Case no.

8
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS
267 SCRA 408, February 3. 1997

Nature: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Petition on prohibition and mandamus

SC Ruling: Wherefore, respondents are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of
petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation

Legal doctrine: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) held a public bidding of the 30% to 51%
shares of the MHC. Only 2 bidders participated, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter, petitioner sent a manager's
check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to
accept.
Perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
The Petitioners contest that Art. XII, Sec. 10, Par. 2, of the 1987 constitution is applicable to
them since that such hotel is a part of the national economy and patrimony.
- submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.

- 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.
 The Respondents, however, say otherwise, and that such provision is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislations.
- Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea,
and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution.
-Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional
provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Issue:

WON The 51% of the shares of the MHC should be awarded to the foreign firm (NO)
WON Article XII Section 10 par. 2 is a self-executing provision. (Yes)
WON MH forms part of the National Patrimony. (YES)
Ruling:

1. Under Art. XII, Sec. 10, Par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution, is states that: “In the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos.” Doctrine of constitutional supremacy: if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect.

It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts must conform with the
fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning
to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither
be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

Foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails
to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987
Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced.
 Case no. 9

DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER, SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987

Nature of the Case: Instant petition for Prohibition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their
salaries.

SC Ruling: The instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Facts:

The petitioners, duly appointed and qualified Judges, submit that "any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that:

“The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of
lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased”.

In other words, by deducting withholding taxes, the judges asserted that their salaries are being
decreased, citing Perfecto vs. Meer and Dencia vs. David as their legal basis which declared the
salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such
payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office.

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response
to representations that the Court direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from
salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the
Chief Justice's directive that: “the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the Fiscal
Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the deduction of the withholding
taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all
other members of the judiciary.” However, with the filing of this petition, the Court has deemed it
best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial pronouncement.

Petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution
"of salaries of judicial officers.

Issue:

WON members of the judiciary are subject to payment of income tax. YES

Ruling:

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers.

Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again
reproduced hereunder:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied).

It is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are
receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed
after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from
taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income
tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs.
Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded.

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

ADDITIONAL INFO:

A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935 Constitution provided:

... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts) shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office ... (Emphasis supplied).

Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:

The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court, and of
judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not be decreased during their
continuance in office. ... (Emphasis ours).

And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973 Constitution specifically
stipulated:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional
officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax.

The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
 The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of
judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall
not be decreased. 4 (Emphasis supplied).

The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of the 1973
Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original
concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII, negate
such contention.

The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:

Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office,
their salary shall not be diminished nor subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of _____________
and each Associate Justice ______________ pesos. (Emphasis ours)
 Case no. 10

G.R. No. 186400 : October 20, 2010

CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, v. DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.

NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

SC Ruling: DENIED

Legal Doctrine: Cardinal rule in statutory construction, Plain-meaning Rule or Verba-

Legis

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review
of the December 10, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and
Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing
the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory.

On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the
Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006.

In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for
Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation
of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages.

On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise
denied.

On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision
final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.

Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children.

The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC.
The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a
prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code
took effect.

It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli the effect that the
"coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988."

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

Section 1 of the Rule reads: Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Petitioner’s Contention:

A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY

OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE
TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE.

ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE

THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO
THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."
NOTE: In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both. The Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988.

Respondent’s Contention:

The requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

ISSUES:

WON A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE

THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE.

WON THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS
TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES."

RULING:

1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code
which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
2. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase
"under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than
to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is
the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there
should be no departure."

ADDITIONAL:

The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion
for reconsideration is non-extendible.

In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of
marriage.

No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution.
This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its
permanence and inviolability
 Case no. 11

[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L.

YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian

Reform, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO
F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL., Respondents.
(Landbank Vs. Court of Appeals)

Nature of the case: Petition for motion for reconsideration

Legal doctrine: Verba legis, plain meaning rule “When the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for
application.”
SC Ruling: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners’ motions for reconsideration are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Facts:
Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on October 6,
1995, petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), filed their respective motions for reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the
Court’s conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is
sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. Moreover, it is argued that there is
no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting
landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties.

Petitioner DAR, maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657,
absent any specific indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or
involuntary (necessary) or other forms known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the
general rule, deemed complying."
Issue: Whether or not the opening of trust accounts in favor of the rejecting landowners is
sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657
Ruling:
The court rejected the petitioner’s contention
Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made
as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds”ch
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds of issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
.anrobles.com.ph

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an
expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the
coverage of term "deposit."

Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only
for application. 3 Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts
as a mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said
provision and is therefore impermissible.
 Case no. 12
G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of
Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID HAGEDORN,
PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding
Officer Punong Bgy. EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS
ABALLA, JR. respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. 154683 November 12, 2002
VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
-----------------------------
G.R. Nos. 155083-84 November 12, 2002
MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by
COMELEC inr elation to the 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.
LEGAL DOCTRINE:
Interpretation of three –term limit; The established rules is that the winner in the recall
election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for the purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s term.
SC RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 24, 2002
enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall
election of September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
FACTS
 Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for
three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. He did not run in
2001 election due to the three-term limit rule, in which Victorino Dennis Socrates run and
eventually won.
 However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings. On July 2, 2002, 312
out of 528 members of barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA), by which Mark David Hagedorn is the interim chair.
PRA passed a resolution which declares loss of confidence in Socrates and called for
his recall. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
  Petitioners filed a petition to COMELEC praying for the disqualification of Hagedorn.
Petitioners argued that Hagedorn is disqualified for a fourth consecutive term, having
been elected and having been served as mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election of the same post
 COMELEC denied the petition, affirmed the resolution that Hagedorn is qualified to run
in the recall election. Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the private respondent was qualified to run for mayor in the contested
election. (YES)
2. Whether or not Edward Hagedorn’s victory in the recall election constitutes a fourth term.
(NO)

HELD:
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected."

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity
of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

Since there is an ambiguity regarding the definition of three-term limit, we have to know the
intent of the framers of the Constitution by referring to the extrinsic aid, which is the Journal of the
Constitutional Commission.
 The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the
term of elective local officials:

"MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to
the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and local officials,
namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2)
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms)."

The framers of the Constitution used the same "no immediate reelection" question in voting
for the term limits of Senators and Representatives of the House.

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection
for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run
in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution
prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission evidently
show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate
reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election.

From the end of his third term in June 30, 2001 until September 24, 2002, Hagedorn was
simply a private citizen. His new recall term from Sept. 24, 2002-June 30, 2004 is not a
seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch
together Hagedorn’s previous three terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a
fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of his
service as mayor. The established rule is that the winner in the recall election cannot be
charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective official’s term.
Case no. 13
 Case no. 14
MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 189600. 622 SCRA 593, June 29, 2010

Case Nature: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.Election Law/Party-List System/Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation.

SC Decision: The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No.
09-130 dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET
ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the
House of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
Legal Doctrine: A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application.
Facts of the case: Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009
and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo
Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
(private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives
In her Petition for Quo Warranto seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner alleged
that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
He was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing
of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age
limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act and his change of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007
elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
HRET, the public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, dismissed petitioner’s Petition for
Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC
had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007.
Respecting the age qualification for youth sectoral nominees under Section 9 of RA No. 7941,
public respondent held that it applied only to those nominated as such during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party
is thereafter registered exclusively as representing the youth sector, which CIBAC, a
multisectoral organization, is not.
In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section 15 of RA No. 7941
did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.

Issue: Whether private respondent Villanueva is eligible to hold office as a member of the
House of Representatives representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
Ruling: No. The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either
the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007
elections due to the following considerations:
1. The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in
May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975. Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007, public respondent
itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC’s overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.

2. As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least
be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election,
so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be
a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, Party-List
System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative
seats. Also, Section 15 of RA No. 7941 clearly states a nominee who changes his
sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new
sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections.

3. As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the
first three congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this
interpretation, the last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two
months after the law was enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and
could not have been the objective of RA No. 7941. There is likewise no rhyme or reason
in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third congressional term from the
ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of RA No. 7941 would
apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth sector.
This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubilex non
distinguitnecnosdistinguiredebemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not
distinguish

Therefore, he is not eligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives

representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
 Case no. 15

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Nature: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the
subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by
law.

Supreme Court Ruling: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Legal Doctrine: The court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well
settled principles of constitutional construction. The word used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Facts:
The power of judicial review extends to the rule making power of the Congress where said
rule contravenes the mandate of the Constitution. Pursuant to the mandate of Section 3 (8) of
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted
and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings. Section 16 Rule V of the
House Rule provides that, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General while Section
17 Rule V states, Within a period of one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can
be initiated against the same official.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On June 2, 2003,
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first complaint),
endorsed by some of the members of the House of Representatives against then Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. (Davide, Jr.) and seven other associate justices. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance
with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on
October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was dismissed for being insufficient in
substance, hence, the Committee Report was never sent to the House in plenary.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on
October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, A second
impeachment complaint signed by at least one third (1/3) of the members of the House of
Representatives was filed with the Secretary General of the House of Representatives by Gilbert
Teodoro et al., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year." Likewise, it prayed that the
House Resolution infringes the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On the other hand, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion
was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but
it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Respondent members of the House of Representatives claims that section 16 and 17 of Rule V
of the House Impeachment Rules did not violates Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present
Constitution, contending that the term initiate does not mean to file and concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could
not have been violated as the impeachment complaint had not been initiated as the House of
Representative. Hence, the first complaint was not really filed.
Respondent intervenors Senator Franklin Drilon (Drilon) and Atty. Jaime Soriano, et. al.
filed a Manifestation and Petitions for Intervention asserting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
hear, prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, a co-equal and independent branch from
performing its mandate of initiating impeachment cases and that there is no justiciable issue and
the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination. The motions for intervention were
granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition
in Intervention were admitted.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings
2. Whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled
3. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint is constitutional.
4. Whether or not the second impeachment complaint is valid?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
This Court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government
in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: Judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system
of checks and balances. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
Even in the American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities
cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate’s “sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases,” as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution,
is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to
check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably
support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial
power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. While the
power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was
given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

2. Yes. The essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled. As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
 also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in
the executive and legislative departments of the government. Upon the other hand, the
Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest and transcendental importance and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them. Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical
reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing. While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us
asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession
which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.

3. Yes. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term “initiate” does not
mean “to file;” that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a
collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean “to file. Respondent House of Representatives concludes
that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Following the principle
of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term “cases” must be distinguished from the term
“proceedings.” An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the
Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all
its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
“exclusive power” to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. On the
other hand, proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House
of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee
which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
 House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House “initiates an impeachment case.”
Thus, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred
to the Committee on Justice for action. To the argument that only the House of
Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1)
says “The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment,” This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of
reddendo singula singulis by equating “impeachment cases” with “impeachment
proceeding.” Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, “No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year,” it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is
clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules
governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has
absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. Clearly,
its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. If as
alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would, by necessary
implication, have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need
of referendum. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3)
by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since
the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. The
provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state
that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3)
by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of
the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give
the term “initiate” a meaning different from “filing.” Therefore, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule
V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
4. No. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon,
 the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine,
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
 Case no. 16

G.R. No. L-21064 February 18, 1970

J.M. TUASON and CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,

vs.
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents-appellants.

Nature: Special civil action for prohibition to nullify a legislative act directing the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate, Quezon City.

Supreme Court Ruling: The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No.
2616 as amended by Republic Act No. 3453 is unconstitutional is reversed. The writ of prohibition suit is
denied, and the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court set aside. With costs against petitioner.

Legal Doctrine: The words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to
be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say.

Facts:

In the leading case of Guido v. Rural Progress, this Supreme Court in passing upon the scope of
the power of the President conferred by statute to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through
purchase or expropriation, and to subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable
prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants had occasion to
delineate the contours of the above constitutional provision, reconciling the undoubtedly broad grant of
constitutional authority to Congress with the right of property that might be adversely affected by its
exercise. The prevailing opinion in the later case Republic v. Baylosis 5 tilted the balance in favor of
property. This is the case cited by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City to rule for Tuason.

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616 took effect without executive approval, provided the
expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City jointly owned by the J. M. Tuason and Company, Inc.,
Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, et al., is hereby authorized. As noted in the
appealed decision,The lands involved in this action, to which Republic Act No. 2616 refer and which
constitute a certain portion of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, have a total area of about 109 hectares
and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 42774 and 49235 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
(Quezon City) registered in the name of petitioner.

On Nov 15, 1960, respondent Land Tenure Administration was directed by the then Executive
Secretary to institute the proceeding for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. And on Nov 17, 1960 the
petitioner J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed in CFI QC a special action for prohibition with preliminary injunction
against respondents praying that the above act be declared unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile a
preliminary injunction to restrain respondents from instituting such expropriation proceeding, to be made
permanent after trial. The next day, on November 18, 1960, the lower court granted the prayer for the
preliminary injunction upon the filing of a P20,000.00 bond. After trial, the lower court promulgated its
decision on January 10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as amended is unconstitutional and
granting the writ of prohibition prayed for.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the special proceeding for prohibition is actually a suit against the State, which is
not allowed without its consent and assuming that the suit could proceed.
2. Whether or not the Executive Secretary, as the real party in interest, ought to have been impleaded.
3. Whether or not the RA 2616 as amended is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

1. No. The government is the adverse party and that therefore must consent to its being sued certainly
is far from persuasive. As was held by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, speaking through Justice Laurel, the power of judicial review is granted, if not
expressly, at least by clear implication from the relevant provisions of the Constitution. This power
may be exercised when the party adversely affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a
municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate suit to test its validity. The special civil
action of prohibition has been relied upon precisely to restrain the enforcement of what is alleged
to be an unconstitutional statute. As it is a fundamental postulate that the Constitution as the
supreme law is binding on all governmental agencies, failure to observe the limitations found
therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of the nullity of the governmental measure
challenged.

2. No. For the purpose of thus obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity, it is enough if the respondents
or defendants named be the government officials who would give operation and effect to official
action allegedly hinted with unconstitutionality. As it cannot be denied that in 1959 the then Land
Tenure Administration as well as the Solicitor General were called upon to enforce the statute now
assailed, it would appear clear that the insistence on the Executive Secretary being made a party
lacks support in law.

3. No. The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963 holding that Republic Act No. 2616 as
amended by Republic Act No. 3453 is unconstitutional is reversed. The writ of prohibition suit is
denied, and the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court set aside. With costs against
petitioner. And for the purpose of deciding the question of validity, a further inquiry into the scope
of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into
small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals is indicated, if for no other purpose than to attain a
greater degree of clarity. The question is then of constitutional construction. The primary task is
one of ascertaining and thereafter assuring the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. Look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain
that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. It does not admit of doubt that the
congressional power thus conferred is far from limited. Power of expropriation rests solely to the
legislative. The judiciary in the discharge of its task to enforce constitutional commands and
prohibitions is denied the prerogative of curtailing its well-nigh all-embracing sweep.

Reference to the historical basis of this provision as reflected in the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, two of the extrinsic aids to construction along with the contemporaneous
understanding and the consideration of the consequences that flow from the interpretation under
consideration, yields additional light on the matter. The opinion of Justice Tuason, in the Guido
case did precisely that. It cited the speech of delegate Miguel Cuaderno, who, in speaking of large
estates and trusts in perpetuity, stated that there has been an impairment of public tranquillity, and
to be sure a continuous impairment of it, because of the existence of these conflicts. He argued
that large estates are evil and disrupts domestic tranquility. Thus it became the duty of the drafters
of the Constitution to prohibit the ownership of large estates and make it the duty of the government
to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through
expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the Constitutions of Mexico and
Jugoslavia. This is not to say that such an appeal to history as disclosed by what could be accepted
as the pronouncement that did influence the delegates to vote for such a grant of power could be
utilized to restrict the scope thereof, considering the language employed. For what could be
expropriated are "lands," not "landed estates." It is well to recall what Justice Laurel would impress
on us, "historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. The social and economic
conditions are not static. To identify the text of a written constitution with the circumstances that
inspired its inclusion may render it incapable of being responsive to future needs. It could thus be
said of our Constitution as of the US Constitution, to borrow from C.J. Marshall's pronouncement
in M'Culloch v. Maryland it is "intended to endure for ages to come and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crisis of human affairs." The text of the constitutional provision in question, its
historical background as noted in pronouncements in the Constitutional Convention and the
inexonerable need for the Constitution to have the capacity for growth and ever be adaptable to
changing social and economic conditions all argue against its restrictive construction.

In the Baylosis Case of J.B.L. Reyes and Chief Justice Paras, the propriety of exercising the power
of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely
quantitative or area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of
landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and
peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a considerable
number of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major
problem before taking remedial action." As to the role of the courts in the appraisal of the
congressional implementation of such a power, he had this to say: "The Constitution considered
the small individual land tenure to be so important to the maintenance of peace and order and to
the promotion of progress and the general welfare that it not only provided for the expropriation and
subdivision of lands but also opened the way for the limitation of private landholdings (Art. XIII,
section 3). It is not for this Court to judge the worth of these and other social and economic policies
expressed by the Constitution; our duty is to conform to such policies and not to block their
realization." This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to
emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel
referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety
of its provisions" although not extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to
property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law
as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects the
doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed
to be enjoyed by the property owner.
There also need be no fear that such constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is without
limit. As in the case of the more general provision on eminent domain, there is the explicit
requirement of the payment of just compensation. The failure to meet the exacting standard of due
process would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of this congressional power, it is
obvious then that a landowner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is
primarily the equal protection guaranty though that petitioner's case is made to rest those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given
to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. We start of course with
the presumption of validity, the doubts being resolved in favor of the challenged enactment. It is
precisely because the challenged statute applies only to petitioner that he could assert a denial of
equal protection. As set forth in its brief: "Republic Act No. 2616 is directed solely against appellee
and for this reason violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As this is the first statute of its kind assailed, SC did not stop inquiry there. The occasion that called
for such legislation, if known, goes far in meeting any serious constitutional objection raised. The
Supreme Court turned to the Explanatory Note of the bill, which was enacted into the challenged
statute. It started with the declaration that it provides for the "expropriation of the Tatalon Estate,
Quezon City, and for the sale at cost of the lots therein to their present bona fide occupants,
authorizing therefor the appropriation of ten million pesos." Then it continued: "The Tatalon Estate
has an area of more than ninety six hectares and the lots therein are at present occupied by no
less than one thousand five hundred heads of families, most of whom are veterans of World War
II. It is the earnest desire of this group of patriotic and loyal citizens to purchase the lots at a
minimum cost." Why there was such a need for expropriation was next taken up: "The population
of Quezon City has considerably increased. This increase in population is posing a serious housing
problem to city residents. This bill will not only solve the problem but will also implement the land-
for-the-landless program of the present Administration." Thus there is a vital point which should
have great weight in the decision of this case. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent Congress in
view of the public funds at its disposal to follow a system of priorities. It could thus determine what
lands would first be the subject of expropriation. This it did under the challenged legislative act. In
the course of the expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a judicial determination
as to the party entitled to the just compensation. As of now then, such a question would appear at
the very least to be premature. What appears undeniable is that in the light of the broad grant of
congressional power so apparent from the text of the constitutional provision, the historical
background as made clear during the deliberation for the Constitutional Convention, and the
cardinal postulate underlying constitutional construction that its provisions are not to be interpreted
to preclude their being responsive to future needs, the fundamental law being intended to govern
the life of a nation as it unfolds through the ages, the challenged statute can survive the test of
validity.
 Case no. 17
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as
Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, as
Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment;
LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of
National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as
Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science
and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE
ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary
of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication;
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head
of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.

Case Nature: Petition for Review of the Order of the Secretary

SC Ruling: Executive Order (EO) 284 is hereby declared null and void, Petition Granted. The
court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense
Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget
Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein
defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and
academic as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of.

Jurisprudence: ratio legis est anima

Facts : Petitioners are contesting the constitutionality of EO 284 which says: "Even if allowed by
law or by ordinary function of his position, a member of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants maty hold not more than two positions in the Government and Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations. According to them, it violates the provision found on Article VII,
Sec. 13, of the 1987 Constitution which says: The President, Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants shall not unless otherwise provided in the Constitution
hold any other office or employment during tenure. They further contend that this provision
expressly prohibits an appointed official to hold multiple positions with the exception of the Vice-
President, who may be appointed as Cabinet Member (Sec. 3, Par. 2, Article VII) and the
Justice Secretary (Sec. 8, Article VIII).

However, respondents insist that the term unless otherwise provided in the constitution should
be read together with Sec. 7, Par. 2, Article IX-B which says: Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Issues:

Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional and should be considered null and void? (YES)

Ruling:

The court held that a foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the
history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was
framed.

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members
of the governing bodies or boards of various Government Agencies and Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations became prevalent during the time of President Ferdinand Marcos.
This would led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. And then would lead to the blatant betrayal of public trust evolved
into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime.

It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the
people of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to give assurance that the scandalous practice
of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and collecting unconscionably
excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued and also impose a stricter Prohibition
on the President and his officials in so far as the holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.

Restricting the number of position that Cabinet members, undersecretaries, or assistant

secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the
government allows them to hold multiple offices and employment in the direct contravention of
the express mandate of Sec. Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
 Case no. 18

G.R. No. L-2007 January 31, 1949

WILLIAM CHIONGBIAN, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO DE LEON, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, JOSE GALLOFIN, in
his capacity as Collector of Customs of the Port of Cebu, and VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, in
his capacity as General Manager of the Philippine Shipping Administration, respondents:
PHILIPPINE SHIPOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, intervenor.

NATURE: Petition seeking to permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from

cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner's vessels, and respondent Philippine Shipping
Administration from rescinding the sale of three vessels to petitioner. The primary basis for
respondents' and intervenor's acts is the allegation that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen
and therefore not qualified by law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry.

SC RULING: The issuance of the writ of prohibition is granted and respondent Customs
officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration certificates of petitioner's vessels
and respondent Philippine Administration is hereby enjoined from rescinding the sale of the
three vessels made to petitioner.

LEGAL DOCTRINE: Ut magis valeat quam pereat

FACTS:

In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and father of the herein petitioner William
Chiongbian, was elected to and held the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
Occidental Misamis. This fact is sufficiently established by the evidence submitted to this Court;
by the findings of the National Bureau of Investigation cited in Opinion No. 27, s. 1948, of the
Secretary of Justice; and as admitted by respondents in their pleadings. It is also shown and
admitted that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, petitioner William Chiongbian was
still a minor.

It is conclusive that upon the adoption of the Constitution, Victoriano Chiongbian, father of
herein petitioner, having been elected to a public office in the Philippines before the adoption of
the Constitution, became a Filipino citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of the
Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a
Filipino citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the Constitution, his father having
become a Filipino citizen upon the adoption of said Constitution. This is also in conformity with
the settled rule of our jurisprudence that a legitimate minor child follows the citizenship of his
father.

It is argued by respondents that this privilege of citizenship granted by Subsection 2 (Article IV,
Constitution) is strictly personal and does not extend to the children of the grantee. In support of
this contention they offer two principal arguments. Firstly, that this subsection was adopted by
the Constitutional Convention merely to grant Filipino citizenship to Delegate Caram and thus
obviate the possibility of a non-Filipino signing the Constitution as one of its framers. Secondly,
it is argued that the original draft of said subsection 2 contained the phrase "and their
descendants," which was deleted from the final draft, thus showing that this privilege of
citizenship was intended to be strictly personal to the one who had been elected to a public
office and did not extend to his descendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen. (YES)

RULING:

Yes, because the petitioner, aside from the fact that he was a minor at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution, follows the citizenship of his father who having been elected to public office
before the adoption of the said Constitution became a Filipino citizen as provided by the same
(Art. IV, 1987 Constitution).

Article IV of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SEC. 2. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Respondents' allegation that the petitioner violated the contract of sale with the Philippine
Shipping Administration on the ground of misrepresentation, petitioner having alleged in said
contract that his father was a naturalized Filipino, is without merit. Such was not a deliberate
misrepresentation but an error. which any person not versed in the law is prone to commit. It is
clear that petitioner merely meant that his father was a Filipino citizen by operation of law and
not by birth.

In view of all the foregoing, the petition for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is hereby
granted and respondent Customs officials are hereby enjoined from cancelling the registration
certificates of petitioner's vessels and respondent Philippine Administration is hereby enjoined
from rescinding the sale of the three vessels made to petitioner. No costs.
 Case no. 19

G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY,
and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

CASE NATURE : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari
and Prohibition

RULING : WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby
DISMISSED.

LEGAL DOCTRINE/TOPIC : Literal Construction of the Constitution

Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution

FACTS:

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent
Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner
by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines
in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the
PNP Chief.3 In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and
order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including
increased police patrols.

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such
time when the situation shall have improved.

On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to
annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional, arguing that:

I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY,

EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF
ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY

IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN
DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE

MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

II

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS

UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD
REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.10

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of the act of the President in
deploying the Marines, contending, among others, that:

1. Petitioner has no legal standing;

2. That the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the
same involves a political question;
3. That the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of
one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution.

ISSUES:

The issues raised in the present petition are:

(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

(2) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed
forces is subject to judicial review; and,

(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of
the PNP.

RULING:

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged.13 The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.14

In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other
basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule
of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial
interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-
A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.

Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition,
has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has
sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual determination of the President of
the necessity of calling the armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in visibility
patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the deployment of the military personnel falls under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, specifically, the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.

We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to
review by the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.

The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that "(T)he Judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."25 Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with
the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.26 Moreover,
the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. 27 When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned.28
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear
from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot
be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of
the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity
of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s
decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden
as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s
duty of "purposeful hesitation"32 before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.

Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all
its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension,
which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action
to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters.33 That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter says, i.e., that
the power to call is fully discretionary to the President.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in
his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion
was gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded
respect from this Court.

The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the
armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, "[V]iolent crimes like
bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro
Manila..."35 We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the
recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities,
and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI
2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis
to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power.

The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe
the civilian character of the police force.

We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’
authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols
at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the
overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.Under the LOI, the police forces
are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.It is their responsibility to
direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character
of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of
law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.