CHAPTER 10
development, conservation and protection of water resources shall
Abe-Abe vs. Manta
Facts:
Abe-Abe, together with one hundred thirty-six farmers and owners
of ricelands, filed an injuction suit againt pedro Romualdo. The
purpose of said suit was to secure a judicial declaration as to the
petitiones’ prior vested rights to use the water of the Anibungan
Inobo Ablay and Tajong Crocks to irrigate their ricelands located
upstream in Camiguin. The petitioners sought to enjoin Romualdo
from using the water of the creeks at night to irrigate his two
hectare Riceland downstream. In July, 1976, respondent or
defendant Romualdo started using the water of the creeks by
opening the diversion dams at night. That act provoked the filing of
the injunction suit already mentioned.
Romualdo contends that at a conference among the petitioners and
other officials was conducted and it was agreed upon that the water
of the creeks would be used on a rotation basis: petitioners would
use it in the daytime and Romualdo and the other landowners
downstram would use the water at night. He wa also issued a
temporary authority to use the water of the creeks.
Romualdo also contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit. The petitioners’ remedy was to
file their complaint with the district engineer’s office, pursuant to
Department Order No. 245.
Lower court rendered a decision enjoining Romualdo from diverting
the water of the creeks to his two hectare farm, upon finding out
that Romualdo’s temporary permit to use the water of the
communal irrigation system was cancelled. In the meantime, the
Water Code of the Philippines was promulgated. The code confers
the original jurisdiction upon the National Water Resources Council
to decide controversies on water rights and which vest appellate
jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance to review the Council’s
jurisdiction. Romualdo was able to urge the trial court to dismiss the
injunction suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners appealed.
Issue:
Whether or not the jurisdiction over controversies on water rights
rests on the National Water Resources Council.
Ruling:
It is the Council which has the jurisdiction. It is incontestable that the
petitioners' immediate recourse is to ventilate their grievance with
the National Water Resources Council which, as already noted, is the
administrative agency exclusively vested with original jurisdiction to
settle water rights disputes-under the Water Code and under
Presidential Decree No. 424.
That jurisdiction of the Council under section 2(b) of Presidential
Decree No. 424 is reaffirmed in section 88 of the Water Code and in
section 3(d) thereof which provides that the utilization, exploitation,
be subject to the control and regulation of the government through"
the Council.
The Code assumes that it is more expeditious and pragmatic to
entrust to an administrative agency the settlement of water rights
disputes rather than require the claimants to go directly to the court
where the proceedings are subject to unavoidable delays which are
detrimental to the parties.
It is patent that the petitioners did not exhaust their administrative
remedy. Their complaint should have been lodged with the National
Water Resources Council whose decision is reviewable by the Court
of First Instance as indicated in the aforequoted sections 88 and 89
of the Water Code.
Metro Iloilo Water District v CA
Facts: Metro Iloilo Water District filed nine individual yet identical
petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
TRO against private respondents before the RTC which read:
6. That the respondent has abstracted or withdrawn
ground water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
petitioner at _______ Iloilo City, without first securing a
Water Permit from the National Water Resources Council
nor had its well driller registered as such with said council,
and sold said water so extracted to commercial and other
consumers in Iloilo City, within petitioners service area.
Private respondents uniformly invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the
RTC and that it was the NWRC that had original and exclusive
jurisdiction.
RTC dismissed the petition. CA affirmed the decision. Both RTC and
CA ruled that said case falls within the jurisdiction of the NWRC.
Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case?
Held: It is the RTC. At issue is whether or not private respondents’
extraction and sale of ground water within petitioner’s service area
violated petitioner’s rights as a water district. It is at once obvious
that the petitions raise a judicial question. A judicial question is
raised when the determination of the questions involves the
exercise of a judicial function (ie. involves the determination of what
the law is, what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the
matter in controversy). A judicial question is properly addressed to
the courts. The instant case certainly calls for the application and
interpretation of pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to
determine whether private respondents’ actions violate petitioner’s
rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This issue does not
so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and
expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial
intervention. In this case, the Court's ruling in Amistoso v. Ong is
applicable. In the said case, the Court ruled that the trial court's
jurisdiction must be upheld where the issue involved is not the
settlement of a water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right to
water use.
CA decision is set aside.
Pilar Development Corporation vs. Ramon Dumadag et al.
GR. No. 194336
Peralta J.:
-This is a case filed by the petitioner in line with the decision of the
CA which affirms the judgment made by RTC to dismiss the
complaint filed by petitioner.
FACTS
On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
for building their dwelling, without its knowledge, within the
property located in Pilar Village subdivision, Las Pinas City owned by
it which will be used for village recreational facilities for the
residence of the said subdivision.
The respondents filed their answers station that it is the local
government and not the petitioner which has jurisdiction and
authority over them.
Decision of the lower court
The LC conducted an ocular and found that the land being occupied
by the respondents are situated in a sloping area going down and
leading towards the Mahabang Ilog creek and within the 3 meters
legal easement which is considered as a public property and could
not be owned by the private petitioner.
PD 1067 (Water Code of the Philippines) Art 51 provides that “The
banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters
in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty
(40) meters in forest areas, along their margins are subject to the
easement of public use xxx”
LC also mentioned that the respondents have a better right to
possess and occupy the lot and that the local government of Las
Pinas City could only institute an action for recovery of possession or
ownership. LC dismissed the case.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner have a better right to the 3m zone along banks
of Mahabang Ilog Creek.
RULING
SC agreed that the petitioner’s right of ownership and possession is
limited by law with respect to the 3m zone along the banks.
However, it does not mean that the respondents have better rights.
It was held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land
intruded upon.
The proper party to institute the case would be:
1) Republic of the PH through OSG – In case of an action for
reversion
2) Local Government – for action to enforce RA 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act 1992)
Yet all is not lost for the petitioner. It may file an action for
mandamus to compel the local government of las pinas to enforce
with reasonable dispatch the eviction of respondents.
Remman Enterprises v CA and Lat
Facts: Petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) and private
respondent Crispin E. Lat are adjoining land owners. The land of Lat
containing an area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly
with fruit trees, while REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15)
hectares, six (6) hectares of which are devoted to its piggery
business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1 1/2) meters higher in
elevation than that of respondent Lat. Lat sued REMMAN for
damages because the waste disposal lagoon of the latter overflowed
and inundated almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. Lat alleged
that the acidity of the soil in his plantation increased because of the
overflow of the water heavy with pig manure from REMMAN's
piggery farm. After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating
the evidence of both parties, the Regional Trial Court found that
indeed REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon overflowed with the
contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation. RTC
found Remman guilty and was ordered to pay for damages. CA
affirmed. Petition claims his liability was not satisfactorily
established. He also claims fortuitous event as defense for the
flooding.
Issue: Did the CA err in its decision?
Held. No. It is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly accountable to
Lat for the damages sustained by him. It was established that the
"acidic, malodorous, and polluted" water which contained pig
manure was continuously flowing from Remman's piggery farm to
Lat's plantation. The negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the level
of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily established. The
Court also rejected REMMAN's defense of fortuitous event. The
Court adopted the opinion of the trial court that even assuming that
the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of REMMAN's
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering it
liable for the ensuing damages. As regards the natural easements
imposed upon the property of Lat, the Water Code of the Philippines
provides:
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which
naturally and without the intervention of man flow from the higher
estates, as well as the stone or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method
of drainage; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase this natural flow.
Said provision imposes a natural easement upon the lower estate to
receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which
flow from a higher state are those which are artificially collected in
man-made lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the
owner of the lower or servient estate to compensation
RTC and CA decisions are affirmed.
Buendia VS. City of Iligan
G.R. No. 132209
Chico-Nazario, J:
FACTS
Petitioner Buendia filed with the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB), an application for the appropriation of water from a spring
located within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan City. In the absence of
protests to the applications being timely filed, the NWRB after
evaluating petitioner’s applications, the water permits are issued in
his favor.
Respondent City of Iligan filed with the NWRB an “Oppostion and/or
Appeal”, contesting the issuance of said water permits to petitioner.
The NWRB dismissed the “Opposition and/or Appeal” of the
Respondent, in the absence of a verified protest having been
reasonably filed, no water rights controvers arose; hence there was
no decision from which respondent may appeal from.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari assailing the legality of the
NWRB order.
ISSUE
Whether or not Carlos Buendia has the better right to the water
source
RULING
Carlos Buendia has the better right to the water source. It is evident
that after an application to obtain a water permit has been made
known to the public, any interested party must file his protest
thereto, in order that the application may be properly evaluated.
Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has been
approved, the grantee of the permit now acquires an exclusive right
to use the water source, reckoned from the date of the filing of the
applications. Thus, after petitioner’s right to the water permit has
been properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly
question such grant. By virtue of respondent’s failure to lodge a
timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the right to
appropriate the water from the spring inside the latter’s property.
In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of Iligan to timely
oppose the water permit applications, and later on file the Petition
for Certiorari within a reasonable time has the effect of rendering
the grant of the water permits to petitioner Buendia, final and
executory.
Buendia VS. City of Iligan
G.R. No. 132209
Chico-Nazario, J:
FACTS
Petitioner Buendia filed with the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB), an application for the appropriation of water from a spring
located within his property in Ditucalan, Iligan City. In the absence of
protests to the applications being timely filed, the NWRB after
evaluating petitioner’s applications, the water permits are issued in
his favor.
Respondent City of Iligan filed with the NWRB an “Oppostion and/or
Appeal”, contesting the issuance of said water permits to petitioner.
The NWRB dismissed the “Opposition and/or Appeal” of the
Respondent, in the absence of a verified protest having been
reasonably filed, no water rights controvers arose; hence there was
no decision from which respondent may appeal from.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari assailing the legality of the
NWRB order.
ISSUE
Whether or not Carlos Buendia has the better right to the water
source
RULING
Carlos Buendia has the better right to the water source. It is evident
that after an application to obtain a water permit has been made
known to the public, any interested party must file his protest
thereto, in order that the application may be properly evaluated.
Otherwise, after the application for a water permit has been
approved, the grantee of the permit now acquires an exclusive right
to use the water source, reckoned from the date of the filing of the
applications. Thus, after petitioner’s right to the water permit has
been properly adjudicated, respondent may no longer belatedly
question such grant. By virtue of respondent’s failure to lodge a
timely protest, petitioner has already acquired the right to
appropriate the water from the spring inside the latter’s property.
In conclusion, the failure of respondent City of Iligan to timely
oppose the water permit applications, and later on file the Petition
for Certiorari within a reasonable time has the effect of rendering
the grant of the water permits to petitioner Buendia, final and
executory.
Collado vs CA
(G.R. No 107764, October 4, 2002)
FACTS: Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration
court an application
for registration of a parcel of land (“Lot”), situated in Antipolo Rizal.
Attached to the
application was a technical description, stating “this survey is inside
IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed.” The Solicitor General filed oppositions to the
application. Petitioners
(Edna Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they have occupied
the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and
in the concept of
owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted evidence to
prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights among them and
their predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners
for
having presented sufficient evidence to establish registrable title
over
the property.
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the Lot. NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel
of land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO.
HELD:
(1) Petitioners
concede that the Lot is inside the literal description of Marikina
Watershed Reservation (MWR). Their main claim over the Lot is that
“all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting aside
the
MWR are subject to private rights.” EO 33 (which established the
MWR) has a saving clause that the reservations are “subject to
existing private rights, if any there be.” Under the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of
the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain." Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership
of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to
the Spanish Crown. The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage
Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as
well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the "Maura
Law" partly amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the
Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in
the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.
Four
years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the
Philippine
Islands through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903,
the United States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which
was described as follows: "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was
passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and
leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands,
and
prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect
their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation
of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short, the
Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands
in the Name:
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the
government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and
other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to
private
appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property
of the government and the friar lands." Thus, it is plain error for
petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands
creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the
public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed,
all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term "natural
resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes,
and
submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and
contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and
are
essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of
property
devoted to park and recreational purposes."
(2) An applicant must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of
the public domain and that he has an interest to warrant registration
in his name arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived
from old Spanish grants or titles). In the case at bar, petitioners were
unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of
the failure to complete the required period of possession (at least 30
years). Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land
prior
to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a
watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and
inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application
on April 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under
EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing of petitioners’ application
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network,
Inc., GR 186450
(CARPIO MORALES)
Lecture: National Water Resources Board
The NWRB is the government agency that is responsible for all the
water resources in the Philippines. It coordinates and regulates all
water-related activities in the country that has impact on the
physical environment and the economy. Its vision is to have a
Sustainable Water for a Healthy Nation. Its missions are the
following:
• To allocate sufficient water for optimal beneficial use;
• To ensure access to safe water supply and adequate sanitation
services; and
•To preserve flow regimes for ecological integrity.
National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network

A.L. Ang Network filed on January 23, 2003 an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience with the National Water Resources
Board (NWRB) to operate and maintain a water service system in
Alijis, Bacolod City which application was later approved on August
20, 2003 despite opposition by the Bacolod City Water District
(BACIWA). BACIWA opposed A.L. Ang Network's application on the
ground that it is the only govemment agency authorized to operate
a water service system within the city.
BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending that
its right to due process was violated when it was not allowed to
present evidence in support of its opposition. The NWRB
reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present evidence
prompting A.L Ang Network to file a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against NWRB and
BACIWA. The NWRB moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the
proper recourse of respondent was to the Court of Appeals, citing
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of NWRB and dismissed A.L.
Ang Network's petition for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC held that
with Art. 89 of PD 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as
amended, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies except those
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the decision of the RTC
and held that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from
NWRB's decisions. As no repeal is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D.
No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an exception to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals over appeals or petitions for certiorari of the
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph
2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is stated that,
"If it involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and
cognizable only by the Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule admits of
some exceptions as plainly provided by the phrase 'unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules" and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is
verily an example of these exceptions
Issue:
Whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources
Board
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NWRB and reversed and set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and upheld the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. Since the appellate court
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial agencies
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-
judicial agencies, like the NWRB, should be filed with it. (NWRB is a
quasi-judicial agency) This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for
procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when
the law or the Rules itself directs otherwise.
In enacting BP 129, there is an intent to change the provision Article
89 of P.D. No. 1067. The legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear
and given the scope and purpose of BP 129, batasang pambansa 129
to provides a homogeneous procedure for the review of
adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.
Although section 9 (3) of BP 129 and Section I of Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court does not list the NWRB as "among" the quasi-judicial
agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are
appealable to the appellate court, it is settled that the list of quasi-
judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be
exclusive. The employment of the word "among" clearly instructs so.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
[G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30, 2011]
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Doctrines:
•The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out t heir functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.
•Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is
given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Facts: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent,
found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply with government
standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ( DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35,
series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved that
respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater.
Petitioner moved to reconsider however the LLDA denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to
pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders
before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide
petitioner’s petition for certiorari as premature since the law
provides for an appeal from decision of the LLDA to the Office of the
President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before
invoking judicial intervention.
Issue: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of
any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it
from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Held: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that
courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge the irresponsibility within the specialized
areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine
is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus
available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its
contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary
would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDA’s findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The
essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the
party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is
decided

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009 Decision

and the February 23, 2010 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 107449, are AFFIRMED.