Rivalidad China-Estados Unidos en La Era Trump.

U.S.
-CHINA RIVALRY
IN THE TRUMP ERA
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE TRUMP ERA of 43
1
U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY IN
THE TRUMP ERA
A WPR REPORT
Integrating China into the liberal trade

order was expected to have a moderating
effect on Beijing. Instead, under President
Xi Jinping, China has asserted its military
control over the South China Sea and
cracked down on domestic dissent, all
while continuing to use unfair trade
practices to boost its economy. As a result,
a bipartisan consensus has emerged in
Washington that the U.S. must rethink the
assumptions underpinning its approach to
China’s rise. But President Donald Trump’s
confrontational approach, including a
costly trade war, is unlikely to prove
effective. This report provides a
comprehensive look at the military and
economic aspects of U.S.-China rivalry in
the Trump era.
WORLDPOLITICSREVIEW.COM 10/2018
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
3
America’s China Policy Hasn’t Failed, but It
Needs to be Recalibrated
8
It’s Time for the U.S. to Rethink Its
Assumptions About China
13
In Standoff With China, Trump Opts for
Platitudes Over Policy
17
Trump’s National Security Strategy Rachets
Up U.S. Competition With China
21
Is the New National Defense Strategy the
Right Way to Deal With China’s Rise?
25
China’s Naval Buildup Is a Real Challenge to
the U.S. Navy’s Dominance
29
How to Know When China is Pulling Even
With the United States
33
The Ongoing Drama, or Farce, of Trump’s
China Trade Policy
38
Did Trump Just Announce a New ‘Aid War’ Editor’s Note All time references are
relative to each article’s publish date,
With China at the U.N.? indicated at the top of the article.
3
AMERICA’S CHINA POLICY HASN’T

FAILED, BUT IT NEEDS TO BE
RECALIBRATED
ALI WYNE | MAY 2018
Forty years after China embarked on the economic reforms that

have helped transform it from an isolated and impoverished
communist outpost into an increasingly confident and capable
global power, a growing number of observers in the United
States have, understandably, concluded that Washington
adopted the wrong strategy toward Beijing. Their judgment is
largely rooted in two propositions. First, the United States was
mistaken to assume, or hope, that China would become more
democratic as its economy grew. Second, by persisting with
efforts to integrate China into the postwar international order,
the United States ultimately enabled the rise of a country that
now stands not only as its principal competitor, but also as its
putative replacement on the global stage.
It is difficult to dispute the first point, although Elizabeth
Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations rightly cautions
that “political change is a long game, and the game is not over.”
Especially under Xi Jinping, however, Beijing has taken a
decisively authoritarian turn—cracking down more aggressively
on foreign nongovernmental organizations, more explicitly
renouncing Western values and governance, and consolidating
what may well be the world’s most intrusive, far-reaching
surveillance state. With the Chinese Communist Party’s decision
to end presidential term limits, moreover, Xi is poised to preside
over China for as long as he lives. The New Yorker’s Evan Osnos
observes that China is “reentering a period in which the fortunes
4
of a fifth of humanity hinge, to an extraordinary degree, on the

visions, impulses, and insecurities of a solitary figure.”
But the second point—that the U.S. has aided the rise of its
now-chief competitor—is more debatable. Could the U.S. have
either stalled China’s progress indefinitely or cultivated a less
formidable competitor?
Because of the multitude of differences that define U.S.-
China relations, it is virtually impossible to imagine that China
would have developed into a U.S. ally. Their histories and
cultures aside, the U.S. prides itself on being the world’s most
successful experiment in democracy, while China regards
Western-style pluralism as a threat to its survival. Yet there are
two paradoxical similarities between the two countries. First,
China largely believes itself to be unique in the annals of human
history, though it neither proclaims its exceptionalism as loudly
nor proselytizes its singularity with nearly the same vigor as the
United States. Second, having spent most of its history atop an
Asian-Pacific hierarchy, China has neither experience in nor
enthusiasm for sustaining an international system in partnership
with an approximate peer.
Nor is it much more plausible to reconstruct the past four
decades in such a way that China would have been permanently
deferential to U.S. strategic interests. Despite being the
principal beneficiary of the postwar order, after the U.S., Beijing
has long chafed at its exclusion from that system’s design. In
addition, both Chinese officialdom and popular culture widely
regard Western pre-eminence since the Industrial Revolution as
an aberration from a far longer stretch of Chinese centrality.
China is animated not only by longstanding nostalgia—
embodied in Xi’s oft-stated call for “the great rejuvenation of
the Chinese nation”—but also by an increasing material capacity
to realize it.
While China may not have undergone as rapid a revival had
the U.S. remained more agnostic, it is wishful thinking to believe
that Beijing would have stagnated indefinitely without
5
American assistance. Its history

demonstrates that it is nothing if not
resilient. In just the past 90 years, China
endured its own devastating civil war,
followed by a brutal Japanese
occupation, the worst famine in human
history and, shortly thereafter, a decade
of intense political upheaval.
The U.S. may have been able to
postpone the challenge from China, but
it would not have been able to do much
once Beijing had arrived. Across four
ABOVE President Xi
Jinping arrives for a
decades and eight administrations in Washington, U.S. policy
plenary session of toward China has facilitated the development of dynamics that
China's National
People's Congress at have helped to prevent strategic competition from devolving
the Great Hall of the into unconstrained hostility, including robust people-to-people
People, Beijing, March
13, 2018 (AP photo by exchanges, deep economic interdependence, and a wide array
Andy Wong).
of institutionalized as well as informal policy dialogues.
Could the U.S. have either stalled China’s progress
indefinitely or cultivated a less formidable competitor?
Finally, what if the U.S. had tried to contain China? It may
have bought itself considerably more time, but at the risk of
creating an implacable antagonist. In 1967, five years before his
landmark trip to China, Richard Nixon warned that the U.S.
would be imprudent “to leave China
COULD THE U.S. HAVE forever outside the family of nations,
there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its
EITHER STALLED hates, and threaten its neighbors. There
CHINA’S PROGRESS is no place on this small planet for a
INDEFINITELY OR billion of its potentially most able people
CULTIVATED A LESS to live in angry isolation.”
Today, America’s relationship with
FORMIDABLE China is increasingly challenging,
COMPETITOR? frustrating and tense. It is preferable,
though, to deal with a complex
competitor that has a stake in
6
maintaining a baseline level of stability in bilateral ties, than it

would be to contend later on with a determined adversary more
explicit and aggressive in its revisionism. While China is
chipping away at certain elements of the postwar order, it has
hardly divested itself from that system. Consider, for example,
its growing contributions to United Nations peacekeeping
forces and its continued desire to gain a greater voice within
two foundational—and U.S.-led—institutions of the postwar
order: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
And for all their tension, Washington and Beijing have amassed
an impressive record of cooperation, working together to boost
economic stability in the aftermath of the global financial crisis,
addressing climate change, bringing the Iran nuclear deal to
fruition, and ramping up economic pressure on North Korea.
No one disputes that distrust between the U.S. and China is
growing rapidly across a number of dimensions. But, as Cold War
historian Odd Arne Westad notes, “Communist Party leaders are
obsessively studying how the Soviet Union collapsed, in order to
avoid a similar fate for their country.” They appreciate that an
armed confrontation with the U.S. would do lasting, if not
irrevocable, damage to their ambition of achieving a peaceful
national renaissance. As such, China will likely focus most on
competing with the U.S. economically. Its huge Belt and Road
Initiative aims to cement Chinese trade and investment across
Eurasia, while its “Made in 2025” campaign seeks to make China
a world leader in 10 domains of cutting-edge technology.
But China does not necessarily seek to succeed the U.S. as
the world’s superpower, especially if such a mantle would
impose on it real and/or perceived obligations for steering
global affairs. Reflecting on a recent gathering in Beijing
between Western journalists and scholars and Chinese elites,
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf explained that “China
does not want to run the world.” Summarizing the views of the
Chinese participants at the meeting, Wolf added that China’s
“internal problems are … too big for any such ambition. In any
case, it has no worked-out view of what to do.”
7
What is the verdict, then, on America’s China policy, and where

should the two countries go from here? Those who urge the U.S.
to recalibrate are right to warn against illusion that masquerades
as ambition. Greater economic prosperity has not accelerated
political liberalization in China to date. But Washington would be
wise to appreciate a corollary danger: yielding to fatalism that
poses as realism. The U.S. and China cannot paper over their
differences indefinitely. They can, however, deepen existing areas
of cooperation and pursue new ones. Mutual interests and
economic interdependence remain the best hopes for anchoring a
relationship that would have been exceedingly challenging no
matter how the past 40 years had unfolded.
Ali Wyne is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND

Corporation and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic
Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security.
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY IN THE TRUMP ERA 13 of 43
IN STANDOFF WITH CHINA, TRUMP

OPTS FOR PLATITUDES OVER
POLICY
JUDAH GRUNSTEIN | OCTOBER 2018
In a speech last week that seemed as much an effort to catch up

to recent events as a formal declaration of policy, Vice President
Mike Pence put Beijing on notice that “the United States of
America has adopted a new approach to China.”
The address, delivered at the Hudson Institute think tank in
Washington, for the most part covered familiar ground in terms
of American grievances with the bilateral relationship. Having
spent the past 20 years seeking to invite China into the
international order as a “responsible stakeholder,” the U.S. has
now run out of patience over Beijing’s unfair trade practices,
domestic repression and assertive militarization of the South
China Sea. Perhaps scrambling to lend weight to President
Donald Trump’s recent charge of Chinese interference in
America’s midterm congressional elections, Pence also added a
new item to the list: “a whole-of-government approach, using
political, economic and military tools, as well as propaganda,”
that China is deploying “to advance its influence and benefit its
interests in the United States.”
Whether as a candidate or president, Trump’s China policy has
confounded observers, as it has lurched chaotically from
provocation to engagement and back again. During the 2016
campaign, he vilified China for devaluing the yuan—although Beijing
had already allowed its currency to rise—and for the bilateral trade
imbalance. During the transition, he outraged Beijing by taking a
congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and
questioning the sanctity of the "one China" policy. He later
AVOID ANY OTHER appointed noted China hawk Peter

CONFIGURATION OF Navarro to his inner circle of trade advisers
and threatened retaliatory tariffs.
QUOTES AND IMAGES Yet in his first face-to-face meeting
NOT SHOWN HERE IF with Chinese President Xi Jinping in April
YOU CAN HELP IT. 2017, Trump seemed smitten, parroting
PULL TEXT CAN BE Xi’s stance on the Korean Peninsula and
calling the Chinese leader his new friend.
The impression was only reinforced
during Trump’s subsequent state visit to China, when Xi pulled
out all the stops to flatter Trump’s ego. The courtship seemed
to pay off when it came to dealing with North Korea’s nuclear
program, as China agreed to tighten sanctions on the North as
part of Trump’s high-stakes “maximum pressure” campaign to
bring Pyongyang to the negotiating table.
But any hopes have long since faded that this early
honeymoon period might forestall Trump’s campaign promise
to get tough on China over trade. A series of tit-for-tat tariffs
initiated by Trump now have observers referring to the U.S.-
BELOW Vice China trade war. And just last week, a near-collision in the
President Mike Pence
speaks at the Hudson South China Sea between a U.S. Navy vessel conducting a
Institute in freedom-of-navigation patrol and a Chinese navy ship that
Washington, Oct. 4,
2018 (AP photo by aggressively cut across its course was a reminder that an
Jacquelyn Martin). actual war is a real risk, however remote.
At the same time, the
administration’s muddled approach to
the trade war left many observers—and
also, reportedly, policymakers in Beijing
—confused as to the ultimate objectives
of Trump’s China policy. Was the goal
just to reduce the trade deficit? Address
China’s long list of unfair trade practices?
Push back against the militarization of
the South China Sea? All of the above?
The ad hoc measures, combined with the
cacophony coming from within the
Trump administration during trade negotiations, made

answering these questions difficult. Pence’s speech seemed to
be a first attempt at rationalizing the disparate grievances into
a coherent policy line.
Inasmuch as it recapitulated the many ways that China has
taken advantage of the international order, particularly on trade,
to increase its wealth, power and influence, without moderating
its behavior at home, Pence’s speech largely articulated what
has become a consensus position among China watchers. While
he presented a one-sided assessment of China’s international
behavior, including its influence operations within the U.S., the
grievances are real and have been of growing concern since at
least the tail end of the Obama administration. The conventional
wisdom in Washington during the 2016 campaign was that
President Barack Obama’s successor would have to take a more
forceful stance with China on all these issues.
When it moved from a backward glance to a preview of
what’s ahead, however, Pence’s speech—and by extension the
entire administration—confused platitudes for policy. Echoing
language that first appeared in a series of Defense Department
reports last year, and which resurfaced recently in a speech by a
senior administration official at a Chinese Embassy function in
Washington, Pence summed up the new U.S. approach as
“great-power competition.” To that end, the U.S. will marshal its
economic and military power and leverage its alliances in
pursuit of a “free, fair and reciprocal” trade relationship with
China. If the prize of this competition is leadership of the 21st-
century global economy, Pence suggested, the contest must
take place on an even playing field.
It’s hard to take issue with such a statement in principle.
But it’s also hard to achieve it in practice, particularly at this
stage of China’s rise and America’s relative decline. The Trump
administration’s trade war and more muscular approach to
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea simply enshrine
China’s worst fear and frequent accusation—that the U.S. is
seeking to contain its rise—as official U.S. policy. Pence took
pains to add that “competition does not always mean

hostility.” But if Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s reception in
China this weekend is any indication, that bromide didn’t go
over very well in Beijing.
Moreover, it is reductionist to dismiss the previous status
quo as a total failure. The U.S. made more room for China in
multilateral institutions to assuage fears of containment, while
nudging and cajoling the Chinese leadership into assuming a
more responsible role in global governance and trade practices.
From North Korea to the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate
change agreement, the U.S. succeeded in getting China to sign
on to key issues where its cooperation and support were
essential. It is unlikely Beijing’s buy-in would have been
forthcoming in a state of open confrontation, a lesson the
Trump administration might be setting itself up to learn now.
At the same time, although the status quo did deliver some
notable successes, its failures—as identified by Pence but also
others before him—were stubbornly persistent. To the extent
that Trump has left the Chinese leadership off-balance and
kept Beijing out of its comfort zone, it is a role-reversal
compared to the last two incoming U.S. administrations. His
iconoclastic approach and the suggestion that he just might
be crazy enough to pull the pin on the grenade, rather than
back down, might incentivize the Chinese leadership to seek
an off-ramp to the current standoff.
If not, however, the kind of great-power competition that
Pence and the Pentagon are describing historically leads to
conflicts with heavy costs. As I argued in last week’s WPR
podcast, this confrontation comes too early for China, which
has not yet risen to its full potential strength, and too late for
the U.S., whose unipolar moment has passed even if it still
enjoys superior economic and military power. But it is also a
confrontation that neither side can afford to back down from.
Judah Grunstein is the editor-in-chief of World Politics Review.
TRUMP’S NATIONAL SECURITY

STRATEGY RATCHETS UP U.S.
COMPETITION WITH CHINA
TIMOTH R. HEATH | DECEMBER 2017
Employing an adversarial tone that surprised many observers,

the White House’s newly unveiled National Security Strategy
described China as a “revisionist power” that “actively competes”
against the United States and its allies and partners. It accused
China of trying to “shift the regional balance in its favor” and
“displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.” The
strategy, the first released by President Donald Trump since
taking office, also declared that China seeks to shape a world
“antithetical” to U.S. values and interests, and painted China’s
expanding economic and diplomatic influence in a decidedly
negative light, deploying terms like “extractive” behavior and
“unfair trade practices.”
Chinese media predictably expressed outrage at the strategy
yet ironically mirrored the antagonistic language. A commentary
in the Global Times, a populist tabloid owned by the Chinese
Communist Party, or CCP, denounced the United States for
“recklessness” and for being the “biggest saboteur of
international rules and challenger of free trade.”
The parallels go further than recriminatory accusations,
however. Earlier this year, China published its first-ever white
paper on “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation,”
in which it signaled its intention to establish itself as the dominant
power in Asia and dislodge U.S. influence. And in the 19th Party
Congress report, the Chinese Communist Party’s most
authoritative strategy document, China articulated for the first
time an ambition to contend for global leadership. It stated that by
mid-century, China seeks to have “become a global leader in

terms of composite national strength and international influence.”
Given that China already has the world’s second-largest
economy and one of the largest militaries, this phrasing
suggests Beijing is mulling the possibilities of competing with
the United States for the status of global leader. Reinforcing
this point, the report also outlined ambitions to build a
network of “partnerships, not alliances,” which a commentary
in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP,
explained meant that China intends to form a “global
partnership network” of countries, mainly in the developing
world, to back Beijing’s agenda.
BELOW People wait
The shifts in policy on both sides were perhaps inevitable,
holding flags for a given the reality that the two countries remain locked in an
welcome ceremony with
President Donald Trump intractable rivalry for primacy in Asia and, increasingly, at the
and Chinese President Xi global systemic level. A narrowing in the gap in comprehensive
Jinping at the Great Hall
of the People, Beijing, national power and the proliferation of disputed issues,
Nov. 9, 2017 (AP photo
by Andrew Harnik).
including trade, has exacerbated the competition. Leaders in
both countries are adjusting to these pressures by

contemplating strategies to gain a decisive edge while avoiding
war. The differences in the two countries’ approaches reflect
their respective advantages and disadvantages.
As the incumbent global leader, the United States enjoys a
tremendous edge in virtually every dimension of national
power, not least of which includes a global network of allies
and partners. However, domestic opinion that is deeply
polarized about America’s involvement in international trade
deals and wars abroad imposes severe restraints on
Washington’s ability to carry out costly measures to shore up
its military power and international standing. China’s leaders
and society have the advantage of operating with far less
division, but the country approaches the competition with far
fewer resources and under the shadow of looming
demographic and economic challenges of its own.
Given the depths of economic interdependence, leaders in
both countries will continue to face a powerful incentive to
maintain cooperative relations. The
struggle for advantage will deepen, but
AS THE U.S. AND most likely in hidden realms less visible
CHINA CARRY OUT to the public eye than was the case in
THEIR OWN the Cold War. In the competition for
technological leadership, both sides can
COMPETITIVE be expected to step up measures to
POLICIES IN A WAY acquire and protect sensitive
THAT AVOIDS OPEN technologies, and recruit top scientists
CONFRONTATION, and experts. For the United States, this
could mean reforms to the Committee
THE RESULT COULD on Foreign Investment in the United
WELL BE AN States—or CFIUS—process, while
ACCELERATION Chinese leaders have already signaled an
TOWARD A interest in stepping up efforts to recruit
BIFURCATED GLOBAL ethnicInChinese scientists abroad.
geopolitics, China can be
ORDER. expected to increase involvement in
closed-door multilateral politicking as well as its leveraging of

economic benefits and threats to cajole countries along the
routes of the Silk Belt and Maritime Silk Road—also known as
the Belt and Road Initiative—into aligning more closely with
Chinese power. The Trump administration’s National Security
Strategy outlined an ambition for the United States to extend
its engagement with countries across the “Indo-Pacific” as well
as Europe. The two countries could find themselves parrying
each other in the cyber domains and in clandestine intelligence
operations around the world as well.
As the U.S. and China carry out their own competitive
policies in a way that avoids open confrontation, the result
could well be an acceleration toward a bifurcated global order
featuring competing, overlapping and occasionally consonant
institutions, standards and norms. The basic features of the
international system, such as the United Nations and the global
trade regime, will likely remain in place. But the United States
and its partners in Europe, Latin America and Asia are likely to
stick to existing standards and norms that uphold liberal values
and human rights. By contrast, China is likely to seek to either
reform existing institutions or create new norms, institutions
and standards that feature far lower consensus on such values
while also benefiting Chinese companies.
Such a development may succeed in avoiding war, but the
added uncertainty could bring risks of its own. Far-sighted and
nuanced leadership will be required in both Beijing and
Washington to find ways of managing intensifying competition
in a manner that continues to yield the greatest prospects for
stability and prosperity for all countries.
Timothy R. Heath is a senior international and defense

researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
IS THE NEW NATIONAL DEFENSE

STRATEGY THE RIGHT WAY TO
DEAL WITH CHINA’S RISE?
STEVEN METZ | FEBRUARY 2018
No issue is more important for U.S. national security than

America’s relationship with an increasingly powerful and
assertive China. But it is also true that no issue is more complex.
Two weeks ago, Secretary of Defense James Mattis released an
unclassified summary of his new National Defense Strategy.
Known among national security professionals as the NDS, the
document outlined a major shift in U.S. security doctrine.
Before Sept. 11, America’s main security concern was what
were called “rogue” states. After the terrorist attacks on the
United States, transnational terrorism inspired by Islamist
extremism moved to the fore. Then, during the Obama
administration, American strategy lost its focus, vacillating
among confronting threats from extremism, rogue states, great-
power competitors and broad phenomena like climate change
and the erosion of political authority. This was a problem: As the
old saying goes, he who aims for nothing is guaranteed to hit it.
With the new NDS summary released by Mattis, focus is
back. “We are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy,” it
declares, when America’s “competitive military advantage has
been eroding.” In its single most important sentence, the NDS
asserts that “inter-state competition, not terrorism, is now the
primary concern of U.S. national security.” This applies to both
rogue states like North Korea and Iran and great-power
competitors like Russia and China.
Of the great-power rivals, China is paramount. “No

geopolitical challenge to the American world role comes close
to that posed by the newly prosperous, nationalistic, and
sometimes belligerent Middle Kingdom,” Eliot Cohen, a political
scientist and former counselor in the State Department, argues
in his new book, “The Big Stick.” Cohen makes another crucial
observation about U.S.-China
competition: Washington’s biggest
advantage over Beijing is not its military
but its extensive network of security
partners. Today at least, the U.S. has
many allies and China does not.
The new NDS is clear on the
importance of these partnerships.
“Mutually beneficial alliances and
partnerships are crucial to our strategy,
providing a durable, asymmetric
strategic advantage that no competitor
or rival can match. This approach has
ABOVE U.S. Defense
Secretary James
served the United States well, in peace and war, for the past 75
Mattis listens to his years... Every day, our allies and partners join us in defending
introduction before
speaking about the freedom, deterring war, and maintaining the rules which
National Defense underwrite a free and open international order.” This is on the
Strategy, Jan. 19, 2018,
Washington (AP mark. Ultimately, America’s competition with China will not be
photo by Jacquelyn
Martin).
decided exclusively or even primarily by which side fields the
biggest and best military, but by which one sustains the most
robust and effective network of security partnerships.
As China has become more powerful and aggressive, some of
America’s security relationships in Asia have stagnated or decayed.
The good news is that the U.S. has extensive bilateral
security relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, some going
back many decades. Australia, South Korea and Japan are
historical, bedrock allies with impressive militaries. Thailand has
been an American security partner since the Cold War, too. The
Philippines and Taiwan have longstanding but complex ties to
the United States. In recent years, Washington has developed
and tightened security relations with India and Singapore. While

very different in capability, both play vital roles in Indo-Pacific
security. And the U.S. has tentatively developed a security
relationship with what was once a major enemy: Vietnam.
The bad news is that as China has become more powerful
and aggressive, some of America’s security relationships in
Asia have stagnated or decayed. The once solid American
commitment to the defense of Taiwan has been complicated
since the U.S. switched its official recognition of China from
Taipei to Beijing in 1978. Ties with the Philippines have ebbed
and flowed for decades with a marked downturn in recent
years under President Rodrigo Duterte, who has moved closer
to an alignment with China.
Over the past year, the Trump administration has undermined
longstanding U.S. ties with Pakistan and South Korea. Following
through on earlier threats, the administration suspended aid to
Pakistan this month for its support of extremist movements.
Worse, President Donald Trump has rattled South Korea with his
threats of military action against North Korea and security
shakedown of Seoul, warning that the U.S. could scrap a free
trade deal unless South Korea paid for an advanced U.S. missile
defense system. In both Pakistan and South Korea, the public
and political leaders have begun to
AS CHINA HAS question their security relationship with
the United States.
BECOME MORE Successfully implementing the new
POWERFUL AND NDS strategy toward China will depend
AGGRESSIVE, SOME less on the U.S. defense budget or the
OF AMERICA’S ability of Mattis to build a “more lethal
force” than on reinvigorating America’s
SECURITY network of security partnerships. This is
RELATIONSHIPS IN particularly true in the Indo-Pacific, but
ASIA HAVE also applies to other regions where China
STAGNATED OR may attempt to supplant the U.S. and
redesign the regional order, including
DECAYED. potentially the Middle East. The NDS
depends as much on the State Department and, in particular,

the president as it does on the Pentagon.
Trump has questioned many of America’s alliances, and
ominously, there are few signs that he is fully committed to
sustaining or expanding vital U.S. security partnerships in the
Indo-Pacific. He seems more concerned with America’s trade
balance than with the region’s security architecture. He does
not appear to back the regional economic integration that
helped provide a soft power bulwark against Chinese
assertiveness. He has given little sign of expanding American
ties with Taiwan or aligning American policy with other key
regional states. And perhaps most important of all, he has
rocked U.S.-South Korean ties to their core by seeming to
threaten unilateral military action against North Korea’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs.
No matter how sound the National Defense Strategy, it
cannot succeed in isolation from tightly integrated political and
diplomatic efforts. Strategy by its nature must be holistic. While
the U.S. military and its security partnerships are two edges of a
single sword, today one is sharp and the other tarnished. As
America’s competition with China continues to demonstrate,
this is not a path to strategic success.
Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of

American Strategy.” You can follow him on Twitter
@steven_metz.
CHINA’S NAVAL BUILDUP IS A REAL

CHALLENGE TO THE U.S. NAVY’S
DOMINANCE
SHAHRYAR PASANDIDEH | JULY 2018
While the United States Navy struggles to figure out if, how and
when it can expand the size of its combat fleet by 47 ships—a 15
percent increase—China continues to crank out around a dozen
new large warships a year. In May, the busy shipyard in the port
city Dalian put to sea China’s second aircraft carrier, following up
on that milestone two months later by simultaneously launching
two Type 055-class cruisers. With the U.S. Navy being the only
other fleet to operate a large number of vessels of such size and
capability, the pace and scale of production at Chinese shipyards
is a sign of Beijing’s desire for a fleet commensurate with its
perceived status as a great power.
Displacing more than 10,000 tons, the Type 055-class cruisers
are large, multirole warships similar to the U.S. Navy’s high-end
Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
Such warships constitute the backbone of navies focused on
high-intensity naval combat. Even a decade ago, the Chinese
navy had only a handful of ships capable of providing a broad
range of naval combat capabilities over a large area. Until the
early 2000s, most Chinese warships were incapable of even
targeting hostile aircraft more than a dozen or so kilometers
away. Without such vessels, combat success in the South China
Sea and the Taiwan Strait was well out of reach, even against
adversaries far less capable than the U.S. Navy.
Today, by contrast, China has 20 large and modern multirole
cruisers and destroyers in service, with another 10 in the water
awaiting completion and a further seven under construction.

Remarkably, most of these warships have been built since 2010.
Although the Chinese navy attracts considerable
international attention when it launches a new aircraft carrier,
smaller-scale vessels generate almost no interest. As a result,
much of China’s naval buildup occurs under the radar. In a
sense, this is understandable. Chinese state media rarely gloats
about the lower-profile naval developments, and the speed of
new naval construction makes it impractical for both the
Chinese and international media to report on each completed
warship. That can obscure just how comprehensive and
expansive China’s naval buildup has been.
Since 2010, in addition to its new destroyers and cruisers,
China has put into service 23 frigates, with three more awaiting
ABOVE Chinese naval
officials stand in front completion. The destroyers, cruisers and frigates have been
of the ship Daqing,
San Diego, Calif., Dec.
supplemented by 41 smaller but still capable Type 056-class
7, 2016 (AP photo by corvettes, all built and commissioned since 2012. These
Gregory Bull).
corvettes, coupled with the larger warships, have dramatically
improved China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which has

been a traditional area of weakness long compounded by the
strength of America’s large submarine force. Although Chinese
shipyards have also been busy building submarines, Beijing’s
efforts at secrecy surrounding its underwater fleet make it
difficult to gauge a reliable count of new sub construction.
China’s naval buildup may no longer be a new
phenomenon, but even seasoned observers struggle to keep
pace with its dramatic advances.
Adding to its growing naval fleet, China has since 2010
commissioned seven large replenishment ships and built five
large amphibious assault ships. Elsewhere, China has built
dozens of noncombat vessels that are no less essential,
including electronic intelligence-gathering ships, mine-warfare
vessels, training ships and vessels required for logistical
support. These provide China with a well-rounded fleet, one
capable of enforcing maritime claims closer to home while also
enabling long-range deployments and naval diplomacy in the
Indian Ocean and beyond.
Although these new foreign missions tax the Chinese fleet, in
regional waters the Chinese navy now serves mainly as a
backstop to the country’s other maritime forces. In particular,
the increasingly capable and ever-growing Chinese coast guard
is the primary enforcer of China’s maritime claims. The coast
guard is both a complement and a substitute for the navy,
thereby freeing up naval assets for use in other missions.
Until the early 2000s, China was incapable of designing and
building technologically competitive warships, which meant that
China’s naval construction primarily posed a quantitative
challenge to its rivals. Today, Chinese warships increasingly
feature world-class designs and equipment, adding a strong
qualitative dynamic to its naval expansion. The Type 055-class
cruiser, for example, features 112 large multirole missile launchers
that can carry everything from ballistic missile defense
interceptors to cruise missiles capable of striking both land and
maritime targets located over 1,000 kilometers away. For
targeting, the ship relies on several powerful radars. The Type

055-class cruiser could serve as the flagship of a highly capable
escort squadron for China’s new fleet of aircraft carriers.
Training standards for Chinese naval personnel were once
questioned in the past, but China has made considerable strides
here as well in recent years. The Chinese navy increasingly
conducts more realistic combat exercises that improve its
ability to make the most of its new equipment. Altogether,
across various metrics, the Chinese navy has addressed
qualitative gaps as well as vital, if somewhat unglamorous,
areas such as logistics to improve its capabilities.
China’s naval buildup may no longer be a new phenomenon,
but even seasoned observers struggle to keep pace with its
dramatic advances. The U.S. Navy, for one, has long kept a close
eye on China’s naval expansion, publishing useful reports in
2009 and 2015. As a testament to the pace of change, the most
recent report is already outdated, and the Chinese navy
continues to pass new milestones. China recently became the
first country to test an electro-magnetic railgun at sea, which
may provide future Chinese warships with a definitive edge.
The U.S. Navy, meanwhile, is struggling to find the requisite
funds and capacity to build, maintain and operate a larger fleet.
China’s steady naval buildup is indicative of the challenges that
the U.S. faces in retaining naval supremacy in what the
Pentagon itself, in its latest defense strategy document,
recognized as an age of great-power competition.
Shahryar Pasandideh is a doctoral student in the Department of

Political Science at the George Washington University. His
research focuses on assessments of military power, the
development and diffusion of military technologies, military
operations and effectiveness, and regional security issues in the
Persian Gulf region and the Indo-Pacific.
HOW TO KNOW WHEN CHINA IS

PULLING EVEN WITH THE UNITED
STATES
STEVEN METZ | MARCH 2018
In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Ely

Ratner—both former senior officials in the Obama administration
—noted that over the past 45 years, “neither carrots nor sticks
have swayed China as predicted.” From Richard Nixon on,
American presidents believed that U.S. diplomacy and military
power could “persuade Beijing that it was neither possible nor
necessary to challenge the U.S.-led security order in Asia.” But
that didn’t prove true. Today, as Campbell and Ratner note,
“China is on the path to becoming a military peer the likes of
which the United States has not seen since the Soviet Union” and
is using its power to challenge the United States.
This is a dangerous trend. If China’s ascent and America’s
current decline continue, China’s ability to not just compete with
U.S. influence but displace it will rise too. It is vital that Americans
recognize the indicators that China is passing them by.
Inside the Pentagon, the greatest concern is China’s rapidly
improving military. For decades, Beijing’s armed forces were
large but qualitatively inferior to those of advanced nations,
particularly the United States. But in more recent years, China
has devoted a significant portion of its immense wealth to
improving its military technology and the overall effectiveness of
its armed forces. Beijing is now working on its second, more
advanced aircraft carrier and is moving quickly on other projects,
such as electromagnetic railguns, a deep-sea reconnaissance
system, autonomous “drone swarms” and infantry exoskeletons.
In key technologies like hypersonic

missiles and artificial intelligence, China
is close to catching up with and perhaps
surpassing the United States.
This is alarming since the American
military traditionally relies on
technological and qualitative superiority
over its opponents. But what might be a
more ominous sign that China has pulled
even with the United States, and may be
poised to push ahead, would be if Beijing
builds a network of defensible overseas
ABOVE The Chinese
naval frigate
military bases that can be used to project power.
Huangshan is seen Until recently, China had no bases outside its own territory,
anchored in the
waters off RSS largely because of its longstanding distaste for great-power
Singapura Changi ambitions. Then it began building islands with military
Naval Base,
Singapore, May 15, installations on little scraps of land in the South China Sea.
2017 (AP photo by
Wong Maye-E).
These have a political and economic purpose as China lays
claim to maritime areas far from its coast, but the bases could
not be defended against the United States and are too small to
play much of a role in power projection.
There are signs, though, that as
China grows in economic and military
IF CHINA REPLACES might, it plans to develop more
WANING U.S. overseas bases even farther afield. Last
INFLUENCE IN THE year, it opened its first one in the small
African nation of Djibouti. While Beijing
MIDDLE EAST OR said this was to support anti-piracy
BECOMES INVOLVED efforts around the Horn of Africa, it may
IN PLACES LIKE THE also reflect China’s growing economic
MEDITERRANEAN OR stake in the continent. And that may be
EUROPE, THE GLOBAL only the first step: There have been
reports that China is planning a base in
SECURITY SYSTEM Pakistan—again following growing
WILL HAVE SHIFTED economic interests there—although at
DRAMATICALLY. this point Beijing denies it.
An extensive network of Chinese overseas military bases

would represent a serious risk to the existing U.S.-led security
order. For a number of years, Western analysts have warned of
what is known as China’s “string of pearls” strategy of
constructing civilian maritime infrastructure throughout the
Indian Ocean, which could be turned into military bases. Should
China establish a foothold in places across the Indian Ocean,
from other African nations to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives,
Myanmar and the Philippines, it would be a sign that it is close
to matching the United States.
It would be even more ominous if China became a major
security player outside the Indo-Pacific region. Beijing already
has a presence in Latin America. As in Africa, it began as an
economic effort but shows signs of evolving into security ties.
Recently, for instance, Beijing began funding what the
commander of U.S. Southern Command calls “lavish” trips for
Latin American military officers to China. This might extend to
other regions still: If China replaces waning U.S. influence in the
Middle East or becomes involved in places like the
Mediterranean or parts of Europe, the global security system
will have shifted dramatically.
There are, though, grounds for some skepticism, or at least
caution in gauging the extent of Chinese power. While Chinese
parity with or superiority to the United States is more
conceivable than it was a few years ago, Washington retains a
significant advantage in both military power—particularly long-
range power projection—and, more importantly, in its network
of security partners and allies. As Harry J. Kazianis has noted,
today at least China would lose a war with the United States.
The question is whether this will last as China becomes
richer, more militarily proficient and more assertive. The United
States may temporarily reverse its declining military spending,
but under the Trump administration, it is letting its vitally
important advantages in soft power and alliance networks
decay. In terms of global power and prestige, “China isn’t rising
to America’s level. America is dropping to—or even below—

China’s,” as Peter Beinart recently put it.
This leaves Americans with two pressing questions. Can or
should the United States sustain or increase its strategic
advantage over a rising China? And, if not, What will it mean for
the United States when China pulls even, or overtakes it? How
these questions are answered will shape both America’s future
and the wider global security environment.
Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of

American Strategy.” You can follow him on Twitter
@steven_metz.
THE ONGOING DRAMA, OR FARCE,

OF TRUMP’S CHINA TRADE POLICY
KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT | MAY 2018
It’s déjà vu all over again. Where’s the beef? And speak loudly,
but forget the stick.
Those were among the clichés that came to mind during the
Trump administration’s China trade policy gyrations over the past
few weeks. Almost exactly a year after Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross announced the results of a “herculean” effort to get
a deal with China to boost U.S. exports of energy and agricultural
goods, and six months after Ross announced another set of deals
purportedly worth $250 billion in increased American exports of
natural gas, soybeans, beef and pork, the White House released a
joint statement in which China again promised “meaningful
increases” in imports of U.S. agricultural and energy products.
The chief White House economic adviser, Lawrence Kudlow,
claimed the Chinese had agreed to increase American exports by
$200 billion, but China denied that there was a commitment to
any specific dollar figure.
In exchange for these vague—and recurring—promises,
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin announced that the
administration would not impose tariffs on up to $150 billion in
Chinese exports aimed at Beijing’s unfair trade practices. But after
pushback from Congress and some in the American business
community, harder-line administration officials and eventually
President Donald Trump himself claimed that the threatened
tariffs could still be imposed if Ross does not come back from
AGAIN AND AGAIN, China next month with a good enough

CHINA MANAGES TO deal—whatever that might be.
To add further confusion, the
WALK AWAY FROM decision to put the trade war with China
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS “on hold” followed an earlier tweet by
MOSTLY UNSCATHED. Trump ordering Ross to do something
about the penalties imposed on Chinese
telecommunications company ZTE over its violations of U.S.
sanctions against Iran and North Korea. After years of railing
against the impact of Chinese trade on American jobs, the
president declared on Twitter that barring sales of U.S.
technology to ZTE threatened thousands of Chinese jobs. It
reportedly followed a phone call from Chinese President Xi
Jinping complaining that the ban on U.S. technology sales to ZTE
threatened the viability of the company.
Just a few weeks ago, I wrote in this space that the Trump
administration seemed to be turning tough words into action. It
had imposed antidumping duties on large Chinese washing
BELOW U.S. Trade machines and solar energy equipment and levied tariffs on steel
Representative
Robert Lighthizer at and aluminum, nominally for national security purposes. The
the 9th China Department of Commerce’s ban on U.S. exports of key
Business Conference
at the U.S. Chamber technologies to ZTE was the most significant action. ZTE had
of Commerce,
Washington, May 1,
admitted to selling equipment with American components to
2018 (AP photo by Iran and North Korea in violation of U.S. sanctions programs,
but then did not fulfill the conditions on
which the suspension of penalties was
based. On a much bigger scale, the
administration had threatened to
impose what are known as Section 301
tariffs on up to $150 billion in Chinese
exports over trade practices relating to
intellectual property theft, forced
technology transfer and other industrial
policies.
Trump’s purported goals with these
moves are to reduce the large bilateral
trade deficit with China and to protect U.S. national security. Yet
again and again, China manages to walk away from
negotiations mostly unscathed. The duties on washing
machines, solar energy, steel and aluminum affect a relatively
small amount of bilateral trade. And China had made similar
promises to increase imports of U.S. agricultural commodities
and liquid natural gas on at least two prior occasions. In each
case, the Chinese resisted Washington’s demands to reduce the
bilateral trade deficit by a certain amount, knowing that the
deficit is ultimately determined by macroeconomic factors
beyond their control.
In the latest case, Chinese negotiators refused to specify a
number for the value of increased U.S. exports they would buy,
making it weaker even than the earlier announcements from Ross.
So, déjà vu all over again, only worse. And where’s the beef?
Well, China did carry through on its May 2017 promise to
Ross to open its market to U.S. beef exports, many years after
the World Organization for Animal Health had designated them
as having a negligible risk of BSE, or bovine spongiform
encephalopathy disease—better known as mad cow disease—
and several months after telling the Obama administration it
would do so. After reaching a hardly whopping $6 million
dollars, and 2.6 percent of U.S. beef exports globally, exports to
China fell back to just over 1 percent of the total in the early
months of 2018. At the current pace, it will take years to reach
the $200 million target for beef exports that China promised to
Ross in November.
More fundamentally, promises to increase purchases of U.S.
soybeans, meat and natural gas do nothing to help American
manufacturing, as Trump has promised. Nor do they anything to
address the underlying economic policies that prevent U.S. and
other foreign firms from being able to compete on an even
playing field. The latest White House statement said almost
nothing about intellectual property, for example. And the
administration is now reportedly planning to restore export
privileges if ZTE pays an additional fine and again commits to
management changes of the sort on which it reneged earlier. In

the face of deep dissatisfaction with its trade policies from
farmers, and with a challenging midterm election looming, the
administration’s negotiations now reportedly include China
lifting the tariffs it imposed on U.S. agricultural exports in
retaliation for Trump’s steel and aluminum tariffs.
Even if the reports that Trump ordered the removal of the
harshest sanctions on ZTE in return for increased agricultural
exports, or Xi’s goodwill, or something else, are untrue, the whole
mess undermines U.S. credibility. Perceptions will inevitably linger
that Trump is susceptible to flattery from Xi, and that the
administration is willing to trade U.S. national security interests to
mollify a key political constituency ahead of elections. A trade
war is not the preferred outcome for many reasons, but the
leverage of trade sanctions, as a last resort, needs to be on the
table. Repeated announcements from Ross and Mnuchin that
they have just concluded the biggest, best deal to increase
exports to China do not help, especially when that “best deal” is
really the same one they have been trying to negotiate all along.
The latest mind-boggling announcement from Trump, that he
wants Ross to investigate whether automobile and truck
imports are a threat to national security, will only make things
worse. Increased tariffs on cars would, like the steel and
aluminum tariffs, hit America’s closest allies and trading
partners hardest. Again, like steel and aluminum, the threat of
auto tariffs exposes the duplicity involved in calling this a
national security issue. And, in terms of China policy, it will
further alienate the very allies whose cooperation the U.S. needs
to pressure China over its unfair trade practices.
The fundamental problem is that Trump, though a longtime
skeptic of free trade, does not have a coherent trade policy. And
deep divisions among his key economic advisers mean that the
supposed chief negotiator, U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Lighthizer, cannot develop one. So what emerges on trade is
driven by short-run concerns and changes from one week to the
next. The result is that American farmers and energy producers
may sell a little more to China. But don’t expect this drama—or
farce—to create many jobs, much less make America great again.
Kimberly Ann Elliott is a visiting fellow at the Center for Global

Development and the author of numerous books and articles on
trade, food security and worker rights.
DID TRUMP JUST ANNOUNCE A

NEW ‘AID WAR’ WITH CHINA AT THE
U.N.?
RICHARD GOWAN | OCT 2018
Was Donald Trump nasty or nice at the United Nations last week?
The answer may depend on whether you listened to his
comments from Beijing or Tehran.
Diplomatic observers expected the American president to
look tough at the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly.
Many predicted that he would strike an especially aggressive
tone toward Iran. He didn’t disappoint them, using his U.N.
appearance to celebrate his withdrawal from the “horrible”
Iranian nuclear deal and attack Tehran’s “agenda of aggression
and expansion” in the Middle East.
Yet there was something formulaic about his rhetoric, and he
made no startlingly new threats against the Islamic Republic.
The president even tweeted that he might be open to
meeting his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani, “someday,”
calling him an “absolutely lovely” man. Diplomats recall how
Trump belittled North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as “Rocket
Man” at the 2017 General Assembly, only to try to forge a
personal bond with Kim this year. Many wonder if Trump will try
a similar routine with Rouhani.
At a minimum, Trump seemed more irritated than angered by
Iran last week. He sat through a Security Council session at which
U.S. allies stood up for the nuclear deal. He did not rebuke them.
This may simply be because Trump and his advisers do not take
the Security Council especially seriously. But it may also be
because the president has bigger diplomatic fish to fry.
ABOVE U.S. President

Donald Trump The most worrying aspects of Trump’s performance at the
addresses the 73rd
United Nations
U.N. did not concern war and peace. Instead they centered on
General Assembly, trade and aid. Three points of concern stood out. First, the
New York, Sept. 25,
2018 (Photo by president seems keen to make his trade war with China a
Anthony Behar for defining issue of his term. Second, he may be willing to take
Sipa USA via AP).
down the international trading system in pursuit of this goal.
Third, he is liable to subordinate U.S. development policy to this
broader strategy, damaging poor nations.
Sino-American relations were worsening sharply as Trump
arrived at the U.N. In recent weeks, the U.S. has slapped new
trade tariffs on Beijing and also announced sanctions in
response to Chinese purchases of Russian weaponry. Trump
tried to minimize tensions by referencing his good personal ties
with Chinese President Xi Jinping. But he proceeded to
emphasize the two countries’ “trade imbalance,” blaming it on
“China’s trade distortions and the way they deal,” before
warning the Security Council that Beijing is trying to interfere in

the upcoming U.S. midterm congressional elections.
By the time the president spoke to the press on Wednesday
night, he was joking that his friendship with Xi might be over. It
seems clear that Trump plans to frame the last weeks of the
midterm campaign, and perhaps the remainder of his first term,
as a struggle to defend American voters from Chinese
predations. Whatever the electoral benefits of this strategy,
which is likely to get rather lost in the current Supreme Court
nomination battle, it will have diplomatic ramifications.
Some of the most serious of these relate to the World Trade
Organization. The president has consistently argued that the
WTO is unfair to the U.S. and even mused about withdrawing
from it. If he were ever to follow through on this, the impact on
the wider international system would be severe. Other
governments have grumbled over U.S. decisions to exit bodies
like the U.N. Human Rights Council and UNESCO. But in truth,
these are “nice to have” multilateral institutions rather than
“must have” mechanisms that underpin the global system. The
WTO is a “must have” body.
Although Trump did not openly threaten to quit the WTO in
New York, he talked up the “dire need of change” to penalize
countries—and specifically, China—that abuse WTO rules and
cost American jobs. Even if the U.S. refrains from pulling out of
the WTO, it has the ability to severely complicate its work. And
if it uses the organization as a multilateral battleground for its
strategic competition with China, it will harm other states’ faith
in global cooperation overall.
These tensions are especially likely to affect international
development policy. Many U.S. politicians believe that they are
involved not only in a trade war with China, but an aid war too.
Western officials have long been critical of China’s
expanding aid presence, claiming that Beijing overlooks human
rights and other concerns in search of a fast buck. As I noted
last week, China has also been working hard to persuade U.N.
bodies to endorse its aid policies, annoying the U.S.
THE U.S. NOW RISKS U.S. officials are now pushing a $60
UPSETTING billion fund to roll back growing Chinese
economic influence in the developing
INTERNATIONAL world. Trump told the General Assembly
COOPERATION OVER of a new aid review to “examine what is
TRADE AND AID IN A working, what is not working, and
STRUGGLE TO GAIN whether countries that receive our
dollars and our protection also have our
ADVANTAGE OVER interests at heart.” The chances that this
CHINA. will turn into a study of whether
developing countries are more pro-
American or pro-Chinese are reasonably high.
Such a process could puncture one of the few remaining
notions about international cooperation that tie the U.N.
together: that everyone believes in aid and development. In
2015, the General Assembly unanimously approved the
Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, as a framework for
guiding aid programming up to 2030. These include ambitious
pledges to eradicate extreme poverty. In a period in which the
U.N. has been stumbling dreadfully over security crises like the
Syrian war, this consensus over aid looked like a way to keep a
sense of common interests alive.
Trump is clearly not moved by such ideas. He told the
General Assembly that he would like to focus aid on those who
“respect” America. His administration has already slashed funds
for the Palestinians. The U.S. now risks upsetting international
cooperation over trade and aid in a struggle to gain advantage
over China. These may be even greater threats to the
international system than a conflict with Iran and will create
concern in capitals well beyond Beijing.
Richard Gowan is a senior fellow at the United Nations

University’s Centre for Policy Research. He is also a fellow at the
European Council on Foreign Relations and NYU’s Center on
International Cooperation, and teaches at Columbia University.
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U.S.

Integrating China into the liberal trade

AMERICA’S CHINA POLICY HASN’T

Forty years after China embarked on the economic reforms that

of a fifth of humanity hinge, to an extraordinary degree, on the

American assistance. Its history

maintaining a baseline level of stability in bilateral ties, than it

What is the verdict, then, on America’s China policy, and where

Ali Wyne is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND

IN STANDOFF WITH CHINA, TRUMP

In a speech last week that seemed as much an effort to catch up

AVOID ANY OTHER appointed noted China hawk Peter

Trump administration during trade negotiations, made

pains to add that “competition does not always mean

Judah Grunstein is the editor-in-chief of World Politics Review.

TRUMP’S NATIONAL SECURITY

Employing an adversarial tone that surprised many observers,

mid-century, China seeks to have “become a global leader in

both countries are adjusting to these pressures by

closed-door multilateral politicking as well as its leveraging of

Timothy R. Heath is a senior international and defense

IS THE NEW NATIONAL DEFENSE

No issue is more important for U.S. national security than

Of the great-power rivals, China is paramount. “No

and tightened security relations with India and Singapore. While

depends as much on the State Department and, in particular,

Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of

CHINA’S NAVAL BUILDUP IS A REAL

awaiting completion and a further seven under construction.

improved China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which has

targeting, the ship relies on several powerful radars. The Type

Shahryar Pasandideh is a doctoral student in the Department of

HOW TO KNOW WHEN CHINA IS

In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Kurt Campbell and Ely

In key technologies like hypersonic

An extensive network of Chinese overseas military bases

to America’s level. America is dropping to—or even below—

Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of

THE ONGOING DRAMA, OR FARCE,

AGAIN AND AGAIN, China next month with a good enough

management changes of the sort on which it reneged earlier. In

Kimberly Ann Elliott is a visiting fellow at the Center for Global

DID TRUMP JUST ANNOUNCE A

ABOVE U.S. President

warning the Security Council that Beijing is trying to interfere in

Richard Gowan is a senior fellow at the United Nations

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Try an all-access subscription to World

Subscribing to WPR is like no other

• Immediate and instant access to the full

• Daily articles with original analysis,

• Daily links to must-read news, analysis,

• Daily Associated Press wire stories,

• Weekly in-depth reports, including

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