University of Batangas

2010 CIVIL LAW Reviewer

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

The FAMILY CODE was enacted AUGUST 3, 1988.

o Under ARTICLE 256, the Family Code may be given retroactive effect,
provided that it will not affect vested rights.

MARRIAGE

o SPECIAL CONTRACT. Why? No discretion to enter into any stipulation

except marriage settlement or property relations.

o MAYOR’s authority to solemnize marriage- only from Aug 3. 1988 to

DEC. 31, 1991

o Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation: If the wife remains a virgin after

being together with the husband for 3 years, the latter is presumed
impotent, and will have to present evidence to overcome this
presumption (Tompkins vs. Tompkins)

o Art. 76.The falsity in the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of the parties’ cohabitation, w/c would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that
the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath-if the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it
is but a mere scrap of paper, w/o force and effect. (Republic vs. Dayot,
435 SCRA 550)

o The five-year common law cohabitation period under Artcle 76 means

a five-year period copmuted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of a marriage (Republic vs. Dayot)

o A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage may be filed

by a party other than the husband or the wife. An intestate compulsory
heir to protect his successional rights, in a proceeding for the
settlement of the state of the deceased spouse, not ina proceeding for
declaration of nullity of the marriage. The new rule took effect on
March 15, 2003 and has prospective application (Juan de Dios Carlos
vs. Felicidad Sandoval, Dec. 16, 2008)

o Psychological Incapacity. While the examination by a physician of a

person in order to declare him/her psychologically incapacitated is not
required, the root cause thereof must be “medically or clinically
identified (Republic vs. Cabantug-Baguio)
o A spouse cannot recover damages from thr psychologically
incapacitated spouse.

o Inveterate and chronic lying and fantasizing impairs the capacity of the
liar to perform essential marital obligation, pre-existing and present at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, grave and incurable.

o Annulment/lack of cohabitation. Lack of cohabitation is not, per se, a

grounf for annulment of marriage. The failure to cohabit becomes
relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation or undue influence. (Villanueva vs CA, 505
SCRA 564)

o Res Judicata. Petitioner sought to declare void his marriage because of

psychological incapacity then later on lack of marriage license. There
was splitting cause of action which is prohibited. Petitioner is estopped
from claiming the absence of marriage license. (Mallion vs. Alcantara,
Oct. 31, 2006)

o Property Relation. In case the marriage is declared void ab initio, the

property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned is that of
equal co-ownership(Buenavantura vs. CA, 454 SCRA 261)

o A spouse may testify against the other spouse as an exception to the

rule on marital disqualification when the marital and domestic relations
are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved or
peace and tranquillity which may be disturbed. (Alvarez vs. Ramirez,
Oct. 14, 2005)

PROOF OF PATERNITY

o As to the nature and character of the entries contained in the parochial

books and the certificates thereof issued by a parish priest, the same
have not lost their character of being public documents for the purpose
of proving acts referred to therein , inasmuch as no law has ever been
encated abolishing the official and public character of parochial books
(Fidel vs. CA)

FAMILY HOME

o All existing family residences as of Aug. 3, 1988 (Family Code) are

considered family homes. Debts for w/c family home is made
answerable must have been incurred prior to that date (Kelley Jr vs.
Planters Products, Inc.)
 o The family home shall continue despite the death of one of the spouses
or of the unmarried head for 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court
finds compelling reasons thereof. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted family home. The rights of
the individual co-owner cannot subjugate the rights granted under
Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home.(Arriola vs. Arriola ,
Jan. 23, 2008)

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH

o The judgement declaring the presumptive death/absence of a spouse

under the Family Code is immediately final and executor by express
provision of law.

ADOPTION

o Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her

natural father to use, as her middle name her mother’s surname, the
Court finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. ( In the
matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA
541)

CHANGE OF FIRST NAME

o The local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over
petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name or
nickname. (Re: Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at RTC, Br.67
Paniqui, Tarlac, 537 SCRA 1)

o RA 9048 now governs the change of first name, and vests he power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. The intent and effect
of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103(Change of Name) and Rule 108( Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied- in sum, the remedy and proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial (Silverio vs.
Republic 537 SCRA 373)

o The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
A man who has undergone sex reassignment surgery cannot be allowed to
change first name and sex in his birth certificate. (Silverio vs. Republic)

PROPERTY

o Public Use has now been held to be synonymous with “Piublic

interest”, “public benefit”, “Public welfare”, and “public convenience”.
(Reyes vs. NHA, 365 SCRA 494)

o Where forcible entry was made clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive

period should be counted from the time the person deprived of
possession demanded that the deforciant desist from such
dispossession when the former learned thereof.
o The Doctrine of pari delicto is applicable to donation, as when the
motive and cause to behind the forgery in the execution of the Deed of
Donation and the Waiver of Possessory Rights, is the desire to evade
the payment of publication expenses and inheritance taxes.(Ramirez
vs. Ramirez, Mar. 17, 2006)

o A nuisance per se (in law) is an act, occupation or structure w/c

unquestionably is a nuisance at all times. It is subject to summary
abatement. Nuisance per accidens (in fact) is that w/c considered
nuisance by reason of circumstance. Location or surroundings. A
judicial process (notice and hearing) is needed before it can be abated.
The fact alone that a structure is illegal does not necessarily make it a
nuisance per se and does not justify its extrajudicial demolition.

CO-OWNERSHIP

o A co-owner may bring an ejectment action (including all actions to

recover possession) w/o joining the other co-owners. However, the
action must be instituted for all. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owner who are indispensable parties. (Adlawan vs. Adlawan,
479 SCRA 275)

OCCUPATION

o Art. 719. The lost movable can always be recovered from its finder and
the latter is entitled to a reward equivalent to 1/10 of the sum or price
of the thing if he complies with the procedural requirements of Article
719 of the NCC. If the finder does not comply with the requirements,
and appropriates for himself the movable property he found, he shall
be liable for the crime of theft, in which case the owner of the
movable can recover its possession w/o need of paying indemnity.

SUCCESSION

o A notarial will attested by only two witnesses is void (Lee vs. Tambago,
A.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008)

o A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the

testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public (Azuela vs. CA, April 12, 2006)

o Based on the Iron Curtain Rule, an illegitimate child has no right to

inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his
mother or father, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate children.

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

o In situations, which merely make the performance of the obligation
more burdensome w/o however, changing the terms of the contract,
there is no impairment (e.g. additional taxes are imposed)

o Martial law is not per se a fortuitous event. It is not the main cause of
the failure to comply with the obligation and hence does not constitute
a valid excuse for non-fulfillment of obligation despite financial
reverses.

o Oral Contract. To be a written contract, all the terms must be in

writing, so that a contract partly in writing and partly oral is in legal
effect an oral contract. (Ramos vs. Heruela, 473 SCRA 79)

o “Complementary-Contracts-Construed Together” doctrine- an

accessory contract must be read in its entirety and together with the
principal agreement. (Phil. Bank of Communications vs. Lim, 455 SCRA
714).

o Accion pauliana. The rescissory action to set aside contracts in fraud of

creditors, essentially a subsidiary remendy accorded under Article
1383 of the Civil Code which the party suffering damage can avail of
only when he has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
same. In effect, the provision applies only when the creditor cannot
recover in any other manner what is due him.(Union Bank vs. Ong, 491
SCRA 596, June 21, 2006)

o The unilateral determination and imposition of increased rates is

violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts ordained in Art. 1308
of the Civil Code. (New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. vs.PNB,
435 SCRA 565).

o Quasi-Contract. “Expectation interest”- interest in having the benefit of

his bargain by being put in a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed, “Reliance Interest”- being reimbursed for
loss caused by such reliance and “Restitution Interest”-having restored
to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.

o No amount of good faith can validate an otherwise void agreement.

Registration likewise cannot legitimize a void contract (Ballesteros vs.
Abion, Feb. 9, 2006)

o Where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the

simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract (relative
simulation), the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable
between the parties and their successors-in–interest(Valerio vs.
Refresca, Mar. 28, 2006)
o Purchase money resulting trust. Art. 1448. There is an implied trust
when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but
the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial
interest of the property.xxx elements(a) an actual payment of money,
property or services or an equivalent constituting valuable
consideration; (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged
beneficiary of a resulting trust (Comilang vs Burcena, Feb. 13, 2006)

o Offer inter praesentes- when the offeror has not fixed a period for the
offeree to accept the offer, and the offer is made to a person present,
the acceptance must be made immediately. (Malbarosa vs. CA, 402
SCRA 168)

o Promissory estoppel- may arise from the making of a promis, even

though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise
should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to
enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or
would result in other injustice. It presupposes existence of a promise
on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. The promis must
be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the court
can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promis
according to its terms. (NPC vs. Alonzo-Legasto, Nov. 22, 2004)

CONFLICT OF LAWS

o Lex loci contractus vs. Art. 2044 of the NCC sanctioning the validity of
mutually agreed arbitral clause and finality of arbitral awards. (Korea
Tech. Co. Ltd vs. Lerma, Jan. 7, 2008) ????

o Long arm statutes are statutes allowing the courts to exercise

jurisdiction when there are minimum contacts between the non-
resident defendant and the forum.

o Depecage refers to the situation where different aspects of a case

involving a foreign element may be governed by different systems of
law.

SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

o Blanket mortgage clause/Dragnet Clause. In American jurisprudence,

one which is specifically phrased to subsume all debts of past or future
origins, enabling the parties to provide continuous dealings, the nature
or extent of which may not be known or anticipated at the time, and
they avoid the expense and inconvenience of executing a new security
on each new transaction. (Union Bank of the Phil vs. CA, 471 SCRA
751)
o Reliance on the Security Test. When the mortgagor takes another loan
for which another security was given it could not be inferred that such
loan was made in reliance solely on the original security with the
“dragnet clause”, but rather, on the new security given. (Prudential
Bank vs. Alviar, July 28, 2005)

o Compensation. Petitioner Citibank was the creditor of respondent for

her outstanding

loans and respondent was the creditor of petitioner as far as her

deposit account was concerened since bank deposits, whether fixes,
savings, or current should be considered a simple loan or muttum, by
the depositor to the bank. Both debts consist in sum of money.
( Citibank vs. Sabeniano, 504 SCRA 378)

o In order that compensation may be proper, in addition to the requisites

under Art. 1279 – that over neither of them there be any retention or
controversy, commenced by third persons and communicated in due
time to the debtor.(BPI vs. CA, 490 SCRA 178, June 8, 2006)

o Failure to return the owner’s duplicate certificate of title after the

mortgage was released upon payment of the loan secure by it, is
breach of contract (Art. 1170NCC) and not quasi-delict (Art. 2176 NCC)
(Gsis vs. Sps. Gonzalo, Sept. 17, 2001)

o “Mortgagee in good faith” doctrine. Even if the mortgagor is not the

owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any
foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public
policy. (Llanto vs. Alzona, January 2005)

o Indivisibility of a real estate mortgage-the mortgage obligation cannot

be divided among the different lots, that is, each and every parcel
under mortgage answers for the totality of the debt.

o Independence Principle. Banks assume no liability or responsibility for

the form, sufficiency, accuracy, genuineness, falsification or legal
effect of any documents, or for the general and/or particular conditions
stipulated in the documents or superimposed thereon, nor do they
assume any liability or responsibility for the description, quantity,
weight, quality, condition, packing, delivery, value or existence of the
goods represented by any documents, or for the good faith or acts
and/or omissions, solvency, performance or standing of the consignor,
the carriers, or the insurers of the goods, or any other person
whomsoever.(Transfield Phils. Inc. vs. Luzon hydro Corp., Nov. 22,
2004)

SALES

o Tender of check. A mere tender of a check is sufficient to compel

redemption. (Biana vs. Gimenez, 469 SCRA 486)
 o Sale of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code w/o
the wife’s consent- VOIDABLE. However, the wife’s failure to file with
the court an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage
and w/n 10 years from the transaction shall render the sale valid.
(Villaranda vs. Villaranda, 423 SCRA 571)

o Perfection of Contract of Sale by public bidding is upon receipt of

notice of award by the bidder. (Caugma vs. People, April 7, 2006)

o A Memorandum of Agreement which provides an implicit agreement

that the seller retained ownership regardless of whether or not there
was delivery is a contract to sell and not a conditional sale. (Vidad Sr et
al vs. Sps. Tayamen, Aug. 24, 2007)

TORTS AND DAMAGES

o Doctrine of Charitable Immunity. Hospitals are not immune from

liability for damages in cases of negligence because now, these are
being run as businesses already unlike before that these are
considered as charitable institutions. PARTNERSHIP

PARTNERSHIP

o Massachusetts Trust. A business trust, w/c consists of a combination of

capital vested in trustees w/ a view to profit or the holders of evidence
of beneficial interest. Like partnership, it is also created for the
purpose of carrying on a business for profit. But unlike partnership, the
membership in the trust depends on the ownership of shares, w/c are
freely transferable. The death of the shareholder does not affect the
existence of the organization and management of the trust is
centralized and involves representative ownership.

LEASE

o The juridical relation between the parties in a lease, constrained by the

continued enjoyment of the leased premises, is one of implied lease
based on the principle of tacita reconduccion. The terms of the original
contract that are carried over to the implied new lease cover only
those terms that are germane to the lessees’ enjoyment of the
premises, such as the rent and terms of payment. (Guda vs. Leynes,
June 9, 2003)

RECENT CASES
2010 reviewer/prepared by: Fridah Lara De Leon/ Hadji Muria/ Vladimir Buensalida/ Carlo Mayo/ Carina
Kasilag/ Agnes Hernandez/ Renalyn Garcia/ Wyeth De Villa/
 Viola vs. Equitable Bank, G.R. 177886. November 27, 2008

Facts:Sps. Viola, as officers of Leo – Mers Commercial, Inc. obtained a loan from the
PCIB, now Equitable Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage over two parcels of
land. For failure to pay their outstanding obligation, Equitable extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were sold for P4,284,000.00 at
public auction to Equitable. Petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of foreclosure
sale, alleging that the foreclosure proceedings and auction sale were null and void
because the mortgage debt is only P2,224,073.31 on the principal obligation and
P1,456,137.36 on the interest, but the mortgaged properties were sold to satisfy an
inflated and erroneous principal obligation of P4,783,254.69, plus 3% penalty fee
per month or 33% per year and 15% interest per year, which amounted to
P14,024,623.22.

Issue: W/N the mrtgage contract also secured the penalty fee per month on the
outstanding amount as stipulated in the Credit Line Agreement.

Held: A mortgage must “sufficiently describe the sought to be secured, which description
must not be such as to mislead or deceive, and an obligation is not secured by a
mortgage unless it comes fairly within the terms of the mortgage. The provisions of
the mortgage contract do not specifically mention that, aside from the principal loan
obligation, it also secures the payment of a “penalty fee of 3% per month of the
outstanding amount to be computed from the ay deficiency is incurred up to the
date of full payment thereon” . In this case,the mortgage contract provides that it
secures notes and other evidences of indebtedness. Under the rule of ejusdem
generic, whre a description of things of a particular class or kind is accompanied by
words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a
kindred nature with those particularly enumerated.

Cantemprate vs. CRS Realty, G.R. No. 171300. May 8, 2009

Facts: Petitioners were among those who filed before the HLURB complaint for the
delivery of certificates of title against respondents. The complaint alleged that
respondent Casal was the owner of a parcel of land in cavite; that petitioners had
fully paid their agreed purchase prices; that despite demands respondent failed to
deliver title. An amended complaint alleged that by virtue of a deed of absolute sale
executed between respondent Casal and respondents Ang and Cuason, was issued
in the names of respondents Ang and Cuason as registered owners thereof. In
aswer, Casal acerred that despite his willingness to deliver them, petitioners refused
to accept the certificates of title with notice of lis pendens covering the subdivision
lots; that the obligation to deliver the certificate of titles without encumbrance fell on
respondent CRS Realty on the following grounds: 1) as stipulated in the subdivision
development agreement between respondents Casal and Crs Realty 2) the
contracts to sell were executed between petitioners and respondent CRS realty;
and 3) the monthly amortizations werepaid to respondent CRS Realty and not to
respondent Casal. Respondent Ang and Cuason claimed in their answer that
respondent Casal remained the registered owner of the undivided lots when they
were transferred to them and that the failure by petitioners to annotate their claims
on the title indicated that they were unfounded. HLURB ruled a) the regular courts
and not the HLURB had jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint, thus, the complaint
for quieting of title could not be given due course; b) the petition be dismissed due
to an earlier case. Notably, the Board referred to an earlier case involving
respondent Casal and the Heirs of Laudiza, where he Board deferred the issuance
of a license to sell in favor of CRS Farm Estate until the issue of ownership thereof
would be resolved in the regular courts.

Issue: W/N the absence of a license to sell has rendered the sales void; 2) W/N the
subsequent sale of respondent Cuason and Ang constitutes double sale; 3) W/N the
HLURB has jurisdiction over petitioners’ complaint
Held: 1) The only requisite for a contract of sale or contract to sell to exist in law is the
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and the price,
including the manner the price is to be paid by the vendee. Under Art1458 of the
NCC, in a contract of sale, whether absolute or conditional, one of the contracting
parties obliges himself to transfer the ownership of and deliver a determinate thing,
and the other to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. The failure
of respondent CRS Realty to obtain a license to sell the subdivision lots does not
render the sales void on that ground alone especially that the parties have impliedly
admitted that there was already a meeting of the minds as to the subject of the sale
and price of the contract. The absence of the license to sell only subjects
respondent CRS Realty and its officers civilly and criminally liable.

2) The remand of the instant case to the HLURB is in order so that the HLURB may
determine if the alleged subsequent sale to respondents ANg andCuason of those
lots initially to petitioners constituted a double sale and was tainted with fraud as
opposed to the respondents’ claim that only the unsold portions of the subdivision
property were sold to them.

3) The HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint for specific performance to
compel respondents to deliver to petitioners the certificates of title after full payment
of the subdivision lots. The HLURB ahs no jurisdiction over the issue of ownership,
possession or interest in the subject of the dispute because under Section19 of
BP129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. However
nothing prevents the hLURB from adjudicating on the issue of whether the alleged
subsequent sale of the subdivision lots to respondents Ang and Cuason constituted
a double sale because the issue is intimately related to petitioners’ complaint to
compel respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador to perform their obligation
under the contracts to sell. Considering that the alleged subsequent sale to
respondents Ang and Cuason apparently would constitute a breach of respondents’
obligation to issue the certififcate of title to petitioners, f not an unsound business
practice punishable under Setion1 of PD No. 1344, the HLURB cannot shirk from its
mandate to enforce the laws for the protection of subdivision buyers.

HUMAN RELATIONS

Abuse of Right

In DART PHILS. INC. VS, SPS. CALOGCOG, G.R. No. 149241, August 24, 2009 ,
there was a distributorship agreement between the parties which was extended
after its expiration. There was a notice of second audit review of its accounts but
there was refusal of the party, hence, the principal accepted respondent’s purchase
orders on rpe – paid basis. Prior to this, the principal found out that there were
violations committed on the distributorship agreement, hence, there was a written
commitment to comply with the agreement, signed by the respondent. Before the
expiration of the distributorship agreement as extended, the respondents filed for
Damages with application for TRO and Injunction alleging that there was abuse of
right when it caused the audit of their account and when it only honored their orders
if they were pre – paid and when it refused to renew the dealership agreement. The
RTC ruled that the second audit was unreasonable and was merely intended to
harass the respondents and that the shift from credit to pre – paid basis in the
purchases and the refusal to renew were pieces of evidence of bad faith of
petitioner. The CA affirmed the decision. Is the judgment correct?

Held: No. Bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of petitioner. Petitioner’s exercise of
its rights under the agreement to conduct an audit, to vary the manner of processing
purchase orders, and to refuse the renewal of the agreement was supported by
legitimate reasons, principally, to protect its own business. The exercise of its rights
was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to injure
or prejudice respondents. The rights exercised were all in accord with the terms and
conditions of the distributorship agreement, which ahs the force of law between
them. Clearly, petitioner could not be said to have committed an abuse of its rights.
 It may not be amiss to state at this juncture that a complaint based on Article 19 of
the CC must necessarily fail if it has nothing to support it but innuendos and
conjectures. (Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259. feb.28, 2005)

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

In REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V.CA, ET.AL., G.R. NO160379. August 14, 2009
a property consisting of 663 sq.meters was taken by the government for the
construction of the Osmena Street in CDO city. At least 297 sq. meters of the lot
was not occupied, but the owner sought for consequential damages because of the
impairment of its value. The State, however, contended that it was not laible as
there was no taking of the same. To award the same would result in unjust
enrichment. Is the contention correct?

Held: No An Award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount
to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust enrichment “when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience.” (Benguet Corp v. DENR – Mine Adjudication Board, G.R.No.
160101, feb.13, 2008). Article22 of the CC provides that “every person who through
an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or lega ground,
shall return the same to him”. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who
will benefit has a valid claim to uch benefit. Consequential damages are awarded if
as a result of the expropriation the remaining property of the owner suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value. Thus, there is valid basis for the grant of
consequential damages to the property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result
therefrom

UNSIGNED AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE FATHER IS SUFFICENT EVIDENCE OF

FILIATION

In JENIE SAN JUAN DE LA CRUZ AND CHRISTIAN DE AL CRUZ “AQUINO”, ETC.

VS. Garcia, G.R. No.177728. July 31, 2009 the court held that Article 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his / her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his
offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an
admission made in public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made
in any of these documents is, I itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. (De
Jesus v. Estae of Juan Dizon, G.R. No.142877, October 2, 2001) In the case,
however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique’s autobiography,
though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. First,
Dominique died 2 months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in
the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten y Dominique, correspond to the
facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie (the common – law wife) proferred.
Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominique’s father and testimony of his brother whose hereditary rights could be
affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his
statements in his Autobiography.

CONSENT OF THE SPOUSE NECESSARY IN ADOPTION

In the case of IN RE PETITION FRO ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LLIM AND

MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM MONINA LIM, PETITIONER, G,R. NOS. 168992 – 93. May
21, 1009 , the court held that the husband and the wife should have jointly filed the
petition for adoption. The principle of dura lex sedlex is applicable as the alw is
explicit that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt. The law is clear. There is no
room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time of the petitions for
sdoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filde
only by petitioner herself, without joining her husbandd, the TC was correct in
 denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. The fact that her husband gave
his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice.
There are certain requirements that her husband must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section7 of RA 8552 such as: 1)
he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Phillippines; 2)he must have been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; 3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; 4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; 5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during
the trial.

REVERSION OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

MENESES, ET AL. V. SPS. VELASCO, ET.AL., G.R. NO. 164024. January 29.2009

In all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon, the Republic of the Philippines is the real party – in –
interest. The action shall be instituted by the Solicitor Genera or the officer acting in
his stead, in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover, such action does
not prscribe. Prescription and laches will not bear actions filed by the State to
recover its property acquired through fraud by private individuals.

Action for quieting of TITLE IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE IF PLAINTIFF IS IN POSSESSION

DBT MAR – BAY CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS. PANES, ET. AL., G.R. NO.167232.July
31, 2009

It is well – entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation
of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Herein respondent’s claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject
property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the CC, the acquisitive prescription of
ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by
special laws. Correlatively, Act No.496, as amended by PD 1529, provides that no
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired
by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by
the respondent is immaterial and inconsequential. There was no ample proof that
DBT participated in the alleged fraud. To add, DBT is an innocent purchaser for
value and good faith which, through a daccion en pago duly entered into with B.C,.
Regalado, acquired ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be
protected under Section 32 of PD1529.