CASE 11: G.R. No.

157286June 16, 2006

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION
(PSDSA) Petitioners, vs.
HON. EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, Department Secretary, THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

FACTS:

On 2001, RA No. 9155 otherwise known as the “Governance of Basic Education Act 2001,”
was enacted. Under the law, each regional office shall have a director, an assistant director,
and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning, administrative and fiscal
services. Subsequently, the IRR of the said law was promulgated by the Sec. of DepEd.

The herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Sec. 5 of the IRR which states that: “xxx
The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and shall not exercise
administrative supervision over school principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper
authorities. xxx”

Petitioners contend that the stated provision is a gross violation of RA 9155. They allege
further that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped of their administrative
functions.

ISSUE:

Whether the IRR extended RA 9155. – NO

RULING:

The schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school heads;
their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155. The
division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private
elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.

On the issue of WON the Administrative functions of the DepEd are stripped of their
administrative functions when they implement the IRR. The Court said NO.

Administrative bodies are allowed to implement policies.

 The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute

is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage,
as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.

 It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of
subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling
in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and
purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.
 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of
laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not
only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and
the establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those
needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized
capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS :

The herein petitioner was convicted for rape. The penalty imposable at that time for such a
kind of crime was death penalty under RA no. 7659. In the mean time, RA 8177 was passed
amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. Under the amendment,
mode of execution for death penalty was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The
Secretary of Justice promulgated the IRR for R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner contends that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void for
being: (a) cruel, xxx (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an
unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

ISSUE :

WON there is undue delegation of legislative power in R.A. no. 8177 to the secretary of
justice and the director of bureau of corrections.

HELD:

None.

As a rule, the consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
delegation of powers, exception is when in“ Delegation to Administrative Bodies”.

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity
of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it
must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate –
and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying
out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be
done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
CASE 13:G.R. No. 109023 August 12, 1998
DE JESUS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:

On July 1, 1989, RA No. 6758 otherwise known as "An Act Prescribing A Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances
and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations,
however, were exempted from consolidation.

To implement Rep. Act 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without
qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of
basic salary.

Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 provides :

Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on
top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, xxx shall be discontinued effective November
1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered
as illegal disbursement of public funds.

Petitioners contends the validity and the enforceability of the circular because it is
inconsistent with the provisions of RA 6758. And it is without force and effect because it was
not published in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not par. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 can supplant or negate the express
provisions of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758 which it seeks to implement; and
2. Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in
the Official Gazette.

RULING:

Following Article 2 of the NCC and the doctrine under Tanada case, all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity xxx

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. The rule in Administrative
matters is that if their purpose of the law is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation, such Administrative rules and regulations must be published. The exception
is that interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public. In such a case, there is no need
to be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued
by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.

In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative
or internal regulation. Thus, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to
substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should
be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines - to the end that they be given amplest
opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on
the matter.
CASE 14: G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Herein private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of

different brands of cigarettes including Champion, Hope, and Mores.

The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of trademark
registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The CIR classified 'Champion,'
'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as
belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope
Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands from the foreign
brand category. Fortune also submitted proof to the BIR that 'Champion' was an original
register and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.

Subsequently, RA 7654 was passed providing for 55% ad valorem tax to be imposed on local
brands carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad
valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA contending that they should have not been taxed at
55%. That the RMC at issue was invalid because there was no notice and hearing, nor
publication of the same.

Petitioner opines that RMC 37-93 is merely an interpretative ruling of the BIR which can
thus become effective without any prior need for notice and hearing, nor publication, and that
its issuance is not discriminatory since it would apply under similar circumstances to all
locally manufactured cigarettes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) was valid.

RULING:

No, because there was no due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of
publication.

The CIR may not disregard legal requirements or applicable principles in the exercise of its
quasi-legislative powers.

There are two kinds of administrative issuances - a legislative rule and an interpretative rule.
"x x x a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the
benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there
must be hearing.

On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing."

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in

nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
ANG TIBAY vs. CIR and NATIONAL LABOR UNION

Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Petitioner Toribio caused the layoff of
members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid the
said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. The CIR decided in favour of the
petitioners. The case then was elevated to the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the
NLU on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Issue:

WON the CIR is the proper venue for the New trial.

Held:
The Court said yes, because the nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with
judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between
employers and employees.

For administrative bodies, like the CIR, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:

 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
 Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
 While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does
imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
 Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the
evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
 The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
 The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
 The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
OCAMPO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANG.R. No. 114683 January 18, 2000

FACTS:

An administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the OMBUDSMAN for the
alleged serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. Several notice were sent by
the OMB to the herein petitioner for him to file his counter affidavit but the latter failed to do
so. Thus, the OMB issued a resolution discharging the petitioner from service.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration and to re-open the case claiming that he was denied due
process in that the administrative case. OMB denied the motion. While the case is pending,
petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the criminal complaint for estafa and falsification
filed against him based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to the administrative
case, was dismissed by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the dismissal of the Petitioner’s of the Criminal Case warrants dismissal of the
Criminal Case?

Held:

The Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the assailed Resolutions
of Ombudsman.

1. Dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action; Quantum of
evidence required in criminal, civil and administrative cases

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against
Ocampoo or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The RTC, in dismissing the
criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of
Ocampo beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence
whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then
too, there is the “substantial evidence” rule in administrative proceedings which merely
requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings,
the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 161086, November 24, 2006

Facts:

An anonymus complaint was filed alleging that certain municipal officials and employees of
the municipal government of Infanta, Pangasinan had committed graft and corruption. As a
respondse, the Commission on Audit (COA) ordered the conduct of a fraud audit. Under the
“Fraud Audit Report” conducted by the audit team, it found out that the Municipal Treasurer
granted various loans to Municipal Officers and Employees which is in violation of COA
Circular.

One of the municipal officers and employees to whom loans were extended was Municipal
Accountant Luzviminda M. Maniago (Luzviminda). One Manuel, who is a resident of
Infanta, Pangasinan, later filed a complaint against Luzviminda before the Office of the
Mayor for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees) in connection with the grant to her of the loan. In her
Answer, Luzviminda claimed that the loan was extended to her by the Municipal Treasurer in
the latter’s personal capacity.

The then Acting Mayor Charlito M. Kho, by Resolution, found Luzviminda guilty of Grave
Misconduct on the basis of the “Fraud Audit Report” and dismissed her from the service. On
Luzviminda’s appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified Acting Mayor Kho’s
resolution, finding her guilty only of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service.

The Court of Appeals reversed the CSC decision and ordered the reinstatement of
Luzviminda. She then elevated the case before the SC challenging among others the decision
of the acting mayor as having been rendered without hearing Manuel's complaint.

Issue:
Whether the absence of a hearing did not deprive Petitioner of due process?

Held:
No, Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a
trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against
him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. As long as a
party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due
process.

Moreover, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict
judicial sense.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. CIR
G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation
duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and
second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by
applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively.
Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no
income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985.
For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net
loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees
withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and
P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of
taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.

On 1988, petitioner then filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees
from property rentals in 1985 1986.

On 1993, the CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of
time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period (i. As privded under Sec.
230 of 1977 NIRC). The CA agreed with the ruling of the CTA. Petitioner then elevated the
case before the SC arguing that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by
prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued
on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-
year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax
credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years.

Issue:
Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the reglementary period from two
(2) years to ten (10) years is valid.

Held:
No, because Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the
provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative
agencies have no legislative power.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings

(in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued
from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. When the Acting Commissioner
of Internal Revenue issued RMC, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years
on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear
inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not
simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by
Congress. Courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of
remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.
FORTICH vs. CORONA
G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998

Facts:
On 1993, Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land owned by petitioner NQSRMDC in Brgy.
San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people.

The DAR however opposed the said enactment contending that it is within its powers to
approve conversion of lands pursuant to Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657. The office of the
President issued its decision in favour of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao. The DAR filed
a motion for reconsideration but was denied having been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP
decision had already become final and executory. A second motion for reconsideration was
filed by the DAR. Subsequently, a hunger strike was conducted by the farmer-beneficiaries.
The President promised to resolve the issue. Later on, Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, issued a Win-Win resolution.

Herein petitioner Gov. Fortich opposed the resolution which was predicated from the 2nd MR.
He alleged that it was invalid since the OP no longer has jurisdiction over the matter when it
the decision became final and executory.

Issue:
Whether the Office of the president still have Jurisdiction when it entertained the Second
Motion for Reconsideration and became the basis of the Win-Win Resolution?

Held:
No, because the OP has already lost its jurisdiction when its decision has already become
final and executory as no one has seasonably filed a MR thereto. Having lost its jurisdiction,
the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration.

Under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Court, it mandated therein that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration
was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality.
(Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its
March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.)
Felipe Ysmael, JR & Co. Vs. Deputy Executive Secretary

Facts:
In 1983, During the Marcos era, along with 9 other concessions, petitioner’s Timber License
Agreement (TLA) with the Dept. Of Agriculture and Natural Resources was cancelled by the
Director of the Forest Development because the government put a ban on logging. However,
this ban was lifted in 1986. Petitioner then sent letters to the Office of the President and to the
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) asking for its TLA to be reinstated. Petitioner alleged
that when its TLA was cancelled, it was not given the opportunity to be heard. It further
alleged that its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires who not only
did not have any award/license but were also Marcos cronies.

The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of
the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or
welfare so demands.
Hence, petitioner filed directly with the Supreme Court (SC) a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.

Held:
No, the refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion, because the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata thus
forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting
within their exclusive jurisdiction.

Moreover, public respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing
the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under their special technical knowledge and training.

(Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by
the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter apermanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause.)
Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.

GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014

Facts:
The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality
measure of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the
Department of Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989,
entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among
others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with
FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on
hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of
circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing
requirement with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the
FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided additional implementation details
concerning the BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.

Respondents filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997
before the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the
authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondents, and thereby declared Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997
null and void contending, among others, that there is nothing in RA 3720 which granted
either the FDA the authority to issue and implement the subject circulars, or the Secretary of
Health the authority to delegate his powers to the FDA. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.

Held:
Yes, because the law has granted them the power to exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers. The rule is that Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-
making power only if there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly,
the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not
involve discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the
doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of
legislative powers.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a

contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by the congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affect
individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret,
clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates.
Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purport to
do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer
to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class
which may be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an
administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
EO 292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice,
hearing and publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an
interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in
nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand,
the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuamce of CPR covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in
consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their
manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the
court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and
publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the exercise of
its official duties.

On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA
operates and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer
and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those
covering the BA/BE testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore,
the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the
substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking,
administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication
are needed for their validity.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries et al..

FACTS:

In 2002, PGMA , through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued EO 156, otherwise
known as "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor
vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The pertinent provision of
EO 156 reads as follows:

Article 2, Sec. 3.1. The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all types of
used motor vehicles is prohibited, xxx. (subject to certain exceptions.)

The herein respondents challenged the constitutionality and legality of the said provision
before the trial court contending, among others, that they will be affected by the importation
ban.

The trial court rendered a summary judgment declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
as an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress. The
trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227
(RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow
of goods and capital within the Freeport.

The CA sustained the findings of the trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, as void
for being repugnant to the constitution.

The petitioners then elevated the case before the SC contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of
EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including the Freeeport.

Issue:

WON the issuance of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-legislative powers.

Held:

The Court said YES, by way of delegation, it is a valid exercise of the President’s quasi-
legislative powers.

The Court explained that Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative body to adopt
rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy.

However, for an administrative issuance to be valid, it must comply with the following
requisites:
 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
4. It must be reasonable.
Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature:

EO 156 actually satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order since it has both
constitutional and statutory bases: a.) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the
President, in the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to,
inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity; and b.) Executive Order No. 226 -
empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the importation of any
equipment or raw materials or finished products.

It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure:

Second requirement was likewise complied with.

It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature:

However, the third requirement was not satisfied because importation ban was not made
within the scope of the authority given by the legislature. EO 156 as issued by the President
has exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on the importation of
used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign territory. The
domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is actually the "customs territory" which is
defined under the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227.

To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and
other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of
the government cannot usurp.

It must be reasonable.

The Court finds no logic in the all encompassing application of the assailed provision to the
Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not
enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not
arise. The application of the law should be consistent with the purpose of and reason for the
law. Rationecessatlex, etcessatlex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is
not the letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. To apply the proscription to
the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the general
economy of the country, the application of the importation ban in the Freeport would subvert
the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would draw investors and
ultimately boost the national economy.

In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar as it is made
applicable to the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to the separability clauseof EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared
valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-
A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-
in former Subic Naval Base area may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the
Philippine territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the
secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.
G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION (CIBAC),Petitioner vs. COMELEC, Respondent

FACTS:

In viw of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) participation in the synchronized

national and local elections. Its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of
five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the
required number of qualifying votes. The nominees are Villanueva, Lokin, Gonzales, Tugna
and Galang.

Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of
nomination, substitution and amendment and subsequently submitted the same to the
COMELEC transmitting therewith together with the signed petitions of more than 81% of the
CIBAC members stating that Lokin, Tugna and Galang were not among the nominees
presented and proclaimed by CIBAC.

On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin
as its second nominee. The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be
thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed
CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the
motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a
proclamation.

Despite the letter sent by Villanueva to the COMELEC, the latter failed to act on the matter,
thereby prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination,
substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC.

On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC resolved for the validity of the withdrawal of the
nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition
and hearing. They further contends that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the
president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority. In view thereof,
the The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be:1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva 2.
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales 3. Armi Jane R. Borje

Lokin now seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as
the official second nominee of CIBAC. He alleged that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804
xxx expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. The pertinent provision enumerates only three
instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the
nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: a.) when the nominee
dies, b.) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination, and c.) when the nominee
becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule
applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing
the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after
the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.

RULING:

Yes, because the COMELEC was not vested the power to approve the withdrawal of the
nominees of CIBAC and allow the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any
basis in fact or law.

While the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs.

To be valid, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.

The Courth explained that the third and fourth requisite was were not satisfied since Section
13 of Resolution No. 7804 as it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC. Thus, it is
invalid and of no effect.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and
a recall. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The
COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804
underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the
procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.

*Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states:

Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only

when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated
to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these
cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees.

No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls.

G.R. NO. 152574, NOVEMBER 17, 2004

FRANCISCO ABELLA JR., PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as
Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for
the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive
Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the required eligibility for said
position.

On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, series
of 1994 with Section 4 enumerating the positions covered by the Career Executive Service
(CES). These positions require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement
for permanent appointment. But, this provides that incumbents to CES shall retain their
permanent appointment but upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, they shall be
under temporary status until they qualify.

Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) on a contractual basis, then subsequently, petitioner was issued by SBMA a
permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center.
However, when said appointment was submitted to respondent Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that petitioner’s eligibility was not
appropriate. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department
Manager III by the SBMA.

Petitioner appealed the disapproval of his permanent appointment by respondent to the CSC.
He further contends that the CSC failed to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of
the challenged Circular. The CSC issued Resolution affirming the action taken by respondent.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the CSC. (Petitioner appealed
to the Court of Appeals but it ruled that he did not have legal standing to question the
disapproval and was not the real party in interest.)

Issue/s:

A.) WON the issuance of Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 21, s. 1994, which
deprived petitioner his property right without due process of law, is constitutional.

B.) Whether the CSC correctly denied his appointment.

Ruling:

Due Process

Yes, it is constitutional since it was issued by the CSC in its quasi-legislative power. There
was no due process to speak of since the act of issuance was not exercised in its quasi-judicial
power. In other words, the classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative,
not a quasi-judicial, hence, prior notice and hearing is not necessary. The Court further
explained:

o In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates

the rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official
action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance
of this function. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.
o On the other hand, quasi-legislative power, is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process,
are not required since there is no determination of past events or facts that
have to be established or ascertained.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of
departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been issued as
an incident of the administrative body's power to issue guidelines for government officials to
follow in performing their duties.

Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment.
The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not
involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but

DENIED insofar as it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his
appointment as department manager III of the Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority. Costs against petitioner.

Denial of his appointment

Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment.
The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not
involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure.

The Petition was GRANTED insofar as it seeks legal standing for petitioner, but DENIED
insofar as it prays for the reversal of the CSC Resolutions disapproving his appointment as
department manager III of the Labor and Employment Center, Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority.
G.R. No. 151908 August 12, 2003
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE
CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 152063 August 12, 2003
GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC.
(ISLACOM), petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000

Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law
Center. It was published in The Philippine Star newspaper, on June 22, 2000.

Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of
prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days
from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service
(CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. It was then followed by another Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities regarding the
vailidty of all the prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least
two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone
Corporation filed against the NTC, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner
Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.

They alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as
the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of
the Philippines. The also alleged that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law. It will also result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable.
They prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.A joint Motion for
Leave to Intervene and Admit Complaint-in-intervention was filed by the Globe Telecom, Inc
and Smart Communications, Inc. which was granted by the trial court.Respondent NTC and
its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review,
docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two petitions were
consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public
policy.

Held:

Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

The administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-

judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized
disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special
competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of
the regulatory statute administered. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil
Case No. Q-00-42221. The CA erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in
dismissing the case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to
its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. However, where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-
6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or
rule-making power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the CA, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly
technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic
familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and
call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of
our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution. Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the CA on the
civil cases are reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation
of the proceedings.
SMART and PILTEL vs. NTC, G.R. No. 151908, August 12, 2003

FACTS:

Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications

Commission issued a Memorandum Circulars on the billing of telecommunications services
and on measures in minimizing, if not eliminating, the incidence of stealing of cellular phone
unit. Isla Communications Co., Inc. (IslaCom) and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (PilTel)
filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the memorandum circulars, alleging that NTC
has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods as stated in the subject
memorandum circulars. Such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Acts of the
Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Thereafter, Globe Telecom, Inc. and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint motion for
leave to intervene and to admit complaint-in-intervention. This was granted by the trial court.

The trial court issued a TRO enjoining NTC from implementing the MCs. NTC filed a
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The defendant's MD is denied for lack of merit. NTC filed a MR but was later on denied by
the trial court. The CA, upon NTC's filing of a special action for certiorari and prohibition,
reversed the decision of the lower court, contending that the private respondents failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in holding that the private respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?

RULING:

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect
of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory
provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It
may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a
statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.

Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative

agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises
its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the
practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and
a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising
in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the
courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation

issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a
specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the
constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts,
including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes
the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Issue:

Whether a party should have exhausted administrative remedies before it filed the case in
court.

Held:

A party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to Court, when questioning
the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency.
The principle only applies when the act of the agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-
judicial function, and not when the assailed and pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.

Issue:

Whether the court or NTC has jurisdiction over the issues pertaining to the memoranda.

Held:

The issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters, and thus are within
the competence of a judge in the lower court. What is required of the judge who will resolve
the issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including
pre-paid SIM and call cards (which is within the knowledge of a good percentage of the
Philippine population) and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution.
GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

FACTS:

Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the airtime

limitations for political campaign from “per station” basis, as used during the 2007 and 2010
elections, to a “total aggregate” basis for the 2013. Petitioner GMA questioned, among
others, the validity of the issuance invoking Sec. 82 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
pertinent portion of which provides that:

Section 82. Lawful election propaganda. - Lawful election propaganda shall include:

xxxx

All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by this Code as the Commission may
authorize after due notice to all interested parties and hearing where all the interested parties
were given an equal opportunity to be heard: Provided, That the Commission's authorization
shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation throughout the nation for at least
twice within one week after the authorization has been granted.

GMA contends that there having been no prior public consultation held upon its issuance, the
COMELEC is guilty of depriving petitioners of its right to due process of law.

On its reply, the COMELEC said that there is no impairment of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern, because in this case, the COMELEC is not
withholding access to any public record.

Issue:

WON prior notice and hearing is necessary before the COMELEC could have issued
Resolution no. 9615.

Held:

Yes, Resolution No. 9615 needs prior hearing before adoption.

The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up with a
public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly on the aggregate-
based air time limits. In this circumstance also renders the new regulation, particularly on the
adoption of the aggregate-based airtime limit, questionable. It must not be overlooked that the
new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for
political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate and effective
means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this regard, it is not
enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in

nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.

For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said
Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective
and ineffectual.