1. Cruz v.

Mijares

FACTS:
 Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of Nuisance pending in the sala of
respondent judge.
 He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
o Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his
litigation personally.
 During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself.
 Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
 Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after the Answer has been filed.
 Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?”
 Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was partiality on the part of respondent judge as
can be seen from her contumacious remarks.
 Motion denied. MR denied.
 Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the document required by Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court.
 MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule 138-A.
o 138 – applicable to any non-lawyer;
o 138-A– specifically for law students.
 MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUES + RULING:

Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition? YES.

 SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and
injunction.
 This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute freedom to choose where the petition will
be filed.
o Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.
o Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against RTCs should be filed with the CA.
 Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take cognizance of petitions directly filed
before it.
 SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the interpretation of Sec. 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court.
 Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with the SC.

What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A? Rule 138.

Rule 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Rule 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney
for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

 Court agrees with petitioner that the basis of his appearance is Rule 138, not 138-A. As plaintiff, he can
personally conduct the litigation of the case.
 He would be acting not as counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to represent himself.
 The fact that petition is a law student does not mean that the applicable rule is always 138-A. Again, he seeks
to represent himself.
 TC’s conclusion that 138-A superseded 138 is incorrect. It is an addendum to the instances when a non-
lawyer may appear in courts.

Should respondent judge inhibit herself? NO.

 Her “hay naku” statement is not enough to show arbitrariness and prejudice.
 In fact, petitioner’s administrative case against respondent judge for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
was dismissed for lack of merit.
 Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties applies.

DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.

2. Five J Taxi and Juan Armamento v. NLRC, Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994

Facts:
1. Maldigan and Sabsalon were hired by the Five J Taxi as taxi driver. Nov. 1987 and June 1979, respectively.
a. They worked for 4 days weekly on a 24 hour shifting schedule.
b. Aside from the daily “boundary” of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned
taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to
answer for any deficiency in their “boundary,” for every actual working day.
2. Subsequently, in less than 4 months after he was hired, Maldigan failed to report to work for unknown reasons.
3. Sabsalon was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and stabbed him. He was hospitalized and
after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
4. While Sabsalon was re-admitted to work by Five J Taxi, he was only required to work every other day. However,
on several instances, he also failed to report for work during his schedule. Despite repeated requests for him to
report to work, he refused.
5. In 1989, Maldigan requested Five J Taxi for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but they told
him that nothing was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the
repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by Five J Taxi to recoup the expenses
incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners
terminated his services.
6. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for
the washing of his taxi seat covers.
7. Maldigan and Sabsalon then filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. Complaint
was dismissed.
 a. The filing of the case was a mere after-thought since it took them two years to file the same. Such delay
is unreasonable.
b. It was also discovered that Maldigan was working for another taxi company called “Mine of Gold” and
that Sabsalon was driving a taxi for “Bulaklak Company.” Both of them failed to controvert the evidence
showing this and that they voluntarily left their jobs.
c. However, ordered Five J Taxi and Armamento to pay Maldigan and Sabsalon their accumulated deposits
and car wash payments.

Issue: WON Maldigan and Sabsalon’s deposits and car wash payments should be refunded. YES.

Held/Ratio: Deposits should be refunded to them. Car wash payments should not be refunded.
1. NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their “boundary” is
covered by the general prohibition in LC 114 against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no
showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a “practice” in the taxi industry. Therefore, the
deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded.
2. It can be deduced that the LC114 provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly the same does not apply to or permit deposits not to defray any
deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his “boundary.”
3. Furthermore, when Maldigan and Sabsalon stopped working for Five J Taxi, the alleged purpose for which the
deposits were required no longer existed. As such, any balance due to private respondents after proper
accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
4. HOWEVER, Maldigan and Sabsalon are not entitled to the reimbursement of the car wash payments.
5. Car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play. It is
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out.
6. There was nothing to prevent Maldigan and Sabsalon from cleaning the taxi units themselves if they wanted to
save P20. :P

3. KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner, vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business nationwide with principal office at
No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel
Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private
respondents were hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of Engineers
Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII,
Iligan City. Numbering forty-one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the minimum and
sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named
co-respondents. The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre and private respondents. At the conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio admitted
petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on
June 19, 1990. As a result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s right to file its position
paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they, too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting
their complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission. It alleged that it was denied due process
and that Engineers Estacio and Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.

NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING: It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation with principal address in Quezon
City. The complaints against petitioner were filed in Iligan City and summons served on Engineer Estacio in Iligan City.
The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic corporation or partnership must be made upon
its officers, such as the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. These persons are
deemed so integrated with the corporation that they know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do
with any legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre, managed and supervised the construction project.
9 According to the Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to the project in Iligan City
and supervised the work of the employees thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible
officer of petitioner. Summons for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to settle the claims of private respondents is
another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor arbiter and respondent Commission in
cases before them. The Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3)
exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances.

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is
properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a) he represents himself as a party to the
case; (b) he represents an organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a duly-
accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines in cases referred to by the latter. 11

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-accredited members of a legal aid office.
Their appearance before the labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the first
exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It
was incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named co-
respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer
Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente were authorized to appear as
representatives of petitioner, they could bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and
respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from Engineer Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay
amounts to an offer to compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express consent of petitioner.
The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and should be duly established by evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their
clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent, enter
into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.
After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and
Palangan did not order the parties to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a decision
on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to substantiate their complaints. The parties may have
earlier waived their right to file position papers but petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer Estacio on the premise
that petitioner shall have paid and settled the claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its “promise,” there was a failure to settle the case amicably. This should have prompted the
arbiters to order the parties to file their position papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement,
in whole or in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating therein the matters taken
up and agreed upon during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified
position papers.

4. In re petition to sign the roll of attorneys

TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law, Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys

FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in 1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Several years later, while rummaging through his things, he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter
of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.

Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief
and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit, saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in
signing in the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not warranted.

The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine
Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.

However, Medado is not free from all liability for his years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was just an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty
likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to conduct
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-fledged lawyer.

However, the Court imposed upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
one (1) year after receipt of the Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000. Also, during the one-year
period, petitioner was not allowed to engage in the practice of law.

5. Beltran v. David

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine
Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD

FACTS:
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., of
practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not deny and
had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc
dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee and
also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the SC, included the respondent as
among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar as shown by a Letter of Request.
3. That while waiting for his turn to take Oath as a member of the Bar, he was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath
by one of the Clerk in the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that
Chief Justice Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his
Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of
my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended. He filed a reply
4. He received a letter from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, informing the respondent of an Annual
General Meeting together with his Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981,
5. Believing that with his signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and his Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's
(Deceased) Answer, the SC did not ordered for the striking of his name in the Roll of Attorneys with IBP and therefore
a Member in Good Standing, He paid his membership due and other assessments.
6. That his name was included as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for the year 1981-
1982,
7. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8, 1981, Complainant
Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice and Motion with the SC; notifying the
Court of this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
8. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the IBP and likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for
1981 as shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .
9. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the IBP as well as a Certificate of Membership in
Good Standing

ISSUE: WON those circumstances constitute as admission to the Philippine Bar.

HELD:
No.
Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute his admission
to the Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter.
He should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19,
Rules of Court.)
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of
Court.)

Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined P500 payable to this Court within 10 DAYS from notice failing which he shall
serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

I.F RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls
within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

NATURE: Disbarment complaint

FACTS:
1. Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate.
Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. PCGG sequestered it and its
operations ceased.
2. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
3. employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v.
Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
4. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He
resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288
in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
5. Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
a. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility- guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating
and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
b. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor- Engaging in the
private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. He received retainer’s fees which
respondent claims to only consultation fees.
6. Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations committed.
7. Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years and refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.
 8. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint and states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that
respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed
9. While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor. Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was engaged in private practice of law while being a public official.

YES. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law. The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the
legal profession. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles,
practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.

ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the
duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in
any matter in which he previously represented him."

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B"
of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control"
of Taggat. Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly
handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the
employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-
240.

It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters
that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for
"Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not
been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is,
I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

RULING. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (conflicting interest.) In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent
was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2)
of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA
6713").

Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with [his] official functions."
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

I.G. MONARES vs. MUÑOZ

Arthur O. Monares vs. Atty. Levi P. Muñoz

A.C. No. 5582 / A.C. No. 5604 / A.C. No. 5652
January 24, 2017

Facts:

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition)
dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the complaints for
disbarment filed by Arthur 0. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002
and March 21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) ofLegazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the said
case during regular government hours while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel
sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel
of the NEA-appointed team which took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz
illegally collected payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their
retainer agreement.

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation
(Sunwest). Constante claimed that Mufi oz filed ten ( 10) cases against Sun west on Ludolfo' s behalf before the Office
of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as Provincial Legal Officer.

All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice. In
addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule against conflict
of interest.

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the
Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and was meted the
penaltyof removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted
by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ofLegazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of
Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713. Muñoz's conviction has since become final
pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.

In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C.
Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This request
was granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary
Alexander P. Aguirre granted Mufi oz' s request, under the following conditions:
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic) and that no conflict of
interest with your present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what circumstances you can engage in
private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not impair in any way your
efficiency; and.
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of this authority.

Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon Muñoz:

a. You cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;

b. You will be on call and you will have no fix working hours provided that the efficiency of the Provincial Legal Office
shall not be prejudiced;
c. You are exempted in accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the limitation already mentioned above; and
d. In addition to the above enumeration, you are to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Levi Muñoz may practice privately even though a he is a government employee?

Held: In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002, he
engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the written
authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims had never been revoked. Mufi.oz also argued that
no conflict of interest existed between ALECO's old BOD and th'e NBA management team, since he was engaged as
retained counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams.
Muñoz violated the conditions of his DILG authorization. Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from
utilizing government time for his private practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus
Rules), requires government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by special
laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a
week. The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or
agency adopts a flexible work schedule. Notably, Mufi.oz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least
eighty-six (86) court appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1,
2001.32 He merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office. Court appearances
are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to
5:00 in the aftemoon. Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draftpleadings and prepare for trial.
The sheer of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of his
private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR. Muñoz should have
requested for authority to engage in private practice from the Secretary of DILG for his second and third terms.
Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have been perpetual. Moreover,
Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his second and
third terms sufficed. Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which Muñoz himself cites
in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage in the
practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head of the department, in
accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which provides, in part: Sec.
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of
the officer or employee.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests. Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini
Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo, the Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus: There
is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is
"whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance
of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01
and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation
hereunder shall be dealt with more severely

A. A. Brennisen vs. Atty. Contawi

AC 7481

Principle:
[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any
violation of
these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

Facts:
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land. . Being a resident of the United States of America (USA), he
entrusted the administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the corresponding owner's
duplicate title.

Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA), mortgaged
and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho (Ho).

Thus, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a
lawyer, causing him damage and prejudice.

The respondent, on the other hand averred that it was his former office assistants, a certain Boy Roque (Roque) and
one Danilo Diaz (Diaz), who offered the subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent
admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor upon the prodding of Roque and Diaz, and because he
was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate
share of P130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan.

Issue:
Whether respondent should be disbarred.

Ruling:
Yes. Respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds
of the sale for his own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially
incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that
complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent
transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's
safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.
Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the
pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Canon 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into his possession.
Canon 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from client.
Canon 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.

Respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a
member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to
the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar. It bears to stress that [t]he practice of law is a privilege
given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of
these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case.

A. B. Presiding Judge Jose L. Madrid, Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Sorsogon City, Complainant, v. Atty. Juan S.
Dealca, Respondent
A.C. No. 7474, 9 September 2014

Facts:
The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L.
Gerona in a pending case docketed at the Court of Appeals wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.

The parties agreed upon PhP 15,000.00 as attorney’s fees with the following breakdown: 50% payable upon
acceptance of the case; and the remaining balance upon termination of the case. Complainant paid the respondent
PhP 7,500.00.

Prior to preparing the appellant’s brief, respondent demanded payment of PhP 4,000.00. The complainant obliged
though it was contrary to the original agreement.

Before filing the appellant's brief, respondent demanded payment of the balance amounting to PhP 3,500.00.
When complainant was unable to do so, respondent withdraw his appearance as complaint’s counsel without
informing the complainant. Thus, the complainant charged the respondent with misconduct and praying the
respondent be “sternly dealt with administratively.”

Issue: Whether respondent committed misconduct and violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Held: The Supreme Court find the respondent violated Canon 22 of the CPR for withdrawing from the complainant’s
case without a good cause. Respondent also violated Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the CPR for demanding full payment
before submission of the complainant-appellant’s brief even though they have an agreement that final payment will
be given upon termination of the case. The Supreme Court reprimanded the respondent.

A. C. SPOUSES UMAGUING vs. ATTY. DE VERA February 04, 2015

FACTS: Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman but lost to her rival. Complainants lodged an election protest
and engaged in the services of Atty. De Vera. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera moved at a glacial pace;
he rushed the preparation of the documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2) of these attachments
are the Affidavits of material witnesses, which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the
aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by the witnesses, they were unavailable.
To remedy this, Atty. De Vera look for the nearest kin of the witnesses and ask them to sign and he had all the
documents notarized. He hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits were falsified. In
further breach of his oath, the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, the complainants withdraw him and for
lack of trust and confidence in as their counsel.
Complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

Whether or not a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that, fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. Xxx The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins
every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or
from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. xxx

In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.”

Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer’s Oath. Yes. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant.

What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. xxx The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.