1. People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos.

136164-65, 20 April 2001

In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to death when such
circumstance was not alleged in the information. Thus, the Rules now require qualifying as well as
aggravating circumstances to be expressly and specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information,
otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even if proved during the trial. And this principle
is applicable in all criminal cases, not only in cases were the aggravating circumstance would increase
the penalty to death. With this, the Court gives fair warning to prosecutors that henceforth, they must
prepare well-crafted information that allege the circumstances qualifying and aggravating the crimes
charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the proper imposable
penalty.

2. People v. Madraga, G.R. No. 129299, 15 November 2000

The penalty for simple rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a single
indivisible penalty. It appears that said counsel is also not aware that under Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed (except where there is a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
accused under Art. 68, and when the crime committed is not wholly excusable under Art. 69 neither of
which is the case here).

People v. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172, 9 January 1995

After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659,
the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative
intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. [I]f reclusion perpetua was
reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason
and basis for existence. To illustrate, the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No.
6425 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs
involved are of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer
applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then there would be
no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or death should be the imposable
penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug
case, regardless of the attendant modifying circumstances.

This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63 assumes
serious proportions since it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid. Under the amendatory
sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is also imposed on treason
by a Filipino (Section 2), qualified piracy (Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6),
kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Section 8), robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive
arson (Section 10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11), and plunder (Section
12). Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible penalty, then
it should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal Code. The latter is the law
on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code and what should be the duration of the
periods thereof. There are, as well, other provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion
perpetua, such as Article 41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article
61, which have not been touched by a corresponding amendment. What then may be the reason
for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua? The deliberations in the Bicameral
Conference Committee and in both Chambers of Congress do not enlighten us on this, except the
cryptic statement of Senator Tolentino adverted to above on the elimination of the "new penalty" of
life imprisonment by the Bicameral conference Committee. It may however, be pointed out that
although the Revised Penal Code did not specify the maximum of reclusion perpetua, it is apparent
that the maximum period for the service of this penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years. At most
then, in fixing a specific duration for reclusion perpetua Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 merely restated
the existing jurisprudences
3. People v. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, 24 October 2012
While the existence of conspiracy among appellants in selling shabu was duly established, there was
no proof that appellants were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain,
which is the essence of the aggravating circumstance of organized/syndicated group under Article 62
of the Revised Penal Code. The existence of conspiracy among accused-appellants in selling shabu
was duly established, but the prosecution failed to provide proof that they operated as an organized
group or as a drug syndicate. Consequently, the aggravating circumstance that "the offense was
committed by an organized/syndicated group" cannot be appreciated. This is in consonance with the
dictum in Criminal Law that the existence of aggravating circumstances must be based on positive and
conclusive proof, and not merely on hypothetical facts no matter how truthful the suppositions and
presumptions may seem

4. People v. Capalac, L-38297, 23 October 1982

The mere fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a member of the police force certainly did not of itself
justify the aggravating circumstance of advantage being taken by the offender of his public position be
considered as present. He acted like a brother, instinctively reacting to what was undoubtedly a vicious
assault on his kin that could cause the death of a loved one. It would be an affront to reason to state
that at a time like that and reacting as he did, he purposely relied on his being a policeman to commit
the act. He pistol-whipped the deceased because he had his pistol with him. It came in handy and he
acted accordingly. That he was a policeman of no relevance in assessing his criminal responsibility.

5. People v. Tiongson, L-35123-24, 25 July 1984

The aggravating circumstance that crimes were committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities cannot be appreciated since Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela were the very ones
against whom the crime were committed. Besides, Pat. Gelera and PC Constable Canela are not
persons in authority, but merely agents of a person in authority.

6. People v. Rodil, G.R. No. L-35156, 20 November 1981

If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of
a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either
circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either
aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.

The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to public authority under paragraph 2 of Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar. The evidence of the
prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was
taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred. As a matter of fact, the said chief
of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from
him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him
even then a town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to the municipal building to
surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.

Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a
person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in
authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code. So is the town municipal
health officer, as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he is
vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the
aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors.
7. People v. Magdueño, L-68699, 22 September 1986
The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does not seem
to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be
shown that the crime was committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was
not committed against the public authority himself. In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority
involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the lower court erred in including commission of the crime
with insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance.

8. People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990

Under the last paragraph of Article 152, it shows that while a teacher or professor of a public or
recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so
deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and
151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised
Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of
the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc."
is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader
scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the
disadvantage of an accused, the do not believe that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized
private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code, the provision the trial court applied in the case at bar. Accordingly, the
decision of the trial court is hereby modified, the aggravating circumstance of having acted with
contempt of or insult to the public authorities shall be deleted and not taken into consideration.

9. See People v. Rodil

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the
victim. Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit
and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with
the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder,
then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot
be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority

10. People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 130708, 22 October 1999

there must be proof which would clearly demonstrate that the accused deliberately intended to act with
insult or in disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his rank, which is the essence of said
aggravating circumstance. There must be proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the accused
deliberately intended to insult the rank of the victim. Otherwise this generic aggravating circumstance may
not be taken into consideration to aggravate the penalty.

Knowledge of the rank of the deceased or that he articulated his hatred against all policemen in general
does not by itself suffice to prove that indeed accused-appellant deliberately intended to act with insult or
in disregard of the respect due the offended party by reason of his rank as a police officer. It cannot just be
demonstrated on circumstances that accused-appellant knew the rank or office of the victim especially so
when no prior facts were established to show why accused-appellant would harbor so grave a grudge
against the victim simply because he was a man in police uniform. A spontaneous utterance of anger or
hate, disregard owing to a victim’s rank. The circumstances aggravating the penalty of a crime must be
proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish
their presence. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused- appellant. which is naturally harbored
by any assailant, is not necessarily an expression of insult

11. People v. Curaraton, G.R. No. 96765, 5 July 1993

The crime committed by accused-appellant is murder qualified by treachery as the killing was sudden and
unexpected (People vs. Liston, 179 SCRA 415 [1989]). The killing, however, was not attended by the
aggravating circumstances of cruelty and disregard of age as erroneously found by the trial court. Cruelty
is to be taken into consideration where the multiple wounds of the victim were inflicted unnecessarily while
he was still alive in order to prolong his physical suffering (People vs. Curiano, 9 SCRA 323 [1963). The
evidence in the case at bar shows that, when accused-appellant continued hacking Cabagte, the latter was
already dead or at least totally unconscious and could no longer feel or experience additional pain that
would prolong his physical suffering. Neither can the aggravating circumstance of age be appreciated
because the same is absorbed by treachery.

12. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, 30 August 1968

The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, like the
offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be committed
without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in crimes which
could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass and robbery in an
inhabited house. This Court in People vs. Pinca, citing People vs. Valdez, ruled that the "circumstances
(of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime committed, because, the crime being
robbery with violence or intimidation against persons (specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors
thereof could have committed it without the necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim."
Cuello Calon opines that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the
accused and produces greater alarm.

13. People v. Alcala, G.R. No. L-18988, 29 December 1922

As to whether the crime must be held to have been committed in the dwelling of the offended party, we take
it that, although the accused were found with the deceased at the foot of the staircase of the house, that
place must be regarded as an integral part of the dwelling of that family. The porch of a house, not common
to different neighbors, is a part of the dwelling.

14. People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, 29 March 2017

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary
that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough
that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without

15. People v. Hilot, G.R. No. 129532, 5 October 2000

it is not necessary under the law that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. It is settled that
for dwelling to be appreciated, the victim need not be the owner of the dwelling. Regardless of whether the
victim was a lessee, a boarder, a bedspacer, or even an invited guest, the place is his home, the sanctity
of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

16. People v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-28108, 27 March 1974

xxxBut dwelling is not aggravating in the killing of Refuerzo since he was a mere visitor in Mariano
Ramolete's house.

17. US v. Ibañez, G.R. No. 10672, 26 October 1915

The fact that the crime of adultery was committed in the dwelling of the offended person should be
deemed an aggravating circumstance, notwithstanding that the conjugal home is the common domicile
of the husband and the adulterous wife; because, besides the latter’s breach of the fidelity she owes
her husband, she and her accomplice violate the respect due to the conjugal home and they both
thereby injure and commit a very grave offense against the head of the house. "As the person offended
by the crime of adultery is the husband, the aggravating circumstance of committing it in his dwelling
cannot be excused by the fact that the dwelling was also the home of the adulteress; because, aside
from the consideration that the stranger to the marriage who violated the law in that domicile is not a
member of the community residing there, the adulates’ liability is morally and legally accentuated by
her lack of respect for the domicile of the offended party, as is implied by her brazen and outrageous
consummation of the crime therein."cralaw virtua1aw library
 There being no extenuating circumstance to offset the said aggravating one, the corresponding penalty
in its maximum degree should be imposed upon the defendants, in addition to which the defendant
Pacifico Manalili should also be sentenced to the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code.

18. US v. Destrito, G.R. No. 6984, 19 August 2012

The trial court found and applied the aggravating circumstance of morada and also, with reference to
Ocampo, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence. It is true that the crime was committed
in the house of the offended husband, but it is likewise true that this same house was the home of both
the Appellants. Genoveva and Ocampo had a right to be in the house, the former because she was the
wife of Ysla, and the latter because that was then his place of residence, he having gone there to live
on the joint invitation of Ysla and his wife. Under these facts it was error to apply the aggravating
circumstance of morada. The trial court committed no error in applying the aggravating circumstance
of abuse of confidence in imposing the penalty upon Ocampo, inasmuch as the record clearly shows
that the offended husband took Ocampo into his home, furnished him with food and lodging without
charge, and treated him like a son.

19. People v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 78853, 8 November 1991

The crime is qualified as murder and therefore, treachery is clearly present in the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.

The elements of treachery are:

1. the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and
2. the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.

Punzalan’s act of running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were walking
inside the NETC camp was a clear act of treachery. The victims were surprised and were not able to
prepare and repel the treacherous assault of Punzalan.

20. People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978

The crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the aggravating
circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although Margarita was
merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a
"dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law,
that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the
place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.

21. People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000

The accused should only stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special
complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against
persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object
of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code.

In this case, treachery is defined as “the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. And
that, the offended party was not given an opportunity to make a defense.”

22. People v. Mandolado, L-51304-05, 28 June 1983

The trial court erred in finding that the aggravating circumstances of (a) advantage was taken of being
a draftee in the Philippine army and (2) abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in
the commission of the crime.
 While it is true that they were draftees, there is no evidence that when they stopped the jeep, the
accused already intended to shoot the occupants of the vehicle. Simply stated, there was no proof that
they intended to take advantage of being a draftee in order to commit the crime. They also cannot be
charged with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence because there was no proof that
the victims had a "relation of trust and confidence" with the accused. As stated in People vs.
Comendador, in order for abuse of confidence to be considered an aggravating circumstance, it is
necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and the one against
whom the crime was committed and the accused made use of such relationship to commit the crime."

23. People v. Ong, G.R. No. L-34497, 30 January 1975**

With regards to the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the same should be deemed
absorbed in treachery. This position is itself supported by the Acting Solicitor General in his brief and is
sustained in a long line of decisions.
In the same vein, the accused would like the aggravating circumstance of nighttime (nocturnidad) to be
absorbed in treachery in that it forms part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure
the execution of the crime.
In the case of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence (abuso de confianza), it appears that
the lower court wrongly appreciated this circumstance. In order for this circumstance to obtain, it is
necessary that there be a relation of trust and confidence between the accused and the one against whom
the crime was committed, and that the accused made use of such relation to commit the crime. It is
essential that the confidence be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking
advantage of the offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence.
More convincing this time is the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle in the commission of the
crime. The Biscayne car of Benjamin Ong was used in trailing the victim's Mustang car from Wigwam
Nightclub up to the time that it was overtaken and blocked. It carried the victim on the way to the scene of
the killing, it contained at its baggage compartment the pick and shovel used in digging the grave; it was
the fast means of fleeing and absconding from the scene. Again, the motor vehicle facilitated the stark
happening. It has been held that the use of a motor vehicle is aggravating in murder where the said vehicle
was used in transporting the victim and the accused.
The two accused-appellants Benjamin Ong y Kho and Bienvenido Quintos y Sumaljag, are hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with the attendant qualifying circumstance of
treachery, and the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of motor vehicle. These
two circumstances are offset by the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and one similar or analogous
to passion or obfuscation which are appreciated in favor of accused-appellant Benjamin Ong who is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

24. Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, 26 August 1999

The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are
engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense
in this case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public
functions.

The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the
penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating
circumstances and one aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.
44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

25. See People v. Jaurigue

The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated to religious
worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the defendant and
appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a
 criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young
woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world
where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know
not where.

26. People v. Garcia, L-30449, 31 October 1979

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused
purposely sought the cover of night time. The objective test was used to determine whether
nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in
the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim
at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and
encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their
Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. There
circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and nocturnity is aggravating because it
facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their
impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily Identified.

27. People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007

The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity cannot be considered against appellants. This

circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was
especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The essence
of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the chronological
onset of, nighttime. Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does not become a
modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the
offender's immunity from identification or capture.The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a
Petromax which led to the identification of all the accused.

28. People v. Oranza, G.R. No. 127748, 25 July 2002

The trial court erred in considering nighttime as aggravating circumstances inasmuch as

prosecution evidence failed to establish that appellant and his co-accused purposely sought
nighttime to perpetrate the crime. Their act of purposely showing their faces to the victims through
the flashlight negates the conclusion that accused chose nighttime to facilitate the commission of
the offense. The mere fact that the rape was committed at nighttime with nothing more than that
does not make nocturnity an aggravating circumstance.

29. People v. Damaso, L-30116, 20 November 1978

The uninhibitedness of a place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to
the scene of the crime, but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable
possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime
and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby,
there was no reasonable possibility for the victims to receive any assistance. That the accused
deliberately sought the solitude of the place is clearly shown by the fact that they brought the victims
 to the sugarcane field although they could have disposed of them right in the house of Donata
Rebolledo where they were found. The aggravating circumstance of band exists whenever more
than three armed malefactors act together in the commission of an offense. 6 Counsel concedes
that at least three of the accused-appellants, namely Eugenio, Alviar, and Gregorio, ,were armed
during the commission of the crime. It is clear also, that Damaso was armed during the night of the
commission of the crime, and it is immaterial what kind of firearm he carried, the only important
thing being that he was armed. In this case, the presence of an armed band is to be considered as
a generic aggravating circumstance.

30. People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 128074, 13 July 1999

An offense is deemed committed by a band when more than three armed malefactors shall
have acted together in the commission thereof. This presupposes that from the onset four of the
malefactors were already armed in order to facilitate the commission of the crime. In the present
case, only two of the five malefactors were armed at the start of the commission of the offense. At
any rate, even assuming that the aggravating circumstance of band was attendant in the
commission of the crime, it is absorbed by treachery.

31. People v. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, 25 April, 1969

The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the
context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, paragraph 7 of the
Revised Penal Code, which refer to other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly
enumerated therein, namely, "configuration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic
conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the Philippines during the last World War. The
reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is found in the debased form of criminality
met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted adds to their
suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them." Clearly, no such condition of
great calamity or misfortune existed when the motor banca developed engine trouble.

32. People v. Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, 10 March 2014

The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances
of a) aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to
murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as accomplices. They must not be acting in the
commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to
be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand,
is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the circumstances mentioned in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to murder.14 Consequently, the accused
in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed firearms, a
circumstance alleged in the information.

33. People v. Baldera, L-2390, 24 April 1950

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by a
final judgment of another crime also punishable in the RPC (Art. 14 RPC). There is no recidivism in the
instant case because Baldera’s crime of theft was committed on or about December 30, 1947 while the
offense now charged took place 7 days before said date, thus there was not yet a prior conviction.
34. People v. Lagarto, G.R. No. 65833, 6 May 1991
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. the accused
was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal,
the judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on
October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused had
been convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.

35. People v. Real, G.R. No. 93436, 24 March 1995

The aggravating circumstance of reiteracion in this case as held by the Trial Court and agreed by the
Solicitor General is improper. The proper aggravating circumstance is recidivism. In recidivism or
reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of RPC. While in reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished
previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for 2 or more crimes
to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Unlike in recidivism, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime
different in kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted.Appellant was previously
convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Title 8) and grave threats (Title 9). He was convicted in the instant
criminal case of homicide (Title 8). Since homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title 8, the
aggravating circumstance to be appreciated is recidivism rather than reiteracion. There’s no reiteracion
because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same
title of the Code (here, ill-treatment by deed and homicide are embraced in the same title, Title 8). While
grave threats fall in a title (Title 9) different from homicide (Title 8), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated
because such aggravating circumstance requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense
must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which accused has been convicted
(penalty for grave threats isin Art 2821 , while the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal). Likewise,
the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There’s no
evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.

36. People v. Manalo, G.R. No. L-8586, 25 May 1956

With regard to the additional penalty for habitual delinquency, the assistant SolGen stated in
accordance with the defense that the additional penalty of 30 years of reclusion temporal is not only
excessive but is even beyond the range of this penalty as reclusion temporal ranges only from 12 years
and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Moreover, in determining the number of convictions for the
imposition of the additional penalty, the trial court failed to take into account the rule that the last
conviction must precede the offense for which the accused is tried. In other words, when a habitual
criminal has committed several crimes without being first convicted of any of them before committing
the others he cannot be sentenced for each of said crimes to the gradually increasing penalty, and for
the purposes of said law said crimes must be considered as one applying the additional penalty to one
of them, and ignoring the last. In examining the information, the first two convictions on September 5,
1947, should be considered as one because the second offense was committed two days after the
commission of the first and before the date of conviction for the first crime. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, and eight convictions listed in the information should also, for the same reason, be considered
as equivalent to one for the purpose of imposing the additional penalty under Article 62, paragraph 5
of the Revised Penal Code. The eleventh conviction should not be counted as the date of commission
in said offense is not stated in the information and it has been held that averment of the commission of
the previous crime is essential and habitual delinquency be taken into account for insufficiency of
allegation on this point. All in all (including the ninth conviction) there are three convictions properly to
be considered in the imposition of the additional penalty. As the case at bar is Appellant’s fourth
conviction, pursuant to Article 62, Case No. 5 paragraph (b), Appellant should be sentenced to an
additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In imposing this additional
penalty, recidivism should not be taken into account (People vs. De Jesus, supra) the same being
inherent in habitual delinquency (People vs. Bohol, 40 Off. Gaz., 3114). The additional penalty should
therefore be imposed in its medium period or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
of prision mayor.

37. People v. Macbul, G.R. No. 48976, 11 October 1943

 The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the consideration by
the trial court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the additional
penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel contending that recidivism should not have been taken into
account because it is inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct, it is beside the
point here because the error committed by the trial court lies not so much in its having considered
recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of penalizing habitual delinquency, as in its
having considered appellant as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the information that his
two previous convictions were more than ten years apart. According to Art. 62 of the RPC, "A person
shall be deems to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release
or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener." Therefore, appellant's first conviction, which took place in November,
1928, cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August, 1942, or
fourteen years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has only one
previous conviction against him, namely, that of 1942.

38. People v. Morales, G.R. No. 42924, 12 March 1935

The only question raised relates to the additional penalty imposed for habitual delinquency, counsel de
oficio for the appellant contending that appellant's plea of guilty did not amount to an admission that he
was a habitual delinquent. While it is well settled that a plea of guilt admits all the material allegations
in the information, including that of habitual delinquency, in the case before us the information failed to
allege the date of appellant's last conviction or release. It simply averred that the crime herein
complained of was "committed within the period of 10 years from the date of his last conviction". Apart
from the fact that such averment is a mere conclusion of fact, the law specifically provides that a person
shall be deemed a habitual delinquent if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction, he is found guilty of the crime of estafa a third time or oftener. It is thus clear that what is
material is not the date of commission of the subsequent offense, but that of his conviction thereof, in
relation to the date of his release or last conviction. Moreover, the record shows that the five previous
convictions of the appellant took place on the same day. The said five convictions should be considered
as only one conviction. It follows that the appellant can not be deemed a habitual delinquent, but only
a recidivist.

39. People v. Bernal, G.R. No. 4498, 31 October 1936

Under the last subsection of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, a person shall be
deemed to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes
a third time or oftener. Paragraph 9 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines recidivism by stating
that it is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. Defining reiteration
or habituality paragraph 10 of the same article provides that it is committed when the offender has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches at an equal or greater penalty or for two
or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Reflecting on these definitions it will be seen that
recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which necessarily forms
an integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the elements as well as the basis of each
of these circumstances are different. For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date
of his trial, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title. For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall have been
convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place ten (10)
years before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes previously committed
be prior to the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged a third time or oftener.

40. People v. Hipolito, G.R. No. L-31402, 17 August 1981

There is no merit in the claim of the accused that the aggravating circumstance of price, reward or
promise is not present in view of the non-prosecution of Vicente Ang, the alleged giver of the price or
reward. The record shows that the accused Feliciano Hipolito made arrangements with his co-accused
Cirilo Malagamba relative to the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang and not with Vicente Ang,
although Cirilo Malagamba said that he was acting at the instance of the said Vicente Ang. Further, it
 was the accused Cirilo Malagamba who paid him the amount of P2,800.00. Accordingly, whether or not
Vicente Ang was prosecuted in connection with the slaying of Concepcion Bustamante Ang is of little
importance, the trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding the accused Feliciano Hipolito
guilty of the crime of MURDER, for the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang, qualified by evident
premeditation and aggravated by the circumstance that the crime was committed in consideration of a
price, reward, or promise.

41. People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998, 290 SCRA 27
There is evident premeditation when the following requisites are met:
1. The time when the offender determined (conceived) to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.

The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive
at a calm judgment.

The determination or conception of the plan to kill the victim could be deduced from the outward
circumstances that happened on the fateful day of October 14, 1992. Records show that at 11:30 in
the morning of October 14, 1992, prosecution witness Nona Cinco saw the accused with some
companions at Funeraria Gloria. She personally heard the plan to kill someone. Another prosecution
witness, Florencio Castro, who works at the Funeraria Gloria also saw the group of Gari Bibat in the
said place. At around 1:30 in the afternoon, Nona Cinco saw the appellant for the second time. She
saw the appellant hurry towards the victim, take a pointed thing from a notebook and with the use of
such weapon, stabbed the victim on the chest. These overt acts clearly evinced that the appellant clung
to his resolution to kill the victim.

42. US v. Manalinde, G.R. No. 5292, 28 August 1909

Even though in a crime committed upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes
present, the latter not being inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the
two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money,
reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being
independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed
upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency
and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being
immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the
inducement and voluntarily executed it.

43. People v. Magbu-at, G.R. No. 25459, August 1926

The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not accepting
his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo
at the house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially having
aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that,
in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill.

Even when there is sufficient proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently
established), yet, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance in the present case,
because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo, who was hit by
the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo.

44. People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. L-24371, 6 April 1968

In the accused’s confession made the day after the crime, he admitted that he was in the store of
Montejo with his fellow-policemen, and they had agreed to ask Papasin to account for his utterances
against the police force; that when his fellow-policemen left the store, he too left the place; that passing
by in front of the house of Papasin, and claiming to have heard the cocking of a gun followed by a shot,
 he hid under a tamarind tree in front of the house of Papasin, and waited thereat, and when he saw a
man coming towards him, be fired at him believing him to be Papasin, but inflicted harm upon the
person of Agapito Salazar. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated because the deceased was not the intended victim.

45. People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148145-46, 5 July 2004

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating
that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination
and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.
The accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and methodical
manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros
Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront Jaime, to the time they entered the Bocateja
residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed – sufficient for appellants to dispassionately
reflect on the consequences of their actions and allow for their conscience and better judgment
to overcome the resolution of their will and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if only
they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants evidently clung to their
determination to kill Jaime. [While appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime,
the trial court correctly held both of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Indeed, since they
deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife Aileen was also
sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an unforeseen
circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic consequences of their
actions.]

46. People v. Empacis, G.R. No. 95756, 14 May 1993

The aggravating circumstance of craft or fraud was properly appreciated against Empacis. He and
Romualdo pretended to be bona fide customers of the victim's store and on his pretext gained entry
into the latter's store and later, into another part of his dwelling. This Court has held stratagems and
ruses of this sort to constitute the aggravating circumstance of fraud or craft, e.g: where the accused
—

a. pretended to be constabulary soldiers and by that ploy gained entry into the residence of
their prey whom they thereafter robbed and killed;
b. pretended to be needful of medical treatment, and through this artifice, entered the house
of the victim whom they thereupon robbed and killed;
c. pretended to be wayfarers who had lost their way and by this means gained entry into a
house, in which they then perpetrated the crime of robbery with homicide;
d. pretended to be customer wanting to buy a bottle of wine;
e. pretended to be co-passengers of the victim in a public utility vehicle;
f. posed as customers wishing to buy cigarettes; and as being thirsty, asking for drink of
water.

47. People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, 13 March 2017

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely
selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. Evidence must show that the
assailants consciously sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this
advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The appreciation of this
aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative disparity in age, size,
strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, attacked
 the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them armed with a knife, is not per se indicative of
abuse of superior strength. Mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of this
circumstance. Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely from the victim's possibly weaker physical
constitution. In fact, what the evidence shows in this case is a victim who is taller than the assailants
and who was even able to deliver retaliatory fist blows against the knife-wielder.

48. People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007

Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim unable
and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. It is an
aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of
the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus:

ART. 14. [16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).]
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order that
treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that
would ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has,
thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods
or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order
that it may be validly considered.

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the
essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial.

49. People v. Sangalang, L-32914, 30 August 1974, 58 SCRA 737

The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and
defenseless. He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The
deliberate, surprise attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution
which insured the killing without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have
made. The qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was
duly established. Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder. Treachery absorbs the aggravating
circumstance of band in this case.

50. People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998

Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate. The overwhelming number of the accused, their use of weapons against the unarmed victim,
and the fact that the victim's hands were held behind him preclude the possibility of any defense by the
victim. The other qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the trial court
appreciated, will no longer be taken against accused-appellants, for it is absorbed in treachery.

51. See People v. Real

The offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt as to whether he acted
with alevosia when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally
or from behind, is treachery if such a mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with
the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the attack was not preconceived and he deliberately adopted but was just triggered by
the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim. This is
more so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him
and the accused. In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after
appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can
be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply
 foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the
latter was sharpening his bolo. The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a
finding of alevosia where the decision to attack was made peremptorily and the victim's helpless
position was accidental.

52. People v. Zeta, G.R. No. 140901-02, 9 May 2002

Treachery or alevosia is committed when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods,
and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person. The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning — done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.

Treachery cannot be established where no particulars are known regarding the manner in which the
aggression was carried out, or how it began or developed. Treachery must be based on positive or
conclusive proofs, not mere suppositions or speculations. Moreover, it must be proved as clearly and
as convincingly as the killing itself.

In the case at bar, Jan Ryan did not witness the onset of the attack as he was upstairs. He only testified
that prior to hearing the three (3) gunshots, he heard his father Jose and accused-appellant exchanging
invectives and apparently having a heated discussion. Time and again, it has been ruled that there is
no treachery where the attack was preceded by a quarrel and a heated discussion.

It is a fundamental rule of long standing that for treachery to be appreciated, that circumstance must
be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, treachery, even if
present at a subsequent stage, is not to be considered. That the final fatal blows may have in truth been
delivered under conditions exhibiting some features of treachery does not remedy the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of treachery at the onset of the attack. In the absence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, accused-appellant's conviction must be modified so that he is
found guilty not of murder but only of homicide.

53. US v. Baluyot, G.R. No. 14476, 6 November 1919

The qualifying circumstance of alevosia essential to the crime of murder was found to be present in the
case at bar not only because of the sudden and unexpected manner in which the fatal assault with a
deadly weapon was begun against the defenseless victim, but also because of the peculiar conditions
under which the offense was finally consummated.

Even though a deadly attack may be begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of alevosia, yet
if the assault is continued and the crime consummated with alevosia, such circumstance may be taken
into consideration as a qualifying factor in the offense of murder.

An assault was begun suddenly and unexpectedly by the firing of a pistol by the accused at his victim,
who was unarmed. As the latter attempted to flee he was pursued by the accused and driven to take
refuge in a closet, where he called aloud for help. The accused then tried to force open the door but
was unable to do so, owing to the resistance of the deceased from within. The accused, however,
judging the position of the deceased from the cries emitted, fired his pistol in the direction thus indicated.
The bullet passed through the panel of the door and entering the head of the deceased, produced
death. That the final attack was characterized by alevosia and the crime perpetrated was murder even
though the attack had not been originally begun with alevosia.

54. People v. Layug, G.R. No. 223679, 27 September 2017

As thoroughly discussed in People v. Escote, Jr., treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but "a
generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime
against property and a single and indivisible crime".
 Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the penalty
for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating
circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account
for the purpose of increasing the penalty. In the case at bar, "treachery is not an element of robbery
with homicide". Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide". As such, treachery may
be properly considered in increasing the penalty for crime.

Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is
killed treacherously. Thus, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is appreciated in the crime of
robbery with homicide only as to the killing but not as to the robbery. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the
victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus, insuring its commission without
risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the victim.

55. People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, 6 February 1971

The appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity
to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the
penalty to be imposed. To put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining
the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves us to
make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended
with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such
circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime
having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another; (c) ignominy, since the
appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes,
before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more
humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal, none
of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda
should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which
does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there
would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be
made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape as provided
in Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.

56. People v. Butler, G.R. No. L-50276, 27 January 1983

The Court find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging
or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he
mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after
she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of
spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and
confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, clearly established the coitus after death. This act of
the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at
her corpse.

It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the corpse of
the victim is not alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been proved but its
contention that the said aggravating circumstance should not have been appreciated against the
accused is without merit. And this is so because the rule is that a generic aggravating circumstance not
alleged in the information may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be
appreciated in imposing the penalty. Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information but
proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do not change the
character of the offense.

57. People v. Mejorada, G.R. No. 102705, 30 July 1993

The SC ruled that the trial court should have, however, appreciated against the accused the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and ignominy 35which, though not alleged in the information, were duly
 proven without objection on the part of the accused. At twenty minutes to midnight, the latter unleashed
the fury of his criminal mind on a sleeping victim. He defiled the sanctity of Mrs. Regino's home by
forcibly opening its door. Wanting to force upon her his evil desires, he hugged her and then pressed
a knife to her face without any provocation on her part. He thereupon had sexual intercourse with her
in a "dog-style" position. While such a position has been resorted to by consenting adults, it adds
ignominy when employed in rape cases.

Such aggravating circumstances would have justified the imposition of the greater penalty of death
pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering, however, that the Constitution prohibits
its imposition, the appropriate imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua, which the trial court
correctly imposed, although it sought to define the same as "imprisonment for life." The penalty of
reclusion perpetua is not, of course, similar to or synonymous with "life imprisonment." As this Court
has repeatedly ruled in many cases, reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not synonymous but
distinct in nature, duration and accessory penalties.

58. People v. Bondoy, G.R. No. 79089, 18 May 1993**

The Court is legally and morally convinced that appellant committed the crime of rape qualified by the
use of a deadly weapon, as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
the Court finds inaccurate the ruling below that the crime committed is "rape with physical injuries and
use of deadly weapon." The physical injuries sustained by Patria are part and parcel of the commission
of the crime of rape, there being no separate treatment in the case of physical harm done to Patria.
Moreover, although mentioned in the complaint filed by Patria, the crime of physical injuries, whether
serious, less serious or slight, was not specifically alleged in the information. This is a deviation from
the provision of Sec. 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as the complaint or information did not even
refer to the provision of law punishing the offense of physical injuries. As such, the ambiguity of the
information in this regard should be resolved in favor of the accused.

The lower court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua inasmuch as the crime was
attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and unlawful entry. 38 The qualifying
circumstance of breaking down a wall should be deemed absorbed in unlawful entry. There being two
aggravating and no mitigating circumstances, the penalty of death would have been the proper penalty
were it not for the fact that such penalty is constitutionally banned.

59. People v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, 18 January 2016

The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate
escape, but not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate
the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension
difficult. In People v. Herbias, the Court held:

The use of motor vehicle may likewise be considered as an aggravating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime. The records show that assailants used a motorcycle in
trailing and overtaking the jeepney driven by Saladio after which appellant’s back rider
mercilessly riddled with his bullets the body of Jeremias. There is no doubt that the motorcycle
was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate their escape after they accomplished
their mission.

The prosecution has proven through the testimonies of Java and Delos Reyes that appellant was riding
a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty. Segundo who thus lost control of his
owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then stopped
near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene aboard
the motorcycle. Clearly, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
use of motor vehicle in the commission of the crime.

Since the fatal shooting of the victim was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
Court upholds the trial court in convicting appellant of the crime of murder. The penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same Code
 provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating
circumstance. Although evident premeditation was not established, the other aggravating
circumstances of use of unlicensed firearm and use of motor vehicle in the commission thereof, were
alleged in the Information and proven during the trial. The presence of such aggravating circumstances
warrants the imposition of the death penalty.

60. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000, 331 SCRA 216
The Court realized that there was no law providing for the additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter
to be considered as aggravating circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art. 13 of the same Code
which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where analogous circumstances may be considered,
hence, the remedy lies with the legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing
that the additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must construe the
penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made
so by the statute. Under this view, the additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered
an aggravating circumstance. Applying Art. 63, par. (2), of the Revised Penal Code which provides that,
in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof x x x x 2. when there are neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.