[A M. No. P-94-1054.
March 11, 2003] against him is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo
charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former
stenographer of the MTC Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully
and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at Bancudo Pulot,
Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May
Irader Arquero, was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to
the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate[2] reflecting
the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also
attached to the letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage
contract[3] showing that complainant and Dedje Irader contracted
marriage on July 10, 1979.
By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent
to file an answer to the complaint.[4]
By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied
the charge of immorality, claiming that it is just a (sic) mere
harassment and a product of complainants hatred and extreme
jealousy to (sic) his wife.[6] Attached to the answer were the
September 27, 1987 affidavit of desistance[7] executed by
complainant in favor of his wife with respect to an administrative
complaint he had much earlier filed against her, and complainants
sworn statement[8] dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging
paternity of a child born out of wedlock, which documents,
respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed
harass him.
Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991,
complainant likewise instituted a criminal complaint against him for
adultery which was, however, dismissed after preliminary
investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been
cohabiting with another woman.
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to
then Executive Judge Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court
of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for investigation, report and
recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara having retired during the
pendency of the investigation, the case was referred to Executive
Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who was, by Resolution of August 16, 2000,
directed by this Court to (1) verify the authenticity of the marriage
certificate and baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2)
conduct an investigation as to the information contained in the said
baptismal certificate and the circumstances under which it was
issued, and such other verifiable matters relevant to the charge; and
(3) submit her report and recommendation thereon.[10]
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez
recommends that the complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce
adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty of the charge.
[11] The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant and
Dedje Irader Acebedo, thusly:
xxx
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie
Irader who per reliable information cannot be notified for reason
that subject persons are no longer residing in their given address
and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the return of the
subpoena dated November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the
baptismal certificate alleging therein that the father of Desiree
Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the reason that the same
had not been testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the
entries contained therein, this Court had not received adequate
proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent
herein could be held liable of the charge imputed against him,
hence, he should be absolved from any liability.
x x x[12] (Quoted verbatim).
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with
the recommendation of the Investigating Judge that the case should
be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held guilty of
immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one
(1) year without pay.[13] Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9)
months, he a single man maintained relations with Dedje Irader
Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with sexual union
(TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15). Based on his testimony,
we observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with
Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the written document purportedly a
Kasunduan or agreement entered into by complainant and his wife,
consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any
partner and to live with him or her. Being a court employee
respondent should have known that said agreement was void
despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I.
Acebedo was separated from her husband during their short lived
relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an
immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-
court-employee at that is highly improper. It is contrary to the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees
which provides that public employees of which respondent is one,
xxx shall at times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Moreover,
respondent cannot seek refuge and sling mud at complainant for
having executed an Affidavit dated September 13, 1994,
acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It
would seem that respondent would want to apply the principle of in
pari delicto in the instant case. Respondent would have it appear
that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an illegitimate
child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a
relationship with another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was
executed by herein complainant. However, a cursory reading of said
document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo and not
herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2
September 1987. Respondent had the temerity to claim it as
evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was only filed
sometime in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he
attended the baptism of the daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his
former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered, I did not.
Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer, we could infer that
respondent did not categorically rule out the possibility that said
child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is doubtful of her
paternity.
x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).
While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution
of the present case, the same does not ipso facto warrant its
dismissal. Once administrative charges have been filed, this Court
may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain
the truth thereof.[15] For it has an interest in the conduct of those
in the service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice
to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by
the complainants desistance from prosecuting the case he initiated.
[16]
On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name as father
in the baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be
used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of to
imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader
Acebedo. A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic
Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove
the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein
which concern the relationship of the person baptized.[17] It merely
attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof,
to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date
stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to the
parentage of the child baptized.[18]
By respondents own admission, however, he had an illicit
relationship with complainants wife:
Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony
before the Court by your counsel, did the Court get it correct that
there has been a short lived relation between you and Dedgie
Irader, am I correct in my impression?
A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have
parted ways already, I jokingly informed her that she is now being
separated, she is now single and is free to have some commitment.
So, I courted her and she accepted me, so we have a short lived
relation and after that we parted ways.
Q: For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a
while ago?
A: May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.
Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to
9 months, you mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a sexual
union with this woman?
A: Yes maam.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainants
wife with the spouses having priorly entered into a settlement with
respect to their marriage which was embodied in a Kasunduan, the
pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:
Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO,
may sapat na taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang
nakatira sa Poblacion, Brokes (sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang
nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at
magiging miserable lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming
ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami ay
malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang mag-asawa,
at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng
kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami
maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;
x x x[20] (Italics supplied).
Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely
no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between
complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that
marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by
rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the
stipulation of the parties.[21]
Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, enunciates the commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.[22] Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of
respondent.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and SO ORDERED.
uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary.[23] That is why
this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and
decency expected of those in the service of the judiciary.[24] Their
conduct, not to mention behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility,[25] characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect
and confidence in the judicial service.[26] It must be free from any
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the
judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private
individuals.[27] There is no dichotomy of morality; court employees
are also judged by their private morals.[28]

Respondents act of having illicit relations with complainants wife is,

within the purview of Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an immoral conduct is
classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first
offense, and dismissal is imposed for the second offense.

Since the present charge of immorality against respondent

constitutes his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process

Server of the Municipal Trial Court of Brookes Point, Palawan,
GUILTY of immorality, for which he is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6)
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081 Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa
(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa
MAXIMO A. GLINDO, (Omaa).

Complainants, Present:

The Antecedent Facts

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION, Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her
oath as a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.
- versus - SERENO,

REYES, and
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife
PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ. Elena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they
could legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA, Promulgated: July 1983. Omaa then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay (contract) which reads:
Respondent. October 12, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON
DECISION

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY
CARPIO, J.:

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat

The Case na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may
pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC,
Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa
ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
 7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mga
panahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi na
pinagsamahan o conjugal.
1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga
buhay ng walang pakialaman, kung kayat bawat isa sa amin ay maaari ng
humanap ng makakasama sa buhay;
BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.
gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taong gulang
ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel John at Aiza
Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang bunso,
Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila (Sgd) (Sgd)
ay pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos ang
kanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugar ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
kung saan siya ay naninirahan;
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawa
tuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng
ang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina; Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga

kagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindi na
ako interesado dito;

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA

Notary Public

PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 482;
Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.
Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the
validity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its
terms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all
their children and took possession of most of the property they acquired
during their union.
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a
law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was
not valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a
complaint against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know
Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract
but she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned
the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her
part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her
signature and notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals
Sinumpaang Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that
the complaint was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of
apology from her staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized
the document without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.
Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived
at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the
person who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in
her office when the contract was notarized.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD
stated that Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings.
The IBP-CBD found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that
Omaa had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her
function as a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law.
The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first
claimed that it was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then
later claimed that it was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD
found:
Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed
its authorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and
make deceit, which she is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or
disbarment.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the
practice of law and for two years as a notary public.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Omaas motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of
Professional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas
Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
The Ruling of this Court
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution
of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court
has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of
a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses
and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly
what Omaa did in this case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where
the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract
in this case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which
permitted the husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live
with another man, without opposition from each other;5 ratifying a
document entitled Legal Separation where the couple agreed to be
separated from each other mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights
and obligations, authorizing each other to remarry, and renouncing any
action that they might have against each other;6 preparing a document
authorizing a married couple who had been separated for nine years to
marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may have against
the other;7 and preparing a document declaring the conjugal partnership
dissolved.8
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff
who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff
who notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her
notarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible
for the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member
of his staff.
We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the
Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach
of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.10
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing,
and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished
to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of
Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26,
908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have
been validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998,
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua
Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint,
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30
September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of
the said town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a
Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
(LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were
destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4)
children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario
H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950,
and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in
1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In
1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao
City living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who
later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another
woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be
declared null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect
the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage
having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City.
She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and
valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to
1944 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon,
Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages
that were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO
Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were
totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by
Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of
Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription
from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March
1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and
Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to
Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife
and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as
well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a
common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth
documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her
claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing
the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as
single when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a
common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed
Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her
capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case
was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to
damages and attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition,
as well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent
PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s
alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to
Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring
the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other
hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and
thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2)
the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed
that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others,
the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25
dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of
marriage" to overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of
the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a
probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the
priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence
presented during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to
Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless
the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it
has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The
same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National
Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General,
Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during
the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in
this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the
city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of
verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the
records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been
married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give
credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the
same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the
fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said proof of
marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the
first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of
lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves
as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications
disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially
that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof
of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found
that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord
with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite
recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said,
citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate,
no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in
Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction
of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence
they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due
execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v.
Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence
of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which
may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent
on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of
fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be
shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not
necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but
by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when
available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on
this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized
the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have
previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any
other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of
Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown
by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the
evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and
EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by
[Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by
[Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the
certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or
by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to
prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco],
the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2)
the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed
that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has
elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such
is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28)
Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed
by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the
certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy
Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between
petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of
Court assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of
Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void
from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state
or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described
their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to
admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife
of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for
convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that
she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him
the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued
the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit.
It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed
to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be
legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The
CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to
enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD
THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire
American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties
freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly
entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept
of a marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into
a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating
her stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and,
therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in
its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a
marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of
consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the
phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has
led to the development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing
of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple
marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits,
have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the
intention of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to
filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if
the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not
"entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the
United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to
establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading
immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule
on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow
an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to
live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through
Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there
being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not
contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x
Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of
representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding
that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to
deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the
husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21
further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has,
therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in
order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied
annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married
only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with
the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It
held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found
the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties
only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship
in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’
supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that
the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into
the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46
of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real
and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of
the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA
characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is
a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real
intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in
order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can
properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for
the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life
together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by
law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to
lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their
right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The
right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages
in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the
ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void.
Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or
fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud
under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed
under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment
of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall
constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering
into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article
47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and
Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.

Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further
trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a
marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further
use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not
be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable

social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil
Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr.
Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen
were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of
the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on
the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom,
the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest
of their invited guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal
marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on
arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the
incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne
was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the
bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding
rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the petitioner
instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter,
they went to the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the
petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by
Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple
declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and
wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr.
where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to
the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, and imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of
Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing
constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition
of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled
that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage
license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the
penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC
applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently states that a
violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty
for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the
penalty of a fine in the amount of P200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It
further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses
deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The
RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead
of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although
there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties
must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should
declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at
least two witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution
duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or
Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the
fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First,
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage
ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil
Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal
declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly
signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing
officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to
prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of
church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as
the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing"
in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating
Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the
present case against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty.
The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the
petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation
promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing
officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the
present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a
marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged
"blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal
marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in
turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed
form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the
Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which
takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for
the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found
by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take
each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the
second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be
taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to
reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly
invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the
petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony,
support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by
the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony
of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed
to show that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-
motive to testify against the petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing"
into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this
principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only
to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in
which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in
the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the
sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and
regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the
commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by
law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a
"blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a
marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner
of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case,
the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage
license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by
law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The
petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his
defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of
determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of
the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple
negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty
imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions
of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister
solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the
Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties
or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the
regulations and practices whereof require banns or publications previous
to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently
declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than
one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act
not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two
hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both,
in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of
the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that
covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the
present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was
not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the
violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
point, Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No.
3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to
be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such
regulations.
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of P200.00
pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution
dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-
Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December
of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he
was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature
of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until
Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that
area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to
show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR
ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there
was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter
of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which
was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses
and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying
that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding
of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18
He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage
license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave
the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the
wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple,
the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony
held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license.23
Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her
the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it
to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did
not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told
that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified
that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated
that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed
Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she
could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented
the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and
asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house
and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several
days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign,
which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license,
they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15,
1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the
license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January
9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and
against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner
and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their
cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the
RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to
the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE
OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT
THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A
VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A
MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND
WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL
AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It
held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition
after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and
subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the
same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS
DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one
that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus,
hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The
CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there
that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as
permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they
are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and
that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located
as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed
located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license
do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of
her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez,
one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license
came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain
Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and
thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin,
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have
simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However,
Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was
held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no
record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of
said license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of
the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49
Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said
that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria
and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion
that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties
are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even
issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein
gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his
name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented
showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic]
one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It
took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003
his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been
instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated
10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We
are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage
and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his
own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without
a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51
Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions,
and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may
well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy
suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void
ab initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011
Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court).
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan
City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin
III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally
GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies
business owned by Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship.
On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to
an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and
Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the
following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and
8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for
Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites
to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the
Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during
the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject
of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence
which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which
the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then
refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency
of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally
several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial
court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court
to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor
ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July
2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial,
that only Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for
the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License No. N-
07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes,
particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the
legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to
the case. The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support
for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for
support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the
37 properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties
with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned
by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to their children, including
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were
bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any
actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The
trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by
TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium
units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that
the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were
purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that
the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state
with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew
that Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family
Code, the trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while
Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO
on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL
and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37)
properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480,
and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,
194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627,
194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635,
194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners,
namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B.
Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
"Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila
are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-
seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution
from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his
lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of
these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of
her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is
further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these
properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally.
However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of
Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner
shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be
further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March
15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to
Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims
are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the
parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial
Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila,
Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied
the motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of
Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the
appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in
submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there
were six resettings of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the
initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her
evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for
decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to
prove his action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals
ruled that Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena
and there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved
before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring
Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals
ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully
belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of
Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he
was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the
absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be
shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share
shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the
trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27,
2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil
Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On
the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and
to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue
to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its
14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
with modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations
of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s
ruling that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that
in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were
married, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement
is not a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.9
In this case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February
2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4
and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008.
They were all made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28
November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to
present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available
witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the
trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was
warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should
she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her
evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her
evidence despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack
of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was
delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of
Appeals on her petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any
temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the
trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because
the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized
her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent
and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if
she were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this
Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as
his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he was
their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as
his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered
in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin
was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of
their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros
(Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City,
testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and
Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros
further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep
a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly,
if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage
was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta
B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National
Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated
marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected
social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially
from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of
Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s
birth certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s birth certificate
which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March
1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982
which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be
void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls
under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio.
The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying
the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the
Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did
not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the
rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss
bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of
Appeals adopted the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is
required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The
marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of
invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if
the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held
that what was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions
of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because
there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance,
be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage
license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be
invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which
states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties
are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only
the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children as advance
inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally
x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the
Court of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the
property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered
in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin"
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered
in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the
civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to
inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge
Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further
alleged that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of

conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the
call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may
be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case
for decision because of Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may
have used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not
enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad
faith in deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March

2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors
BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR.,
petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out
of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a
car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the
said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed
under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is
"rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to
declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his
death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates
the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of
marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification
failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the
petition are "true and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned
pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered
the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their
validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance
of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social
institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein
a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in
Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of
gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent
Norma was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority,
and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue
that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of
the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation
period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-
year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as
"husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as
to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify
their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of
the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage,
the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining
persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil
registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars
thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . .
.
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely
prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person
during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted
during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject
only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in
that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage
and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least
five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived
with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make
any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is
void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a
petition to declare their father's marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20
cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at
anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment
suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22
That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a
voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared
by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect
on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father
extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The
conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was
a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void
marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of
a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained
in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will
be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a
voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death
of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be
a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the
same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is

necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family
Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional

Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Acting Chairperson,
Petitioner, TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x------------------x Promulgated:
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner, March 28, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa),
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared
JOSE A. DAYOT,
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
Respondent.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas
G.R. No. 175581 V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration

of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna,
Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no
marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
G.R. No. 179474 execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband
and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud.
Present:
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing
of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.
Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the
latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to
accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded
pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign
the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially
refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal
could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their
relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early
part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded
that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3
June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she
filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out
to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint.
It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].
[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the
pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this
Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up
on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is
now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote
the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency.
This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written
in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but
a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded
wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage
in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot
was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and
when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that
the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured
party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained
by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false
marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at
the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals
found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose
and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did
not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the
action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed
on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the
consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be
commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the
fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file
an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993
that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his
marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as
one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the
validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by
the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals
gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the
falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal
side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that
neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the
marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect.
The prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code
which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must
have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together
for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the
Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which
is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This
5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties
were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the
law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing
element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware
or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it
known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without
a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void
from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is
not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is,
therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying
Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R.
No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity
of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE
VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by
reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a
circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally,
Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after
a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed
against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of
nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa.
To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related
arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988,
indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the
effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the
prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on
24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly,
the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.
For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in (2) Their consent, freely given;
favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November
1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the (Emphasis ours.)
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does
not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal
requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without
required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not
where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under
marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void,
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties
this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the
marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article
fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30] This is in
76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the
further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents:
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is
(1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay
marriage.[32]
City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace
or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman
who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in
an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications
of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that
the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons
who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being
unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37]
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity
of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the
rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule,
should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so
far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not
curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41] For the exception
in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the
woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried,
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a
marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum
period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the
law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum
requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official,
priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together
only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose
was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in
February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied
the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact
arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject
to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in
every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage
license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the
statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court
holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially,
when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the
prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49]
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to
institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not
salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the
law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires
not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a
marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court
is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of
deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as
a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years
as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to
an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument
that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated
the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a
misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for
application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of
marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration
of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal
liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is
deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina
Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he
sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56]

Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the
five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-
year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.
[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the
marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED,
without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain
to the protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated August 17,
2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its
subsequent Resolution2 dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89
declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen.
Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice –
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City3 and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge
at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.4 In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as
Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf
and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with
Zorayda,5 filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration
of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married
Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise
averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law.
Based on Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage
entered into by deceased Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio
because he contracted the same while his prior marriage to Complainant
Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status being declared as "divorced" has
no factual or legal basis, because the deceased never divorced Complainant
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly done so because
divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise
known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the
marriage of the deceased with Complainant Zorayda was never deemed,
legally and factually, to have been one contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they (deceased and
Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then
asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be
counted from January 4, 1995,8 and again, another 15 days9 or until
February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to
Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites, as
had been averred in the latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen.
Tamano.12 Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083,
or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim Code),
questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its jurisdiction over
the case for declaration of nullity.13 Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995
a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA14
which was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the
case since there can be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage even if the respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was
allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce evidence, the
hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed mostly at her instance
until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the proceedings16 in
view of the CA’s temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996,
enjoining it from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its
Decision dated September 30, 1996.18 Estrellita then elevated the
appellate court’s judgment to this Court by way of a petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered
Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997.20 As Estrellita was
indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July 9, 1997.21 The day
before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib
moved to submit the case for decision,23 reasoning that Estrellita had long
been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not
yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,25
stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of marriages celebrated under
both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction,
is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s motion for
reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered
the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita’s marriage with Sen.
Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were
never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita as
void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.29 The
court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that
the second marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into
during the subsistence of his first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the
subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late
Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the
void character of the second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce
obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an acceptable method of terminating
the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the subsequent
marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard
as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the
Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the
RTC should have required her to file her answer after the denial of her
motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to
marry her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is
governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of legal
standing to question the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,32 the CA
held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her answer as she was
given ample opportunity to be heard but simply ignored it by asking for
numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It
also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari
with the higher courts since, as an independent and original action, it does
not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellita’s
marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning
that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil
Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their
first nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim
celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had
the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen. Tamano’s wife and, hence,
the injured party in the senator’s subsequent bigamous marriage with
Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,33 the CA denied Estrellita’s Motion
for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it
debunked the additional errors she raised. The CA noted that the allegation
of lack of the public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in
violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court34 and Article 48
of the Family Code35 will not invalidate the trial court’s judgment as the
proceedings between the parties had been adversarial, negating the
existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been joined
before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that the trial court
erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to our remand to the RTC of
the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the
issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the
validity of Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues
that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was
prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to file an answer and
to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of
her marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias36 laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer suspends the
period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court is obliged to
suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she
merely participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to whatever
action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTC’s
jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an
adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R.
No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of
whether there was collusion, this being a prerequisite before further
proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an answer in a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late
senator is valid as the latter was already divorced under the Muslim Code
at the time he married her. She asserts that such law automatically applies
to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering
their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose
marriage was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen.
Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested to by the
affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file
suit because only the husband or the wife can file a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme Court Resolution A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CA’s
reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be
heard; and, that filing an original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is
collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer essential considering the
vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the lack of
collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents’ legal standing to
challenge the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen. Tamano,
reasoning that any proper interested party may attack directly or
collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib have such right to file
the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues

The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment, even
though the latter was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was
rendered without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final resolution of her
certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer
and thus was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor did not
even conduct an investigation whether there was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s
marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to
answer; and her pending petition for certiorari/review on certiorari
questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the higher courts
does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to
due process. She was never declared in default, and she even actively
participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias40 to justify the suspension of the
period to file an answer and of the proceedings in the trial court until her
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to
Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s basis for her
argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead
of filing an Answer to the complaint. The filing of said motion suspended
the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is
resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the
Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying the ‘Motion
to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the
period provided for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five
(5) days computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x x41
(Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is
that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the
motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states
that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe due process in
the course of the proceeding of the case because after it denied the wife’s
motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to
present evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even
when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had time to file an
answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an answer,
as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier
granted by the trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to
file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it
should have waited first for the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before
the CA and, subsequently, before this Court. However, in upholding the
RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application
for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a continuation
of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the judgment complained
of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the public respondent from further proceeding in the case."43 In fact, the
trial court respected the CA’s temporary restraining order and only after
the CA rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present
her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we
never issued any order precluding the trial court from proceeding with the
principal action. With her numerous requests for postponements, Estrellita
remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first
for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and her
refusal to present her evidence were attributable only to herself and she
should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the
prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it deemed
Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become
final and executory, nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back
to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the Motion
to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the
Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44
also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving
void marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is collusion between the
parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within one month
after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating
whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties
and their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the
basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments
on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the
report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall
set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to
appear for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public
prosecutor to submit the required report,45 which we find to have been
sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua
in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that
there could be no collusion between the parties and no fabrication of
evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even
assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of participation
by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,47
the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in
the trial court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and
legal separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed
or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the
parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances,
we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to
assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity of the proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.49 The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.50 Under the marriage provisions of
the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083,52 the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or
this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already ruled in G.R. No.
126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this
law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former
explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior to the
effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in force at the time of
their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically
provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws
operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect
of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil
acts that took place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code
in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted
under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this
effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the
marriage to be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still
be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under
both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil
Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to
only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective
in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,55 Estrellita
relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003
claiming that under Section 2(a)56 thereof, only the husband or the wife,
to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity, therefore only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity
of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this
interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file
the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of
voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited
a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57 Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should
be interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11- include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision
10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita’s correctly rendered.
interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she Resolution issued on September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should SO ORDERED.
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.

Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit
the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the
Family Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases
already commenced before March 15, 2003.58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita’s
marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to
the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void
marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source
of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property
rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the

G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which
affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete
from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they
became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition
appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were
married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan,
Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on
January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil
Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground
that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal
Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven
(7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim
that his first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following
Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid
marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity
of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the
spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court
is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and
the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the
law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was
pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab
initio since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court
stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to
Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what
is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void
from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by
Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact
that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of
the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision,
contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon
a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to
be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the
appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio
S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P.
Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since
the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since
herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner
committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good
faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact
that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a
person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further
argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal
in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished
under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack
of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there
is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to
perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention
to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit
bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that
good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The
Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements
concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or
not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s
contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce
decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal
intent, we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are
present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the
elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the
pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed
down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing
the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the
Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In
other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the
declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the
law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from
the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision
had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the
time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must,
perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado
v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already
celebrated. We held therein that:
favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under
the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not
committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well
as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of
BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral
certainty.
SO ORDERED.

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest
in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed

by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete
merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe
a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts
a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals
the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on
August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of
the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband
acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano
Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein
intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church
ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and
Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA
and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February
1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into
a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed
to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican
Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date,
ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD.
Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna,
Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from
Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City,
consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said
condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full
payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100
share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT
No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common
under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand
used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken
over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his
own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as
well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject
of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil
Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were
acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children,
SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the
said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs
of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share
in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared
the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be
partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the
heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit
to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have
been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC,
namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT
WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID
NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE
UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF
THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial
court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE
OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified
decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the
latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by
ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision
of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds
ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican
Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of
purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties
should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium
unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the
law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first
marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the
late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in
property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at
the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted
the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule,
to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty.
Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10,
1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not
been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two
types of defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and
the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage
and the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving
the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the
nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad,
did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding
conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and
family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a
manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially
among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon
a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered
into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the
CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their
property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of
the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains
thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of
various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code,
viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not
per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The
approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under
Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal
partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the
voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors
may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take
such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214
and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of
partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal
partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the
approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted
by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution
of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for
divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law,
the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between
Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to
Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been
dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July
12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being
void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during
the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife,
but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of
proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual
contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved
the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were
parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and
reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more
vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present
evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection
as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable
relief can be granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven
by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the
burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual
contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate
amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from
Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire
share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to
P362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you"
note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and
purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own
due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s
assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings and
conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her
own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and
the law books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was
required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family
Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code,
the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it
applied only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were
without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create
a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was
filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and
in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for
this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The
same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and
evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his
or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted
in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147.
The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-
ownership was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the
strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase
the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she
presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA
in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the
trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita
Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another
check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P"
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for
P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment
of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for P4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject
condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
 conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co- condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as
ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry
of ATTY. LUNA, thus: WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November
11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit
was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. SO ORDERED.
The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of
Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna.
The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust
Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not
have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the
name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books
for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to
contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it
was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from
his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask
from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both
because they were substantiated by the records and because we have not
been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as
the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof.
Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not
serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired Petitioner,
the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
 The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint[3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on
- versus- 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children Crasus,
Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely
was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
CRASUS L. IYOY, Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
R e s p o n d e n t. children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of
respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent
G.R. No. 152577 Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
Present: divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
PUNO, children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
Chairman, had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not
CALLEJO, SR., bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear
TINGA, and the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest
Promulgated: child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
September 21, 2005 American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
DECISION was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed,
it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and
there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
the Family Code of the Philippines.
Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him,
Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any
normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on
certain occasions but it was because of the latters drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had
no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of
her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was
able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to
stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and
acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to
pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,
[5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support
of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he
essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City,
on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16
December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13] issued by the RTC to
the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single
deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and
that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an
Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her
right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab
initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in
an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals
her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage
which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It
is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to
comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at
the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds
that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are
her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage
in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the
marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null
and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC
was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried,
and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee
categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of
nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY,
THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY
UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision
is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In
the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American
husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court
cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to
a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn
plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,[17]
denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se
constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord
with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that
Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown
trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He
further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was
defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy,
by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of
the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the
RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording
with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961;
and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in
which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even considering the
admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this
Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper,
nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family
and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged
incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root
cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was
not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological
or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in
existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.
While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is
no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein
one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband
in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic,
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not
bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General
as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His
Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal
law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the
Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the
case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only
reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the
State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the
case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the
instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of
the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit
to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor,
shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail.
If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action,
the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper
of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of
the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the
Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
valid and subsisting. Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
Decision reads:
SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against
Petitioner, him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry
G.R. No. 154380 under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
- versus -
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Present: Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
(Chairman), obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Quisumbing, She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove
Ynares-Santiago, Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Carpio, and Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to
Azcuna, JJ. remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the
Respondent. same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Promulgated: In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
October 5, 2005 WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF
x--------------------------------------------------x THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
DECISION applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
QUISUMBING, J.: marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is
capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
under Philippine law? matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
question of law. decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed
before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In
this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction
or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.
The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the
State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell
on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the
intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26,
36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code,
the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the
following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose
spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-
Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens
when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a
foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of
the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for
legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in
this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be
no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should
be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized
as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. BRION, J.:
The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23,
are hereby SET ASIDE. Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial
No pronouncement as to costs. Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on
SO ORDERED. certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Petitioner, Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
- versus - discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts
petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Respondents. -- -
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
G.R. No. 186571
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
Present: National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
BRION, by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
BERSAMIN, 1982.[6]
*ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
Promulgated: submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
August 11, 2010 offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
------------x circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
DECISION
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article
26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the
provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks
for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to
file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to
be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient
legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in
their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15]
and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before
or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates
the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.[17]
Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
[the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry,
the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct
in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes
the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and
its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport
to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate
to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will
allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32]
between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse
bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for
the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the
need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting
a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No.
3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn
and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
status of persons, in which shall be entered: of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which
(a) births; required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
(b) deaths; judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
(c) marriages; it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
(d) annulments of marriages; to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite
(e) divorces; judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions; Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
(i) naturalization; and authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
(j) changes of name. recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in
xxxx the civil registry.

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not
ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in
detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed
as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign
divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree
and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms
of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE

the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under
Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the
Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing
for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-
resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the
election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view
that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the
RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended
that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only
to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section
2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a
nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on
the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of
venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the
petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third
person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree
of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be
judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain
its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court
cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should
be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is
Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25
The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of
entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26
Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
"jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification
and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under
the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial
court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity
of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is
protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35
In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present
case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of
the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a
void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with
the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that
Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between
his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This
is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of
action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition
and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that
"the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine
court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency
and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen
if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce
involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or
dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment
he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the
right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality
to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on
the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law.
The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who
has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone
can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78
there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the
public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly
the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most
of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real
party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and
judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry
of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied
on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support
pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words,
a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88
this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her
country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case
for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws
do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based
on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the
Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may
file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy.
The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry
while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is
still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is
that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to
him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent
to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law.
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status,
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect
to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15
of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs
to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of
the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011

and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful
marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having
been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that:
(1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2)
in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate
him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for
the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig
City, in view of the filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by
petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the
voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to
Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed
against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and
private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be
dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil
Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage)
nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley
G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was
stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar
or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the
resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the
parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the
Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already
been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which
has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said
second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy
to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC’s decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but
the same was denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari
alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE
IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND
DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND
VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES
WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043,
IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND
IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE
PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF
THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN
THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE
BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL
AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY
G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE
OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN
THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE
OF THE CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of
bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has
been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of
a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the
prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accused’s conviction for
bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration
of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been
judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had
already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to
[private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all
that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned
case and ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time
he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the
finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage
does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose
“death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two
Susans whom he married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which
affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred
to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-
ibig,” 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from
“GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated
as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her
in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the
marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in
this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of
this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of
death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY
IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is
essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject
“death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the
validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before
the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided
the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot
stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
“death benefits” under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second
marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a
judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation
of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime
of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is
a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association,
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies
earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal
wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family
Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the
parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if
only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
19 Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the
deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-
ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both
parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-
half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner
as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on
the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20
where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his
estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....”
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case
would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on
the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article
40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of
nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for
purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes
to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree
declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same
rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case
for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid,
no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a
party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues
before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws
and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
“on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not
be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON,
Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED
in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by
her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the
legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition,
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo
was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of
the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore,
be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the
time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF
LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE
TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON
HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in
the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same
meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from
the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp
on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in
death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at
the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972
up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact
that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of
taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in
Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court,
in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and
their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at
bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a
previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established
by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino
in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of
marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the
probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact
that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the
possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National
Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently,
in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at
the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab
initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of
kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they
are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited
by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as
one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and
7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the
July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No.
62443, which reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The
reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito
Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
JOCELYN M. SUAZO,
Petitioner,
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985;
they were residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship,
Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone
for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding
- versus - them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986
in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
Respondents. schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as
G.R. No. 164493 household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent
quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found
DEL CASTILLO, another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ. Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with
the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
Promulgated: the Family Code, as amended. She claimed that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship,
March 10, 2010
she alleged in her complaint:

xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987,
their relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused
unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff
because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time they had
a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the
defendant to work or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes
him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations making
life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff causing their
separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the
time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves
to be continuous, permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit
himself to a psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who
was presumably hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano,
and the psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her
petition, including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received
from Angelito. On cross-examination, she remained firm on these
declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated her
violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got
married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe
his behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature
before you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of
his behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the
time of the marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social
personality Disorder this is a serious and severe apparently incurable (sic).
This disorder is chronic and long-standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the
petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of
lying when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive,
coherent, relevant to marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a statement
rather on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion
of the undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom
rock (sic) even before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent(s)
immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic)
the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s)
the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality
Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and responsibility to his family.
The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion and appear(s)
incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and
became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life.
He apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what
does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there
long before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early
developmental (sic) Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because
psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others
particularly and this (sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder
do not know that they have this kind of disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder
(sic)?
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that
they are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to
the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?

Q. So in other words, permanent? A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more
A. Permanent and incurable. often than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the Court:
wedding or at the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, maam.
A. Yes, sir.
xxxx
Court:
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social respondent (sic).
Personality Disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any
employment exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the
clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the
respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party
(sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent
is under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious
relationship during the less than one year and one thing what is significant,
respondent allowed wife to work as housemaid instead of he who should
provide and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her earning for the five
months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took sustainance of
the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the
petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the
marital relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the
petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder, he is good for nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The
Report pertinently states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner
for Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a
part time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine
operator, described to be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler.
While mother is a sales agent. It was a common knowledge within their
vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial
relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering and
squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately
suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety.
She is fully equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as her morale. She
may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness;
in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better
future in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully
aware of external realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic)
commensurate with her capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to
prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific goals.
Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping
mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the
Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the
psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about
him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person
may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some
admitted grounds that would render a person to be unfit to comply with
his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of
rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on
parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition
by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The Family
Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed
to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent. On the contrary,
the respondent has not shown love and respect to the petitioner
manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler,
drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any
longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one
year and four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of
her married life with the respondent, she already suffered from
maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was
the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband to sustain
the latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands
family, she was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is
a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his
(sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the
fact that at the time of their marriage, she and her husband are still young
and was forced only to said marriage by her relatives. The petitioner and
the respondent had never developed the feeling of love and respect,
instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early
marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity
enunciated by this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC
concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist
testimony quoted above] would only tend to show that the respondent
was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave
but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court
of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held
that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case
was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore,
petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of
the respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral
certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered
wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent, although
they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who
made here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her
marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an
instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-
social behavior of herein respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in
Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require
that a physician personally examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court adopted the totality of
evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to be
drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of
the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the
aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological
incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the
person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the
respondent was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage
state, that is, to assume the essential duties of marriage due to an
underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand testimony on
the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the
Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material
support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper psychological
malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social
personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of
any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got
from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the
behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or
irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca
vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been
the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not
under a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability
to engage in productive work and more stable relationships with another.
The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining
characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same
roof, the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy
one. But the marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the
Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a
reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and
the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of
psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are
convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the
reversal of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally
disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and
void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v.
Court of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court as to the
existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage is final and binding on us (the Supreme Court);
petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings
and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis--vis
petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous;
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity;
this omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to
interpret the term without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article
36 though was taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
which gives three conditions that would make a person unable to contract
marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and
accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony
due to causes of a psychic nature.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these
criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its
finding of psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the
law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define
what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further
claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is
opposed to the dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error
of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare
Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it
merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that
disables compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without
any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We
must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. It should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic
requirements of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases
then already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or
construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law;
the latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of
that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted,
that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC,
Rules) promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules
pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall
specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the
evidence presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or
describing the nature and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section
14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial conference the
advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may
aid in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules,
the grounds for the declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that
came to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited
cases. This was the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the
Court decided Te v. Yu-Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by
so doing, it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the
Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic premise that the law is so
designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis,
that should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of
annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware
of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation
of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the
resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a
set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the
Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths,
schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-
to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the
abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely
looked at other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v.
Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of
its stringent requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause
of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written
report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too
expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor
litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are
not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this
stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the
examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist
and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely
stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also
noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded
on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of
cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage;
that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that
the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty
in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations
must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.[27]
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of
Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos
psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so
conclude based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which
we were compelled to undertake because of the differences in the trial
court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns
presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos
alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert
opinion evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological
evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in
open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition
only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist
heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave,
severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence
holds that this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While
such examination is desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in
all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the parties.
For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile,
information coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the
partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it
avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have
secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological
condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to
be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the
characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her
conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be
found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is
chronic or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder
prior to his marriage with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental
stage, as basic trust was not developed. However, she did not support this
declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her conclusion
on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional
family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on
this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may have
realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of
Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why
and to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable,
and on the effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his
capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more
important concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which
are critical to the success of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report
and the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of
Jocelyns testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with
sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely
testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek
employment and the physical beatings she received from him all of which
occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this to be We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the No. 62443. Costs against the petitioner.
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged
physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly
took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the -SO ORDERED.
marriage or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that
materially affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence
require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative

of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological
incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
perform marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot
be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence
of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.

The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women
indicates abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence,
standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence
holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost
in the present case under our finding that the opinion of the psychologist
cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns account of
the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.

On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual
bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in
Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in
Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with
us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the
CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts
and the evidence of the present case.
 RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008
resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari
(under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the
January 26, 2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the
Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage

to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke.
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but
maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a
year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and
started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married
man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the
marriage was not fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed

personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, G.R. No. 165424
disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court
Petitioner,
a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable
Present:
and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]
CORONA,
- v e r s u s - VELASCO, JR.,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on
PERALTA,** JJ. the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration.
and THE REPUBLIC OF THE It was denied.
PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated: The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.
June 9, 2009 We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the
x--------------------------------------------------x marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his
argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and
void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the
evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was
more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court
that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this
Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological
incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a
case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must
consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
disposition of the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that
petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you
conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to
[dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a]
dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner
relational problem during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of
fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from
psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very
questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood
what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no
consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the
respondent. And after three months he refused to see or talk with the
respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death,
and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and
respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you
expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had
undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should
get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to
conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from
psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they
never consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they
had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of
lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt
by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to
make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent
personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
respondent was for real.[10]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological
condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This
Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable
personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy
may be long-term.[17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing,
inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning
and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
display them and for others.[18]

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a
dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-
denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive
attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.[11] This could
be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his
father who treated his family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who
was as domineering as his father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take
respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than
confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family
life, to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering
from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April
16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and
September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April
17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The

father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very
unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x
x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person
but it was never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were
practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-
confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what
[it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life.

Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was

grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of
his marriage to respondent.[16]
 Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ,⃰ JJ.

MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ,

Promulgated:
Respondent.

September 19, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------
VALERIO E. KALAW, -----------x

G.R. No. 166357 DECISION

Petitioner,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established

facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of
these facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
May 27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the
herein parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE
and VACATED while the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
(Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually
married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children,
Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime
Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital
affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March
1983.[5]
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-
laws) and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started
living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented
house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp
would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them
got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children
stayed with Malyn on weekends.[9]
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to
go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that
Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned
to the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and Jay.
According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her
house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.
[11]
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that
her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-
habitation, as shown by Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played
mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early
hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in
flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged
infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law,
Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned
that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra (Benjie).
When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside.[15]
At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a towel around
his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange
of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter
agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.[16] They put their
agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding
Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her
wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns
NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident
even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background
and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived
and without a proper maternal role model.[20]
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also
read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.[22] He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary. Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
prioritizing her familys needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are
not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity
whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as
well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert
witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the
factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the
courts duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption
that the factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted
playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always
between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had
Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their respective
yayas with her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her duties as
mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however,
explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive husband.
[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife,
was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up the
security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house.
Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded to lock
the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their
bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone would
beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the house.
[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes,
because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her
discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US
with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only
booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after
partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone
at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at
that time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her
spousal and parental rights under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by
surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of
the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone
against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was
suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35]
Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from
these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of
her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual
infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that
both Tyrone and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered
problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to
the demise of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized
below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning.
Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after two years of
living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who
showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she resisted his overtures.
She made it clear that she could take him or leave him. But the minute she
started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the
most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent. It
appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she
puts all her energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance
between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted
that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when
he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other women. His
interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun dancing, drinking,
or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted
to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and unresolved
issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about
his work and friends tha[n] he was about spending time with his family.
Because of Malyns and Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with
high conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The
conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their
individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their
marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had
relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues
which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a husband. He
is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to
perform this duty.[41]
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided
for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany
their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was
only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her
mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
mother would visit them only in school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and
driver during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not
live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were
in agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would
see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp
would call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde
whenever any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila
Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the
couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support
she gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested
negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they
found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones
version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but
stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-
naked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of
Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on
nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend
afterwards.[49]
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to
conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor children.
Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children
Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and Tyrone and
Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and
have positive relationships with their children, she recommended that the
custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more
available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The
social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal
home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their
respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of
the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their
needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couples
de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with only a
maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family
abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his
second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this
history during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not
find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be
awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform
the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts
Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage
without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed to commit
themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of
life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education
of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties psychological
incapacity is grave, and serious such that both are incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically
established and was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a
finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture
their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and
familial obligations. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal
separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by
petitioners expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of
NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and
jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied on
December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual
findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to
appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant
evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that
respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession and self-
centeredness were manifestations of respondents NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD is grave and
incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial
obligations;[62] and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family background, and
socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void
because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving
her alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of
her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that
she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones
allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates
did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover,
her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was
grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was
based only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is
intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently
had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to
Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69] She manifested that she was
no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on
the basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to
dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden
of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must
prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior,
suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her
from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the
time of marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not
been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.

But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying
premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In
fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of
the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong
and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother
when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions
were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during
the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove
her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-
out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but
Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men.
Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent
had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention
from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but
it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of
the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the
facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did
the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the
contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they
were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made
real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement
from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact
that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level
despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings
to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis
for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs
reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity.
The trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the
veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which
can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity,
which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves
to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171557 February 12, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
June 2, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69103 which affirmed the Decision4 dated
October 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte,
Branch 11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S-665 declaring the marriage of
respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N. Rosalem
(Natividad) void on the ground of psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines5 (Family Code).

The Facts

Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at the Parish of
St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma.
Reynilda R. De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma.
Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15, 1972,
respectively.7

On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint for declaration of

nullity of marriage (complaint) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S-
665, alleging that Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the Order8 dated
January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine if collusion exists between Rodolfo and
Natividad and found that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.

In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others, that he first
met Natividad when they were students at the Barangay High School of
Sindangan,10 and he was forced to marry her barely three (3) months into
their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18 years of age. He had
no stable job and merely worked in the gambling cockpits as "kristo" and
"bangkero sa hantak." When he decided to join and train with the army,12
Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their house without his
consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to Dipolog City where she lived
with a certain Engineer Terez (Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann
Terez.14 After cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named Antonio Mondarez
and has lived since then with the latter in Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the
time Natividad abandoned them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of
Ma. Reynilda and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save their
marriage which, however, proved futile because of Natividad’s
psychological incapacity that appeared to be incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as appear during
trial, despite service of summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed the court
that she submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl T.
Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfo’s claims.19 Rodolfo also
underwent the same examination.20
In her two-page psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos stated that both
Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations, finding that both parties suffered from
"utter emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable behavior
considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by established norms of
conduct."22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed that she lacked the
willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters.
Similarly, Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too
that he sired a son with another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos noted that the
mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the
celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that the "couple’s union was bereft of the
mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage."23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed an
opposition24 to the complaint, contending that the acts committed by
Natividad did not demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by
law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage
between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the ground of psychological
incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that
Natividad’s emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which in
psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that existed at the
time of the parties’ marriage but manifested only thereafter. It likewise
concurred with Dr. Zalsos’s observation that Natividad’s condition is
incurable since it is deeply rooted within the make-up of her personality.
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have known, much more
comprehend the marital obligations she was assuming, or, knowing them,
could not have given a valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no showing that
Natividad’s personality traits constituted psychological incapacity as
envisaged under Article 36 of the Family Code, and that the testimony of
the expert witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC,
finding that while Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and
promiscuity by themselves do not necessarily equate to psychological
incapacity, "their degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so profound as to
render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations."30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a
Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
sustaining the RTC’s finding of psychological incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article
3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely
physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 6833 of the
Family Code, among others,34 include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.35 In Santos v.
CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required
in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability
(i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved).37 The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are
footnoted hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA,41 held that therein
respondent’s emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be
equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the marital state,
not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the
same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v. Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against
a declaration of nullity, as petitioner therein "utterly failed, both in her
allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of
solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of
the marriage," significantly noting that the "[e]motional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity." In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate court’s finding that
the petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed signs
of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that
the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his
incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological,
not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been
identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and
that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature."44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case.1âwphi1 Based on the
evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even
sexual promiscuity, can be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Zalsos which does not, however, explain in reasonable detail
how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted,
and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity
jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the types of psychological tests
which she administered on Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her
report the root cause of Natividad's condition and to show that it existed at
the time of the parties' marriage. Neither was the gravity or seriousness of
Natividad's behavior in relation to her failure to perform the essential
marital obligations sufficiently described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the
finding contained therein on the incurability of Natividad's condition
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and, hence, appears
to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and even self-serving. In the same
vein, Dr. Zalsos's testimony during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of
her report, also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Natividad
was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although expert opm10ns
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence
of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent
evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court, however, does not
find any such evidence sufficient enough to uphold the court a quo's nullity
declaration. To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo
and to assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties'
marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. To hark
back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court does not
perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present case. Thus, for
these reasons, coupled too with the recognition that marriage is an
inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,47 the instant
petition is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2005
and Resolution dated February 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 69103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 192718 February 18, 2015
ROBERT F. MALLILIN, Petitioner,
vs.
LUZ G. JAMESOLAMIN and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court assailing the November 20, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) and its June 1, 2010 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-
MIN, which reversed and set aside the September 20, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City(RTC-Br.37), declaring
the marriage between petitioner Robert F. Mallilin (Robert) and private
respondent Luz G. Jamesolamin (Luz) null and void.
The Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3)
children.
On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, Branch 23, Cagayan de Oro City (RTC-Br. 23). On
March 7, 1996, RTC-Br. 23 denied the petition. Robert appealed this
judgment before the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54261.
On January 29, 1999, the CA reversed the RTC-Br. 23 decision "due to lack
of participation of the State as required under Article 48 of the Family
Code."3 The case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings and its
records were thereafter transferred from RTC-Br. 23 to RTC-Br. 37, as the
latter was designated as Family Court pursuant to the Family Code Act of
1997.
In the complaint, Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its
essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity became even
more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent
rational judgment, and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes
demanding obligation of a parent.
Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She
averred that it was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their
marriage. Despite due notice, however, she did not appear during the trial.
Assistant City Prosecutor Isabelo Sabanal appeared for the State. When
Robert testified, he disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA,
and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still
engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt.
Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her
duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following
circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz
did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their
meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she
did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who
took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at
the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men;
(5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male
students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a
certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she
would contract loans without his knowledge.
In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes
Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao
Medical Center.
On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert
filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of
First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).
On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision
declaring their marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due
discretion on the part of both parties as contemplated by the second
paragraph of Canon1095. This decision was affirmed by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).
Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential
marital obligations.
The State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
interposed an appeal with the CA. The OSG argued that Robert failed to
make a case for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Luz. It pointed
out that the real cause of the marital discord was the sexual infidelity of
Luz. Such ground, the OSG contended, should not result in the nullification
of the marriage under the law, but merely constituted a ground for legal
separation.
The CA, in its November 20, 2009 Decision,4 granted the petition and
reversed the RTC decision. The decision, including the decretal portion,
partially reads:
[W]e find that the trial court committed a reversible error. Closer scrutiny
of the records reveals, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, sexual
infidelity are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a
mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x.
xxxx
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving declarations, the evidence
adduced by Robert fell short of establishing the fact that at the time of
their marriage, Luz was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived [her] of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and
its concomitant responsibilities.
xxxx
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee’s undeserved marital plight.
Yet, Our paramount duty as a court compels Us to apply the law at all costs,
however harsh it may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear its
unbiased brunt.
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision dated September 20, 2002 in
Civil Case No. 94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its
June 1, 2010 Resolution,6 stating that the arguments of Robert were mere
rehash of the same ground, arguments and discussion previously pointed
out by him, and that no new substance was brought out to warrant the
reconsideration or reversal of its decision.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WIFE UNDERSCORES THE
EVIDENTIAL GAP TO SUSTAIN THE DECISION OFTHE RTC DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO DECLARED BY THE NATIONAL
APPELLATE MATRIMONIAL TRIBUNAL OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOP’S
CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AS GUILTY OF GRAVE LACKOF DUE
DISCRETION.
III
THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND BY THE LOWER COURT AS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
Robert now argues that he has sufficiently proven the nullity of his
marriage even in the absence of any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination of the wife by a competent and qualified professional. To
bolster his claim, he avers that the Metropolitan Tribunal already declared
that Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in judgment concerning the
essential rights and obligations mutually given and accepted in marriage.
The said decision was affirmed by the NAMT.
Robert further argues that the sexual indiscretion of Luz with different men
coupled with the fact that she failed to function as a home maker to her
family and as a housewife to him incapacitated her from accepting and
complying with her essential marital obligations. For said reason, he asserts
that the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual infidelity, but clearly an
illness that was rooted on some debilitating psychological condition which
incapacitated her to carry out the responsibilities of a married woman.
Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a mere sexual infidel but one who
is suffering from a deep psychological problem.
Position of the State
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled that the totality of evidence
presented by Robert was not sufficient to support a finding that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated. His evidence fell short of establishing his
assertion that at the time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from a
psychological defect which deprived her of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan Tribunal and the NAMT, the
OSG claims that the same were only given persuasive value and were not
controlling or decisive in cases of nullity of marriage. Further, the decision
was based on grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning matrimonial
rights and obligations due to outside factors other than psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also
raises the strong possibility of collusion between the parties as shown by
the events that took place after the issuance of the March 7, 1996 RTC
Decision. The OSG wrote:
Significantly, the chronological events after the trial court issued its March
7, 1996 Decision unmistakably show the collusion between the parties to
obtain the reliefs pleaded. Among others, respondent’s Retraction of
Testimony was executed without the presence of counsel sometime in
1998, a few months before she married an American. This irregularity was
even noticed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261:
xxxx
The involvement and active participation of the Solicitor General became
indispensable, in the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind turn of events,
the Appellee made a VOLTE FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" and
a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of Franco Mark J Mallillin, still a
minor, her son by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the Appellee, in the
Court a quo, obdurately denied the material allegations of the Appellant’s
complaint and declared that it was the Appellant who was psychologically
incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the appellee, in the present
recourse, to the extent of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo and
even praying for the reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court is strongly
suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a modus vivendi between the
parties, outlawed by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
Constitution. x x x
The Court’s Ruling
The main issue is whether the totality of the evidence adduced proves that
Luz was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligation of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. "Psychological incapacity,"
as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among
others, include their mutual obligations to live together; observe love,
respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is hardly a doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.7
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.8
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo C. De Quintos, Jr.,9 the Court
reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage, embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,10 based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Thus:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court is of the considered view that
Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
First, the testimony of Robert failed to overcome the burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-serving testimony, no
other evidence was adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz. He
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on her
behavior. Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had no serious value as
evidence.
Second, the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of Luz was
not medically or clinically identified, and sufficiently proven during the trial.
Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that her disposition of not
cleaning the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and
propensity for dating and receiving different male visitors, was grave,
deeply rooted, and incurable within the parameters of jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity.
The alleged failure of Luz to assume her duties as a wife and as a mother,
as well as her emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot
rise to the level of psychological incapacity that justifies the nullification of
the parties' marriage. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological
incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.11 Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.
Psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.12
As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a
marriage void based on psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the
series of sexual indiscretion of Luz were external manifestations of the
psychological defect that she was suffering within her person, which could
be considered as nymphomania or "excessive sex hunger." Other than his
allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove
that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that
it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological
incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is
insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity.
In Sivino A. Ligeralde v. May Ascension A. Patalinghug and the Republic of
the Philippines,13 the Court ruled that the respondent’s act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity
was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner
must be able to establish that the respondent’s unfaithfulness was a
manifestation of a disordered personality, which made her completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Third, the psychological report of Villanueva, Guidance Psychologist II of
the Northern Mindanao Medical Center, Cagayan deOro City, was
insufficient to prove the psychological in capacity of Luz. There was nothing
in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or
was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her
psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving
information provided by Robert.

Fourth, the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove
the psychological incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,14 the Court stated that
interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law
on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed
civilly void x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinently, Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the NAMT cannot
be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court has in
no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.
Granting that it was offered and admitted, it must be pointed out that the
basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT was not the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a psychological
nature similar to Article 36 of the Family Code, but the second paragraph of
Canon 1095 which refers to those who suffer from grave lack of discretion
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portions of the
NAMT decision are as follows:
The FACTS on the Case prove with the certitude required by law that based
on the deposition of the petitioner – the respondent understandably
ignored the proceedings completely for which she was duly cited for
Contempt of Court – and premised on the substantially concordant
testimonies of the Witnesses, the woman Respondent demonstrated in the
external forum through her action and reaction patterns, before and after
the marriage-in-fact, her grave lack of due discretion in judgement for
marriage intents and purposes basically by reason of her immaturity of
judgement as manifested by her emotional ambivalence x x x.
WHEREFORE, this COLLEGIAL COURT OF APPEALS, having invoked the
Divine Name and having in mind the Law, the Jurisprudence and the Facts
pertaining to the Case, hereby declares and decrees the confirmation of
the nullity decision rendered by the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance
for the Archdiocese of Manil on the Marriage Case MALLILIN –
JAMISOLAMIN with Prot. N. 63/2000 on the ground provided by Canon
1095 par. 2CIC on the part of the woman Respondent – but NOT on the
part of the man Petitioner for lack of evidence. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)15
In Santos v. Santos,6 the Court referred to the deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code,
to provide an insight on the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It went
out to state that a part of the provision is similar to the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 of the Code of Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In Najera v. Najera,17 the Court was also confronted with a similar issue of
whether to consider an annulment by the NAMT as also covering
psychological incapacity, the only ground recognized in our law. In the said
case, the NAMT decision was also based on the second paragraph of Canon
1095. The Court ruled that it was not similar to, and only annulments
under the third paragraph of, Canon 1095 should be considered.
Elucidating, the Court wrote: Petitioner’s argument is without merit.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals apparently
did not have the opportunity to consider the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court of
Appeals considered the Matrimonial Tribunal’s decision in its Resolution
dated August 5, 2004 when it resolved petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals took
cognizance of the very same issues now raised before this Court and
correctly held that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was devoid of
merit. It stated:
The Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal dated July 2,
2002, which was forwarded to this Court only on February 11, 2004, reads
as follows:
[T]he FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court
dated June14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving
his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and
lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage
suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract: First, his family was dysfunctional in that as a
child, he saw the break-up of the marriage of his own parents; his own two
siblings have broken marriages; Second, he therefore grew up with a
domineering mother with whom [he] identified and on whom he
depended for advice; Third, he was according to his friends, already into
drugs and alcohol before marriage; this affected his conduct of bipolar
kind: he could be very quiet but later very talkative, peaceful but later
hotheaded even violent, he also was aware of the infidelity of his mother
who now lives with her paramour, also married and a policeman; Finally,
into marriage, he continued with his drugs and alcohol abuse until one
time he came home very drunk and beat up his wife and attacked her with
a bolo that wounded her; this led to final separation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor
of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095,
2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
However, records of the proceedings before the Trial Court show that,
other than herself, petitioner-appellant offered the testimonies of the
following persons only, to wit: Aldana Celedonia (petitioner-appellant’s
mother), Sonny de la Cruz (member, PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan), and Ma.
Cristina R. Gates (psychologist). Said witnesses testified, in particular, to the
unfaithful night of July 1, 1994 wherein the respondent allegedly made an
attempt on the life of the petitioner. But unlike the hearing and finding
before the Matrimonial Tribunal, petitioner-appellant’s sister-in-law and
friends of the opposing parties were never presented before said Court. As
to the contents and veracity of the latter’s testimonies, this Court is
without any clue. True, in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(268 SCRA 198), the Supreme Court held that the interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. However, the Highest Tribunal expounded as follows:
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should
be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law
on evidence– what is decreed as [canonically] invalid should be decreed
civilly void x x x.
And in relation thereto, Rule 132, Sec. 34 of the Rules of Evidence states:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose of which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Given the preceding disquisitions, petitioner-appellant should not expect
us to give credence to the Decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal when, apparently, it was made on a different set of evidence of
which We have no way of ascertaining their truthfulness. Furthermore, it is
an elementary rule that judgments must be based on the evidence
presented before the court (Manzano vs. Perez, 362 SCRA 430 [2001]). And
based on the evidence on record, We find no ample reason to reverse or
modify the judgment of the Trial Court.[31]
Santos v. Santos18 cited the deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which drafted the Code, to provide an insight on
the import of Article 36 of the Family Code. It stated that a part of the
provision is similar to the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law, which reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. those who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
the essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted;
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
It must be pointed out that in this case, the basis of the declaration of
nullity of marriage by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not
the third paragraph of Canon 1095 which mentions causes of a
psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon 1095 which refers
to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and
accepted. For clarity, the pertinent portion of the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reads:
The FACTS collated from party complainant and reliable witnesses which
include a sister-in-law of Respondent (despite summons from the Court
dated June 14, 1999, he did not appear before the Court, in effect waiving
his right to be heard, hence, trial in absentia followed) corroborate and
lead this Collegiate Court to believe with moral certainty required by law
and conclude that the husband-respondent upon contacting marriage
suffered from grave lack of due discretion of judgment, thereby rendering
nugatory his marital contract x x x.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court of Second Instance, having
invoked the Divine Name and having considered the pertinent Law and
relevant Jurisprudence to the Facts of the Case hereby proclaims, declares
and decrees the confirmation of the sentence from the Court a quo in favor
of the nullity of marriage on the ground contemplated under Canon 1095,
2 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law. x x x.
Hence, even if, as contended by petitioner, the factual basis of the decision
of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is similar to the facts
established by petitioner before the trial court, the decision of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal confirming the decree of nullity of marriage
by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity of
respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of
Psychologist Cristina Gates regarding the psychological incapacity of
respondent is supported by the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the Decision of the
RTC. (Emphases in the original; Underscoring supplied)
Hence, Robert’s reliance on the NAMT decision is misplaced. To repeat, the
decision of the NAMT was based on the second paragraph of Canon 1095
which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of
judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be
mutually given and accepted, a cause not of psychological nature under
Article 36 of the Family Code. A cause of psychological nature similar to
Article 36 is covered by the third paragraph of Canon 1095 of the Code of
Canon Law (Santos v. Santos 19), which for ready reference reads:
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxxx
3. those who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the
second paragraph of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to
expand what the lawmakers did not intend to include. What would prevent
members of other religious groups from invoking their own interpretation
of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if not
inconsistent, interpretations?
To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under
Article 36 would be legislating from the bench.1âwphi1 As stated in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,20 interpretations given by the
NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines are given great respect by
our courts, but they are not controlling or decisive.
In Republic v. Galang,21 it was written that the Constitution set out a policy
of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution,
and the marriage was the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the
whim of the parties. In petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff.
Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties,
or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of
a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was
celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie.
In fine, the Court holds that the CA decided correctly. Petitioner Robert
failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove the alleged
psychological incapacity of Luz.
As asserted by the OSG, the allegations of the petitioner make a case for
legal separation. Hence, this decision is without prejudice to an action for
legal separation if a party would want to pursue such proceedings. In this
disposition, the Court cannot decree a legal separation because in such
proceedings, there are matters and consequences like custody and
separation of properties that need to be considered and settled.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78303-MIN, dated November 20, 2009, and its
Resolution, dated June 1, 2010, are hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210929, July 29, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA,
Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, assails the October 18, 2013 Decision1 and the January 8, 2014
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 03768-MIN,
which affirmed the October 8, 2009 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon (RTC), in SP Proc. Case No. 3316-09,
granting the petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) and
declaring her husband, Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), as presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.4chanrobleslaw
The Antecedents
Edna and Romeo were married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City.
In 1992, Edna worked as domestic helper in Singapore while her husband
worked as a mechanic in Valencia City, Bukidnon. In 1993, Edna heard the
news from her children that Romeo had left their conjugal home without
reason or information as to his whereabouts.
Thereafter, Edna took a leave from work and returned to the country to
look for Romeo. She inquired from her parents-in-law and common friends
in Iligan City. Still, she found no leads as to his whereabouts or existence.
She also went to his birthplace in Escalante, Negros Oriental, and inquired
from his relatives.
On August 6, 2009, Edna filed before the RTC a petition5 to declare Romeo
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
During the trial, Edna was presented as the lone witness. In its October 8,
2009 Order,6 the RTC granted the petition on the basis of her well-founded
belief of Romeo's death. Hence:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Romeo L. Villanueva to be presumptively dead for all legal intents and
purposes in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, without prejudice to his reappearance.
SO ORDERED.7
On August 13, 2010, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in finding that Edna had a well-founded belief that Romeo,
her absent spouse, was dead. It argued that the conclusions reached by the
RTC were in direct opposition to established jurisprudence, as ruled by the
Court in Republic v. Nolasco8 (Nolasco) and U.S. v. Biasbas9 On October 18,
2013, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the RTC acted within its
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed decision having been expressly clothed
with the power to determine the case.10 It also cited Article 247 of the
Family Code11 which provided for the final and immediate executory
character of the decision of the RTC, acting as a family court, thus,
rendering the issue of whether or not Edna had sufficiently established a
well-founded belief to warrant the decree of presumptive death of her
absent spouse, as moot and academic.
On November 20, 2013, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration but the
CA denied it on January 8, 2014.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC DECISION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE RTC IS
CONTRARY TO PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE GROUNDS RAISED
BY THE PETITIONER TO ASSAIL THE RTC DECISION ARE MERE ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT.12
The OSG argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC when the latter affirmed the existence of Edna's
well-founded belief as to the death of her absent spouse. It claims that the
evidence presented by Edna, which merely consisted of bare and
uncorroborated assertions, never amounted to a diligent and serious
search required under prevailing jurisprudence.
Respondent Edna, through her counsel, invokes the finality, inalterability
and immutability of the RTC decision, which was affirmed by the
CA.13chanrobleslaw
Ruling of the Court
The Court grants the petition.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides that before a judicial declaration of
presumptive death may be granted, the present spouse must prove that
he/she has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.14 In this case,
Edna failed. The RTC and the CA overlooked Edna's patent non-compliance
with the said requirement. The well-founded belief in the absentee's death
requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based
on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion
of active effort (not a mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse
(even beyond the period required by law), lack of any news that the
absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice.15 The
premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present
spouse the burden of complying with the stringent requirement of well-
founded belief which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is
still alive or is already dead.16chanrobleslaw
This strict standard approach ensures that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool
to conveniently circumvent the laws in light of the State's policy to protect
and strengthen the institution of marriage. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts but instead should see to it that the stricter standard
required by the Family Code is met.17chanrobleslaw
Accordingly, in a string of cases, this Court has denied petitions for the
declaration of presumptive death on the said basis.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court ruled that
the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts
to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
He went to his in-laws' house to look for her;
(2)
He sought the barangay captain's aid to locate her;
(3)
He went to her friends' houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among her friends;
(4)
He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in
malls during his free time;
(5)
He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6)
He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these claimed "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the
present spouse. The Court explained that he failed to present the persons
from whom he made inquiries and only reported his wife's absence after
the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
Similarly in Republic v. Granada,19 the Court ruled that the present spouse
failed to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the petition. She simply did not exert
diligent efforts to locate her husband either in the country or in Taiwan,
where he was known to have worked. Moreover, she did not explain her
omissions. In said case, the Court wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of the
death of the absent spouse depends upon inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of
an absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by the
present spouse.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four
years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted
of:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2)
Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3)
Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved
fruitless.
The Court held that the present spouse's methods of investigation were
too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead. It stated that the
pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.
Recently, in Republic v. Cantor20 (Cantor), the Court considered the
present spouse's efforts to have fallen short of the "stringent standard" and
lacked the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence as she did not
actively look for her missing husband; that she did not report his absence
to the police or seek the aid of the authorities to look for him; that she did
not present as witnesses her missing husband's relatives or their neighbors
and friends, who could corroborate her efforts to locate him; that these
persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named;
and that there was no other corroborative evidence to support her claim
that she conducted a diligent search. In the Court's view, the wife merely
engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries
from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to conduct a
diligent search. Her claimed efforts were insufficient to form a well-
founded belief that her husband was already dead.
In this case, Edna claimed to have done the following to determine the
whereabouts and the status of her husband:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She took a vacation/leave of absence from her work and returned to the
Philippines to look for her husband.
She inquired from her parents-in-law in Iligan City and from their common
friends in the same city and in Valencia City.
She went as far as the birthplace of her husband in Escalante, Negros
Oriental, so she could inquire from her husband's relatives.
Despite her efforts, she averred that she received negative responses from
them because none of them had knowledge of the existence of her
husband who had been missing for 15 years.
Applying the standard set forth by the Court in the previously cited cases,
particularly Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the required well-
founded belief of her absent husband's death.
Her claim of making diligent search and inquiries remained unfounded as it
merely consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on
record. She also failed to present any person from whom she inquired
about the whereabouts of her husband. She did not even present her
children from whom she learned the disappearance of her husband. In fact,
she was the lone witness. Following the basic rule that mere allegation is
not evidence and is not equivalent to proof,21 the Court cannot give
credence to her claims that she indeed exerted diligent efforts to locate her
husband.
from their common friends in Iligan City and in Valencia City, and even
went as far as the birthplace of her husband, particularly at Escalante,
Negros Oriental, inquiring from her husband's relatives, but she only got
negative response from them since none of them have any knowledge as
to the present existence of her husband that since the year 1993 up to the
present, a period of about fifteen [15] years have elapsed, the person and
the body of petitioner's husband could not be found, located nor traced as
there is no any information as to his existence or whereabouts.23
Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when it dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by the OSG. The CA should have realized the glaring and
patent disregard by the RTC of the rulings in similar situations where
petitions for declaration of presumptive death have been denied by this
Court. By declaring Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly ignored this
Court's categorical pronouncements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 18, 2013
Decision and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Edna
Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared presumptively dead is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, no document was submitted to corroborate the allegation that

her husband had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years already. As the
OSG observed, there was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the
authorities at the time her husband disappeared. In Cantor, the present
spouse claimed to have sought the aid of the authorities or, at the very
least, reported his absence to the police.22 Yet, the Court denied her pleas.

Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her efforts were not diligent and
serious enough to give meaning to her well-founded belief that Romeo was
already dead. Suffice it to state that her petition should have been denied
at the first instance. The RTC, however, granted it, reasoning
xxx that it was in 1993 when the petitioner while abroad heard the news
from her children that her husband left their conjugal home xxx without
informing the children nor communicating with the herein petitioner as to
the reasons why he left their family abode nor giving them any information
as to his whereabouts; that herein petitioner took vacation/leave of
absence from her work and return to the Philippines, in order to look for
her husband and made some inquiries with her parents-in-law in Iligan City,
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated
August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN
which affirmed be order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case
No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa
Cantor’s husband, presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had
a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach
"sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments;
and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.

After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last
time that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen,
communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her
husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No.
313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was
already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law,
her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends,
but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a
point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All
these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her
to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s
petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the
respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead
since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any
news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the
order dated December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that
respondent Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the
petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the
petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part,
and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring
Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.
The Petition The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the
decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the
Family Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in
summary judicial proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are
deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able under
Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not
subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded
belief to justify the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It
claims that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search
for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly,
the degree of search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to
meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final
orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial
Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary
proceedings, such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and
executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of
the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer
subject to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having
become immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but
even as against the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter
how erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of
this summary proceeding thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained
in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not
granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the
Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the
Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have
said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is
it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered
in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and
executory," the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties
therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had
no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours;
italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a
remedy. While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the
trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has
become final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to
issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or
processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such
a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we
held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in
this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious
manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the
rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124
and 217, insofar as they are applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course,
it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment ina
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry
presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must
be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse
was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or
two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger
of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden
of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the
requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the
present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death,
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of
the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires
a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we
noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and
Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration
of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article
41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news
that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to
be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the
other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.

Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article
41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of
proving the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-
to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends
upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to
speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this
requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the
law, an analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court
ruled that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition.
His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her
in malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the
NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the
present spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the persons from
whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence
after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence
of a "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the
absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the]
present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove
her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to
her filing of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her
brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent
spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor
seek the aid of the mass media. Applying the standards in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the
present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out
that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her
absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these
relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short,
respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband.
Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from
the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government
agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of
presumptive death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four
years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all
proved fruitless. The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations
were too sketchy to form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled
that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to
communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was
dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on
her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the
following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through
the patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can
be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent
checking of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not
purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits
were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus
considers these attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband
is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek
the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded
belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is
placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a
present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors
and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these
persons, from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named.
As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired
from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as
the names of the friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified
in the testimony nor presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondent’s claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there
supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than
her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the
respondent merely engaged in a "passive search" where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She
failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are
insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband was already
dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth
Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the natureand extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is
Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of
spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the
"strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a
tool to conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow
procedural shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required
by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the
Family Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the
degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-
mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be
strictly complied with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family
Code had been resorted to by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well
that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that
those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for
relief because of the xxx summary nature of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if
we consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it
is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the
whim of the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the
underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court
of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in
the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public
policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under
Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse (and consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its
issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is intended to protect
him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would
prematurely remarry sans the court's declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse
presumptively dead, the present spouse's good faith in contracting a
second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent
court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal
intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of
remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard
and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict
standard required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not
been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances
when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of
marriage and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict
standard necessitates a denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are
now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires in
cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August
27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated
December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City,
South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death

obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit
of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared
presumptively dead has never been absent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing

the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5,
2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the
trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner
Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration
of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June
15, 2007.1 Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo

alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan,
Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a
year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
business.4chanrobleslaw

Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.6
Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed
her to work abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in
Ermita, Manila, in February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was
never heard from again.8chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went
to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know
their daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information.11chanrobleslaw
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed
away.12chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime
in October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court
when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented
to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina,
her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City.16 This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal
dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008.17 As a result of
Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and
opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively
dead.18chanrobleslaw
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an
employment agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not
true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she
never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the
conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations in his
petition.24chanrobleslaw
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper.25
She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's
petition.26chanrobleslaw
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008,
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy
was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family
Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
resolution dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5,
2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy
for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of
the Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and
the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a
well-founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in
the first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is
proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under
Article 42 of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it
would not nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her
presumptive death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of
judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed when
there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the
Court of Appeals' ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article
42 of the Family Code is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.

Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's
judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an
issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud
were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair
submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was
fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the court with
respect to her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was
absent for 12 years. There was also no publication of the notice of hearing
of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina
claimed that because of these, she was deprived of notice and opportunity
to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively
dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for
declaration of presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further claimed
that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not given
copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina
alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for
annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17,
2008. This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision
declaring her presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of
the decision in October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the
four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the
action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time
of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them
certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for
four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present
spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a
justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of
being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she
reappears. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed. (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse
with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the
first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the
termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to
several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the
sworn statement of fact and circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice
to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance;
and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially
determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not
always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the
termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions
enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has
already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn
statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the
subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent
spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is disputed in the proper courts
of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already
dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should
prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first
spouse.48 The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49
The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly
dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second
marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for
terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de
Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate
the subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage
were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court
action[.]"53 "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a
presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of
determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the
spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a
bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1)
The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2)
The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
3)
There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4)
There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted
after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a
well-founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage
will not be considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to
the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith
is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void
for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition
to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent
marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances
lack the element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for
Code, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
marriages to apply.59chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies
existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw

Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely
the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because
it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of
the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under

Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such
marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is
terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent
marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a
defense against prosecution for bigamy.63chanrobleslaw

It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the

subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage,
specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of
prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

may be filed solely by the husband or wife."64 This means that even if
Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by
the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is
not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent

marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive
death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of
G.R. No. 179620 August 26, 2008

MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of

their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.1

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming
in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas, Branch 254.
The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.

The Facts

Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad

(Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral.3
Their union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on
October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3)
Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both
medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5

After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in
Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case,
docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.

During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the
San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that
time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well
with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they
got married.6

Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long.
In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father.
This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described
Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered.
Manuel's unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was
the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that
this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on
her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed
Manuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his
affection for a male caller.9 She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed
when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything.
At this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since
then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also
had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with
Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence;
it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty
arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital
relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by
Leonida came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him
was their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum
ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or
secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which
is situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence.17 In
other words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the
same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He
denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary
discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was
nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who
reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that
his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida
found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very
jealous and possessive nature.19
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the
company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further
misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories
about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus
narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips
to Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True,
they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But
there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida
allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident
occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home
from a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time,
except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by
presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989
and all its effects under the law null and void from the beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties
with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties'
children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right
afforded to defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the
children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its
finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of Judgment
in accordance thereto; and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and Manila City to
cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective
Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence
presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there is
more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally
incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in
this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract
exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when
homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample
remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or
Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the
biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a
homosexual and forces himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will
surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall
prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and
welfare of his own family.25
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course.
Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.26
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the
lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the
absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of
his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby
DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25,
2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Piñas City, in Civil Case
No. LP-00-0132. No costs.27
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the
extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the
appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision
rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a
mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary
appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction,
which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims
excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is not covered
by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of
jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the
CA the following errors:
I technical sense. The exception is that while the Rules are liberally
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN
VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands
of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30 This is to prevent the
party from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most
rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.31
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be
resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of
procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial
justice and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and
construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the
exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due
course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of
the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the
demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the
stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice
justice for technicality.36
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the
indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of
discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his
alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with
a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia
R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision
suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this
Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong
remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under
the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals
from judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for
review."40
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially
complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal.
xxx
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with
merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the
insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the
parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural
rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object
and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the
rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules.41 (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G.
Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari
instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of
justice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in
this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of
justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not
hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.43
(Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving
due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the
validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern
Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon.
While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is
an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather,
ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the
ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel
that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio,
repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice
of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment
rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence.
These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that
the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized
certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel
deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result
in outright deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the
interest of justice so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately,
the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the
loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's
grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on
the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. However,
where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of
duty, which resulted in the client's being held liable for damages in a
damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment
may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence
on their defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's
mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to parties
aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their
clients, of their day in court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With
more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the
sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of
giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's
action.50
The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government
Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.51 and
Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office
as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its
rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a
particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of
justice require it.53
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage,
not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his
marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations
of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at
all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case
under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic v.
Molina:54
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in
the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish
psychological incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to
demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts
generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to
prove that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of
fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage
between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue
of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is
smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant,
there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with certainty that
defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from
the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him
even including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference
(TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After
receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she
heard but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once
and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those
people but nothing happened after that. There may have been more
important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases
against and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon
reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant
for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the
end, only one thing is certain - even during his marriage with plaintiff, the
smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker,
reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid
family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent
and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is
meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded
bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing what clothes
or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented
apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to
the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February
2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips
plus the homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real sex
identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of
defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason
of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough
to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such
a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children
and family as a whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the
time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it
took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his
sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the
lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with
Leonida. The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of
his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.60 It is the
concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith
and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be
proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated
an exclusive list of circumstances61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per
se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the
provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however,
pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of "concealment," while
in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in
legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46,
the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested
that, for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage"
at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is
its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.64
Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is
constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed
to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for
divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one
of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond
between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to
the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her
that it would become impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife,
and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course
of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her
health.67
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines,
the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in
the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond
in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and
board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital
union for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida.
Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated
marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In
Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to
baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said
the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with
those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this
Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely
and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the
ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He
cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily
to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank.
Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to
keep himself out of harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to
believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they
were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have impregnated the
appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at
best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference
to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of
the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x
x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.69
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by
solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its
concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in
the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against
desecration by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy
their community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property,
provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and
enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both
spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime,
jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community
property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court
forfeited Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the
marriage is upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of
Manuel's share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the
joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Florencio Dumapias for appellant.
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. for appellee.
FELIX, J.:
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the case was dismissed.
The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said
Tribunal certified the case to the Court on the ground that there is
absolutely no question of fact involved, the motion being predicated on the
assumption as true of the very facts testified to by plaintiff-husband.
The facts of the case abridgedly stated are as follows: Benjamin Bugayong,
a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave.
Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who
later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July, 1951,
Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan,
Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in
a local college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from
Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and some from anonymous
writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged
acts of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to mention. On
cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by
letter, which she claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed
her. All these communications prompted him in October, 1951 to seek the
advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation
between him and his wife on account of the latter's alleged acts of
infidelity, and he was directed to consult instead the navy legal
department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his
wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, defendant's
godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of
Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and
lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the
plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife.
On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the
truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but
Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which
he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that
and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to
find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded
feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against his wife,
Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the
averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the
issues were joined and convinced that a reconciliation was not possible,
the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel
announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but after plaintiff-husband
finished testifying in his favor, counsel for the defendant orally moved for
the dismissal of the complaint, but the Court ordered him to file a written
motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following grounds: (1)
Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the commission of "acts
of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the same assumption,
the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That
the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to
render a valid judgment.
The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering
only the second ground of the motion to dismiss i. e., condonation,
ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion for reconsideration
filed by plaintiff was denied, the case was taken up for review to the Court
of Appeals, appellant's counsel maintaining that the lower court erred:
(a) In so prematurely dismissing the case;
(b) In finding that there were condonation on the part of plaintiff-
appellant; and
(c) In entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as
same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.
As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the Court
of Appeals certified the case to Superiority.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage for the
part of the husband as defined on the Penal Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became
cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred.
As the only reason of the lower Court for dismissing the action was the
alleged condonation of the charges of adultery that the plaintiff-husband
had preferred in the complaint against his wife, We will disregard the other
2 grounds of the motion to dismiss, as anyway they have not been raised in
appellant's assignment of errors.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground
for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585,
condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be
noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously
denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and
even if We were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, who
was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such
evidence with the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude
that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish
the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" preferred against the defendant. Certainly, the
letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law Valeriana
Polangco, which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's
infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters
which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according
to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by
one Eliong, whose identity was not established and which admission
defendant had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was
filed soon after plaintiff finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to
anything that can be relied upon.
But this is not a question at issue. In this appeal, We have to consider
plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that he really believed his
wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August,
1952, he went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife and after finding her
they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which
he says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about
her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose because his wife, instead of
answering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably
enraged for being subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate
her, though in vain. Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping with his
wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him,
amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts? In
the order appealed from, the Court a quo had the following to say on this
point:
In the hearing of the case, the plaintiff further testified as follows:
Q. Now Mr. Bugayong, you have filed this action for legal separation from
your wife. Please tell this Hon. Court why you want to separate from your
wife? — A. I came to know that my wife is committing adultery, I consulted
the chaplain and he told me to consult the legal adviser. (p. 11, t.s.n.)
Q. Did you finally locate her?--A. Four days later or on the fifth day since my
arrival she went to the house of our god-mother, and as a husband I went
to her to come along with me in our house but she refused. (p. 12,
t.s.n.)lawphil.net
Q. What happened next? — A. I persuaded her to come along with me. She
consented but I did not bring her home but brought her to the house of my
cousin Pedro Bugayong. (p. 12, t.s.n.)
Q. How long did you remain in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong?
— A. One day and one night. (p. 12. t.s.n.)
Q. That night when you stayed in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong
as husband and wife, did you slept together? — A. Yes, sir. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
Q. On the next night, when you slept in your own house, did you sleep
together also as husband and wife? — A. Yes, sir. (p. 19. t.s.n.)
Q. When was that? — A. That was in August, 1952. (p. 19 t.s.n.)
Q. How many nights did you sleep together as husband and wife? — A.
Only two nights. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
The New Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Art. 97, says:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part
of the husband as defined on the Penal Code.
and in its Art. 100 it says:lawphil.net
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot
be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially
those portions quoted above, clearly shows that there was a condonation
on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the
sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were
committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her
and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to
the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as
husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion
of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that
there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it has been held
that "condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of
the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely
consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual
intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent
should operate as a pardon of his wrong."
In Tiffany's Domestic and Family Relations, section 107 says:
Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground
for divorce and bars the right to a divorce. But it is on the condition,
implied by the law when not express, that the wrongdoer shall not again
commit the offense; and also that he shall thereafter treat the other
spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the
original offense as a ground for divorce. Condonation may be express or
implied.
It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of
the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the
husband'. (27 Corpus Juris Secundum, section 61 and cases cited therein).
In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal
provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the
inevitable conclusion is that the present action is untenable.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We
agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above
narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as
alleged the offended spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction of
Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation
with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the
knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will
amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption may
be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute
condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is
sufficient to constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
(27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue
to live together after it was known (Land vs. Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs.
Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery
(Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single night
(Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl. 401, citing Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185,
154 Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many others. The
resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally
be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living
together as husband and wife, especially as against the husband (Marsh vs.
Marsh, 14 N. J. Eq. 315).
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no
reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the decisions of the
various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred
in entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same
was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the
second ground of the motion to dismiss. It is true that it was filed after the
answer and after the hearing had been commenced, yet that motion serves
to supplement the averments of defendant's answer and to adjust the
issues to the testimony of plaintiff himself (section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court).
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by
certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case
for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff,
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order
was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased
plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and
to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation
against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married
civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that
they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband
cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street,
Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio
S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several
other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on
the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the
respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9
and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of
her death.

On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation" 1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102
of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the
case. 2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss
and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of
whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court
resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion
was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the
order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was
given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed
for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio,
filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below
dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by
praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition
for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz
marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute —
for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the
principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into
one for a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party
abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a
legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is
without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has
acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to
declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the
petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will
abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-
and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and
no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing
that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings
and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur cum
persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because
the marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the
death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81;
Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law,
and an action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of
effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal
nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has
settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived the
court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and
of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;
Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of
Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874;
Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80
Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717;
Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;
hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the
decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other,
but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal
community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article
176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of
said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor
of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be
revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned
by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and
by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not
a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the
actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property,
or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be
deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death
of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such
action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by
either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon
as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should
be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in
Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and
Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,
vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which
affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41,
Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein
respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002
which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong
(Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila.
They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now
all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under
Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked
by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William
quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago",
"tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head
against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his
hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children
or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at
different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she
tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s
decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William
slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995,
she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel
ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and
arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of
the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to
leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she
was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in
Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife,
used insulting language against her, or whipped the children with the
buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on
December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo,
Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their
office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman
told him that Lucita left the house.7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal
separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing
the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects
attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties are hereby
ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the
Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in
a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their
frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made both of their lives
miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said
that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had
regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and
had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their
children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats
and intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children.
In the process, insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The
plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical anguish of these
marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of
her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have
been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an
atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also
suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, "it would be
unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship,
abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children,
whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its
Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for
Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal
separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical violence
and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately
proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were
uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to show
that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear
that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her cheek, black eye
on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish
discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The
presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita]
herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate
also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate from the
doctor’s main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic]
the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the
cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart
from the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly
established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her
during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive
conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in front of their
customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo,"
tanga," and "you don’t know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim
who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister
after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the
latter on the same date. She was a witness to the kind of relationship her
sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She
observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and
becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that
William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and
deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to
bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and
her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by
[William], except by making a general denial thereof. Consequently, as
between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be
accorded to the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by
[Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his
treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are
enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of
[William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on
April 26, 2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE
PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE
SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S
CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the
case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging to the
conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in
Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during the
marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will
benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and siblings
while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a
wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among
the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have
been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that
factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the
findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical
violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established;
what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and
disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucita’s favorite son;
marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal
disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on
the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their
parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with
relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage, Lucita has not
complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their
marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive
respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the
conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint
properties; the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the
preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for
grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should
be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation
among the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues
raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts
rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a
trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of
William that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove
from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to
transfer the same to Lucita’s family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her
marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her
children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal
home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a
Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since respondent is
guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code.17 Petitioner argues that since
respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning
the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless
the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioner’s in-
laws, no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier
assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent
application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In
such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the
exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially
when they are borne out by the records or are based on substantial
evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA
and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that
there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life
miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and
for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the
instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their
children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita;24 threw
chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at
her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;27 pinned Lucita
against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed
the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in
disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda
and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft
letter on his table;29 got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin
prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then
slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang
pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the
December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave
the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995,
were not the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on
December 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because
before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I
suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts
to downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial
for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court
also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges enjoy the
unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled
that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to observe
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
William’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical
violence committed by him could not be given much credence by the
Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman
Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their livelihood, their
testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as
impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with
defendant and depends upon him for support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not
credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s
testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a witness’
relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity
of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed and straightforward
testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the
credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds that their
testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal
separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control of the
conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by
filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning
hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for
her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at the expense of her
marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for
legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the
courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of
relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her
children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond
her endurance.39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his
reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not
elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief
from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the
first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has
abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted,
following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.40 As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does
not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the
policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.41 The
Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect the same.42 With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family,
spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that
affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.43 As Lucita has
adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court
has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant
her the relief she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including
coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or

detention,[1] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto.[2] Slx

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,

commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time
and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do,
submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ
shall consider in that behalf."[3]

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great

object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause.[4] It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is
wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.[5]

The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio[6] is to reverse the decision[7] of the

Court of Appeals and its resolution[8] dismissing the application for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and
enforce consortium as the wife.

On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio[9] is to annul that

[G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000]
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
[G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000]
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio
visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of
Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

PARDO, J.: On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City.
On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon
Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia
(age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States,
he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The
children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother
gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a
consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo
City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She
alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioners demands to see and visit
her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is
hereby rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-
Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place,
his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora
Montemayor to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda
Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors
thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof;
xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled
and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject
of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person
is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.[15] Jksm
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.[16]
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint
of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.[18]
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86
years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical
condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no
unlawful restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his womans free choice.
wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that
he did not object to seeing them. WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack
of merit. No costs.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals
observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the
relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to
respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make
choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the SO ORDERED.
people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to
some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong
to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was
not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that
declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason
to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this
will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Es m

The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation

rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for
such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subjects sanity.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized
that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of
violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is
unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right
of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty
to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live

with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of
habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That
 Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and
Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on
November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben
Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one
(1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they
were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino,
one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to
Rosario and their children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was
in the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the
family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about
the death of her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested
that she delay the interment for a few days but her request was not
heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum
of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not
able to attend the interment.
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner, Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial
vs. Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary
TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be
ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents. exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial
Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
DECISION
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been
MENDOZA, J.: separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had introduced
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision1 and the May 9, her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living
2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the
which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of
Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill.
(Valino) was entitled to the remains of the decedent. She also claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and
dying, Rosario still left for the United States. According to Valino, it was
The Facts:
Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit
brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as
the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently
proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long
time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the
United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court
concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering
also that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of
a wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished
to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum.4
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the
transfer of the body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any
useful purpose and so he should be spared and respected.5 Decision of the
CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed
Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of
respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer,
transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the
Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the
legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased
husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199
of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that
the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to
make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was
still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with
Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-
year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of
respondents due to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the
deceased a decent burial when the wife and the family were in the United
States. All other claims for damages were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is
entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 1996 of the
Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a
relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support,
under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants,
the paternal shall have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294
and 305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate
duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate
liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein
below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial
shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient
means to pay the necessary expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply
confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members
of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,7 a petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers
and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr.,
alleging that the latter forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It
appearing that she already died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the petition for lack
of jurisdiction and claimed the right to bury the deceased, as the common-
law husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have
jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As
to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse"
having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-
law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a
community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court,
thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property)
stated: "Be it noted, however, that with respect to 'spouse,' the same must
be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
"spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said,
makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned
by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.
But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that
the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary
as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of
Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and
was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To
say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly,
her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like
any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative
of a free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While there was disaffection
between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still
alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than
not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family member joins
his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted
no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for
a few days so they could attend the service and view the remains of the
deceased. As soon as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the
morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the
respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial
Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should
nevertheless prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own
testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is
being relied upon heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park, no other evidence was presented to corroborate such
claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to
be buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes apparent
that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite.
Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the
law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No presumption can be
said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time
relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable
to bury her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right
to do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
the right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the
remains of her deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have
been exercised, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that end.
Should there be any doubt as to the true intent of the deceased, the law
favors the legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights
and obligations accorded to the legal wife was even bolstered by the fact
that she was joined by the children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be
buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result
remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of
the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of
the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the
family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the
"form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased.
As thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to
Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to
include the place of burial among those on which the wishes of the
deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an
eminent authority on civil law, commented that it is generally recognized
that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased should be established
by some form of testamentary disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides,
the wishes of the deceased must be expressly provided. It cannot be
inferred lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his
last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once more that other
than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino
family plot, no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with
respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must
not be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary
provisions concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether
as regards the time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the
ceremony to be observed.11 [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are
limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the
Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and
duty to make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-
one. As aptly explained by the appellate court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral
wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of
the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the
deceased to be interred at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants
the duty and the right to decide what to do with the remains to the wife, in
this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse,
and not to defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of
those legally preferred, despite the fact that her intentions may have been
very commendable. The law does not even consider the emotional fact
that husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact
and had been living apart for more than 30 years.12
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and
transferring the remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of
his remains in a place other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs
counter to the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right
provided by law, but it also disrespects the family because the remains of
the patriarch are buried in the family plot of his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and
for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its
final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the
memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family
right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the
corpse from third persons.13
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in
taking care of Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving him a
proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual
or moral damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-
appellee Fe Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was
separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-
being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his
remains when he had died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual
damages. Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in
giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and
family were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial.
Actual damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for,
loss or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be capable
of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty.
In this case at bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to justify
award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is
able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the
damages and its causal connection with the acts complained of because
moral damages although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed
not to impose a penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual
damages suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was
any intended by anyone in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other
hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Unfortunately,
neither of the requirements to sustain an award for either of these
damages would appear to have been adequately established by plaintiffs-
appellants.
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the
award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule,
and counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.
The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the
New Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have
searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that justifies the
award of attorney's fees.14
Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make
arrangements for the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the
bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity which
should prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such
controversies that the Code Commission saw it best to include the
provisions on "Funerals."15
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.