atty C: There were two evidences scrutinized by the SC, one is
thecertification from the MARO, mau niang g gamit sa alleged
tenant. What is the content of the certification, that person is
an agri lessee. Why was this not given credence by the court,
the court said, this certification is not bounding upon us, we
will make our own determination. Aside from that, this is a
conclusion of law, the MARo should have certified when the
adjudicated was made , who are the parties, what was the
agreement all about. Going back to the 6th requisite, do not
simply sa agri lessee. Aside from the MARO there was a cert
from orig owner, certifying that the person was an agri lessee.
The court said that is not sufficient the cert was not notarized
and the original owner was not presented. If notarized?
Dawatun? Dawatun basta notarized.
Picture of the land bisan naay carabao ngara – not enough.
DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORP V. SPS SALIGA
SC: No tenancy relationship exists between DNTDC, as the
owner of the property, and the respondents, as the purported
tenants; the second essential requisite as outlined above – the
subject is agricultural land – is lacking. To recall, the property
had already been reclassified as non-agricultural land.
Accordingly, the respondents are not de jure tenants and are,
therefore, not entitled to the benefits granted to agricultural
lessees under the provisions of P.D. No. 27, in relation to R.A.
No. 6657.
AUTOMAT REALTY V. SPS CRUZ (tenancy is not
established)
The land was not occupied in 1990 when it was purchased by
Automat. Respondent Ofelia dela Cruz volunteered her
services to petitioner Lim as caretaker to prevent informal
settlers from entering the property. Automat agreed, through
its authorized administrator, petitioner Lim, on the condition
that the caretaker would voluntarily vacate the premises upon
Automat’s demand.
Respondent spouses’ family stayed in the property as rent-
paying tenants. They cultivated and improved the land. They
shared the produced palay with Automat through its
authorized agent, petitioner Lito Cecilia (petitioner Cecilia). He
also remitted the rentals paid by respondent Ofelia Dela Cruz
to petitioner Lim in Makati and to Automat's office in Quezon
City.
Sometime in August 2000, Automat asked respondent
spouses to vacate the premises as it was preparing the
groundwork for developing the property.
Respondent spouses refused to vacate unless they were paid
compensation. They claimed "they were agricultural tenants
[who] enjoyed security of tenure under the law."
SC: (on allegations as tillers)
This court has held that a MARO certification "concerning the
presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between
the contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or
provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the
judiciary."
The amended certification does not bind this court. Several
elements must be present before the courts can conclude that
a tenancy relationship exists. MARO certifications are limited
to factual determinations such as the presence of actual tillers.
It cannot make legal conclusions on the existence of a tenancy
agreement.
Atty C: this is a classic case of a landowner na manluod.
Nihangyo siya wa man gamita imu yuta ako sa bantay
paghuman pagpahaon na di muhawa.
Who has the burden of proof? The spouses not Automat
What about sharing of harvest what was the allegation?
Automat never denied rental, is tis correct? NO.
CALUZOR V. LLANILLO (tenancy is not established)
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Petitioner claimed to be a tenant and filed a petition before
PARAD.
Private respondents denied tenancy.
SC: The presence of all these elements must be proved by
substantial evidence;24 this means that the absence of one
will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.
Being the party alleging the existence of the tenancy
relationship, the petitioner carried the burden of proving the
allegation of his tenancy.
In establishing the tenancy relationship, therefore,
independent evidence, not self-serving statements, should
prove, among others, the consent of the landowner to the
relationship, and the sharing of harvests.
The third and sixth elements of agricultural tenancy were not
shown to be presented in this case.
To prove the element of consent between the parties, the
petitioner testified that Lorenzo had allowed him to cultivate
the land by giving to him the sketch of the lot in order to
delineate the portion for his tillage. Yet, the sketch did not
establish that Lorenzo had categorically taken the petitioner
in as his agricultural tenant. This element demanded that the
landowner and the tenant should have agreed to the
relationship freely and voluntarily, with neither of them unduly
imposing his will on the other. The petitioner did not make
such a showing of consent.
LIGTAS V. PEOPLE (DARAB decision is conclusive and is
binding on Courts)
Ligtas was charged and convicted of theft
Ligtas filed a petition before DARAB for Maintenance of
Peaceful Possession where she was declared a de jure tenant;
the decision became final for lack of appeal
SC: A DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy
relationship is conclusive and binding on courts if supported
by substantial evidence.
In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and
affidavits of both petitioner and private complainant. It was
convinced by petitioner's evidence, which consisted of sworn
statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was
installed as tenant by Andres Pacate sometime in 1993.
Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the
produce after harvest. However, Andres Pacate had died
before the first harvest. Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest
until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the land on June 29,
2000.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on
criminal proceedings.
However, this case does not involve an administrative charge
stemming from the same set of facts involved in a criminal
proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both
criminal and administrative liability. DARAB Case No. VIII-319-
SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a
tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves
determination of whether petitioner committed theft.
However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in determining
whether all the elements of theft were proven by the
prosecution.
DAR V. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS (no tenancy)
PARO filed a petition before PARAD to nullify the sale of
several lands including the land of private respondents on the
ground that the sale was effected without DAR clearance.
Private respondents opposed, the petition is about
administrative implementation, so with Sec. Of DAR, not
DARAB.
SC: PARO’s petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenural or
agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land.
Even the petition filed with the PARAD failed to indicate
otherwise, that the subject parcels of land had not been the
subject of any notice of coverage under CARL. Clearly, the
PARO’s cause of action was merely founded on the absence
of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of the subject
parcels of land, which were claimed in the petition to be
agricultural.
The ground for the nullification of the Deeds of Sale in this
case is the absence of a DAR clearance. However, since such
clearance is not one of the requisites in an Agrarian Dispute,
it is an administrative matter.
DAR V. ROBLES (tenancy alleged)
DAR vs. Robles – (compared with paramount holdings)
annulment of titles and CLOAs for lack of DAR clearance, clear
violation of law; the sale was made to avoid retention limits
and coverage under CARP.
Petition filed by PARO before PARAD to annul deeds of sale
and cancel titled for lack of DAR clearance.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
PARAD and CA held that DAR Adjudication Board has no
jurisdiction.
The issue before SC is whether the Adjudicatory Board has
jurisdiction over annulment of sale and the corresponding
titles issued.
Allegations in petition:
o 4.1 The late Eduardo Reyes was the original registered
owner of TCT 85055 and TCT 116506, an agricultural
land situated at Brgy. Ambling, Magdalena, Laguna,
consisting of 195,366 sq. meters and 7,431 sq. meters,
respectively.
31 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
o 4.2 The land described under TCT 85055 was issued a
notice of coverage under the Compulsory Acquisition
(CA) scheme pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. 6657.
Subdivision plan over this property has been approved
and the DAR is now on the process of generating the
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the
qualified recipient of the government's land reform
program. However, pending processing of the case
folder, the DAR Municipal Office in Magdalena
received on September 8, 2005 a letter coming from
Atty. Homer Antazo, the alleged counsel of Igmidio
Robles and Christina Robles informing the MAR Office
of the subsequent sale of the property in their favor
attaching documents in support of their claim. It was
only then, after proper verification with the Register of
Deeds that the DAR found out that indeed the
properties under TCT-T-85055 and TCT T-116506 were
all conveyed and transferred in favor of the herein
private respondents by well intentioned deeds of
absolute sale executed in 1997. xxx Subsequently, by
virtue of such deeds of sale the Registry of Deeds
caused the cancellation of TCT T-85055 and TCT
116506 and the issuance of new titles in private
respondents' favor without securing the necessary
clearance from the DAR as mandated under
Administrative Order No. 1 series of 1989. xxx The said
titles were issued arbitrarily and in clear violation of
Section 6 of R.A. 6657, hence null and void. Xxx
o 4.4 The Registry of Deeds was probably not aware and
mindful on the extent of properties of Eduardo Reyes,
that it exceeded more than the retention limit but, thru
machinations and crafty action exerted to by the
parties to accomplish an evil end, the immediate
cancellation was brought to completion.
o Eduardo - owner (195,366 and 7, 431 sq. M.)
 Subdivided the first lot to five lots
 Sale two lots on Apr. 17, 1997 to respondents as
follows: 1. Igmidio D. Robles - 38,829 sq. m.;
2. Randy V. Robles - 39,896 sq. m.;
3. Mary Krist B. Malimban - 38,904 sq. m.;
4. Anne Jamaca G. Robles - 38,595 sq. m.;
5. John Carlo S. Robles - 39,142 sq. m.; and
6. Christine Anne V. Robles - 7,431 sq. M.
Given that PARO’s petition in this case likewise failed to allege
any tenancy or agrarian relations and to indicate an agrarian
dispute, and its cause of action is merely founded on the
absence of a clearance to cover the sale and registration of
subject lands, it bears emphasis that the DARAB’s jurisdiction
is not limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy relationship
between the parties exists. Under Sec. 1 (1.13), Rule II of the
2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB also has
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters referred to it by the
Sec of DAR such as the PARO’s petition for annulment of
deeds of sale and titles pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 01-89 and
DAR M.C. No. 02-01 for violation of the legal requirement for
clearances in the sale and transfer of agricultural lands.
Paramount is inapplicable given the different allegations in
the petition. In this case, there is an allegation that one of the
subject lands was issued a notice of coverage while there was
none in Paramount. In this case, the sale appears to have been
done to avoid the retention limits and coverage under CARP
while in Paramount, based on the records, the lands were
classified as industrial before effectivity of CARL.
Atty C: The SC made a comparison between this case and the
paramount Holding case.
Paramount holding case: There was also an annulment of the
titles and the CLOAs there was only one ground relied upon
by the PARAD and the ground is lack of DAR clearance. In this
case the SC said it is not an agra dispute because the lack of
DAR clearance is related to ALI (Agra law implementation) it
has nothing to do with agra dispute.
Roble case: The court said this is an agra dispute because
there were 2 grounds raised: the first ground was the lack of
DAR clearance, the second ground is the violation of law, the
avoidance of the retention limit and coverage.
Why? What happened here? We have a landowner who has
20-30 hectares of agri land, what he did to circumvent the Law
he subdivided the land. Now, there were a portion consisting
of 5 hectares sold to the son, the other portions were given to
different persons. It was subdivided in order to circumvent the
retention limits. The court said there is a clear violation of law
and that is an agra dispute. And how is it different with
paramount holdings. The court said that in paramount
holdings the only issue that was raised the was the lack of DAR
clearance which is ALI(Agra law implementation) but here it
is not only the lack of DAR clearance was raised.
Summary:
In this case, a Notice of Coverage was sent to Eduardo that
the
land was covered under the Agrarian Reform.
Furthermore, the grounds were the (1) lack of a DAR clearance
coupled with the (2) transfer of land beyond the retention
limit. Hence, there was a circumvention of the law especially
that Eduardo divided the land so that the land will not be
under the Agrarian Reform
If the ground was only one of the two grounds stated then the
ruling would have been similar to the Paramount case.
If it was subdivided before June 15, 1988, it would have been
acceptable provided that it is not a land for corn amongst
others under PD 27 and there are no farmers on the land.
MALABANAN V. HEIRS OF RESTRIVERA (no tenurial
relationship)
Petitioners were awarded lands covered by CLOA
Petition filed before PARAD by respondents to annul CLOA,
sale, repossession and reconveyance invoking preferential
rights as beneficiaries under Sec 22 of CARL
PARAD, DARAB and CA upheld jurisdiction of the Adjudicatory
Board
Issue before SC is whether the Adjudicatory Board has
jurisdiction over petition for cancellation of title and
reconveyance
32 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
SC: It is not sufficient that the controversy involves the
cancellation of a CLOA already registered with the Land
Registration Authority as in this case. For purposes of
determining whether DARAB has jurisdiction, the central
consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute.
In this case, respondents have not alleged any tenurial
relationship with petitioners. Rather, their petition is centered
on their supposed preferential right as farmer-beneficiaries
and the suitability of the land for CARP coverage. These are
matters falling under the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of
DAR, which is supposed to determine and adjudicate all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.
Atty C: Beneficiaries nag away, ingun usa kami ang immediate
beneficiaries gusto nila ipa nullify ang CLOA sa lain, ingun ag
court that is not an agra dispute , what is that? ALI. Kinsa man
mu identify nila as parties ? DAR secretary. Who will issue
CLOA ? DAR Sec.
LANDICHO V. LIMQUECO
(agrarian dispute present) – invocation of rights by
beneficiaries as they were deceived into signing
documents which turn out to be deeds of sale and lease
within the 10-year prohibited period; transfers shall be
nullified.
Case: CLOAs were awarded in favor of petitioners while
respondents were previous landowners who retained part of
the agricultural lands
Petitioners alleged that they were made to sign documents by
respondents which in turn out to be deed of sale and lease
within the 10-year prohibited period and that titles were
delivered by them to respondents without any consideration
PARAD upheld jurisdiction but CA reversed. Issue is on
jurisdiction.
SC:
These allegations plainly show that the petitioners are
invoking their rights as beneficiaries of the CARL; that they
consider the conveyance of their properties as having been
made in violation of the terms and conditions of the CARL;
and that all of the transfers should be nullified because they
were procured through fraud, undue influence and mistake.
All these constitute an agrarian dispute in the context of a
controversy relating to terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowner to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
This is because the main contention of the parties was clearly
couched on the alleged denial by the respondent of their
established rights as beneficiaries over the subject properties
under agrarian reform laws.
In order for the DARAB and PARAD to exercise jurisdiction
over such controversies, sufficient allegations establishing the
existence of an agrarian dispute must be made in the
complaint following the rule that the jurisdiction of a tribunal,
including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over
the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the
character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Atty Capanas:
It is highly possible, previous landowners made their farmer
beneficiaries to sign deed of sale and contract of lease without
explaining to the farmers what were the contents of the
document. You have landowners who are not concern about
the welfare of the farmer beneficiaries, they still want to hold
on their parties, notwithstanding that the properties had
already been acquired by the government. So, the problem
here is the execution of the deeds were made within the 10
year prohibited period so the farmers file a case to nullify the
deeds of sale. So where did the farmers file the case? Before
the agra court. The court said it is an agrarian dispute, because
this is about terms and conditions in relation to the transfer of
ownership. Because one of the issue that will be resolved by
agra court is whether this complainant has right under agra
law. Once there is an invocation of a right under agra, it is a
dispute and has to be resolved in agra court.
Situation 1: What about, if the sale was not made within the
10 year prohibited period but after the 10 yr prohibited
period. Does agra court has jurisdiction?
I submit that the agra court has no jurisdiction. Because if it is
beyond the 10 year prohibited period it is not covered under
agra even if the buyers are previous landowners.
DAR V. WOODLAND
Facts:
NOC dated 11 Dec 2003 and NOA dated 5 Oct 2004 were
issued over the portion of respondent’s land
Issue: Can petitioner still issue NOC and NOA after June 15,
1998?
SC:
For us to sustain Woodland's theory that the DAR can no
longer issue those notices after 15 June 1998 despite the
enactment of R.A. 8532 would thwart the CARP's purpose.
Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL
in its entirety, not just the funding source. Indeed, R.A. 8532
specifically amended Section 63 of R.A. 6657, but it does not
follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the
amendment. The fact that Section 63 falls under the chapter
on "Financing" only emphasizes its general applicability.
Hence, the phrase "until the year 2008" used in R.A. 8532
unmistakably extends the DAR's authority to issue NOCs for
purposes of acquiring and distributing private agricultural
lands.
Finally, R.A. 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of
all agricultural lands until 30 June 2014. The title alone of R.A.
9700 - An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and
Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary
Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657, Otherwise Known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, As Amended,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor - reveals that the CARP was
indeed extended from 1998 to 2008 via R.A. 8532. Had there
been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could
the CARP have been extended by R.A. 9700 until 30 June
33 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
2014? There could have been an extension only if the program
sought to be extended had not expired.
 RA 9700
 Approved Aug 7, 2009
 “Sec 34. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect
on July 1,2009 and it shall be published in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.”
 RA 9700, Sec 21:
"SEC. 63. Funding Source. - The amount needed to further
implement the CARP as provided in this Act, until June 30,
2014, upon expiration of funding under Republic Act No. 8532
and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from the Agrarian
Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at
least One hundred fifty billion pesos (P150,000,000,000.00).”
Atty C:
Woodland case: Woodland argued that there were 2 notices
issued against the properties of woodland against, 2003 and
2004. Woodland said under sec 5 the implementation was for
a period of only 10 years when those notices were issued on
2003 and 2004 there was no legal basis to implement the law,
because it has already expired. SC said no that is not correct
because under RA 8532 sec 63 was amended but what about
sec 5 it was not amended the court said that is deemed
amended when sec 63 was amended . The court further said
if indeed it was true that it was not amended here, if you look
at RA 9700, RA 9700 is about an extension so If presupposes
that there was an extension here because RA 97000 talks
about extension. But what you are looking at there is no gap
supposedly on the implementation. Because once there is a
gap I submit there are legal implications.
What are the possible legal implications?
DAR cannot legally issue Notice of Coverage, if there is a
notice of coverage issued and it is considered void. All
subsequent proceedings would be void.
Now, why is it this is a mere resolution? Because it was during
this time that nobody took the budget? of extending the
program. They were hesitant. Until now, because until 2014 no
original law was passed nor an amendment.
What happened after June 30, 2014?
 DAR’s management reiterated that it will be business as
usual for the agrarian reform agency come July 1, 2014. The
agency’s officials clarified that DAR can still distribute land
even after June 30, 2014
 “Sec 30 permits DAR to complete the acquisition and
distribution of landholdings for which there are pending cases
or proceedings. And since a Notice of Coverage initiates land
distribution proceedings for lands subject to compulsory
acquisition, then all landholdings with NOCs can still be
distributed after June 2014” - DAR Undersecretary for Legal
Affairs Anthony Parungao
 Parungao added that the DOJ , through DOJ Opinions No.
59 and 60, series of 2013 concurs with this position.
 Furthermore, Special Provision No. 2 of the 2014 Gen
Appropriations Act explicitly states that “all lands which have
been issued notices of coverage and with pending cases
and/or proceedings as of June 30, 2014 shall continue to be
processed until issuance of the duly registered certificate of
land ownership award to the individual agrarian reform
beneficiaries in accordance with Sec 30 of RA 9700 and Item
IV (A.1) of DAR A.O. No. 2, series of 2009, as amended.
❖ GCC: These opinions were made during the Aquino
administration; will they apply also to Du30 administration?
Atty C: S, according to DAR if there were notices issued prior
to June 30, 2014 = business as usual, they can continue the
acquisition , if there were no notices issued before June 30,
2014 they cannot issue notices after June 30, 2014.
Sorry I missed one, in the case of Woodland the SC explained
that from here up to here, it was convenience?, but the SC was
silent on this one. My question here is can a resolution amend
the law? If it will be raised, I believe the Sc will justify it because
if you could just imagine in the period of 6 months there
would be considered as a gap.
ROBUSTUM AGRI CORP V DAR
Facts: Petitioner Robustum Agricultural Corporation is the
registered owner of a 50,000-square meter parcel of
agricultural land (subject land) in Silay City per Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-15256.4 The subject land was
formerly a part of a 300,000-square meter agricultural estate
(mother estate) owned5 by Puyas Agro, Inc. (PAI), petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest.
On December 5, 2013, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR),6 through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) II
Teresita R. Mabunay, prepared a letter, denominated as
"Transmittal of NOC to the Landowner-Transferee/s,"7
addressed to petitioner. The letter sought to furnish petitioner
with a copy of a notice of coverage previously issued by the
DAR which identifies the mother estate as subject to the
agrarian reform program.8 The letter also aims to inform
petitioner that, as a transferee of a portion of the mother
estate, it will be included by the DAR as an "alternative land
owner and payee" for purposes of "documentation of the
[claim folder], the issuance of [a] memorandum of [v]aluation
and the payment of compensation proceeds for the [mother
estate]."
The DAR and the LBP shared a common objection against the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Both contended that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition, pointing out that
the issues raised therein but pertain to matters of
"implementation of the [agrarian reform program]"21 which
belong to the exclusive competence of the DAR to determine.
In support, the DAR and the LBP cite Section 50 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657, to wit:
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is
hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
34 | AGRA 2019 MIDTEMRS | Atty. Capanas | Dalusung, Diaz, Labunog, Patalinghug |
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
The RTC sided with the DAR and the LBP.
PETITIONER QUESTIONS THE VALIDITY OF THE NOTICE
OF COVERAGE ISSUED BY DAR. HE FILED AT RTC A
PETITION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE AND DECLARATORY
RELIEF. WAS HIS ACTION PROPER?
NO. IT IS DAR AND NOT RTC WHICH HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE. THE NOTICE OF COVERAGE IS PART OF THE
POWER OF DAR TO IMPLEMENT LAND REFORM.
“The grant of authority upon the DAR to conclude a
“proceeding involving the implementation of the [agrarian
reform law}” pending as of June 30, 2014 under Section 30 of
RA No. 9700, like any statutory grant of authority, must be
deemed to include all such powers, even those not expressly
stated, that are necessary to effectuate the granted authority.
This construction is justified by the doctrine of necessary
implication: 41 No statute can be enacted that can provide all
the details involved in its application. There is always an
omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an allembracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the
law is enforced.”
“A petition to lift the notice of coverage under the cited
regulation is clearly the proper remedial forum whereby an
aggrieved landowner can raise issues contesting the validity
or efficacy of a notice of coverage. This, for all intents and
purposes, is the remedy that petitioner should have availed of.
Since the sole question raised in the petition a quo is really
only an agrarian reform matter that arose from an on-going
proceeding for compulsory land acquisition and distribution,
jurisdiction to resolve the same – as is the case for the main
proceeding itself – must rest too with the DAR. As already
pointed out, the authority given to the DAR under Section 30
of RA No. 9700 to conclude any agrarian reform proceeding
pending as of June 30, 2014, by necessity, includes an
authority for the same to continue exercising its quasi-judicial
powers under Section 50 of RA No. 6657 with respect to any
agrarian reform matter or controversy that may arise in such
proceeding.”
(JUST READ MIDTERM TRANSCRIPT FROM PAGE 51 TIL
END)
HOMESTEAD PATENT SEC 6
RETETION LIMIT SEC 6, WHAT ARENT COVERED
AWARD TO CHILD OF LANDOWNER
EXEMPTION FROM OVERAGE SEC 10
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION SEC 16
JUST COMPENSATION