DE CASTRO VS JBC | 2010 | BERSAMIN should negate any fear of foul play or the possible effects of the
midnight appointments which might be made because of the
FACTS: Pursuant to the controversy following the compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election, the JBC agreed that the
vacant position must be filled and opened the application for the
next Chief Justice on January 2010 but it had not submitted the
list of nominees to the President. Their failure to submit the list
of nominees is due to the on-going debate regarding the conflict
between the provisions in the constitution namely, Section 4 (1),
in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution which
states that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the
Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy.” On the other hand,
Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which
prohibits the President or the Acting President from making
appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
ISSUE: WON Sec. 15, Art. 7 applies to the Judiciary.
RATIO: NO - The Supreme Court sought the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and found out that Section 4(1) of
Art. 8 imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment. Moreover, the court resorted to statutory
construction and determined that Sec. 15 only applies to
members of the Executive, and not with the Judiciary because
of the principle of the separation of powers in the government.
Lastly, the presence of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
intensive filtering procedure that the JBC undertakes before
coming up with a shortlist.
HELD: The rule on midnight appointments for the executive
branch does not lie with the judiciary.
PH HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS VS CIR | 2009 | CORONA
FACTS: Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic
corporation whose primary purpose is "[t]o establish, maintain,
conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care
delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take
care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care
plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial
responsibilities of the organization." Individuals enrolled in its
health care programs pay an annual membership fee and are
entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical
services provided by its duly licensed physicians, specialists
and other professional technical staff participating in the group
practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned,
operated or accredited by it.
January 27, 2000: Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR)
sent petitioner a formal demand letter and the corresponding
assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency
taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years
1996 and 1997 in the total amount of P224,702,641.18
Petitioner protested the assessment in a letter dated February
23, 2000.
CIR did not act on the protest, petitioner filed a petition for
review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) seeking the
cancellation of the deficiency VAT and DST assessments.
■ CTA: PARTIALLY GRANTED
■ to pay VAT
■ DST assessment CANCELLED AND SET
ASIDE
■ CIR: health care agreement was a contract of
insurance subject to DST under Section 185 of the
1997 Tax Code
■ CA: health care agreement was in the nature of a
non-life insurance contract subject to DST
■ Court Affirmed CA
ISSUES:
1. WON the Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc (HMO)
was engaged in the business of insurance during the
pertinent taxable years - NO
2. WON the Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc enters
into an insurance contract - NO
HELD: motion for reconsideration is GRANTED
P.D. 612 Insurance Code
Sec. 2 (2)
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an
insurance business", within the meaning of this Code, shall
include:
(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance
contract;
(b) making or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of
suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any
other legitimate business or activity of the surety;
(c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance
business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of
an insurance business within the meaning of this Code;
(d) doing or proposing to do any business in substance
equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this Code.
In the application of the provisions of this Code the fact that
no profit is derived from the making of insurance contracts,
agreements or transactions or that no separate or direct
consideration is received therefor, shall not be deemed
conclusive to show that the making thereof does not
constitute the doing or transacting of an insurance business.
RATIO:
First Issue - No profit is derived from the making of insurance
contracts, agreements or transactions or that no separate or
direct consideration is received therefore, shall not be deemed
conclusive to show that the making thereof does not constitute
the doing or transacting of an insurance business
Second Issue -
● Basic distinction between medical service corporations
and ordinary health and accident insurers is that the
former undertake to provide prepaid medical services
through participating physicians, thus relieving
subscribers of any further financial burden, while the
latter only undertake to indemnify an insured for medical
expenses up to, but not beyond, the schedule of rates
contained in the policy
● A participating provider of health care services is one
who agrees in writing to render health care services to
or for persons covered by a contract issued by health
service corporation in return for which the health service
corporation agrees to make payment directly to the
participating provider
● Any indemnification resulting from the payment for
services rendered in case of emergency by non-
participating health providers would still be incidental to
petitioner’s purpose of providing and arranging for
health care services and does not transform it into an
insurer.
● As an HMO, it is its obligation to maintain the good
health of its members
● its undertaking under its agreements is not to indemnify
its members against any loss or damage arising from a
medical condition but, on the contrary, to provide the
health and medical services needed to prevent such
loss or damage
● Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type
benefits to its members (with respect to its curative
medical services), but these are incidental to the
principal activity of providing them medical care. The
"insurance-like" aspect of petitioner’s business is
miniscule compared to its noninsurance activities.
Therefore, since it substantially provides health care
services rather than insurance services, it cannot be
considered as being in the insurance business.
● principal purpose test: purpose of determining what
"doing an insurance business" means, we have to
scrutinize the operations of the business as a whole and
not its mere components
● letter dated September 3, 2000, the Insurance
Commissioner confirmed that petitioner is not engaged
in the insurance business. This determination of the
commissioner must be accorded great weight
● Section 2 (1) of the Insurance Code defines a contract
of insurance as an agreement whereby one undertakes
for a consideration to indemnify another against loss,
damage or liability arising from an unknown or
contingent event. An insurance contract exists where
the following elements concur: (NOT present)
○ The insured has an insurable interest;
○ The insured is subject to a risk of loss by the
happening of the designed peril;
○ The insurer assumes the risk;
○ Such assumption of risk is part of a general
scheme to distribute actual losses among a large
group of persons bearing a similar risk and
 ○ In consideration of the insurer’s promise, the
insured pays a premium.
■ no indemnity
■ member can take advantage of the bulk
of the benefits anytime even in the
absence of any peril, loss or damage on
his or her part.
■ assumption of the expense by petitioner
is not confined to the happening of a
contingency but includes incidents even
in the absence of illness or injury
■ Since indemnity of the insured was
not the focal point of the agreement
but the extension of medical services
to the member at an affordable cost,
it did not partake of the nature of a
contract of insurance
● HMO, undertakes a business risk when it offers to
provide health services. But it is not the risk of the
type peculiar only to insurance companies.
Insurance risk, also known as actuarial risk, is the
risk that the cost of insurance claims might be higher
than the premiums paid. The amount of premium is
calculated on the basis of assumptions made
relative to the insured.
● In our jurisdiction, a commentator of our insurance
laws has pointed out that, even if a contract contains
all the elements of an insurance contract, if its
primary purpose is the rendering of service, it is not
a contract of insurance. The primary purpose of the
parties in making the contract may negate the
existence of an insurance contract.
● health care agreements are clearly not within the
ambit of Section 185 of the NIRC and there was
never any legislative intent to impose the same on
HMOs
PAGSIBIGAN VS PEOPLE (NO DIGEST AVAILABLE)
:(
IN RE: MAX SHOOP APPLICATION | 1920 | MALCOLM
FACTS: This is an application to the court by Max Shoop for
admission to practice law in the Philippines Islands wherein the
applicant has been admitted to practice, and has practiced for
more than five years in the highest court of the State of New
York. With the rule cited by the court, the following are required
for compliance for the admission of the applicant: (1) Any
person admitted to practice and who has practiced five years as
a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state
or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia.
(2) Any person admitted to practice and who has practiced five
years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the
principles of the English Common Law.
ISSUE: WON Max Shoop is qualified to practice law in the
Philippines.
RATIO: The decision is based upon the interpretation of the
New York rule...
(1) The Philippine Islands is an unorganized territory of the
United States, under a civil government established by the
Congress.
(2) In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of
this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decision in cases not
covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the
theories and precedents of Anglo- American cases, subject to
the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of
the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories
and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent
with local customs and institutions. (3) The
jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English
Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American
Common Law to an almost exclusive extent. (4) By virtue of the
foregoing, the New York rule, given a reasonable interpretation,
permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice
in the Philippine Islands similar to those privileges accorded by
the rule of this court.
HELD: Accordingly, the supporting papers filed by the applicant
in this case showing to the satisfaction of the court his
qualifications as an attorney-at-law, his petition is hereby
granted and he is admitted to the practice of law in the Philippine
Islands.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION | 1936 | LAUREL
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara (Angara) and Private
Respondent Pedro Ynsua (Ynsua) were candidates voted to be
members of the National Assembly (NA) for the 1st district of
Tayabas.
Angara was proclaimed as the member-elect of the district and
he subsequently took his oath of office. NA passed Resolution
8, confirming election of the members of the National Assembly,
against whom no protests were filed so far. However, 5 days
after the issuance of Resolution No. 8, Ynsua filed a Motion for
Protest to the Electoral Commission against Angara. A day after
Ynsua’s protest, the EC issued its own resolution declaring the
said day to be the cut-off for the filing of election protests.
Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can
take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot
be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. Angara, instituted
a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain the
Electoral Commission (EC) from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Ynsua against his election, hence the case
at bar.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter
regarding the EC and the controversy.
2.Whether or not the EC within their jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the election protest.
RATIO:
First Issue - Yes. The SC has jurisdiction of the matter and the
SC emphasized that in conflicts between its several
departments and agencies, the Judiciary, with the SC as the
final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism that is made
to resolve the said conflicts and allocate constitutional
boundaries. Hence, when conflict arise between these
boundaries, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve
these conflicts through their Judicial Supremacy or the power of
Judicial Review and is the power and duty to see that no one
branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, which is the source of all authority. As such, the
EC, which is an organ of created under the constitution is still
within the purview of the constitutional mechanism for checks
and balances.
Second Issue - Yes. As to the jurisdiction of the EC to take
cognizance of the election protest, the SC held that the EC was
correct to do so since it is an independent constitutional creation
with specific powers and functions to execute and perform.
Specifically, the EC is granted the power to be the sole judge of
all contests related to election and therefore, it was acting within
its legitimate exercise of its constitutionally mandated
prerogative in taking cognizance of the election protest. With
this, the court emphasized that the NA’s confirmation of
members through Resolution No. 8 does not limit EC of its
power to fix dates for election protest, or else it would undermine
the power and functions of the EC.
HELD: The SC has jurisdiction and the Electoral Commission
was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election
protest filed by Ynsua.
IN RE: PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (1954)
FACTS: In general, the passing grade for the bar examination
is a general average of 75% in all subjects without any subject
dropping below 50%. For the past years, the passing rate
fluctuated depending on the strictness of those correcting the
bar examinations. The rates from the years 1946-1953 are as
follows: 1946-72%, 1947-69%, 1948-70%, 1949-74%, 1950-
53–75%
The “bar flunkers”, believing that they were unduly discriminated
against went to Congress and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no.
12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise
adverse to it. Though the veto was not overridden, in 1953, the
Senate approved Senate Bill no. 372 which contained
substantially the same provisions of the previous vetoed bill.
The Bar Flunker’s Act of 1953 was passed on June 21, 1953,
arousing public concern. The objective of said law, Republic Act
972, was to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations.
However, the law is contrary to public interest and sparked
animosity since it qualified 1,094 law graduates who had
inadequate preparation for the law profession, as evidenced by
their failure in the exams.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 972 is unconstitutional.
RATIO: Yes. To admit those who have inadequate preparation
is contrary to public interest. It would, in effect, create a serious
social danger if the law qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
confessed that they had inadequate preparation for the practice.
The legal profession is not to be taken lightly. The public interest
demands that those who engage in the legal profession have
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problems evolved by the times become more difficult. The legal
profession, being entrusted with the responsibility of protecting
life, civil liberties and property, must not be tainted with
mediocrity. The act of admitting or denying people admission to
the bar is done through a court judgment – only the court can
revoke such judgment. Throughout the history of the judicial
system, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Though the Congress has the power
to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, the claim
that Congress can regulate the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law as a
legislative function is untenable. The distinction between the
functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall
regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions
that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise
of judicial power. Thus, the power to grant licenses to practice
law belongs exclusively to the judiciary, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter at hand is merely to fix the minimum
conditions for such license.
HELD: Article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and
effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA (PART 1 / 1985)
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and
administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is
required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of
this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall
be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA (PART 2 / 1986)
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly.
A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act
of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must
be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called
upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it
if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the
sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot
be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law
is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless
the naked blade is drawn.
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE VS LA TRINIDAD | 2011
FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a
cooperative, organized to provide domestic water services in
Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water
District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Section 47
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is
authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and
commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad,
Benguet.
TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB)
an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to
operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application, arguing that its
franchise is exclusive as provided under PD 198. A CPC is
however granted. LTWD filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied by NWRB. LTWD then appealed to the
RTC where it court set aside the NWRB decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition may be granted
RATIO: Yes. Political Law - No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens,nor shall such franchise, certificate or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years.
Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a
public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that,"nor
shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character."There is no
exception.
When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but
to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is
worded. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not
need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create
directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the
President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly
they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and
the Court cannot create indirectly.
In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that
are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and
the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in
character.
In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the
Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the
basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of
the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all
laws that do not conform to it.
HELD: RTC Decision Set Aside. Petition Granted. Section 47 of
PD 198 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION | 1959
FACTS: Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction
against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent
Office due to a circular the latter issued scheduling an
examination for determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice
law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent
before members of the bar may be allowed to represent
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for
patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of
patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of
law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office
from requiring further condition or qualification from those who
would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE: Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law
HELD: Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and
application of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal
principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal
knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the
bar has been prepared.
As stated in 5 Am. Jur, “The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and social proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and
in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law
corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions.”
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members
of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business
in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the
scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws
applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish
facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director
are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
Facts - President Aquino nominated herein respondent
ChristianMonsod for the position of COMELEC Chairman in
1991. Petitioner Cayetano opposed his nomination on the
ground that Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10
years. The Constitution requires that the COMELEC
Chairperson has to be a member of the Philippine Bar who has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: “There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-
five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.” Despite Cayetano’s opposition, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination and he was appointed
as COMELEC chairperson. Cayetano then filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
confirmation by the CA of Monsod’s nomination.
Issue - Does Monsod possess the necessary qualifications to
be COMELEC Chairman?
Ratio - Yes. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It also includes: conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law are deeply related to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill,
of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligation to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
The case has defined the practice of law as “any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to
give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
As seen in Monsod’s employment history, he definitely
possesses the necessary qualifications. Some examples of his
work include:
a.Atty. Monsod worked in his father’s law firm after passing the
bar.
b.Operations officer for World Bank Group in Costa Rica. (This
job involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic
and project work of the bank.)
c.Chief Executive of an investment bank and a business
conglomerate in Meralco Group.
d.Legal and economic consultant as well as a Chief Executive
Officer for various companies.
e.Secretary-General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in
1986-1987.
f.His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in election
law.
g.Member of the Davide Commission in 1990.
Held - The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years so, in the view of the foregoing, the petition
is dismissed.

ULEP VS LEGAL CLINIC
Facts - Petitioner Ulep prays the Supreme Court "to order the
respondent Legal Clinic, Inc. to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
Annexes 'A' and 'B' and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise
of the law profession other than those allowed by law. In 1984,
The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim,
according to Nogales, was to move toward specialization and to
cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Atty. Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of
its advertisements which states undignified phrases like--
“Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on
DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to
6:00pm 7th Floor Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.” It is also
alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for
Legal Problems in The Philippine Star because it is composed
of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter
how complicated it is, especially on marriage problems like the
Sharon and Gabby situation. Citing John Bates vs. The State
Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed
based on this American Jurisprudence. According to him, there
is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal
Clinic has to offer.
Issue
1.WON the Legal Clinic is engaged in the Practice of law.
2.WON such advertisement may be allowed.
Ratio
1.The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however,
such advertisements are not allowed. The Legal Clinic is
composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond
the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous
jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members
of the Philippine bar, and not to paralegals. As with the Legal
Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must
use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.
2. No, A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a
merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are
undoubtedly contrary to law. The only allowed form of
advertisements would be: (a) Citing your involvement in a
reputable law list, (b) An ordinary professional card (c) Phone
directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
Held - Legal Clinic is restrained and enjoined from
issuing/publishing advertisements of this kind.
INTEGRATION OF THE PH BAR
Facts: Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds
Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within
two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar
Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly
recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted
all comments on the proposed integration.
ISSUES:
1)Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
bar?
2)Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?
3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?
RATIO: In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted
the definition given by the Commission to “integration” in this
wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the
collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers. // Complete unification is not possible unless
it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based
on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the rule of law, integration fosters
cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in
the exercise of its power “to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to integrate
is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the
Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights:
freedom of association and of speech, as well as the nature of
the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court
thus levies a tax. The Court held:
a)Integration is not violative of freedom of association
because it does not compel a lawyer to become a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does
is “to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled
to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The only
compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however,
that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated
bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the state”
b) Integration is also not violative of the freedom of
speech just because dues paid by the lawyer may be used for
projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule
otherwise would make every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his
objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
c) The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of
a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the
integration. Survey showed an overwhelming majority of
lawyers who favored integration.
SPS. WILLIAMS VS ENRIQUEZ
(SEPARATE FILE)
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication. (1a)
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith. (2)
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. (3)
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (5a)
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. (n)
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE VIII
SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which
under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of
at least three of such Members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that
no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
SECTION 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any
case submitted to it for decision en banc or in division shall be
reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a
Member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification
to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon
the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or
abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower
collegiate courts.
ARTICLE VI
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-
thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall
be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members
voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (BOOK I)
CHAPTER 5
SECTION 18. When Laws Take Effect.—Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
unless it is otherwise provided.
SECTION 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect
unless the contrary is expressly provided.
SECTION 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative
Issuances.—In the interpretation of a law or administrative
issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English
text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be
consulted.
SECTION 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.—When a law SECTION 25. Editing and Publications.—The Official Gazette
which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law shall be edited in the Office of the President and published
first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and
provided. distributed by the National Printing Office which shall promptly
mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.
SECTION 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed.—When a law
which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior
law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides
otherwise.

SECTION 23. Ignorance of the Law.—Ignorance of the law

excuses no one from compliance therewith.

CHAPTER 6

SECTION 24. Contents.—There shall be published in the Official

Gazette all legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature; all
executive and administrative issuances of general application;
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be
deemed by the said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and such documents or
classes of documents as the President shall determine from
time to time to have general application or which he may
authorize so to be published.

The publication of any law, resolution or other official

documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence
of its authority.