#41 Geotina vs CA – words/phrase construed in relation to other provisions

#42 Gelano vs CA – words/phrase construed in relation to other provisions

Facts: Insular Sawmill, Inc. (ISI) is a corporation organized on 17 September 1945 with a corporate life of
50 years, or up to 17 September 1995, with the primary purpose of carrying on a general lumber and
sawmill business. To carry on this business, ISI leased the paraphernal property of Carlos Gelano's wife
Guillermina Mendoza-Gelano at the corner of Canonigo and Otis, Paco, Manila for P1,200.00 a month. It
was while ISI was leasing the aforesaid property that its officers and directors had come to know Carlos
Gelano who received from the corporation cash advances on account of rentals to be paid by the
corporation on the land. Between 19 November 1947 to 26 December 1950 Carlos Gelano obtained from
ISI cash advances of P25,950.00. The said sum was taken and received by Carlos Gelano on the
agreement that ISI could deduct the same from the monthly rentals of the leased premises until said cash
advances are fully paid. Out of the aforementioned cash advances in the total sum of P25,950.00, Carlos
Gelano was able to pay only P5,950.00 thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P20,000.00 which he
refused to pay despite repeated demands by ISI. Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay on the ground
that said amount was for the personal account of her husband asked for by, and given to him, without her
knowledge and consent and did not benefit the family.

On various occasions from 4 May 1948 to 11 September 1949 the Spouses Gelano also made credit
purchases of lumber materials from ISI with a total price of P1,120.46 in connection with the repair and
improvement of the spouses' residence. On 9 November 1949 partial payment was made by the spouses
in the amount of P91.00 and in view of the cash discount in favor of the spousesin the amount of P83.00,
the amount due ISI on account of credit purchases of lumber materials is P946.46 which the spouses
failed to pay. On 14 July 1952, in order to accommodate and help the spouses renew previous loans
obtained by them from the China Banking Corporation, ISI, through Joseph Tan Yoc Su, executed a joint
and several promissory note with Carlos Gelano in favor of said bank in the amount of P8,000.00 payable
in 60 days. For failure of Carlos Gelano to pay the promissory note upon maturity, the bank collected from
the ISI the amount of P9,106.00 including interests, by debiting it from the corporation's current account
with the bank. Carlos Gelano was able to pay ISI the amount of P5,000.00 but the balance of P4,106.00
remained unsettled. Guillermina M. Gelano refused to pay on the ground that she had no knowledge
about the accommodation made by ISI in favor of her husband.

On 29 May 1959, ISI, thru Atty. German Lee, filed a complaint for collection against the spouses before
the Court of First Instance of Manila. Trial was held and when the case was at the stage of submitting
memorandum, Atty. Lee retired from active law practice and Atty. Eduardo F. Elizalde took over and
prepared memorandum. In the meantime, ISI amended its Articles of Incorporation to shorten its term of
existence up to 31 December 1960 only. The amended Articles of Incorporation was filed with, and
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, but the trial court was not notified of the
amendment shortening the corporate existence and no substitution of party was ever made. On 20
November 1964 and almost 4 years after the dissolution of the corporation, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of ISI ordering Carlos Gelano to pay ISI the sum of P19,650.00 with interest thereon at
the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint on 29 May 1959 until said sum is fully paid; and
P4,106.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until said sum
is fully paid; and the sum of P2,000.00 attorney's fees. The Court also ordered the spouses to solidarily
pay ISI the sum of P946.46, with interest thereon at the agreed rate of 12% per annum from 6 October
1946, until said sum is fully paid; P550.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing
of the complaint until the said sum is fully paid; and costs of the suit.

The court dismissed the counterclaims of the spouses. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals,
with ISI ppealing because it insisted that both Carlos Gelano and Guillermina Gelano should be held
liable for the substantial portion of the claim. On 23 August 1973, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision modifying the judgment of the trial court by holding the spouses jointly and severally liable on
ISI's claim and increasing the award of P4,106.00 to P8,160.00. After the spouses received a copy of the
decision on 24 August 1973, they came to know that the ISI was dissolved way back on 31 December
1960.

Hence, the spouses filed a motion to dismiss the case and or reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals on grounds that the case was prosecuted even after dissolution of ISI as a corporation and
that a defunct corporation cannot maintain any suit for or against it without first complying with the
requirements of the winding up of the affairs of the corporation and the assignment of its property rights
within the required period. Incidentally, after the receipt of the spouses' motion to dismiss and/or
reconsideration or on 28 October 1973,ISI thru its former directors filed a Petition for Receivership before
the Court of First Instance of Manil (Special Proceedings 92303), which petition is still pending before
said court. On 5 November 1973, ISI filed a comment on the motion to dismiss and/or reconsideration
and after the parties have filed reply and rejoinder, the Court of Appeals on 5 July 1974 issued a
resolution denying the aforesaid motion. The spouses filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether a corporation, whose corporate life had ceased by the expiration of its terms of existence,
could still continue prosecuting and defending suits after its dissolution and beyond the period of 3 years
provided for under Act 1459, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, to wind up its affairs, without
having undertaken any step to transfer its assets to a trustee or assignee.

Held: Yes . Pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408 of the Civil Code of 1889 which provision incidentally
can still found in Paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The obligation/ debt contracted by
petitioner husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence the conjugal property is
liable for his debt.

When ISI was dissolved on 31 December 1960, under Section 77 of the Corporation Law, it still has the
right until 31 December 1963 to prosecute in its name the present case. After the expiration of said
period, the corporation ceased to exist for all purposes and it can no longer sue or be sued. However, a
corporation that has a pending action and which cannot be terminated within the 3-year period after its
dissolution is authorized under Section 78 to convey all its property to trustees to enable it to prosecute
and defend suits by or against the corporation beyond the 3-year period. Although ISI did not appoint any
trustee, yet the counsel who prosecuted and defended the interest of the corporation in the present case
and who in fact appeared in behalf of the corporation may be considered a trustee of the corporation at
least with respect to the matter in litigation only. Said counsel had been handling the case when the same
was pending before the trial court until it was appealed before the Court of Appeals and finally to the
Supreme Court.

#43 People vs Chavez – meaning of term dictated by context

Facts: Accused-appellant de Chavez was charged with murder. On March 17, 2005, accused-appellant
was arrested. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the RTC. Hence, accused-appellant filed a final
appeal to the Supreme Court. During the pendency appeal, accused-appellant had died on December 9,
2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital.

Issue: Whether or not criminal liability of de Chavez is extinguished.

Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the effect of death
of the accused on his criminal and civil liabilities, to wit:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

It is clear that the death of accused-appellant, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only
his criminal liability, but also his civil liabilities arising from or based on the crime. But, as held in Bayotas,
accused-appellant’s civil liability may be based on other sources of obligation other than ex delicto, in
which case the heirs of the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused appellant,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Ratio Decidendi: The death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed.

Gist: Before the Court is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Dionisio de Chavez, Jr. assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rosario,
Batangas, Branch 87.

#44 Santulan vs Exec Secretary – meaning of term dictated by context

Facts:

Petitioner Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin who have been succeeded by their heirs were rival
claimants with respect to the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of public domain with an area of about 4
½ hectares located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit Cavite. The Petitioner Santulan surveyed the land on
December 5, 1942 and filed an application on Dec. 29, 1942 to lease for five (5) years for agricultural
purposes an area of 36, 120 sq. meters and including the application for revocable permit to occupy the
said land for planting of Bakawan which later develop to fishpond seven years later after acquiring
ordinary fishpond permit from BFAR. On the other hand, private respondent Lusin was reported and was
being summoned that he was illegally entered the area covered by the petitioners fishpond permit and
was refrain from introducing improvements.

However, private respondent Lusin filed applications 1n 1942 and 1945 for a revocable-permit and a
lease of a foreshore for the purpose of producing salt in the said land. He also contends that he had been
in the continues and exclusive possession of the land since 1920 when it was still under water, and that
he had used it as a site of his fish corrals, and allegedly converted two (2) hectares into fishpond
enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood.
On the northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve
as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. The private
respondent said that he introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953. The 1942 foreshore
lease applications of Petitioner Santulan and private respondent Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands
Conflict.

Issue:

Whether or not the continues and exclusive possession of the private respondent could nullify the
petitioner’s preferential right to lease the land by reason of his riparian rights?

Ruling:

The Director of Land ruled that the disputed land was subject to “reparian rights” which may he invoked
by petitioner Julian Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1. It was found out that the disputed land is foreshore land covered and
uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides that is an extension of Santulan’s Lot No. 986 of the
Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17, 301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent, and the said foreshore land was
allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action of the sea, and the petitioner was the
first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon.

Private Respondent Antonio Lusin was found out to be possessor in bad faith, and latter’s allegation with
respect to the possession and improvements could not nullify the petitioner’s preferential right to lease the
land by reason of his riparian rights. Therefore, the rejection of the private respondent’s revocable permit
and foreshore lease is proper.

Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936

32. Preference of the Reparian Owner � The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be
given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right.

Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person who owns land situated on the
bank of a river.

“Riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral
owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The
littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast or the
shore zone between the high and low watermarks.

#45 Ramirez vs CA – ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus

Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner in the RTC alleging that the private respondent in a
confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. the RTC granted the Motion. From the RTC’s order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent CA
declared the RTC’s order null and void, and holding that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. Petitioner filed a MR which the CA denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

Issue: Whether the recording of a “Private Conversation” without the consent of both of the party is a
violation of R.A. 4200.

Held: Yes, Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides that it shall be unlawful for
any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated
provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, therefore plainly supports the
view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.